Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ............................... 75
Consciousness of danger from air attack .......................... 75
Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ........... 75
General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............ 79
Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier ............. 81
Concept of the war in the Pacific .............................. 87
Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air
attack ....................................................... 88
VI C O N T E N T S
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii-Continued Page
Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the
imminence of war .............................................. 89
Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the
imminence of war .............................................. 100
Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders
from Washington ............................................... 103
Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103
Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104
The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104
Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107
On where the attack might come .............................. 107
Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108
"Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109
The "War warning" and training .............................. 110
The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute
distant reconnaissance .................................... 110
Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117
Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the
warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119
No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120
Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121
"Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and
"Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123
Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125
Interference with training ................................... 125
The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126
The Short reply ................................................. 128
Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27
dispatch ...................................................... 129
The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130
General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter
by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131
The "Lost" Japanese carriers-Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133
The "Mori" call ................................................. 137
Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138
Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140
Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142
Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142
The "Manila message" ......................................... 142
The Honolulu press ........................................... 142
The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145
Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150
Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 75
RESPONSIBILITIES IN HAWAII
CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
The Japanese raiding force approached the island of Oahu with
virtually no danger of detection and executed its treacherous attack at
a time when only a minimum state of readiness prevailed to meet it. 
One of the causes of the disaster in consequence must lie in the failure
to employ facilities available to detect the attacking force in
sufficient time to effect a state of readiness best designed to repel or
minimize the attack. That the attack on Pearl Harbor surprised the
defending Army and Navy establishments is indisputable. The question
therefore becomes, as previously indicated: Under all of the
circumstances should the responsible commanders at Hawaii have been
surprised or, more particularly, were they justified in failing to
employ adequately the defensive facilities available to them on the
morning of December 7, 1941? 
The estimate of both Admirals Richardson  and Kimmel  in a letter
which they jointly prepared and dispatched to the Chief of Naval
Operations on January 25, 1941, pointed out that if Japan entered the
war or committed an overt act against the United States our position
would be primarily defensive in the Pacific.  There were outlined in
the letter certain assumptions upon which the action of the Pacific
Fleet would be predicated, including:
"(a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy; (b) war with Japan
imminent; (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may
take any form_even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian
flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be
considered German or Italian; and (d) Japanese attacks may be expected
against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units. Surprise raids on
Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible. "
It was pointed out that the tasks to be undertaken by the fleet with
respect to these assumptions included the taking of full security
 See section "State of Readiness," Part II, supra.
 The Army Pearl Harbor Board said: "Therefore, the situation on
December 7 can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was
being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBY's were out; the
antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with
the Fleet air arm, the naval carriers with their planes were at a
distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the ground, were
parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the Fleet
was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which
included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers Lexington and
Enterprise. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near
the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat
divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent
quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in
close confines by reason of anti-sabotage Alert No. 1. This made of them
easy targets for an air attack. *In short everything that was done made
the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full
advantage of it.*" See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee
Exhibit No. 157
 Admiral James O. Richardson, who preceded Admiral Kimmel as
commander in chief of the Pacific.
 Admiral Husband E. Kimmel assumed command of the United States
Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941 and served in that capacity until
December 17, 1941. The evidence clearly indicates that while Admiral
Kimmel was promoted over several other officers with more seniority, his
selection was made because he was regarded as preeminently qualified for
the position of commander in chief.
 See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 70.
76 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
measures for the protection of the fleet in port and at sea. Thereafter
there were set forth observations concerning the existing deficiencies
in the defenses of Oahu.
Under date of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of Navy addressed a
communication to the Secretary of War, with copies designated for the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District, observing among other things: 
"The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of
the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the
Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This
reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of
the situation with respect to Japan and by reports from abroad of
successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases.
*If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that
hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or
the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.*
"In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the
Fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be
done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to
withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.
"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are
considered to be:
"(1) Air bombing attack.
"(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
"(4) Submarine attack.
"(6) Bombardment by gun fire.
"Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have
been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted
principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2)
above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.
"Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out
successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other
operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at
twelve aircraft squadrons and the minimum at two. Attacks would be
launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.
"The counter measures to be considered are:
"(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels
before air attack can be launched;
"(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their
"(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire
"(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
"(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.
"The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but,
quit possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack
initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war Pursuit aircraft
in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the
operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit
aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and
equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire
control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on
visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to
four miles. * * *"
The foregoing communication was seen by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he
assumed command. 
The Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, replied to the letter of the
Secretary of Navy in the following terms: 
"1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility
of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I
wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter
and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a
hostile effort. The Hawaiian
 Committee Exhibit No. 10.
 Admiral Kimmel testified: "* * * I saw the letter of the Secretary
of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941, early in
February 1941." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 286.
 Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 24.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 77
Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and
continues to old a high priority for the completion of its projected
defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the
"2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight
pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes,
nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less
efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes
assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days,
as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit
group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat
less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit
planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be
assembled at: San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to
"3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA
guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route) and one hundred and nine caliber
.50 AA machine gun}. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch
guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight
caliber .50 AA machine guns.
"4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment
therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All
arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the
equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery
of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.
"5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to
give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of
balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base
facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for
installation, and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941.
At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured_
forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The
Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred
and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas in Oahu
is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and
geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke
impracticable or large-scale screening operations. However, the
Commanding General will look into this matter again.
"6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am
forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the
local naval authorities in making those measures effective."
In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 27, 1941, 
Admiral Kimmel stated he thought the supply of an adequate number of
Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the
It should be noted at this point in considering the letter of the
Secretary of Navy dated January 24, 1941, that the following dispatch
dated February 1, 1941, was sent the commander in chief of the Pacific
Fleet from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the subject "Rumored
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor": 
"1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27
January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State
Department to the following effect:
" "The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has
heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event
of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the
Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all
of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian
Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered
them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of
"2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these
rumors. furthermore, based on known data regarding the present
disposition and employment of Japanese Naval and Army forces, no move
against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
 This dispatch is indicated to have been dictated by Lt. Comdr. (now
Captain) A. H. McCollum on January 31, 1941. See committee exhibit No.
78 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The estimate made concerning the information supplied by the Peruvian
Minister with respect to a rumored Japanese surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor and a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24
were received by Admiral Kimmel at approximately the same time and are
in apparent conflict. However, the dispatch of February 1 was an
estimate of the rumor concerning the Japanese plan to make a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor based on the then present disposition and
employment of Japanese forces, whereas the Secretary's letter relates to
the dangers of the Pearl Harbor situation in contemplation of future
conflict with Japan. The communications apparently were so interpreted
by Admiral Kimmel for in a letter dated February 18, 1941, to the Chief
of Naval Operations he said: 
"I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl
Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to
minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force
In a letter of February 15, 1941  the Chief of Naval Operations
wrote Admiral Kimmel concerning antitorpedo baffles for protection
against air-torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. He stated that the
congestion in the harbor and the necessity for maneuverability limited
the practicability of the then present type of baffles. Further, the
letter indicated that the shallow depth of water in Pearl Harbor limited
the need for torpedo nets; that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet
might be assumed necessary to drop torpedoes successfully from planes
and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. A similar
communication was sent Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District, among others, requesting his recommendations and
comments concerning the matter. 
In a letter of March 20,  Admiral Bloch replied, stating that the
depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet and for this reason among
others he did not recommend antitorpedo baffles. Admiral Kimmel was in
agreement with this recommendation until such time as a light efficient
net was developed. 
However, in June of 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a
communication to the commandants of naval districts as follows: 
"1. * * * Commandants were requested to consider the employment of, and
to make recommendations concerning, antitorpedo baffles especially for
the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their
respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph
3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T
baffles among which the following was stated:
" "A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to
successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of
torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this
may be altered."
"2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British
torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three
hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less
than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it
cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe
when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a
sufficient run to arm the torpedo.
"3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be
anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo-
plane attack, it may
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
 Id., No. 116.
 Letter from Chief of Naval Operations dated February 17, 1941.
Committee exhibit No. 116.
 See Committee exhibit No. 116.
 Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated March 12,1941,
Committee exhibit No. 116
 Letter dated June 13, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to
commandants of all naval districts. Committee exhibit No. 116. This
communication made reference to the observations set forth in the letter
of February 17,1941 (committee exhibit No. 116), pointing out certain
limitations with respect to air torpedo attack. Note 13, supra.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 79
be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by
any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10
fathoms [16a] or more) is much more likely.
"4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at
Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water,
although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve
The foregoing communication clearly indicated that preconceived views
concerning the invulnerability of Pearl Harbor to air-torpedo attack
were in error.
Admiral Kimmel himself stated that during his visit to Washington in
June of 1941 he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers
to the fleet at Pearl Harbor including air attack, blocking of the
harbor, and similar matters. 
GENERAL SHORT'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
On February 7, 1941, General Short  assumed command of the Hawaiian
Department of the Army. Upon his arrival he had the benefit of
conversations with General Herron,  his predecessor, with respect to
problems prevailing in the Department. Significantly General Herron had
been directed by the War Department on June 17, 1940, to institute an
alert against a possible trans-Pacific raid.  This alert was an all-
out endeavor with full equipment and ammunition and lasted 6 weeks. It
was suspended after the 6-week period and thereafter resumed for some
time. Planes had been dispersed and gun crews alerted with the
ammunition available. The Commanding General lead the benefit of all the
plans and operations incident to the so-called "Herron alert" as a guide
in estimating the steps to be taken on the occasion of a threat of enemy
General Short saw both the letter from the Secretary of Navy dated
January 24 and the reply of the Secretary of War dated February 7, set
forth in the preceding section, concerning the danger of attack from the
Under date of February 7, 1941, General Marshall directed a letter to
General Short relating in utmost clarity the problems and responsibility
of General Short in his new command.  This letter, which referred to
a conversation with Admiral Stark, pointed out that there was need for
additional planes and antiaircraft guns; that the fullest protection for
the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major consideration of the
Army; that the risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid
by air and by submarine constituted the real perils of the situation;
and, again, that they were keeping clearly in mind that the first
concern is to protect the feet.
On February 19, 1941, General Short wrote General Marshall  pointing
out, among other things, the great importance of (1) cooperation with
the Navy; (2) dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair,
maintenance, and servicing of aircraft; (3) improvement of the
[16a] A fathom is 6 feet.
 The evidence reflects repeated efforts by the Chief of Naval
Operations to secure from the Bureau of Ordnance more efficient light-
weight baffles. See committee exhibit No. 116.
 Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 367.
 Lt. Gen Walter C. Short served as commanding general of the
Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941.
 Maj. Gen. Charles B. Herron.
 See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 213-215.
 Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 237.
 Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 1-3.
 Id., at pp. 4-9.
80 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
antiaircraft defense; (4) improvement of the situation with reference to
searchlights; and (5) bombproofing of vital installations such as
command posts and communication centers. General Short advised the Chief
of Staff that he was taking the necessary steps in line with the
important needs of the Department.
On March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General short: 
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian
Department with regard to *defense from air attack*. The establishment
of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end
is a matter of first priority."
In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 6, 1941,  General
Short observed that the Aircraft Warning Service was vital to the
defense of the Hawaiian Islands and referred to delays in construction
and establishment of sites. In a subsequent letter  General Short
again referred to the necessary for the dispersion and protection of
aircraft as well as to the matter of coordinating antiaircraft defense.
A letter dated March 28, 1941,  from General Marshall made reference
to General Short's proposal for relieving congestion by the construction
of an additional airfield and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in
protected bunkers at existing airfields with the observation that the
proposal was undoubtedly sound. He also indicated his hopefulness of
arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison.
On April 14, 1941, General Short wrote the Chief of Staff, as follows:
"Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are
making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following
agreements made with them: 
"1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and
Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security
"2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, to implement the above
"3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the
Army the provisions of the joint agreement.
"I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and
we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army
and Navy air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the
"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the
air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at
something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the
more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up
an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was
considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not
necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and
General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall.
"Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal
to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much
encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall
write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will
In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated May 29, 1941, General Short made
the following comments concerning the first phase of their recent
"The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted
of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer
Supplies for Field
 Id., at p. 10.
 Id., at pp. 11, 12.
 Letter dated March 15,1941. Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 15-17.
 Committee exhibit No. 53, p. 18.
 Id., at pp. 19, 20
 See section "Plans for Defense of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier",
 Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 35, 36.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 81
Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers
acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons
and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea.
The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol
planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers
and they then made the attack: Pursuit attacked enemy bombers
represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to
attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our
bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit planes were
dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I
believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy
Air Force, and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise."
On August 19, 1941, General Marshall addressed a letter to General Short
setting forth his reasons for deciding to establish an airfield base for
the Fifteenth Pursuit Group at Kahuku Point and stated:
"I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance
of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly,
will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the
efficiency of such defense. "
The Chief of Staff on October 10, 1941, sent the following letter to
General Short: 
"The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian
Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am
particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For
instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the
mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu
against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional
battalion of 500 men for military police duty.
"*This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air
strength in Hawaii*, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum
operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of
fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of air-base
defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two
antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving
the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at
locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as
there are in Hawaii."
On October 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short stating that
he appreciated the reasons General Short had assigned for giving ground
defense training to Air Corps personnel  but that it appeared the
best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps
training until they have completed their expansion program and have
their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned.
From the foregoing correspondence there can be no doubt that General
Short was adequately apprised of his responsibility to defend the fleet
from attack and that he was conscious of the necessity of building up
the defense against air attack.
PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER
There is nowhere, however, a better expression of the keen understanding
of the danger of a surprise air attack upon Oahu than is manifested in
the plans which the Army and Navy jointly effected for the defense of
the Hawaiian coastal frontier.
 Id., at pp. 40, 41.
 Id., at p. 42.
 In this connection General Short had written General Marshall on
October 14,1941, in part: "At the time our tentative Standing Operating
Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details
and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and
organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no
assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the
assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers.
Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground
attack on Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces." See
committee exhibit No. 53.
 Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 44, 45.
82 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Hawaiian coastal frontier was listed in defense category D. This
category covered *coastal frontiers that may be subject to major
attack*. The war plans "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," the
basic document controlling the relationship of the Army and Navy in the
formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, contains the
following with respect to category D: 
"Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this
category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with
the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval
operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of
defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a
more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C
(coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor
attack) will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea
areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-
gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be
organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to
facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be
developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of
operations. Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans
made for use of the GHQ air force."
As a basic responsibility ("Joint Action Army and Navy 1935") under
contemplation of normal circumstances responsibility for the defense of
Pearl Harbor was that of the Army.  It was recognized that- 
"* * * The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured.
This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted
as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its
bases * * *. "
The basic allocation of Army and Navy responsibility for coastal defense
was not possible under conditions prevailing in Hawaii during 1941.
Fundamental deficiencies in equipment, particularly shortage of
sufficient Army patrol planes, confronted the responsible commanders. As
Admiral Kimmel stated shortly after assuming command at Pearl Harbor_
"There is a definite line of demarcation between this objective and
longer range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be
continued as an essential basis for determining and stressing improved
readiness requirements. This planning will naturally include the more
effective schemes of employment that improved readiness, when attained,
"Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation
for or expectation of, improved conditions or facilities. *Such plans
must be based only on hard fact*. They must be so developed as to
provide for *immediate* action, based on facilities and materials that
are *now* available.
"A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing
is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor
defense, of all available aviation components. As is well known, much
remains to be done for adequate *future* effectiveness in this respect.
Much, however, can *now* be done with means now available, to make
arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they
In realistic recognition of this situation, plans were conceived early
in 1941 known as "The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier".  This plan was signed and placed in effect on
April 11, 1941, by General Short and Admiral Bloch, commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District. The plan was based on the joint
 "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", Navy Court of Inquiry
exhibit No. 6.
 Id., at p. 42.
 Letter of February 4, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet
personnel. See committee record pp. 14511, 14512.
 See committee exhibit No. 44; also Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 83
Army and Navy basic war plans  and was to constitute the basis on
which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and
mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the
plan was by *mutual cooperation* which was to apply to all activities
wherein the Army and the Navy would cooperate in coordination until and
if the method of unity of command were invoked.
Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the following tasks of the
Army and Navy were recognized:
"a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to
control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
"b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air
forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.
"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect
shipping therein; to support the Army forces."
One of the most significant features of the plan was the assumption of
responsibility by the Navy for distant reconnaissance, a normal task of
the Army. In this regard, the plan provided: "The Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, shall provide for: * * * i. *Distant Reconnaissance*."
On March 28, 1941, an agreement, incorporated as an annex to the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,  was prepared and approved by General
Short and Admiral Bloch on April 2 dealing with joint security measures
and protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base. This agreement
was entered into-
"in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the
Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile
raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before
a general mobilization for war."
It was recognized that-
"*when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Defense Officer* (the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District)
*agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently
imminent* to warrant such action, each commander will take such
preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to
the other commander such proportion of the air forces at is disposal as
the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be
conducted * * *"
Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed under
the tactical command of the Navy. When naval forces were insufficient
for long-distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were
made available, these aircraft were to be under the tactical control of
the Navy. It was contemplated that the Army would expedite the
installation and operation of an Aircraft Warning service through use of
On March 31, 1941, Admiral Bellinger, as commander, Naval Base Defense
Air Force, and General Martin, commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a
joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of
sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.
The situation was summarized in the following terms: 
(1) Relations between the United States and Japan are strained;
uncertain, and varying.
(2) In the past Japan has never preceded hostile actions by declaration
 See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits Nos. 4 and 5.
 Annex VII, see. VI. See committee exhibit No. 44.
 See committee exhibit No. 44.
84 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations
on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the
Western Pacific for a long period.
(4) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating
areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or
submarine force which initiates hostile action.
(5) It appears possible that Japanese submarines and/or a Japanese fast
raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters without prior warning from
our intelligence service.
The estimate embracing a "Survey of Opposing Strength" indicated, among
other things, that Japan might send into the Hawaiian area one or more
submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers
supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet
would be when several of the above elements were present and closely
coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii
were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a
patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from a Japanese
carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. It was
elsewhere observed in the estimate that it would be desirable to run
daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 but that this
could only be effectively maintained with "present personnel and
material" for a very short period, and as a practical measure could not
therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a
surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. 
The outline of possible enemy action as set forth in the Martin-
Bellinger estimate is a startling harbinger of what actually occurred:
"(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
"1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
"2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
"3. A combination of these two.
"(b) It appears that *the most likely and dangerous form of attack on
OAHU would be an air attack*. It is believed that at present such an
attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which
would probably approach inside of 300 miles.
"(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more
submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft
have been drawn away by the original thrust.
"(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a
considerable undiscovered surface force *probably* composed of fast
ships accompanied by a carrier.
"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be
delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be
using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which
pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a
diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The
major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and
attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the
carrier could use the night for escape
 In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral
Kimmel referred to this portion of the estimate and stated: "This plan
was on file with the Departments in Washington. They knew of this
decision. *They had done nothing to change or alter the basic
deficiencies in personnel and material which required that decision.*"
This statement, it should be noted, is not strictly accurate. The number
of Navy patrol bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance was
increased appreciably after the Martin-Bellinger estimate was prepared.
As will subsequently appear, there were sufficient patrol planes at Oahu
to conduct a distant reconnaissance for a considerable period of time
after receipt of the November 27 "war warning" (detailed reference will
be made to this warning, infra). The estimate made by Admiral Bellinger
and General Martin was prepared in March of 1941 and was necessarily in
contemplation of patrol planes then available. As indicated, the number
of Navy planes available for this purpose was substantially increased
before December 7. See committee exhibit No. 120.
 Committee exhibit No. 44.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 85
and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a
successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the
day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under
the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for
until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive
action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise.
Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of
the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer
certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk
attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better
chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be
coordinated with any air attack."
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 from Admiral Kimmel the
Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the fleet at base and in
operating areas, was issued in February 1941 and reissued in revised
form on October 14, 1941.  This fleet order was predicated on two
assumptions, one being_ 
"That a declaration of war may be preceded by_
"(1) A surprise attack on ships at Pearl Harbor.
"(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
"(3) A combination of these two."
Among the provisions of this letter concerning action to be taken if
submarine attacked in the operating area it was pointed out_
"It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the
presence of more submarines waiting to attack_"
"it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate
the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast
ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must,
therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and
daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet
enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."
A letter dated August 20, 1941, to the commanding general, Army Air
Forces, Washington, prepared by General Martin, and transmitted through
General Short, submitted as an enclosure a plan for the employment of
long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. Several
observations set forth in this plan are of particular pertinence: 
"The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of
hostile carriers in this vicinity before the approach within range of
Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an
attack on Oahu.
* * * * * * *
"Our most likely enemy, Orange (Japan), can probably employ a maximum of
six carriers against Oahu.
* * * * * * *
"* * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action
open to the enemy.
* * * * * * *
 Referring to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 14, 1941, to the
fleet 2CL-41 (revised) wherein it was stated that a declaration of war
may be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (see
committee exhibit No. 44), he was asked what form of surprise attack on
ships in Pearl Harbor he contemplated by this statement. Admiral Kimmel
"*An airplane attack. This was an assumption upon which to base our
training. The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was
sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose.* I felt, as
the situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor,
and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the
installations at Pearl Harbor might be attempted. I thought it was much
more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if the
Fleet were away than if it were there. However, at no time did I
consider it more than a possibility and one which ordinary prudence
would make us guard against." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 287.
 See committee exhibit No. 13.
86 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is
highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover
of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable.
This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following
"(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical
method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.
"(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D-Day at
close at range.
"(3) The enemy will be more concerned with deliverying [sic] a
successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He
will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably
make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept
his losses if his attack is successful.
* * * * * * *
"The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action
upon which we should base our plans of operation is the early morning
attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:
"(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before
"(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before
"(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of
"(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the
day of the attack
* * * * * * *
"He (Japan) will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.
"a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.
"b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian
materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of
detection by friendly surface vessels. *It seems that his most probable
avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0 (due north)
counterclockwise to 180 around Oahu, the next probable*, the quadrant
180 counterclockwise to 90 ; the least probable, 90 to 0 ."
Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both fully familiar with all the
provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The plans
effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier viewed in
their entirety were fully adequate under the circumstances and represent
a commendable recognition by the Hawaiian commanders of the realities of
their situation.  The unfortunate fact is that features of the plan
designed to meet an air attack were not invoked prior to the actual
attack in view of the imminence of hostile Japanese action. It is clear
that the plans with respect to joint air operations was to be operative
when the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the naval
base defense officer "agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack
is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action."  It is equally
clear that the joint security measures for the protection of the fleet
and the Pearl Harbor base were designed in order to coordinate joint
defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks
delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general
mobilization for war. The plan against air attack was prepared in
Hawaii; it was designed to meet the peculiar problems existing in
 Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Admiral Kimmel stated that "he
(Admiral Bloch) accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance,
because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." See Army Pearl
Harbor Board Record, p 1753.
He commented "There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft
available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any."
 Committee exhibit No. 44.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 87
Hawaii; its invocation, implementation, and execution was essentially a
responsibility resting in Hawaii. 
From a review of the defense plans prepared in Hawaii the conclusion is
inescapable that the Army and Navy commanders there not only appreciated
the dangers of an air attack on Pearl Harbor but had also prepared
detailed arrangements to meet this threat.
CONCEPT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC
It is to be recalled that from January 29 to March 27, 1941, staff
conversations were held in Washington between Army and Navy officials of
Great Britain and the United States to determine the best methods by
which the armed forces of the United States and the British
Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat Germany and the powers
allied with her *should the United States be compelled to resort to
war.*  The report of these conversations, dated March 27, 1941, and
referred to by the short title "ABC-1," reflected certain principles
governing contemplated action, including: 
"Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the
Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The
principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater,
and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be
conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort."
In recognition of the foregoing principle that the Atlantic and European
area was to be considered the decisive theater, the concept of military
operations as respecting Japan was expressed as follows: 
"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the
Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to
deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese
intervention. If Japan does enter the war, *the military strategy in the
Far East will be defensive*. The United States does not intend to add to
its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United
States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken
Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier
by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States
intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas
that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the
necessary forces for the Far East."
Pursuant to the principles and plans visualized in ABC-1, the Army and
Navy prepared "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan_Rainbow No. 5," which
was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the
Secretary of War on June 2, 1941.  On July 21, 1941, United States
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was distributed to the Pacific
Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This
 The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, expressed this thought in the
following terms: "* * * each theater commander is charged with the
preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of
any defense operations with the local naval authorities. Such plans are
submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington
and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from
that source. *The primary responsibility for such plans and their
creation, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the
local situation and conditions*. Before December 7, 1941 detailed plans
for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked
out by General Short as well as a joint agreement with the local naval
authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency and *he and
the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting
into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion
demanded*." See statement of Secretary of War with respect to the report
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board; committee exhibit No. 157.
 Committee exhibit No. 49. See section " ABCD Understanding?", Part
IV, infra, this report.
 Committee exhibit No. 49 p. 5.
 Id., at pp. 5, 6.
 See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 4. This Plan is also referred
to as "WPL-46."
88 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five)
insofar as the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were
concerned and was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on September
9, 1941.  It assumed, consistent with "ABC-1" and the United States
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, that the principal military
efforts of the Associated Powers would be in the Atlantic and European
areas, and that operations in other areas would be so conducted as to
facilitate that effort.
In estimating the likely enemy (Japanese) action it was observed, among
other things, that it was believed Japan's initial action would be
toward "possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other
outlying United States positions" and "raiding and observation forces
widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area."
One of the tasks formulated to accomplish assigned missions contemplated
by the plan under phase I (Japan not in the war) was to "guard against
surprise attack by Japan."
Under phase IA (initial tasks_Japan in the war) the Pacific Fleet, among
other things was to "make reconnaissance and raid in force on the
Marshall Islands." Among the tasks under phase II (succeeding tasks) was
"to capture and establish a protected fleet base anchorage in the
Marshall Island area."
From the Army standpoint, as stated by General Marshall, the fullest
protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major
consideration.  The function of the Army, therefore, was primarily
that of protecting Hawaii because it was the sea and air base of the
fleet and to render protection to the fleet proper when it was in
harbor.  Aside from these purposes, the protection of the Hawaiian
Islands was secondary and necessary only to the extent of making it
possible for the Army to execute its primary mission.
CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
Considering all of the information made available to the commanding
officers of the Army and Navy in Hawaii from the time of their assuming
command until December 7, 1941, it must be concluded that both General
Short and Admiral Kimmel knew that if Pearl Harbor was to be attacked
the danger of a Japanese air attack upon that base was the greatest
peril of their situation and that the necessity of taking steps to
provide the best possible defense to this most dangerous form of attack
was clearly indicated. It is further concluded that both responsible
officers appreciated the fact that Japan might strike before a formal
declaration of war.
It is clear that the function of both the Army and the Navy in the
Pacific was essentially a defensive one, particularly in the early
stages of the war. While diversionary and sporadic raids were envisaged
for the fleet, naval operations were to be fundamentally defensive in
character. Pending imminence of war against Japan both services were
engaged in preparation and training for this eventuality.
 Id, exhibit No. 5. This plan is referred to as "U. S. Pacific Fleet
Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five (WP Pac-46)."
 Committee exhibit No. 53 pp. 1-3
 As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "The defense of a permanent
naval base is the direct responsibility of the Army. The Navy is
expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within
whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the
base is a joint operation only to that extent." See Navy Court of
Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 89
The next point of inquiry is to determine whether Admiral Kimmel and
General Short, through information available to them, were adequately
informed concerning the imminence of war in such manner as reasonably to
contemplate they would employ every facility at their command in defense
of the fleet and the fleet base.
INFORMATION SUPPLIED ADMIRAL KIMMEL BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE
IMMINENCE OF WAR
In a letter to Admiral Stark dated February 18, 1941, Admiral Kimmel set
forth the following comments in a postscript: 
"I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI
considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-
Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that
Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of
information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed
anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to
keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on
subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix
that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?"
In reply the Chief of Naval Operations advised that the Office of Naval
Intelligence was fully aware of its responsibility to keep the commander
in chief of the Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign
nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the
United States; that information concerning the location of Japanese
merchant vessels was forwarded by air mail weekly and if desired could
be issued more frequently.
On February 25 Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, forwarding a copy of
a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the
possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines by way of the
"southern route."  Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum
for the President of February 5, 1941, setting forth an analysis of the
situation in Indochina, prepared by Admiral Stark. This expressed
Admiral Stark's view that Japan had some fear that the British and the
United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indochina and
Thailand; and that the size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and
Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indochina and Thailand, for
attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use
against the Philippines. It observed that insofar as Admiral Stark could
tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major
move; that, as he saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the
British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take
on more than one at a time; and that at present she desired not to go to
war with the United States at all.
The following significant dispatch was sent on April 1, 1941, from he
Chief of Naval Operations addressed to the commandants of all naval
PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT
BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS
OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES
Committee exhibit No. 106.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 1.
90 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IN A PARTICULAR FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS
OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, THEY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS TO SEE
THAT PROPER WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT.
In a letter of April 3, 1941,  Admiral Stark expressed his
observations on the international situation to the commanders in chief,
Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, including a discussion
of the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. Admiral Stark
stated that the basic idea of this plan contemplated that the United
States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the
Atlantic Fleet; that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval
forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the
Malay barrier; and that the United States Asiatic Fleet would be
supported through offensive operations of the United States Pacific
Fleet. He then discussed the dangers facing Britain and stated that the
Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing
on the future of the war in the Atlantic. He observed that for some time
Japan had been showing less inclination to attack the British, Dutch,
and the United States in the Far East. Admiral Stark instructed the
addressees to watch this situation closely. He expressed the feeling
that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a
stabilizing effect in the Far East but that the question was when and
not whether we would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was
that we might be in the war against Germany and Italy within about 2
months, but there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain
out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility.
In the meantime, he suggested that as much time as available be devoted
Under date of April 18, 1941, instructions were given various naval
observers to include the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet as an
information addressee in all dispatch reports and to furnish one copy of
all intelligence reports directly to him. 
In a memorandum dated May 26 to the Chief of Naval Operations the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet suggested that he be guided by
broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions; and
that it be made a cardinal principle that he be immediately informed of
all important developments as soon as they occur and by the quickest
secure means possible. 
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 3.
 Admiral Kimmel said:
"The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position.
He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly
changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or
change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and,
as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own
situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him
and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry
out his assigned tasks. The lack of information is disturbing and tends
to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that
singleness of purpose and confidence is one's own course of action so
necessary to the conduct of military operations.
"It is realized that on occasion, the rapid developments in the
international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even
the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may
militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the
present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and
authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though
necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, to modify adapt or even reorient his possible courses of action
to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the
current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training
of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the
desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions,
or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this
same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well
informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the
status of current outlying island development, *thus making it even more
necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad
policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions*.
"*It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all
important development as they occur and by the quickest secure means
available*." See committee exhibit No. 106.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 91
In June of 1941 Admiral Kimmel visited Washington at which time matters
of naval policy were reviewed with him. 
On July 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was advised "for action"
by the Chief of Naval Operations,  that the unmistakable deduction
from information obtained from numerous sources was that the Japanese
Government had determined upon its future policy, supported by all
principal Japanese political and military groups; that his policy
probably involved war in the near future. It was pointed out that an
advance by Japan against the British and Dutch could not be entirely
ruled out but that the Chief of Naval Operations held to the opinion
that Japanese activity in "the south" would be confined for the present
to seizure and development of naval, army, and in bases in Indochina.
The dispatch stated that the Japanese neutrality pact with Russia would
be abrogated and the major military effort on the part of Japan against
Russia would be toward the latter's maritime provinces probably toward
the end of July, although the attack might be deferred until after the
collapse of European Russia. It was pointed out that all Japanese
vessels in United States Atlantic Forts had been ordered to be west of
the Panama Canal by August 1, that the movement of Japanese "flag
shipping" from Japan had been suspended and additional merchant vessels
were being requisitioned. Vith an admonition to secrecy, instructions
were issued to inform the principal army commanders and the commander in
chief's own immediate subordinates.
In another dispatch of July 3,  Admiral Kimmel was advised for
action that definite information had been received indicating that
between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Government had issued an order for 7
of the 11 Japanese vessels then in the North Atlantic and Caribbean
areas to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific, and that under
routine schedules three of the remaining ships were to move to the
Pacific during the same period. It was suggested that in Japanese
business communities strong rumors were current that Russia would be
attacked by Japan on July 20, and that a definite move by the Japanese
might be expected during the period July 20 to August 1, 1941. On July 7
the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised for information
of the substance of three intercepted dispatches, including one of July
2 from Tokyo to Berlin, stating: 
"JAPAN IS PREPARING FOR ALL POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES REGARDING SOVIET IN
ORDER (TO) JOIN FORCES WITH GERMANY IN ACTIVELY COMBATTING COMMUNIST
(SIC) AND DESTROYING COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN EASTERN SIBERIA. AT SAME TIME
JAPAN CANNOT AND WILL NOT RELAX EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH TO RESTRAIN BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES. NEW INDOCHINA BASES WILL INTENSIFY RESTRAINT AND
BE VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO AXIS VICTORY."
And another of July 2 from Berlin to Tokyo: 
"OSHIMA DELIVERS ABOVE NOTE AND TELLS RIBBENTROP IN PART, "MATSUOKA WILL
SOON SUBMIT A DECISION. IF YOU GERMANS HAD ONLY LET US KNOW YOU WERE
GOING TO FIGHT
 See Navy Court of Inquiry record page 113.
 Committee exhibit No 37, p. 4.
 Id., at p. 5.
 Id., at p. 6.
 Id. This dispatch and that indicated, note 68, supra, were based on
the so-called Magic. For a discussion of Magic see Part IV, this report.
92 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RUSSIA SO SOON WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN READY. WE WERE PLANNING TO SETTLE
SOUTH SEAS QUESTIONS AND CHINA INCIDENT HENCE DECISION CANNOT BE REACHED
IMMEDIATELY, BUT JAPAN WILL NOT SIT ON FENCE WHILE GERMANY FIGHTS."
The Chief of Naval Operations in a dispatch of July 15,  sent
Admiral Kimmel for information, supplied intelligence received to the
effect that within "the next day or two," Japan would begin commercial
negotiations with Vichy France at which time she would propose "in the
name of mutual defense" Japan's taking over southern French Indochina
naval and air bases; and that at the same time Japan would attempt to
station army and navy air forces peacefully with French agreement, if
possible. It was pointed out that if Vichy objected Japan had decided to
use force; and that Japan did not intend to move farther south or
interfere with colonial government. On the basis of the information
received it was observed that the Japanese move was necessary to
guarantee supplies from "Colony and Thailand" and to prevent "Syrian
type British action"; and that while Tokyo wished to avoid friction with
Britain and particularly the United States, if possible, the risk was
regarded as necessary.
In a dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on July 17 for his information, he was
advised of a six-point ultimatum sent by Tokyo to Vichy requiring an
answer by July 20 71 The six points were specified as:
(1) Japan to send necessary Army and Wavy air forces to southern French
(2) Vichy to turn over certain naval and air bases;
(3) Japanese expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move
(4) Vichy to withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible
(5) Vichy to authorize French Indochina military to arrange details with
Japanese either before or after landing;
(6) Colony to pay Japan 23,000,000 piastres annually to meet cost of
This same dispatch advised of intelligence received on July 14 that the
Japanese Army was planning its advance on or about July 20 and, of
intelligence received on July 14, that Japan intended to carry out its
plans by force if opposed or if Britain or the United States interfered.
On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information concerning the
substance of an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Canton to Tokyo, as
"THE RECENT GENERAL MOBILIZATION ORDER EXPRESSES JAPAN'S IRREVOCABLE
RESOLUTION TO END ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN THWARTING JAPAN'S NATURAL
EXPANSION AND HER INDOMITABLE INTENTION TO CARRY THIS OUT WITH THE
BACKING OF THE AXIS IF POSSIBLE BUT ALONE IF NECESSARY. FORMALITIES SUCH
AS DINING THE EXPEDITIONARY FORGES AND SAYING FAREWELL TO THEM WERE
DISPENSED WITH TO AVOID ALARM AND BECAUSE WE WISHED TO FACE THIS NEW WAR
WITH A CALM AND COOL ATTITUDE. * * * IMMEDIATE OBJECT WILL BE TO ATTEMPT
PEACEFUL FRENCH INDOCHINA OCCUPATION BUT WILL CRUSH RESISTANCE IF
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 8. This dispatch was based on Magic.
 Id., at page 9. This dispatch was also based on Magic.
 Id., at p. 10. This dispatch was likewise based on Magic, see
committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 93
SET UP MARTIAL LAW. SECONDLY OUR PURPOSE IS TO LAUNCH THEREFROM A RAPID
ATTACK WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS SUITABLE. AFTER OCCUPATION
NEXT ON OUR SCHEDULE IS SENDING ULTIMATUM TO NETHERLANDS INDIES. IN THE
SEIZING OF SINGAPORE THE NAVY WILL PLAY THE PRINCIPAL PART. ARMY WILL
NEED ONLY ONE DIVISION TO SEIZE SINGAPORE AND TWO DIVISIONS TO SEIZE
NETHERLANDS INDIES WITH AIR FORCES BASED ON CANTON, SPRATLEY, PALAU,
SINGORA IN THAILAND, PORTUGUESE TIMOR AND INDOCHINA AND WITH SUBMARINE
FLEET IN MANDATES, HAINAN, AND INDOCHINA WE KILL CRUSH BRITISH AMERICAN
MILITARY POWER AND ABILITY TO ASSIST IN SCHEMES AGAINST US."
On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised of an intercepted dispatch from
Tokyo informing that although the Japanese Cabinet had changed there
would be no departure from the principle that the Tripartite Pact formed
the keystone of Japan's national policy and that the new Cabinet would
also pursue the policy of the former cabinet in all other matters. 
In another dispatch, supplying information concerning an intercepted
Tokyo message to Vichy, Admiral Kimmel was advised on July 20, that the
Japanese Army had made all preparations and had decided to advance
regardless of whether Vichy France accepted her demands. 
Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart on July 24, 1941,  sending a
copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel, concerning among other things, a
2-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Ambassador Nomura. Admiral
Stark expressed the thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that
the United States and Japan avoid open rupture; stated they had a very
plain talk; and observed that he, Admiral Stark, liked Nomura. He
advised that Nomura discussed at length Japan's need for the rice and
minerals of Indochina. Admiral Stark said his guess was that with the
establishment of bases in Indochina, Japan would stop for the time
being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that no doubt
the Japanese would use their Indochina bases from which to take early
action against the Burma Road. He said that, of course, there was the
possibility that Japan would strike at Borneo, but that he doubted his
in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them.
Admiral Stark also said that he talked with the President and hoped no
open rupture would come but that conditions were not getting better.
On July 25, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was advised that beginning July 26 the
United States would impose economic sanctions against Japan and that it
was expected these sanctions would embargo all trade between Japan and
the United States, subject to modification through a licensing system
for certain material.  It was further pointed out that funds in the
United States would be frozen except as they may be moved under
licensing. In estimating the situation it was observed:
"*Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use
of military means but you are furnished this information in order that
you may take appropriate precautionary measures against hostile
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 11.
 Id., at p. 12.
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14.
94 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated July 31, 1941,  Admiral Stark
discussed the over-all international situation, and stated that "after
the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they
should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along
with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies. He
stated he thought it fairly safe to say that the opinion was generally
held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I.  but that Admiral
Turner thought Japan would go into the maritime provinces in August. He
commented that Turner might be right and usually was. Admiral Stark said
his thought had been that while Japan would ultimately go into Siberia
she would delay doing so until she had the Indochina-Thailand situation
more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the
Russian-German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia. A
postscript to this letter stated, among other things, that_ .
"*obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate;
this is one thing that is factual*."
Admiral Kimmel was advised on August 14 that the Japanese were rapidly
completing withdrawal from world shipping routes, that scheduled
sailings were canceled, and that the majority of ships in other than
China and Japan Sea areas were homeward bound. 
The following dispatch of August 28 was sent to Admiral Kimmel, among
others, for action: 
"CERTAIN OPERATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR THE ATLANTIC BY WPL 51 ARE HEREBY
EXTENDED TO AREAS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AS DESCRIBED HEREIN IN VIEW OF
THE DESTRUCTION BY RAIDERS OF MERCHANT VESSELS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN
WITHIN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NEUTRALITY ZONE AS DEFINED IN THE
DECLARATION OF PANAMA OF OCTOBER 3, 1939. FORMAL CHANGES IN WPL 51 WILL
BE ISSUED, BUT MEANWHILE ACTION ADDRESSES WILL EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THE
FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. CINCPAC CONSTITUTE THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE
CONSISTING OF TWO 7,500-TON LIGHT CRUISERS AND DISPATCH IT TO BALBOA.
FOR TASK PURPOSES THIS FORCE WILL OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER CNO  AFTER
ENTERING THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AS DEFINED IN WPL 46 PAR. 3222
EXCEPT WESTERN LIMIT IS LONGITUDE 100 WEST. WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR
OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND WITHIN THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC
SUB AREA THE COMMANDER PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND COMMANDER
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE WILL IN COOPERATION AND ACTING UNDER THE
STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS EXECUTE THE
FOLLOWING TASK: DESTROY SURFACE RAIDERS WHICH ATTACK OR THREATEN UNITED
STATES FLAG SHIPPING. INTERPRET AN APPROACH OF SURFACE RAIDERS WITHIN
THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER OR THE PACIFIC
SOUTHEAST SUB AREA AS A THREAT TO UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING. FOR THE
PRESENT THE FORCES CONCERNED WILL BASE BALBOA, BUT CNO WILL ENDEAVOR TO
MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BASING ON SOUTH AMERICAN PORTS AS
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
 Netherlands East Indies.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 15.
 Id., at p. 16.
 Chief of Naval Operations.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 99
MAY BE REQUIRED. ACTION ADEES  AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE
INFORM CNO WHEN THESE INSTRUCTIONs HAVE BEEN PLACED IN EFFECT."
In a letter to Admiral Kimmel, also on August 28, 1941.  Admiral
Stark discussed, among other things, the status of the Japanese
situation and observed that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at
another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages
had been sent to them but just what they were going to do he did not
know. He said he had told one of Japan's statesmen that another move,
such as the one into Thailand, would go a long way toward destroying
before the American public what good will still remained. Admiral Stark
said he had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he
wished the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.
Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter to Admiral Stark of
September 12, 1941  such as whether he should not issue shooting
orders to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral
Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts
off Pearl Harbor and vicinity. He said:
"As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to
bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb
contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"
Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941,  and stated, among
other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders
only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the
longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the
better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to
shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in article 723 of the
Navy Regulations.  The letter also stated, in connection with the
question of submarine contacts, that they had no definite information
that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the
Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i.
e., not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas,
were appropriate, and continued:
"If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that
Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory,
then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such
submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."
Going on, Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not
believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be
sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances
that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet
could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker
than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in
one area only with the greatest difficulty. In this letter, Admiral
"* * * would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some
pictures of the Mandated Islands?"
In a postscript to this letter, Admiral Stark stated that Secretary Hull
had informed him that the conversations with the Japanese had
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
 These regulations provide for the use of force in self-
preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last
96 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get
nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there as
some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. A
second postscript to the letter, in making reference to a conversation
between Admiral Stark and Nomura, said that Ambassador Nomura usually
came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there
was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark observed that
conversations without results could not last forever and that if the
conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could
only grow more tense. Admiral Stark said he had again talked to
Secretary Hull and thought the Secretary would make one more try. He
said that Secretary Hull kept him, Admiral Stark, pretty fully informed;
and, if there was anything of moment, he would of course hasten to let
With this letter there was enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General
Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to
strengthen the Philippines. The memorandum indicated, among other
things, that on September 30, 26 Flying Fortresses would leave San
Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines.
The following dispatch of October 16, 1941, was sent to the commander in
chief, Pacific Fleet, for action: 
"THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION.
IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC
AND ANTI-AMERICAN. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT
IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT
WITH THE U. S. IN EITHER CASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A
STRONG POSSIBILITY. SINCE THE U. S. AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY
JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY
THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES
YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS
WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS
AGAINST JAPAN. SECOND AND THIRD ADEES INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL
DISTRICT AUTHORITIES. ACKNOWLEDGE."
Referring to the dispatch of October 16 concerning the resignation of
the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Stark stated in a letter of October 17 to
Admiral Kimmel: 
"Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the
message I sent you merely stated the "possibility", in fact I tempered
the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope
not. In any ease after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we
should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."
In a postscript to this letter Admiral Stark said:
"Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a
reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a
Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him
that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt
it extremely improbable and that while we keep track of Japanese ships
so far as we can, a carefully planned raid
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 97.
on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to
detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my
advice to him was not to worry. "
On October 17, 1941) Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information
that, effective immediately, all trans-Pacific United States flag
shipping to and from the Far East, India, and East India area was to be
routed through the Torres Straits, keeping to the southward and well
clear of the Japanese Mandates.  On the same day he was advised for
"BECAUSE OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO REINFORCE THE
PHILIPPINES WITH LONG-RANGE ARMY BOMBERS YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TAKE ALL
PRACTICAL PRECAUTIONS OR THE SAFETY OF THE AIRFIELDS AT WAKE AND MIDWAY.
Admiral Kimmel was advised, among other things, on October 23 at until
further orders all Army and Navy "trans-Pacific troop transports,
ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military
cargo" would be escorted both ways between Honolulu ad Manila. 
On November 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed that complete
withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters of Japanese merchant vessels
appeared in progress. 
A letter to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark on November 7 commented,
among other things: 
"Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just
when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it
all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and
worser!" A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable
policies cannot go on forever_ particularly if one party cannot live
with the set-up. It doesn't look good."
On November 14, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, stating among other
"The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has
been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better
understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his
visit. I note this morning in the press dispatches a listing of a number
of points by the Japan Times and
 Transmitted as an enclosure to this letter was an estimate dated
October 17 prepared by Admiral Schuirmann with respect to the change in
the Japanese Cabinet, stating:
"I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in
the Japanese Cabinet as indicative great changes in Japanese political
thought or action.
"The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled
for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy
of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military
based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what
they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic
maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties."
After recounting that Konoye cabinets had time and again expressed
disapproval of the acts committed the Japanese military but remedial
action had not been taken, that Konoye himself had declared Japan's
policy was to beat China to her knees; that while the Konoye cabinet may
have restrained the *extremists* among the military it had not opposed
Japan's program of expansion by force; that when opportunities arise
during the "coming months" which seemed favorable to the military for
further advance, they would be seized; and that the same "bill of
goods," regarding the necessity of making some concession to the
moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" had
been offered to the United States since the days when Mr. Stimson was
Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador, Admiral Schuirmann concluded:
"Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better
and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack
Russia, or may move southward, but *in the final analysis this will be
determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they
can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power" (Committee exhibit
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 21.
 Id., at p. 22.
 Id., at p. 23.
 Id., at p. 24.
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
 Id. As an enclosure to this letter, Admiral Stark forwarded a copy
of a joint memorandum for the President which he and General Marshall
had prepared dated November 5 and bearing caption "Estimate concerning
Far Eastern Situation." This memorandum was prepared with respect to
dispatches received indicating it to be Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's
belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that military
support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States
and British units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations opposed dispatching
American military assistance to meet this supposed threat. For a
discussion of this memorandum, see Part IV, infra, this report.
98 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Advertiser upon which concessions by the United States are necessary for
the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitulation by the
United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this
country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible
to reconcile such divergent points of view."
On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message
marked for action: 
"CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL.
THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND
MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT
*A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON
PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY*. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS
DESPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY
OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO
COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION.
GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY."
The postscript of a personal letter dated November 25 from Admiral Stark
to Admiral Kimmel read: 
"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.
I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long
talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing
the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as
did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise
attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most
embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who
think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I
included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I
have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed
against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into
Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely.
"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I
will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that
we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared
for, or we may do nothing_I think it is more likely to be "anything." "
On November 27, 1941, the following dispatch was sent Admiral Kimmel for
"*THIS DESPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING*. NEGOTIATIONS WITH
JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC *HAVE
CEASED* AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW
DAYS. THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION
OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER
THE PHILIPPINES THAI OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO. *EXECUTE AN
APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS
ASSIGNED IN WPL46*. INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES. A SIMILAR
WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT. SPENAVO  INFORM BRITISH.
CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. This dispatch was also sent for
action to commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and commandants of the
Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Naval Districts.
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
 Committee exhibit No 37, p. 36. This dispatch was also sent for
action to the commander in chief et the Asiatic Fleet. It has been
referred to throughout the proceedings as the "War Warning."
 Special naval observer.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 99
The following dispatch dated November 28, 1941, referring to the
November 27 warning, was supplied Admiral Kimmel for his information:
"* * * ARMY HAS SENT FOLLOWING TO COMMANDER WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
"NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL
PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION
UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. IF HOSTILITIES
CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT
THE FIRST OVERT ACT. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS
RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR
DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE
St-CH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE
MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL
POPULATION- OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. A SEPARATE
MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G TWO NINTH CORPS AREA RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
IN UNITED STATES. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR THEY WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS
ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT
DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
OFFICERS." WPL 52 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PACIFIC AREA AND WILL NOT BE
PLACED IN EFFECT IN THAT AREA EXCEPT AS NOW IN FORCE IN SOUTHEAST
PACIFIC SUB AREA AND PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. UNDERTAKE NO
OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT. BE PREPARED TO
CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN CASE
On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent Admiral Kimmel a
dispatch for information describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. The
dispatch indicated that Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya
in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malay into
Thailand. Thailand would then brand Britain an aggressor and call upon
Japan for aid, thereby facilitating the Japanese entry into Thailand as
a full-fledged ally and give Japan air bases on the Kra Peninsula and a
position to carry out any further operations along Malaya. [100a]
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38. This dispatch was sent for action
to the naval commanders on the west coast.
[100a] This dispatch, No. 011400 which was addressed to the commander in
chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action, read: "AMBASSADOR TSUBOKAMI IN
BANGKOK ON TWENTY NINTH SENT TO TOKYO AS NUMBER EIGHT SEVEN TWO THE
FOLLOWING QUOTE CONFERENCES NOW IN PROGRESS IN BANGKOK CONSIDERING PLANS
AIMED AT FORCING BRITISH TO ATTACK THAI AT PADANG BESSA NEAR SINGORA AS
COUNTER MOVE TO JAPANESE LANDING AT KOTA BHARU SINCE THAI INTENDS TO
CONSIDER FIRST INVADER AS HER ENEMY, ORANGE BELIEVES THIS LANDING IN
MALAY WOULD FORCE BRITISH TO INVADE THAI AT PADANG BESSA. THAI WOULD
THEN DECLARE WAR AND REQUEST ORANGE HELP. THIS PLAN APPEARS TO HAVE
APPROVAL OF THAI CHIEF OF STAFF BIJITTO. THAI GOVERNMENT CIRCLES HAVE
BEEN SHARPLY DIVIDED BETWEEN PRO-BRITISH AND PRO-ORANGE UNTIL TWENTY
FIVE NOVEMBER BUT NOW WANITTO AND SHIN WHO FAVOR JOINT MILITARY ACTION
WITH ORANGE HAVE SILENCED ANTI ORANGE GROUP AND INTEND TO FORCE PREMIER
PIBUL TO MAKE A DECISION. EARLY AND FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ARE POSSIBLE
UNQUOTE " See committee exhibit No. 112, p. 67.
100 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On December 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was supplied the following
information for action: 
"HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT
INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
POSTS AT HONGKONG, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO
DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER
IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS."
And, again, on December 3, 1941, he received the following message for
his information: 
"CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FOUR FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON,
HONGKONG, SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY MACHINE. BATAVIA MACHINE
ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO. DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY,
ALL BUT ONE COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS, AND ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS. BRITISH
ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED."
On December 4, 1941, a dispatch  was supplied the commander in
chief of the Pacific Fleet, for his information, instructing Guam to
destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified
matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to
destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter.
A dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of December 6  for action stated that
"in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our
outlying Pacific islands" he was authorized to order the destruction in
such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under
later conditions of greater emergency." It was pointed out that means of
communication to support "our current operations an special
intelligence" should be maintained until the last moment.
From a review of dispatches and correspondence sent Admiral Kimmel it is
concluded that he was fully informed concerning the progressive
deterioration of relations with Japan and was amply warned of the
imminence of war with that nation.
INFORMATION SUPPLIED GENERAL SHORT BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE
IMMINENCE OF WAR
The accepted practice in the Navy whereby the Chief of Naval Operations
supplemented official dispatches by personal correspondence does not
appear to have been followed by the War Department. The letters sent by
the Chief of Staff to General Short, heretofore discussed, related
largely to the latter's responsibility, steps necessary to improve the
Army defenses in Hawaii, and suggestions and comments with respect
thereto. It does not appear that such correspondence was employed to
acquaint the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department with the
international situation generally nor to convey the personal estimates
and impressions of the Chief of Staff. The
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. This dispatch was also sent for
action to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the
commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. This dispatch was sent for action
to the commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and the commandant of the
Sixteenth Naval District.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 44.
 Id., at p. 45.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 101
evidence indicates that the Army did not forward the substance of any
intercepted Japanese dispatches to field commanders because of the
feeling that the Army codes were generally not so secure as those of the
Navy.  General Short, however, was supplied either directly from
the War Department or by reference from his naval opposites in Hawaii
adequate information concerning the critical international situation and
the impending likelihood of war with Japan.
The dispatch of July 3, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, advising among other
things that the unmistakable deduction from information received from
numerous sources was to the effect that Japan was agreed on a policy
involving war in the near future, carried instructions to advise General
Admiral Kimmel was instructed to supply General Short the information
contained in the dispatch of July 25 advising of economic sanctions
against Japan and possible Japanese reaction. 
The following Navy message of October 16, 1941, was received by General
Short through reference from Admiral Kimmel: 
"THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE C. N. O. WHICH I
HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU. QUOTE: "JAPANESE CABINET RESIGNATION
CREATES A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY
BE ANTI-AMERICAN AND EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC. IF THE KONOYE CABINET
REMAINS IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES. EITHER WAY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN
JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE STRONGLY POSSIBLE. SINCE BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT SITUATION THERE IS
ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF
THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH
PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR
CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN." "
In a radiogram of October 20 signed "Adams"  the War Department
advised the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of its
estimate of the situation in the following terms:
"TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS STRAINED BUT NO
ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY APPEARS IMMINENT. "
Admiral Kimmel was instructed to advise General Short concerning the
dispatch of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations 
advising, among other things, that "chances of favorable outcome of
negotiations with Japan very doubtful" and movements of Japanese forces
"indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."
General Short expressed the belief that he had seen this dispatch. 
 See committee record, pp. 2220-2222.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 4; also, No. 32, p. 1.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14; also No. 32, p. 2.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18; also, No. 32, p. 3. See Army
Pearl Harbor board record, p. 279.
 Maj. Gen. Emory S. Adams, Adjutant General.
 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 4. See also Army Pearl Harbor board
record, p. 4258.
 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 5
 See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258.
102 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A dispatch of November 26 signed "Adams" was sent General Short reading
in part as follows: 
"* * * IT IS DESIRED THAT THE PILOTS BE INSTRUCTED TO PHOTOGRAPH TRUK
ISLAND IN THE CAROLINE GROUP JALUIT IN THE MARSHALL GROUP. VISUAL
RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY. INFORMATION DESIRED AS TO
THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF NAVAL VESSELS INCLUDING SUBMARINES * * *
INSURE THAT BOTH B-TWENTY FOUR AIR PLANES ARE FULLY EQUIPPED WITH GUN
AMMUNITION UPON DEPARTURE FROM HONOLULU. "
The November 27 dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral
Kimmel beginning "This despatch is to be considered a war warning" 
contained instructions that General Short be informed and he did in fact
see this warning.
On November 27 the following dispatch signed "Marshall"  was sent
General Short by the War Department: 
"NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL
PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION
UNPREDICTABLE BUT *HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT*. IF
HOSTILITIES CANNOT, REPEAT CANNOT, BE AVOIDED THE *UNITED STATES DESIRES
THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT*. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT, REPEAT
NOT, BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT
JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION *YOU ARE
DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM
NECESSARY* BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT, REPEAT
NOT, TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES
TAKEN. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN
RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF
THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS."
The following dispatch signed 'Miles',  and also dated November 27,
was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department: 
"JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALEMATE *HOSTILITIES MAY
ENSUE*. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY BE EXPECTED. INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL
AND CHIEF OF STAFF ONLY."
On November 28 a dispatch signed "Adams" was directed to General Short,
as follows: 
"CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY
AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY_
FORTY FIVE). ALSO
 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 6.
 This reconnaissance was not flown inasmuch as the Army planes were
not made ready prior to the December 7 attack.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
 Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff.
 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7.
 Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2, Army Intelligence.
 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10.
 Id., at p. 13.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 103
DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO
PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS, PROPERTY, AND EQUIPMENT
AGAINST SABOTAGE, PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE
PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE. THIS DOES
NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED. PROTECTIVE
MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY, AVOIDING
UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM. TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION
IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT
REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS.
Again on November 28 another dispatch from the War Department was sent
the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, as follows: 
"ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE. THAT INSTRUCTIONS
SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER
YOUR CONTROL AND COMMAND IS DESIRED: AGAINST THOSE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
(SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SR 30_45) THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION
DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE. IT IS DESIRED ALSO THAT
ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE INITIATED BY YOU IMMEDIATELY TO
PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE
PROPAGANDA PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE, AND
PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT, PROPERTY AND
ESTABLISHMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZE ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES.
AVOIDING UNNECESSARY ALARM AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE
CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY.
"IT IS ALSO DESIRED THAT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS YEAR REPORTS BE
SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES OF ALL STEPS INITIATED BY YOU TO
COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS. SIGNED ARNOLD."
A dispatch dated December 5 and signed "Miles",  was sent the
assistant chief of staff headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, to_
"CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THROUGH COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH
NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKYO REFERENCE WEATHER. "
ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL PURSUANT TO WARNINGS AND ORDERS FROM
DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
In the dispatch of October 16  Admiral Kimmel was advised that the
resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation;
[120a] For the reply of General Short to this message from the Adjutant
General, see committee exhibit No. 32, p. 17.
 Id., at p. 14. This message was also signed "Adams."
 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 20.
 This dispatch refers to the so-called winds code which will be
found discussed in detail in Part IV, infra, this report.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.
104 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that there was a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan and
Russia and there also was a possibility Japan might attack the United
States and Great Britain; and that he should_
"take due precautions including such *preparatory deployments*  as
will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions
Pursuant to the order Admiral Kimmel ordered submarines to assume a "war
patrol" off both Wake and Midway; he reinforced Johnston and Wake with
additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional
marines to Palmyra Island; he ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands; he
placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in
west-coast ports, held 6 submarines in readiness to depart for Japan,
and delayed the sailing of 1 battleship which was scheduled to visit a
west-coast navy yard; he dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with
orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island and
placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating
On October 22, Admiral Kimmel reported by letter  these
dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. By letter
dated November 7 Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet: 
"OK on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent
change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is_what next?"
DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 24 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
In the dispatch of November 24  Admiral Kimmel was advised that the
chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very
doubtful and that the movements of Japanese naval and military forces_
"indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."
This dispatch carried no orders for the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet  and would appear designed to acquaint him with the
mounting tenseness of the situation as well as to supply him with an
estimate of probable Japanese action.  No action appears to have
been taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to this dispatch and he has stated
that he felt the message required no action other than that which he had
already taken. 
"WAR WARNING" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27
The dispatch of November 27 began with the words:  "This dispatch
is to be considered a war warning."  It stated that negotiations
with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the
 Admiral Kimmel said: "The term 'preparatory deployments' used in
this dispatch is nontechnical. It has no especial significance other
than its natural meaning." Committee record, pp. 6708, 6709.
 See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6709.
 Committee exhibit No. 106.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32.
 See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 50-53.
 Admiral Turner testified: "The dispatch of the 24th we did not
consider required any immediate action, except to get ready plans for
putting into effect when we gave them another warning." Committee
record, p. 5159.
 See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 298, 299.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
 Admiral Kimmel observed: "The phrase 'war warning' cannot be made
a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a
characterization of the specific information which the dispatch
contained." Committee record, p. 6717.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 105
Pacific had ceased and "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within
the next few days," and that "the number and equipment of Japanese
troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious
expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or
possibly Borneo." Admiral Kimmel was ordered "to execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
After receiving this warning Admiral Kimmel made the deliberate decision
not to institute long-range reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor against
possible air attacks for reasons which will subsequently appear. 
Between the warning and the attack on December 7 the following
deployments were made and action taken:
1. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in
command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier Enterprise, three
heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon
searches to 300 miles for any sign of hostile shipping.  The
sending of this force to Wake was pursuant to a dispatch dated November
26 to Admiral Kimmel stating, in part_
"in order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available
for expeditionary use OpNav  has requested and Army has agreed to
station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake
provided you consider this is feasible and desirable. It will be
necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu
to these stations on an aircraft carrier. "
Admiral Halsey knew of the war warning dispatch and held a lengthy
conference with Admiral Kimmel and other officers on November 27. He
stated that when he prepared to depart with the task force for Wake
Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far the latter wanted him to go;
that Admiral Kimmel replied "Use your common sense."  Admiral Smith
said that before Admiral Halsey left in the Enterprise, he asked Admiral
Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces, to which
Admiral Kimmel replied he should use his own discretion. Admiral Smith
stated that Admiral Halsey commented these were the best orders he had
received and that if he found even Japanese sampan he would sink it.
2. On December 5, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in
command of Task Force 2, consisting of the carrier Lexington, three
heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Like Halsey, Newton conducted
scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance  despite the
fact, however, that Admiral Newton was leaving Pearl Harbor with some of
the most powerful and valuable units of the Pacific fleet he was not
even shown the war warning, had no knowledge of it, and indeed had no
knowledge of the dispatches of October
 The Navy court of inquiry found: "It was the duty of Rear Admiral
Bloch, when and if ordered by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to
conduct long-range reconnaissance. The commander in chief Pacific Fleet,
for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such
reconnaissance in ease of emergency, specifically ordered that no
routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full
responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was
not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military
decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with
experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all
the factors involved." Navy court of inquiry report, committee exhibit
 Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750. See also
testimony of Admiral Halsey, Hart inquiry record, p. 299.
 Office of Naval Operations.
 Dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet, No. 270038, dated November 26, 1941. Committee
exhibit No. 112. See also committee record, pp. 1614, 1615; also Hart
inquiry record, p. 299.
 Hart inquiry record, pp. 297, 298.
 Id., at p. 43.
 Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750: see also
testimony of Admiral Newton, Hart inquiry record. p. 318.
106 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
16 and November 24 or the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction
of codes to which reference will hereafter be made Except for what he
read in the press, Admiral Newton received no information concerning the
increasing danger of our relations with Japan. He was given no special
orders and regarded his departure from Hawaii as a mission with no
special significance other than to proceed to Midway for the purpose of
flying off the Lexington a squadron of planes for the reinforcement of
the island. In consequence, no special orders were given for the arming
of planes or making preparation for war apart from ordinary routine.
 The failure to supply Admiral Newton any orders or information is
in marked contrast with the "free hand" orders given Admiral Halsey. In
his testimony Admiral Kimmel stated that Admiral Newton's orders and
information would have come through Admiral Brown, who was Newton's
3. Admiral Wilson Brown on December 5 left Pearl Harbor en route to
Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises. 
4. On November 28, orders were issued to bomb unidentified submarines
found in the operating sea areas around Oahu. Full security was invoked
for the ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts.
 However, no change was made in the condition of readiness in port
except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they
began sweeping the harbor channel and approaches. 
5. Upon receipt of the war warning Admiral Kimmel ordered a squadron of
patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas
en route. While at Wake and Midway on December 2 and 3 they searched to
a distance of 525 miles. 
6. A squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor was ordered to replace
the squadron which went from Midway to Wake. This squadron of patrol
planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded from Johnston to
Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching
Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not
less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3,
4, 5, and 6. On December 7, five of these Midway based patrol planes
were searching the sector 120 to 170 from Midway, to a distance of 450
miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at
the same time to rendezvous with the Lexington at a point 400 miles from
Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with
bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready striking force. 
Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified
before the Hewitt inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was
"there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the
fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to
 See Hart inquiry record, pp. 316 318.
[142a] In this regard, the testimony of Admiral Brown indicates that he
was not shown the "war warning". See testimony of Rear Admiral Brown
before the Roberts Commission, Committee exhibit No. 143.
 Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751
 See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 299, 300; see also committee
exhibit No. 112, p. 96. 115
 See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 395.
 Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751.
 See Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, page 6752; also
testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 684.
It should be noted that Admiral Inglis stated, "*There is no written
record available of any searches having be made on December 6, either
from the Hawaiian area or from Midway*." For further testimony of Adm.
Inglis concerning the matter of reconnaissance see committee record, pp.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 107
Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers,
to those locations to deliver aircraft. "
While the dispatch of the three task forces does not appear to have been
primarily made by Admiral Kimmel as a result of the implications of the
war warning,  this action combined with the other steps above-
mentioned had the effect of providing reconnaissance sweeps of the
patrol-plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to
Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to
Pearl Harbor covering a distance of nearly 5,000 miles. Each squadron as
it proceeded would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path,
bring under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of-
ocean area. In addition, submarines of the Fleet on and after November
27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously. 
The southwest approaches to Hawaii were thereby to a degree effectively
screened by reconnaissance from a raiding force bent on attacking Pearl
Harbor by surprise.  *Nothing was done, however, to detect an
approaching hostile force coming from the north and northwest,
recognized as the most dangerous sector, and it is into the
justification for this non-action that we shall inquire*. 
EVALUATION OF THE WAR WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27.
ON WHERE THE ATTACK MIGHT COME
Admiral Kimmel stated that the war warning dispatch of November 27 did
not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area nor did it
state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area
was imminent or probable. 
The warning dispatch did not, it is true, mention Pearl Harbor as a
specific point of attack, and gave the estimate that the number and
equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines,
Thailand or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. [153a] It is to be
recalled in this connection, however, that the November 24 dispatch
[153b] to Admiral Kimmel warned of "*a surprise aggressive movement in
any direction including attack on Philippines or (Guam is a
possibility*". The latter dispatch while indicating that an attack would
possibly come in the vicinity of the Philippines or Guam did
nevertheless indicate, by use of the words "*in any direction*," that
just where the attack might come could not be predicted. 
 Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 321, 322.
 See committee record, pp. 9312, 9313.
 Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6752.
 In this connection, see testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee
record, pp. 9321, 9324.
 See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9324,
9325, also 9436, 9437.
 Admiral Kimmel testified: "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch of
November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian
area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the
Hawaiian area was imminent or probable." Committee record, p 6715. For a
detailed statement by Admiral Kimmel concerning where the attack might
come based on the "war warning," see Navy Court of Inquiry record, p.
[153a] For the full text of the "war warning" dispatch, see p. 98,
[153b For the full text of the November 24 dispatch, see p. 98, supra.
 Admiral Kimmel stated that in the November 24 dispatch the words
"in any direction" did include so far as his estimate was concerned, a
possible submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands but not an air attack.
See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 299.
It has been pointed out that the estimate of enemy action referred to in
the "war warning"_*an amphibious operation to the South*_is to be
distinguished from *a surprise aggressive movement in any direction*
mentioned in the November 24 warning; that the distinction between an
amphibious expedition and a surprise aggressive movement is such that a
war warning in making reference to such an expedition in no way
superseded the estimate of surprise aggressive action mentioned in the
November 24 dispatch. See in this regard the testimony of Admiral
Turner, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 997, 1020.
108 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The fact that Admiral Kimmel was ordered to take "an appropriate
*defensive deployment* preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
WPL-46" indicated that his situation was subject to possible danger
requiring such action.  It was Washington's responsibility to give
Admiral Kimmel its best estimate of where the major strategic enemy
effort would come.  It was Admiral Kimmel's responsibility as
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to be prepared for the worst
contingency, and when he was warned of war and ordered to execute a
defensive deployment it was necessarily in contemplation that such
action would be against all possible dangers with which the Hawaiian
situation was fraught. 
OTHER DISPATCHES RECEIVED ON NOVEMBER 27
Admiral Kimmel stated that two other dispatches which he received on
November 27 were affirmative evidence that the War or Navy Departments
did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable.
 The first of these dispatches read: 
"Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for
reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this
desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for
advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide
any antiaircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and
advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended
The second read: 
"*In order to keep the planes of the second marine aircraft wing
available for expeditionary use Op Nav has requested and Army has agreed
to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake
provided you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary
for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these
stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination
and ground personnel landed in boats; essential spare parts, tools and
ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular
Naval supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in
tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and
transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be
allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to
Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if
necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army
bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations?
Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable."
Both of these dispatches, however, were dated November 26, the day
before the war warning dispatch. The latter dispatch was not to be
controlled by messages which antedated it. The reinforcing of Wake and
Midway was left up entirely to Admiral Kimmel both as to feasibility and
desirability.  The fact that other outposts needed reinforcements
and steps were outlined in that direction did not elim
 In this connection it is to be noted that the "war warning"
dispatch was directed for action to the commander in chief of the
Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet (committee
exhibit No. 37, p. 36). This would appear to be an indication to Admiral
Kimmel that the same defensive action was expected of him as of Admiral
Hart in the Philippine area who was located in the path of the Japanese
move to the south: that the message of November 27 placed in the same
category_exposed to the same perils and requiring the same action_the
Asiatic and the Pacific Fleets.
 See testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, Navy Court of Inquiry record,
 See discussion regarding "Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger
from air attack " Part III p. 75 et seq., supra.
 Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6716, 6717.
 Committee exhibit No. 112, p. 54.
 Id., at p. 55.
 Admiral Kimmel testified before the Nay Court of Inquiry that he
regarded the proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to transfer
Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake in order to conserve the marine
planes for expeditionary duty as a suggestion and not a directive. See
Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 307.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 109
inate the necessity for the defense of Hawaii, the best-equipped outpost
the United States possessed, nor remove it as a possible point of
attack. The same is true with respect to the use of Hawaii as a
crossroads for dispositions going to the Philippines or elsewhere;
Hawaii was the only point we controlled in the Pacific which had
adequate facilities to be such a crossroads.
"PSYCHOLOGICAL HANDICAPS" INDICATED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL
In his testimony Admiral Kimmel has suggested that one can appreciate
the "psychological handicaps" that dispatches he received placed upon
the Navy in Hawaii. He stated:
"In effect, I was told:
"Do take precautions" 
"Do not alarm civilians" 
"Do take a preparatory deployment" 
"Do not disclose intent" 
"Do take a defensive deployment" 
"Do not commit the first overt act." 
In this connection, however, it is to be noted that the only cautions
mentioned, which were contained largely in Army messages, were not to
alarm civilians, not to disclose intent, and not to commit the first
overt act. To have deployed the fleet; to have instituted distant
reconnaissance; to have effected a higher degree of readiness, on a
maneuver basis if necessary_none of these steps would have alarmed the
civilian population of Hawaii,  have disclosed intent, or have
constituted an overt act against Japan. Admiral Kimmel's contention must
be judged in light of the fact that on November 28 on his own
responsibility,  he instructed the fleet to depth bomb all
submarine contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas.
 The Office of Naval Operations acquiesced in this order to depth
bomb submarine contacts. Admiral Halsey, prior to departing for Wake
Island on November 28, received orders from Admiral Kimmel which he
interpreted as permitting him to sink "even a Japanese sampan" if he
found it.  Asked by Admiral Halsey as to how far he "should go"
Admiral Kimmel replied, "Use your common sense." 
 Referring to the dispatch of October 16 advising of the
resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and stating in part, "You will take
due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not
disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against
Japan." See committee exhibit No. 37.
 Referring to a portion of the dispatch of November 28 sent Admiral
Kimmel for information and incorporating a portion of an Army message
sent the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, which latter
message stated in part, "The United States desires that Japan commit the
first overt act * * *. Measures should be carried out so as not to alarm
civil population or disclose intent." See committee exhibit No. 37.
 Referring to the dispatch of October 16, note 162, supra.
 Referring to the dispatches of October 16 and November 28, notes
162 and 163, supra.
 Referring to the "war warning" dispatch of November 27. Committee
exhibit No. 37.
 Referring to the dispatch of November 28, note 163, supra.
 There had been air raid drills at Pearl Harbor on April 24, May
12, 13; June 19; July 10, 26; August 1, 20; September 5, 27; October 13,
27; and November 12, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 120.
 As stated by the Navy court of inquiry: "* * * he (Admiral Kimmel)
has issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified
submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and
sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and *ran
the risk of committing an overt act against Japan*, but did so feeling
that it is best to follow the rule 'shoot first and explain
afterwards'." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No.
 See dispatch No. 280355 from Admiral Kimmel to the Pacific Fleet
with a copy for information to the Office of Naval Operations; committee
exhibit No. 112, p. 96. For a description of the fleet operating sea
areas, see committee exhibit No. 6, Item 3.
 See Hart inquiry record, p. 43.
 Id., at pp. 297, 298.
110 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The "war warning" dispatch of November 27 to the commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet contained no cautions, admonitions, or restraints
THE "WAR WARNING" AND TRAINING
It has been pointed out by Admiral Kimmel that had he effected all-out
security measures upon receiving each alarming dispatch from Washington,
the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the
fleet could not have been prepared for war.  To appraise the merit
of this observation it is necessary to consider the nature of
instructions with respect to training under which the fleet operated.
Admiral Kimmel has stated he was under a specific injunction to continue
the training program, referring in this connection to a letter from the
Chief of Naval Operations dated April 3, 1941. 
In this letter, however, the Chief of Naval Operations had stated the
question was *when* and not *whether* we would enter the war and that in
the meantime he would advise that Admiral Kimmel devote as much time as
may be available to training his forces in the particular duties which
the various units might be called upon to perform under the Pacific
Fleet operating plans. Clearly the suggestion that training be conducted
was made pending a more critical turn indicating the imminence of war.
The dispatch of November 27 with vivid poignance warned of war with
Japan. It stated that negotiations with Japan looking to stabilization
of conditions in the Pacific had *ceased* and that an *aggressive move*
by Japan was expected *within the next few days*. The time for training
for a prospective eventuality was past_the eventuality, war, was at
hand.  In none other of the dispatches had the commander in chief
been so emphatically advised that war was imminent. Indeed the November
27 dispatch used the words "war warning," an expression which Admiral
Kimmel testified he had never before seen employed in an of official
dispatch in all of his 40 years in the Navy. Manifestly the commander in
chief of the United States Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would not expect
that it would be necessary for the Navy Department to advise him to put
aside his training now that war was imminent. The "war warning" provided
adequate indication that the primary function thereafter was not
training but defense against a treacherous foe who had invariably struck
without a declaration of war.
THE TERM DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT AND FAILURE TO INSTITUTE DISTANT
Admiral Kimmel has made particular reference to the fact that the term
"defensive deployment" was nontechnical and that it was to be
 Referring to the November 27 warning, Admiral Stark said: "This
message begins with the words 'This dispatch is to be considered a war
warning.' These words were carefully weighed and chosen after
considerable thought and discussion with my principal advisors and with
the Secretary of the Navy. The words 'war warning' had never before been
used in any of my dispatches to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.
They were put at the beginning of the message to accentuate the extreme
gravity of the situation. We considered the picture as we saw it and we
felt that there was grave danger of Japan striking anywhere. We wanted
our people in the Pacific to know it, and we used language which we
thought would convey what we felt." Committee record, pp. 5650, 5651.
 Committee record p. 6703, see also testimony of Admiral Bellinger,
Committee record, p. 9350.
 Committee record p. 6702. For letter see committee exhibit No.
 Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel stated, after
outlining the circumstances attending the decision, testified: "* * * I
made the decision on the 27th of November not to stop training in the
Fleet but to continue until further developments." Navy Court of Inquiry
record, p. 285.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 111
effected "preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."
This plan called for a raid upon the Marshall Islands by the Pacific
Fleet very shortly after hostilities with Japan should begin. Admiral
Kimmel has pointed out that the prime purpose of the raids was to divert
Japanese strength from the Malay Barrier. He has observed that the only
patrol planes of consequence at Pearl Harbor were assigned to the fleet
and that these planes would be required in the raid on the Marshalls. He
further pointed out that he had only 49 patrol planes in flying
condition, an insufficient number to conduct each day a 360 distant
reconnaissance from Oahu. In this connection he observed that to insure
an island base against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes,
it was necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles
and that this required 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours to cover the
360 perimeter. He testified that, of course, the same planes and the
same crews cannot make a 16-hour flight every day and therefore for
searches of this character over a protracted period 250 patrol planes
would be required. He observed that a search of all sectors of approach
to an island base is the only type of search that deserves the name and
that he manifestly had an insufficient number of planes for this
purpose.  In consequence of this situation, Admiral Kimmel decided
to undertake no distant reconnaissance whatever from Pearl Harbor and
regarded the deployment of the task forces and other measures already
indicated as an adequate defensive deployment within the terms of the
order contained in the war warning. 
In this connection, as heretofore pointed out, Admiral McMorris,
Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified before the Hewitt
Inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was executed, stating_
"there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the
fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to
Midway and Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and
destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft. "
He further stated that the language with respect to a defensive
deployment in the war warning was a "direction" and that he considered
the action taken constituted an appropriate defensive deployment; that
it was a major action in line with the measure to execute an appropriate
defensive deployment; and that the major portion of the fleet was
disposed in Hawaiian waters and reinforcements were sent to Midway and
Wake. He said, however, that the establishing of an air patrol from Oahu
to guard against a surprise attack by Japan would have been an
appropriate act but that_
"no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other
Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said that following the
war warning of November 27 the establishment of aircraft patrols from
Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out
the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans. 
 See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6752-6750.
 See committee record, pp. 6759-6761; also Navy Court of Inquiry
record, pp. 1144, 1145.
 In Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 321, 322.
 Id., at pp. 323, 324.
 Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 372, 373.
112 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans, who had a principal part in
preparing the November 27 war warning, testified as follows with respect
to the term *defensive deployment*: 
"Before coming to the meat of the answer, I invite attention to the fact
that this dispatch has a multiple address. It goes to the commander in
chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action and it goes to the commander in
chief of the Pacific Fleet for action. It is as if it were the Army
practice, with two dispatches, one addressed to each, but both in
"A "deployment" is a spreading out of forces. A naval deployment means
to spread out and make ready for hostilities. To get into the best
positions from which to execute the operating plans against the enemy.
The defensive deployment as applied to Hawaii, which is of chief
interest, was for the defense of Hawaii and of the west coast of the
United States, because one of the tasks of WPL-6 is to defend the
territory and coastal zones, our own territory and coastal zones, and to
defend our shipping.
"Instead of being in a concentrated place, or instead of being off in
some distant region holding exercises and drills, it meant that the
forces under the command of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet
could take station for the most probable attack against them or against
the Hawaiian Islands, keeping in mind their responsibilities for
covering the United States and Panama.
"The deployment in the vicinity of Hawaii, if wide enough, would in
itself constitute a formidable barrier against any attempt further east,
and we definitely did not expect an attack, that is, the Navy did not,
an attack on the west coast or in Panama, as is indicated by a dispatch
going out the same day to the commandants of districts to take
precautions against subversive activities but we did not tell them to
make any defensive deployment.
"The deployment from Hawaii might have been made in a number of
different ways. Certainly I would expect that in accordance with the
plans that should have been drawn up, and they were, that airplanes
would have been sent to Midway, if not already there, to Wake, to
Johnston Island, to Palmyra, the reconnaissance planes as well as
defensive planes, and that a reconnaissance would have been undertaken.
The movement of those planes and forces to those positions constituted
part of the defensive deployment.
"The battleships, of course, were of no use whatsoever against undamaged
fast ships. Naturally, it was not to be expected that the Japanese would
bring over slow ships unless they were making their full and complete
effort against Hawaii so that a proper deployment for the battleships
would have been in the best position to do what was within their power,
which was only to defend Hawaii against actual landings. In other words
if they had been at sea and in a retired position even, such that if
actual landings were attempted on the Hawaiian Islands and at such a
distance that they could arrive prior to or during the landings, they
would have been most useful indeed to have interfered with and defeated
"Since, as has been pointed out previously, the danger zone, the danger
position of Hawaii was to the north because there were not little
outlying islands there from which observation could have been made,
since there was no possibility of detecting raiders from the north
except by airplanes and ships, an appropriate deployment would have been
to have sent some fast ships, possibly with small seaplanes, up to the
north to assist and possibly to cover certain sectors against approach,
which the long-range reconnaissance could not have done. Of course,
these ships would naturally have been in considerable danger, but that
was what they were there for, because fighting ships are of no use
unless they are in a dangerous position so that they can engage the
enemy and inflict loss on them.
"Another part of a deployment, even where airplanes would not be moved,
would have been to put them on operating air fields scattered throughout
the islands so that they could be in a mutual supporting position with
respect to other fields and to cover a somewhat wider arc.
"Another part of the deployment would have been to have sent submarines,
as many as were available, out into a position from which they could
exercise either surveillance or could make attacks against approaching
"It is to be noted that there was no offensive action ordered for
submarines. The offensive action, of course, would have been to send
them into Japanese waters."
 Committee record, pp. 5168-5172.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 113
With respect to the same matter, Admiral Stark said that he had
anticipated that full security measures would be taken, that the Army
would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the aircraft warning
service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness measures,
distant reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures, and that the plans
previously agreed on with the Army would be implemented. 
In considering the validity of Admiral Kimmel's position that the order
to execute an appropriate defensive deployment is inseparable from the
language "preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL-46" it is
necessary to consider what the purport of the message would have been
without the words "execute an appropriate defensive deployment." In such
case Admiral Kimmel might conceivably have been partially justified in
making all preparations with a view to carrying out the tasks assigned
after war began. But under the terms of the dispatch as received by him
he was to do something else. He was to execute a defensive deployment
preparatory to carry-ing out these tasks_a defensive deployment before
Furthermore, Admiral Kimmel received for his information the message of
November 28 directed for action to the naval commanders on the west
coast.  After quoting the Army dispatch of November 27 to the
commander of the Army Western Defense Command, this message stated: "* *
* Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply
to Japan in case hostilities occur." The west coast commanders were not
ordered to effect a defensive deployment, only to *be prepared to carry
out the tasks assigned in WPL-46*. Here was a clear indication to the
Commander of the Pacific Fleet that he was to do something significantly
more than merely getting prepared to carry out war tasks. He was to
execute a *defensive deployment* preparatory to carrying out such tasks.
And among Admiral Kimmel's tasks under the war plans, prior to outbreak
of war, were the maintenance of fleet security and guarding "against a
surprise attack by Japan." As has already been seen in the plans for the
defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier it was recognized that a
declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on
ships in the operating areas and a surprise attack on Oahu including
ships and installations in Pearl Harbor; that it appeared "the most
likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack." 185
 See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 54-62, 84. Asked what was
meant by the "defensive deployment" in the message of November 27,
Admiral Stark said: "My thought in that message about the defensive
deployment was clear all-out security measures. Certainly, having been
directed to take a defensive deployment, the Army having been directed
to make reconnaissance, but regardless of the Army, our message to
Admiral Kimmel, that the natural thing-and perhaps he did to it-was to
take up with the Army right away in the gravity of the situation, the
plans that they had made, and then make dispositions as best he could
against surprise for the safety not only of the ships which he decided
to keep in port but also for the safety of the ships which he had at
sea. He had certain material which he could use for that and we
naturally expected he would use it."
"* * * *a defensive deployment would be to spread and to use his forces
to the maximum effect to avoid surprise and if he could, to hit the
other fellow and in conjunction with the Army, to implement the
arrangement which had previously been made for just this sort of
thing*." Committee record, pp. 5705, 5706.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38.
 See committee exhibit No. 44.
Admiral Bellinger testified that in his opinion an air attack was the
most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor. Committee record, p. 9355.
He further testified that the Martin-Bellinger estimate was not an
estimate of the strategy that the Japanese would employ in starting the
war but rather an estimate covering the event of sudden hostile action
against Oahu, in other words, that it was not an estimate which
indicated that Japan was going to strike against Oahu as part of their
national strategy but rather if they were going to strike Oahu this was
the estimate of how it would be done. Committee record, p. 9382.
114 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
With the clear recognition that Japan might attack before a declaration
of war and with a war warning carrying an order to execute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to performing tasks during
war, it is difficult to understand why Admiral Kimmel should have
concluded that no distant air reconnaissance should be conducted,
particularly in the dangerous sector to the north. Apart from radio
intelligence which will be later discussed, distant reconnaissance
admittedly was the only adequate means of detecting an approaching
raiding force in sufficient time to avoid a surprise attack. Certainly
the sector from the west to the south was covered, partially at least,
by the three task forces. And yet the most dangerous sector, the 90
counterclockwise from due north to due west, the sector through which
the Japanese striking force approached, was given no attention whatever.
 Admiral Bellinger testified that had distant reconnaissance been
conducted it would have been to the north  and, although he was
responsible for Navy patrol planes, Admiral Bellinger was not even shown
the war warning. 
Admiral Kimmel has suggested that under the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan Admiral Bloch was responsible for distant reconnaissance
and had the latter desired planes he could have called upon the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.  This suggestion, apart
from being incompatible with Admiral Kimmel's stating he made the
decision not to conduct distant reconnaissance, is not tenable. Admiral
Bloch had no planes with which to conduct distant patrols and Admiral
Kimmel knew it.  While he was on the ground, it was the
responsibility of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to take
all necessary steps in line with a defensive deployment and in
recognition of the realities at Hawaii to protect the fleet. 
Admiral Kimmel's assertion that only a 360 -distant; reconnaissance is
worthy of the name ignores the fact that a 90 arc to the southwest was
being partially covered, a fact concerning which he has made a point in
testifying before the committee. Manifestly, to have conducted
reconnaissance to any extent would have been more effective than no
reconnaissance at all.  And Admiral Kimmel had adequate
 See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Committee record, pp. 9369,
9370; also section "Plans for the Defense of the Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier," Part III, this report.
 Committee record, pp. 9324, 9325; also Hewitt Inquiry record, pp.
In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked
what he could consider the most probable areas of approach for a
surprise attack launched from carriers against Pearl Harbor. He replied:
"I testified before the so-called Roberts Commission that I thought the
northern sector was the most probable. I thought at the time that the
aircraft had come from the north-the time I testified I mean-and I
didn't wish to make alibis. However, I feel that there is no sector
around Oahu which is much more dangerous than any other sector. We have
an island which can be approached from any direction. There is no
outlying land which prevents this, and you have got a 360 arc, minus
the very small line which runs up along the Hawaiian chain. From the
southern, we have observation stations, Johnston and Palmyra, and the
closest Japanese possession is to the southwestward in the Marshalls,
and these Japanese carriers were fuel eaters and short-legged. I would
say that while all sectors are important, if I were restricted, I would
probably search the western 180 sector first." Navy Court of Inquiry
record, p. 305.
 Committee record, pp. 9305, 9306; also 9362, 9363.
 Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1125.
 The Navy Court of Inquiry found "The Naval Base Defense Officer
(Admiral Bloch) was entirely without aircraft, either fighters or patrol
planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled to rely upon Fleet
aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units." See Navy
Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.
 Admiral Bellinger testified that in the absence of definite
information as to the probability of an attack, it was the
responsibility of Admiral Kimmel to order long-range reconnaissance.
Hart Inquiry record, p. 125.
 Admiral Bellinger testified that covering certain selected sectors
was a possible and feasible operation.
Admiral Kimmel admitted that "Of course, any patrol run has some value.
I will admit that as far as surface ship." Navy Court of Inquiry record,
Admiral Stark testified: "When you haven't got enough planes to search
the entire area which you would like to search, whether it is planes or
what not, you narrow down to where you think is the most likely area of
travel and your next study is how can you cover that or how much of it
can you cover." Committee record p. 5702.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 115
patrol planes to conduct distant reconnaissance for an extended period
throughout the most dangerous sectors. The evidence reflects that there
were 81 planes available to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet
which were capable of performing distant reconnaissance.  Estimates
of the number which can properly be regarded as in a state of readiness
to conduct reconnaissance flights from Oahu as of December 7 range from
48 to 69. In addition the Army had six long-range bombers  which
were available to the Navy under the plans for joint air operations at
Hawaii. Even with the minimum estimate of 48 and the conservative basis
of employing each plane only once every 3 days,  a sector of 128
could have been covered daily for several weeks.  This fact, when
considered with the reconnaissance sweeps from Midway and by the task
forces, leaves clear that the most dangerous sectors could have been
fully covered.  In all events it would have been entirely possible
and proper to have employed aircraft to any extent available for distant
reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, using submarines,
destroyers, or other vessels in the less dangerous approaches to Oahu.
 That substantial and effective distant reconnaissance could have
been conducted is demonstrated by the fact that it was instituted
immediately after the attack despite the fact that over half the
available planes were rendered inoperative by the attack. 
Yet Admiral Kimmel contends that use of all his available planes would
have unduly impaired his ability to carry out the offensive measures
assigned the Pacific Fleet in the event of war.  The evidence
establishes, however, that his plans for the conduct of
 See committee exhibit No 120.
 Admiral Bellinger stated; however, that the Army reported 8 B-17's
available for December 6 1941. Committee record, p. 9307
 See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9328,
 Id., Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 480-507. See also committee
record, p. 9330 where Bellinger stated the patrol could be maintained
for 11 days to 2 weeks, perhaps longer. Admiral Bellinger testified that
1 patrol plane could cover 8 to 700 miles. Committee record p. 9325.
 Admiral Davis, fleet aviation officer, said that the entire 360
circumference was not of equal importance; that a considerable arc to
the north and west and another arc to the south and west were the most
important. He said that although there were not enough planes and pilots
to have established and maintained a long-range 360 search
indefinitely, there were enough to have made searches using relatively
short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors and by obtaining some
assistance from available Army aircraft. Hart Inquiry record, pp. 98,
99; 240, 241.
 The evidence before the committee contradicts the following
conclusion of the Navy Court of Inquiry: "Neither surface ships nor
submarines properly may be employed to perform this duty
(reconnaissance) even if the necessary number be available. The
resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the fleet incapable of
performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in
detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarines over an
extensive sea area is a means of continuously guarding against a
possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not
sound military procedure either in peace or in war." *The committee
regards the employment of surface vessels for the purpose of
reconnaissance as sound military procedure where reconnaissance is
imperative and the more adaptable facilities, patrol planes, are not
sufficiently available. See also note 192, supra.
It is highly significant that the Commandant of the *15th Naval District
(Panama*) was taking the following action, as reported by General
Andrews to the War Department under date of November 29, 1941: "In the
Panama Sector, *the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting
continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal
Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his
disposal, by an air patrol*. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th
Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his
control for adequate reconnaissance." See Committee Exhibit No. 32, p.
 See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9371,
 In his statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral
Kimmel said: "Having covered the operating areas by air patrols it was
not prudent in my judgment and that of my staff to fritter away our slim
resources in patrol planes in token searches and thus seriously impair
their required availability to carry out their functions with the Fleet
under approved War Plans."
When questioned concerning the time that Admiral Kimmel would be
expected to start a raid against the Marshall Islands after war began,
Admiral Ingersoll stated that Admiral Kimmel "*could have chosen any
date, and we did not expect him to move on any particular date, we
expected him to move to carry out that task when he was ready.*" If I
can digress a little bit on that, I do not know that Admiral Kimmel, or
anybody, knew what was the state of the Japanese fortifications and
defenses in the Marshall Islands. Any movement of that kind I have no
doubt would have been preceded by reconnaissance, possibly from carrier
planes or possibly from some of the long-range Army planes which were
fixed up for photographic purposes, and they would undoubtedly have made
a reconnaissance to determine where the Japanese strength was, what
islands were fortified, and so forth, and upon the receipt of that
intelligence base their plans. As a matter of fact, I think we were
trying to get out of the Army a reconnaissance of those islands in
connections with the flight of Army planes from Hawaii to Australia. I
believe it did not take place until after Pearl Harbor." Committee
record, p. 11457.
116 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
offensive operations, after outbreak of war, contemplated the use of a
maximum of 24 patrol planes.  Even if this number were deducted
from those available, there were still sufficient planes to have covered
at least the entire dangerous northwest sector. The offensive tasks of
the future did not justify disregarding the danger that the Pacific
Fleet might be caught by surprise while still in port and before
offensive operations could begin.
In making the decision not to conduct distant reconnaissance, Admiral
Kimmel erred.  In determining whether making the decision that he
did evinced poor judgment consideration must be given his responsibility
as commander in chief and the realities of his situation. It was
essentially his duty to protect the Pacific Fleet from all dangers to
the utmost of his ability. He knew that the primary function of the
Pacific Fleet in the early stages of the war was a defensive one, save
for sporadic raids and limited offensive operations, in recognition o
the fact that our Pacific Fleet was inferior to that of Japan. He was
ordered to effect an appropriate defensive deployment. This was a
general directive consistent with his specific suggestion that the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and
objectives rather than by categorical instructions.  He was given
free rein to effect defensive security, in line with his more intimate
knowledge of the detailed and peculiar problems affecting the Pacific
Fleet, prior to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Pacific war
plans. He knew that one of the tasks before the outbreak of war was
guarding against a possible surprise attack by Japan. He knew that the
only effective means of detecting a surprise raiding force in adequate
time to combat it was by distant reconnaissance. He knew the Japanese
reputation for deceit and treachery. He knew the greatest danger to the
Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the possibility of an air raid. He knew that
the maintenance and protection of the fleet while in its base
constituted a fundamental element in making military dispositions at
Pearl Harbor. He had been categorically warned of war. He knew or must
have known that the necessity of Japan's striking the first blow
required of him greater vigilance consistent with his fundamental duty
as commander in chief to prepare for the worst contingency. He had
adequate facilities to patrol the most dangerous approaches to Pearl
Harbor. The decision was not a simple one, but, failing to resolve his
dilemma by seeking advice from the Navy Department,  Admiral Kimmel
displayed poor judgment in failing to
 See committee record, p. 9316 et seq.
As to the use of long-distance patrol Planes by Admiral Kimmel in
prospective raids on the Marshall Islands under the war plans, Admiral
Ingersoll stated: "The radius of patrol planes out there was about 600
miles, or somewhere m the neighborhood of a 1,200-mile flight. They
could not have been used in that operation to cover actual operations in
the Marshalls area, unless he was able to establish a base in the
Marshalls from which the planes could operate. They could, however,
cover the movement of vessels to the westward of Johnston and Palmyra
and Wake to the extent that their radius could take them, that is 600
miles from those positions." Committee record, p. 11450.
 There is no substantial evidence of any specific discussions
between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt
of the "war warning" concerning the advisability or practicability of
distant reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral McMorris, war plans officer,
thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no
specific discussion. The commander of the fleet patrol Planes, Admiral
Bellinger, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning
messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no discussion with him
concerning the matter.
 See memorandum from Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval
Operations, dated May 23, 1941, committee exhibit No. 106.
Admiral Stark testified that the handling of the Pacific Fleet was up to
the commander in chief: "* * * it was then up to the Commander in Chief
on the spot. I would not have presumed, sitting at a desk in Washington,
to tell him what to do with his fleet. There were many factors involved,
of which he was the only person who had the knowledge, and once I had
started, if I had started, to give him directives, I would have been
handling the fleet. That was not my job." Committee record, p. 5705.
 Referring to the order to execute an appropriate "defensive
deployment," Admiral Kimmel stated: "This appropriate defensive
deployment was a new term to me. I decided that what was meant was
something similar to the disposition I had made on October 16, which had
been approved by the originator of both these dispatches (Chief of Naval
Operations), and I therefore made the dispositions which I have
outlined." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 305.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 117
employ every instrumentality at his command to defend the fleet. 
Conceding for purposes of discussion that Admiral Kimmel's decision to
employ none of the fleet patrol planes for distant reconnaissance was a
reasonable military decision under the circumstances the very fact of
having made such decision placed upon him the affirmative responsibility
of determining that every other available means for reconnaissance was
being employed to protect the fleet. His determination not to conduct
long-range reconnaissance is of itself a recognition by him that it was
his obligation to provide such reconnaissance. He knew that the Army was
depending upon him for certain defensive measures.  Further, the
fact that there was an agreement with the Army at Hawaii whereby the
Navy was to perform distant reconnaissance placed upon Admiral Kimmel
the obligation of advising General Short that he had decided not to
conduct such reconnaissance. Indeed, General Short, who saw the war
warning, testified that in his opinion the "defensive deployment" which
the Navy was directed to execute "would necessarily include distant
reconnaissance."  Admiral Kimmel's clear duty, therefore, in the
absence of Navy reconnaissance was to confer with General Short to
insure that Army radar, antiaircraft, and planes were fully utilized and
alerted. None of these things were done. And there appears to be no
substantial reason for failure to call upon the Army, consistent with
the joint plans, for the six long-range bombers which were admittedly
available to the Navy at Hawaii for the asking. 
ACTION WHICH WAS NOT TAKEN UPON RECEIPT OF THE "WAR WARNING"
As has been seen, following the warning dispatch of November 27 no
distant reconnaissance as such was instituted. [208a] This meant that
there was no adequate means whatever taken by the Navy to detect
 The Navy Court of Inquiry found "It is a fact that the use of
fleet patrol planes for daily long-range all-around reconnaissance was
not justified in the absence of information indicating that an attack
was to be expected within narrow limits of time." The committee is in
essential disagreement with this conclusion. Admiral Kimmel was warned
in categorical fashion of war on November 27, 2 days after the Japanese
Task Force bad left Hitokappu Bay and while on the way to Pearl Harbor.
*It is difficult to imagine hour it would hare been possible from
Washington to have narrowed the limits of time in which Japan might
strike in any more timely fashion, particularly inasmuch as Radio
Intelligence had lost track completely of substantial carrier units of
the Japanese Fleet*. This being true, distant reconnaissance was the
only possible means of detecting the striking force within adequate time
to prepare to meet the attack. There was no other channel for indicating
that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time or
Going on, the Navy Court of Inquiry stated: "It is a further fact that,
even if justified, this was not possible with the inadequate number of
fleet planes available." The court is here of course referring to all-
around reconnaissance from Oahu. *As has been clearly indicated, there
were adequate facilities for patrolling the more dangerous sectors, a
procedure that was practical, feasible, and desirable*.
 As stated by the commander in chief, United States Fleet and Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral King: "In the case of Pearl Harbor, where
local defenses were inadequate, the commander in chief of the Pacific
Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the
defense, merely because principle, this is not normally a fleet task. It
appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciate properly this
phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor
should have bee strong enough for self-defense. The fact that *it was*
not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the
employment of the fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and
accepted the necessity for employing the fleet in the defensive
measures." See "Second Endorsement" to report of Navy Court of Inquiry,
committee exhibit No. 157.
Admiral King also observed, "I think * * * that Admiral Kimmel was fully
aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the fleet had to
be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in
 Committee record, pp. 7926, 7927.
 See in this connection testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee
record, p. 9310.
[208a] When questioned as to any reason why Admiral Kimmel should not
have had long-range reconnaissance operating from November 27 on through
to the time Japan struck, with whatever planes we had eve if it were
only "three," Admiral Ingersoll replied: "I had every reason to expect
that he would do that and I was surprised that he had not done it. As I
stated the other day, I was very much surprised that the attack had
gotten in undetected * * * I expected that it would be done not only
because the plane were there, but because this (WPL-46) plan inferred
that it was going to be done. It never occurred to him that it was not
being done." Committee record, p. 11420.
118 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the approach of a raiding force in sufficient time to repel it or
effectively minimize the force of an attack. The Pacific Fleet patrol
planes which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel were operating in
accordance with schedules prepared as of November 22, 1941, stressing
training operations. These schedules were not changed prior to the
No effort was made to secure the available long-range bombers of the
Army for reconnaissance.
No change was made in the condition of readiness of vessels in Pearl
Harbor which had been in effect for a considerable period of time
preceding November 27.  This condition of readiness has been
referred to as "an augmented Navy No. 3," the No. 3 condition being the
lowest state of readiness.  The three conditions of readiness
established for the Navy were:
No. 1. Entire crew, officers and men at battle stations. Action
No. 2. Provides the means of opening fire immediately with one
half the armament. Enemy believed to be in vicinity.
No. 3. Provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the second-
ary and antiaircraft batteries in case of surprise encounter.
While it appears that condition No. 3 prevailed subsequently during
wartime at Pearl Harbor and is the condition normally maintained in
port, there nevertheless was an extensive distant reconnaissance
designed to alert the fleet to a higher condition of readiness prior to
possible attack and to afford a considerable measure of protection. This
means of protection was not available to the fleet on the morning of
December 7. 
 In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was
asked: "On the morning of 7 December 1941, preceding the attack, can you
tell the court what the material condition of readiness was in effect on
ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor?" Admiral Kimmel replied:
"The condition of readiness No. 3, as laid down in 2CL-41 had been
prescribed some time before by Vice Admiral Pye, and that was in effect
on the day of the attack. In addition to that, the Commander of
Battleships, Battle Force, had issued an order requiring two 5-inch guns
and two 50-calibre guns on each battleship to be manned at all times.
These were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, manned on the date
in question." P. 278
The three conditions of readiness with respect to naval base defense, as
set forth in 2CL-41 follow:
Condition I. General quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as
prescribed by naval base defense officer.
Condition II. One-half of antiaircraft battery of all ships in each
sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval
base defense officer.
Condition III. Antiaircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector)
of at least one ship in each sector) manned and ready (minimum of four
guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by
naval base defense officer.
See committee exhibit No. 44.
Admiral Kimmel was asked whether, upon receipt of the November 27 war
warning, he consulted with the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District on any measures of security to be adopted in the Fourteenth
Naval District that were different from any then in effect. He replied
that he discussed the message with the commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District but no additional measures of security were deemed
advisable as a result of the conversation. See Navy Court of Inquiry
record, p. 303.
 While virtually all antiaircraft guns aboard ship were firing
within 10 minutes, only about one-fourth were "ready machine guns"
available to fire immediately. Inasmuch as by far the greatest damage
was effected by the torpedo planes in the first wave, a higher degree of
readiness would have reduced beyond question the effectiveness of this
initial thrust. Admiral Kimmel said: "*Had it not been for the torpedoes
I think the damage would hare been enormously less*." Roberts record, p.
For the indicated reason the conclusion of Navy Court of Inquiry that "a
higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to
the defense" is in error. See Navy Court of Inquiry report committee
exhibit No. 157.
 In its report, the Navy Court of Inquiry has observed: "It has
been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the
air, all naval Personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft guns
manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is
questionable when it is considered that it would not be known when an
attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been
necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day,
and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and
planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7
This statement contains within itself the certain proof of its
invalidity. It was for the very reason that it could not be known when
an attack would take place that it was essential a higher degree of
readiness prevail. If it were possible to know with definitiveness when
the attack would come the necessity for a higher state of readiness
would be obviated until the time for the attack had approached.
Furthermore, the extreme state of readiness suggested by the court is a
far cry from the lowest conditions of readiness which prevailed at the
time of the attack in both the Army and Navy Commands.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 119
No change was effected in the state of readiness of naval aircraft. The
aircraft on the ground and the patrol planes moored on the water were
not in condition to take to the air promptly. Approximately 50 percent
of the planes on December 7 were on 4 hours' notice.
Having elected to institute no distant reconnaissance by aircraft, no
effort was made to inaugurate patrols by surface or subsurface craft to
compensate and partially serve in lieu of distant reconnaissance by
planes.  The evidence shows there were 29 destroyers and 5
submarines in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7.  While the
employment of surface craft or submarines in lieu of distant air
reconnaissance is not altogether satisfactory or fully effective, it
nonetheless would have provided a measure of protection more to be
desired than no reconnaissance whatever.
No effort was made to maintain a striking force at sea in readiness to
intercept possible raiding forces approaching through the dangerous
northern sector. 
No change was made in the schedules of ships proceeding to Pearl Harbor
with a view to maintenance of a minimum force at harbor with provision
for entry into port at irregular intervals.
After the decision to institute no distant reconnaissance, the Navy did
not check or otherwise maintain effective liaison with the Army as to
the readiness of Army antiaircraft defense and aircraft warning
ESTIMATE AND ACTION TAKEN BY GENERAL SHORT WITH RESPECT TO THE WARNING
DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27
The commanding general of the Hawaiian Department does not appear to
have taken any appreciable action, apart from his normal training
operations, on the basis of any information received by him with respect
to our critical relations with Japan prior to the warning of November 27
from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall.
This dispatch, No. 472,  advised that negotiations with Japan
appeared terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest
possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to
continue; that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile
action was possible at any moment. It stated that if hostilities could
not be avoided the United States desired that Japan commit the first
overt act. It pointed out, however, that this policy should not be
construed as restricting General Short to a course of action that might
jeopardize his defense. It ordered the commanding general, prior to
hostile Japanese action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other
measures as he deemed necessary but admonished that these measures
should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or
disclose intent. It instructed that should hostilities occur, General
Short should carry out the tasks assigned in the war plans insofar as
they applied to Japan. He was to limit the dissemination of "this highly
secret information to minimum essential officers" and to report measures
 See note 192, supra.
 Committee exhibit No. 6.
 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7.
120 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Within 30 minutes of receiving this dispatch and after consulting only
with his chief of staff, Colonel Phillips,  General Short replied
to the War Department as follows: 
"Reurad four seven two 27th. Report Department alerted to prevent
sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. SHORT."
As a result of the November 27 dispatch General Short decided to
institute alert No. 1, the lowest of three alerts provided for the
Hawaiian Department. The three alerts were: 
No. 1. Defense against sabotage and uprisings. *No threat from without*.
No. 2. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and
aircraft, in addition to No. 1.
No. 3. Requires occupation of all field positions by all units, pre-
pared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on
At the same time that he ordered alert No. 1, the commanding general
directed that the Interceptor Command, including the Aircraft Warning
Service (Radar) and Information Center, should operate from 4 a. m. to 7
a. m. daily. In addition, it should be noted that the six mobile radar
stations operated daily except Sunday from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. for
routine training and daily, except Saturday and Sunday, from 12 noon
until 4 p. m. for training and maintenance work.  In explaining his
reasons and the considerations responsible for his instituting an alert
against sabotage only, General Short has stated: (1) That the message of
November 27 contained nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an
air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii;  (2) that he received
other messages after the November 27 dispatch emphasizing measures
against sabotage and subversive activities;  (3) that the dispatch
was a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the
avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War
Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii
which Japan would regard as an overt act;  (4) that he was looking
to the Navy to provide him adequate warning of the approach of a hostile
force, particularly through distant reconnaissance which was a Navy
responsibility;  and (5) that instituting alerts 2 or 3 would have
seriously interfered with the training mission of the Hawaiian
NO WARNING OF ATTACK ON HAWAII
The first statement by General Short that there was nothing directing
him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii
will be considered. Implicit in this contention is the assumption that,
despite the known imminence of war between the United States and Japan
and the fact that he commanded a Pacific outpost,
 Colonel Walter C. Phillips. See committee record, pp. 7945, 7946.
 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12.
 See committee exhibit No. 44. See also testimony of General Short,
committee record pp. 7944, 7945.
 Testimony of General Short, committee record, p. 7946.
 General Short said, "There was nothing in the message directing me
to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack." Committee
record, p. 7929.
 Committee record, p. 7929.
 Id., at p. 7927.
 Id., at p. 7946 et seq.
 Id., at pp. 7948-7951.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 121
it was not his duty to be on the alert against a threat from without.
This assumption does not appear to be supported by military doctrine or
the logic of the Hawaiian situation prior to the attack. 
The wording of the November 27 dispatch indicated the possibility of an
attack from without in ordering General Short to undertake
reconnaissance. The only conceivable reconnaissance which could have
been undertaken by the Army was through employment of aircraft or radar,
either or both of which would be in contemplation of an attack from
without. General Marshall had told the commanding general of the
Hawaiian Department much earlier, with emphasis and clarity, that the
function of the Army in Hawaii was to defend the fleet base. Despite
this fact, when warned that Japan's future action was unpredictable but
hostile action was possible at any moment and when his attention was
called to the necessity for reconnaissance, General Short proceeded to
institute an alert against sabotage only. This was done although there
had not been one single act of sabotage on the islands up to that time;
for that matter, there were no acts of sabotage thereafter, although
this danger in Hawaii had been recognized by both the Hawaiian
Department and Washington. [225a]. However, in all of General Short's
correspondence with General Marshall the subject of sabotage was not
emphasized and scarcely discussed. Quite to the contrary, the letters
referred repeatedly to aircraft and antiaircraft defense.
DISPATCHES INDICATING THREAT OF SABOTAGE
We will now consider the contention made by General Short that he
received other messages emphasizing measures against sabotage and
subversive activities, which to his mind confirmed the accuracy of his
judgment in instituting an alert against sabotage only. All of these
messages, however, were received after the warning dispatch of November
27 and after he had replied thereto.  They could not, therefore,
have influenced in any way his decision to institute an alert against
The first of the messages concerning possible subversive activities was
signed by General Miles and was dated November 27. It pointed out that
hostilities may ensue and that subversive activities may be expected.
This message made definitely clear that subversive activities and
sabotage were not all that might be expected but hostilities as well. In
this connection, however, General Short has referred to the fact that
sabotage was a form of hostile action. 
On November 28 the Hawaiian Department received two dispatches from the
War Department specifically warning of the danger of sabotage and
subversive activities.  To the first of these dispatches which was
signed by General Adams, the Adjutant General, the
 As expressed by Secretary Stimson in his statement submitted for
the committee's consideration: "The outpost commander is like a sentinel
on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and
precise. He must assume that the enemy will attack at his particular
post; and that the enemy will attack at the time and in the way in which
it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty of the
outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy
attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to
meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight
that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been
supplied ." Committee record, pp. 14405, 14406.
[225a] See in this connection an aide memoire concerning "Defense of
Hawaii" prepared by the War Department and presented to the President by
General Marshall in May of 1941. Part IV, Note 42, infra.
 Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 10,13, and 34.
 General Short said: " 'Hostile action at any moment' meant to me
that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War Department was predicting
sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile action." Committee record, p.
 For the full text of these two dispatches see pages 102 and 103,
122 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
following reply (directed to the Adjutant General) was made on November
"Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are
being taken against subversive activities within the field of
investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph three MID SC
thirty dash forty five) and military establishments including personnel
and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of
military reservations such as power plants telephone exchanges and
highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated June
nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to
use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic
act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the
commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the
territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June
twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this
headquarters to furnish him and to continue to furnish such adequate
protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence
in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and
structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request
appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian
installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this
headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen
forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the commanding general
Hawaiian Department, to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon,
any highway within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever the
commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of
national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised.
Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are
and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all
The reply (directed to General Arnold) to the second dispatch was not
received in the War Department until December 10, 1941. 
General Short, as heretofore indicated, has referred to the two
dispatches from the War Department of November 28 warning of the danger
of sabotage and subversive activities as confirming his original
decision to institute an alert against sabotage only. It is significant,
however, that the army commanders at Panama, on the West Coast, and in
the Philippines received these same dispatches warning of subversive
activities that were received by the Hawaiian commander. [230a] They did
not deter the commanders at these other places from taking full and
complete measures to alert their commands or convey to their minds that
defense against sabotage was the only action required. [230b]
The November 27 warning to General Short concerning possible hostile
action at any moment was signed by General Marshall-a command directive-
whereas the dispatches relating to sabotage and subversive activities
were signed by subordinate officials of the War Department. Inasmuch as
General Marshall's message contained no reference to sabotage whatever,
it would seem fair to suggest that upon receiving subsequent dispatches
from subordinate War Department officials warnings of this danger there
should have been aroused in the Commanding General's mind the thought
that perhaps he had misjudged the purport of the original warning. The
evidence reflects that any reference to sabotage or subversive
activities was deliberately omitted from the warning message sent
General Short (and the commanders at Panama, on the West Coast, and in
the Philippines) on November 27 in order "that this message could be
interpreted only as
 Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 17, 18.
 Id, at pp. 19, 20.
 See Committee exhibit No. 35, p. 2.
[230b] For dispatches reflecting the full and complete measures taken by
these commanders (Panama, West Coast, the Philippines) see Committee
exhibit No. 32 pp. 11,15,15a, 16,18, 18a, and 18b.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 123
warning the commanding general in Hawaii against an attack from without.
General Short stated that he assumed the Navy would conduct distant
reconnaissance [230d] and that he was relying on the Navy to give him
timely warning of an attack, indicating thereby that he realized the
warning messages required precautionary measures against all possible
contingencies. It naturally follows that his failure to take the action
required by the November 27 warning was not due to the subsequent
emphasis on the specific danger of subversive activities but rather by
reason of his failure to institute liaison with the Navy-failure to
determine what the Navy was really doing-as he advised the War
Department he had done, and his unwarranted assumption that even though
he did not himself institute precautionary measures against the danger
of an air attacks, the Navy would do so.
"DO-DON'T" CHARACTER OF THE NOVEMBER 27 DISPATCH AND AVOIDANCE OF WAR
As earlier indicated, General Short has referred to the November 27
dispatch as a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression
that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War
Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii
which Japan would regard as all overt act to test the merits of this
contention it is necessary to aline the directives and intelligence
beside the prohibitions and admonitions:
Negotiations with the Japanese appear
to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest pos-
sibilities that the Japanese Govern-
ment might come back and offer to con-
tinue. Japanese future action unpre-
dictable but hostile action possible
at any moment.
This policy should not be construed
as restricting you to a course of
action that might jeopardize your
defense. Prior to hostile Japanese
action, you are directed to undertake
such reconnaissance and other
measures as you deem necessary
Report measures taken. Should hos-
tilities occur, you will carry out
the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five
so far as they pertain to Japan.
If hostilities cannot be avoided the
United States desires that Japan
commit the first overt act.
But these measures should be car-
ried out so as not to alarm the
civil population or disclose intent.
Limit the dissemination of this
highly secret information to minimum
The first admonition appearing in the foregoing dispatch is a statement
of traditional American policy against the initiation of war-*if
hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires the prospective
enemy to commit the first overt act*. This General Short already knew.
Certainly he did not have in mind committing an overt act against Japan.
There was nothing here to restrict the commanding general's
[230c] See testimony of General Gerow, Committee record, pp. 2696-2698.
[230d] See committee record, p. 7927.
124 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
contemplated plan of action. Indeed, the dispatch itself clearly pointed
out that the policy should not be construed as restricting General Short
to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense.  The very
fact that Japan must commit the first overt act emphasized the need for
greater vigilance and defensive effort.
The prohibition in the dispatch was that reconnaissance and "other
measures" should not be carried out so as to alarm the civil population
or disclose intent. This was incorporated in the message because of the
large number of Japanese inhabitants and it was felt that nothing should
be done, unless necessary to defense, to alarm the civil population and
thus possibly precipitate an incident which would give Japan an excuse
to go to war saying we had committed the first overt act.  No one
appreciated more than General Short the abnormally large percentage of
Japanese among the population of Hawaii. He knew that 37 percent or
approximately 160,000 of the population were of Japanese descent, some
35,000 being aliens. This was one of the principal reasons for the alert
against sabotage. 
The civil population was inured to Army and Navy maneuvers which were
going on continuously.  To have taken any of the logical steps to
defend Oahu-reconnaissance, 24 hour operation of radar, effecting a high
state of aircraft and anti-aircraft readiness-would not have alarmed a
population accustomed to simulated conditions of warfare.  In this
respect the November 27 dispatch from the War Department interjected no
deterrent to full and adequate defensive measures.
The admonition to limit dissemination of the information in the dispatch
to minimum essential officers was within the complete discretion of the
Commanding General. Dissemination of the information was to follow and
not precede the selection of the proper alert; and there were no
restrictions in the November 27 warning which should have precluded
General Short's instituting an alert commen-
 Mr. Stimson stated: "When General Short was informed on November
27 that 'Japanese action unpredictable' and that 'hostile action
possible at any moment,' and that the policy directed 'should not comma
repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense,' we had a right to assume that he
would competently perform this paramount duty entrusted to him " Mr.
Stimson's statement, committee record, pp. 14397, 14398.
 See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14397. This
admonition was not included in the message to General MacArthur but was
contained in the message to the Commanding General, Western Defense
Command. See committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 8, 9.
 It is to be noted that one of the best criterions that General
Short possessed to determine what might alarm the civil population was
the so-called Herron Alert during the summer of 1940. This was an all-
out alert with complete dispersal of planes and troops with ammunition
at the guns and reconnaissance being conducted. There was no disturbance
of the civil population resulting from this action. See in this
connection Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2738,
2772, 2772, 3096, 3097.
 *General Maxwell Murray testified that the action required by
Alert No. 1-taking over water, lights, gas and oil utilities, patrols
all over, all important bridges guarded,-was just as much of an alarm to
the people that something was anticipated "as if they had gone to the
beaches"-all out alert*. See Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 3096,
 Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel testified: "I
discussed the question of air attack on Pearl Harbor with the commanding
general on various occasions. We simulated such attack; we sent planes
in to attack Pearl Harbor, I don't know how many times, but several
times, during the year I was out there, and we put the defending planes
or other elements into operation." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p.
Testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked
whether there were any drills furthering joint Army-Navy exercises. He
replied: "Yes. Air raid drills for several months were conducted each
week. For about 2 to 3 months prior to December 7,1941, we conducted the
drills once every 2 weeks This was in order to insure the participation
of all elements in each drill as held, and when the drills were held
weekly there were too many people excused due to overhauling a plane or
some work that they considered essential and more important than taking
part in drills." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, P. 296.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 125
surate with the warning and orders contained therein.  Perhaps,
after the event the warning message could be improved upon. It
nevertheless was adequate and its orders should have been carried out
with an appreciation of the implications of the warning it conveyed.
COMMANDING GENERAL'S RELIANCE ON THE NAVY
It is apparent from the evidence that General Short was depending on the
Navy to give him timely and adequate warning of any enemy force
approaching Hawaii. He stated that from repeated conversations with the
Navy he knew that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be either
in their home ports or proceeding south; that he knew the Navy had task
forces at sea with reconnaissance from Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and
Johnston Islands, which would render an air attack highly improbable;
that the War Plans Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff, Admiral McMorris,
had stated that there was no chance of a surprise attack on Oahu; that
it was only through the Navy that he could obtain information concerning
the movement of Japanese vessels; and that distant reconnaissance was a
Navy responsibility. 
General Short's unfortunate predicament on the morning of December 7 was
occasioned to a degree by reason of his reliance on the Navy to provide
him timely warning. However, the fact that he was relying on the Navy
does not excuse General Short for his failure to determine whether his
assumptions with respect to what the Navy was doing were correct. He
assumed operations of the task forces rendered an air attack highly
improbable; he assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance
from Oahu; he assumed the Navy would advise him of the location and
movement of Japanese warships. Yet a simple inquiry by General Short
would have revealed that the task forces effected no coverage of the
dangerous northern approaches to Oahu; that the Navy was not conducting
distant reconnaissance; and that the Navy did not know where the
Japanese carrier strength was for over a week prior to December 7. We
can understand General Short's dependence on the Navy, but we cannot
overlook the fact that he made these assumptions with no attempt to
verify their correctness.
INTERFERENCE WITH TRAINING
General Short has pointed out that the factor of training was considered
in selecting Alert No. 1; that the use of Alerts 2 or 3 would
 In commenting concerning the November 27 warning sent General
Short, Secretary Stimson said: "This message has been characterized as
ambiguous and described as a 'do-don't' message. The fact is that it
presented with the utmost precision the situation with which we were all
confronted and in the light of which all our commanding officers, as
well as we ourselves in Washington, had to govern our conduct. The
situation was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand, in view
of the fact that we wanted more time, we did not want to precipitate war
at this moment if it could be avoided. If there was to be war, moreover,
we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On the other hand,
the matter of defense against an attack by Japan was the first
consideration. In Hawaii, because of the large numbers of Japanese
inhabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that
nothing would be done, unless necessary to the defense, to alarm the
civil population and this possibly to precipitate an incident and give
the Japanese an excuse to go to war and the chance to say that we had
committed the first overt act." Further: "*All these considerations were
placed before the commanding officers of their respective areas, and it
was because they were thought competent to act in a situation of
delicacy requiring judgment and skill that they had been placed in these
high posts of command.*" Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record, pp.
 Committee record, page 7946 et seq.
126 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
have seriously interfered with his training mission. He observed that
the soldiers and officers of his command were in large part relatively
new to the Army and to their specialized tasks and that regular training
was essential. He stated that the War Department dispatch of November 27
"had not indicated in any way that our training mission was modified,
suspended or abolished, and that all troops were to go immediately into
tactical status." 
General Short has pointed out that the Hawaiian Air Force had the
particular mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17's to the
Philippine Islands. He recalled that on September 8, 1941, 9 trained
combat teams were sent to the Philippines; that before November 27, 18
trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland and 17 more teams
were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes; and that 12 more
combat crews had to be trained for planes expected to arrive at an early
date. He observed that only 6 of his 12 Flying Fortresses were in
condition and available for the training and that it was imperative
General Martin make maximum use of these planes for training. He felt
that if war were momentarily expected in the Hawaiian coastal frontier,
the training considerations would give way but that every indication was
that the War Department expected the war to break out, if at all, only
in the far Pacific and not at Hawaii. 
As has been earlier indicated, however, the very fact of having
suggested to General Short that he undertake reconnaissance was an
indication of the possibility of an attack on Hawaii from without. This
committee believes that the warning dispatch of November 27 was ample
notice to a general in the field that his training was now secondary-
that his primary mission had become execution of the orders contained in
the dispatch and the effecting of maximum defensive security.
THE ORDER TO UNDERTAKE RECONNAISSANCE
The very fact that General Short noted the order with respect to
undertaking reconnaissance contained in the dispatch of November 27 and
thereafter instituted an alert against sabotage only demonstrates a
failure to grasp the serious circumstances confronting his command. It
is to be recalled in this connection that Army commanders in the
Philippines, at Panama, and on the West Coast, upon receiving the
dispatch of November 27 in substantially the same terms as General
Short, instituted full measures adequately to alert their commands.
The observation has been made by General Short that he presumed the man
who prepared the message of November 27 ordering him to undertake
reconnaissance was unfamiliar with the fact that the Navy
 Id., at pp. 7948, 7949.
 See Committee Exhibit No. 32, pp. 11, 15 16 and 18 for replies,
pursuant to the warning messages of November 27, from General MacArthur
in the Philippines, General DeWitt on the West Coast, and General
Andrews at Panama.
General MacArthur replied under date of November 28: "Pursuant to
instructions contained in your radio six two four, air reconnaissance
has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Around
security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by
present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is
in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison
and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy."
A significant portion of the reply from General Andrews follows: "In the
Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting
continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal
Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his
disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th
Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his
control for adequate reconnaissance."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 127
was responsible for distant reconnaissance.  It is inconceivable,
however, that in the face of a specific directive with respect to
reconnaissance General Short should not have requested clarification
from the War Department in the event he felt the latter did not mean
what it had unequivocally said and had failed to take into consideration
the Navy's responsibility for reconnaissance. This fact takes on added
importance when it is realized that the November 27 dispatch was the
first and only dispatch General Short had received signed by General
Marshall, the Chief of Staff, since becoming commanding general of the
Hawaiian Department. It was a *command directive* which should have
received the closest scrutiny and consideration by the Hawaiian general.
Certainly the least that General Short could have done was to advise
Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch and consult with them at once concerning
the fact that he had been directed to undertake reconnaissance if he
presumed the Navy was to perform this function. The Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan, the very document wherein the Navy assumed
responsibility for distant reconnaissance, contained in an annex thereto
provision for joint operations *when the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer agree that a
threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent*. The
failure to appreciate the necessity for following through on an order to
undertake reconnaissance is not in keeping with the good judgment
expected from the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department.
It is further to be borne in mind that General Short had six mobile
radar units which were available for reconnaissance use. He ordered
their operations from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., in addition to the normal
training operation of radar during the day, but failed to provide the
necessary officers handling the equipment with the knowledge that war
was at hand in order that they would intelligently attach significance
to information which the radar might develop. In testifying before the
committee concerning the operation of radar, General Short said: [241a]
"That (the radar) was put into alert during what I considered the most
dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7
o'clock a. m. daily." The very fact that radar was ordered operated at
all was in recognition of the danger of a threat from without; indeed it
was only in contemplation of such a threat that General Short would have
been supplied radar at all. 
 Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 4436, 4437.
[241a] Committee record, p. 8054.
 In a statement submitted for the committee's consideration, Mr.
Stimson said: "You will notice that this message of November 27th
specifically mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to
my mind was a very important part of the message, not only because of
its obvious desirability but also because we had provided the Hawaiian
Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of
reconnaissance against air attack and one to which I had personally
devoted a great deal of attention during the preceding months. I refer
to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was then
provided. This equipment permitted approaching planes to be seen at
distances of approximately 100 miles, and to do so in darkness and storm
as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 I had taken up
earnestly the matter of securing such radar equipment for aircraft
protection. I knew, although it was not then generally known that radar
had proved of the utmost importance to the British in the Battle of
Britain, and I felt in the beginning of 1941 that we were not getting
this into production and to the troops as quickly as we should, and put
on all the pressure I could to speed up its acquisition. By the autumn
of 1941 we had got some of this equipment out to Hawaii, and only a few
days before this I had received a report of the tests which had been
made of this equipment in Hawaii on November 19th, which indicated very
satisfactory results in detecting approaching airplanes. I testified at
considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl Harbor
Board (A. P. H. B. 4064, et seq.). When we specifically directed the
commanding officer at Hawaii, who had been warned that war was likely at
any moment, to make reconnaissance, I assumed that *all means of
reconnaissance available to both the Army and Navy would be employed*.
On the same day a war warning was dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations. The standing
instructions to the theatre commanders were that all messages of this
character were to be exchanged between the Army and Navy commands.
Committee record, pp. 14398, 14399.
128 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
THE SHORT REPORT
It is recalled that the dispatch of November 27, No. 472, carried
instructions to report measures taken and that General Short, referring
to the dispatch by number, advised that the Hawaiian Department was
"alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy." As paraphrased and
reviewed in the War Department, this reply read: "Report Department
alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad four seven two
twenty seven."  No action was taken by the War Department following
receipt of this reply.
General Short has stated that the silence and failure of the War
Department to reply to his report of measures taken constituted
reasonable grounds for his belief that his action was exactly what the
War Department desired. He has pointed out that if the action taken by
him was not consistent with the desires of the War Department it should
have informed him of that fact. 
The question at this point, however, is not whether Washington should
have replied to General Short's dispatch but whether the commanding
general was entitled to believe that his reply had adequately informed
Washington that he had or had not carried out the orders contained in
General Marshall's warning of November 27.  General Gerow has
already assumed full responsibility for failure to follow up to insure
that the alert to prevent sabotage was not the only step taken by the
Hawaiian Department under the circumstances. No one in Washington
appears to have been impressed with or caught the fact that General
Short's report of measures taken was inadequate and not sufficiently
responsive to the directive. This failure of supervision cannot be
However, a reasonable inference from the statement "liaison with Navy"
was that through liaison with the Navy he had taken the necessary steps
to implement the War Department warning, including the undertaking of
reconnaissance. This was clearly recognized by General Short. In
testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board he was asked the question:
 "In your message of November 27, you say, 'Liaison with the Navy.'
Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by
that particular message?"
"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch
with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were
"Question. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to
carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?
"General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or
not it would have affected it, because they signed a definite agreement
which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff."
 See committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12.
 Committee record, p. 7965 et seq.
 Referring to General Short's reply, Secretary Stimson said: "* * *
he then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no adequate notice
of what he had faded to do and which was susceptible of being taken, and
was taken, as a general compliance with the main warning from
Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk, and in
spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly gave me no
intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not being
carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was alert against
sabotage, I had no idea that being 'alerted to prevent sabotage' was in
any way an express or implied denial of being alert against an attack by
Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a fortress such as Hawaii is
to repel such an attack, and Short was the commander of that fortress.
Furthermore, Short's statement in his message that 'liaison' was being
carried out with the Navy, coupled with the fact that our message of
November 27th had specifically directed reconnaissance, naturally gave
the impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive
measures in which the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary,
were under way and a proper alert was in effect." Committee record pp.
 Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 380.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 129
General Short was not entitled to presume that his responsibilities as
Commander of the Hawaiian Department had been discharged or shifted to
the War Department through dispatch of his reply.  This conclusion
is most fully appreciated when he admittedly was not clear concerning
the order to undertake reconnaissance.  The War Department was
entitled to expect the commanding general had carried out the order to
effect reconnaissance or in the alternative that he would have requested
clarifying instructions. Conceding that General Short presumed the War
Department would correct him if he was in error, the fact that
supplemental instructions were not issued does not serve to remove that
error. Had he made no report whatever the situation in Hawaii on the
morning of December 7 would have been the same.
Although General Short specifically advised the War Department on
November 27 that he was maintaining "liaison with Navy" the evidence is
unmistakably clear, as will subsequently appear, that he did not
establish liaison with the Navy concerning the action to be taken
pursuant to the Department's warning message.
ACTION WHICH WAS NOT TAKEN UPON RECEIPT OF THE NOVEMBER 27 DISPATCH
Apart from instituting an alert against sabotage and ordering the
operation of radar from 4 to 7 a. m. no other appreciable steps were
taken by the commanding general to prepare his command for defense
against possible hostilities. 
No change was made in the state of readiness of aircraft which were on
four hours' notice. There was therefore no integration of aircraft and
radar, even in the latter's limited operation from 4 to 7 a. m. The
maximum distance radar could pick up approaching planes was
approximately 130 miles. With the Army aircraft on 4 hours' notice a
warning from the radar information center would have been of little
Operation of radar was not instituted on a 24-hour basis. It was so
operated immediately after the attack, although as a matter of fact it
was not until December 17 that the aircraft warning service was placed
under complete control Of the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, handling
the training phases, removed from the picture. 
No action was taken with a view to tightening up the antiaircraft
defenses.  The ammunition for the 60 mobile antiaircraft guns was
 See committee record, pp. 4420, 4421
 Referring to the testimony of General Gerow to the effect that the
commanding general's report would have been perfectly clear if he had
indicated he was alerted against sabotage only (see note 247, supra)
General Short commented that General Gerow "was unwilling to read my
message and admit it meant what it said, no more and no less". Yet
General Short failed to accord the war Department the same privilege he
was taking; that is, that the order to undertake reconnaissance *meant
what it said, no more and no less*. See committee record, pp. 7967,
 Referring to the action taken by General Short, Secretary Stimson
stated: "* * * to cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions
that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours, and
to keep his antiaircraft ammunition so stored that it could not be
promptly and immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance
system, the radar, only for a very small fraction of the day and night,
in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost
beyond belief." See statement Of Secretary Stimson submitted for the
committees consideration; committee record, p. 14408.
 committee record, p. 8379.
 In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was
asked which service was charged with repulsing enemy aircraft by
antiaircraft fire on December 7, 1941. He replied: "The Army, I should
say, had the prime responsibility. The plans that we had provided for
the Navy rendering every possible assistance to the Army. It provided
for the use of all guns, including 30 calibers and even shoulder rifles
by the marines in the navy yard, and by the crews of the flying field.
In addition, it provided that the batteries of all ships should take
part in shooting down the planes." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 295.
130 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
located in Aliamanu Crater, between 2 and 3 miles from Fort Shafter.
 The crews of the antiaircraft guns were not alerted in such manner
as to provide effective defense even with maximum warning from the radar
As in the case of Admiral Kimmel, no effective action was taken with a
view to integration and coordination of Army-Navy facilities for
THE "CODE DESTRUCTION" INTELLIGENCE
As has been seen, Admiral Kimmel was advised "for action" on December 3
of information received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent
on December 2 to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong,
Singapore, Batavia, *Manila, Washington*, and London to destroy most of
their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important
confidential and secret documents. 
Testifying with respect to the foregoing intelligence, Admiral Kimmel
stated that both he and his staff noted that *most* of the codes and
ciphers-*not all*-were to be destroyed and that this information
appeared to fit in with the information "we had received about a
Japanese movement in South East Asia." He commented that Japan would
naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her
communication system in the event her action in southeast Asia caused
Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over diplomatic
Admiral Kimmel did not supply General Short the information he had
received concerning the orders from Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and
confidential documents. He testified: "I didn't consider that of any
vital importance when I received it * * * ." 
General Short, on the other hand, has complained that he was not
provided this intelligence and has indicated it would have been of the
greatest significance to him. Referring to the intelligence concerning
the fact that Washington had been ordered to destroy its code machine
 General Short said: "The one thing that would have affected me
more than the other matter was the fact they had ordered their code
machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing: that they
are going into an entirely new phase and that they want to be perfectly
sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of three
or four days * * *."  He further testified that had the Navy given
him any of the dispatches received concerning the destruction of codes
he would have gone into a more serious alert. 
In strange contrast with the view of the code burning intelligence taken
by Admiral Kimmel, virtually all witnesses have agreed that this was the
most significant information received between November 27 and December 6
with respect to the imminence of war. Indeed, the overwhelming weight of
the testimony is to effect that orders to
 See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 2604-2697.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40.
On the same day Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information of the
substance of an intercepted Tokyo dispatch of December 1 ordering
London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy (their code) machine.
It was stated that the Batavia (code) machine had already been sent to
Tokyo and on December 2 Washington was also directed to destroy all but
one copy of other systems and all secret documents, that the British
Admiralty had reported London Embassy had complied. Committee exhibit
No. 37, p. 41.
 Committee record, p. 6723.
 Id., at p. 7477.
 This advice was contained in a December 7 dispatch from the War
Department which was not received by General Short until after the
attack. This dispatch will be found discussed in detail, Part IV, infra.
 Roberts Commission record, p. 1620.
 Committee record, p. 8397.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 131
destroy codes mean from a military standpoint only one thing-war within
a very few days. 
It is concluded that the failure of Admiral Kimmel to supply this
intelligence to General Short was inexcusable and that the purport of
this information was to advise the commander in chief within reasonably
narrow limits of time as to when Japan might be expected to strike.
While orders to burn codes may not always mean war in the diplomatic
sense, it very definitely meant war-and soon-in a military sense after
the "war warning" of November 27. Admiral Kimmel received this
intelligence less than 4 days before the attack; it gave him an
opportunity to correct his mistake in failing to institute distant
reconnaissance and effect a state of readiness commensurate with the
likelihood of hostilities after the November 27 war warning. Nothing was
done-General Short was not even informed.
On December 4 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised
for information of orders instructing Guam to destroy all secret and
confidential publications and other classified matter except that
essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy instantly,
in event of emergency, all classified matter.  This intelligence
was of the greatest significance. It meant that not only was war almost
immediately at hand but that a landing operation by Japan against Guam
was regarded as a possibility. Nothing was done.
On December 6 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to Admiral
Kimmel advising, for action, that in view of the international situation
and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands he was
authorized to order destruction in such outlying islands secret and
confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater
emergency."  This dispatch suggested the possibility of landing
operations against our outlying islands including Wake and Midway.
GENERAL SHORT'S KNOWLEDGE OF DESTRUCTION OF CONFIDENTIAL MATTER BY
The evidence reflects that although Admiral Kimmel received significant
information on four different occasions between December 3 and 6
concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in
Japanese diplomatic establishments as well as in our own outlying
possessions, he failed to convey this information to General Short.
Despite this fact it appears that the commanding general obtained
adequate information concerning the destruction of confidential matter
by Japanese diplomatic establishments. Col. George W. Bicknell,
assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, stated that he learned from
Navy sources in Hawaii about December 3 that diplomatic representatives
of Japan in Washington,
 see Part IV, infra re code destruction.
 Committee exhibit No .37, p. 44.
 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 45.
A memorandum submitted by the Navy Department concerning this dispatch
under date of January 29, 1946 stated OpNav dispatch 061743 was
transmitted to Radio Honolulu at 5:54 p. m. December 6, 1941 Washington
local time" (committee record, p.11441).
It is to be noted that during committee examination Admiral Kimmel was
asked whether he had testified as to when he had received the message of
December 6, 1941, authorizing the destruction of confidential papers
referred to in the preceding paragraph Admiral Kimmel said "I will look
at it. I couldn't tell you when that was received but to the best of my
recollection I never saw it until after the attack. It is an even bet as
to whether I saw it before or after the attack. I think I didn't get it
until after the attack. * * * I have no record upon which I can
definitely state that. I can only state my recollection."
Going on, Admiral Kimmel said "*At any rate, if I did receive this
before the attack, it was no more than I would have expected under the
circumstances. * * * And that (referring to the message) was not
particularly alarming*," see committee record pp. 7649,7650.
132 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere were destroying their
codes and papers. He further stated that about the same time he learned
from the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI that the latter had
intercepted a telephone "message from the Japanese consulate Honolulu,
which disclosed that the Japanese consul general was burning and
destroying all his important papers." Colonel Bicknell said: 
"In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference
conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those
assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned
concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese
consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information
which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such
papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was
about to happen somewhere."
General Fielder stated that he was present at the staff conference and
that on December 6 he gave to General Short the information that the
Japanese consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. 
Colonel Phillips also stated that this information was given by him to
The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI stated that on December 3 the
district intelligence officer of the Navy asked him if he could verify
information that the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was burning his
codes and papers; that about 2 hours later the FBI intercepted a
telephone conversation between the cook of the Japanese consulate and a
Japanese in Honolulu in the course of which the cook stated that the
consul general was "burning and destroying all his important papers." He
stated that he immediately gave this information to the district
intelligence officer of the Navy and the assistant G-2 of the Army; and
thereupon sent a dispatch to Director J. Edgar Hoover in Washington:
"Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all
important papers." 
In testifying before the Roberts Commission General Short stated that he
received no information from his intelligence officer until after the
attack that the consular records were being burned. He stated: 
"As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had really burned anything
until the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th; they interrupted
the burning. I wasn't cognizant of the fact that they had burned the
Before the committee, however, General Short corrected his former
testimony, stating that he had been advised on the morning of December 6
that the Honolulu consul was burning his papers. 
While the evidence would indicate that General Short was advised on
December 6 that the Japanese consul was burning his *codes* and
*papers*, a point has been made by the commanding general that his
information was limited to the fact that the consul was burning his
papers without reference to *codes*. Even conceding this to be true, the
fact that the consul was burning his papers after General Short had been
informed hostilities were possible at any moment was of adequate import
to impress the commanding general with the fact that our relations with
Japan were extraordinarily critical. It is
 See affidavit. Dated February 25, 1945, of Colonel Bicknell before
Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148.
 See affidavit of Colonel (now General) Kendall J. Fielder dated
May 11, 1945, before Major Clausen.
 See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers dated April 10, 1945, before
 Roberts Commission record, p. 1620.
 Committee record, pp. 8398, 8399.
concluded that General Short received prior to the attack substantially
the intelligence concerning the destruction of codes and confidential
papers *by Japanese diplomatic representatives*, although he was not
informed by Admiral Kimmel of the very significant fact that the Navy
Department had issued orders for the destruction of codes *in certain of
our own outlying possessions*.
THE "LOST" JAPANESE CARRIERS-RADIO INTELLIGENCE AT HAWAII
Perhaps the most vital intelligence available to the commander in chief
of the Pacific Fleet indicating Pearl Harbor as a possible point of
attack was that gathered from his own Radio Intelligence Unit at Hawaii.
This unit was engaged in "traffic analyses"; that is, identifying,
locating, and determining the movements of Japanese warships through
their call signals. The location of vessels was effected through radio-
direction methods. 
Information of a similar type was contained in dispatches from the Radio
Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of
Naval Intelligence in Washington. Fortnightly intelligence bulletins
incorporating information received from the radio intelligence units in
the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor were issued by the Office of Naval
Intelligence. These bulletins were made available to Admiral Kimmel.
Because of conflicting reports that had been received concerning
Japanese naval movements and the further fact that reports received from
the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District (Philippines) were
considered the most reliable, the Chief of Naval Operations on, November
24 advised the commanders in chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets,
among others, that other reports should be carefully evaluated and sent
to the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District for action and to the
Office of Naval Operations for information. After combining all incoming
reports the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District was to direct
dispatches to the Office of Naval Operations with copies to Admiral
Kimmel for information setting forth his evaluation and best possible
continuity. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on November
26 advised the Office of Naval Operations and the commandant of the
Sixteenth Naval District in summary form of information with respect to
Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at
Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. This dispatch expressed the
belief that a strong concentration of Japanese submarines and air
groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a
carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet were located in
the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. The estimate of the situation was
to the effect that a strong force might be preparing to operate in
southeastern Asia, while some units might operate from Paleo and the
Marshalls. On the same day, the Radio Intelligence Unit in the
Philippines advised, among others, the commander in chief of the Pacific
Fleet and the Office of Naval Operations, in commenting on the November
26 dispatch from Hawaii, that traffic analysis for the past few days
indicated that the commander in chief of the Second Fleet (Japanese) was
directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently
would be divided into two
 See testimony of Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, pp.
134 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sections, the first of which was expected to operate in the south China
area, the second, in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second
section included Carrier Division 3 "Ryujo, and one Maru." This dispatch
further pointed out that the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District
could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force
were in the Mandated Islands and that his best indications were that all
known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. The opinion was
expressed that this evaluation was regarded as reliable.
Periodically after November 27, 1941, there were sighting reports from
the Asiatic Fleet as well as from other observers confirming the
movement of important Japanese naval forces southward from Japan. These
reports, however, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, did
not indicate the movement of any Japanese carriers.
The Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice after
November 27 of preparing daily summaries of the information received
through its traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications. 
These summaries were submitted each day to the Fleet Intelligence
Officer, Captain Layton, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the
following morning. On November 28, an intelligence summary, reviewed by
Admiral Kimmel, stated there was no further information concerning the
presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were
still located in home waters." The next day he received the November 28
summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese
radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon United States
Naval Communications and "is getting results." There was no information
set forth in the summary with respect to carriers. On the following day,
Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29, indicating that
Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the commander in
chief, Second Fleet. On December 1, Admiral Kimmel received the previous
day's summary which stated with respect to carriers that the presence of
a unit of "plane guard" destroyers indicated the presence of at least
one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed. The
Fortnightly Intelligence Summary dated December 1  received by
Admiral Kimmel from the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington
stated, among other things, with respect to the Japanese naval situation
that " * * * the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as
well as the greatest portion of the carriers." This summary related to
information obtained during the 2 weeks preceding its date of December 1
and the Washington estimate of the situation was necessarily based on
radio intelligence information received largely from the Philippines and
Hawaii before the sudden and unexplained change in the call signals of
Japanese vessels on December 1. The December 1 summary, which Admiral
Kimmel received from Captain Layton stated that all Japanese service
radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on December 1;
that previously service calls had been changed after a period of 6
months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941.
This summary stated:
"*The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an
additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large
 For these summaries, see committee exhibits Nos. 115 and 115a.
 Committee exhibit No. 80.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 135
This statement was underlined by Admiral Kimmel. The summary also
stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were
believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and that as to
carriers there was "no change."
On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton
had prepared on December 1 at his request. This contained Layton's
estimate, on the basis of all available information, concerning the
location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-
Takao area Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Division 4, which included
four carriers, and the Kasuga Maru (believed to have been a converted
carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "*Koryu* (?) plus plane
guards" in the Marshalls area.
Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions
1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate, the
reason being that Layton considered the information as to the location
of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of
their whereabouts. 
On December 2, 1941, according to Captain Layton, he and Admiral Kimmel
had the following conversation: 
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said "What! You
don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I
replied, "No sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do
not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty
confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as
sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially
with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could
be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that
effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or
words to that effect."
Captain Layton observed that the incident was impressed on his mind and
that Admiral Kimmel was pointing out to him his complete ignorance as to
the location of the Japanese carrier divisions. However, the very
reference by Admiral Kimmel to the carriers rounding "Diamond Head" was
recognition by him of this possibility and his complete lack of
knowledge as to where they might be. Admiral Kimmel and Captain Layton
"radio intelligence, its faults and its promises, its inexactities and
yet the over-all picture that it will produce. *Whether then or at other
times, we discussed the fact that a force can take sealed orders,
proceed under radio silence and never be detected by visual or other
The December 2 radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to
Admiral Kimmel on December 3, read as follows:
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of
identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However,
since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the
change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been
recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
The Radio Intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4
stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary
delivered on December 5 contained no mention of carriers. The summary
delivered on December 6 stated "No traffic from the Commander Carriers
or Submarine Force has been seen either."
Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources,
the only way by which Admiral Kimmel would have obtained in-
 See Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 212.
 Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 212, 213.
 Testimony of Captain Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 215.
136 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
formation as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from
27 November to 7 December 1941 was by distant air reconnaissance.
Knowledge of the location of Japanese carriers was vital to the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Two carrier divisions very
definitely could not be located. The service calls of Japanese vessels
were changed on December 1, a most unusual procedure inasmuch as they
had been changed only a month previously on November 1. Admiral Kimmel
fully appreciated the significance of this change and actually
underscored the statement submitted to him: "*The fact that service
calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in
preparing for operations on a large scale*." It would appear Admiral
Kimmel regarded the preparation to be in anticipation of a Japanese
movement to South East Asia.
The presumption was made that inasmuch as the Japanese carriers could
not be located they were in home waters. It was fully known, however,
that the missing carriers of Japan were not engaged in a movement to the
south since such an operation would be open to visual observation by our
forces in the Philippines as well as by friendly powers. In consequence,
only two reasonable alternatives remained-either the carriers were in
home waters or they were engaged in an operation under radio silence in
some direction other than to the south. It was Admiral Kimmel's duty to
be prepared for the alternative most dangerous to him. Had he concluded
that the unusual change in service signals on December 1 clothed a
Japanese major operation, perhaps to the eastward at Hawaii, he could
have predicted within reasonably narrow limits of time as to when such
an attack would come. 
Admiral Kimmel has referred to the lack of exactitude of radio
intelligence and the fact that this was not the first instance in which
his staff had been unable to get a line on the location of Japanese
vessels. [273a] Recognizing all of the vagaries of radio intelligence
analysis, however, it was still not in keeping with his responsibility
as commander in chief of the Fleet for Admiral Kimmel to ignore the
sinister implications of the information supplied through the Radio
Intelligence Unit after he had been warned of war. In many respects the
picture presented by radio intelligence was among the most significant
information relating to when and, to a degree, where the Japanese would
 Secretary of the Navy Forrestal observed: "I am of the view that
the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval
forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding
the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had
received, including the 'war warning' and other messages from the Chief
of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an
attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack
could be predicted within fairly narrow limits." See "Fourth
Endorsement" to report of Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No.
And again: "The absence of positive information as to the location of
the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to
them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific,
and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should
have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to
reduce the effectiveness of such an attack." Id.
[273a] In this regard, Admiral Kimmel stated, among other things: "The
failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and after December
first when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During
the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of eight
to fourteen days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about
the location of the Japanese battleships. During the six months
preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of
positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese
First Fleet, and eight periods of ten to twenty days each, in which the
location of the greater number of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet
was uncertain. As to the Japanese carriers, during the six months
preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of one hundred and thirty-
four days-in twelve separate periods-each ranging from nine to twenty-
two days, when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic
analysis was uncertain." Committee record, pp. 6727, 6728.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 137
THE "MORI CALL"
The Federal Bureau of Investigation on December 6 delivered to
responsible Army and Navy intelligence officers at Hawaii a transcript
of an intercepted trans-Pacific radiotelephone conversation 
between a person in Honolulu named "Mori"  and an individual in
Japan. The transcript of this conversation indicated, among other
things, that the individual in Japan was interested in the daily flights
of airplanes, particularly large planes, from Honolulu; whether
searchlights were being used; and the number of ships present at Pearl
Harbor. Reference was made during the conversation to various flowers,
 the significance of which was not known, but which conceivably
could have been an open code employed to convey information concerning
the presence or absence of fleet vessels to the approaching Japanese
attack force, which could have listened in on the conversation.
Instead of taking action on the basis of the conversation, the office of
the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy decided that it should be
studied further by a Japanese linguist. This was not done until after
the attack and in consequence the transcript of the conversation was not
seen by Admiral Kimmel before December 7. The transcript was delivered
to General Short and his G-2 on the evening of December 6 by Colonel
Bicknell, his assistant G-2, the latter attaching great significance to
the matters discussed. Colonel Bicknell stated that the special agent in
charge of the FBI was alarmed at what he considered the military
implications of the Mori conversation with respect to Pearl Harbor and
that he, Bicknell, concurred in this view, considering the conversation
as very irregular and highly suspicious. He stated, however, that "both
Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too
'intelligence conscious' and that to them the message seemed to be quite
in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about."  No action
whatever was taken by General Short.
Regardless of what use the Japanese made of the "Mori call," the
conversation should have been, on its very face, of the greatest
significance to the responsible commanders in Hawaii. Members of the
Mori family were the subject of investigation by the FBI, a fact known
to the intelligence offices of both the Army and Navy. An interest by
Japan in the daily flights of "large airplanes" and whether searchlights
were employed could have but one meaning to alert Commanders who were
properly vigilant and should have been prepared for the worst in the
knowledge that hostilities were imminent-a desire to know whether air
reconnaissance was being conducted and whether searchlights were
employed for defense against air attack. The undecipherable and
suspicious reference to flowers should have intensified alertness by
reason of the very fact that the true meaning could not be gathered.
*The Mori call pointed directly at Hawaii*.
The decision of the District intelligence Office of the Navy to place
the matter aside for further study was inexcusable and reflects the
apathetic state of alertness throughout the Navy command.
 See committee exhibit No. 84 for complete transcript of the
 The Mori family included Dr. Motokazu Mori, his wife Mrs. Ishiko
Mori, his father Dr. Iga Mori, and his son Victor Motojiro Mori. The
family was the subject of security investigations in Hawaii.
 In the course of the conversation the question was asked, "What
kind of dowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The reply was:
"Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year.
However the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now."
 See affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell dated February 25, 1945,
before Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148.
138 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DETECTION OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE ON MORNING OF DECEMBER 7
The U. S. S. Condor, a minesweeper, at 3:42 a. m. (Honolulu time)
December 7, reported sighting a submarine periscope off the entrance
buoys to Pearl Harbor in a defensive area where American submarines had
been restricted from operating while submerged. The Condor by visual
signal reported this sighting to the U. S. S. Ward, a destroyer of the
Inshore Patrol between 3:50 and 3:58 a. m. After receiving this
information the Ward searched for the submarine for approximately one
and one-half hours without results. It thereupon contacted the Condor,
inquiring as to the distance and course of the submarine that was
sighted. At 5:20 a. m. the Condor replied but the Ward was unable to
effect the submarine's location on the basis of this information. The
commander of the Ward thought the Condor had been mistaken in concluding
that it had seen a submarine and made no report to higher authority.
 The radio conversation between the Ward and the Condor was
overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point
Oahu, a radio station under the jurisdiction of the Inshore Patrol,
Fourteenth Naval District. Inasmuch as the conversation was solely
between the ships, was not addressed to the Section Base, and no request
was made that it be relayed, the radio station did not report it to
At 6:30 a. m. The U. S. S. Antares, arriving off Pearl Harbor with a
barge in tow, sighted a suspicious object which appeared to be a small
submarine. The Antares notified the Ward, asking it to investigate, and
at approximately 6:33 a. m. observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop
two "smoke pots" near the object. At 6:40 the Ward sighted an
unidentified submarine apparently following the Antares. The Ward opened
fire at 6:45 and the Antares, observing the fire of the Ward, noted
about the same time that a Navy patrol plane appeared to drop depth
charges or bombs on the submarine. When the submarine keeled over and
started to sink, the Ward ceased firing and then dropped depth charges.
At 6:51 the Ward radioed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "We
have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area."
The captain of the Ward followed this dispatch with a supplemental
message at 6:53: "We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges
upon submarine operating in defensive sea area." This information was
received by the Chief of Staff to Admiral Bloch at 7:12 and by the Duty
Officer of Admiral Kimmel at 7:15. Admiral Kimmel stated he received
this information between 7:30 and 7:40 a. m.
Admiral Bloch, according to his testimony, was informed by his Chief of
Staff, but in view of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts,
their reaction was that the Ward had probably been mistaken, but that if
it were not a mistake, the Ward and the relief duty destroyer could take
care of the situation; that Admiral Kimmel to whom the information had
been referred had the power to take any action which might be desired.
 Admiral Kimmel testified: 
"Between 7:30 and 7:40, I received information from the Staff Duty
Officer of the Ward's report, the dispatch of the ready-duty destroyer
to assist the Ward,
 See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 87-92; 428, 429.
 Id., at pages 414 416; 452-469. For further details concerning
this incident, see Hewitt inquiry exhibits Nos. 18, 73, 75, and 76.
 Committee record, p. 6760-6770.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 139
and the efforts then underway to obtain a verification of the Ward's
report. I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In
my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine
attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action
in view of the number of such contacts which had not been been verified
in the past."
It is to be noted, however, that in Admiral Kimmel's own statement he
refers to only two reports concerning possible submarine contacts after
November 3 in addition to the Ward incident. He stated: 
"* * * On November 28, 1941, the U. S. S. Helena reported that a radar
operator without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against
submarines was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area. A
search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area
produced no contacts. During the night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S.
Gamble reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-
23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no
conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine."
The reported sighting of a submarine periscope at 3:42 a. m. on the
morning of December 7, in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, even though
not verified, should have put the entire Navy command on the qui vive
and when at 6:40 a. m. The presence of a submarine was definitely
established, the entire Navy command should have been on a full alert.
In the Martin-Bellinger estimate annexed to the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan it was pointed out that a single submarine attack may
indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed
of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. Admiral Kimmel in his letter to
the Fleet, 2CL-41 (Revised), *dated October 14, 1941*, made this
identical statement and followed it with the words:  "The Task
Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as
the situation and daylight conditions warrant *in order to be prepared
to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other
The evidence does not reflect that the sighting and sinking of a
submarine, particularly in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, was of such
frequent occurrence as to justify the failure to attach significance to
the events of the morning of December 7. This is especially true when it
is realized that a war warning had been received and Admiral Kimmel's
own estimates indicated the extreme significance of submarine activity.
As a matter of fact the Condor and Ward incidents appear to be the
*first* instance of reported sighting and sinking of a submarine since
the critical turn in our negotiations with Japan.
The reported sighting was at 3:42 a. m., *over 4 hours before the
Japanese air force struck*. Appearing before the Roberts Commission,
General Short commented as follows with respect to the Ward incident:
"That would under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was
danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine
attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it
was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that
information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of
Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine
attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me
that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely
wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the
information to me had not-at any rate, I did not get the information
until after the attack."
 Id, at p. 6769.
 Hewitt inquiry exhibit No. 8; committee exhibit No. 44.
 Roberts Commission record, p. 311.
140 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The supposed sighting of a submarine at 3:42 a. m. And the attack upon a
submarine at 6:45 a. m., December 7, should have been recognized as
immediate basis for an all-out alert to meet all military contingencies.
RADAR DETECTION OF JAPANESE RAIDING FORCE
The army radar was scheduled for operation on Sunday morning, December 7
from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. [284a] The normal operation for training
purposes after 7 a. m. Was discontinued for this particular Sunday by
reason of special authorization obtained from the control officer.
At one of the more remote aircraft warning stations, Opana, Privates
Joseph Lockard and George Elliott had been on duty from 4 to 7 a. m.
Inasmuch as they were waiting for the army truck to return them to
quarters for breakfast, it was decided to operate the radar after 7 a.
m. in order that Private Lockard, who was skilled in the operation of
the radar detector, might afford his partner additional instruction. As
the machine was being adjusted, Private Lockard saw on the radar screen
an unusual formation he had not previously seen in the machine. Inasmuch
as the indicator reflected a large number of planes coming in and he was
confident there was nothing like it in the air, he felt that the machine
must be at fault. After additional checking he found, however, that the
machine was operating properly and concluded at 7:02 a. m. that there
was a large number of planes approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles
from 3 east of north. 
After some discussion concerning the advisability of informing the
information center, Private Lockard called the center at 7:20 a. m.
advising that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu from the
direction indicated. It is to be noted that, as General Short stated,
"At 7 a. m. all the men at the information center except the telephone
operator had folded up their equipment and left."  The switchboard
operator was unable to do anything about the call and accordingly, since
the information center personnel had departed, referred it to Lt. Kermit
A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps whose tour of duty at the
center was until 8 a. m. He was there solely for training and
Lieutenant Tyler, upon being advised of the approach of a large number
of planes, told Private Lockard in substance and effect to "forget it."
He assumed that the flight indicated was either a naval patrol, a flight
of Hickam Field bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the mainland that
were scheduled to arrive on December 7.
 In the light of the known and declared significance to be attached
to the presence of a Japanese submarine in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor,
this committee does not concur in the implications of the conclusion
made by the Navy Court of Inquiry that: "There was nothing, however, in
the presence of a single sub marine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate
that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent " See Navy Court of
Inquiry report committee exhibit No. 157.
[284a] In the course of examination by Counsel, General Short was asked
it radar was put on the alert after the warning of November 27. General
Short replied: " That was put into alert during. what I considered the
most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7
o'clock a. m. daily."
Asked if just putting the radar into operation as effective without an
Information Center that worked with it, General Short said: " The
information center was working with it." Committee record page 8054.
The evidence reflects that installation of three permanent radar
stations had not been completed. The mobile sets had been in operation,
however, for some time prior to December 7 with very satisfactory
results See in this regard Note 287, infra.
 For complete discussion, see testimony of Joseph L. Lockard, Army
Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1014-1034; Navy Court of Inquiry record
p. 628-343; testimony of George E. Elliott, Army Pearl Harbor Board
record, pp. 994-1014; Navy Court of Inquiry record, pages 644-659; and
committee record, p. 13380-13499.
 Committee record, p. 7976,
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 141
General Short stated: 
"If he (Tyler) had alerted the interceptor command there would have been
time if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes.
There would not have been time to get them in the air. * * *. It would
have made a great difference in the loss * * *. It would have been a
question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action."
In testifying before the joint committee, General Short said: 
"If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Japanese,
there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to warm up the
engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler made no report of
this matter to me and as far as I know did not report the incident to
the control officer, Major Tyndall after the information center was
manned about 8:30 a. m. This matter was not brought to my attention
until the next day when it was too late to be of value. Had this
incident been reported to the control officer at 8:30 a. m. on the 7th,
he would have informed the Navy and it might have enabled them to locate
If the Army command at Hawaii had been adequately alerted, Lieutenant
Tyler's position would be indefensible. He was at the information center
for training and observation, had no knowledge on which to predicate any
action, and accordingly should have consulted higher authority. His
fatal estimate-"Forget it"-was empty assumption. The fact that
Lieutenant Tyler took the step that he did, merely tends to demonstrate
how thoroughly unprepared and how completely lacking in readiness the
Army command really was on the morning of December 7.
Further, the evidence reflects that Privates Lockard and Elliott debated
the advisability of informing the Information Center concerning the
approach of a large number of planes. It would appear that this unusual
information concerning a large number of planes-so unusual in fact that
Private Lockard stated he had never before seen such a formation-should
have provided immediate and compelling reason for advising the
Information Center had the necessary alert been ordered after the
November 27 warning and the proper alertness pervaded the Army command.
While it was not possible with the then state of radar development to
distinguish friendly planes from hostile planes, this fact is of no
application to the situation in Hawaii; for in a command adequately
alerted to war any presumptions of the friendly or enemy character of
approaching forces must be that they are enemy forces. It is to be noted
General Short has stated that if Lieutenant Tyler had alerted the
interceptor command there would have been time to disperse the planes
and to have reduced the losses. The real reason, however, that the
information developed by the radar was of no avail was the failure of
the commanding general to
 Roberts Commission record, pp. 312, 313. However, in a memorandum
dated November 14, 1941, Lt. Col. C . A. Powell, Signal Corps, Hawaiian
Department, stated: "In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian
Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very
satisfactory. The exercise was started approximately 4:30 in the morning
and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took
off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this
distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact the planes would
circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier.
"As soon as the planes were assembled they proceeded toward Hawaii.
*This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit
aircraft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming
bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor* . . ."
A copy of this memorandum was forwarded under date of November 19, 1941,
to Mr. Harvey E. Bundy special assistant to the Secretary of War. See
committee exhibit No. 136.
 Committee record, p. 7977.
142 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
order an alert commensurate with the warning he had been given by the
War Department that hostilities were possible at any moment.
OTHER INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY ARMY AND NAVY IN HAWAII
CHANNELS OF INTELLIGENCE
Both the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii had responsible intelligence
officers whose duty it was to coordinate and evaluate information from
all sources and of all pertinent types for their superiors. The record
reflects full exploitation of all sources for this purpose including the
interview of passengers transiting Hawaii. The record also reflects that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in Hawaii were
supplying Army and Navy intelligence officers with data available. 
The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI at Honolulu, for example, stated
that on or about November 28, 1941, he received a radio communication
from Director J. Edgar Hoover to the effect "that peace negotiations
between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the
alert at all times as anything could happen" and that, on the same day,
he delivered this information to responsible Army and Navy intelligence
officers in Hawaii. 
THE "MANILA MESSAGE"
Both the Army and Navy intelligence offices received about December 3,
1941, the following dispatch from a British source in Manila through a
British representative in Honolulu: 
"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following
developments in Indochina:
A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000
troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers,
tanks, and guns (75 mm).
B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed
Washington Nov 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
C. *Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early
hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not
intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South*.
You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence
The assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department stated he gave the
foregoing intelligence to General Short. 
THE HONOLULU PRESS
The information available in the Hawaiian Islands from the press and the
attendant state of the public mind in the days before Pearl Harbor can
to a great extent be gathered from a recitation of the headlines
appearing in Honolulu newspapers. Among the headlines were the
[288a] Illustrative of the insufficiency of the radar alert is the fact
that although the charts plotting the Japanese force in and plotting the
force as it retired were turned over to higher authority during the
course of the attack, this information was not employed to assist in
locating the Japanese task force and it appears no inquiries were made
concerning it for a considerable period of time after the attack.
 See testimony of Col. George W. Bicknell before the joint
committee, committee record, pp. 13536-13620.
 See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, dated April 10, 1945, before
Major Clausen; Clausen investigation, pp. 88-91.
 See exhibits, Clausen investigation.
 See supplemental affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell, dated
August 14, 1945, before Clausen.
 Committee record, p. 13622-13627.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 143
November 7, 1941
"Kurusu Carrying Special Note to F. D. R. From Premier Tojo-Japan Ready
to Act Unless Tension Eases."
"Japan Waits Before Move in Far East-Aggression in Pacific Appears
Shelved Until Kurusu's Mission has been Completed in U. S."
"Invasion Held too Difficult by Officials-Offensive May Start in Middle
East Soon; Invasion of Continent Impracticable at Present."
November 13, 1941
"Tokyo Radio Asserts War is Already on-Any Military Moves Only Logical
Result of Encirclement Policy, Japanese Staff Says."
"Envoy Undismayed-Carries Broad Powers to Act-Kurusu Denies Taking
Message, Implies Errand of Bigger Scope."
November 14, 1941
"Japanese Confident of Naval Victory."
November 26, 1941
"Americans Get Warning to Leave Japan, China."
"Hull Reply to Japan Ready."
November 27, 1941
"U.S.-Japan Talks Broken Off as Hull Rejects Appeasement-Full Surrender
Demanded in U. S. Statement."
"Evacuation Speeded as Peace Fades."
November 28, 1941
"Parris Island, S. C.-This is the tail assembly of the captive barrage
balloon at Parris Island, S. C., looking for all the world like an air
monster. The wench controlling it is in the sandbagged structure
protected there from bomb splinters. The helium sausage may be used to
protect beachheads, bridgeheads and other strong points thereby
differing from the British technique which keeps them flying over
London. The marines encamped on Parris Island, S. C., have a special
training school on these balloons."
November 29, 1941
"U. S. Rejects Compromise in Far East-Washington Insists on Maintenance
of Status Quo, Withdrawal from China by Japan Army."
"U. S. Warplanes May Protect Burma Road-Protective Force of 200 Planes,
500 Pilots Held Sufficient to Ward Off Attack by Japanese."
November 30, 1941
"Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle-Foreign Affairs Expert
Attacks Tokyo Madness."
144 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Leaders Call Troops Back in Singapore-Hope Wanes as Nations Fail at
Parleys; Nightly Blackouts Held in P. I.; Hawaii Troops alerted."
December 1, 1941
"Japanese Press Warns Thailand."
"Burma Troops Are Reinforced-British, Indian Units Arrive Rangoon."
"F. D. R. Hurries to Parleys on Orient Crisis."
December 2, 1941
"Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S.-Thailand Now in
Allied Bloc, Press Charges."
"Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations-Prepares for Action in Event
"Malaya Forces Called to Full Mobilization."
"Quezon Held to Blame in P. I. Defense Delay."
December 3, 1941
"Huge Pincer attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted-Pepper Visions
Nations Acting as Nazi Pawns."
"U S. Demands Explanation of Japan Moves-Americans Prepare for Any
Emergency; Navy Declared Ready."
December 4, 1941
"Hawaii Martial Law Measure Killed for Present Session."
"Japanese Pin Blame on U. S.-Army Paper Charges Violation by F. D. R."
December 5, 1941
"Probe of Japanese Activities Here Will Be Made by Senate-Spy Inquiry
Rapidly Gets Tentative O. K. By State Department."
"Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today."
"Japan Calls in Nationals."
"Japan Has Secret Shanghai Agents."
December 6, 1941
"America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo China-Hull May Ask
Proof, Suggest Troop's Recall."
"Japan Troops Concentrated on Thai Front-Military Observers Say Few
Units Have Been Posted in North."
December 7, 194l
"F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis-Japanese Deny
Massing Troops for Thai War."
"British Fear Tientsin Row, Call Up Guards-May Isolate Concession to
'Prevent' Agitation over U. S.-Japan Rumors."
"Hirohito Holds Power to Stop Japanese Army."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 145
Honolulu Star Bulletin
November 10, 1941
"Navy Control for Honolulu Harbor."
December 1, 1941
"U. S. Army Alerted in Manila-Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension
"Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension."
December 4, 1941
"Japan Spurns U. S. Program-Press Holds Acceptance Not Possible."
December 5, 1941
"Japan Parries Open U. S. Break."
"Further Peace Efforts Urged-Tokyo Claims Policy 'Misunderstood' in
Washington as One of Force and Conquest."
"Singapore on War Footing-Sudden Order Calls Troops to Positions-State
of Readiness is Completed; No Explanation Given."
"New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo-Joint Commission to Iron Out Deadlock
with U. S. Proposed."
It would seem difficult to imagine how anyone-upon reading the
newspapers alone -could have failed to appreciate the increasing
tenseness of the international situation and the unmistakable signs of
THE ROLE OF ESPIONAGE IN THE ATTACK
It has been suggested that Admiral Kimmel and General Short should be
charged with knowledge that the Japanese were conducting extensive
espionage activity in Hawaii and by reason thereof they should have
exercised greater vigilance commensurate with the realization that Japan
knew everything concerning the fleet, the fleet base and the defenses
available thereto. Implicit in this suggestion is the assumption that
superior intelligence possessed by Japan concerning Pearl Harbor
conditioned her decision to strike there or,
 Referring to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department,
Secretary Stimson expressed this idea in the following terms:
"Even without any such message (the War Department dispatch of November
7) the outpost commander should have been on the alert. If he did not
know that the relations between Japan and the United States were
strained and might be broken at any time, he must have been almost the
only man in Hawaii who did not know it, for the radio and the newspapers
were blazoning out those facts daily, and he had a chief of staff and an
intelligence officer to tell him so. And if he did not know that the
Japanese were likely to strike without warning, he could not have read
his history of Japan or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in
respect to such matters." Statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p.
 Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have made a point of the
fact that after the warnings of November 27 they were dependent on the
newspapers for information concerning the state of negotiations and from
the press, gathered that the conversations were still continuing. It is
to be recalled, however, that the "code destruction" intelligence was
made available after November 27 and indicated with unmistakable clarity
that effective negotiations were at an end. In any event it would appear
anomalous that the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet would permit unofficial
newspaper accounts to take precedence over official War and Navy
Department dispatches, setting forth the break-down in negotiations.
Admiral Kimmel, himself, admitted that he did not act on newspaper
information in preference to official information supplied to him by the
Navy Department, after having previously observed that he obtained a
major portion of his "diplomatic information from the newspapers." See
Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 306, 307.
146 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
otherwise stated, that Japan would not have attacked Pearl Harbor on the
morning of December 7 if she had not the benefit of unusual and superior
intelligence. Virtually every report that has been heretofore prepared
concerning the disaster has referred to the probability of supposed
extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and the peculiar vulnerability of
the fleet base to such activity by reason of the surrounding mountainous
There is evidence before the committee, however, which reveals several
salient considerations indicating that Japanese Hawaiian espionage was
not particularly effective and that from this standpoint there was
nothing unusual about the Hawaiian situation. It is clear beyond
reasonable doubt that superior Japanese intelligence had nothing
whatever to do with the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Among the
considerations giving rise to this conclusion are the following:
1. Radar equipment was available on Oahu for use in detecting
approaching planes. That Japan knew of radar and its capabilities would
seem clear if for no other reason than on November 22 her consul in
Panama advised her that the United States had set up airplane detector
bases and "some of these detectors are said to be able to discover a
plane 200 miles away."  The attacking force was actually detected
through radar over 130 miles from Oahu. Had Japanese espionage developed
the fact that radar was in use at Hawaii and so advised Tokyo of that
fact, it would seem unlikely that the attacking planes would have come
in for the raid at high altitude but, on the other hand, would have
flown a few feet above the water in order to take advantage of the radar
electrical horizon-presupposing of course that Japan possessed at least
an elementary working knowledge of radar and its potentialities.
2. Perhaps the greatest single item of damage which the attacking force
could have inflicted on Oahu and our potential for effectively
prosecuting the war would have been to bomb the oil-storage tanks around
Pearl Harbor.  These tanks were exposed and visible from the air.
Had they been hit, inexplicable damage would have resulted. Considering
the nature of installations that were struck during the attack, it is
questionable whether Japanese espionage had developed fully the
extraordinary vulnerability of the oil storage to bombing and its
peculiar and indispensable importance to the fleet.
3. The evidence before the Committee reflects that other Japanese
consulates were supplying Tokyo as much information as the Honolulu
consulate.  Information supplied by the Manila and Panama consuls
was detailed in character and related meticulously to defenses available
and those in process of development. It appears that it was not until a
few days before December 7 that the Honolulu consul supplied his
Japanese superiors any significant information concerning the defenses
of Oahu, and
 See reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of Inquiry,
committee exhibit No. 157.
 Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 49.
 Admiral Bloch pointed out that, had the Japanese attacked the oil
supply at Oahu, the dry-dock repair shop, barracks, and other facilities
instead of the airfields and the ships of the fleet, the United States
would have suffered more insofar as the prosecution of the war was
concerned. See Hart inquiry record, p. 94. It is, of course, known that
the Japanese knew generally as to the location of the oil-storage tanks
as reflected by a map recovered after the attack. See Hewitt inquiry,
exhibit No. 30.
 From evidence before the Committee it appears that the Manila and
Panama consuls were supplying Tokyo more information and of a type far
more indicative of an attack than that received concerning Hawaii. See
section "Ships in Harbor Reports," Part IV, infra, this report.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 147
at a time when the attacking force was already on its way to Pearl
4. The Japanese task force left Hitokappu Bay on November 25 with
December 7 set as the time for the attack. This departure, it would seem
clear, was in anticipation of the failure to secure concessions from the
United States through further negotiations. The date December 7 had been
recognized as suitable for the attack in discussions prior to November
7. It is hardly credible that superior intelligence should have
precipitated or otherwise conditioned the attack when the decision to
strike on December 7 was made many days earlier and, manifestly, in the
interim between the decision and the attack date the entire defensive
situation at Hawaii could have changed.  As a matter of fact two of
our task forces left Pearl Harbor while the raiders were en route for
5. It is apparent from the evidence obtained through Japanese sources
since VJ-day that the decision to attack on December 7 was made on the
basis of the general assumption that units of the fleet ordinarily came
into Pearl Harbor on Friday and remained over the week end.  With
this realization providing adequate odds that substantial units of the
Pacific Fleet would-be in Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, that date
6. In February of 1941 Admiral Yamamoto is reported to have stated,
"If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning
unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed. "
This statement is clearly in line with the premise laid down by several
witnesses before the committee that Japan would open her attack on us by
hitting our Pacific Fleet wherever it might be-whether at Pearl Harbor,
Manila, Panama, or on the west coast-in order to immobilize it as a
threat to Japanese moves to the south.  The fleet happened to be
based at Pearl Harbor and in consequence that was where Japan struck.
7. The "Mori call," to which reference has heretofore been made, was on
the evening of December 5. It would appear doubtful that Japan should
have been seeking information just before the attacking the rather
inexpert manner displayed in the call if she possessed any wealth of
intelligence gleaned through espionage agents in Hawaii.
8. Investigation conducted in Japan since VJ-day indicates as a matter
of fact, that espionage agents, apart from the consul and his staff,
played no role whatever in the attack.  The sources of information
employed, according to Japanese interviewed, were naval attaches to the
Japanese Embassy in Washington, public newspapers in the United States,
American radio broadcasts (public), crews and passengers on ships which
put in at Honolulu, and general information. 
 See committee exhibit No. 2.
 Committee exhibit No. 8.
 Committee exhibit No. 8D.
 See testimony of Capt. Arthur McCollum, committee record, pp.
9115-9288; testimony of Capt. Ellis Zacharias, committee record, pp.
8709-8778, 8909 9044.
 See committee exhibit No. 8. Also note 6, Part II, this report.
148 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9. As late as December 2, Tokyo was solicitously asking its Honolulu
"whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or
if there are any indications they will be sent up. Also advise me
whether the warships are provided with antimine nets. "
On December 6, the Honolulu Consul advised Tokyo:
"In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation. "
The foregoing is hardly indicative of any superior sources or facilities
for obtaining intelligence. It is reported that the decision to employ a
horizontal-bombing attack on Pearl Harbor in conjunction with an air-
torpedo attack was for the reason that Tokyo could not determine whether
ships at Pearl Harbor were equipped with torpedo nets and the horizontal
bombing could be depended upon to inflict some damage if the torpedo
attack failed. 
10. In planning for the attack, Japan made elaborate precautions to
protect the raiding task force which was of itself very formidable,
probably more so as a striking force than the entire fleet based at
Pearl Harbor. A large striking force was held in readiness in the Inland
Sea to proceed to assist the raiding force if the latter were detected
or attacked.  It is proper to suggest that such precautions would
seem unlikely and misplaced if Japan had known through superior
espionage information that there was no air or other reconnaissance from
Oahu and the defenses were not properly alerted. The evidence reflects
that the raiding task force probably determined the extent of
reconnaissance through plotting in our plane positions with radio
bearings. Further, the Japanese force followed the broadcasts from
Honolulu commercial radio stations on the theory that if the stations
were going along in their normal manner, the Hawaiian forces were still
oblivious to developments. 
11. In moving in for the attack on December 7, the Japanese ran the risk
of tipping over the apple cart by sending out scouting planes a
considerable period of time ahead of the bombers.  They took the
further risk of having several submarines in the operating sea areas
around Pearl Harbor. If Japan had possessed extraordinary intelligence
concerning the state of Hawaiian defenses or lack thereof, it would seem
improbable that she would have invited disaster by taking such risks.
12. Reference has been made to the large number of semiofficial consular
agents that were stationed in Hawaii, the implication being they were
engaged in widespread espionage activity Yet the facts before the
committee reflect no evidence that these agents committed a single act
of espionage, except as it may be inferred from the information sent by
the Honolulu consul to Tokyo, which as will be indicated was no more
extensive than was being received from other consulates.
 See committee exhibit No. 2, p. 21.
 Id., at pp. 27, 28.
 See committee exhibit No. 8.
 See committee exhibit No. 8D.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 149
13. It would seem likely that Japan expected some of the most effective
striking units of the Pacific Fleet, particularly the carriers, to be in
Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The raiders, for example, as
testified by Admiral Kimmel, bombed a vessel with lumber on its upper
deck, apparently thinking it was a carrier. In the light of
retrospection and the experiences of the war, it is suggested that Japan
would not have indulged the Pyrrhic victory of destroying our lumbering
battleships if she had not also hoped to find the fast striking units of
14. Japanese estimates in the late fall of 1941 as to the disposition of
United States air strength in the Pacific were, with respect to Hawaii,
as follows: Fighter planes, 200; small attack planes, 150; 4-engine
planes, 40; 2-engine planes, 100; reconnaissance and patrol planes, 35;
and flying boats, 110, for a total of 635 planes. [312a] This estimate
is roughly twice that of the actual number of planes at Hawaii and
reflects a thoroughly erroneous impression as to the ratio of planes in
a particular category. The inability to make an approximation of enemy
strength within more narrow limits of exactitude can hardly be credited
as superior intelligence.
15. In the last analysis it is difficult to believe that Japanese
espionage was actually able to develop satisfactorily the real strength
of our Pacific Fleet. In December of 1941 the Japanese fleet was
superior to our fleet in the Pacific. The latter would have been unable,
based on the testimony of witnesses questioned on the subject, to have
proceeded, for example, to the aid of General MacArthur in the
Philippines even had Pearl Harbor not been attacked. Our war plan in the
Pacific, particularly in the early stages, was essentially defensive in
character, save for sporadic tactical raids.
If the Japanese really knew the weakness of the Pacific Fleet they must
also have known that it did not present a formidable deterrent to
anything Japan desired to do in the Far East. As already suggested, the
question presents itself: *Why, if Japanese espionage in Hawaii was
superior, would Japan invite the unqualified wrath of the American
people, weld disunited American public opinion, and render certain a
declaration of war by the Congress through a sneak attack on Pearl
Harbor when the only real weapon we had, our Pacific Fleet, presented
itself no substantial obstacle to what Japan had in mind*? A logical
answer would seem to be that Japan had not been able to determine and,
in consequence, was not cognizant of our real naval weakness in the
Pacific.[312b] The extremely large raiding force and the excessive
number of attacking planes would appear to be further confirmation of
[312a] See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a
letter of the same date from Commander Walter Wilds, Office of the
Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Committee
record, p. 14626.
[312b] When questioned as to the deterring effect the Pacific Fleet
based at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 might have on Japanese aggressive
action in the Far East, Admiral Ingersoll declared: "The Pacific Fleet
had no train, it had no transports, it did not have sufficient oilers to
leave the Hawaiian Islands on an offensive campaign and Japan knew it
just as well as we did and she knew that she could make an attack in the
area in which she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with
impunity." Committee record, p. 11370.
It appears that the statement by Admiral Ingersoll concerning his
estimate of Japanese knowledge concerning the capacity of the Pacific
Fleet is illogical and completely incompatible with the risks entailed
by Japan in attacking Pearl Harbor. During the war games carried on at
the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, *it was
assumed that the Pearl Harbor Striking Force would suffer the loss of
one-third of its participating units; it was specifically assumed that
one AKAGI class carrier, and one SORYU class carrier would be lost*. See
committee record, p. 457.
150 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From the foregoing considerations it is proper to suggest that the role
played by espionage in the Pearl Harbor attack may have been magnified
all out of proportion to the realities of the situation.
The Japanese diplomatic establishments and others did, however, have
uncensored channels of communication with Tokyo as a result of statutory
restrictions imposed upon our own counterespionage agencies by the
Communications Act of 1934. The position assumed in 1941 by the Federal
Communications Commission was expressed in a memorandum dated September
29, 1944, by the Chairman, James Lawrence Fly, as follows: [312c]
"The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under
which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which
it derives its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other
interception of messages transmitted between points in the United
States, including its territories, and a foreign country (see. 605).
Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way
superseded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the
radio-telegraph, cable telegraph, or radiotelephone circuits between the
United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to Dec. 7, 1941."
*The situation should never again be permitted whereby the efforts of
our Government to combat forces inimical to our national security are
hamstrung by restrictions of our own imposition which aid the enemy.*
LIAISON BETWEEN ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT
Consistent with instructions from the Chief of Staff,  General
Short set about immediately upon assuming command of the Hawaiian
Department to establish a cordial and cooperative relationship with
Admiral Kimmel and his staff. That he was successful is undisputed and
there can be no doubt that a bond of personal friendship developed
between the commanders of the Army and the Navy in Hawaii. They
addressed themselves to the task of preparing for war and set about to
perfect plans for defense resulting in the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan. As has been seen, this plan was thorough, despite the
recognized limitations of equipment, well conceived and if timely
invoked using all of the facilities at hand was adequate to effect
maximum defensive security. The evidence reflects, however, that
personal friendship was obviously confused with effective liaison at a
time when the latter was indispensable to the security of the Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier. 
They exchanged the warning messages of November 27 and discussed their
import. They did not, however, in the face of these warnings sit down
with one another to determine what they together had and what they could
jointly do to defend the fleet and the fleet base. This action and this
alone could have demonstrated effective liaison in a command by-mutual
cooperation. After reading the "war warning" sent Admiral Kimmel,
General Short assumed the
[312c] See report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No.
 General Short testified: "The one thing that that letter (letter
of February 7,1941, from General Marshall) emphasized to me, I think,
more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation
with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more
than anything else." Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 355.
 The Army Pearl Harbor Board, it should be noted, said: "General
Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a cordial and
friendly relationship with the Navy. His instructions from the Chief of
Staff to do this were not for the purpose of social intercourse, but for
more effectively accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete
detail working agreement with the Navy to get results. He successfully
accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite
numbers in the Navy, i. e., the top rank of the Navy; he did not
accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own
full information, the complete execution of his own job and the
performance of his mission. The claim of a satisfactory relationship for
practical purposes is not substantiated." See Report of Army Pearl
Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 151
Navy would be conducting distant reconnaissance when ordered to effect a
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out war tasks. 
Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the other hand, that the Army in the face of
the warnings would be on an all-out alert.  In fact, he testified
he didn't know the Army was alerted to prevent sabotage only that he
thought they were on an all-out alert; and that he didn't know they had
any other kind of alert. He also assumed the Army radar would be in full
operation. Even though General Short testified that he conferred with
Admiral Kimmel on December 1, 2, and 3 and they talked over every phase
of what they were doing  these fatal assumptions still persisted.
In short, when the time came for really effective liaison it was
The Navy failed to advise General Short of information received on four
different occasions between December 3 and 6 concerning the destruction
of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic
establishments and in our own outlying islands.  General Short
testified that had he known of these messages he would have ordered a
more "serious alert." 
On November 26 the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District expressed
to the Chief of Naval Operations the belief, based on radio
intelligence, that a strong Japanese concentration of submarines and air
groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a
carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet, were located in
the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. In spite of the believed dangerous
proximity to Hawaii of possible Japanese carrier units, the commanding
general was not advised of this highly significant information. 
While this information was questioned the same day by the radio
intelligence unit in the Philippines, it nevertheless displays the
futility of General Short's assumption that the Navy would keep him
informed of the location of Japanese warships.
On November 28, 1941, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet
directed a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations with a copy to
Admiral Kimmel for information concerning the establishment by Japan of
the celebrated "winds code" to be employed in "ordinary Tokyo news
broadcasts" to advise when "diplomatic relations are on the verge of
being severed." 321 Certain Japanese phrases were set up to indicate a
break of relations with the United States, England and the Netherlands,
and Russia. Efforts were made by the Navy at Hawaii to monitor for a
broadcast employing this code. On December 1 the Chief of Naval
Operations sent a dispatch to the commander in chief of the Asiatic
Fleet, with a copy to Admiral Kimmel, advising of Japanese broadcast
frequencies.  Despite the importance which was attached to the
winds code at the time, General Short has testified this information was
not supplied him by the Navy in Hawaii. 
 Committee record pp. 7926, 7927.
 Yet it is difficult to understand why he should have expected such
an alert when in his statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry,
Admiral Kimmel said: "On November 28th the messages from the War and
Navy Departments were discussed (with General Short). We arrived at the
conclusion at this and succeeding conferences that probable Japanese
actions would be confined to the Far East with Thailand most probably
and Malaya the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines the next most
probable objectives in the order named. *In general, we arrived at the
conclusion that no immediate activity beyond possible sabotage was to be
expected in Hawaii*" (p. 31 of statement). See committee exhibit No. 146
 See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 242, 251.
 See committee record, pp. 8366-8368
 Id., at p. 8397.
 Id., at p. 8261.
 Committee exhibit No. 142. See discussion of "Winds Code," Part.
 Committee record p. 8374.
 Id., at p. 8374.
152 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Beginning November 30, Admiral Kimmel made a daily memorandum entitled:
"Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next
twenty-four hours," the last of these memoranda being reviewed and
approved by him on the morning of December 6. Although conferences were
held with Admiral Kimmel subsequent to the initiation of these
memoranda, General Short has testified he did not know of these steps
being taken by the Navy.  There is some indication that Admiral
Kimmel acted as arbiter of what information General Short received.
Admiral Bellinger, who was not shown the war warning, has stated that
between November 27 and December 7 he did not confer with the Army Air
Force commander, General Martin, regarding long-range reconnaissance.
 In other words, there were no discussions during this critical
period between the two officers responsible for the air arms of the Army
and Navy in Hawaii. It is to be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and
General Martin prepared the estimate of possible Japanese action against
Hawaii which reflected in such startling detail what did occur on the
morning of December 7.
At 3:42 a. m. On December 7 (Honolulu time) a Navy mine sweeper reported
the sighting of a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl
Harbor in the defensive sea area where American submarines had been
restricted from operating submerged. Between 6:30 and 6:45 a. m. a
submarine was sunk in naval action. Both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral
Bloch knew of this prior to the attack. Although the Martin-Bellinger
estimate of possible enemy action had stated that any single submarine
attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered
surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier,
General Short was not advised of the fact that the submarine had been
sighted and sunk.
The Army radar at 7:02 a. m. December 7 detected a large contingent of
airplanes which turned out to be the attacking force approaching Oahu at
a distance of 132 miles away. This information was not supplied the Navy
until after the attack.
Although the Army radar plotted the withdrawal to the north of the
Japanese force after the attack, this vital information was not employed
following the raid in searches for the raiders.  This situation is
traceable to faulty liaison and a complete failure in integration of
The Navy maintained a liaison officer in the Army operations section for
purposes of informing the Fourteenth Naval District concerning action
being taken by the Army. No liaison officer, however, was maintained in
the Navy operations section by the Army, although an
 Id, at pp. 8375-8378.
 Before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked: "Did
your organization exchange intelligence with the Commanding General of
the Hawaiian Department?" Admiral Kimmel replied:
"We did, to this extent: The Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department had his interests restricted to the defense of Hawaii and to
such of the outlying islands as he had his forces and the ones to which
he expected to send his forces. He was primarily interested in the
probability of attack where his forces were stationed, and in general
the information I gave to him bore upon his interests, or was confined
to his interests. My own interests covered a much greater geographical
area and many more factors. I tried to keep the Commanding General
informed of everything that I thought would be useful to him. I did not
inform the Commanding General of my proposed plans and what I expected
to do in the Marshalls and other places distant from Hawaii. I saw no
reason for taking the additional chance of having such information
divulged by giving it to any agency who would have no part in the
execution of the plan."
See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 282.
 Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 672.
 Committee record, pp. 9343-9346.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 153
officer was assigned on an 8-hour shift to the harbor patrol.  That
Admiral Kimmel was completely oblivious of what the Army was really
doing evinces the ineffectiveness of the liaison that was maintained by
the Navy in the Army operations section.
No conferences were held by Admiral Kimmel and General Short between
December 3 and the attack. 
General Short said: 330 "I would say frankly that I imagine that as a
senior admiral, Kimmel would have *resented it* if I tried to have him
report every time a ship went in or out. * * * "
The considerations which apparently occasioned Admiral Kimmel's failure
to acquaint himself with what the Army was doing were voiced by him as
"* * * when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and
responsible commanders in the Navy, *it does not sit very well to be
constantly checking up on them*."
And yet when asked whether, in the method of mutual cooperation, it was
necessary for one commander to know what the other commander was doing
and what his plans were, Admiral Kimmel admitted that this knowledge was
While such concern for the sensibilities of another may have social
propriety, it is completely out of place when designed to control the
relationship of two outpost commanders whose very existence is dependent
upon full exchange of information and coordination of effort.  It
defeats the purpose of command by mutual cooperation and is worse than
no liaison at all. At least, without the pretense of liaison, each
commander would not be blindly relying on what the other was doing.
It can fairly be concluded that there was a complete failure in Hawaii
of effective Army-Navy liaison during the critical period November 27 to
December 7.  There was but little coordination and no integration
of Army and Navy facilities and efforts for defense. Neither of the
responsible commanders really knew what the other was doing with respect
to essential military activities. 
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
The consideration overshadowing all others in the minds of the Hawaiian
commanders was the belief and conviction that Pearl Har-
 Id., at pp. 8205, 8206.
 See committee record, p. 8204
 Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 363.
 Roberts Commission record, p. 631.
 The Army Pearl Harbor Board, for example, commented: "Apparently
Short was afraid that if be went much beyond social contacts and really
got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to know in
order to do his lob, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good
will of the Navy which he was charged with securing " See Report of the
Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157.
 Admiral McMorris, Chief of War Plans to Admiral Kimmel, admitted
that he had no knowledge as to whether the Army antiaircraft defenses
were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness, but he
assumed they were in a state of readiness. "* * * Perhaps I was remiss
in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew
that from own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to
be as good as I felt. *We were a bit too complacent there*. I had been
around all of the aircraft defenses of Hawaii; I knew their general
location. I had witnessed a number of their antiaircraft practices and
knew the quantity and general disposition of their aircraft. I knew that
they were parked closely together as a more ready protection against
sabotage rather than dispersed. *Nonetheless, I was not directly
acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness
being maintained or of the watches being kept*." Hewitt Inquiry record,
 See committee record, p. 8205
During the course of examination Admiral Kimmel was asked: "In other
words, neither you nor any member of your staff made any attempt to
verify or find out what the condition of alertness was with respect to
the antiaircraft guns operated by the Army?" He replied: "And neither
did General Short make any attempt to find out the details of an alert
that the Fleet had in effect at that time." Committee record, p. 7053.
154 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bor would not be attacked.  It explains the reason for no effective
steps being taken to meet the Japanese raiders on the morning of
December 7. This was not occasioned through disregard of obligations or
indifference to responsibilities but rather because of unfortunate
errors of judgment. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the
commanding general of the Hawaiian Department failed to appreciate the
demands of their situation and the necessities of their responsibility
in the light of the information and warnings they had received. More
than anyone else it cannot be doubted that Admiral Kimmel and General
Short would have desired to avoid the disaster of December 7. But
unfortunately they were blinded by the self-evident; they felt that
Japan would attack to the south and Hawaii was safe. Their errors of
judgment were honest mistakes-yet errors they were.
The evidence reflects that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel
addressed themselves assiduously to the task of training and other wise
preparing the outpost of Hawaii and the Pacific Fleet for war Throughout
their respective tenures as commanding general of the Hawaiian
Department and commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet they manifested a
keen awareness of the imperative necessity that personnel and material
be increased commensurate with the realities and responsibilities in the
Pacific. From the time of assuming command throughout the year 1941
their correspondence with the War and Navy Departments is replete with
clear statements concerning shortages in equipment and expressions of
the need for improving Hawaiian defenses. As will subsequently appear,
they were successful in effecting marked improvement in the situation
generally and the potential capacity of Hawaii to defend itself
particularly. General Short and Admiral Kimmel were conscientious and
indefatigable commanders. They were relentless in what they regarded as
the consuming need in their commands-training and preparation for war.
One of the major responsibilities of Admiral Kimmel and the major
responsibility of General Short was defense of the Hawaiian coastal
frontier and the Pacific Fleet. They knew that an air attack on Hawaii
was a possibility; they knew this to be the most dangerous form of
attack to Oahu; they knew that extensive efforts had been made to
improve Hawaiian defenses against air attack; they had been warned of
war; they knew of the unfailing practice of Japan to launch an attack
with dramatic and treacherous suddenness without a declaration of war;
they had been given orders calling for defense action against an attack
from without; they were the commanders of the Hawaii outpost. In the
face of this knowledge it is difficult to understand that the withering
Japanese attack should have come without any substantial effort having
been made to detect a possible hostile force and with a state of
readiness least designed to meet the onslaught. That the responsible
commanders were surprised that Japan
 During the course of counsel's examination of Admiral Kimmel, he
was asked this question: "The fact is, is it not, Admiral, that as you
approached December 7 you very definitely gave the Navy program for
action in event of the declaration of war precedence over the
establishment of the defense of Pearl Harbor?" and Admiral Kimmel
replied; "*If I had believed in those days preceding Pearl Harbor that
there was a 50-50 chance or anything approaching that of an attack on
Pearl Harbor, it would hare changed my viewpoint entirely*. I didn't
believe it. And in that I was of the same opinion as that of the members
of my staff, my advisers, my senior advisers." Committee record, p.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 155
struck Hawaii is understandable; that they should have failed to prepare
their defenses against such a surprise is not understandable. 
The estimate of the situation made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short
is not altogether incredible in the light of the inevitable lassitude
born of over 20 years of peace.  But the fact that their inaction
is to a degree understandable does not mean that it can be condoned. The
people are entitled to greater vigilance and greater resourcefulness
from those charged with the duty of defending the Nation from an
Hawaii is properly chargeable with possessing highly significant
information and intelligence in the days before Pearl Harbor, including:
Correspondence with Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers
of air attack, the warning dispatches, the code-destruction
intelligence, radio intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese
carriers, the Mori call, the report of sighting and subsequent attack on
a Japanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar
detection of the Japanese raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the
morning of December 7. Despite the foregoing, the estimate was made and
persisted that Hawaii was safe from an air attack although the very
assumptions made by the Army and Navy commanders are implicit with the
contemplation of an attack from without. General Short assumed the Navy
was conducting distant reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the
other hand, that the Army would alert its aircraft warning service,
antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes. 
Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have insisted they received no
information that Hawaii was to be attacked Yet commanders in the field
cannot presume to expect that they will be advised of the exact time and
place an enemy will attack or indeed that their particular post will be
attacked. As outpost commanders it was their responsibility to be
prepared against surprise and the worst possible contingency.  They
have suggested that the War
 This distinction was clearly recognized by Admiral Ingersoll when
he was asked if he was surprised when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941. He replied: "*I was surprised that Pearl Harbor was
attacked but I was more surprised that the attack was not detected that
was my first reaction, and if I express it in the words which I used at
the time, it was, 'How in the hell did they get in there without
somebody finding it out*?' " Committee record, p. 11310
 Admiral Kimmel stated: "* * * and what is so often overlooked in
connection with this Pearl Harbor affair is that we were still at peace
and still conducting conversations, and there were limits that I could
take with planes and aviators. We were still in the peace psychology,
and I myself was affected by it just like everybody else." Navy Court of
Inquiry Record, page 1126, 1127.
 See note 336, supra.
 Incident to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the
following interrogation occurred:
Question. "In estimating the situation with which a military commander
is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally
have been along the lines of taking all information that is available,
evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?"
General Short. "Yes."
Question: "That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our war
college teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now in
coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the
Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a
commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?"
General Short, "The worst." See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 436
The Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board stated: "It is a familiar
premise of military procedure in estimating a situation to *select the
most dangerous and disastrous type of attack the enemy may make and
devote your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the
attacks*." (Citing Army Pearl Harbor Board record Pp. 1121, 2662.) Bee
committee exhibit 1st for APHB Report.
Mr. Stimson said, " One of the basic polices of the Army command, which
has been adhered to throughout the entire war, and in most instances
with complete success, has been to give the local commander his
objective and mission but not to interfere with him in the performance
of it." Stimson's statement, committee record, p. 14397.
Testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board General Herron, General
Short's predecessor, was asked the question: "I have one more question
on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War
Department to alert the command (General Herron on June 17,1940 had been
directed by Washington to institute an alert): Did that leave the
impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future
the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up
to your judgment?" He replied: "I always felt that I was entire
responsible out there and I had better protect the island." See Army
Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 228; also pp. 213-215.
156 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and Navy Departments possessed additional information which they were
not given. But the fact that additional information may have been
available elsewhere did not alter fundamental military responsibilities
in the field. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the responsible
military commanders at Hawaii. They were officers of vast experience and
exemplary records in their respective services. That Admiral Kimmel and
General Short were supplied enough in formation as reasonably to justify
the expectation that Hawaiian defenses would be alerted to any military
contingency is irrefutable.  That there may have been other
information which could have been supplied them cannot becloud or modify
this conclusion. It is into the nature of this further information that
we shall hereafter inquire.
 And yet Admiral Kimmel has indicated he felt he was entitled to
more warning. In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, he
said: "I had many difficult decisions to make but none which required
more accurate timing than the decision as to when to drastically curtail
training and to utilize all my forces in the highest form of alert
status. The warnings I received prior to 7 December 1941, were of such
a nature that I felt training could continue. *I felt that I was
entitled and would receive further warnings before the actual outbreak
of war*. I am convinced that my estimate based on the intelligence
received was correct." (P. 38 of statement.) See committee exhibit No.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 157
RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON
158 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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