Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ...............................  75 
  Consciousness of danger from air attack ..........................  75 
    Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ...........  75 
    General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............  79 
    Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier .............  81 
    Concept of the war in the Pacific ..............................  87 
    Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air 
      attack .......................................................  88 

 
 
VI                          C O N T E N T S 
 
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii-Continued                     Page 

  Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the 
    imminence of war ..............................................  89 
  Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the 
    imminence of war .............................................. 100 
  Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders 
    from Washington ............................................... 103 
      Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103 
      Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104 
      The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104 
  Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107 
      On where the attack might come .............................. 107 
      Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108 
      "Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109 
      The "War warning" and training .............................. 110 
      The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute  
        distant reconnaissance .................................... 110 
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117 
  Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the  
    warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119 
      No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120 
      Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121 
     "Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and  
        "Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123 
     Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125 
     Interference with training ................................... 125 
  The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126 
  The Short reply ................................................. 128 
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27  
    dispatch ...................................................... 129 
  The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130 
  General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter  
    by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131 
  The "Lost" Japanese carriers-Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133 
  The "Mori" call ................................................. 137 
  Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138 
  Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140 
  Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142 
     Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142 
     The "Manila message" ......................................... 142 
     The Honolulu press ........................................... 142 
  The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145 
  Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150 
  Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               75 
 
PART III. 

RESPONSIBILITIES IN HAWAII
CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK The Japanese raiding force approached the island of Oahu with virtually no danger of detection and executed its treacherous attack at a time when only a minimum state of readiness prevailed to meet it. [1] One of the causes of the disaster in consequence must lie in the failure to employ facilities available to detect the attacking force in sufficient time to effect a state of readiness best designed to repel or minimize the attack. That the attack on Pearl Harbor surprised the defending Army and Navy establishments is indisputable. The question therefore becomes, as previously indicated: Under all of the circumstances should the responsible commanders at Hawaii have been surprised or, more particularly, were they justified in failing to employ adequately the defensive facilities available to them on the morning of December 7, 1941? [2] The estimate of both Admirals Richardson [3] and Kimmel [4] in a letter which they jointly prepared and dispatched to the Chief of Naval Operations on January 25, 1941, pointed out that if Japan entered the war or committed an overt act against the United States our position would be primarily defensive in the Pacific. [5] There were outlined in the letter certain assumptions upon which the action of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated, including: "(a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy; (b) war with Japan imminent; (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form_even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian; and (d) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible. " It was pointed out that the tasks to be undertaken by the fleet with respect to these assumptions included the taking of full security [1] See section "State of Readiness," Part II, supra. [2] The Army Pearl Harbor Board said: "Therefore, the situation on December 7 can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBY's were out; the antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with the Fleet air arm, the naval carriers with their planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the Fleet was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers Lexington and Enterprise. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of anti-sabotage Alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack. *In short everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it.*" See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee Exhibit No. 157 [3] Admiral James O. Richardson, who preceded Admiral Kimmel as commander in chief of the Pacific. [4] Admiral Husband E. Kimmel assumed command of the United States Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941 and served in that capacity until December 17, 1941. The evidence clearly indicates that while Admiral Kimmel was promoted over several other officers with more seniority, his selection was made because he was regarded as preeminently qualified for the position of commander in chief. [5] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 70. 76 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK measures for the protection of the fleet in port and at sea. Thereafter there were set forth observations concerning the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu. Under date of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of Navy addressed a communication to the Secretary of War, with copies designated for the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, observing among other things: [6] "The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. *If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.* "In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the Fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above. "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: "(1) Air bombing attack. "(2) Air torpedo plane attack. "(3) Sabotage. "(4) Submarine attack. "(5) Mining. "(6) Bombardment by gun fire. "Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance. "Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels. "The counter measures to be considered are: "(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched; "(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives; "(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire "(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; "(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. "The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quit possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles. * * *" The foregoing communication was seen by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he assumed command. [7] The Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, replied to the letter of the Secretary of Navy in the following terms: [8] "1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian [6] Committee Exhibit No. 10. [7] Admiral Kimmel testified: "* * * I saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941, early in February 1941." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 286. [8] Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 24. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 77 Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to old a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. "2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes, nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at: San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii. "3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route) and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine gun}. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns. "4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date. "5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation, and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured_ forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas in Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable or large-scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again. "6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective." In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 27, 1941, [9] Admiral Kimmel stated he thought the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority. It should be noted at this point in considering the letter of the Secretary of Navy dated January 24, 1941, that the following dispatch dated February 1, 1941, was sent the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the subject "Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor": [10] "1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect: " "The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff." "2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese Naval and Army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future. [9] Committee exhibit No. 106. [10] This dispatch is indicated to have been dictated by Lt. Comdr. (now Captain) A. H. McCollum on January 31, 1941. See committee exhibit No. 15. 78 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The estimate made concerning the information supplied by the Peruvian Minister with respect to a rumored Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24 were received by Admiral Kimmel at approximately the same time and are in apparent conflict. However, the dispatch of February 1 was an estimate of the rumor concerning the Japanese plan to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor based on the then present disposition and employment of Japanese forces, whereas the Secretary's letter relates to the dangers of the Pearl Harbor situation in contemplation of future conflict with Japan. The communications apparently were so interpreted by Admiral Kimmel for in a letter dated February 18, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations he said: [11] "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay." In a letter of February 15, 1941 [12] the Chief of Naval Operations wrote Admiral Kimmel concerning antitorpedo baffles for protection against air-torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. He stated that the congestion in the harbor and the necessity for maneuverability limited the practicability of the then present type of baffles. Further, the letter indicated that the shallow depth of water in Pearl Harbor limited the need for torpedo nets; that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary to drop torpedoes successfully from planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. A similar communication was sent Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, among others, requesting his recommendations and comments concerning the matter. [13] In a letter of March 20, [14] Admiral Bloch replied, stating that the depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet and for this reason among others he did not recommend antitorpedo baffles. Admiral Kimmel was in agreement with this recommendation until such time as a light efficient net was developed. [15] However, in June of 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a communication to the commandants of naval districts as follows: [16] "1. * * * Commandants were requested to consider the employment of, and to make recommendations concerning, antitorpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated: " "A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered." "2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient run to arm the torpedo. "3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo- plane attack, it may [11] Committee exhibit No. 106. [12] Id., No. 116. [13] Letter from Chief of Naval Operations dated February 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 116. [14] See Committee exhibit No. 116. [15] Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated March 12,1941, Committee exhibit No. 116 [16] Letter dated June 13, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to commandants of all naval districts. Committee exhibit No. 116. This communication made reference to the observations set forth in the letter of February 17,1941 (committee exhibit No. 116), pointing out certain limitations with respect to air torpedo attack. Note 13, supra. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 79 be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms [16a] or more) is much more likely. "4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms. [17]" The foregoing communication clearly indicated that preconceived views concerning the invulnerability of Pearl Harbor to air-torpedo attack were in error. Admiral Kimmel himself stated that during his visit to Washington in June of 1941 he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers to the fleet at Pearl Harbor including air attack, blocking of the harbor, and similar matters. [18] GENERAL SHORT'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK On February 7, 1941, General Short [19] assumed command of the Hawaiian Department of the Army. Upon his arrival he had the benefit of conversations with General Herron, [20] his predecessor, with respect to problems prevailing in the Department. Significantly General Herron had been directed by the War Department on June 17, 1940, to institute an alert against a possible trans-Pacific raid. [21] This alert was an all- out endeavor with full equipment and ammunition and lasted 6 weeks. It was suspended after the 6-week period and thereafter resumed for some time. Planes had been dispersed and gun crews alerted with the ammunition available. The Commanding General lead the benefit of all the plans and operations incident to the so-called "Herron alert" as a guide in estimating the steps to be taken on the occasion of a threat of enemy attack. General Short saw both the letter from the Secretary of Navy dated January 24 and the reply of the Secretary of War dated February 7, set forth in the preceding section, concerning the danger of attack from the air. [22] Under date of February 7, 1941, General Marshall directed a letter to General Short relating in utmost clarity the problems and responsibility of General Short in his new command. [23] This letter, which referred to a conversation with Admiral Stark, pointed out that there was need for additional planes and antiaircraft guns; that the fullest protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major consideration of the Army; that the risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constituted the real perils of the situation; and, again, that they were keeping clearly in mind that the first concern is to protect the feet. On February 19, 1941, General Short wrote General Marshall [24] pointing out, among other things, the great importance of (1) cooperation with the Navy; (2) dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance, and servicing of aircraft; (3) improvement of the [16a] A fathom is 6 feet. [17] The evidence reflects repeated efforts by the Chief of Naval Operations to secure from the Bureau of Ordnance more efficient light- weight baffles. See committee exhibit No. 116. [18] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 367. [19] Lt. Gen Walter C. Short served as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941. [20] Maj. Gen. Charles B. Herron. [21] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 213-215. [22] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 237. [23] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 1-3. [24] Id., at pp. 4-9. 80 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK antiaircraft defense; (4) improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights; and (5) bombproofing of vital installations such as command posts and communication centers. General Short advised the Chief of Staff that he was taking the necessary steps in line with the important needs of the Department. On March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General short: [25] "I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to *defense from air attack*. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority." In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 6, 1941, [26] General Short observed that the Aircraft Warning Service was vital to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and referred to delays in construction and establishment of sites. In a subsequent letter [27] General Short again referred to the necessary for the dispersion and protection of aircraft as well as to the matter of coordinating antiaircraft defense. A letter dated March 28, 1941, [28] from General Marshall made reference to General Short's proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of an additional airfield and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields with the observation that the proposal was undoubtedly sound. He also indicated his hopefulness of arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison. On April 14, 1941, General Short wrote the Chief of Staff, as follows: [29] "Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made with them: [30] "1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure. "2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, to implement the above agreement. "3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement. "I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires. "We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall. "Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will interest you." In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated May 29, 1941, General Short made the following comments concerning the first phase of their recent maneuvers: [31] "The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer Supplies for Field [25] Id., at p. 10. [26] Id., at pp. 11, 12. [27] Letter dated March 15,1941. Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 15-17. [28] Committee exhibit No. 53, p. 18. [29] Id., at pp. 19, 20 [30] See section "Plans for Defense of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier", infra. [31] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 35, 36. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 81 Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack: Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise." On August 19, 1941, General Marshall addressed a letter to General Short setting forth his reasons for deciding to establish an airfield base for the Fifteenth Pursuit Group at Kahuku Point and stated: "I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly, will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense. [32]" The Chief of Staff on October 10, 1941, sent the following letter to General Short: [33] "The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty. "*This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii*, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of air-base defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii." On October 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short stating that he appreciated the reasons General Short had assigned for giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel [34] but that it appeared the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. [35] From the foregoing correspondence there can be no doubt that General Short was adequately apprised of his responsibility to defend the fleet from attack and that he was conscious of the necessity of building up the defense against air attack. PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER There is nowhere, however, a better expression of the keen understanding of the danger of a surprise air attack upon Oahu than is manifested in the plans which the Army and Navy jointly effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier. [32] Id., at pp. 40, 41. [31] Id., at p. 42. [34] In this connection General Short had written General Marshall on October 14,1941, in part: "At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack on Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces." See committee exhibit No. 53. [35] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 44, 45. 82 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The Hawaiian coastal frontier was listed in defense category D. This category covered *coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack*. The war plans "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," the basic document controlling the relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, contains the following with respect to category D: [36] "Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C (coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor attack) will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine- gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of operations. Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force." As a basic responsibility ("Joint Action Army and Navy 1935") under contemplation of normal circumstances responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was that of the Army. [37] It was recognized that- [38] "* * * The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its bases * * *. " The basic allocation of Army and Navy responsibility for coastal defense was not possible under conditions prevailing in Hawaii during 1941. Fundamental deficiencies in equipment, particularly shortage of sufficient Army patrol planes, confronted the responsible commanders. As Admiral Kimmel stated shortly after assuming command at Pearl Harbor_ [39] "There is a definite line of demarcation between this objective and longer range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be continued as an essential basis for determining and stressing improved readiness requirements. This planning will naturally include the more effective schemes of employment that improved readiness, when attained, will permit. "Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation for or expectation of, improved conditions or facilities. *Such plans must be based only on hard fact*. They must be so developed as to provide for *immediate* action, based on facilities and materials that are *now* available. "A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all available aviation components. As is well known, much remains to be done for adequate *future* effectiveness in this respect. Much, however, can *now* be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they now are." In realistic recognition of this situation, plans were conceived early in 1941 known as "The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier". [40] This plan was signed and placed in effect on April 11, 1941, by General Short and Admiral Bloch, commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The plan was based on the joint [36] "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 6. [37] Id. [38] Id., at p. 42. [39] Letter of February 4, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet personnel. See committee record pp. 14511, 14512. [40] See committee exhibit No. 44; also Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 7. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 83 Army and Navy basic war plans [41] and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by *mutual cooperation* which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would cooperate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the following tasks of the Army and Navy were recognized: "a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone. "b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces. "c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces." One of the most significant features of the plan was the assumption of responsibility by the Navy for distant reconnaissance, a normal task of the Army. In this regard, the plan provided: "The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for: * * * i. *Distant Reconnaissance*." On March 28, 1941, an agreement, incorporated as an annex to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, [42] was prepared and approved by General Short and Admiral Bloch on April 2 dealing with joint security measures and protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base. This agreement was entered into- "in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war." It was recognized that- "*when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer* (the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District) *agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent* to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at is disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted * * *" Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. When naval forces were insufficient for long-distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft were to be under the tactical control of the Navy. It was contemplated that the Army would expedite the installation and operation of an Aircraft Warning service through use of radar. On March 31, 1941, Admiral Bellinger, as commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, and General Martin, commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area. The situation was summarized in the following terms: [43] (1) Relations between the United States and Japan are strained; uncertain, and varying. (2) In the past Japan has never preceded hostile actions by declaration of war. [41] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits Nos. 4 and 5. [42] Annex VII, see. VI. See committee exhibit No. 44. [43] See committee exhibit No. 44. 84 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (3) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period. (4) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action. (5) It appears possible that Japanese submarines and/or a Japanese fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters without prior warning from our intelligence service. The estimate embracing a "Survey of Opposing Strength" indicated, among other things, that Japan might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from a Japanese carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. It was elsewhere observed in the estimate that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 but that this could only be effectively maintained with "present personnel and material" for a very short period, and as a practical measure could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. [44] The outline of possible enemy action as set forth in the Martin- Bellinger estimate is a startling harbinger of what actually occurred: [45] "(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by: "1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area. "2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor. "3. A combination of these two. "(b) It appears that *the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack*. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. "(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. "(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force *probably* composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. "(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape [44] In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel referred to this portion of the estimate and stated: "This plan was on file with the Departments in Washington. They knew of this decision. *They had done nothing to change or alter the basic deficiencies in personnel and material which required that decision.*" This statement, it should be noted, is not strictly accurate. The number of Navy patrol bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance was increased appreciably after the Martin-Bellinger estimate was prepared. As will subsequently appear, there were sufficient patrol planes at Oahu to conduct a distant reconnaissance for a considerable period of time after receipt of the November 27 "war warning" (detailed reference will be made to this warning, infra). The estimate made by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin was prepared in March of 1941 and was necessarily in contemplation of patrol planes then available. As indicated, the number of Navy planes available for this purpose was substantially increased before December 7. See committee exhibit No. 120. [45] Committee exhibit No. 44. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 85 and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack." Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 from Admiral Kimmel the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February 1941 and reissued in revised form on October 14, 1941. [46] This fleet order was predicated on two assumptions, one being_ [47] "That a declaration of war may be preceded by_ "(1) A surprise attack on ships at Pearl Harbor. "(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area. "(3) A combination of these two." Among the provisions of this letter concerning action to be taken if submarine attacked in the operating area it was pointed out_ "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack_" that_ "it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means." A letter dated August 20, 1941, to the commanding general, Army Air Forces, Washington, prepared by General Martin, and transmitted through General Short, submitted as an enclosure a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. Several observations set forth in this plan are of particular pertinence: [48] "The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before the approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on Oahu. * * * * * * * "Our most likely enemy, Orange (Japan), can probably employ a maximum of six carriers against Oahu. * * * * * * * "* * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy. * * * * * * * [46] Id. [47] Referring to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 14, 1941, to the fleet 2CL-41 (revised) wherein it was stated that a declaration of war may be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (see committee exhibit No. 44), he was asked what form of surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor he contemplated by this statement. Admiral Kimmel replied: "*An airplane attack. This was an assumption upon which to base our training. The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose.* I felt, as the situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor, and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the installations at Pearl Harbor might be attempted. I thought it was much more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if the Fleet were away than if it were there. However, at no time did I consider it more than a possibility and one which ordinary prudence would make us guard against." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 287. [48] See committee exhibit No. 13. 86 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons: "(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu. "(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D-Day at close at range. "(3) The enemy will be more concerned with deliverying [sic] a successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his attack is successful. * * * * * * * "The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should base our plans of operation is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule: "(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the attack. "(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the attack. "(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack. "(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the day of the attack * * * * * * * "He (Japan) will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack. "a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection. "b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by friendly surface vessels. *It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0 (due north) counterclockwise to 180 around Oahu, the next probable*, the quadrant 180 counterclockwise to 90 ; the least probable, 90 to 0 ." Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both fully familiar with all the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The plans effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier viewed in their entirety were fully adequate under the circumstances and represent a commendable recognition by the Hawaiian commanders of the realities of their situation. [49] The unfortunate fact is that features of the plan designed to meet an air attack were not invoked prior to the actual attack in view of the imminence of hostile Japanese action. It is clear that the plans with respect to joint air operations was to be operative when the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the naval base defense officer "agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action." [50] It is equally clear that the joint security measures for the protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base were designed in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war. The plan against air attack was prepared in Hawaii; it was designed to meet the peculiar problems existing in [49] Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Admiral Kimmel stated that "he (Admiral Bloch) accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." See Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p 1753. He commented "There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any." Id. [50] Committee exhibit No. 44. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 87 Hawaii; its invocation, implementation, and execution was essentially a responsibility resting in Hawaii. [51] From a review of the defense plans prepared in Hawaii the conclusion is inescapable that the Army and Navy commanders there not only appreciated the dangers of an air attack on Pearl Harbor but had also prepared detailed arrangements to meet this threat. CONCEPT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC It is to be recalled that from January 29 to March 27, 1941, staff conversations were held in Washington between Army and Navy officials of Great Britain and the United States to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with her *should the United States be compelled to resort to war.* [52] The report of these conversations, dated March 27, 1941, and referred to by the short title "ABC-1," reflected certain principles governing contemplated action, including: [53] "Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater, and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort." In recognition of the foregoing principle that the Atlantic and European area was to be considered the decisive theater, the concept of military operations as respecting Japan was expressed as follows: [54] "Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, *the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive*. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East." Pursuant to the principles and plans visualized in ABC-1, the Army and Navy prepared "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan_Rainbow No. 5," which was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the Secretary of War on June 2, 1941. [55] On July 21, 1941, United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This [51] The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, expressed this thought in the following terms: "* * * each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. *The primary responsibility for such plans and their creation, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local situation and conditions*. Before December 7, 1941 detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a joint agreement with the local naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency and *he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion demanded*." See statement of Secretary of War with respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board; committee exhibit No. 157. [52] Committee exhibit No. 49. See section " ABCD Understanding?", Part IV, infra, this report. [53] Committee exhibit No. 49 p. 5. [54] Id., at pp. 5, 6. [55] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 4. This Plan is also referred to as "WPL-46." 88 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) insofar as the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were concerned and was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on September 9, 1941. [56] It assumed, consistent with "ABC-1" and the United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, that the principal military efforts of the Associated Powers would be in the Atlantic and European areas, and that operations in other areas would be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. In estimating the likely enemy (Japanese) action it was observed, among other things, that it was believed Japan's initial action would be toward "possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions" and "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area." One of the tasks formulated to accomplish assigned missions contemplated by the plan under phase I (Japan not in the war) was to "guard against surprise attack by Japan." Under phase IA (initial tasks_Japan in the war) the Pacific Fleet, among other things was to "make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands." Among the tasks under phase II (succeeding tasks) was "to capture and establish a protected fleet base anchorage in the Marshall Island area." From the Army standpoint, as stated by General Marshall, the fullest protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major consideration. [57] The function of the Army, therefore, was primarily that of protecting Hawaii because it was the sea and air base of the fleet and to render protection to the fleet proper when it was in harbor. [53] Aside from these purposes, the protection of the Hawaiian Islands was secondary and necessary only to the extent of making it possible for the Army to execute its primary mission. CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK Considering all of the information made available to the commanding officers of the Army and Navy in Hawaii from the time of their assuming command until December 7, 1941, it must be concluded that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel knew that if Pearl Harbor was to be attacked the danger of a Japanese air attack upon that base was the greatest peril of their situation and that the necessity of taking steps to provide the best possible defense to this most dangerous form of attack was clearly indicated. It is further concluded that both responsible officers appreciated the fact that Japan might strike before a formal declaration of war. It is clear that the function of both the Army and the Navy in the Pacific was essentially a defensive one, particularly in the early stages of the war. While diversionary and sporadic raids were envisaged for the fleet, naval operations were to be fundamentally defensive in character. Pending imminence of war against Japan both services were engaged in preparation and training for this eventuality. [56] Id, exhibit No. 5. This plan is referred to as "U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five (WP Pac-46)." [57] Committee exhibit No. 53 pp. 1-3 [58] As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "The defense of a permanent naval base is the direct responsibility of the Army. The Navy is expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the base is a joint operation only to that extent." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 89 The next point of inquiry is to determine whether Admiral Kimmel and General Short, through information available to them, were adequately informed concerning the imminence of war in such manner as reasonably to contemplate they would employ every facility at their command in defense of the fleet and the fleet base. INFORMATION SUPPLIED ADMIRAL KIMMEL BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE IMMINENCE OF WAR In a letter to Admiral Stark dated February 18, 1941, Admiral Kimmel set forth the following comments in a postscript: [59] "I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in- Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?" In reply the Chief of Naval Operations advised that the Office of Naval Intelligence was fully aware of its responsibility to keep the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States; that information concerning the location of Japanese merchant vessels was forwarded by air mail weekly and if desired could be issued more frequently. On February 25 Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, forwarding a copy of a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines by way of the "southern route." [60] Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum for the President of February 5, 1941, setting forth an analysis of the situation in Indochina, prepared by Admiral Stark. This expressed Admiral Stark's view that Japan had some fear that the British and the United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indochina and Thailand; and that the size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indochina and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines. It observed that insofar as Admiral Stark could tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major move; that, as he saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time; and that at present she desired not to go to war with the United States at all. The following significant dispatch was sent on April 1, 1941, from he Chief of Naval Operations addressed to the commandants of all naval districts: [61] PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES [59]Committee exhibit No. 106. [60] Id. [61] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 1. 90 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK IN A PARTICULAR FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, THEY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS TO SEE THAT PROPER WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT. In a letter of April 3, 1941, [62] Admiral Stark expressed his observations on the international situation to the commanders in chief, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, including a discussion of the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. Admiral Stark stated that the basic idea of this plan contemplated that the United States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet; that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay barrier; and that the United States Asiatic Fleet would be supported through offensive operations of the United States Pacific Fleet. He then discussed the dangers facing Britain and stated that the Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. He observed that for some time Japan had been showing less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and the United States in the Far East. Admiral Stark instructed the addressees to watch this situation closely. He expressed the feeling that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East but that the question was when and not whether we would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was that we might be in the war against Germany and Italy within about 2 months, but there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility. In the meantime, he suggested that as much time as available be devoted to training. Under date of April 18, 1941, instructions were given various naval observers to include the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet as an information addressee in all dispatch reports and to furnish one copy of all intelligence reports directly to him. [63] In a memorandum dated May 26 to the Chief of Naval Operations the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet suggested that he be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions; and that it be made a cardinal principle that he be immediately informed of all important developments as soon as they occur and by the quickest secure means possible. [64] [62] Committee exhibit No. 106. [63] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 3. [64] Admiral Kimmel said: "The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. The lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence is one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations. "It is realized that on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify adapt or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, *thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions*. "*It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important development as they occur and by the quickest secure means available*." See committee exhibit No. 106. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 91 In June of 1941 Admiral Kimmel visited Washington at which time matters of naval policy were reviewed with him. [65] On July 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was advised "for action" by the Chief of Naval Operations, [66] that the unmistakable deduction from information obtained from numerous sources was that the Japanese Government had determined upon its future policy, supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups; that his policy probably involved war in the near future. It was pointed out that an advance by Japan against the British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out but that the Chief of Naval Operations held to the opinion that Japanese activity in "the south" would be confined for the present to seizure and development of naval, army, and in bases in Indochina. The dispatch stated that the Japanese neutrality pact with Russia would be abrogated and the major military effort on the part of Japan against Russia would be toward the latter's maritime provinces probably toward the end of July, although the attack might be deferred until after the collapse of European Russia. It was pointed out that all Japanese vessels in United States Atlantic Forts had been ordered to be west of the Panama Canal by August 1, that the movement of Japanese "flag shipping" from Japan had been suspended and additional merchant vessels were being requisitioned. Vith an admonition to secrecy, instructions were issued to inform the principal army commanders and the commander in chief's own immediate subordinates. In another dispatch of July 3, [67] Admiral Kimmel was advised for action that definite information had been received indicating that between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Government had issued an order for 7 of the 11 Japanese vessels then in the North Atlantic and Caribbean areas to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific, and that under routine schedules three of the remaining ships were to move to the Pacific during the same period. It was suggested that in Japanese business communities strong rumors were current that Russia would be attacked by Japan on July 20, and that a definite move by the Japanese might be expected during the period July 20 to August 1, 1941. On July 7 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised for information of the substance of three intercepted dispatches, including one of July 2 from Tokyo to Berlin, stating: [68] "JAPAN IS PREPARING FOR ALL POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES REGARDING SOVIET IN ORDER (TO) JOIN FORCES WITH GERMANY IN ACTIVELY COMBATTING COMMUNIST (SIC) AND DESTROYING COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN EASTERN SIBERIA. AT SAME TIME JAPAN CANNOT AND WILL NOT RELAX EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH TO RESTRAIN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. NEW INDOCHINA BASES WILL INTENSIFY RESTRAINT AND BE VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO AXIS VICTORY." And another of July 2 from Berlin to Tokyo: [69] "OSHIMA DELIVERS ABOVE NOTE AND TELLS RIBBENTROP IN PART, "MATSUOKA WILL SOON SUBMIT A DECISION. IF YOU GERMANS HAD ONLY LET US KNOW YOU WERE GOING TO FIGHT [65] See Navy Court of Inquiry record page 113. [66] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 4. [67] Id., at p. 5. [68] Id., at p. 6. [69] Id. This dispatch and that indicated, note 68, supra, were based on the so-called Magic. For a discussion of Magic see Part IV, this report. 92 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK RUSSIA SO SOON WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN READY. WE WERE PLANNING TO SETTLE SOUTH SEAS QUESTIONS AND CHINA INCIDENT HENCE DECISION CANNOT BE REACHED IMMEDIATELY, BUT JAPAN WILL NOT SIT ON FENCE WHILE GERMANY FIGHTS." The Chief of Naval Operations in a dispatch of July 15, [70] sent Admiral Kimmel for information, supplied intelligence received to the effect that within "the next day or two," Japan would begin commercial negotiations with Vichy France at which time she would propose "in the name of mutual defense" Japan's taking over southern French Indochina naval and air bases; and that at the same time Japan would attempt to station army and navy air forces peacefully with French agreement, if possible. It was pointed out that if Vichy objected Japan had decided to use force; and that Japan did not intend to move farther south or interfere with colonial government. On the basis of the information received it was observed that the Japanese move was necessary to guarantee supplies from "Colony and Thailand" and to prevent "Syrian type British action"; and that while Tokyo wished to avoid friction with Britain and particularly the United States, if possible, the risk was regarded as necessary. In a dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on July 17 for his information, he was advised of a six-point ultimatum sent by Tokyo to Vichy requiring an answer by July 20 71 The six points were specified as: (1) Japan to send necessary Army and Wavy air forces to southern French Indochina; (2) Vichy to turn over certain naval and air bases; (3) Japanese expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move about freely; (4) Vichy to withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible clashes; (5) Vichy to authorize French Indochina military to arrange details with Japanese either before or after landing; (6) Colony to pay Japan 23,000,000 piastres annually to meet cost of occupation. This same dispatch advised of intelligence received on July 14 that the Japanese Army was planning its advance on or about July 20 and, of intelligence received on July 14, that Japan intended to carry out its plans by force if opposed or if Britain or the United States interfered. On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information concerning the substance of an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Canton to Tokyo, as follows: [72] "THE RECENT GENERAL MOBILIZATION ORDER EXPRESSES JAPAN'S IRREVOCABLE RESOLUTION TO END ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN THWARTING JAPAN'S NATURAL EXPANSION AND HER INDOMITABLE INTENTION TO CARRY THIS OUT WITH THE BACKING OF THE AXIS IF POSSIBLE BUT ALONE IF NECESSARY. FORMALITIES SUCH AS DINING THE EXPEDITIONARY FORGES AND SAYING FAREWELL TO THEM WERE DISPENSED WITH TO AVOID ALARM AND BECAUSE WE WISHED TO FACE THIS NEW WAR WITH A CALM AND COOL ATTITUDE. * * * IMMEDIATE OBJECT WILL BE TO ATTEMPT PEACEFUL FRENCH INDOCHINA OCCUPATION BUT WILL CRUSH RESISTANCE IF OFFERED AND [70] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 8. This dispatch was based on Magic. [71] Id., at page 9. This dispatch was also based on Magic. [72] Id., at p. 10. This dispatch was likewise based on Magic, see committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 93 SET UP MARTIAL LAW. SECONDLY OUR PURPOSE IS TO LAUNCH THEREFROM A RAPID ATTACK WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS SUITABLE. AFTER OCCUPATION NEXT ON OUR SCHEDULE IS SENDING ULTIMATUM TO NETHERLANDS INDIES. IN THE SEIZING OF SINGAPORE THE NAVY WILL PLAY THE PRINCIPAL PART. ARMY WILL NEED ONLY ONE DIVISION TO SEIZE SINGAPORE AND TWO DIVISIONS TO SEIZE NETHERLANDS INDIES WITH AIR FORCES BASED ON CANTON, SPRATLEY, PALAU, SINGORA IN THAILAND, PORTUGUESE TIMOR AND INDOCHINA AND WITH SUBMARINE FLEET IN MANDATES, HAINAN, AND INDOCHINA WE KILL CRUSH BRITISH AMERICAN MILITARY POWER AND ABILITY TO ASSIST IN SCHEMES AGAINST US." On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised of an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo informing that although the Japanese Cabinet had changed there would be no departure from the principle that the Tripartite Pact formed the keystone of Japan's national policy and that the new Cabinet would also pursue the policy of the former cabinet in all other matters. [73] In another dispatch, supplying information concerning an intercepted Tokyo message to Vichy, Admiral Kimmel was advised on July 20, that the Japanese Army had made all preparations and had decided to advance regardless of whether Vichy France accepted her demands. [74] Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart on July 24, 1941, [75] sending a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel, concerning among other things, a 2-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Ambassador Nomura. Admiral Stark expressed the thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that the United States and Japan avoid open rupture; stated they had a very plain talk; and observed that he, Admiral Stark, liked Nomura. He advised that Nomura discussed at length Japan's need for the rice and minerals of Indochina. Admiral Stark said his guess was that with the establishment of bases in Indochina, Japan would stop for the time being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that no doubt the Japanese would use their Indochina bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. He said that, of course, there was the possibility that Japan would strike at Borneo, but that he doubted his in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them. Admiral Stark also said that he talked with the President and hoped no open rupture would come but that conditions were not getting better. On July 25, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was advised that beginning July 26 the United States would impose economic sanctions against Japan and that it was expected these sanctions would embargo all trade between Japan and the United States, subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material. [76] It was further pointed out that funds in the United States would be frozen except as they may be moved under licensing. In estimating the situation it was observed: "*Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against hostile eventualities.*" [73] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 11. [74] Id., at p. 12. [75] Committee exhibit No. 106. [76] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14. 94 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK In a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated July 31, 1941, [77] Admiral Stark discussed the over-all international situation, and stated that "after the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies. He stated he thought it fairly safe to say that the opinion was generally held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I. [78] but that Admiral Turner thought Japan would go into the maritime provinces in August. He commented that Turner might be right and usually was. Admiral Stark said his thought had been that while Japan would ultimately go into Siberia she would delay doing so until she had the Indochina-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the Russian-German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia. A postscript to this letter stated, among other things, that_ . "*obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual*." Admiral Kimmel was advised on August 14 that the Japanese were rapidly completing withdrawal from world shipping routes, that scheduled sailings were canceled, and that the majority of ships in other than China and Japan Sea areas were homeward bound. [79] The following dispatch of August 28 was sent to Admiral Kimmel, among others, for action: [80] "CERTAIN OPERATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR THE ATLANTIC BY WPL 51 ARE HEREBY EXTENDED TO AREAS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AS DESCRIBED HEREIN IN VIEW OF THE DESTRUCTION BY RAIDERS OF MERCHANT VESSELS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN WITHIN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NEUTRALITY ZONE AS DEFINED IN THE DECLARATION OF PANAMA OF OCTOBER 3, 1939. FORMAL CHANGES IN WPL 51 WILL BE ISSUED, BUT MEANWHILE ACTION ADDRESSES WILL EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. CINCPAC CONSTITUTE THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE CONSISTING OF TWO 7,500-TON LIGHT CRUISERS AND DISPATCH IT TO BALBOA. FOR TASK PURPOSES THIS FORCE WILL OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER CNO [81] AFTER ENTERING THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AS DEFINED IN WPL 46 PAR. 3222 EXCEPT WESTERN LIMIT IS LONGITUDE 100 WEST. WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND WITHIN THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA THE COMMANDER PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE WILL IN COOPERATION AND ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS EXECUTE THE FOLLOWING TASK: DESTROY SURFACE RAIDERS WHICH ATTACK OR THREATEN UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING. INTERPRET AN APPROACH OF SURFACE RAIDERS WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER OR THE PACIFIC SOUTHEAST SUB AREA AS A THREAT TO UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING. FOR THE PRESENT THE FORCES CONCERNED WILL BASE BALBOA, BUT CNO WILL ENDEAVOR TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BASING ON SOUTH AMERICAN PORTS AS [77] Committee exhibit No. 106. [78] Netherlands East Indies. [79] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 15. [80] Id., at p. 16. [81] Chief of Naval Operations. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 99 MAY BE REQUIRED. ACTION ADEES [82] AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE INFORM CNO WHEN THESE INSTRUCTIONs HAVE BEEN PLACED IN EFFECT." In a letter to Admiral Kimmel, also on August 28, 1941. [83] Admiral Stark discussed, among other things, the status of the Japanese situation and observed that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages had been sent to them but just what they were going to do he did not know. He said he had told one of Japan's statesmen that another move, such as the one into Thailand, would go a long way toward destroying before the American public what good will still remained. Admiral Stark said he had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he wished the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender. Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter to Admiral Stark of September 12, 1941 [84] such as whether he should not issue shooting orders to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and vicinity. He said: "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?" Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941, [85] and stated, among other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in article 723 of the Navy Regulations. [86] The letter also stated, in connection with the question of submarine contacts, that they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i. e., not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, were appropriate, and continued: "If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed." Going on, Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty. In this letter, Admiral Stark inquired: "* * * would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?" In a postscript to this letter, Admiral Stark stated that Secretary Hull had informed him that the conversations with the Japanese had [82] Addressees. [83] Committee exhibit No. 106. [84] Id. [85] Id. [86] These regulations provide for the use of force in self- preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last resort. 96 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there as some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. A second postscript to the letter, in making reference to a conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura, said that Ambassador Nomura usually came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark observed that conversations without results could not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark said he had again talked to Secretary Hull and thought the Secretary would make one more try. He said that Secretary Hull kept him, Admiral Stark, pretty fully informed; and, if there was anything of moment, he would of course hasten to let Kimmel know. With this letter there was enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines. The memorandum indicated, among other things, that on September 30, 26 Flying Fortresses would leave San Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines. The following dispatch of October 16, 1941, was sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, for action: [87] "THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC AND ANTI-AMERICAN. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE U. S. IN EITHER CASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A STRONG POSSIBILITY. SINCE THE U. S. AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST JAPAN. SECOND AND THIRD ADEES INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL DISTRICT AUTHORITIES. ACKNOWLEDGE." Referring to the dispatch of October 16 concerning the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Stark stated in a letter of October 17 to Admiral Kimmel: [88] "Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility", in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any ease after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." In a postscript to this letter Admiral Stark said: "Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid [87] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18. [88] Committee exhibit No. 106. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 97. on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry. [89]" On October 17, 1941) Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information that, effective immediately, all trans-Pacific United States flag shipping to and from the Far East, India, and East India area was to be routed through the Torres Straits, keeping to the southward and well clear of the Japanese Mandates. [90] On the same day he was advised for action that- "BECAUSE OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO REINFORCE THE PHILIPPINES WITH LONG-RANGE ARMY BOMBERS YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TAKE ALL PRACTICAL PRECAUTIONS OR THE SAFETY OF THE AIRFIELDS AT WAKE AND MIDWAY. [91]" Admiral Kimmel was advised, among other things, on October 23 at until further orders all Army and Navy "trans-Pacific troop transports, ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military cargo" would be escorted both ways between Honolulu ad Manila. [92] On November 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed that complete withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters of Japanese merchant vessels appeared in progress. [93] A letter to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark on November 7 commented, among other things: [94] "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser!" A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever_ particularly if one party cannot live with the set-up. It doesn't look good." On November 14, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, stating among other things: [95] "The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press dispatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and [89] Transmitted as an enclosure to this letter was an estimate dated October 17 prepared by Admiral Schuirmann with respect to the change in the Japanese Cabinet, stating: "I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative great changes in Japanese political thought or action. "The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties." After recounting that Konoye cabinets had time and again expressed disapproval of the acts committed the Japanese military but remedial action had not been taken, that Konoye himself had declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees; that while the Konoye cabinet may have restrained the *extremists* among the military it had not opposed Japan's program of expansion by force; that when opportunities arise during the "coming months" which seemed favorable to the military for further advance, they would be seized; and that the same "bill of goods," regarding the necessity of making some concession to the moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" had been offered to the United States since the days when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador, Admiral Schuirmann concluded: "Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but *in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power" (Committee exhibit No. 106). [90] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 21. [91] Id., at p. 22. [92] Id., at p. 23. [93] Id., at p. 24. [94] Committee exhibit No. 106. [95] Id. As an enclosure to this letter, Admiral Stark forwarded a copy of a joint memorandum for the President which he and General Marshall had prepared dated November 5 and bearing caption "Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation." This memorandum was prepared with respect to dispatches received indicating it to be Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations opposed dispatching American military assistance to meet this supposed threat. For a discussion of this memorandum, see Part IV, infra, this report. 98 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Advertiser upon which concessions by the United States are necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view." On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message marked for action: [96] "CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT *A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY*. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DESPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY." The postscript of a personal letter dated November 25 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel read: [97] "I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely. "I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for, or we may do nothing_I think it is more likely to be "anything." " On November 27, 1941, the following dispatch was sent Admiral Kimmel for action: [98] "*THIS DESPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING*. NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC *HAVE CEASED* AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES THAI OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO. *EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46*. INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES. A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT. SPENAVO [99] INFORM BRITISH. CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE." [96] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. This dispatch was also sent for action to commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and commandants of the Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Naval Districts. [97] Committee exhibit No. 106. [98] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 36. This dispatch was also sent for action to the commander in chief et the Asiatic Fleet. It has been referred to throughout the proceedings as the "War Warning." [99] Special naval observer. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 99 The following dispatch dated November 28, 1941, referring to the November 27 warning, was supplied Admiral Kimmel for his information: [100] "* * * ARMY HAS SENT FOLLOWING TO COMMANDER WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND "NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE St-CH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION- OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. A SEPARATE MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G TWO NINTH CORPS AREA RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN UNITED STATES. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR THEY WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS." WPL 52 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PACIFIC AREA AND WILL NOT BE PLACED IN EFFECT IN THAT AREA EXCEPT AS NOW IN FORCE IN SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AND PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. UNDERTAKE NO OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT. BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN CASE HOSTILITIES OCCUR." On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent Admiral Kimmel a dispatch for information describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. The dispatch indicated that Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malay into Thailand. Thailand would then brand Britain an aggressor and call upon Japan for aid, thereby facilitating the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally and give Japan air bases on the Kra Peninsula and a position to carry out any further operations along Malaya. [100a] [100] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38. This dispatch was sent for action to the naval commanders on the west coast. [100a] This dispatch, No. 011400 which was addressed to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action, read: "AMBASSADOR TSUBOKAMI IN BANGKOK ON TWENTY NINTH SENT TO TOKYO AS NUMBER EIGHT SEVEN TWO THE FOLLOWING QUOTE CONFERENCES NOW IN PROGRESS IN BANGKOK CONSIDERING PLANS AIMED AT FORCING BRITISH TO ATTACK THAI AT PADANG BESSA NEAR SINGORA AS COUNTER MOVE TO JAPANESE LANDING AT KOTA BHARU SINCE THAI INTENDS TO CONSIDER FIRST INVADER AS HER ENEMY, ORANGE BELIEVES THIS LANDING IN MALAY WOULD FORCE BRITISH TO INVADE THAI AT PADANG BESSA. THAI WOULD THEN DECLARE WAR AND REQUEST ORANGE HELP. THIS PLAN APPEARS TO HAVE APPROVAL OF THAI CHIEF OF STAFF BIJITTO. THAI GOVERNMENT CIRCLES HAVE BEEN SHARPLY DIVIDED BETWEEN PRO-BRITISH AND PRO-ORANGE UNTIL TWENTY FIVE NOVEMBER BUT NOW WANITTO AND SHIN WHO FAVOR JOINT MILITARY ACTION WITH ORANGE HAVE SILENCED ANTI ORANGE GROUP AND INTEND TO FORCE PREMIER PIBUL TO MAKE A DECISION. EARLY AND FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ARE POSSIBLE UNQUOTE " See committee exhibit No. 112, p. 67. 100 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK On December 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was supplied the following information for action: [101] "HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS." And, again, on December 3, 1941, he received the following message for his information: [102] "CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FOUR FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON, HONGKONG, SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY MACHINE. BATAVIA MACHINE ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO. DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY, ALL BUT ONE COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS, AND ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS. BRITISH ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED." On December 4, 1941, a dispatch [103] was supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, for his information, instructing Guam to destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter. A dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of December 6 [104] for action stated that "in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands" he was authorized to order the destruction in such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency." It was pointed out that means of communication to support "our current operations an special intelligence" should be maintained until the last moment. From a review of dispatches and correspondence sent Admiral Kimmel it is concluded that he was fully informed concerning the progressive deterioration of relations with Japan and was amply warned of the imminence of war with that nation. INFORMATION SUPPLIED GENERAL SHORT BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE IMMINENCE OF WAR The accepted practice in the Navy whereby the Chief of Naval Operations supplemented official dispatches by personal correspondence does not appear to have been followed by the War Department. The letters sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short, heretofore discussed, related largely to the latter's responsibility, steps necessary to improve the Army defenses in Hawaii, and suggestions and comments with respect thereto. It does not appear that such correspondence was employed to acquaint the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department with the international situation generally nor to convey the personal estimates and impressions of the Chief of Staff. The [101] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. This dispatch was also sent for action to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts. [102] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. This dispatch was sent for action to the commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District. [103] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 44. [104] Id., at p. 45. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 101 evidence indicates that the Army did not forward the substance of any intercepted Japanese dispatches to field commanders because of the feeling that the Army codes were generally not so secure as those of the Navy. [105] General Short, however, was supplied either directly from the War Department or by reference from his naval opposites in Hawaii adequate information concerning the critical international situation and the impending likelihood of war with Japan. The dispatch of July 3, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, advising among other things that the unmistakable deduction from information received from numerous sources was to the effect that Japan was agreed on a policy involving war in the near future, carried instructions to advise General Short. [106] Admiral Kimmel was instructed to supply General Short the information contained in the dispatch of July 25 advising of economic sanctions against Japan and possible Japanese reaction. [107] The following Navy message of October 16, 1941, was received by General Short through reference from Admiral Kimmel: [108] "THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE C. N. O. WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU. QUOTE: "JAPANESE CABINET RESIGNATION CREATES A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE ANTI-AMERICAN AND EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES. EITHER WAY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE STRONGLY POSSIBLE. SINCE BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN." " In a radiogram of October 20 signed "Adams" [109] the War Department advised the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of its estimate of the situation in the following terms: "TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS STRAINED BUT NO ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY APPEARS IMMINENT. [110]" Admiral Kimmel was instructed to advise General Short concerning the dispatch of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations [111] advising, among other things, that "chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful" and movements of Japanese forces "indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." General Short expressed the belief that he had seen this dispatch. [112] [105] See committee record, pp. 2220-2222. [106] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 4; also, No. 32, p. 1. [107] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14; also No. 32, p. 2. [108] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18; also, No. 32, p. 3. See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 279. [109] Maj. Gen. Emory S. Adams, Adjutant General. [110] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 4. See also Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258. [111] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 5 [112] See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258. 102 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK A dispatch of November 26 signed "Adams" was sent General Short reading in part as follows: [113] "* * * IT IS DESIRED THAT THE PILOTS BE INSTRUCTED TO PHOTOGRAPH TRUK ISLAND IN THE CAROLINE GROUP JALUIT IN THE MARSHALL GROUP. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY. INFORMATION DESIRED AS TO THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF NAVAL VESSELS INCLUDING SUBMARINES * * * INSURE THAT BOTH B-TWENTY FOUR AIR PLANES ARE FULLY EQUIPPED WITH GUN AMMUNITION UPON DEPARTURE FROM HONOLULU. [114]" The November 27 dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel beginning "This despatch is to be considered a war warning" [115] contained instructions that General Short be informed and he did in fact see this warning. On November 27 the following dispatch signed "Marshall" [116] was sent General Short by the War Department: [117] "NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT *HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT*. IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT, REPEAT CANNOT, BE AVOIDED THE *UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT*. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION *YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY* BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS." The following dispatch signed 'Miles', [118] and also dated November 27, was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department: [119] "JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALEMATE *HOSTILITIES MAY ENSUE*. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY BE EXPECTED. INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEF OF STAFF ONLY." On November 28 a dispatch signed "Adams" was directed to General Short, as follows: [120] "CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY_ FORTY FIVE). ALSO [113] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 6. [114] This reconnaissance was not flown inasmuch as the Army planes were not made ready prior to the December 7 attack. [115] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36. [116] Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff. [117] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7. [118] Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2, Army Intelligence. [119] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10. [120] Id., at p. 13. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 103 DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS, PROPERTY, AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABOTAGE, PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED. PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY, AVOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM. TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS. [120a]" Again on November 28 another dispatch from the War Department was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, as follows: [121] "ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE. THAT INSTRUCTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER YOUR CONTROL AND COMMAND IS DESIRED: AGAINST THOSE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SR 30_45) THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE. IT IS DESIRED ALSO THAT ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE INITIATED BY YOU IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE, AND PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT, PROPERTY AND ESTABLISHMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZE ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES. AVOIDING UNNECESSARY ALARM AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY. "IT IS ALSO DESIRED THAT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS YEAR REPORTS BE SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES OF ALL STEPS INITIATED BY YOU TO COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS. SIGNED ARNOLD." A dispatch dated December 5 and signed "Miles", [122] was sent the assistant chief of staff headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, to_ "CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THROUGH COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKYO REFERENCE WEATHER. [123]" ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL PURSUANT TO WARNINGS AND ORDERS FROM WASHINGTON DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS In the dispatch of October 16 [124] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation; [120a] For the reply of General Short to this message from the Adjutant General, see committee exhibit No. 32, p. 17. [121] Id., at p. 14. This message was also signed "Adams." [122] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 20. [123] This dispatch refers to the so-called winds code which will be found discussed in detail in Part IV, infra, this report. [124] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18. 104 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK that there was a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan and Russia and there also was a possibility Japan might attack the United States and Great Britain; and that he should_ "take due precautions including such *preparatory deployments* [126] as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan." Pursuant to the order Admiral Kimmel ordered submarines to assume a "war patrol" off both Wake and Midway; he reinforced Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island; he ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands; he placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in west-coast ports, held 6 submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, and delayed the sailing of 1 battleship which was scheduled to visit a west-coast navy yard; he dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island and placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating areas. [126] On October 22, Admiral Kimmel reported by letter [127] these dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. By letter dated November 7 Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet: [128] "OK on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is_what next?" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 24 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS In the dispatch of November 24 [129] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that the movements of Japanese naval and military forces_ "indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." This dispatch carried no orders for the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet [130] and would appear designed to acquaint him with the mounting tenseness of the situation as well as to supply him with an estimate of probable Japanese action. [131] No action appears to have been taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to this dispatch and he has stated that he felt the message required no action other than that which he had already taken. [132] "WAR WARNING" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27 The dispatch of November 27 began with the words: [133] "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." [134] It stated that negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the [125] Admiral Kimmel said: "The term 'preparatory deployments' used in this dispatch is nontechnical. It has no especial significance other than its natural meaning." Committee record, pp. 6708, 6709. [126] See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6709. [127] Committee exhibit No. 106. [128] Id. [129] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. [130] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 50-53. [131] Admiral Turner testified: "The dispatch of the 24th we did not consider required any immediate action, except to get ready plans for putting into effect when we gave them another warning." Committee record, p. 5159. [132] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 298, 299. [133] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36. [134] Admiral Kimmel observed: "The phrase 'war warning' cannot be made a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dispatch contained." Committee record, p. 6717. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 105 Pacific had ceased and "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days," and that "the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." Admiral Kimmel was ordered "to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46." After receiving this warning Admiral Kimmel made the deliberate decision not to institute long-range reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor against possible air attacks for reasons which will subsequently appear. [135] Between the warning and the attack on December 7 the following deployments were made and action taken: 1. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier Enterprise, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles for any sign of hostile shipping. [136] The sending of this force to Wake was pursuant to a dispatch dated November 26 to Admiral Kimmel stating, in part_ "in order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use OpNav [137] has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this is feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. [135]" Admiral Halsey knew of the war warning dispatch and held a lengthy conference with Admiral Kimmel and other officers on November 27. He stated that when he prepared to depart with the task force for Wake Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far the latter wanted him to go; that Admiral Kimmel replied "Use your common sense." [139] Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the Enterprise, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces, to which Admiral Kimmel replied he should use his own discretion. Admiral Smith stated that Admiral Halsey commented these were the best orders he had received and that if he found even Japanese sampan he would sink it. [140] 2. On December 5, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in command of Task Force 2, consisting of the carrier Lexington, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Like Halsey, Newton conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance [141] despite the fact, however, that Admiral Newton was leaving Pearl Harbor with some of the most powerful and valuable units of the Pacific fleet he was not even shown the war warning, had no knowledge of it, and indeed had no knowledge of the dispatches of October [135] The Navy court of inquiry found: "It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The commander in chief Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in ease of emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved." Navy court of inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157. [136] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750. See also testimony of Admiral Halsey, Hart inquiry record, p. 299. [137] Office of Naval Operations. [138] Dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, No. 270038, dated November 26, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 112. See also committee record, pp. 1614, 1615; also Hart inquiry record, p. 299. [139] Hart inquiry record, pp. 297, 298. [140] Id., at p. 43. [141] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750: see also testimony of Admiral Newton, Hart inquiry record. p. 318. 106 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 16 and November 24 or the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes to which reference will hereafter be made Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton received no information concerning the increasing danger of our relations with Japan. He was given no special orders and regarded his departure from Hawaii as a mission with no special significance other than to proceed to Midway for the purpose of flying off the Lexington a squadron of planes for the reinforcement of the island. In consequence, no special orders were given for the arming of planes or making preparation for war apart from ordinary routine. [142] The failure to supply Admiral Newton any orders or information is in marked contrast with the "free hand" orders given Admiral Halsey. In his testimony Admiral Kimmel stated that Admiral Newton's orders and information would have come through Admiral Brown, who was Newton's superior. [142a] 3. Admiral Wilson Brown on December 5 left Pearl Harbor en route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises. [143] 4. On November 28, orders were issued to bomb unidentified submarines found in the operating sea areas around Oahu. Full security was invoked for the ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts. [144] However, no change was made in the condition of readiness in port except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they began sweeping the harbor channel and approaches. [145] 5. Upon receipt of the war warning Admiral Kimmel ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake and Midway on December 2 and 3 they searched to a distance of 525 miles. [146] 6. A squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor was ordered to replace the squadron which went from Midway to Wake. This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded from Johnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5, and 6. On December 7, five of these Midway based patrol planes were searching the sector 120 to 170 from Midway, to a distance of 450 miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the Lexington at a point 400 miles from Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready striking force. [147] Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified before the Hewitt inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was executed, stating_ "there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and [142] See Hart inquiry record, pp. 316 318. [142a] In this regard, the testimony of Admiral Brown indicates that he was not shown the "war warning". See testimony of Rear Admiral Brown before the Roberts Commission, Committee exhibit No. 143. [143] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751 [144] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 299, 300; see also committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96. 115 [145] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 395. [146] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751. [147] See Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, page 6752; also testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 684. It should be noted that Admiral Inglis stated, "*There is no written record available of any searches having be made on December 6, either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway*." For further testimony of Adm. Inglis concerning the matter of reconnaissance see committee record, pp. 70-73. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 107 Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft. [148]" While the dispatch of the three task forces does not appear to have been primarily made by Admiral Kimmel as a result of the implications of the war warning, [149] this action combined with the other steps above- mentioned had the effect of providing reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol-plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor covering a distance of nearly 5,000 miles. Each squadron as it proceeded would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path, bring under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of- ocean area. In addition, submarines of the Fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously. [150] The southwest approaches to Hawaii were thereby to a degree effectively screened by reconnaissance from a raiding force bent on attacking Pearl Harbor by surprise. [151] *Nothing was done, however, to detect an approaching hostile force coming from the north and northwest, recognized as the most dangerous sector, and it is into the justification for this non-action that we shall inquire*. [152] EVALUATION OF THE WAR WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27. ON WHERE THE ATTACK MIGHT COME Admiral Kimmel stated that the war warning dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area nor did it state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. [153] The warning dispatch did not, it is true, mention Pearl Harbor as a specific point of attack, and gave the estimate that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. [153a] It is to be recalled in this connection, however, that the November 24 dispatch [153b] to Admiral Kimmel warned of "*a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or (Guam is a possibility*". The latter dispatch while indicating that an attack would possibly come in the vicinity of the Philippines or Guam did nevertheless indicate, by use of the words "*in any direction*," that just where the attack might come could not be predicted. [154] [148] Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 321, 322. [149] See committee record, pp. 9312, 9313. [150] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6752. [151] In this connection, see testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9321, 9324. [152] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9324, 9325, also 9436, 9437. [153] Admiral Kimmel testified: "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable." Committee record, p 6715. For a detailed statement by Admiral Kimmel concerning where the attack might come based on the "war warning," see Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 301. [153a] For the full text of the "war warning" dispatch, see p. 98, supra. [153b For the full text of the November 24 dispatch, see p. 98, supra. [154] Admiral Kimmel stated that in the November 24 dispatch the words "in any direction" did include so far as his estimate was concerned, a possible submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands but not an air attack. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 299. It has been pointed out that the estimate of enemy action referred to in the "war warning"_*an amphibious operation to the South*_is to be distinguished from *a surprise aggressive movement in any direction* mentioned in the November 24 warning; that the distinction between an amphibious expedition and a surprise aggressive movement is such that a war warning in making reference to such an expedition in no way superseded the estimate of surprise aggressive action mentioned in the November 24 dispatch. See in this regard the testimony of Admiral Turner, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 997, 1020. 108 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The fact that Admiral Kimmel was ordered to take "an appropriate *defensive deployment* preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46" indicated that his situation was subject to possible danger requiring such action. [155] It was Washington's responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel its best estimate of where the major strategic enemy effort would come. [156] It was Admiral Kimmel's responsibility as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to be prepared for the worst contingency, and when he was warned of war and ordered to execute a defensive deployment it was necessarily in contemplation that such action would be against all possible dangers with which the Hawaiian situation was fraught. [157] OTHER DISPATCHES RECEIVED ON NOVEMBER 27 Admiral Kimmel stated that two other dispatches which he received on November 27 were affirmative evidence that the War or Navy Departments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable. [158] The first of these dispatches read: [159] "Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament." The second read: [160] "*In order to keep the planes of the second marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use Op Nav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats; essential spare parts, tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Naval supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations? Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable." Both of these dispatches, however, were dated November 26, the day before the war warning dispatch. The latter dispatch was not to be controlled by messages which antedated it. The reinforcing of Wake and Midway was left up entirely to Admiral Kimmel both as to feasibility and desirability. [161] The fact that other outposts needed reinforcements and steps were outlined in that direction did not elim [155] In this connection it is to be noted that the "war warning" dispatch was directed for action to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet (committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36). This would appear to be an indication to Admiral Kimmel that the same defensive action was expected of him as of Admiral Hart in the Philippine area who was located in the path of the Japanese move to the south: that the message of November 27 placed in the same category_exposed to the same perils and requiring the same action_the Asiatic and the Pacific Fleets. [156] See testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 839-842. [157] See discussion regarding "Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack " Part III p. 75 et seq., supra. [158] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6716, 6717. [159] Committee exhibit No. 112, p. 54. [160] Id., at p. 55. [161] Admiral Kimmel testified before the Nay Court of Inquiry that he regarded the proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to transfer Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake in order to conserve the marine planes for expeditionary duty as a suggestion and not a directive. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 307. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 109 inate the necessity for the defense of Hawaii, the best-equipped outpost the United States possessed, nor remove it as a possible point of attack. The same is true with respect to the use of Hawaii as a crossroads for dispositions going to the Philippines or elsewhere; Hawaii was the only point we controlled in the Pacific which had adequate facilities to be such a crossroads. "PSYCHOLOGICAL HANDICAPS" INDICATED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL In his testimony Admiral Kimmel has suggested that one can appreciate the "psychological handicaps" that dispatches he received placed upon the Navy in Hawaii. He stated: "In effect, I was told: "Do take precautions" [162] "Do not alarm civilians" [163] "Do take a preparatory deployment" [164] "Do not disclose intent" [165] "Do take a defensive deployment" [166] "Do not commit the first overt act." [167] In this connection, however, it is to be noted that the only cautions mentioned, which were contained largely in Army messages, were not to alarm civilians, not to disclose intent, and not to commit the first overt act. To have deployed the fleet; to have instituted distant reconnaissance; to have effected a higher degree of readiness, on a maneuver basis if necessary_none of these steps would have alarmed the civilian population of Hawaii, [168] have disclosed intent, or have constituted an overt act against Japan. Admiral Kimmel's contention must be judged in light of the fact that on November 28 on his own responsibility, [169] he instructed the fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas. [170] The Office of Naval Operations acquiesced in this order to depth bomb submarine contacts. Admiral Halsey, prior to departing for Wake Island on November 28, received orders from Admiral Kimmel which he interpreted as permitting him to sink "even a Japanese sampan" if he found it. [171] Asked by Admiral Halsey as to how far he "should go" Admiral Kimmel replied, "Use your common sense." [172] [162] Referring to the dispatch of October 16 advising of the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and stating in part, "You will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan." See committee exhibit No. 37. [163] Referring to a portion of the dispatch of November 28 sent Admiral Kimmel for information and incorporating a portion of an Army message sent the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, which latter message stated in part, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act * * *. Measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." See committee exhibit No. 37. [164] Referring to the dispatch of October 16, note 162, supra. [165] Referring to the dispatches of October 16 and November 28, notes 162 and 163, supra. [166] Referring to the "war warning" dispatch of November 27. Committee exhibit No. 37. [167] Referring to the dispatch of November 28, note 163, supra. [168] There had been air raid drills at Pearl Harbor on April 24, May 12, 13; June 19; July 10, 26; August 1, 20; September 5, 27; October 13, 27; and November 12, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 120. [169] As stated by the Navy court of inquiry: "* * * he (Admiral Kimmel) has issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and *ran the risk of committing an overt act against Japan*, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule 'shoot first and explain afterwards'." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157. [170] See dispatch No. 280355 from Admiral Kimmel to the Pacific Fleet with a copy for information to the Office of Naval Operations; committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96. For a description of the fleet operating sea areas, see committee exhibit No. 6, Item 3. [171] See Hart inquiry record, p. 43. [172] Id., at pp. 297, 298. 110 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The "war warning" dispatch of November 27 to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet contained no cautions, admonitions, or restraints whatever. [173] THE "WAR WARNING" AND TRAINING It has been pointed out by Admiral Kimmel that had he effected all-out security measures upon receiving each alarming dispatch from Washington, the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the fleet could not have been prepared for war. [174] To appraise the merit of this observation it is necessary to consider the nature of instructions with respect to training under which the fleet operated. Admiral Kimmel has stated he was under a specific injunction to continue the training program, referring in this connection to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations dated April 3, 1941. [175] In this letter, however, the Chief of Naval Operations had stated the question was *when* and not *whether* we would enter the war and that in the meantime he would advise that Admiral Kimmel devote as much time as may be available to training his forces in the particular duties which the various units might be called upon to perform under the Pacific Fleet operating plans. Clearly the suggestion that training be conducted was made pending a more critical turn indicating the imminence of war. The dispatch of November 27 with vivid poignance warned of war with Japan. It stated that negotiations with Japan looking to stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had *ceased* and that an *aggressive move* by Japan was expected *within the next few days*. The time for training for a prospective eventuality was past_the eventuality, war, was at hand. [175] In none other of the dispatches had the commander in chief been so emphatically advised that war was imminent. Indeed the November 27 dispatch used the words "war warning," an expression which Admiral Kimmel testified he had never before seen employed in an of official dispatch in all of his 40 years in the Navy. Manifestly the commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would not expect that it would be necessary for the Navy Department to advise him to put aside his training now that war was imminent. The "war warning" provided adequate indication that the primary function thereafter was not training but defense against a treacherous foe who had invariably struck without a declaration of war. THE TERM DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT AND FAILURE TO INSTITUTE DISTANT RECONNAISSANCE Admiral Kimmel has made particular reference to the fact that the term "defensive deployment" was nontechnical and that it was to be [173] Referring to the November 27 warning, Admiral Stark said: "This message begins with the words 'This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.' These words were carefully weighed and chosen after considerable thought and discussion with my principal advisors and with the Secretary of the Navy. The words 'war warning' had never before been used in any of my dispatches to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. They were put at the beginning of the message to accentuate the extreme gravity of the situation. We considered the picture as we saw it and we felt that there was grave danger of Japan striking anywhere. We wanted our people in the Pacific to know it, and we used language which we thought would convey what we felt." Committee record, pp. 5650, 5651. [174] Committee record p. 6703, see also testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Committee record, p. 9350. [175] Committee record p. 6702. For letter see committee exhibit No. 106. [176] Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel stated, after outlining the circumstances attending the decision, testified: "* * * I made the decision on the 27th of November not to stop training in the Fleet but to continue until further developments." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 285. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 111 effected "preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46." This plan called for a raid upon the Marshall Islands by the Pacific Fleet very shortly after hostilities with Japan should begin. Admiral Kimmel has pointed out that the prime purpose of the raids was to divert Japanese strength from the Malay Barrier. He has observed that the only patrol planes of consequence at Pearl Harbor were assigned to the fleet and that these planes would be required in the raid on the Marshalls. He further pointed out that he had only 49 patrol planes in flying condition, an insufficient number to conduct each day a 360 distant reconnaissance from Oahu. In this connection he observed that to insure an island base against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes, it was necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles and that this required 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours to cover the 360 perimeter. He testified that, of course, the same planes and the same crews cannot make a 16-hour flight every day and therefore for searches of this character over a protracted period 250 patrol planes would be required. He observed that a search of all sectors of approach to an island base is the only type of search that deserves the name and that he manifestly had an insufficient number of planes for this purpose. [177] In consequence of this situation, Admiral Kimmel decided to undertake no distant reconnaissance whatever from Pearl Harbor and regarded the deployment of the task forces and other measures already indicated as an adequate defensive deployment within the terms of the order contained in the war warning. [178] In this connection, as heretofore pointed out, Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified before the Hewitt Inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was executed, stating_ "there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft. [179]" He further stated that the language with respect to a defensive deployment in the war warning was a "direction" and that he considered the action taken constituted an appropriate defensive deployment; that it was a major action in line with the measure to execute an appropriate defensive deployment; and that the major portion of the fleet was disposed in Hawaiian waters and reinforcements were sent to Midway and Wake. He said, however, that the establishing of an air patrol from Oahu to guard against a surprise attack by Japan would have been an appropriate act but that_ "no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other requirements. [180]" Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said that following the war warning of November 27 the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans. [181] [177] See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6752-6750. [178] See committee record, pp. 6759-6761; also Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 1144, 1145. [179] In Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 321, 322. [180] Id., at pp. 323, 324. [181] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 372, 373. 112 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans, who had a principal part in preparing the November 27 war warning, testified as follows with respect to the term *defensive deployment*: [182] "Before coming to the meat of the answer, I invite attention to the fact that this dispatch has a multiple address. It goes to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action and it goes to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for action. It is as if it were the Army practice, with two dispatches, one addressed to each, but both in identical terms. "A "deployment" is a spreading out of forces. A naval deployment means to spread out and make ready for hostilities. To get into the best positions from which to execute the operating plans against the enemy. The defensive deployment as applied to Hawaii, which is of chief interest, was for the defense of Hawaii and of the west coast of the United States, because one of the tasks of WPL-6 is to defend the territory and coastal zones, our own territory and coastal zones, and to defend our shipping. "Instead of being in a concentrated place, or instead of being off in some distant region holding exercises and drills, it meant that the forces under the command of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet could take station for the most probable attack against them or against the Hawaiian Islands, keeping in mind their responsibilities for covering the United States and Panama. "The deployment in the vicinity of Hawaii, if wide enough, would in itself constitute a formidable barrier against any attempt further east, and we definitely did not expect an attack, that is, the Navy did not, an attack on the west coast or in Panama, as is indicated by a dispatch going out the same day to the commandants of districts to take precautions against subversive activities but we did not tell them to make any defensive deployment. "The deployment from Hawaii might have been made in a number of different ways. Certainly I would expect that in accordance with the plans that should have been drawn up, and they were, that airplanes would have been sent to Midway, if not already there, to Wake, to Johnston Island, to Palmyra, the reconnaissance planes as well as defensive planes, and that a reconnaissance would have been undertaken. The movement of those planes and forces to those positions constituted part of the defensive deployment. "The battleships, of course, were of no use whatsoever against undamaged fast ships. Naturally, it was not to be expected that the Japanese would bring over slow ships unless they were making their full and complete effort against Hawaii so that a proper deployment for the battleships would have been in the best position to do what was within their power, which was only to defend Hawaii against actual landings. In other words if they had been at sea and in a retired position even, such that if actual landings were attempted on the Hawaiian Islands and at such a distance that they could arrive prior to or during the landings, they would have been most useful indeed to have interfered with and defeated the landings. "Since, as has been pointed out previously, the danger zone, the danger position of Hawaii was to the north because there were not little outlying islands there from which observation could have been made, since there was no possibility of detecting raiders from the north except by airplanes and ships, an appropriate deployment would have been to have sent some fast ships, possibly with small seaplanes, up to the north to assist and possibly to cover certain sectors against approach, which the long-range reconnaissance could not have done. Of course, these ships would naturally have been in considerable danger, but that was what they were there for, because fighting ships are of no use unless they are in a dangerous position so that they can engage the enemy and inflict loss on them. "Another part of a deployment, even where airplanes would not be moved, would have been to put them on operating air fields scattered throughout the islands so that they could be in a mutual supporting position with respect to other fields and to cover a somewhat wider arc. "Another part of the deployment would have been to have sent submarines, as many as were available, out into a position from which they could exercise either surveillance or could make attacks against approaching vessels. "It is to be noted that there was no offensive action ordered for submarines. The offensive action, of course, would have been to send them into Japanese waters." [182] Committee record, pp. 5168-5172. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 113 With respect to the same matter, Admiral Stark said that he had anticipated that full security measures would be taken, that the Army would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the aircraft warning service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness measures, distant reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures, and that the plans previously agreed on with the Army would be implemented. [183] In considering the validity of Admiral Kimmel's position that the order to execute an appropriate defensive deployment is inseparable from the language "preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL-46" it is necessary to consider what the purport of the message would have been without the words "execute an appropriate defensive deployment." In such case Admiral Kimmel might conceivably have been partially justified in making all preparations with a view to carrying out the tasks assigned after war began. But under the terms of the dispatch as received by him he was to do something else. He was to execute a defensive deployment preparatory to carry-ing out these tasks_a defensive deployment before war broke. Furthermore, Admiral Kimmel received for his information the message of November 28 directed for action to the naval commanders on the west coast. [184] After quoting the Army dispatch of November 27 to the commander of the Army Western Defense Command, this message stated: "* * * Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur." The west coast commanders were not ordered to effect a defensive deployment, only to *be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46*. Here was a clear indication to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet that he was to do something significantly more than merely getting prepared to carry out war tasks. He was to execute a *defensive deployment* preparatory to carrying out such tasks. And among Admiral Kimmel's tasks under the war plans, prior to outbreak of war, were the maintenance of fleet security and guarding "against a surprise attack by Japan." As has already been seen in the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier it was recognized that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas and a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor; that it appeared "the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack." 185 [183] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 54-62, 84. Asked what was meant by the "defensive deployment" in the message of November 27, Admiral Stark said: "My thought in that message about the defensive deployment was clear all-out security measures. Certainly, having been directed to take a defensive deployment, the Army having been directed to make reconnaissance, but regardless of the Army, our message to Admiral Kimmel, that the natural thing-and perhaps he did to it-was to take up with the Army right away in the gravity of the situation, the plans that they had made, and then make dispositions as best he could against surprise for the safety not only of the ships which he decided to keep in port but also for the safety of the ships which he had at sea. He had certain material which he could use for that and we naturally expected he would use it." "* * * *a defensive deployment would be to spread and to use his forces to the maximum effect to avoid surprise and if he could, to hit the other fellow and in conjunction with the Army, to implement the arrangement which had previously been made for just this sort of thing*." Committee record, pp. 5705, 5706. [184] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38. [185] See committee exhibit No. 44. Admiral Bellinger testified that in his opinion an air attack was the most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor. Committee record, p. 9355. He further testified that the Martin-Bellinger estimate was not an estimate of the strategy that the Japanese would employ in starting the war but rather an estimate covering the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu, in other words, that it was not an estimate which indicated that Japan was going to strike against Oahu as part of their national strategy but rather if they were going to strike Oahu this was the estimate of how it would be done. Committee record, p. 9382. 114 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK With the clear recognition that Japan might attack before a declaration of war and with a war warning carrying an order to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to performing tasks during war, it is difficult to understand why Admiral Kimmel should have concluded that no distant air reconnaissance should be conducted, particularly in the dangerous sector to the north. Apart from radio intelligence which will be later discussed, distant reconnaissance admittedly was the only adequate means of detecting an approaching raiding force in sufficient time to avoid a surprise attack. Certainly the sector from the west to the south was covered, partially at least, by the three task forces. And yet the most dangerous sector, the 90 counterclockwise from due north to due west, the sector through which the Japanese striking force approached, was given no attention whatever. [186] Admiral Bellinger testified that had distant reconnaissance been conducted it would have been to the north [187] and, although he was responsible for Navy patrol planes, Admiral Bellinger was not even shown the war warning. [188] Admiral Kimmel has suggested that under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Admiral Bloch was responsible for distant reconnaissance and had the latter desired planes he could have called upon the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. [189] This suggestion, apart from being incompatible with Admiral Kimmel's stating he made the decision not to conduct distant reconnaissance, is not tenable. Admiral Bloch had no planes with which to conduct distant patrols and Admiral Kimmel knew it. [190] While he was on the ground, it was the responsibility of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to take all necessary steps in line with a defensive deployment and in recognition of the realities at Hawaii to protect the fleet. [191] Admiral Kimmel's assertion that only a 360 -distant; reconnaissance is worthy of the name ignores the fact that a 90 arc to the southwest was being partially covered, a fact concerning which he has made a point in testifying before the committee. Manifestly, to have conducted reconnaissance to any extent would have been more effective than no reconnaissance at all. [192] And Admiral Kimmel had adequate [186] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Committee record, pp. 9369, 9370; also section "Plans for the Defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," Part III, this report. [187] Committee record, pp. 9324, 9325; also Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 506, 507. In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked what he could consider the most probable areas of approach for a surprise attack launched from carriers against Pearl Harbor. He replied: "I testified before the so-called Roberts Commission that I thought the northern sector was the most probable. I thought at the time that the aircraft had come from the north-the time I testified I mean-and I didn't wish to make alibis. However, I feel that there is no sector around Oahu which is much more dangerous than any other sector. We have an island which can be approached from any direction. There is no outlying land which prevents this, and you have got a 360 arc, minus the very small line which runs up along the Hawaiian chain. From the southern, we have observation stations, Johnston and Palmyra, and the closest Japanese possession is to the southwestward in the Marshalls, and these Japanese carriers were fuel eaters and short-legged. I would say that while all sectors are important, if I were restricted, I would probably search the western 180 sector first." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 305. [188] Committee record, pp. 9305, 9306; also 9362, 9363. [189] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1125. [190] The Navy Court of Inquiry found "The Naval Base Defense Officer (Admiral Bloch) was entirely without aircraft, either fighters or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled to rely upon Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157. [191] Admiral Bellinger testified that in the absence of definite information as to the probability of an attack, it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel to order long-range reconnaissance. Hart Inquiry record, p. 125. [192] Admiral Bellinger testified that covering certain selected sectors was a possible and feasible operation. Admiral Kimmel admitted that "Of course, any patrol run has some value. I will admit that as far as surface ship." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1125. Admiral Stark testified: "When you haven't got enough planes to search the entire area which you would like to search, whether it is planes or what not, you narrow down to where you think is the most likely area of travel and your next study is how can you cover that or how much of it can you cover." Committee record p. 5702. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 115 patrol planes to conduct distant reconnaissance for an extended period throughout the most dangerous sectors. The evidence reflects that there were 81 planes available to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet which were capable of performing distant reconnaissance. [193] Estimates of the number which can properly be regarded as in a state of readiness to conduct reconnaissance flights from Oahu as of December 7 range from 48 to 69. In addition the Army had six long-range bombers [194] which were available to the Navy under the plans for joint air operations at Hawaii. Even with the minimum estimate of 48 and the conservative basis of employing each plane only once every 3 days, [195] a sector of 128 could have been covered daily for several weeks. [196] This fact, when considered with the reconnaissance sweeps from Midway and by the task forces, leaves clear that the most dangerous sectors could have been fully covered. [197] In all events it would have been entirely possible and proper to have employed aircraft to any extent available for distant reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, using submarines, destroyers, or other vessels in the less dangerous approaches to Oahu. [198] That substantial and effective distant reconnaissance could have been conducted is demonstrated by the fact that it was instituted immediately after the attack despite the fact that over half the available planes were rendered inoperative by the attack. [199] Yet Admiral Kimmel contends that use of all his available planes would have unduly impaired his ability to carry out the offensive measures assigned the Pacific Fleet in the event of war. [200] The evidence establishes, however, that his plans for the conduct of [193] See committee exhibit No 120. [194] Admiral Bellinger stated; however, that the Army reported 8 B-17's available for December 6 1941. Committee record, p. 9307 [195] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9328, 9329. [196] Id., Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 480-507. See also committee record, p. 9330 where Bellinger stated the patrol could be maintained for 11 days to 2 weeks, perhaps longer. Admiral Bellinger testified that 1 patrol plane could cover 8 to 700 miles. Committee record p. 9325. [197] Admiral Davis, fleet aviation officer, said that the entire 360 circumference was not of equal importance; that a considerable arc to the north and west and another arc to the south and west were the most important. He said that although there were not enough planes and pilots to have established and maintained a long-range 360 search indefinitely, there were enough to have made searches using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft. Hart Inquiry record, pp. 98, 99; 240, 241. [198] The evidence before the committee contradicts the following conclusion of the Navy Court of Inquiry: "Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to perform this duty (reconnaissance) even if the necessary number be available. The resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the fleet incapable of performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarines over an extensive sea area is a means of continuously guarding against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not sound military procedure either in peace or in war." *The committee regards the employment of surface vessels for the purpose of reconnaissance as sound military procedure where reconnaissance is imperative and the more adaptable facilities, patrol planes, are not sufficiently available. See also note 192, supra. It is highly significant that the Commandant of the *15th Naval District (Panama*) was taking the following action, as reported by General Andrews to the War Department under date of November 29, 1941: "In the Panama Sector, *the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol*. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance." See Committee Exhibit No. 32, p. 18. [199] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9371, 9372. [200] In his statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel said: "Having covered the operating areas by air patrols it was not prudent in my judgment and that of my staff to fritter away our slim resources in patrol planes in token searches and thus seriously impair their required availability to carry out their functions with the Fleet under approved War Plans." When questioned concerning the time that Admiral Kimmel would be expected to start a raid against the Marshall Islands after war began, Admiral Ingersoll stated that Admiral Kimmel "*could have chosen any date, and we did not expect him to move on any particular date, we expected him to move to carry out that task when he was ready.*" If I can digress a little bit on that, I do not know that Admiral Kimmel, or anybody, knew what was the state of the Japanese fortifications and defenses in the Marshall Islands. Any movement of that kind I have no doubt would have been preceded by reconnaissance, possibly from carrier planes or possibly from some of the long-range Army planes which were fixed up for photographic purposes, and they would undoubtedly have made a reconnaissance to determine where the Japanese strength was, what islands were fortified, and so forth, and upon the receipt of that intelligence base their plans. As a matter of fact, I think we were trying to get out of the Army a reconnaissance of those islands in connections with the flight of Army planes from Hawaii to Australia. I believe it did not take place until after Pearl Harbor." Committee record, p. 11457. 116 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK offensive operations, after outbreak of war, contemplated the use of a maximum of 24 patrol planes. [201] Even if this number were deducted from those available, there were still sufficient planes to have covered at least the entire dangerous northwest sector. The offensive tasks of the future did not justify disregarding the danger that the Pacific Fleet might be caught by surprise while still in port and before offensive operations could begin. In making the decision not to conduct distant reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel erred. [202] In determining whether making the decision that he did evinced poor judgment consideration must be given his responsibility as commander in chief and the realities of his situation. It was essentially his duty to protect the Pacific Fleet from all dangers to the utmost of his ability. He knew that the primary function of the Pacific Fleet in the early stages of the war was a defensive one, save for sporadic raids and limited offensive operations, in recognition o the fact that our Pacific Fleet was inferior to that of Japan. He was ordered to effect an appropriate defensive deployment. This was a general directive consistent with his specific suggestion that the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions. [203] He was given free rein to effect defensive security, in line with his more intimate knowledge of the detailed and peculiar problems affecting the Pacific Fleet, prior to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Pacific war plans. He knew that one of the tasks before the outbreak of war was guarding against a possible surprise attack by Japan. He knew that the only effective means of detecting a surprise raiding force in adequate time to combat it was by distant reconnaissance. He knew the Japanese reputation for deceit and treachery. He knew the greatest danger to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the possibility of an air raid. He knew that the maintenance and protection of the fleet while in its base constituted a fundamental element in making military dispositions at Pearl Harbor. He had been categorically warned of war. He knew or must have known that the necessity of Japan's striking the first blow required of him greater vigilance consistent with his fundamental duty as commander in chief to prepare for the worst contingency. He had adequate facilities to patrol the most dangerous approaches to Pearl Harbor. The decision was not a simple one, but, failing to resolve his dilemma by seeking advice from the Navy Department, [204] Admiral Kimmel displayed poor judgment in failing to [201] See committee record, p. 9316 et seq. As to the use of long-distance patrol Planes by Admiral Kimmel in prospective raids on the Marshall Islands under the war plans, Admiral Ingersoll stated: "The radius of patrol planes out there was about 600 miles, or somewhere m the neighborhood of a 1,200-mile flight. They could not have been used in that operation to cover actual operations in the Marshalls area, unless he was able to establish a base in the Marshalls from which the planes could operate. They could, however, cover the movement of vessels to the westward of Johnston and Palmyra and Wake to the extent that their radius could take them, that is 600 miles from those positions." Committee record, p. 11450. [202] There is no substantial evidence of any specific discussions between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning" concerning the advisability or practicability of distant reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral McMorris, war plans officer, thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The commander of the fleet patrol Planes, Admiral Bellinger, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no discussion with him concerning the matter. [203] See memorandum from Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated May 23, 1941, committee exhibit No. 106. Admiral Stark testified that the handling of the Pacific Fleet was up to the commander in chief: "* * * it was then up to the Commander in Chief on the spot. I would not have presumed, sitting at a desk in Washington, to tell him what to do with his fleet. There were many factors involved, of which he was the only person who had the knowledge, and once I had started, if I had started, to give him directives, I would have been handling the fleet. That was not my job." Committee record, p. 5705. [204] Referring to the order to execute an appropriate "defensive deployment," Admiral Kimmel stated: "This appropriate defensive deployment was a new term to me. I decided that what was meant was something similar to the disposition I had made on October 16, which had been approved by the originator of both these dispatches (Chief of Naval Operations), and I therefore made the dispositions which I have outlined." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 305. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 117 employ every instrumentality at his command to defend the fleet. [205] Conceding for purposes of discussion that Admiral Kimmel's decision to employ none of the fleet patrol planes for distant reconnaissance was a reasonable military decision under the circumstances the very fact of having made such decision placed upon him the affirmative responsibility of determining that every other available means for reconnaissance was being employed to protect the fleet. His determination not to conduct long-range reconnaissance is of itself a recognition by him that it was his obligation to provide such reconnaissance. He knew that the Army was depending upon him for certain defensive measures. [206] Further, the fact that there was an agreement with the Army at Hawaii whereby the Navy was to perform distant reconnaissance placed upon Admiral Kimmel the obligation of advising General Short that he had decided not to conduct such reconnaissance. Indeed, General Short, who saw the war warning, testified that in his opinion the "defensive deployment" which the Navy was directed to execute "would necessarily include distant reconnaissance." [207] Admiral Kimmel's clear duty, therefore, in the absence of Navy reconnaissance was to confer with General Short to insure that Army radar, antiaircraft, and planes were fully utilized and alerted. None of these things were done. And there appears to be no substantial reason for failure to call upon the Army, consistent with the joint plans, for the six long-range bombers which were admittedly available to the Navy at Hawaii for the asking. [208] ACTION WHICH WAS NOT TAKEN UPON RECEIPT OF THE "WAR WARNING" As has been seen, following the warning dispatch of November 27 no distant reconnaissance as such was instituted. [208a] This meant that there was no adequate means whatever taken by the Navy to detect [205] The Navy Court of Inquiry found "It is a fact that the use of fleet patrol planes for daily long-range all-around reconnaissance was not justified in the absence of information indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time." The committee is in essential disagreement with this conclusion. Admiral Kimmel was warned in categorical fashion of war on November 27, 2 days after the Japanese Task Force bad left Hitokappu Bay and while on the way to Pearl Harbor. *It is difficult to imagine hour it would hare been possible from Washington to have narrowed the limits of time in which Japan might strike in any more timely fashion, particularly inasmuch as Radio Intelligence had lost track completely of substantial carrier units of the Japanese Fleet*. This being true, distant reconnaissance was the only possible means of detecting the striking force within adequate time to prepare to meet the attack. There was no other channel for indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time or otherwise. Going on, the Navy Court of Inquiry stated: "It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was not possible with the inadequate number of fleet planes available." The court is here of course referring to all- around reconnaissance from Oahu. *As has been clearly indicated, there were adequate facilities for patrolling the more dangerous sectors, a procedure that was practical, feasible, and desirable*. [204] As stated by the commander in chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King: "In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because principle, this is not normally a fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciate properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should have bee strong enough for self-defense. The fact that *it was* not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for employing the fleet in the defensive measures." See "Second Endorsement" to report of Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157. Admiral King also observed, "I think * * * that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general." Id. [207] Committee record, pp. 7926, 7927. [208] See in this connection testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, p. 9310. [208a] When questioned as to any reason why Admiral Kimmel should not have had long-range reconnaissance operating from November 27 on through to the time Japan struck, with whatever planes we had eve if it were only "three," Admiral Ingersoll replied: "I had every reason to expect that he would do that and I was surprised that he had not done it. As I stated the other day, I was very much surprised that the attack had gotten in undetected * * * I expected that it would be done not only because the plane were there, but because this (WPL-46) plan inferred that it was going to be done. It never occurred to him that it was not being done." Committee record, p. 11420. 118 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the approach of a raiding force in sufficient time to repel it or effectively minimize the force of an attack. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel were operating in accordance with schedules prepared as of November 22, 1941, stressing training operations. These schedules were not changed prior to the attack. No effort was made to secure the available long-range bombers of the Army for reconnaissance. No change was made in the condition of readiness of vessels in Pearl Harbor which had been in effect for a considerable period of time preceding November 27. [209] This condition of readiness has been referred to as "an augmented Navy No. 3," the No. 3 condition being the lowest state of readiness. [210] The three conditions of readiness established for the Navy were: No. 1. Entire crew, officers and men at battle stations. Action imminent. No. 2. Provides the means of opening fire immediately with one half the armament. Enemy believed to be in vicinity. No. 3. Provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the second- ary and antiaircraft batteries in case of surprise encounter. While it appears that condition No. 3 prevailed subsequently during wartime at Pearl Harbor and is the condition normally maintained in port, there nevertheless was an extensive distant reconnaissance designed to alert the fleet to a higher condition of readiness prior to possible attack and to afford a considerable measure of protection. This means of protection was not available to the fleet on the morning of December 7. [211] [209] In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked: "On the morning of 7 December 1941, preceding the attack, can you tell the court what the material condition of readiness was in effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor?" Admiral Kimmel replied: "The condition of readiness No. 3, as laid down in 2CL-41 had been prescribed some time before by Vice Admiral Pye, and that was in effect on the day of the attack. In addition to that, the Commander of Battleships, Battle Force, had issued an order requiring two 5-inch guns and two 50-calibre guns on each battleship to be manned at all times. These were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, manned on the date in question." P. 278 The three conditions of readiness with respect to naval base defense, as set forth in 2CL-41 follow: Condition I. General quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer. Condition II. One-half of antiaircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer. Condition III. Antiaircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector) manned and ready (minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer. See committee exhibit No. 44. Admiral Kimmel was asked whether, upon receipt of the November 27 war warning, he consulted with the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on any measures of security to be adopted in the Fourteenth Naval District that were different from any then in effect. He replied that he discussed the message with the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District but no additional measures of security were deemed advisable as a result of the conversation. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 303. [210] While virtually all antiaircraft guns aboard ship were firing within 10 minutes, only about one-fourth were "ready machine guns" available to fire immediately. Inasmuch as by far the greatest damage was effected by the torpedo planes in the first wave, a higher degree of readiness would have reduced beyond question the effectiveness of this initial thrust. Admiral Kimmel said: "*Had it not been for the torpedoes I think the damage would hare been enormously less*." Roberts record, p. 547. For the indicated reason the conclusion of Navy Court of Inquiry that "a higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to the defense" is in error. See Navy Court of Inquiry report committee exhibit No. 157. [211] In its report, the Navy Court of Inquiry has observed: "It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval Personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it would not be known when an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December. This statement contains within itself the certain proof of its invalidity. It was for the very reason that it could not be known when an attack would take place that it was essential a higher degree of readiness prevail. If it were possible to know with definitiveness when the attack would come the necessity for a higher state of readiness would be obviated until the time for the attack had approached. Furthermore, the extreme state of readiness suggested by the court is a far cry from the lowest conditions of readiness which prevailed at the time of the attack in both the Army and Navy Commands. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 119 No change was effected in the state of readiness of naval aircraft. The aircraft on the ground and the patrol planes moored on the water were not in condition to take to the air promptly. Approximately 50 percent of the planes on December 7 were on 4 hours' notice. Having elected to institute no distant reconnaissance by aircraft, no effort was made to inaugurate patrols by surface or subsurface craft to compensate and partially serve in lieu of distant reconnaissance by planes. [212] The evidence shows there were 29 destroyers and 5 submarines in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7. [213] While the employment of surface craft or submarines in lieu of distant air reconnaissance is not altogether satisfactory or fully effective, it nonetheless would have provided a measure of protection more to be desired than no reconnaissance whatever. No effort was made to maintain a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible raiding forces approaching through the dangerous northern sector. [214] No change was made in the schedules of ships proceeding to Pearl Harbor with a view to maintenance of a minimum force at harbor with provision for entry into port at irregular intervals. After the decision to institute no distant reconnaissance, the Navy did not check or otherwise maintain effective liaison with the Army as to the readiness of Army antiaircraft defense and aircraft warning installations. ESTIMATE AND ACTION TAKEN BY GENERAL SHORT WITH RESPECT TO THE WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27 The commanding general of the Hawaiian Department does not appear to have taken any appreciable action, apart from his normal training operations, on the basis of any information received by him with respect to our critical relations with Japan prior to the warning of November 27 from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. This dispatch, No. 472, [215] advised that negotiations with Japan appeared terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue; that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment. It stated that if hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that Japan commit the first overt act. It pointed out, however, that this policy should not be construed as restricting General Short to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. It ordered the commanding general, prior to hostile Japanese action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary but admonished that these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. It instructed that should hostilities occur, General Short should carry out the tasks assigned in the war plans insofar as they applied to Japan. He was to limit the dissemination of "this highly secret information to minimum essential officers" and to report measures taken. [212] See note 192, supra. [213] Committee exhibit No. 6. [214] Id. [215] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7. 120 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Within 30 minutes of receiving this dispatch and after consulting only with his chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, [216] General Short replied to the War Department as follows: [217] "Reurad four seven two 27th. Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. SHORT." As a result of the November 27 dispatch General Short decided to institute alert No. 1, the lowest of three alerts provided for the Hawaiian Department. The three alerts were: [218] No. 1. Defense against sabotage and uprisings. *No threat from without*. No. 2. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to No. 1. No. 3. Requires occupation of all field positions by all units, pre- pared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands. At the same time that he ordered alert No. 1, the commanding general directed that the Interceptor Command, including the Aircraft Warning Service (Radar) and Information Center, should operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. daily. In addition, it should be noted that the six mobile radar stations operated daily except Sunday from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. for routine training and daily, except Saturday and Sunday, from 12 noon until 4 p. m. for training and maintenance work. [210] In explaining his reasons and the considerations responsible for his instituting an alert against sabotage only, General Short has stated: (1) That the message of November 27 contained nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii; [220] (2) that he received other messages after the November 27 dispatch emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive activities; [221] (3) that the dispatch was a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as an overt act; [222] (4) that he was looking to the Navy to provide him adequate warning of the approach of a hostile force, particularly through distant reconnaissance which was a Navy responsibility; [223] and (5) that instituting alerts 2 or 3 would have seriously interfered with the training mission of the Hawaiian Department. [224] NO WARNING OF ATTACK ON HAWAII The first statement by General Short that there was nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii will be considered. Implicit in this contention is the assumption that, despite the known imminence of war between the United States and Japan and the fact that he commanded a Pacific outpost, [216] Colonel Walter C. Phillips. See committee record, pp. 7945, 7946. [217] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12. [218] See committee exhibit No. 44. See also testimony of General Short, committee record pp. 7944, 7945. [219] Testimony of General Short, committee record, p. 7946. [220] General Short said, "There was nothing in the message directing me to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack." Committee record, p. 7929. [221] Committee record, p. 7929. [222] Id., at p. 7927. [223] Id., at p. 7946 et seq. [224] Id., at pp. 7948-7951. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 121 it was not his duty to be on the alert against a threat from without. This assumption does not appear to be supported by military doctrine or the logic of the Hawaiian situation prior to the attack. [225] The wording of the November 27 dispatch indicated the possibility of an attack from without in ordering General Short to undertake reconnaissance. The only conceivable reconnaissance which could have been undertaken by the Army was through employment of aircraft or radar, either or both of which would be in contemplation of an attack from without. General Marshall had told the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department much earlier, with emphasis and clarity, that the function of the Army in Hawaii was to defend the fleet base. Despite this fact, when warned that Japan's future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment and when his attention was called to the necessity for reconnaissance, General Short proceeded to institute an alert against sabotage only. This was done although there had not been one single act of sabotage on the islands up to that time; for that matter, there were no acts of sabotage thereafter, although this danger in Hawaii had been recognized by both the Hawaiian Department and Washington. [225a]. However, in all of General Short's correspondence with General Marshall the subject of sabotage was not emphasized and scarcely discussed. Quite to the contrary, the letters referred repeatedly to aircraft and antiaircraft defense. DISPATCHES INDICATING THREAT OF SABOTAGE We will now consider the contention made by General Short that he received other messages emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive activities, which to his mind confirmed the accuracy of his judgment in instituting an alert against sabotage only. All of these messages, however, were received after the warning dispatch of November 27 and after he had replied thereto. [226] They could not, therefore, have influenced in any way his decision to institute an alert against sabotage only. The first of the messages concerning possible subversive activities was signed by General Miles and was dated November 27. It pointed out that hostilities may ensue and that subversive activities may be expected. This message made definitely clear that subversive activities and sabotage were not all that might be expected but hostilities as well. In this connection, however, General Short has referred to the fact that sabotage was a form of hostile action. [227] On November 28 the Hawaiian Department received two dispatches from the War Department specifically warning of the danger of sabotage and subversive activities. [228] To the first of these dispatches which was signed by General Adams, the Adjutant General, the [225] As expressed by Secretary Stimson in his statement submitted for the committee's consideration: "The outpost commander is like a sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. He must assume that the enemy will attack at his particular post; and that the enemy will attack at the time and in the way in which it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied ." Committee record, pp. 14405, 14406. [225a] See in this connection an aide memoire concerning "Defense of Hawaii" prepared by the War Department and presented to the President by General Marshall in May of 1941. Part IV, Note 42, infra. [226] Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 10,13, and 34. [227] General Short said: " 'Hostile action at any moment' meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile action." Committee record, p. 7929. [228] For the full text of these two dispatches see pages 102 and 103, supra. 122 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK following reply (directed to the Adjutant General) was made on November 29: [229] "Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five) and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish him and to continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the commanding general Hawaiian Department, to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters." The reply (directed to General Arnold) to the second dispatch was not received in the War Department until December 10, 1941. [230] General Short, as heretofore indicated, has referred to the two dispatches from the War Department of November 28 warning of the danger of sabotage and subversive activities as confirming his original decision to institute an alert against sabotage only. It is significant, however, that the army commanders at Panama, on the West Coast, and in the Philippines received these same dispatches warning of subversive activities that were received by the Hawaiian commander. [230a] They did not deter the commanders at these other places from taking full and complete measures to alert their commands or convey to their minds that defense against sabotage was the only action required. [230b] The November 27 warning to General Short concerning possible hostile action at any moment was signed by General Marshall-a command directive- whereas the dispatches relating to sabotage and subversive activities were signed by subordinate officials of the War Department. Inasmuch as General Marshall's message contained no reference to sabotage whatever, it would seem fair to suggest that upon receiving subsequent dispatches from subordinate War Department officials warnings of this danger there should have been aroused in the Commanding General's mind the thought that perhaps he had misjudged the purport of the original warning. The evidence reflects that any reference to sabotage or subversive activities was deliberately omitted from the warning message sent General Short (and the commanders at Panama, on the West Coast, and in the Philippines) on November 27 in order "that this message could be interpreted only as [229] Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 17, 18. [230] Id, at pp. 19, 20. [231] See Committee exhibit No. 35, p. 2. [230b] For dispatches reflecting the full and complete measures taken by these commanders (Panama, West Coast, the Philippines) see Committee exhibit No. 32 pp. 11,15,15a, 16,18, 18a, and 18b. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 123 warning the commanding general in Hawaii against an attack from without. [230c] General Short stated that he assumed the Navy would conduct distant reconnaissance [230d] and that he was relying on the Navy to give him timely warning of an attack, indicating thereby that he realized the warning messages required precautionary measures against all possible contingencies. It naturally follows that his failure to take the action required by the November 27 warning was not due to the subsequent emphasis on the specific danger of subversive activities but rather by reason of his failure to institute liaison with the Navy-failure to determine what the Navy was really doing-as he advised the War Department he had done, and his unwarranted assumption that even though he did not himself institute precautionary measures against the danger of an air attacks, the Navy would do so. "DO-DON'T" CHARACTER OF THE NOVEMBER 27 DISPATCH AND AVOIDANCE OF WAR As earlier indicated, General Short has referred to the November 27 dispatch as a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as all overt act to test the merits of this contention it is necessary to aline the directives and intelligence beside the prohibitions and admonitions: Negotiations with the Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest pos- sibilities that the Japanese Govern- ment might come back and offer to con- tinue. Japanese future action unpre- dictable but hostile action possible at any moment. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary Report measures taken. Should hos- tilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. But these measures should be car- ried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Limit the dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. The first admonition appearing in the foregoing dispatch is a statement of traditional American policy against the initiation of war-*if hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires the prospective enemy to commit the first overt act*. This General Short already knew. Certainly he did not have in mind committing an overt act against Japan. There was nothing here to restrict the commanding general's [230c] See testimony of General Gerow, Committee record, pp. 2696-2698. [230d] See committee record, p. 7927. 124 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK contemplated plan of action. Indeed, the dispatch itself clearly pointed out that the policy should not be construed as restricting General Short to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. [231] The very fact that Japan must commit the first overt act emphasized the need for greater vigilance and defensive effort. The prohibition in the dispatch was that reconnaissance and "other measures" should not be carried out so as to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. This was incorporated in the message because of the large number of Japanese inhabitants and it was felt that nothing should be done, unless necessary to defense, to alarm the civil population and thus possibly precipitate an incident which would give Japan an excuse to go to war saying we had committed the first overt act. [232] No one appreciated more than General Short the abnormally large percentage of Japanese among the population of Hawaii. He knew that 37 percent or approximately 160,000 of the population were of Japanese descent, some 35,000 being aliens. This was one of the principal reasons for the alert against sabotage. [233] The civil population was inured to Army and Navy maneuvers which were going on continuously. [234] To have taken any of the logical steps to defend Oahu-reconnaissance, 24 hour operation of radar, effecting a high state of aircraft and anti-aircraft readiness-would not have alarmed a population accustomed to simulated conditions of warfare. [235] In this respect the November 27 dispatch from the War Department interjected no deterrent to full and adequate defensive measures. The admonition to limit dissemination of the information in the dispatch to minimum essential officers was within the complete discretion of the Commanding General. Dissemination of the information was to follow and not precede the selection of the proper alert; and there were no restrictions in the November 27 warning which should have precluded General Short's instituting an alert commen- [231] Mr. Stimson stated: "When General Short was informed on November 27 that 'Japanese action unpredictable' and that 'hostile action possible at any moment,' and that the policy directed 'should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense,' we had a right to assume that he would competently perform this paramount duty entrusted to him " Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record, pp. 14397, 14398. [232] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14397. This admonition was not included in the message to General MacArthur but was contained in the message to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. See committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 8, 9. [233] It is to be noted that one of the best criterions that General Short possessed to determine what might alarm the civil population was the so-called Herron Alert during the summer of 1940. This was an all- out alert with complete dispersal of planes and troops with ammunition at the guns and reconnaissance being conducted. There was no disturbance of the civil population resulting from this action. See in this connection Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2738, 2772, 2772, 3096, 3097. [234] *General Maxwell Murray testified that the action required by Alert No. 1-taking over water, lights, gas and oil utilities, patrols all over, all important bridges guarded,-was just as much of an alarm to the people that something was anticipated "as if they had gone to the beaches"-all out alert*. See Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 3096, 3097. [235] Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel testified: "I discussed the question of air attack on Pearl Harbor with the commanding general on various occasions. We simulated such attack; we sent planes in to attack Pearl Harbor, I don't know how many times, but several times, during the year I was out there, and we put the defending planes or other elements into operation." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1131. Testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked whether there were any drills furthering joint Army-Navy exercises. He replied: "Yes. Air raid drills for several months were conducted each week. For about 2 to 3 months prior to December 7,1941, we conducted the drills once every 2 weeks This was in order to insure the participation of all elements in each drill as held, and when the drills were held weekly there were too many people excused due to overhauling a plane or some work that they considered essential and more important than taking part in drills." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, P. 296. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 125 surate with the warning and orders contained therein. [235] Perhaps, after the event the warning message could be improved upon. It nevertheless was adequate and its orders should have been carried out with an appreciation of the implications of the warning it conveyed. COMMANDING GENERAL'S RELIANCE ON THE NAVY It is apparent from the evidence that General Short was depending on the Navy to give him timely and adequate warning of any enemy force approaching Hawaii. He stated that from repeated conversations with the Navy he knew that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be either in their home ports or proceeding south; that he knew the Navy had task forces at sea with reconnaissance from Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands, which would render an air attack highly improbable; that the War Plans Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff, Admiral McMorris, had stated that there was no chance of a surprise attack on Oahu; that it was only through the Navy that he could obtain information concerning the movement of Japanese vessels; and that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility. [237] General Short's unfortunate predicament on the morning of December 7 was occasioned to a degree by reason of his reliance on the Navy to provide him timely warning. However, the fact that he was relying on the Navy does not excuse General Short for his failure to determine whether his assumptions with respect to what the Navy was doing were correct. He assumed operations of the task forces rendered an air attack highly improbable; he assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance from Oahu; he assumed the Navy would advise him of the location and movement of Japanese warships. Yet a simple inquiry by General Short would have revealed that the task forces effected no coverage of the dangerous northern approaches to Oahu; that the Navy was not conducting distant reconnaissance; and that the Navy did not know where the Japanese carrier strength was for over a week prior to December 7. We can understand General Short's dependence on the Navy, but we cannot overlook the fact that he made these assumptions with no attempt to verify their correctness. INTERFERENCE WITH TRAINING General Short has pointed out that the factor of training was considered in selecting Alert No. 1; that the use of Alerts 2 or 3 would [236] In commenting concerning the November 27 warning sent General Short, Secretary Stimson said: "This message has been characterized as ambiguous and described as a 'do-don't' message. The fact is that it presented with the utmost precision the situation with which we were all confronted and in the light of which all our commanding officers, as well as we ourselves in Washington, had to govern our conduct. The situation was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand, in view of the fact that we wanted more time, we did not want to precipitate war at this moment if it could be avoided. If there was to be war, moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan was the first consideration. In Hawaii, because of the large numbers of Japanese inhabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing would be done, unless necessary to the defense, to alarm the civil population and this possibly to precipitate an incident and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act." Further: "*All these considerations were placed before the commanding officers of their respective areas, and it was because they were thought competent to act in a situation of delicacy requiring judgment and skill that they had been placed in these high posts of command.*" Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record, pp. 14396, 14397. [237] Committee record, page 7946 et seq. 126 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK have seriously interfered with his training mission. He observed that the soldiers and officers of his command were in large part relatively new to the Army and to their specialized tasks and that regular training was essential. He stated that the War Department dispatch of November 27 "had not indicated in any way that our training mission was modified, suspended or abolished, and that all troops were to go immediately into tactical status." [238] General Short has pointed out that the Hawaiian Air Force had the particular mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17's to the Philippine Islands. He recalled that on September 8, 1941, 9 trained combat teams were sent to the Philippines; that before November 27, 18 trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland and 17 more teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes; and that 12 more combat crews had to be trained for planes expected to arrive at an early date. He observed that only 6 of his 12 Flying Fortresses were in condition and available for the training and that it was imperative General Martin make maximum use of these planes for training. He felt that if war were momentarily expected in the Hawaiian coastal frontier, the training considerations would give way but that every indication was that the War Department expected the war to break out, if at all, only in the far Pacific and not at Hawaii. [239] As has been earlier indicated, however, the very fact of having suggested to General Short that he undertake reconnaissance was an indication of the possibility of an attack on Hawaii from without. This committee believes that the warning dispatch of November 27 was ample notice to a general in the field that his training was now secondary- that his primary mission had become execution of the orders contained in the dispatch and the effecting of maximum defensive security. THE ORDER TO UNDERTAKE RECONNAISSANCE The very fact that General Short noted the order with respect to undertaking reconnaissance contained in the dispatch of November 27 and thereafter instituted an alert against sabotage only demonstrates a failure to grasp the serious circumstances confronting his command. It is to be recalled in this connection that Army commanders in the Philippines, at Panama, and on the West Coast, upon receiving the dispatch of November 27 in substantially the same terms as General Short, instituted full measures adequately to alert their commands. [240] The observation has been made by General Short that he presumed the man who prepared the message of November 27 ordering him to undertake reconnaissance was unfamiliar with the fact that the Navy [238] Id., at pp. 7948, 7949. [239] Id. [240] See Committee Exhibit No. 32, pp. 11, 15 16 and 18 for replies, pursuant to the warning messages of November 27, from General MacArthur in the Philippines, General DeWitt on the West Coast, and General Andrews at Panama. General MacArthur replied under date of November 28: "Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four, air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Around security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy." A significant portion of the reply from General Andrews follows: "In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 127 was responsible for distant reconnaissance. [241] It is inconceivable, however, that in the face of a specific directive with respect to reconnaissance General Short should not have requested clarification from the War Department in the event he felt the latter did not mean what it had unequivocally said and had failed to take into consideration the Navy's responsibility for reconnaissance. This fact takes on added importance when it is realized that the November 27 dispatch was the first and only dispatch General Short had received signed by General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, since becoming commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. It was a *command directive* which should have received the closest scrutiny and consideration by the Hawaiian general. Certainly the least that General Short could have done was to advise Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch and consult with them at once concerning the fact that he had been directed to undertake reconnaissance if he presumed the Navy was to perform this function. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the very document wherein the Navy assumed responsibility for distant reconnaissance, contained in an annex thereto provision for joint operations *when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer agree that a threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent*. The failure to appreciate the necessity for following through on an order to undertake reconnaissance is not in keeping with the good judgment expected from the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. It is further to be borne in mind that General Short had six mobile radar units which were available for reconnaissance use. He ordered their operations from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., in addition to the normal training operation of radar during the day, but failed to provide the necessary officers handling the equipment with the knowledge that war was at hand in order that they would intelligently attach significance to information which the radar might develop. In testifying before the committee concerning the operation of radar, General Short said: [241a] "That (the radar) was put into alert during what I considered the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock a. m. daily." The very fact that radar was ordered operated at all was in recognition of the danger of a threat from without; indeed it was only in contemplation of such a threat that General Short would have been supplied radar at all. [242] [241] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 4436, 4437. [241a] Committee record, p. 8054. [242] In a statement submitted for the committee's consideration, Mr. Stimson said: "You will notice that this message of November 27th specifically mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to my mind was a very important part of the message, not only because of its obvious desirability but also because we had provided the Hawaiian Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of reconnaissance against air attack and one to which I had personally devoted a great deal of attention during the preceding months. I refer to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was then provided. This equipment permitted approaching planes to be seen at distances of approximately 100 miles, and to do so in darkness and storm as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 I had taken up earnestly the matter of securing such radar equipment for aircraft protection. I knew, although it was not then generally known that radar had proved of the utmost importance to the British in the Battle of Britain, and I felt in the beginning of 1941 that we were not getting this into production and to the troops as quickly as we should, and put on all the pressure I could to speed up its acquisition. By the autumn of 1941 we had got some of this equipment out to Hawaii, and only a few days before this I had received a report of the tests which had been made of this equipment in Hawaii on November 19th, which indicated very satisfactory results in detecting approaching airplanes. I testified at considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (A. P. H. B. 4064, et seq.). When we specifically directed the commanding officer at Hawaii, who had been warned that war was likely at any moment, to make reconnaissance, I assumed that *all means of reconnaissance available to both the Army and Navy would be employed*. On the same day a war warning was dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations. The standing instructions to the theatre commanders were that all messages of this character were to be exchanged between the Army and Navy commands. Committee record, pp. 14398, 14399. 128 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK THE SHORT REPORT It is recalled that the dispatch of November 27, No. 472, carried instructions to report measures taken and that General Short, referring to the dispatch by number, advised that the Hawaiian Department was "alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy." As paraphrased and reviewed in the War Department, this reply read: "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad four seven two twenty seven." [243] No action was taken by the War Department following receipt of this reply. General Short has stated that the silence and failure of the War Department to reply to his report of measures taken constituted reasonable grounds for his belief that his action was exactly what the War Department desired. He has pointed out that if the action taken by him was not consistent with the desires of the War Department it should have informed him of that fact. [244] The question at this point, however, is not whether Washington should have replied to General Short's dispatch but whether the commanding general was entitled to believe that his reply had adequately informed Washington that he had or had not carried out the orders contained in General Marshall's warning of November 27. [245] General Gerow has already assumed full responsibility for failure to follow up to insure that the alert to prevent sabotage was not the only step taken by the Hawaiian Department under the circumstances. No one in Washington appears to have been impressed with or caught the fact that General Short's report of measures taken was inadequate and not sufficiently responsive to the directive. This failure of supervision cannot be condoned. However, a reasonable inference from the statement "liaison with Navy" was that through liaison with the Navy he had taken the necessary steps to implement the War Department warning, including the undertaking of reconnaissance. This was clearly recognized by General Short. In testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board he was asked the question: [246] "In your message of November 27, you say, 'Liaison with the Navy.' Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?" "General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing." "Question. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance? "General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not it would have affected it, because they signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff." [243] See committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12. [244] Committee record, p. 7965 et seq. [245] Referring to General Short's reply, Secretary Stimson said: "* * * he then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had faded to do and which was susceptible of being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the main warning from Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly gave me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being 'alerted to prevent sabotage' was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert against an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's statement in his message that 'liaison' was being carried out with the Navy, coupled with the fact that our message of November 27th had specifically directed reconnaissance, naturally gave the impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert was in effect." Committee record pp. 14408, 11409. [248] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 380. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 129 General Short was not entitled to presume that his responsibilities as Commander of the Hawaiian Department had been discharged or shifted to the War Department through dispatch of his reply. [247] This conclusion is most fully appreciated when he admittedly was not clear concerning the order to undertake reconnaissance. [248] The War Department was entitled to expect the commanding general had carried out the order to effect reconnaissance or in the alternative that he would have requested clarifying instructions. Conceding that General Short presumed the War Department would correct him if he was in error, the fact that supplemental instructions were not issued does not serve to remove that error. Had he made no report whatever the situation in Hawaii on the morning of December 7 would have been the same. Although General Short specifically advised the War Department on November 27 that he was maintaining "liaison with Navy" the evidence is unmistakably clear, as will subsequently appear, that he did not establish liaison with the Navy concerning the action to be taken pursuant to the Department's warning message. ACTION WHICH WAS NOT TAKEN UPON RECEIPT OF THE NOVEMBER 27 DISPATCH Apart from instituting an alert against sabotage and ordering the operation of radar from 4 to 7 a. m. no other appreciable steps were taken by the commanding general to prepare his command for defense against possible hostilities. [249] No change was made in the state of readiness of aircraft which were on four hours' notice. There was therefore no integration of aircraft and radar, even in the latter's limited operation from 4 to 7 a. m. The maximum distance radar could pick up approaching planes was approximately 130 miles. With the Army aircraft on 4 hours' notice a warning from the radar information center would have been of little avail. Operation of radar was not instituted on a 24-hour basis. It was so operated immediately after the attack, although as a matter of fact it was not until December 17 that the aircraft warning service was placed under complete control Of the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, handling the training phases, removed from the picture. [250] No action was taken with a view to tightening up the antiaircraft defenses. [251] The ammunition for the 60 mobile antiaircraft guns was [247] See committee record, pp. 4420, 4421 [248] Referring to the testimony of General Gerow to the effect that the commanding general's report would have been perfectly clear if he had indicated he was alerted against sabotage only (see note 247, supra) General Short commented that General Gerow "was unwilling to read my message and admit it meant what it said, no more and no less". Yet General Short failed to accord the war Department the same privilege he was taking; that is, that the order to undertake reconnaissance *meant what it said, no more and no less*. See committee record, pp. 7967, 7968. [249] Referring to the action taken by General Short, Secretary Stimson stated: "* * * to cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft ammunition so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance system, the radar, only for a very small fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief." See statement Of Secretary Stimson submitted for the committees consideration; committee record, p. 14408. [250] committee record, p. 8379. [251] In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked which service was charged with repulsing enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire on December 7, 1941. He replied: "The Army, I should say, had the prime responsibility. The plans that we had provided for the Navy rendering every possible assistance to the Army. It provided for the use of all guns, including 30 calibers and even shoulder rifles by the marines in the navy yard, and by the crews of the flying field. In addition, it provided that the batteries of all ships should take part in shooting down the planes." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 295. 130 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK located in Aliamanu Crater, between 2 and 3 miles from Fort Shafter. [252] The crews of the antiaircraft guns were not alerted in such manner as to provide effective defense even with maximum warning from the radar information center. As in the case of Admiral Kimmel, no effective action was taken with a view to integration and coordination of Army-Navy facilities for defense. THE "CODE DESTRUCTION" INTELLIGENCE As has been seen, Admiral Kimmel was advised "for action" on December 3 of information received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent on December 2 to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, *Manila, Washington*, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents. [253] Testifying with respect to the foregoing intelligence, Admiral Kimmel stated that both he and his staff noted that *most* of the codes and ciphers-*not all*-were to be destroyed and that this information appeared to fit in with the information "we had received about a Japanese movement in South East Asia." He commented that Japan would naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her communication system in the event her action in southeast Asia caused Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over diplomatic residences. [254] Admiral Kimmel did not supply General Short the information he had received concerning the orders from Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential documents. He testified: "I didn't consider that of any vital importance when I received it * * * ." [255] General Short, on the other hand, has complained that he was not provided this intelligence and has indicated it would have been of the greatest significance to him. Referring to the intelligence concerning the fact that Washington had been ordered to destroy its code machine [256] General Short said: "The one thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact they had ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing: that they are going into an entirely new phase and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of three or four days * * *." [257] He further testified that had the Navy given him any of the dispatches received concerning the destruction of codes he would have gone into a more serious alert. [258] In strange contrast with the view of the code burning intelligence taken by Admiral Kimmel, virtually all witnesses have agreed that this was the most significant information received between November 27 and December 6 with respect to the imminence of war. Indeed, the overwhelming weight of the testimony is to effect that orders to [252] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 2604-2697. [253] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. On the same day Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information of the substance of an intercepted Tokyo dispatch of December 1 ordering London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy (their code) machine. It was stated that the Batavia (code) machine had already been sent to Tokyo and on December 2 Washington was also directed to destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents, that the British Admiralty had reported London Embassy had complied. Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. [254] Committee record, p. 6723. [255] Id., at p. 7477. [256] This advice was contained in a December 7 dispatch from the War Department which was not received by General Short until after the attack. This dispatch will be found discussed in detail, Part IV, infra. [257] Roberts Commission record, p. 1620. [258] Committee record, p. 8397. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 131 destroy codes mean from a military standpoint only one thing-war within a very few days. [259] It is concluded that the failure of Admiral Kimmel to supply this intelligence to General Short was inexcusable and that the purport of this information was to advise the commander in chief within reasonably narrow limits of time as to when Japan might be expected to strike. While orders to burn codes may not always mean war in the diplomatic sense, it very definitely meant war-and soon-in a military sense after the "war warning" of November 27. Admiral Kimmel received this intelligence less than 4 days before the attack; it gave him an opportunity to correct his mistake in failing to institute distant reconnaissance and effect a state of readiness commensurate with the likelihood of hostilities after the November 27 war warning. Nothing was done-General Short was not even informed. On December 4 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised for information of orders instructing Guam to destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter. [260] This intelligence was of the greatest significance. It meant that not only was war almost immediately at hand but that a landing operation by Japan against Guam was regarded as a possibility. Nothing was done. On December 6 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel advising, for action, that in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands he was authorized to order destruction in such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency." [261] This dispatch suggested the possibility of landing operations against our outlying islands including Wake and Midway. GENERAL SHORT'S KNOWLEDGE OF DESTRUCTION OF CONFIDENTIAL MATTER BY JAPANESE CONSULATE The evidence reflects that although Admiral Kimmel received significant information on four different occasions between December 3 and 6 concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic establishments as well as in our own outlying possessions, he failed to convey this information to General Short. Despite this fact it appears that the commanding general obtained adequate information concerning the destruction of confidential matter by Japanese diplomatic establishments. Col. George W. Bicknell, assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, stated that he learned from Navy sources in Hawaii about December 3 that diplomatic representatives of Japan in Washington, [259] see Part IV, infra re code destruction. [260] Committee exhibit No .37, p. 44. [261] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 45. A memorandum submitted by the Navy Department concerning this dispatch under date of January 29, 1946 stated OpNav dispatch 061743 was transmitted to Radio Honolulu at 5:54 p. m. December 6, 1941 Washington local time" (committee record, p.11441). It is to be noted that during committee examination Admiral Kimmel was asked whether he had testified as to when he had received the message of December 6, 1941, authorizing the destruction of confidential papers referred to in the preceding paragraph Admiral Kimmel said "I will look at it. I couldn't tell you when that was received but to the best of my recollection I never saw it until after the attack. It is an even bet as to whether I saw it before or after the attack. I think I didn't get it until after the attack. * * * I have no record upon which I can definitely state that. I can only state my recollection." Going on, Admiral Kimmel said "*At any rate, if I did receive this before the attack, it was no more than I would have expected under the circumstances. * * * And that (referring to the message) was not particularly alarming*," see committee record pp. 7649,7650. 132 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere were destroying their codes and papers. He further stated that about the same time he learned from the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI that the latter had intercepted a telephone "message from the Japanese consulate Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese consul general was burning and destroying all his important papers." Colonel Bicknell said: [262] "In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere." General Fielder stated that he was present at the staff conference and that on December 6 he gave to General Short the information that the Japanese consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. [263] Colonel Phillips also stated that this information was given by him to General Short. The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI stated that on December 3 the district intelligence officer of the Navy asked him if he could verify information that the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers; that about 2 hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone conversation between the cook of the Japanese consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu in the course of which the cook stated that the consul general was "burning and destroying all his important papers." He stated that he immediately gave this information to the district intelligence officer of the Navy and the assistant G-2 of the Army; and thereupon sent a dispatch to Director J. Edgar Hoover in Washington: "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers." [264] In testifying before the Roberts Commission General Short stated that he received no information from his intelligence officer until after the attack that the consular records were being burned. He stated: [265] "As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had really burned anything until the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th; they interrupted the burning. I wasn't cognizant of the fact that they had burned the previous day." Before the committee, however, General Short corrected his former testimony, stating that he had been advised on the morning of December 6 that the Honolulu consul was burning his papers. [266] While the evidence would indicate that General Short was advised on December 6 that the Japanese consul was burning his *codes* and *papers*, a point has been made by the commanding general that his information was limited to the fact that the consul was burning his papers without reference to *codes*. Even conceding this to be true, the fact that the consul was burning his papers after General Short had been informed hostilities were possible at any moment was of adequate import to impress the commanding general with the fact that our relations with Japan were extraordinarily critical. It is [262] See affidavit. Dated February 25, 1945, of Colonel Bicknell before Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148. [263] See affidavit of Colonel (now General) Kendall J. Fielder dated May 11, 1945, before Major Clausen. [264] See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers dated April 10, 1945, before Major Clausen. [265] Roberts Commission record, p. 1620. [266] Committee record, pp. 8398, 8399. concluded that General Short received prior to the attack substantially the intelligence concerning the destruction of codes and confidential papers *by Japanese diplomatic representatives*, although he was not informed by Admiral Kimmel of the very significant fact that the Navy Department had issued orders for the destruction of codes *in certain of our own outlying possessions*. THE "LOST" JAPANESE CARRIERS-RADIO INTELLIGENCE AT HAWAII Perhaps the most vital intelligence available to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet indicating Pearl Harbor as a possible point of attack was that gathered from his own Radio Intelligence Unit at Hawaii. This unit was engaged in "traffic analyses"; that is, identifying, locating, and determining the movements of Japanese warships through their call signals. The location of vessels was effected through radio- direction methods. [267] Information of a similar type was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington. Fortnightly intelligence bulletins incorporating information received from the radio intelligence units in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence. These bulletins were made available to Admiral Kimmel. Because of conflicting reports that had been received concerning Japanese naval movements and the further fact that reports received from the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District (Philippines) were considered the most reliable, the Chief of Naval Operations on, November 24 advised the commanders in chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, among others, that other reports should be carefully evaluated and sent to the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District for action and to the Office of Naval Operations for information. After combining all incoming reports the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District was to direct dispatches to the Office of Naval Operations with copies to Admiral Kimmel for information setting forth his evaluation and best possible continuity. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on November 26 advised the Office of Naval Operations and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District in summary form of information with respect to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. This dispatch expressed the belief that a strong concentration of Japanese submarines and air groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet were located in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. The estimate of the situation was to the effect that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia, while some units might operate from Paleo and the Marshalls. On the same day, the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines advised, among others, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Office of Naval Operations, in commenting on the November 26 dispatch from Hawaii, that traffic analysis for the past few days indicated that the commander in chief of the Second Fleet (Japanese) was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two [267] See testimony of Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 182-292. 134 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK sections, the first of which was expected to operate in the south China area, the second, in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included Carrier Division 3 "Ryujo, and one Maru." This dispatch further pointed out that the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandated Islands and that his best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. The opinion was expressed that this evaluation was regarded as reliable. Periodically after November 27, 1941, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet as well as from other observers confirming the movement of important Japanese naval forces southward from Japan. These reports, however, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, did not indicate the movement of any Japanese carriers. The Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice after November 27 of preparing daily summaries of the information received through its traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications. [268] These summaries were submitted each day to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Layton, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. On November 28, an intelligence summary, reviewed by Admiral Kimmel, stated there was no further information concerning the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day he received the November 28 summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon United States Naval Communications and "is getting results." There was no information set forth in the summary with respect to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29, indicating that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the commander in chief, Second Fleet. On December 1, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated with respect to carriers that the presence of a unit of "plane guard" destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed. The Fortnightly Intelligence Summary dated December 1 [269] received by Admiral Kimmel from the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington stated, among other things, with respect to the Japanese naval situation that " * * * the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." This summary related to information obtained during the 2 weeks preceding its date of December 1 and the Washington estimate of the situation was necessarily based on radio intelligence information received largely from the Philippines and Hawaii before the sudden and unexplained change in the call signals of Japanese vessels on December 1. The December 1 summary, which Admiral Kimmel received from Captain Layton stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on December 1; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of 6 months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated: "*The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale*." [268] For these summaries, see committee exhibits Nos. 115 and 115a. [269] Committee exhibit No. 80. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 135 This statement was underlined by Admiral Kimmel. The summary also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and that as to carriers there was "no change." On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1 at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, concerning the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako- Takao area Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Division 4, which included four carriers, and the Kasuga Maru (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "*Koryu* (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate, the reason being that Layton considered the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts. [270] On December 2, 1941, according to Captain Layton, he and Admiral Kimmel had the following conversation: [271] "Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said "What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I replied, "No sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or words to that effect." Captain Layton observed that the incident was impressed on his mind and that Admiral Kimmel was pointing out to him his complete ignorance as to the location of the Japanese carrier divisions. However, the very reference by Admiral Kimmel to the carriers rounding "Diamond Head" was recognition by him of this possibility and his complete lack of knowledge as to where they might be. Admiral Kimmel and Captain Layton discussed- "radio intelligence, its faults and its promises, its inexactities and yet the over-all picture that it will produce. *Whether then or at other times, we discussed the fact that a force can take sealed orders, proceed under radio silence and never be detected by visual or other sighting*. [272]" The December 2 radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3, read as follows: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." The Radio Intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4 stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5 contained no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6 stated "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either." Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only way by which Admiral Kimmel would have obtained in- [270] See Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 212. [271] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 212, 213. [272] Testimony of Captain Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 215. 136 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK formation as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by distant air reconnaissance. Knowledge of the location of Japanese carriers was vital to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Two carrier divisions very definitely could not be located. The service calls of Japanese vessels were changed on December 1, a most unusual procedure inasmuch as they had been changed only a month previously on November 1. Admiral Kimmel fully appreciated the significance of this change and actually underscored the statement submitted to him: "*The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale*." It would appear Admiral Kimmel regarded the preparation to be in anticipation of a Japanese movement to South East Asia. The presumption was made that inasmuch as the Japanese carriers could not be located they were in home waters. It was fully known, however, that the missing carriers of Japan were not engaged in a movement to the south since such an operation would be open to visual observation by our forces in the Philippines as well as by friendly powers. In consequence, only two reasonable alternatives remained-either the carriers were in home waters or they were engaged in an operation under radio silence in some direction other than to the south. It was Admiral Kimmel's duty to be prepared for the alternative most dangerous to him. Had he concluded that the unusual change in service signals on December 1 clothed a Japanese major operation, perhaps to the eastward at Hawaii, he could have predicted within reasonably narrow limits of time as to when such an attack would come. [273] Admiral Kimmel has referred to the lack of exactitude of radio intelligence and the fact that this was not the first instance in which his staff had been unable to get a line on the location of Japanese vessels. [273a] Recognizing all of the vagaries of radio intelligence analysis, however, it was still not in keeping with his responsibility as commander in chief of the Fleet for Admiral Kimmel to ignore the sinister implications of the information supplied through the Radio Intelligence Unit after he had been warned of war. In many respects the picture presented by radio intelligence was among the most significant information relating to when and, to a degree, where the Japanese would possibly attack. [273] Secretary of the Navy Forrestal observed: "I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the 'war warning' and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits." See "Fourth Endorsement" to report of Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157. And again: "The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack." Id. [273a] In this regard, Admiral Kimmel stated, among other things: "The failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and after December first when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of eight to fourteen days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about the location of the Japanese battleships. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese First Fleet, and eight periods of ten to twenty days each, in which the location of the greater number of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet was uncertain. As to the Japanese carriers, during the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of one hundred and thirty- four days-in twelve separate periods-each ranging from nine to twenty- two days, when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain." Committee record, pp. 6727, 6728. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 137 THE "MORI CALL" The Federal Bureau of Investigation on December 6 delivered to responsible Army and Navy intelligence officers at Hawaii a transcript of an intercepted trans-Pacific radiotelephone conversation [274] between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" [275] and an individual in Japan. The transcript of this conversation indicated, among other things, that the individual in Japan was interested in the daily flights of airplanes, particularly large planes, from Honolulu; whether searchlights were being used; and the number of ships present at Pearl Harbor. Reference was made during the conversation to various flowers, [276] the significance of which was not known, but which conceivably could have been an open code employed to convey information concerning the presence or absence of fleet vessels to the approaching Japanese attack force, which could have listened in on the conversation. Instead of taking action on the basis of the conversation, the office of the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy decided that it should be studied further by a Japanese linguist. This was not done until after the attack and in consequence the transcript of the conversation was not seen by Admiral Kimmel before December 7. The transcript was delivered to General Short and his G-2 on the evening of December 6 by Colonel Bicknell, his assistant G-2, the latter attaching great significance to the matters discussed. Colonel Bicknell stated that the special agent in charge of the FBI was alarmed at what he considered the military implications of the Mori conversation with respect to Pearl Harbor and that he, Bicknell, concurred in this view, considering the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. He stated, however, that "both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too 'intelligence conscious' and that to them the message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about." [277] No action whatever was taken by General Short. Regardless of what use the Japanese made of the "Mori call," the conversation should have been, on its very face, of the greatest significance to the responsible commanders in Hawaii. Members of the Mori family were the subject of investigation by the FBI, a fact known to the intelligence offices of both the Army and Navy. An interest by Japan in the daily flights of "large airplanes" and whether searchlights were employed could have but one meaning to alert Commanders who were properly vigilant and should have been prepared for the worst in the knowledge that hostilities were imminent-a desire to know whether air reconnaissance was being conducted and whether searchlights were employed for defense against air attack. The undecipherable and suspicious reference to flowers should have intensified alertness by reason of the very fact that the true meaning could not be gathered. *The Mori call pointed directly at Hawaii*. The decision of the District intelligence Office of the Navy to place the matter aside for further study was inexcusable and reflects the apathetic state of alertness throughout the Navy command. [274] See committee exhibit No. 84 for complete transcript of the conversation. [275] The Mori family included Dr. Motokazu Mori, his wife Mrs. Ishiko Mori, his father Dr. Iga Mori, and his son Victor Motojiro Mori. The family was the subject of security investigations in Hawaii. [276] In the course of the conversation the question was asked, "What kind of dowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The reply was: "Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now." [277] See affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell dated February 25, 1945, before Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148. 138 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK DETECTION OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE ON MORNING OF DECEMBER 7 The U. S. S. Condor, a minesweeper, at 3:42 a. m. (Honolulu time) December 7, reported sighting a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor in a defensive area where American submarines had been restricted from operating while submerged. The Condor by visual signal reported this sighting to the U. S. S. Ward, a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol between 3:50 and 3:58 a. m. After receiving this information the Ward searched for the submarine for approximately one and one-half hours without results. It thereupon contacted the Condor, inquiring as to the distance and course of the submarine that was sighted. At 5:20 a. m. the Condor replied but the Ward was unable to effect the submarine's location on the basis of this information. The commander of the Ward thought the Condor had been mistaken in concluding that it had seen a submarine and made no report to higher authority. [278] The radio conversation between the Ward and the Condor was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point Oahu, a radio station under the jurisdiction of the Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District. Inasmuch as the conversation was solely between the ships, was not addressed to the Section Base, and no request was made that it be relayed, the radio station did not report it to higher authority. At 6:30 a. m. The U. S. S. Antares, arriving off Pearl Harbor with a barge in tow, sighted a suspicious object which appeared to be a small submarine. The Antares notified the Ward, asking it to investigate, and at approximately 6:33 a. m. observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two "smoke pots" near the object. At 6:40 the Ward sighted an unidentified submarine apparently following the Antares. The Ward opened fire at 6:45 and the Antares, observing the fire of the Ward, noted about the same time that a Navy patrol plane appeared to drop depth charges or bombs on the submarine. When the submarine keeled over and started to sink, the Ward ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. At 6:51 the Ward radioed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area." The captain of the Ward followed this dispatch with a supplemental message at 6:53: "We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area." This information was received by the Chief of Staff to Admiral Bloch at 7:12 and by the Duty Officer of Admiral Kimmel at 7:15. Admiral Kimmel stated he received this information between 7:30 and 7:40 a. m. Admiral Bloch, according to his testimony, was informed by his Chief of Staff, but in view of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the Ward had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the Ward and the relief duty destroyer could take care of the situation; that Admiral Kimmel to whom the information had been referred had the power to take any action which might be desired. [279] Admiral Kimmel testified: [280] "Between 7:30 and 7:40, I received information from the Staff Duty Officer of the Ward's report, the dispatch of the ready-duty destroyer to assist the Ward, [278] See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 87-92; 428, 429. [279] Id., at pages 414 416; 452-469. For further details concerning this incident, see Hewitt inquiry exhibits Nos. 18, 73, 75, and 76. [280] Committee record, p. 6760-6770. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 139 and the efforts then underway to obtain a verification of the Ward's report. I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action in view of the number of such contacts which had not been been verified in the past." It is to be noted, however, that in Admiral Kimmel's own statement he refers to only two reports concerning possible submarine contacts after November 3 in addition to the Ward incident. He stated: [281] "* * * On November 28, 1941, the U. S. S. Helena reported that a radar operator without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against submarines was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area. A search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During the night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S. Gamble reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158- 23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine." The reported sighting of a submarine periscope at 3:42 a. m. on the morning of December 7, in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, even though not verified, should have put the entire Navy command on the qui vive and when at 6:40 a. m. The presence of a submarine was definitely established, the entire Navy command should have been on a full alert. In the Martin-Bellinger estimate annexed to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan it was pointed out that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. Admiral Kimmel in his letter to the Fleet, 2CL-41 (Revised), *dated October 14, 1941*, made this identical statement and followed it with the words: [282] "The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant *in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means*." The evidence does not reflect that the sighting and sinking of a submarine, particularly in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, was of such frequent occurrence as to justify the failure to attach significance to the events of the morning of December 7. This is especially true when it is realized that a war warning had been received and Admiral Kimmel's own estimates indicated the extreme significance of submarine activity. As a matter of fact the Condor and Ward incidents appear to be the *first* instance of reported sighting and sinking of a submarine since the critical turn in our negotiations with Japan. The reported sighting was at 3:42 a. m., *over 4 hours before the Japanese air force struck*. Appearing before the Roberts Commission, General Short commented as follows with respect to the Ward incident: [283] "That would under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not-at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack." [281] Id, at p. 6769. [282] Hewitt inquiry exhibit No. 8; committee exhibit No. 44. [282] Roberts Commission record, p. 311. 140 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The supposed sighting of a submarine at 3:42 a. m. And the attack upon a submarine at 6:45 a. m., December 7, should have been recognized as immediate basis for an all-out alert to meet all military contingencies. [284] RADAR DETECTION OF JAPANESE RAIDING FORCE The army radar was scheduled for operation on Sunday morning, December 7 from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. [284a] The normal operation for training purposes after 7 a. m. Was discontinued for this particular Sunday by reason of special authorization obtained from the control officer. At one of the more remote aircraft warning stations, Opana, Privates Joseph Lockard and George Elliott had been on duty from 4 to 7 a. m. Inasmuch as they were waiting for the army truck to return them to quarters for breakfast, it was decided to operate the radar after 7 a. m. in order that Private Lockard, who was skilled in the operation of the radar detector, might afford his partner additional instruction. As the machine was being adjusted, Private Lockard saw on the radar screen an unusual formation he had not previously seen in the machine. Inasmuch as the indicator reflected a large number of planes coming in and he was confident there was nothing like it in the air, he felt that the machine must be at fault. After additional checking he found, however, that the machine was operating properly and concluded at 7:02 a. m. that there was a large number of planes approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles from 3 east of north. [285] After some discussion concerning the advisability of informing the information center, Private Lockard called the center at 7:20 a. m. advising that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu from the direction indicated. It is to be noted that, as General Short stated, "At 7 a. m. all the men at the information center except the telephone operator had folded up their equipment and left." [286] The switchboard operator was unable to do anything about the call and accordingly, since the information center personnel had departed, referred it to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps whose tour of duty at the center was until 8 a. m. He was there solely for training and observation. Lieutenant Tyler, upon being advised of the approach of a large number of planes, told Private Lockard in substance and effect to "forget it." He assumed that the flight indicated was either a naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the mainland that were scheduled to arrive on December 7. [284] In the light of the known and declared significance to be attached to the presence of a Japanese submarine in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, this committee does not concur in the implications of the conclusion made by the Navy Court of Inquiry that: "There was nothing, however, in the presence of a single sub marine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent " See Navy Court of Inquiry report committee exhibit No. 157. [284a] In the course of examination by Counsel, General Short was asked it radar was put on the alert after the warning of November 27. General Short replied: " That was put into alert during. what I considered the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock a. m. daily." Asked if just putting the radar into operation as effective without an Information Center that worked with it, General Short said: " The information center was working with it." Committee record page 8054. The evidence reflects that installation of three permanent radar stations had not been completed. The mobile sets had been in operation, however, for some time prior to December 7 with very satisfactory results See in this regard Note 287, infra. [285] For complete discussion, see testimony of Joseph L. Lockard, Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1014-1034; Navy Court of Inquiry record p. 628-343; testimony of George E. Elliott, Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 994-1014; Navy Court of Inquiry record, pages 644-659; and committee record, p. 13380-13499. [286] Committee record, p. 7976, PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 141 General Short stated: [287] "If he (Tyler) had alerted the interceptor command there would have been time if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air. * * *. It would have made a great difference in the loss * * *. It would have been a question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action." In testifying before the joint committee, General Short said: [288] "If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Japanese, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to warm up the engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler made no report of this matter to me and as far as I know did not report the incident to the control officer, Major Tyndall after the information center was manned about 8:30 a. m. This matter was not brought to my attention until the next day when it was too late to be of value. Had this incident been reported to the control officer at 8:30 a. m. on the 7th, he would have informed the Navy and it might have enabled them to locate the carriers." If the Army command at Hawaii had been adequately alerted, Lieutenant Tyler's position would be indefensible. He was at the information center for training and observation, had no knowledge on which to predicate any action, and accordingly should have consulted higher authority. His fatal estimate-"Forget it"-was empty assumption. The fact that Lieutenant Tyler took the step that he did, merely tends to demonstrate how thoroughly unprepared and how completely lacking in readiness the Army command really was on the morning of December 7. Further, the evidence reflects that Privates Lockard and Elliott debated the advisability of informing the Information Center concerning the approach of a large number of planes. It would appear that this unusual information concerning a large number of planes-so unusual in fact that Private Lockard stated he had never before seen such a formation-should have provided immediate and compelling reason for advising the Information Center had the necessary alert been ordered after the November 27 warning and the proper alertness pervaded the Army command. While it was not possible with the then state of radar development to distinguish friendly planes from hostile planes, this fact is of no application to the situation in Hawaii; for in a command adequately alerted to war any presumptions of the friendly or enemy character of approaching forces must be that they are enemy forces. It is to be noted General Short has stated that if Lieutenant Tyler had alerted the interceptor command there would have been time to disperse the planes and to have reduced the losses. The real reason, however, that the information developed by the radar was of no avail was the failure of the commanding general to [287] Roberts Commission record, pp. 312, 313. However, in a memorandum dated November 14, 1941, Lt. Col. C . A. Powell, Signal Corps, Hawaiian Department, stated: "In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. The exercise was started approximately 4:30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier. "As soon as the planes were assembled they proceeded toward Hawaii. *This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor* . . ." A copy of this memorandum was forwarded under date of November 19, 1941, to Mr. Harvey E. Bundy special assistant to the Secretary of War. See committee exhibit No. 136. [288] Committee record, p. 7977. 142 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK order an alert commensurate with the warning he had been given by the War Department that hostilities were possible at any moment. OTHER INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY ARMY AND NAVY IN HAWAII CHANNELS OF INTELLIGENCE Both the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii had responsible intelligence officers whose duty it was to coordinate and evaluate information from all sources and of all pertinent types for their superiors. The record reflects full exploitation of all sources for this purpose including the interview of passengers transiting Hawaii. The record also reflects that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in Hawaii were supplying Army and Navy intelligence officers with data available. [289] The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI at Honolulu, for example, stated that on or about November 28, 1941, he received a radio communication from Director J. Edgar Hoover to the effect "that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything could happen" and that, on the same day, he delivered this information to responsible Army and Navy intelligence officers in Hawaii. [290] THE "MANILA MESSAGE" Both the Army and Navy intelligence offices received about December 3, 1941, the following dispatch from a British source in Manila through a British representative in Honolulu: [291] "We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indochina: A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways. 2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks, and guns (75 mm). B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov 21 by American Military Intelligence here. C. *Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South*. You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu." The assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department stated he gave the foregoing intelligence to General Short. [292] THE HONOLULU PRESS The information available in the Hawaiian Islands from the press and the attendant state of the public mind in the days before Pearl Harbor can to a great extent be gathered from a recitation of the headlines appearing in Honolulu newspapers. Among the headlines were the following: [293] [288a] Illustrative of the insufficiency of the radar alert is the fact that although the charts plotting the Japanese force in and plotting the force as it retired were turned over to higher authority during the course of the attack, this information was not employed to assist in locating the Japanese task force and it appears no inquiries were made concerning it for a considerable period of time after the attack. [289] See testimony of Col. George W. Bicknell before the joint committee, committee record, pp. 13536-13620. [290] See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, dated April 10, 1945, before Major Clausen; Clausen investigation, pp. 88-91. [291] See exhibits, Clausen investigation. [292] See supplemental affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell, dated August 14, 1945, before Clausen. [293] Committee record, p. 13622-13627. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 143 Honolulu Advertiser November 7, 1941 "Kurusu Carrying Special Note to F. D. R. From Premier Tojo-Japan Ready to Act Unless Tension Eases." "Japan Waits Before Move in Far East-Aggression in Pacific Appears Shelved Until Kurusu's Mission has been Completed in U. S." "Invasion Held too Difficult by Officials-Offensive May Start in Middle East Soon; Invasion of Continent Impracticable at Present." November 13, 1941 "Tokyo Radio Asserts War is Already on-Any Military Moves Only Logical Result of Encirclement Policy, Japanese Staff Says." "Envoy Undismayed-Carries Broad Powers to Act-Kurusu Denies Taking Message, Implies Errand of Bigger Scope." November 14, 1941 "Japanese Confident of Naval Victory." November 26, 1941 "Americans Get Warning to Leave Japan, China." "Hull Reply to Japan Ready." November 27, 1941 "U.S.-Japan Talks Broken Off as Hull Rejects Appeasement-Full Surrender Demanded in U. S. Statement." "Evacuation Speeded as Peace Fades." November 28, 1941 "Parris Island, S. C.-This is the tail assembly of the captive barrage balloon at Parris Island, S. C., looking for all the world like an air monster. The wench controlling it is in the sandbagged structure protected there from bomb splinters. The helium sausage may be used to protect beachheads, bridgeheads and other strong points thereby differing from the British technique which keeps them flying over London. The marines encamped on Parris Island, S. C., have a special training school on these balloons." November 29, 1941 "U. S. Rejects Compromise in Far East-Washington Insists on Maintenance of Status Quo, Withdrawal from China by Japan Army." "U. S. Warplanes May Protect Burma Road-Protective Force of 200 Planes, 500 Pilots Held Sufficient to Ward Off Attack by Japanese." November 30, 1941 "Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle-Foreign Affairs Expert Attacks Tokyo Madness." 144 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "Leaders Call Troops Back in Singapore-Hope Wanes as Nations Fail at Parleys; Nightly Blackouts Held in P. I.; Hawaii Troops alerted." December 1, 1941 "Japanese Press Warns Thailand." "Burma Troops Are Reinforced-British, Indian Units Arrive Rangoon." "F. D. R. Hurries to Parleys on Orient Crisis." December 2, 1941 "Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S.-Thailand Now in Allied Bloc, Press Charges." "Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations-Prepares for Action in Event of Failure." "Malaya Forces Called to Full Mobilization." "Quezon Held to Blame in P. I. Defense Delay." December 3, 1941 "Huge Pincer attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted-Pepper Visions Nations Acting as Nazi Pawns." "U S. Demands Explanation of Japan Moves-Americans Prepare for Any Emergency; Navy Declared Ready." December 4, 1941 "Hawaii Martial Law Measure Killed for Present Session." "Japanese Pin Blame on U. S.-Army Paper Charges Violation by F. D. R." December 5, 1941 "Probe of Japanese Activities Here Will Be Made by Senate-Spy Inquiry Rapidly Gets Tentative O. K. By State Department." "Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today." "Japan Calls in Nationals." "Japan Has Secret Shanghai Agents." December 6, 1941 "America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo China-Hull May Ask Proof, Suggest Troop's Recall." "Japan Troops Concentrated on Thai Front-Military Observers Say Few Units Have Been Posted in North." December 7, 194l "F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis-Japanese Deny Massing Troops for Thai War." "British Fear Tientsin Row, Call Up Guards-May Isolate Concession to 'Prevent' Agitation over U. S.-Japan Rumors." "Hirohito Holds Power to Stop Japanese Army." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 145 Honolulu Star Bulletin November 10, 1941 "Navy Control for Honolulu Harbor." December 1, 1941 "U. S. Army Alerted in Manila-Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows." "Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension." December 4, 1941 "Japan Spurns U. S. Program-Press Holds Acceptance Not Possible." December 5, 1941 "Japan Parries Open U. S. Break." "Further Peace Efforts Urged-Tokyo Claims Policy 'Misunderstood' in Washington as One of Force and Conquest." December 6,1941 "Singapore on War Footing-Sudden Order Calls Troops to Positions-State of Readiness is Completed; No Explanation Given." "New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo-Joint Commission to Iron Out Deadlock with U. S. Proposed." It would seem difficult to imagine how anyone-upon reading the newspapers alone [294]-could have failed to appreciate the increasing tenseness of the international situation and the unmistakable signs of war.[295] THE ROLE OF ESPIONAGE IN THE ATTACK It has been suggested that Admiral Kimmel and General Short should be charged with knowledge that the Japanese were conducting extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and by reason thereof they should have exercised greater vigilance commensurate with the realization that Japan knew everything concerning the fleet, the fleet base and the defenses available thereto. Implicit in this suggestion is the assumption that superior intelligence possessed by Japan concerning Pearl Harbor conditioned her decision to strike there or, [294] Referring to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Secretary Stimson expressed this idea in the following terms: "Even without any such message (the War Department dispatch of November 7) the outpost commander should have been on the alert. If he did not know that the relations between Japan and the United States were strained and might be broken at any time, he must have been almost the only man in Hawaii who did not know it, for the radio and the newspapers were blazoning out those facts daily, and he had a chief of staff and an intelligence officer to tell him so. And if he did not know that the Japanese were likely to strike without warning, he could not have read his history of Japan or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in respect to such matters." Statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14408. [295] Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have made a point of the fact that after the warnings of November 27 they were dependent on the newspapers for information concerning the state of negotiations and from the press, gathered that the conversations were still continuing. It is to be recalled, however, that the "code destruction" intelligence was made available after November 27 and indicated with unmistakable clarity that effective negotiations were at an end. In any event it would appear anomalous that the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet would permit unofficial newspaper accounts to take precedence over official War and Navy Department dispatches, setting forth the break-down in negotiations. Admiral Kimmel, himself, admitted that he did not act on newspaper information in preference to official information supplied to him by the Navy Department, after having previously observed that he obtained a major portion of his "diplomatic information from the newspapers." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 306, 307. 146 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK otherwise stated, that Japan would not have attacked Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 if she had not the benefit of unusual and superior intelligence. Virtually every report that has been heretofore prepared concerning the disaster has referred to the probability of supposed extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and the peculiar vulnerability of the fleet base to such activity by reason of the surrounding mountainous terrain. [296] There is evidence before the committee, however, which reveals several salient considerations indicating that Japanese Hawaiian espionage was not particularly effective and that from this standpoint there was nothing unusual about the Hawaiian situation. It is clear beyond reasonable doubt that superior Japanese intelligence had nothing whatever to do with the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Among the considerations giving rise to this conclusion are the following: 1. Radar equipment was available on Oahu for use in detecting approaching planes. That Japan knew of radar and its capabilities would seem clear if for no other reason than on November 22 her consul in Panama advised her that the United States had set up airplane detector bases and "some of these detectors are said to be able to discover a plane 200 miles away." [297] The attacking force was actually detected through radar over 130 miles from Oahu. Had Japanese espionage developed the fact that radar was in use at Hawaii and so advised Tokyo of that fact, it would seem unlikely that the attacking planes would have come in for the raid at high altitude but, on the other hand, would have flown a few feet above the water in order to take advantage of the radar electrical horizon-presupposing of course that Japan possessed at least an elementary working knowledge of radar and its potentialities. 2. Perhaps the greatest single item of damage which the attacking force could have inflicted on Oahu and our potential for effectively prosecuting the war would have been to bomb the oil-storage tanks around Pearl Harbor. [298] These tanks were exposed and visible from the air. Had they been hit, inexplicable damage would have resulted. Considering the nature of installations that were struck during the attack, it is questionable whether Japanese espionage had developed fully the extraordinary vulnerability of the oil storage to bombing and its peculiar and indispensable importance to the fleet. 3. The evidence before the Committee reflects that other Japanese consulates were supplying Tokyo as much information as the Honolulu consulate. [299] Information supplied by the Manila and Panama consuls was detailed in character and related meticulously to defenses available and those in process of development. It appears that it was not until a few days before December 7 that the Honolulu consul supplied his Japanese superiors any significant information concerning the defenses of Oahu, and [296] See reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157. [297] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 49. [298] Admiral Bloch pointed out that, had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the dry-dock repair shop, barracks, and other facilities instead of the airfields and the ships of the fleet, the United States would have suffered more insofar as the prosecution of the war was concerned. See Hart inquiry record, p. 94. It is, of course, known that the Japanese knew generally as to the location of the oil-storage tanks as reflected by a map recovered after the attack. See Hewitt inquiry, exhibit No. 30. [299] From evidence before the Committee it appears that the Manila and Panama consuls were supplying Tokyo more information and of a type far more indicative of an attack than that received concerning Hawaii. See section "Ships in Harbor Reports," Part IV, infra, this report. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 147 at a time when the attacking force was already on its way to Pearl Harbor. [300] 4. The Japanese task force left Hitokappu Bay on November 25 with December 7 set as the time for the attack. This departure, it would seem clear, was in anticipation of the failure to secure concessions from the United States through further negotiations. The date December 7 had been recognized as suitable for the attack in discussions prior to November 7. It is hardly credible that superior intelligence should have precipitated or otherwise conditioned the attack when the decision to strike on December 7 was made many days earlier and, manifestly, in the interim between the decision and the attack date the entire defensive situation at Hawaii could have changed. [301] As a matter of fact two of our task forces left Pearl Harbor while the raiders were en route for the attack. 5. It is apparent from the evidence obtained through Japanese sources since VJ-day that the decision to attack on December 7 was made on the basis of the general assumption that units of the fleet ordinarily came into Pearl Harbor on Friday and remained over the week end. [302] With this realization providing adequate odds that substantial units of the Pacific Fleet would-be in Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, that date was selected. 6. In February of 1941 Admiral Yamamoto is reported to have stated, "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed. [303]" This statement is clearly in line with the premise laid down by several witnesses before the committee that Japan would open her attack on us by hitting our Pacific Fleet wherever it might be-whether at Pearl Harbor, Manila, Panama, or on the west coast-in order to immobilize it as a threat to Japanese moves to the south. [304] The fleet happened to be based at Pearl Harbor and in consequence that was where Japan struck. 7. The "Mori call," to which reference has heretofore been made, was on the evening of December 5. It would appear doubtful that Japan should have been seeking information just before the attacking the rather inexpert manner displayed in the call if she possessed any wealth of intelligence gleaned through espionage agents in Hawaii. 8. Investigation conducted in Japan since VJ-day indicates as a matter of fact, that espionage agents, apart from the consul and his staff, played no role whatever in the attack. [305] The sources of information employed, according to Japanese interviewed, were naval attaches to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, public newspapers in the United States, American radio broadcasts (public), crews and passengers on ships which put in at Honolulu, and general information. [306] [300] See committee exhibit No. 2. [301] Committee exhibit No. 8. [302] Id. [303] Committee exhibit No. 8D. [304] See testimony of Capt. Arthur McCollum, committee record, pp. 9115-9288; testimony of Capt. Ellis Zacharias, committee record, pp. 8709-8778, 8909 9044. [305] See committee exhibit No. 8. Also note 6, Part II, this report. [306] Id. 148 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 9. As late as December 2, Tokyo was solicitously asking its Honolulu consul- "whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications they will be sent up. Also advise me whether the warships are provided with antimine nets. [307]" On December 6, the Honolulu Consul advised Tokyo: "In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation. [308]" The foregoing is hardly indicative of any superior sources or facilities for obtaining intelligence. It is reported that the decision to employ a horizontal-bombing attack on Pearl Harbor in conjunction with an air- torpedo attack was for the reason that Tokyo could not determine whether ships at Pearl Harbor were equipped with torpedo nets and the horizontal bombing could be depended upon to inflict some damage if the torpedo attack failed. [309] 10. In planning for the attack, Japan made elaborate precautions to protect the raiding task force which was of itself very formidable, probably more so as a striking force than the entire fleet based at Pearl Harbor. A large striking force was held in readiness in the Inland Sea to proceed to assist the raiding force if the latter were detected or attacked. [310] It is proper to suggest that such precautions would seem unlikely and misplaced if Japan had known through superior espionage information that there was no air or other reconnaissance from Oahu and the defenses were not properly alerted. The evidence reflects that the raiding task force probably determined the extent of reconnaissance through plotting in our plane positions with radio bearings. Further, the Japanese force followed the broadcasts from Honolulu commercial radio stations on the theory that if the stations were going along in their normal manner, the Hawaiian forces were still oblivious to developments. [311] 11. In moving in for the attack on December 7, the Japanese ran the risk of tipping over the apple cart by sending out scouting planes a considerable period of time ahead of the bombers. [312] They took the further risk of having several submarines in the operating sea areas around Pearl Harbor. If Japan had possessed extraordinary intelligence concerning the state of Hawaiian defenses or lack thereof, it would seem improbable that she would have invited disaster by taking such risks. 12. Reference has been made to the large number of semiofficial consular agents that were stationed in Hawaii, the implication being they were engaged in widespread espionage activity Yet the facts before the committee reflect no evidence that these agents committed a single act of espionage, except as it may be inferred from the information sent by the Honolulu consul to Tokyo, which as will be indicated was no more extensive than was being received from other consulates. [307] See committee exhibit No. 2, p. 21. [308] Id., at pp. 27, 28. [309] See committee exhibit No. 8. [310] Id. [311] See committee exhibit No. 8D. [312] Id. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 149 13. It would seem likely that Japan expected some of the most effective striking units of the Pacific Fleet, particularly the carriers, to be in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The raiders, for example, as testified by Admiral Kimmel, bombed a vessel with lumber on its upper deck, apparently thinking it was a carrier. In the light of retrospection and the experiences of the war, it is suggested that Japan would not have indulged the Pyrrhic victory of destroying our lumbering battleships if she had not also hoped to find the fast striking units of the fleet. 14. Japanese estimates in the late fall of 1941 as to the disposition of United States air strength in the Pacific were, with respect to Hawaii, as follows: Fighter planes, 200; small attack planes, 150; 4-engine planes, 40; 2-engine planes, 100; reconnaissance and patrol planes, 35; and flying boats, 110, for a total of 635 planes. [312a] This estimate is roughly twice that of the actual number of planes at Hawaii and reflects a thoroughly erroneous impression as to the ratio of planes in a particular category. The inability to make an approximation of enemy strength within more narrow limits of exactitude can hardly be credited as superior intelligence. 15. In the last analysis it is difficult to believe that Japanese espionage was actually able to develop satisfactorily the real strength of our Pacific Fleet. In December of 1941 the Japanese fleet was superior to our fleet in the Pacific. The latter would have been unable, based on the testimony of witnesses questioned on the subject, to have proceeded, for example, to the aid of General MacArthur in the Philippines even had Pearl Harbor not been attacked. Our war plan in the Pacific, particularly in the early stages, was essentially defensive in character, save for sporadic tactical raids. If the Japanese really knew the weakness of the Pacific Fleet they must also have known that it did not present a formidable deterrent to anything Japan desired to do in the Far East. As already suggested, the question presents itself: *Why, if Japanese espionage in Hawaii was superior, would Japan invite the unqualified wrath of the American people, weld disunited American public opinion, and render certain a declaration of war by the Congress through a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor when the only real weapon we had, our Pacific Fleet, presented itself no substantial obstacle to what Japan had in mind*? A logical answer would seem to be that Japan had not been able to determine and, in consequence, was not cognizant of our real naval weakness in the Pacific.[312b] The extremely large raiding force and the excessive number of attacking planes would appear to be further confirmation of this conclusion. [312a] See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a letter of the same date from Commander Walter Wilds, Office of the Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Committee record, p. 14626. [312b] When questioned as to the deterring effect the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 might have on Japanese aggressive action in the Far East, Admiral Ingersoll declared: "The Pacific Fleet had no train, it had no transports, it did not have sufficient oilers to leave the Hawaiian Islands on an offensive campaign and Japan knew it just as well as we did and she knew that she could make an attack in the area in which she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with impunity." Committee record, p. 11370. It appears that the statement by Admiral Ingersoll concerning his estimate of Japanese knowledge concerning the capacity of the Pacific Fleet is illogical and completely incompatible with the risks entailed by Japan in attacking Pearl Harbor. During the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, *it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor Striking Force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating units; it was specifically assumed that one AKAGI class carrier, and one SORYU class carrier would be lost*. See committee record, p. 457. 150 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK From the foregoing considerations it is proper to suggest that the role played by espionage in the Pearl Harbor attack may have been magnified all out of proportion to the realities of the situation. The Japanese diplomatic establishments and others did, however, have uncensored channels of communication with Tokyo as a result of statutory restrictions imposed upon our own counterespionage agencies by the Communications Act of 1934. The position assumed in 1941 by the Federal Communications Commission was expressed in a memorandum dated September 29, 1944, by the Chairman, James Lawrence Fly, as follows: [312c] "The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (see. 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way superseded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the radio-telegraph, cable telegraph, or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to Dec. 7, 1941." *The situation should never again be permitted whereby the efforts of our Government to combat forces inimical to our national security are hamstrung by restrictions of our own imposition which aid the enemy.* LIAISON BETWEEN ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT Consistent with instructions from the Chief of Staff, [313] General Short set about immediately upon assuming command of the Hawaiian Department to establish a cordial and cooperative relationship with Admiral Kimmel and his staff. That he was successful is undisputed and there can be no doubt that a bond of personal friendship developed between the commanders of the Army and the Navy in Hawaii. They addressed themselves to the task of preparing for war and set about to perfect plans for defense resulting in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. As has been seen, this plan was thorough, despite the recognized limitations of equipment, well conceived and if timely invoked using all of the facilities at hand was adequate to effect maximum defensive security. The evidence reflects, however, that personal friendship was obviously confused with effective liaison at a time when the latter was indispensable to the security of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. [314] They exchanged the warning messages of November 27 and discussed their import. They did not, however, in the face of these warnings sit down with one another to determine what they together had and what they could jointly do to defend the fleet and the fleet base. This action and this alone could have demonstrated effective liaison in a command by-mutual cooperation. After reading the "war warning" sent Admiral Kimmel, General Short assumed the [312c] See report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157. [313] General Short testified: "The one thing that that letter (letter of February 7,1941, from General Marshall) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else." Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 355. [314] The Army Pearl Harbor Board, it should be noted, said: "General Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His instructions from the Chief of Staff to do this were not for the purpose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i. e., the top rank of the Navy; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own full information, the complete execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is not substantiated." See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 151 Navy would be conducting distant reconnaissance when ordered to effect a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out war tasks. [315] Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the other hand, that the Army in the face of the warnings would be on an all-out alert. [316] In fact, he testified he didn't know the Army was alerted to prevent sabotage only that he thought they were on an all-out alert; and that he didn't know they had any other kind of alert. He also assumed the Army radar would be in full operation. Even though General Short testified that he conferred with Admiral Kimmel on December 1, 2, and 3 and they talked over every phase of what they were doing [317] these fatal assumptions still persisted. In short, when the time came for really effective liaison it was entirely absent. The Navy failed to advise General Short of information received on four different occasions between December 3 and 6 concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic establishments and in our own outlying islands. [318] General Short testified that had he known of these messages he would have ordered a more "serious alert." [319] On November 26 the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District expressed to the Chief of Naval Operations the belief, based on radio intelligence, that a strong Japanese concentration of submarines and air groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet, were located in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. In spite of the believed dangerous proximity to Hawaii of possible Japanese carrier units, the commanding general was not advised of this highly significant information. [320] While this information was questioned the same day by the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, it nevertheless displays the futility of General Short's assumption that the Navy would keep him informed of the location of Japanese warships. On November 28, 1941, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet directed a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations with a copy to Admiral Kimmel for information concerning the establishment by Japan of the celebrated "winds code" to be employed in "ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts" to advise when "diplomatic relations are on the verge of being severed." 321 Certain Japanese phrases were set up to indicate a break of relations with the United States, England and the Netherlands, and Russia. Efforts were made by the Navy at Hawaii to monitor for a broadcast employing this code. On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, with a copy to Admiral Kimmel, advising of Japanese broadcast frequencies. [322] Despite the importance which was attached to the winds code at the time, General Short has testified this information was not supplied him by the Navy in Hawaii. [323] [315] Committee record pp. 7926, 7927. [316] Yet it is difficult to understand why he should have expected such an alert when in his statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel said: "On November 28th the messages from the War and Navy Departments were discussed (with General Short). We arrived at the conclusion at this and succeeding conferences that probable Japanese actions would be confined to the Far East with Thailand most probably and Malaya the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines the next most probable objectives in the order named. *In general, we arrived at the conclusion that no immediate activity beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii*" (p. 31 of statement). See committee exhibit No. 146 [317] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 242, 251. [318] See committee record, pp. 8366-8368 [319] Id., at p. 8397. [320] Id., at p. 8261. [321] Committee exhibit No. 142. See discussion of "Winds Code," Part. IV, infra. [322] Committee record p. 8374. [323] Id., at p. 8374. 152 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Beginning November 30, Admiral Kimmel made a daily memorandum entitled: "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next twenty-four hours," the last of these memoranda being reviewed and approved by him on the morning of December 6. Although conferences were held with Admiral Kimmel subsequent to the initiation of these memoranda, General Short has testified he did not know of these steps being taken by the Navy. [324] There is some indication that Admiral Kimmel acted as arbiter of what information General Short received. [325] Admiral Bellinger, who was not shown the war warning, has stated that between November 27 and December 7 he did not confer with the Army Air Force commander, General Martin, regarding long-range reconnaissance. [326] In other words, there were no discussions during this critical period between the two officers responsible for the air arms of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. It is to be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin prepared the estimate of possible Japanese action against Hawaii which reflected in such startling detail what did occur on the morning of December 7. At 3:42 a. m. On December 7 (Honolulu time) a Navy mine sweeper reported the sighting of a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor in the defensive sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. Between 6:30 and 6:45 a. m. a submarine was sunk in naval action. Both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch knew of this prior to the attack. Although the Martin-Bellinger estimate of possible enemy action had stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier, General Short was not advised of the fact that the submarine had been sighted and sunk. The Army radar at 7:02 a. m. December 7 detected a large contingent of airplanes which turned out to be the attacking force approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles away. This information was not supplied the Navy until after the attack. Although the Army radar plotted the withdrawal to the north of the Japanese force after the attack, this vital information was not employed following the raid in searches for the raiders. [327] This situation is traceable to faulty liaison and a complete failure in integration of Army-Navy effort. The Navy maintained a liaison officer in the Army operations section for purposes of informing the Fourteenth Naval District concerning action being taken by the Army. No liaison officer, however, was maintained in the Navy operations section by the Army, although an [324] Id, at pp. 8375-8378. [325] Before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked: "Did your organization exchange intelligence with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?" Admiral Kimmel replied: "We did, to this extent: The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had his interests restricted to the defense of Hawaii and to such of the outlying islands as he had his forces and the ones to which he expected to send his forces. He was primarily interested in the probability of attack where his forces were stationed, and in general the information I gave to him bore upon his interests, or was confined to his interests. My own interests covered a much greater geographical area and many more factors. I tried to keep the Commanding General informed of everything that I thought would be useful to him. I did not inform the Commanding General of my proposed plans and what I expected to do in the Marshalls and other places distant from Hawaii. I saw no reason for taking the additional chance of having such information divulged by giving it to any agency who would have no part in the execution of the plan." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 282. [326] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 672. [327] Committee record, pp. 9343-9346. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 153 officer was assigned on an 8-hour shift to the harbor patrol. [328] That Admiral Kimmel was completely oblivious of what the Army was really doing evinces the ineffectiveness of the liaison that was maintained by the Navy in the Army operations section. No conferences were held by Admiral Kimmel and General Short between December 3 and the attack. [329] General Short said: 330 "I would say frankly that I imagine that as a senior admiral, Kimmel would have *resented it* if I tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out. * * * " The considerations which apparently occasioned Admiral Kimmel's failure to acquaint himself with what the Army was doing were voiced by him as follows: 331 "* * * when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, *it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them*." And yet when asked whether, in the method of mutual cooperation, it was necessary for one commander to know what the other commander was doing and what his plans were, Admiral Kimmel admitted that this knowledge was necessary. [332] While such concern for the sensibilities of another may have social propriety, it is completely out of place when designed to control the relationship of two outpost commanders whose very existence is dependent upon full exchange of information and coordination of effort. [333] It defeats the purpose of command by mutual cooperation and is worse than no liaison at all. At least, without the pretense of liaison, each commander would not be blindly relying on what the other was doing. It can fairly be concluded that there was a complete failure in Hawaii of effective Army-Navy liaison during the critical period November 27 to December 7. [334] There was but little coordination and no integration of Army and Navy facilities and efforts for defense. Neither of the responsible commanders really knew what the other was doing with respect to essential military activities. [335] ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION The consideration overshadowing all others in the minds of the Hawaiian commanders was the belief and conviction that Pearl Har- [328] Id., at pp. 8205, 8206. [329] See committee record, p. 8204 [330] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 363. [331] Roberts Commission record, p. 631. [332] Id. [333] The Army Pearl Harbor Board, for example, commented: "Apparently Short was afraid that if be went much beyond social contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to know in order to do his lob, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good will of the Navy which he was charged with securing " See Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157. [334] Admiral McMorris, Chief of War Plans to Admiral Kimmel, admitted that he had no knowledge as to whether the Army antiaircraft defenses were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness, but he assumed they were in a state of readiness. "* * * Perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew that from own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I felt. *We were a bit too complacent there*. I had been around all of the aircraft defenses of Hawaii; I knew their general location. I had witnessed a number of their antiaircraft practices and knew the quantity and general disposition of their aircraft. I knew that they were parked closely together as a more ready protection against sabotage rather than dispersed. *Nonetheless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness being maintained or of the watches being kept*." Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 330-332. [335] See committee record, p. 8205 During the course of examination Admiral Kimmel was asked: "In other words, neither you nor any member of your staff made any attempt to verify or find out what the condition of alertness was with respect to the antiaircraft guns operated by the Army?" He replied: "And neither did General Short make any attempt to find out the details of an alert that the Fleet had in effect at that time." Committee record, p. 7053. 154 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK bor would not be attacked. [336] It explains the reason for no effective steps being taken to meet the Japanese raiders on the morning of December 7. This was not occasioned through disregard of obligations or indifference to responsibilities but rather because of unfortunate errors of judgment. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department failed to appreciate the demands of their situation and the necessities of their responsibility in the light of the information and warnings they had received. More than anyone else it cannot be doubted that Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have desired to avoid the disaster of December 7. But unfortunately they were blinded by the self-evident; they felt that Japan would attack to the south and Hawaii was safe. Their errors of judgment were honest mistakes-yet errors they were. The evidence reflects that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel addressed themselves assiduously to the task of training and other wise preparing the outpost of Hawaii and the Pacific Fleet for war Throughout their respective tenures as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet they manifested a keen awareness of the imperative necessity that personnel and material be increased commensurate with the realities and responsibilities in the Pacific. From the time of assuming command throughout the year 1941 their correspondence with the War and Navy Departments is replete with clear statements concerning shortages in equipment and expressions of the need for improving Hawaiian defenses. As will subsequently appear, they were successful in effecting marked improvement in the situation generally and the potential capacity of Hawaii to defend itself particularly. General Short and Admiral Kimmel were conscientious and indefatigable commanders. They were relentless in what they regarded as the consuming need in their commands-training and preparation for war. One of the major responsibilities of Admiral Kimmel and the major responsibility of General Short was defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier and the Pacific Fleet. They knew that an air attack on Hawaii was a possibility; they knew this to be the most dangerous form of attack to Oahu; they knew that extensive efforts had been made to improve Hawaiian defenses against air attack; they had been warned of war; they knew of the unfailing practice of Japan to launch an attack with dramatic and treacherous suddenness without a declaration of war; they had been given orders calling for defense action against an attack from without; they were the commanders of the Hawaii outpost. In the face of this knowledge it is difficult to understand that the withering Japanese attack should have come without any substantial effort having been made to detect a possible hostile force and with a state of readiness least designed to meet the onslaught. That the responsible commanders were surprised that Japan [336] During the course of counsel's examination of Admiral Kimmel, he was asked this question: "The fact is, is it not, Admiral, that as you approached December 7 you very definitely gave the Navy program for action in event of the declaration of war precedence over the establishment of the defense of Pearl Harbor?" and Admiral Kimmel replied; "*If I had believed in those days preceding Pearl Harbor that there was a 50-50 chance or anything approaching that of an attack on Pearl Harbor, it would hare changed my viewpoint entirely*. I didn't believe it. And in that I was of the same opinion as that of the members of my staff, my advisers, my senior advisers." Committee record, p. 7054. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 155 struck Hawaii is understandable; that they should have failed to prepare their defenses against such a surprise is not understandable. [337] The estimate of the situation made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short is not altogether incredible in the light of the inevitable lassitude born of over 20 years of peace. [338] But the fact that their inaction is to a degree understandable does not mean that it can be condoned. The people are entitled to greater vigilance and greater resourcefulness from those charged with the duty of defending the Nation from an aggressor. Hawaii is properly chargeable with possessing highly significant information and intelligence in the days before Pearl Harbor, including: Correspondence with Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers of air attack, the warning dispatches, the code-destruction intelligence, radio intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers, the Mori call, the report of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection of the Japanese raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the morning of December 7. Despite the foregoing, the estimate was made and persisted that Hawaii was safe from an air attack although the very assumptions made by the Army and Navy commanders are implicit with the contemplation of an attack from without. General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the other hand, that the Army would alert its aircraft warning service, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes. [339] Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have insisted they received no information that Hawaii was to be attacked Yet commanders in the field cannot presume to expect that they will be advised of the exact time and place an enemy will attack or indeed that their particular post will be attacked. As outpost commanders it was their responsibility to be prepared against surprise and the worst possible contingency. [340] They have suggested that the War [337] This distinction was clearly recognized by Admiral Ingersoll when he was asked if he was surprised when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. He replied: "*I was surprised that Pearl Harbor was attacked but I was more surprised that the attack was not detected that was my first reaction, and if I express it in the words which I used at the time, it was, 'How in the hell did they get in there without somebody finding it out*?' " Committee record, p. 11310 [338] Admiral Kimmel stated: "* * * and what is so often overlooked in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair is that we were still at peace and still conducting conversations, and there were limits that I could take with planes and aviators. We were still in the peace psychology, and I myself was affected by it just like everybody else." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, page 1126, 1127. [339] See note 336, supra. [340] Incident to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the following interrogation occurred: Question. "In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?" General Short. "Yes." Question: "That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our war college teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?" General Short, "The worst." See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 436 and 437. The Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board stated: "It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a situation to *select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attack the enemy may make and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the attacks*." (Citing Army Pearl Harbor Board record Pp. 1121, 2662.) Bee committee exhibit 1st for APHB Report. Mr. Stimson said, " One of the basic polices of the Army command, which has been adhered to throughout the entire war, and in most instances with complete success, has been to give the local commander his objective and mission but not to interfere with him in the performance of it." Stimson's statement, committee record, p. 14397. Testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board General Herron, General Short's predecessor, was asked the question: "I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert the command (General Herron on June 17,1940 had been directed by Washington to institute an alert): Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up to your judgment?" He replied: "I always felt that I was entire responsible out there and I had better protect the island." See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 228; also pp. 213-215. 156 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK and Navy Departments possessed additional information which they were not given. But the fact that additional information may have been available elsewhere did not alter fundamental military responsibilities in the field. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the responsible military commanders at Hawaii. They were officers of vast experience and exemplary records in their respective services. That Admiral Kimmel and General Short were supplied enough in formation as reasonably to justify the expectation that Hawaiian defenses would be alerted to any military contingency is irrefutable. [341] That there may have been other information which could have been supplied them cannot becloud or modify this conclusion. It is into the nature of this further information that we shall hereafter inquire. [341] And yet Admiral Kimmel has indicated he felt he was entitled to more warning. In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, he said: "I had many difficult decisions to make but none which required more accurate timing than the decision as to when to drastically curtail training and to utilize all my forces in the highest form of alert status. The warnings I received prior to 7 December 1941, were of such a nature that I felt training could continue. *I felt that I was entitled and would receive further warnings before the actual outbreak of war*. I am convinced that my estimate based on the intelligence received was correct." (P. 38 of statement.) See committee exhibit No. 146. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 157 PART IV RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON 158 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK [Blank]

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