Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ...............................  75 
  Consciousness of danger from air attack ..........................  75 
    Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ...........  75 
    General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............  79 
    Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier .............  81 
    Concept of the war in the Pacific ..............................  87 
    Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air 
      attack .......................................................  88 

 
 
VI                          C O N T E N T S 
 
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii-Continued                     Page 

  Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the 
    imminence of war ..............................................  89 
  Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the 
    imminence of war .............................................. 100 
  Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders 
    from Washington ............................................... 103 
      Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103 
      Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104 
      The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104 
  Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107 
      On where the attack might come .............................. 107 
      Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108 
      "Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109 
      The "War warning" and training .............................. 110 
      The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute  
        distant reconnaissance .................................... 110 
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117 
  Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the  
    warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119 
      No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120 
      Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121 
     "Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and  
        "Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123 
     Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125 
     Interference with training ................................... 125 
  The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126 
  The Short reply ................................................. 128 
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27  
    dispatch ...................................................... 129 
  The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130 
  General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter  
    by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131 
  The "Lost" Japanese carriers-Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133 
  The "Mori" call ................................................. 137 
  Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138 
  Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140 
  Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142 
     Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142 
     The "Manila message" ......................................... 142 
     The Honolulu press ........................................... 142 
  The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145 
  Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150 
  Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               75 
 
PART III. 

RESPONSIBILITIES IN HAWAII
CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK The Japanese raiding force approached the island of Oahu with virtually no danger of detection and executed its treacherous attack at a time when only a minimum state of readiness prevailed to meet it. [1] One of the causes of the disaster in consequence must lie in the failure to employ facilities available to detect the attacking force in sufficient time to effect a state of readiness best designed to repel or minimize the attack. That the attack on Pearl Harbor surprised the defending Army and Navy establishments is indisputable. The question therefore becomes, as previously indicated: Under all of the circumstances should the responsible commanders at Hawaii have been surprised or, more particularly, were they justified in failing to employ adequately the defensive facilities available to them on the morning of December 7, 1941? [2] The estimate of both Admirals Richardson [3] and Kimmel [4] in a letter which they jointly prepared and dispatched to the Chief of Naval Operations on January 25, 1941, pointed out that if Japan entered the war or committed an overt act against the United States our position would be primarily defensive in the Pacific. [5] There were outlined in the letter certain assumptions upon which the action of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated, including: "(a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy; (b) war with Japan imminent; (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form_even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian; and (d) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible. " It was pointed out that the tasks to be undertaken by the fleet with respect to these assumptions included the taking of full security [1] See section "State of Readiness," Part II, supra. [2] The Army Pearl Harbor Board said: "Therefore, the situation on December 7 can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBY's were out; the antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with the Fleet air arm, the naval carriers with their planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the Fleet was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers Lexington and Enterprise. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of anti-sabotage Alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack. *In short everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it.*" See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee Exhibit No. 157 [3] Admiral James O. Richardson, who preceded Admiral Kimmel as commander in chief of the Pacific. [4] Admiral Husband E. Kimmel assumed command of the United States Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941 and served in that capacity until December 17, 1941. The evidence clearly indicates that while Admiral Kimmel was promoted over several other officers with more seniority, his selection was made because he was regarded as preeminently qualified for the position of commander in chief. [5] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 70. 76 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK measures for the protection of the fleet in port and at sea. Thereafter there were set forth observations concerning the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu. Under date of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of Navy addressed a communication to the Secretary of War, with copies designated for the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, observing among other things: [6] "The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. *If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.* "In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the Fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above. "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: "(1) Air bombing attack. "(2) Air torpedo plane attack. "(3) Sabotage. "(4) Submarine attack. "(5) Mining. "(6) Bombardment by gun fire. "Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance. "Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels. "The counter measures to be considered are: "(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched; "(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives; "(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire "(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; "(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. "The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quit possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles. * * *" The foregoing communication was seen by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he assumed command. [7] The Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, replied to the letter of the Secretary of Navy in the following terms: [8] "1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian [6] Committee Exhibit No. 10. [7] Admiral Kimmel testified: "* * * I saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941, early in February 1941." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 286. [8] Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 24. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 77 Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to old a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. "2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes, nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at: San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii. "3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route) and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine gun}. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns. "4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date. "5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation, and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured_ forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas in Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable or large-scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again. "6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective." In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 27, 1941, [9] Admiral Kimmel stated he thought the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority. It should be noted at this point in considering the letter of the Secretary of Navy dated January 24, 1941, that the following dispatch dated February 1, 1941, was sent the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the subject "Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor": [10] "1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect: " "The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff." "2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese Naval and Army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future. [9] Committee exhibit No. 106. [10] This dispatch is indicated to have been dictated by Lt. Comdr. (now Captain) A. H. McCollum on January 31, 1941. See committee exhibit No. 15. 78 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The estimate made concerning the information supplied by the Peruvian Minister with respect to a rumored Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24 were received by Admiral Kimmel at approximately the same time and are in apparent conflict. However, the dispatch of February 1 was an estimate of the rumor concerning the Japanese plan to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor based on the then present disposition and employment of Japanese forces, whereas the Secretary's letter relates to the dangers of the Pearl Harbor situation in contemplation of future conflict with Japan. The communications apparently were so interpreted by Admiral Kimmel for in a letter dated February 18, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations he said: [11] "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay." In a letter of February 15, 1941 [12] the Chief of Naval Operations wrote Admiral Kimmel concerning antitorpedo baffles for protection against air-torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. He stated that the congestion in the harbor and the necessity for maneuverability limited the practicability of the then present type of baffles. Further, the letter indicated that the shallow depth of water in Pearl Harbor limited the need for torpedo nets; that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary to drop torpedoes successfully from planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. A similar communication was sent Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, among others, requesting his recommendations and comments concerning the matter. [13] In a letter of March 20, [14] Admiral Bloch replied, stating that the depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet and for this reason among others he did not recommend antitorpedo baffles. Admiral Kimmel was in agreement with this recommendation until such time as a light efficient net was developed. [15] However, in June of 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a communication to the commandants of naval districts as follows: [16] "1. * * * Commandants were requested to consider the employment of, and to make recommendations concerning, antitorpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated: " "A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered." "2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient run to arm the torpedo. "3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo- plane attack, it may [11] Committee exhibit No. 106. [12] Id., No. 116. [13] Letter from Chief of Naval Operations dated February 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 116. [14] See Committee exhibit No. 116. [15] Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated March 12,1941, Committee exhibit No. 116 [16] Letter dated June 13, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to commandants of all naval districts. Committee exhibit No. 116. This communication made reference to the observations set forth in the letter of February 17,1941 (committee exhibit No. 116), pointing out certain limitations with respect to air torpedo attack. Note 13, supra. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 79 be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms [16a] or more) is much more likely. "4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms. [17]" The foregoing communication clearly indicated that preconceived views concerning the invulnerability of Pearl Harbor to air-torpedo attack were in error. Admiral Kimmel himself stated that during his visit to Washington in June of 1941 he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers to the fleet at Pearl Harbor including air attack, blocking of the harbor, and similar matters. [18] GENERAL SHORT'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK On February 7, 1941, General Short [19] assumed command of the Hawaiian Department of the Army. Upon his arrival he had the benefit of conversations with General Herron, [20] his predecessor, with respect to problems prevailing in the Department. Significantly General Herron had been directed by the War Department on June 17, 1940, to institute an alert against a possible trans-Pacific raid. [21] This alert was an all- out endeavor with full equipment and ammunition and lasted 6 weeks. It was suspended after the 6-week period and thereafter resumed for some time. Planes had been dispersed and gun crews alerted with the ammunition available. The Commanding General lead the benefit of all the plans and operations incident to the so-called "Herron alert" as a guide in estimating the steps to be taken on the occasion of a threat of enemy attack. General Short saw both the letter from the Secretary of Navy dated January 24 and the reply of the Secretary of War dated February 7, set forth in the preceding section, concerning the danger of attack from the air. [22] Under date of February 7, 1941, General Marshall directed a letter to General Short relating in utmost clarity the problems and responsibility of General Short in his new command. [23] This letter, which referred to a conversation with Admiral Stark, pointed out that there was need for additional planes and antiaircraft guns; that the fullest protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major consideration of the Army; that the risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constituted the real perils of the situation; and, again, that they were keeping clearly in mind that the first concern is to protect the feet. On February 19, 1941, General Short wrote General Marshall [24] pointing out, among other things, the great importance of (1) cooperation with the Navy; (2) dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance, and servicing of aircraft; (3) improvement of the [16a] A fathom is 6 feet. [17] The evidence reflects repeated efforts by the Chief of Naval Operations to secure from the Bureau of Ordnance more efficient light- weight baffles. See committee exhibit No. 116. [18] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 367. [19] Lt. Gen Walter C. Short served as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941. [20] Maj. Gen. Charles B. Herron. [21] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 213-215. [22] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 237. [23] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 1-3. [24] Id., at pp. 4-9. 80 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK antiaircraft defense; (4) improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights; and (5) bombproofing of vital installations such as command posts and communication centers. General Short advised the Chief of Staff that he was taking the necessary steps in line with the important needs of the Department. On March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General short: [25] "I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to *defense from air attack*. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority." In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 6, 1941, [26] General Short observed that the Aircraft Warning Service was vital to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and referred to delays in construction and establishment of sites. In a subsequent letter [27] General Short again referred to the necessary for the dispersion and protection of aircraft as well as to the matter of coordinating antiaircraft defense. A letter dated March 28, 1941, [28] from General Marshall made reference to General Short's proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of an additional airfield and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields with the observation that the proposal was undoubtedly sound. He also indicated his hopefulness of arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison. On April 14, 1941, General Short wrote the Chief of Staff, as follows: [29] "Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made with them: [30] "1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure. "2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, to implement the above agreement. "3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement. "I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires. "We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall. "Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will interest you." In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated May 29, 1941, General Short made the following comments concerning the first phase of their recent maneuvers: [31] "The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer Supplies for Field [25] Id., at p. 10. [26] Id., at pp. 11, 12. [27] Letter dated March 15,1941. Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 15-17. [28] Committee exhibit No. 53, p. 18. [29] Id., at pp. 19, 20 [30] See section "Plans for Defense of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier", infra. [31] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 35, 36. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 81 Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack: Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise." On August 19, 1941, General Marshall addressed a letter to General Short setting forth his reasons for deciding to establish an airfield base for the Fifteenth Pursuit Group at Kahuku Point and stated: "I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly, will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense. [32]" The Chief of Staff on October 10, 1941, sent the following letter to General Short: [33] "The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty. "*This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii*, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of air-base defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii." On October 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short stating that he appreciated the reasons General Short had assigned for giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel [34] but that it appeared the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. [35] From the foregoing correspondence there can be no doubt that General Short was adequately apprised of his responsibility to defend the fleet from attack and that he was conscious of the necessity of building up the defense against air attack. PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER There is nowhere, however, a better expression of the keen understanding of the danger of a surprise air attack upon Oahu than is manifested in the plans which the Army and Navy jointly effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier. [32] Id., at pp. 40, 41. [31] Id., at p. 42. [34] In this connection General Short had written General Marshall on October 14,1941, in part: "At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack on Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces." See committee exhibit No. 53. [35] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 44, 45. 82 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The Hawaiian coastal frontier was listed in defense category D. This category covered *coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack*. The war plans "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," the basic document controlling the relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, contains the following with respect to category D: [36] "Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C (coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor attack) will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine- gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of operations. Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force." As a basic responsibility ("Joint Action Army and Navy 1935") under contemplation of normal circumstances responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was that of the Army. [37] It was recognized that- [38] "* * * The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its bases * * *. " The basic allocation of Army and Navy responsibility for coastal defense was not possible under conditions prevailing in Hawaii during 1941. Fundamental deficiencies in equipment, particularly shortage of sufficient Army patrol planes, confronted the responsible commanders. As Admiral Kimmel stated shortly after assuming command at Pearl Harbor_ [39] "There is a definite line of demarcation between this objective and longer range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be continued as an essential basis for determining and stressing improved readiness requirements. This planning will naturally include the more effective schemes of employment that improved readiness, when attained, will permit. "Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation for or expectation of, improved conditions or facilities. *Such plans must be based only on hard fact*. They must be so developed as to provide for *immediate* action, based on facilities and materials that are *now* available. "A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all available aviation components. As is well known, much remains to be done for adequate *future* effectiveness in this respect. Much, however, can *now* be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they now are." In realistic recognition of this situation, plans were conceived early in 1941 known as "The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier". [40] This plan was signed and placed in effect on April 11, 1941, by General Short and Admiral Bloch, commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The plan was based on the joint [36] "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 6. [37] Id. [38] Id., at p. 42. [39] Letter of February 4, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet personnel. See committee record pp. 14511, 14512. [40] See committee exhibit No. 44; also Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 7. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 83 Army and Navy basic war plans [41] and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by *mutual cooperation* which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would cooperate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the following tasks of the Army and Navy were recognized: "a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone. "b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces. "c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces." One of the most significant features of the plan was the assumption of responsibility by the Navy for distant reconnaissance, a normal task of the Army. In this regard, the plan provided: "The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for: * * * i. *Distant Reconnaissance*." On March 28, 1941, an agreement, incorporated as an annex to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, [42] was prepared and approved by General Short and Admiral Bloch on April 2 dealing with joint security measures and protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base. This agreement was entered into- "in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war." It was recognized that- "*when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer* (the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District) *agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent* to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at is disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted * * *" Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. When naval forces were insufficient for long-distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft were to be under the tactical control of the Navy. It was contemplated that the Army would expedite the installation and operation of an Aircraft Warning service through use of radar. On March 31, 1941, Admiral Bellinger, as commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, and General Martin, commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area. The situation was summarized in the following terms: [43] (1) Relations between the United States and Japan are strained; uncertain, and varying. (2) In the past Japan has never preceded hostile actions by declaration of war. [41] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits Nos. 4 and 5. [42] Annex VII, see. VI. See committee exhibit No. 44. [43] See committee exhibit No. 44. 84 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (3) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period. (4) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action. (5) It appears possible that Japanese submarines and/or a Japanese fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters without prior warning from our intelligence service. The estimate embracing a "Survey of Opposing Strength" indicated, among other things, that Japan might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from a Japanese carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. It was elsewhere observed in the estimate that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 but that this could only be effectively maintained with "present personnel and material" for a very short period, and as a practical measure could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. [44] The outline of possible enemy action as set forth in the Martin- Bellinger estimate is a startling harbinger of what actually occurred: [45] "(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by: "1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area. "2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor. "3. A combination of these two. "(b) It appears that *the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack*. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. "(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. "(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force *probably* composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. "(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape [44] In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel referred to this portion of the estimate and stated: "This plan was on file with the Departments in Washington. They knew of this decision. *They had done nothing to change or alter the basic deficiencies in personnel and material which required that decision.*" This statement, it should be noted, is not strictly accurate. The number of Navy patrol bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance was increased appreciably after the Martin-Bellinger estimate was prepared. As will subsequently appear, there were sufficient patrol planes at Oahu to conduct a distant reconnaissance for a considerable period of time after receipt of the November 27 "war warning" (detailed reference will be made to this warning, infra). The estimate made by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin was prepared in March of 1941 and was necessarily in contemplation of patrol planes then available. As indicated, the number of Navy planes available for this purpose was substantially increased before December 7. See committee exhibit No. 120. [45] Committee exhibit No. 44. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 85 and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack." Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 from Admiral Kimmel the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February 1941 and reissued in revised form on October 14, 1941. [46] This fleet order was predicated on two assumptions, one being_ [47] "That a declaration of war may be preceded by_ "(1) A surprise attack on ships at Pearl Harbor. "(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area. "(3) A combination of these two." Among the provisions of this letter concerning action to be taken if submarine attacked in the operating area it was pointed out_ "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack_" that_ "it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means." A letter dated August 20, 1941, to the commanding general, Army Air Forces, Washington, prepared by General Martin, and transmitted through General Short, submitted as an enclosure a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. Several observations set forth in this plan are of particular pertinence: [48] "The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before the approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on Oahu. * * * * * * * "Our most likely enemy, Orange (Japan), can probably employ a maximum of six carriers against Oahu. * * * * * * * "* * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy. * * * * * * * [46] Id. [47] Referring to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 14, 1941, to the fleet 2CL-41 (revised) wherein it was stated that a declaration of war may be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (see committee exhibit No. 44), he was asked what form of surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor he contemplated by this statement. Admiral Kimmel replied: "*An airplane attack. This was an assumption upon which to base our training. The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose.* I felt, as the situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor, and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the installations at Pearl Harbor might be attempted. I thought it was much more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if the Fleet were away than if it were there. However, at no time did I consider it more than a possibility and one which ordinary prudence would make us guard against." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 287. [48] See committee exhibit No. 13. 86 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons: "(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu. "(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D-Day at close at range. "(3) The enemy will be more concerned with deliverying [sic] a successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his attack is successful. * * * * * * * "The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should base our plans of operation is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule: "(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the attack. "(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the attack. "(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack. "(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the day of the attack * * * * * * * "He (Japan) will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack. "a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection. "b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by friendly surface vessels. *It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0 (due north) counterclockwise to 180 around Oahu, the next probable*, the quadrant 180 counterclockwise to 90 ; the least probable, 90 to 0 ." Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both fully familiar with all the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The plans effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier viewed in their entirety were fully adequate under the circumstances and represent a commendable recognition by the Hawaiian commanders of the realities of their situation. [49] The unfortunate fact is that features of the plan designed to meet an air attack were not invoked prior to the actual attack in view of the imminence of hostile Japanese action. It is clear that the plans with respect to joint air operations was to be operative when the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the naval base defense officer "agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action." [50] It is equally clear that the joint security measures for the protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base were designed in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war. The plan against air attack was prepared in Hawaii; it was designed to meet the peculiar problems existing in [49] Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Admiral Kimmel stated that "he (Admiral Bloch) accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." See Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p 1753. He commented "There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any." Id. [50] Committee exhibit No. 44. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 87 Hawaii; its invocation, implementation, and execution was essentially a responsibility resting in Hawaii. [51] From a review of the defense plans prepared in Hawaii the conclusion is inescapable that the Army and Navy commanders there not only appreciated the dangers of an air attack on Pearl Harbor but had also prepared detailed arrangements to meet this threat. CONCEPT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC It is to be recalled that from January 29 to March 27, 1941, staff conversations were held in Washington between Army and Navy officials of Great Britain and the United States to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with her *should the United States be compelled to resort to war.* [52] The report of these conversations, dated March 27, 1941, and referred to by the short title "ABC-1," reflected certain principles governing contemplated action, including: [53] "Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater, and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort." In recognition of the foregoing principle that the Atlantic and European area was to be considered the decisive theater, the concept of military operations as respecting Japan was expressed as follows: [54] "Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, *the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive*. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East." Pursuant to the principles and plans visualized in ABC-1, the Army and Navy prepared "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan_Rainbow No. 5," which was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the Secretary of War on June 2, 1941. [55] On July 21, 1941, United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This [51] The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, expressed this thought in the following terms: "* * * each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. *The primary responsibility for such plans and their creation, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local situation and conditions*. Before December 7, 1941 detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a joint agreement with the local naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency and *he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion demanded*." See statement of Secretary of War with respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board; committee exhibit No. 157. [52] Committee exhibit No. 49. See section " ABCD Understanding?", Part IV, infra, this report. [53] Committee exhibit No. 49 p. 5. [54] Id., at pp. 5, 6. [55] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 4. This Plan is also referred to as "WPL-46." 88 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) insofar as the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were concerned and was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on September 9, 1941. [56] It assumed, consistent with "ABC-1" and the United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, that the principal military efforts of the Associated Powers would be in the Atlantic and European areas, and that operations in other areas would be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. In estimating the likely enemy (Japanese) action it was observed, among other things, that it was believed Japan's initial action would be toward "possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions" and "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area." One of the tasks formulated to accomplish assigned missions contemplated by the plan under phase I (Japan not in the war) was to "guard against surprise attack by Japan." Under phase IA (initial tasks_Japan in the war) the Pacific Fleet, among other things was to "make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands." Among the tasks under phase II (succeeding tasks) was "to capture and establish a protected fleet base anchorage in the Marshall Island area." From the Army standpoint, as stated by General Marshall, the fullest protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major consideration. [57] The function of the Army, therefore, was primarily that of protecting Hawaii because it was the sea and air base of the fleet and to render protection to the fleet proper when it was in harbor. [53] Aside from these purposes, the protection of the Hawaiian Islands was secondary and necessary only to the extent of making it possible for the Army to execute its primary mission. CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK Considering all of the information made available to the commanding officers of the Army and Navy in Hawaii from the time of their assuming command until December 7, 1941, it must be concluded that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel knew that if Pearl Harbor was to be attacked the danger of a Japanese air attack upon that base was the greatest peril of their situation and that the necessity of taking steps to provide the best possible defense to this most dangerous form of attack was clearly indicated. It is further concluded that both responsible officers appreciated the fact that Japan might strike before a formal declaration of war. It is clear that the function of both the Army and the Navy in the Pacific was essentially a defensive one, particularly in the early stages of the war. While diversionary and sporadic raids were envisaged for the fleet, naval operations were to be fundamentally defensive in character. Pending imminence of war against Japan both services were engaged in preparation and training for this eventuality. [56] Id, exhibit No. 5. This plan is referred to as "U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five (WP Pac-46)." [57] Committee exhibit No. 53 pp. 1-3 [58] As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "The defense of a permanent naval base is the direct responsibility of the Army. The Navy is expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the base is a joint operation only to that extent." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 89 The next point of inquiry is to determine whether Admiral Kimmel and General Short, through information available to them, were adequately informed concerning the imminence of war in such manner as reasonably to contemplate they would employ every facility at their command in defense of the fleet and the fleet base. INFORMATION SUPPLIED ADMIRAL KIMMEL BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE IMMINENCE OF WAR In a letter to Admiral Stark dated February 18, 1941, Admiral Kimmel set forth the following comments in a postscript: [59] "I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in- Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?" In reply the Chief of Naval Operations advised that the Office of Naval Intelligence was fully aware of its responsibility to keep the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States; that information concerning the location of Japanese merchant vessels was forwarded by air mail weekly and if desired could be issued more frequently. On February 25 Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, forwarding a copy of a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines by way of the "southern route." [60] Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum for the President of February 5, 1941, setting forth an analysis of the situation in Indochina, prepared by Admiral Stark. This expressed Admiral Stark's view that Japan had some fear that the British and the United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indochina and Thailand; and that the size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indochina and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines. It observed that insofar as Admiral Stark could tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major move; that, as he saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time; and that at present she desired not to go to war with the United States at all. The following significant dispatch was sent on April 1, 1941, from he Chief of Naval Operations addressed to the commandants of all naval districts: [61] PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES [59]Committee exhibit No. 106. [60] Id. [61] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 1. 90 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK IN A PARTICULAR FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, THEY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS TO SEE THAT PROPER WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT. In a letter of April 3, 1941, [62] Admiral Stark expressed his observations on the international situation to the commanders in chief, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, including a discussion of the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. Admiral Stark stated that the basic idea of this plan contemplated that the United States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet; that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay barrier; and that the United States Asiatic Fleet would be supported through offensive operations of the United States Pacific Fleet. He then discussed the dangers facing Britain and stated that the Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. He observed that for some time Japan had been showing less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and the United States in the Far East. Admiral Stark instructed the addressees to watch this situation closely. He expressed the feeling that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East but that the question was when and not whether we would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was that we might be in the war against Germany and Italy within about 2 months, but there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility. In the meantime, he suggested that as much time as available be devoted to training. Under date of April 18, 1941, instructions were given various naval observers to include the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet as an information addressee in all dispatch reports and to furnish one copy of all intelligence reports directly to him. [63] In a memorandum dated May 26 to the Chief of Naval Operations the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet suggested that he be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions; and that it be made a cardinal principle that he be immediately informed of all important developments as soon as they occur and by the quickest secure means possible. [64] [62] Committee exhibit No. 106. [63] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 3. [64] Admiral Kimmel said: "The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. The lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence is one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations. "It is realized that on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify adapt or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, *thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions*. "*It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important development as they occur and by the quickest secure means available*." See committee exhibit No. 106. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 91 In June of 1941 Admiral Kimmel visited Washington at which time matters of naval policy were reviewed with him. [65] On July 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was advised "for action" by the Chief of Naval Operations, [66] that the unmistakable deduction from information obtained from numerous sources was that the Japanese Government had determined upon its future policy, supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups; that his policy probably involved war in the near future. It was pointed out that an advance by Japan against the British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out but that the Chief of Naval Operations held to the opinion that Japanese activity in "the south" would be confined for the present to seizure and development of naval, army, and in bases in Indochina. The dispatch stated that the Japanese neutrality pact with Russia would be abrogated and the major military effort on the part of Japan against Russia would be toward the latter's maritime provinces probably toward the end of July, although the attack might be deferred until after the collapse of European Russia. It was pointed out that all Japanese vessels in United States Atlantic Forts had been ordered to be west of the Panama Canal by August 1, that the movement of Japanese "flag shipping" from Japan had been suspended and additional merchant vessels were being requisitioned. Vith an admonition to secrecy, instructions were issued to inform the principal army commanders and the commander in chief's own immediate subordinates. In another dispatch of July 3, [67] Admiral Kimmel was advised for action that definite information had been received indicating that between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Government had issued an order for 7 of the 11 Japanese vessels then in the North Atlantic and Caribbean areas to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific, and that under routine schedules three of the remaining ships were to move to the Pacific during the same period. It was suggested that in Japanese business communities strong rumors were current that Russia would be attacked by Japan on July 20, and that a definite move by the Japanese might be expected during the period July 20 to August 1, 1941. On July 7 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised for information of the substance of three intercepted dispatches, including one of July 2 from Tokyo to Berlin, stating: [68] "JAPAN IS PREPARING FOR ALL POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES REGARDING SOVIET IN ORDER (TO) JOIN FORCES WITH GERMANY IN ACTIVELY COMBATTING COMMUNIST (SIC) AND DESTROYING COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN EASTERN SIBERIA. AT SAME TIME JAPAN CANNOT AND WILL NOT RELAX EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH TO RESTRAIN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. NEW INDOCHINA BASES WILL INTENSIFY RESTRAINT AND BE VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO AXIS VICTORY." And another of July 2 from Berlin to Tokyo: [69] "OSHIMA DELIVERS ABOVE NOTE AND TELLS RIBBENTROP IN PART, "MATSUOKA WILL SOON SUBMIT A DECISION. IF YOU GERMANS HAD ONLY LET US KNOW YOU WERE GOING TO FIGHT [65] See Navy Court of Inquiry record page 113. [66] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 4. [67] Id., at p. 5. [68] Id., at p. 6. [69] Id. This dispatch and that indicated, note 68, supra, were based on the so-called Magic. For a discussion of Magic see Part IV, this report. 92 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK RUSSIA SO SOON WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN READY. WE WERE PLANNING TO SETTLE SOUTH SEAS QUESTIONS AND CHINA INCIDENT HENCE DECISION CANNOT BE REACHED IMMEDIATELY, BUT JAPAN WILL NOT SIT ON FENCE WHILE GERMANY FIGHTS." The Chief of Naval Operations in a dispatch of July 15, [70] sent Admiral Kimmel for information, supplied intelligence received to the effect that within "the next day or two," Japan would begin commercial negotiations with Vichy France at which time she would propose "in the name of mutual defense" Japan's taking over southern French Indochina naval and air bases; and that at the same time Japan would attempt to station army and navy air forces peacefully with French agreement, if possible. It was pointed out that if Vichy objected Japan had decided to use force; and that Japan did not intend to move farther south or interfere with colonial government. On the basis of the information received it was observed that the Japanese move was necessary to guarantee supplies from "Colony and Thailand" and to prevent "Syrian type British action"; and that while Tokyo wished to avoid friction with Britain and particularly the United States, if possible, the risk was regarded as necessary. In a dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on July 17 for his information, he was advised of a six-point ultimatum sent by Tokyo to Vichy requiring an answer by July 20 71 The six points were specified as: (1) Japan to send necessary Army and Wavy air forces to southern French Indochina; (2) Vichy to turn over certain naval and air bases; (3) Japanese expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move about freely; (4) Vichy to withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible clashes; (5) Vichy to authorize French Indochina military to arrange details with Japanese either before or after landing; (6) Colony to pay Japan 23,000,000 piastres annually to meet cost of occupation. This same dispatch advised of intelligence received on July 14 that the Japanese Army was planning its advance on or about July 20 and, of intelligence received on July 14, that Japan intended to carry out its plans by force if opposed or if Britain or the United States interfered. On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information concerning the substance of an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Canton to Tokyo, as follows: [72] "THE RECENT GENERAL MOBILIZATION ORDER EXPRESSES JAPAN'S IRREVOCABLE RESOLUTION TO END ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN THWARTING JAPAN'S NATURAL EXPANSION AND HER INDOMITABLE INTENTION TO CARRY THIS OUT WITH THE BACKING OF THE AXIS IF POSSIBLE BUT ALONE IF NECESSARY. FORMALITIES SUCH AS DINING THE EXPEDITIONARY FORGES AND SAYING FAREWELL TO THEM WERE DISPENSED WITH TO AVOID ALARM AND BECAUSE WE WISHED TO FACE THIS NEW WAR WITH A CALM AND COOL ATTITUDE. * * * IMMEDIATE OBJECT WILL BE TO ATTEMPT PEACEFUL FRENCH INDOCHINA OCCUPATION BUT WILL CRUSH RESISTANCE IF OFFERED AND [70] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 8. This dispatch was based on Magic. [71] Id., at page 9. This dispatch was also based on Magic. [72] Id., at p. 10. This dispatch was likewise based on Magic, see committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 93 SET UP MARTIAL LAW. SECONDLY OUR PURPOSE IS TO LAUNCH THEREFROM A RAPID ATTACK WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS SUITABLE. AFTER OCCUPATION NEXT ON OUR SCHEDULE IS SENDING ULTIMATUM TO NETHERLANDS INDIES. IN THE SEIZING OF SINGAPORE THE NAVY WILL PLAY THE PRINCIPAL PART. ARMY WILL NEED ONLY ONE DIVISION TO SEIZE SINGAPORE AND TWO DIVISIONS TO SEIZE NETHERLANDS INDIES WITH AIR FORCES BASED ON CANTON, SPRATLEY, PALAU, SINGORA IN THAILAND, PORTUGUESE TIMOR AND INDOCHINA AND WITH SUBMARINE FLEET IN MANDATES, HAINAN, AND INDOCHINA WE KILL CRUSH BRITISH AMERICAN MILITARY POWER AND ABILITY TO ASSIST IN SCHEMES AGAINST US." On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised of an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo informing that although the Japanese Cabinet had changed there would be no departure from the principle that the Tripartite Pact formed the keystone of Japan's national policy and that the new Cabinet would also pursue the policy of the former cabinet in all other matters. [73] In another dispatch, supplying information concerning an intercepted Tokyo message to Vichy, Admiral Kimmel was advised on July 20, that the Japanese Army had made all preparations and had decided to advance regardless of whether Vichy France accepted her demands. [74] Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart on July 24, 1941, [75] sending a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel, concerning among other things, a 2-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Ambassador Nomura. Admiral Stark expressed the thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that the United States and Japan avoid open rupture; stated they had a very plain talk; and observed that he, Admiral Stark, liked Nomura. He advised that Nomura discussed at length Japan's need for the rice and minerals of Indochina. Admiral Stark said his guess was that with the establishment of bases in Indochina, Japan would stop for the time being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that no doubt the Japanese would use their Indochina bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. He said that, of course, there was the possibility that Japan would strike at Borneo, but that he doubted his in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them. Admiral Stark also said that he talked with the President and hoped no open rupture would come but that conditions were not getting better. On July 25, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was advised that beginning July 26 the United States would impose economic sanctions against Japan and that it was expected these sanctions would embargo all trade between Japan and the United States, subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material. [76] It was further pointed out that funds in the United States would be frozen except as they may be moved under licensing. In estimating the situation it was observed: "*Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against hostile eventualities.*" [73] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 11. [74] Id., at p. 12. [75] Committee exhibit No. 106. [76] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14. 94 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK In a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated July 31, 1941, [77] Admiral Stark discussed the over-all international situation, and stated that "after the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies. He stated he thought it fairly safe to say that the opinion was generally held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I. [78] but that Admiral Turner thought Japan would go into the maritime provinces in August. He commented that Turner might be right and usually was. Admiral Stark said his thought had been that while Japan would ultimately go into Siberia she would delay doing so until she had the Indochina-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the Russian-German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia. A postscript to this letter stated, among other things, that_ . "*obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual*." Admiral Kimmel was advised on August 14 that the Japanese were rapidly completing withdrawal from world shipping routes, that scheduled sailings were canceled, and that the majority of ships in other than China and Japan Sea areas were homeward bound. [79] The following dispatch of August 28 was sent to Admiral Kimmel, among others, for action: [80] "CERTAIN OPERATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR THE ATLANTIC BY WPL 51 ARE HEREBY EXTENDED TO AREAS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AS DESCRIBED HEREIN IN VIEW OF THE DESTRUCTION BY RAIDERS OF MERCHANT VESSELS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN WITHIN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NEUTRALITY ZONE AS DEFINED IN THE DECLARATION OF PANAMA OF OCTOBER 3, 1939. FORMAL CHANGES IN WPL 51 WILL BE ISSUED, BUT MEANWHILE ACTION ADDRESSES WILL EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. CINCPAC CONSTITUTE THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE CONSISTING OF TWO 7,500-TON LIGHT CRUISERS AND DISPATCH IT TO BALBOA. FOR TASK PURPOSES THIS FORCE WILL OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER CNO [81] AFTER ENTERING THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AS DEFINED IN WPL 46 PAR. 3222 EXCEPT WESTERN LIMIT IS LONGITUDE 100 WEST. WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND WITHIN THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA THE COMMANDER PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE WILL IN COOPERATION AND ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS EXECUTE THE FOLLOWING TASK: DESTROY SURFACE RAIDERS WHICH ATTACK OR THREATEN UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING. INTERPRET AN APPROACH OF SURFACE RAIDERS WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER OR THE PACIFIC SOUTHEAST SUB AREA AS A THREAT TO UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING. FOR THE PRESENT THE FORCES CONCERNED WILL BASE BALBOA, BUT CNO WILL ENDEAVOR TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BASING ON SOUTH AMERICAN PORTS AS [77] Committee exhibit No. 106. [78] Netherlands East Indies. [79] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 15. [80] Id., at p. 16. [81] Chief of Naval Operations. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 99 MAY BE REQUIRED. ACTION ADEES [82] AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE INFORM CNO WHEN THESE INSTRUCTIONs HAVE BEEN PLACED IN EFFECT." In a letter to Admiral Kimmel, also on August 28, 1941. [83] Admiral Stark discussed, among other things, the status of the Japanese situation and observed that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages had been sent to them but just what they were going to do he did not know. He said he had told one of Japan's statesmen that another move, such as the one into Thailand, would go a long way toward destroying before the American public what good will still remained. Admiral Stark said he had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he wished the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender. Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter to Admiral Stark of September 12, 1941 [84] such as whether he should not issue shooting orders to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and vicinity. He said: "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?" Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941, [85] and stated, among other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in article 723 of the Navy Regulations. [86] The letter also stated, in connection with the question of submarine contacts, that they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i. e., not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, were appropriate, and continued: "If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed." Going on, Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty. In this letter, Admiral Stark inquired: "* * * would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?" In a postscript to this letter, Admiral Stark stated that Secretary Hull had informed him that the conversations with the Japanese had [82] Addressees. [83] Committee exhibit No. 106. [84] Id. [85] Id. [86] These regulations provide for the use of force in self- preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last resort. 96 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there as some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. A second postscript to the letter, in making reference to a conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura, said that Ambassador Nomura usually came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark observed that conversations without results could not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark said he had again talked to Secretary Hull and thought the Secretary would make one more try. He said that Secretary Hull kept him, Admiral Stark, pretty fully informed; and, if there was anything of moment, he would of course hasten to let Kimmel know. With this letter there was enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines. The memorandum indicated, among other things, that on September 30, 26 Flying Fortresses would leave San Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines. The following dispatch of October 16, 1941, was sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, for action: [87] "THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC AND ANTI-AMERICAN. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE U. S. IN EITHER CASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A STRONG POSSIBILITY. SINCE THE U. S. AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST JAPAN. SECOND AND THIRD ADEES INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL DISTRICT AUTHORITIES. ACKNOWLEDGE." Referring to the dispatch of October 16 concerning the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Stark stated in a letter of October 17 to Admiral Kimmel: [88] "Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility", in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any ease after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." In a postscript to this letter Admiral Stark said: "Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid [87] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18. [88] Committee exhibit No. 106. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 97. on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry. [89]" On October 17, 1941) Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information that, effective immediately, all trans-Pacific United States flag shipping to and from the Far East, India, and East India area was to be routed through the Torres Straits, keeping to the southward and well clear of the Japanese Mandates. [90] On the same day he was advised for action that- "BECAUSE OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO REINFORCE THE PHILIPPINES WITH LONG-RANGE ARMY BOMBERS YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TAKE ALL PRACTICAL PRECAUTIONS OR THE SAFETY OF THE AIRFIELDS AT WAKE AND MIDWAY. [91]" Admiral Kimmel was advised, among other things, on October 23 at until further orders all Army and Navy "trans-Pacific troop transports, ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military cargo" would be escorted both ways between Honolulu ad Manila. [92] On November 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed that complete withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters of Japanese merchant vessels appeared in progress. [93] A letter to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark on November 7 commented, among other things: [94] "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser!" A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever_ particularly if one party cannot live with the set-up. It doesn't look good." On November 14, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, stating among other things: [95] "The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press dispatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and [89] Transmitted as an enclosure to this letter was an estimate dated October 17 prepared by Admiral Schuirmann with respect to the change in the Japanese Cabinet, stating: "I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative great changes in Japanese political thought or action. "The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties." After recounting that Konoye cabinets had time and again expressed disapproval of the acts committed the Japanese military but remedial action had not been taken, that Konoye himself had declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees; that while the Konoye cabinet may have restrained the *extremists* among the military it had not opposed Japan's program of expansion by force; that when opportunities arise during the "coming months" which seemed favorable to the military for further advance, they would be seized; and that the same "bill of goods," regarding the necessity of making some concession to the moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" had been offered to the United States since the days when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador, Admiral Schuirmann concluded: "Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but *in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power" (Committee exhibit No. 106). [90] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 21. [91] Id., at p. 22. [92] Id., at p. 23. [93] Id., at p. 24. [94] Committee exhibit No. 106. [95] Id. As an enclosure to this letter, Admiral Stark forwarded a copy of a joint memorandum for the President which he and General Marshall had prepared dated November 5 and bearing caption "Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation." This memorandum was prepared with respect to dispatches received indicating it to be Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations opposed dispatching American military assistance to meet this supposed threat. For a discussion of this memorandum, see Part IV, infra, this report. 98 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Advertiser upon which concessions by the United States are necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view." On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message marked for action: [96] "CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT *A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY*. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DESPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY." The postscript of a personal letter dated November 25 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel read: [97] "I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely. "I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for, or we may do nothing_I think it is more likely to be "anything." " On November 27, 1941, the following dispatch was sent Admiral Kimmel for action: [98] "*THIS DESPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING*. NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC *HAVE CEASED* AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES THAI OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO. *EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46*. INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES. A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT. SPENAVO [99] INFORM BRITISH. CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE." [96] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. This dispatch was also sent for action to commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and commandants of the Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Naval Districts. [97] Committee exhibit No. 106. [98] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 36. This dispatch was also sent for action to the commander in chief et the Asiatic Fleet. It has been referred to throughout the proceedings as the "War Warning." [99] Special naval observer. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 99 The following dispatch dated November 28, 1941, referring to the November 27 warning, was supplied Admiral Kimmel for his information: [100] "* * * ARMY HAS SENT FOLLOWING TO COMMANDER WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND "NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE St-CH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION- OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. A SEPARATE MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G TWO NINTH CORPS AREA RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN UNITED STATES. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR THEY WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS." WPL 52 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PACIFIC AREA AND WILL NOT BE PLACED IN EFFECT IN THAT AREA EXCEPT AS NOW IN FORCE IN SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AND PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. UNDERTAKE NO OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT. BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN CASE HOSTILITIES OCCUR." On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent Admiral Kimmel a dispatch for information describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. The dispatch indicated that Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malay into Thailand. Thailand would then brand Britain an aggressor and call upon Japan for aid, thereby facilitating the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally and give Japan air bases on the Kra Peninsula and a position to carry out any further operations along Malaya. [100a] [100] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38. This dispatch was sent for action to the naval commanders on the west coast. [100a] This dispatch, No. 011400 which was addressed to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action, read: "AMBASSADOR TSUBOKAMI IN BANGKOK ON TWENTY NINTH SENT TO TOKYO AS NUMBER EIGHT SEVEN TWO THE FOLLOWING QUOTE CONFERENCES NOW IN PROGRESS IN BANGKOK CONSIDERING PLANS AIMED AT FORCING BRITISH TO ATTACK THAI AT PADANG BESSA NEAR SINGORA AS COUNTER MOVE TO JAPANESE LANDING AT KOTA BHARU SINCE THAI INTENDS TO CONSIDER FIRST INVADER AS HER ENEMY, ORANGE BELIEVES THIS LANDING IN MALAY WOULD FORCE BRITISH TO INVADE THAI AT PADANG BESSA. THAI WOULD THEN DECLARE WAR AND REQUEST ORANGE HELP. THIS PLAN APPEARS TO HAVE APPROVAL OF THAI CHIEF OF STAFF BIJITTO. THAI GOVERNMENT CIRCLES HAVE BEEN SHARPLY DIVIDED BETWEEN PRO-BRITISH AND PRO-ORANGE UNTIL TWENTY FIVE NOVEMBER BUT NOW WANITTO AND SHIN WHO FAVOR JOINT MILITARY ACTION WITH ORANGE HAVE SILENCED ANTI ORANGE GROUP AND INTEND TO FORCE PREMIER PIBUL TO MAKE A DECISION. EARLY AND FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ARE POSSIBLE UNQUOTE " See committee exhibit No. 112, p. 67. 100 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK On December 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was supplied the following information for action: [101] "HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS." And, again, on December 3, 1941, he received the following message for his information: [102] "CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FOUR FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON, HONGKONG, SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY MACHINE. BATAVIA MACHINE ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO. DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY, ALL BUT ONE COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS, AND ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS. BRITISH ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED." On December 4, 1941, a dispatch [103] was supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, for his information, instructing Guam to destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter. A dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of December 6 [104] for action stated that "in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands" he was authorized to order the destruction in such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency." It was pointed out that means of communication to support "our current operations an special intelligence" should be maintained until the last moment. From a review of dispatches and correspondence sent Admiral Kimmel it is concluded that he was fully informed concerning the progressive deterioration of relations with Japan and was amply warned of the imminence of war with that nation. INFORMATION SUPPLIED GENERAL SHORT BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE IMMINENCE OF WAR The accepted practice in the Navy whereby the Chief of Naval Operations supplemented official dispatches by personal correspondence does not appear to have been followed by the War Department. The letters sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short, heretofore discussed, related largely to the latter's responsibility, steps necessary to improve the Army defenses in Hawaii, and suggestions and comments with respect thereto. It does not appear that such correspondence was employed to acquaint the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department with the international situation generally nor to convey the personal estimates and impressions of the Chief of Staff. The [101] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. This dispatch was also sent for action to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts. [102] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. This dispatch was sent for action to the commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District. [103] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 44. [104] Id., at p. 45. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 101 evidence indicates that the Army did not forward the substance of any intercepted Japanese dispatches to field commanders because of the feeling that the Army codes were generally not so secure as those of the Navy. [105] General Short, however, was supplied either directly from the War Department or by reference from his naval opposites in Hawaii adequate information concerning the critical international situation and the impending likelihood of war with Japan. The dispatch of July 3, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, advising among other things that the unmistakable deduction from information received from numerous sources was to the effect that Japan was agreed on a policy involving war in the near future, carried instructions to advise General Short. [106] Admiral Kimmel was instructed to supply General Short the information contained in the dispatch of July 25 advising of economic sanctions against Japan and possible Japanese reaction. [107] The following Navy message of October 16, 1941, was received by General Short through reference from Admiral Kimmel: [108] "THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE C. N. O. WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU. QUOTE: "JAPANESE CABINET RESIGNATION CREATES A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE ANTI-AMERICAN AND EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES. EITHER WAY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE STRONGLY POSSIBLE. SINCE BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN." " In a radiogram of October 20 signed "Adams" [109] the War Department advised the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of its estimate of the situation in the following terms: "TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS STRAINED BUT NO ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY APPEARS IMMINENT. [110]" Admiral Kimmel was instructed to advise General Short concerning the dispatch of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations [111] advising, among other things, that "chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful" and movements of Japanese forces "indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." General Short expressed the belief that he had seen this dispatch. [112] [105] See committee record, pp. 2220-2222. [106] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 4; also, No. 32, p. 1. [107] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14; also No. 32, p. 2. [108] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18; also, No. 32, p. 3. See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 279. [109] Maj. Gen. Emory S. Adams, Adjutant General. [110] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 4. See also Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258. [111] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 5 [112] See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258. 102 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK A dispatch of November 26 signed "Adams" was sent General Short reading in part as follows: [113] "* * * IT IS DESIRED THAT THE PILOTS BE INSTRUCTED TO PHOTOGRAPH TRUK ISLAND IN THE CAROLINE GROUP JALUIT IN THE MARSHALL GROUP. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY. INFORMATION DESIRED AS TO THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF NAVAL VESSELS INCLUDING SUBMARINES * * * INSURE THAT BOTH B-TWENTY FOUR AIR PLANES ARE FULLY EQUIPPED WITH GUN AMMUNITION UPON DEPARTURE FROM HONOLULU. [114]" The November 27 dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel beginning "This despatch is to be considered a war warning" [115] contained instructions that General Short be informed and he did in fact see this warning. On November 27 the following dispatch signed "Marshall" [116] was sent General Short by the War Department: [117] "NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT *HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT*. IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT, REPEAT CANNOT, BE AVOIDED THE *UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT*. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION *YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY* BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS." The following dispatch signed 'Miles', [118] and also dated November 27, was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department: [119] "JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALEMATE *HOSTILITIES MAY ENSUE*. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY BE EXPECTED. INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEF OF STAFF ONLY." On November 28 a dispatch signed "Adams" was directed to General Short, as follows: [120] "CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY_ FORTY FIVE). ALSO [113] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 6. [114] This reconnaissance was not flown inasmuch as the Army planes were not made ready prior to the December 7 attack. [115] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36. [116] Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff. [117] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7. [118] Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2, Army Intelligence. [119] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10. [120] Id., at p. 13. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 103 DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS, PROPERTY, AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABOTAGE, PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED. PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY, AVOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM. TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS. [120a]" Again on November 28 another dispatch from the War Department was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, as follows: [121] "ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE. THAT INSTRUCTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER YOUR CONTROL AND COMMAND IS DESIRED: AGAINST THOSE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SR 30_45) THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE. IT IS DESIRED ALSO THAT ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE INITIATED BY YOU IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE, AND PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT, PROPERTY AND ESTABLISHMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZE ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES. AVOIDING UNNECESSARY ALARM AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY. "IT IS ALSO DESIRED THAT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS YEAR REPORTS BE SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES OF ALL STEPS INITIATED BY YOU TO COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS. SIGNED ARNOLD." A dispatch dated December 5 and signed "Miles", [122] was sent the assistant chief of staff headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, to_ "CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THROUGH COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKYO REFERENCE WEATHER. [123]" ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL PURSUANT TO WARNINGS AND ORDERS FROM WASHINGTON DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS In the dispatch of October 16 [124] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation; [120a] For the reply of General Short to this message from the Adjutant General, see committee exhibit No. 32, p. 17. [121] Id., at p. 14. This message was also signed "Adams." [122] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 20. [123] This dispatch refers to the so-called winds code which will be found discussed in detail in Part IV, infra, this report. [124] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18. 104 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK that there was a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan and Russia and there also was a possibility Japan might attack the United States and Great Britain; and that he should_ "take due precautions including such *preparatory deployments* [126] as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan." Pursuant to the order Admiral Kimmel ordered submarines to assume a "war patrol" off both Wake and Midway; he reinforced Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island; he ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands; he placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in west-coast ports, held 6 submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, and delayed the sailing of 1 battleship which was scheduled to visit a west-coast navy yard; he dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island and placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating areas. [126] On October 22, Admiral Kimmel reported by letter [127] these dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. By letter dated November 7 Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet: [128] "OK on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is_what next?" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 24 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS In the dispatch of November 24 [129] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that the movements of Japanese naval and military forces_ "indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." This dispatch carried no orders for the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet [130] and would appear designed to acquaint him with the mounting tenseness of the situation as well as to supply him with an estimate of probable Japanese action. [131] No action appears to have been taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to this dispatch and he has stated that he felt the message required no action other than that which he had already taken. [132] "WAR WARNING" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27 The dispatch of November 27 began with the words: [133] "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." [134] It stated that negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the [125] Admiral Kimmel said: "The term 'preparatory deployments' used in this dispatch is nontechnical. It has no especial significance other than its natural meaning." Committee record, pp. 6708, 6709. [126] See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6709. [127] Committee exhibit No. 106. [128] Id. [129] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. [130] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 50-53. [131] Admiral Turner testified: "The dispatch of the 24th we did not consider required any immediate action, except to get ready plans for putting into effect when we gave them another warning." Committee record, p. 5159. [132] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 298, 299. [133] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36. [134] Admiral Kimmel observed: "The phrase 'war warning' cannot be made a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dispatch contained." Committee record, p. 6717. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 105 Pacific had ceased and "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days," and that "the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." Admiral Kimmel was ordered "to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46." After receiving this warning Admiral Kimmel made the deliberate decision not to institute long-range reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor against possible air attacks for reasons which will subsequently appear. [135] Between the warning and the attack on December 7 the following deployments were made and action taken: 1. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier Enterprise, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles for any sign of hostile shipping. [136] The sending of this force to Wake was pursuant to a dispatch dated November 26 to Admiral Kimmel stating, in part_ "in order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use OpNav [137] has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this is feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. [135]" Admiral Halsey knew of the war warning dispatch and held a lengthy conference with Admiral Kimmel and other officers on November 27. He stated that when he prepared to depart with the task force for Wake Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far the latter wanted him to go; that Admiral Kimmel replied "Use your common sense." [139] Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the Enterprise, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces, to which Admiral Kimmel replied he should use his own discretion. Admiral Smith stated that Admiral Halsey commented these were the best orders he had received and that if he found even Japanese sampan he would sink it. [140] 2. On December 5, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in command of Task Force 2, consisting of the carrier Lexington, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Like Halsey, Newton conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance [141] despite the fact, however, that Admiral Newton was leaving Pearl Harbor with some of the most powerful and valuable units of the Pacific fleet he was not even shown the war warning, had no knowledge of it, and indeed had no knowledge of the dispatches of October [135] The Navy court of inquiry found: "It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The commander in chief Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in ease of emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved." Navy court of inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157. [136] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750. See also testimony of Admiral Halsey, Hart inquiry record, p. 299. [137] Office of Naval Operations. [138] Dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, No. 270038, dated November 26, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 112. See also committee record, pp. 1614, 1615; also Hart inquiry record, p. 299. [139] Hart inquiry record, pp. 297, 298. [140] Id., at p. 43. [141] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750: see also testimony of Admiral Newton, Hart inquiry record. p. 318. 106 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 16 and November 24 or the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes to which reference will hereafter be made Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton received no information concerning the increasing danger of our relations with Japan. He was given no special orders and regarded his departure from Hawaii as a mission with no special significance other than to proceed to Midway for the purpose of flying off the Lexington a squadron of planes for the reinforcement of the island. In consequence, no special orders were given for the arming of planes or making preparation for war apart from ordinary routine. [142] The failure to supply Admiral Newton any orders or information is in marked contrast with the "free hand" orders given Admiral Halsey. In his testimony Admiral Kimmel stated that Admiral Newton's orders and information would have come through Admiral Brown, who was Newton's superior. [142a] 3. Admiral Wilson Brown on December 5 left Pearl Harbor en route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises. [143] 4. On November 28, orders were issued to bomb unidentified submarines found in the operating sea areas around Oahu. Full security was invoked for the ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts. [144] However, no change was made in the condition of readiness in port except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they began sweeping the harbor channel and approaches. [145] 5. Upon receipt of the war warning Admiral Kimmel ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake and Midway on December 2 and 3 they searched to a distance of 525 miles. [146] 6. A squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor was ordered to replace the squadron which went from Midway to Wake. This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded from Johnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5, and 6. On December 7, five of these Midway based patrol planes were searching the sector 120 to 170 from Midway, to a distance of 450 miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the Lexington at a point 400 miles from Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready striking force. [147] Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified before the Hewitt inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was executed, stating_ "there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and [142] See Hart inquiry record, pp. 316 318. [142a] In this regard, the testimony of Admiral Brown indicates that he was not shown the "war warning". See testimony of Rear Admiral Brown before the Roberts Commission, Committee exhibit No. 143. [143] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751 [144] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 299, 300; see also committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96. 115 [145] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 395. [146] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751. [147] See Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, page 6752; also testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 684. It should be noted that Admiral Inglis stated, "*There is no written record available of any searches having be made on December 6, either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway*." For further testimony of Adm. Inglis concerning the matter of reconnaissance see committee record, pp. 70-73. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 107 Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft. [148]" While the dispatch of the three task forces does not appear to have been primarily made by Admiral Kimmel as a result of the implications of the war warning, [149] this action combined with the other steps above- mentioned had the effect of providing reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol-plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor covering a distance of nearly 5,000 miles. Each squadron as it proceeded would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path, bring under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of- ocean area. In addition, submarines of the Fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously. [150] The southwest approaches to Hawaii were thereby to a degree effectively screened by reconnaissance from a raiding force bent on attacking Pearl Harbor by surprise. [151] *Nothing was done, however, to detect an approaching hostile force coming from the north and northwest, recognized as the most dangerous sector, and it is into the justification for this non-action that we shall inquire*. [152] EVALUATION OF THE WAR WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27. ON WHERE THE ATTACK MIGHT COME Admiral Kimmel stated that the war warning dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area nor did it state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. [153] The warning dispatch did not, it is true, mention Pearl Harbor as a specific point of attack, and gave the estimate that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. [153a] It is to be recalled in this connection, however, that the November 24 dispatch [153b] to Admiral Kimmel warned of "*a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or (Guam is a possibility*". The latter dispatch while indicating that an attack would possibly come in the vicinity of the Philippines or Guam did nevertheless indicate, by use of the words "*in any direction*," that just where the attack might come could not be predicted. [154] [148] Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 321, 322. [149] See committee record, pp. 9312, 9313. [150] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6752. [151] In this connection, see testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9321, 9324. [152] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9324, 9325, also 9436, 9437. [153] Admiral Kimmel testified: "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable." Committee record, p 6715. For a detailed statement by Admiral Kimmel concerning where the attack might come based on the "war warning," see Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 301. [153a] For the full text of the "war warning" dispatch, see p. 98, supra. [153b For the full text of the November 24 dispatch, see p. 98, supra. [154] Admiral Kimmel stated that in the November 24 dispatch the words "in any direction" did include so far as his estimate was concerned, a possible submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands but not an air attack. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 299. It has been pointed out that the estimate of enemy action referred to in the "war warning"_*an amphibious operation to the South*_is to be distinguished from *a surprise aggressive movement in any direction* mentioned in the November 24 warning; that the distinction between an