Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159 
  Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159 
  Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163 
  Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167 
  "ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168 
  Avoidance of war ................................................ 172 
  Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179 
     The "Magic" .................................................. 179 
     Policy with respect to dissemination of magic ................ 180 
  "Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181 
     Nature of consular espionage ................................. 181 
     Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports ........ 189 
  The "Winds code" ................................................ 191 
  "Hidden word" code .............................................. 192 
  The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193 
  Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after  
    November 28, 1941 ............................................. 195 
  Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of  
    November 27 ................................................... 198 
  Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201 
  The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204 
  Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205 
  The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206 
 
VII                         C O N T E N T S 

Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington-Continued                  Page 
  Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209 
    The "Pilot message" ........................................... 210 
    The fourteen part memorandum .................................. 211 
      First thirteen parts ........................................ 211 
      Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper .... 212 
      Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages 
        apart from messages proper ................................ 219 
        The fourteenth part ....................................... 221 
  "One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222 
     Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch ...... 224 
     Choice of facilities ......................................... 225 
     Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction  
       messages ................................................... 226 
  Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228 
    Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses ..................... 228 
    Considerations responsible for delays in translations ......... 230 
  Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in  
    Washington which was not supplied Hawaii ...................... 232 
  Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234 
  Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237 
     Duties in Hawaii ............................................. 237 
     Duties in Washington ......................................... 238 
  Unity of command ................................................ 240 
  General observations ............................................ 245 
     The "Wyman Matter" ........................................... 245 
     The Philippine Attack ........................................ 246 
     Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack ........... 246 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              159 
 
PART IV. RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON
BASING THE PACIFIC FLEET AT HAWAII Beginning in May of 1940 the entire American Pacific Fleet operated in the Hawaiian theater with Pearl Harbor as its base. [1] Prior to that time the fleet had been based on the west coast with certain contingents operating from time to time in the Hawaiian area. Admiral James O. Richardson, who was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in 1940, stated that while the fleet was in Hawaii incident to exercises during the summer of 1940 he received instructions to announce to the press that "at his request" the fleet would continue at Hawaii for the purpose of carrying out further exercises. [2] It was his understanding that the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was with a view to its providing a restraining influence on Japan. [3] At the time of original contemplation it appears that the fleet was to remain at Hawaii on a relatively temporary basis. [4] Admiral Richardson did not concur in the decision to station the fleet there and so informed the Chief of Naval Operations. [5] He testified with respect to his objections as follows: [6] "My objections for remaining there were, primarily, that you only had one port, secure port, and very crowded, no recreation facilities for the men, a long distance from Pearl Harbor to the city of Honolulu, inadequate transportation inadequate airfields. "A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from the carrier deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway at substantial speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever carriers are training their squadrons there must be flying fields available, so that while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair, or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the flying fields "There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the fleet; to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time. "Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are perfectly willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when there is a job to be done and they can see the reason for their being there, but to keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal peacetimes, away from the coast and away from their families, away from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of morale that is essential to successful training. "For those reasons, and because I believed that the fleet could be better prepared for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted to return to the west coast." As a result of a visit to Washington in July of 1940, Admiral Richardson stated he gained three distinct impressions: [7] "*First*. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action; "*Second*. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan; "*Third*. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of [1] See committee exhibit No. 9 for file of correspondence between Admirals Stark and Richardson concerning, among other things, the matter of basing the fleet at Hawaii. For a description of the base at Pearl Harbor see appendix F to this report. [2] Committee record, p. 669. [3] See committee record, p. 682, also Navy Court of Inquiry, pp. 1057, 1058. [4] Committee record, p 668. [5] See committee exhibit No. 9. [6] Committee record, pp. 674, 675. [7] See memorandum dated October 22 1940 from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Operations. Committee exhibit No. 160 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaii area." In a memorandum for the Secretary of Navy dated September 12, 1940, Admiral Richardson pointed out several disadvantages from a Navy point of view of retaining the fleet in the Hawaiian area and stated: [8] "If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific coast bases?" During October of 1940 while in Washington he talked with President Roosevelt at which time the President informed him that the Pacific Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan. Admiral Richardson testified: [9] "I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action. I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations." He stated that the President's comment to the foregoing was in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now having a restraining influence on the actions of Japan." [10] Admiral Richardson testified that he replied that he still did not believe this to be the case and that he knew the Pacific Fleet was disadvantageously disposed to prepare for or to initiate war operations, whereupon the President said: [11] "I can be convinced of the desirability of returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the west coast we are not stepping backward." It is clear from consideration of the evidence that Admiral Richardson's position was based on the feeling that the fleet could be better prepared for war if based on the west coast and not because he feared for the security of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. [12] In a letter to Admiral Stark on November 28 concerning the matter of the security of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area he said : [13] "*This feature of the problem [8] Committee exhibit No. 9. [9] Committee record pp. 682, 683. [10] Committee record, p. 683. [11] See, however, in this connection the testimony of Mr. Sumner Welles, committee record, pp. 1124,1125. [12] Committee exhibit No. 9. This comment was made by Admiral Richardson pursuant to a letter from Admiral Stark dated November 22, 1940, in which the latter had stated, among other things: "Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of the Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of the units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 161 does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for.*" Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Richardson did not raise any question concerning the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor as a reason for bringing it back to the west coast. [14] Referring to the decision to base the fleet at Hawaii Admiral Kimmel stated: [15] "When I assumed command, the decision to base the Fleet in the Hawaiian area was an historical fact. The target and base facilities required to train the Fleet for war were in the process of being moved from the West Coast to Hawaii. The Fleet had been practically without gunnery practice for nearly a year due to the previous uncertainty as to the location of its base. Any further uncertainty would have delayed the availability of the mobile facilities to maintain, repair and train the Fleet. The resulting loss of time in starting intensive training would have been disastrous. This was my view when I took command. My appointment was in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence on my part in a decision already made months before to keep the Fleet in Hawaiian waters." Admiral Kimmel stated that during his visit to Washington in June of 1941, he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers to the fleet at Pearl Harbor, including air attack, blocking of the harbor and similar matters. He said that generally he felt the fleet should not remain at Pearl Harbor but he made no protests and submitted no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or carriers. [16] Regardless of the position taken by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet during 1940 with respect to basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, extensive measures were taken thereafter and long before the outbreak of war to improve the fleet's security at Hawaii. [17] The Secretary of State, as well as our Ambassador to Japan were satisfied that the presence of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor did in fact prove a deterrent to Japanese action as did the Chief of Naval Operations. [18] Referring to the presence of our fleet at Hawaii, the Japanese Foreign Minister in June of 1940 stated to Ambassador Grew that "the continued stay of our fleet in those waters (Hawaiian) constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas * * *." [19] As Secretary Hull stated, [20] "The worst bandit * * * doesn't like for the most innocent citizen to point an unloaded pistol or an unloaded gun at him at * *. They will take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on the high seas, whether fully equipped or not." The degree to which the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters influenced Japanese action necessarily cannot be precisely determined but the fact is the Japanese did not strike at the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay barrier for more than a year and a half after it was contemplated she would make such a move. The wisdom and merit of the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii cannot be divorced from the high Government policy of which that decision was a part. As has elsewhere been observed, the traditional interest of the United States in the Pacific and our determination [14] committee record, p. 5687. [15] committee record, pp. 6661, 6662. [16] Navy court of inquiry record, p. 367. [17] See section, infra, "Defensive Facilities Available in Hawaii."' [18] See testimony of secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1203-1205, 1452, 1464, 1603, 1608; testimony of Mr. Grew, committee record, pp. 1570, 1738, 1919, 1969. In a letter of April 3, 1941, to the commanders in chief, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Stark expressed the feeling that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. See committee exhibit No. 106. [19] See "Foreign Relations," vol. II, p. 69. [20] Committee record, p. 1603. 162 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to aid the valiant Chinese fighting under insuperable odds the Juggernaut of Japanese aggression made imperative our taking every reasonable step which would assist in deterring the insatiable Japanese ambition for conquest and at the same time bolster flagging Chinese morale. Basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor was but one of the steps taken in this direction. [21] The fact that it had been decided to make Hawaii the base of the fleet did not require that all of the battleships and other substantial fleet units should be *in* Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 after the responsible commander had been warned of war and ordered to execute an appropriate *defensive deployment*. [22] The very words defensive deployment could have meant nothing if not that the fleet should be moved and stationed in such manner as to afford maximum defensive security not only to the fleet itself but to the Hawaiian Islands, the west coast, and the Panama Canal as well. This order required the deploying of vessels in the Hawaiian waters; which afforded the commander in chief a vast scope of operations, and it was left to his judgment and discretion as to what specific action was required consistent with his responsibilities. It has certainly never been suggested that because a particular harbor has been designated as the base for a fleet its vessels are thereby restricted to that harbor, particularly after an order has been issued for their employment. It remains a debatable question as to whether the Pacific Fleet as exposed to any greater danger by reason of the fact that it was based at Hawaii. The 360 perimeter of the islands afforded unlimited avenues for operations and the maximum channels for escape in the event of attack by a hostile superior force. The west coast, on the other hand, afforded only a 180 scope of operation with no avenues for escape from a superior attacking force and left only the alternative of proceeding into the teeth of such a force. Nor does it appear that the fleet was exposed to any greater danger from the standpoint of espionage by reason of its being at Hawaii. [23] The evidence before this Committee reflects that Tokyo was receiving as much information, if not more information, from its diplomatic establishments which operated outside the restraining counterespionage efforts of our own Government, located in Panama, on the west coast, and in Manila as from the Honolulu consulate. [24] There is a strong possibility that Japan would have taken the Hawaiian Islands by amphibious operations as she did in the case of so many other outlying Pacific Islands had the fleet not been based at Pearl Harbor. [25] Fur- [21] See Part I, supra, "Diplomatic Background of the Pearl Harbor Attack." [22] In the course of counsel's examination, Admiral Turner was asked: "During this time after around November 27 to December 7, in all your discussions around the Navy with those in authority was any consideration given to the question of whether the fleet should be moved out of Pearl Harbor and sent to sea?" Admiral TURNER. "No, there was not that I recall. I assumed that most or all of it would be at sea." Question. "Well, why did you assume that?" Admiral TURNER. "Well, that was the place for them under Admiral Kimmel's operating plan for their deployment." Committee record, pp. 5224, 5225. The evidence reflects that the Office of Naval Operations in Washington did not know the exact location of the various units of the Pacific Fleet. See committee record, p. 13956. [23] See section "The Role of Espionage in the Attack," Part III, this report. [24] In referring to Japanese espionage activity, Admiral Stark said: "We had felt that *not only in Hawaii* but at practically all our given posts the Japs knew everything we were doing." Committee record, p. 5707. [25] In the course of his testimony before the committee, General Short was asked whether he believed, assuming that the fleet had been withdrawn to the west coast and conditions at Pearl Harbor were other wise the same, the Japanese could have made a landing with the striking air forces that they had and brought the planes down as they did. He replied: "It would have been thoroughly possible. If they had sent as large a force as they sent against the Philippines they could have made the landing." Committee record pp. 8293, 8294. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 163 thermore, had the fleet been based on the west coast a raid on our west coast cities and the Panama Canal could not have been entirely repulsed. For it is agreed as a military proposition that even with the most effective resistance to an enemy air attack some units will inevitably get through the screen of defense and carry home the attack. In this connection, the opinion has been expressed by several naval witnesses that it was their belief Japan would attack our Pacific Fleet *wherever it might be* at the very outset of hostilities with a view to immobilizing it, temporarily at least, as a restraining and deterring influence on Japanese sea-borne operations in Pacific Far Eastern waters. [26] Under this view, which has the weight of logic and the experience of December 7, the fact the fleet was based at Hawaii bore no conclusive relationship to nor conditioned the Japanese decision to attack our Pacific Fleet. As has been indicated, the basing of the fleet at Hawaii is inseparable from the global plan of operations in which the Pacific Fleet was to perform only one phase. It was an integral part of our policy and action in the Atlantic and can only be questioned save as one presumes to challenge the policies of the United States Government from 1937 to 1941 and our determination to aid the impoverished free peoples of the world striving in desperation to stem the overpowering tide of Axis aggression and world conquest. DEFENSIVE FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN HAWAII There can be no question that Hawaii was regarded as the best equipped of our outposts and possessed the greatest potential for its own defense. [27] In this connection General Marshall testified: [28] "I will say as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, we felt that was a vital installation, but *we also felt that that was the only installation we had anywhere that was reasonably well equipped. Therefore, we were not worried about it. In our opinion, the commanders had been alerted. In our opinion, there was nothing more we could give them at the time for the purpose of defense. In our opinion, that was one place that had enough within itself to put up a reasonable defense*. "MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning to get something. His position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of complete flux, with the ships on the ocean en route out there and the planes half delivered and half still to go. "The Panama Canal was quite inadequate at that period, seriously inadequate in planes and, of course, of vast importance to anything in the Pacific. "*The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for that reason we had less concern about Hawaii because we had worked on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one point*. "Therefore we felt that it would be a great hazard for the Japanese to attack it." The correspondence between the Chief of Staff and General Short during 1941, [29] as well as that between the Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral Kimmel, [30] manifest clearly the mutual desire to improve [26] See section, supra, Part III, "The Role of Espionage in the Attack." [27] In the course of committee examination Admiral Turner was asked: "Did you consider the fleet in Hawaii prepared for that attack at the time it did come?" Admiral TURNER. "Yes, sir, within the limits of the material improvements program, I felt that the fleet was efficient and was ready for war." Question. "You felt confident that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ready for war on December 7, 1941?" Admiral TURNER. "Yes, sir, and further that the district was ready for war within the limits of the material that we had been able to provide. *We all had the utmost confidence in the command of the fleet and the command ashore*." Committee record, pp. 5253, 5254. [28] Committee record, pp. 13792, 13793. [29] See committee exhibit No. 53. [30] Id., No. 106. 164 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to the utmost the defensive facilities available to the Hawaiian commanders. But both General Marshall and Admiral Stark, in addition to their interest in Hawaii, had the enormous task and responsibility of allocating to many places, consistent with an ever-expanding global conflict, the military and naval equipment that was produced during the year 1941. [31] They had the obligation to spread the results of our productive efforts in those quarters where the needs and exigencies appeared in their best judgment to be most pressing. Our defensive facilities on the mainland were in great need of improvement Panama and the Philippines were in woeful need of additional equipment; the Nation had committed itself to aiding the Chinese who had been fighting Japanese aggression for 4 years with little more than sheer courage and the will to exist as a nation; we were determined that supplies being shipped under lend-lease should not be destroyed by German and Italian raiders before they reached their destination necessitating thereby the building up of our naval power in the Atlantic: we were determined to aid Britain and Russia to the extent of our capacity for our own self- protection before the overpowering might of the German war machine had destroyed the last vestige of resistance on the continent of Europe and we were left alone to stem the Axis thrust for world conquest-all of these considerations were a part of the problem posed for the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations in making allocations of the materiel at hand. It should be noted that most of the lend-lease transfers effected prior to December 7, 1941, were in a category in which, by the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, it was provided that transfers to foreign governments could be made only after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy. The Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations personally approved these transfers. [32] The only justifiable allegation concerning the shortage of equipment at Hawaii relating to the failure to detect the Japanese task force was the fact that insufficient long-range patrol planes were available to conduct a 360 distant search from Oahu. As has been seen, however, adequate patrol planes were on hand to cover the vital and more dangerous sectors. [33] Referring to the lack of long-range planes, it is in order to determine the extent to which such planes were available and conceivably might have been sent to Hawaii. In the case of 210 B-17's and B-24's, Army heavy bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance, delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, none were shipped under lend-lease and a total [31] In a letter of November 7,1941, Admiral Stark pointed out to Admiral Kimmel the difficulties experienced through shortage of material needs: "I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific Fleet-particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any* destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles but he is up against it for DDs for escort-and defense against raiders." (Admiral King at the time was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.) Committee record, p. 5575. [32] See letter from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissions, Department of State, concerning the organization of Lend-Lease. Committee record, p. 14095 et seq. [33] See Part III, supra. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 165 of 113 were sold for cash to foreign countries; 12 B-17's were shipped to Hawaii and 35 to the Philippines. [34] With respect to Navy planes, there were no lend-lease transfers of long- range patrol bombers or scout bombers during the same period. Of a total of 835 Navy planes of all types delivered during this period, February 1 to November 30, 582 were delivered to the Navy and 253 to foreign countries (Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Norway) under cash transactions. Of the 582 planes delivered to the Navy, 218 were sent to the Hawaiian area, 146 of the planes being assigned to carriers. [35] It appears that of 3,128 Army and Navy planes of various types delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, only 177 were shipped under lend-lease to foreign countries and none of these were capable of performing distant reconnaissance. The record is clear, therefore, that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations did not prejudice our own defenses in approving excessive allocations to foreign governments. A brief review of the improvement effected in the Hawaiian situation during the year 1941 will serve to demonstrate the manner in which the exigencies and problems prevailing in the Pacific were recognized. The total number of Army planes in the Hawaiian Department was virtually doubled between January 31 and December 7, 1941, having been increased from 124 to 227 planes. The number of B-17 four-motored bombers was increased from none on January 31 to 21 as of May 31, 1941, this number subsequently being reduced to 12 by reason of the transfer of 9 B-17's to the Philippines in September. As of September 1, 1941, the United States possessed 109 13-17's [34] See enclosure to War Department memorandum to committee counsel dated March 20,1946, committee exhibit No. 172. In response to a request of the general counsel of the Committee, the War Department on March 20, 1946, transmitted a tabulation supplied by the Army Air Forces reflecting, among other things the total deliveries and types of American-produced planes delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, without any break-down as to months. This tabulation reflects a total of 579 planes delivered having a maximum range *without bombs* in excess of 1,600 miles. In addition to this figure, the tabulation shows 836 planes delivered having ranges of 2,000 and 1,120 miles with no break-down indicating how many planes were produced in a particular range category. The tabulation of plane deliveries was not introduced as an exhibit by the general counsel until May 23, 1946. General Marshall appeared before the committee for the second time on April 9, 1946, but he was asked no questions concerning the dispositions of these planes, it being noted that General Marshall had earlier testified that Hawaii had received priority consideration in the disposition of equipment. Although the tabulation delivered by the War Department on March 20 was available to the Committee counsel it was not available to the members of the committee for consideration and examination at the time General Marshall appeared on April 9. The committee has thus been placed in the position of not having inquired concerning the adaptability, design, and potentialities of these planes with ranges exceeding 1,600 miles; of not having determined where they may otherwise have been disposed and the exigencies requiring such dispositions; of not having determined whether there were crews available to man these planes, of not having determined whether ferrying facilities were available had they been directed to Hawaii; of not having determined exactly when the planes were delivered to determine whether they could have been sent to Hawaii before December 7, 1941; and of not having determined whether they would satisfy the distant reconnaissance requirements in Hawaii, among other things. In the latter connection, however, it is to be noted that General Martin, commanding general of the Hawaiian Air Forces, under date of August 20, 1941, recommended the War Department give consideration to the allotment of "B-17D type airplanes or *other four-engine* bombers with equal or better performance and operating range" for reconnaissance purposes, committee exhibit No. 13. It would appear that in the making of aircraft dispositions the indicated needs of the Hawaiian Department would be a controlling consideration. It appears from the evidence before the committee that only 210 of the Army-type planes delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, were four-engine bombers of a type adaptable to the type of long distance reconnaissance required by the plans and requirements of the Hawaiian commanders. It is to be noted that a tabulation of factory deliveries of bombers to foreign countries appearing on page 12991 of the Committee record is superseded by Committee exhibit No. 172. [35] See enclosure to Navy Department memorandum to committee counsel dated April 12, 1946. Committee exhibit No. 172. 166 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK disposed: 21 in Hawaii, 7 in Panama, and 81 in the continental United States. [36] The number of P-40 pursuit planes was increased from none in January to 99 as of November 30; and the number of P-36's from 19 to 39. [37] In the case of the Navy at Hawaii, during January of 1941 a squadron of 12 PBY-3's left the west coast for the Hawaiian area. In April a second squadron equipped with 12 PBY-3's also moved to Hawaii. In October and November of 1941, 3 squadrons of 12 planes each and 1 squadron of 6 planes, then in the Hawaiian area, returned to the west coast and exchanged their PBY-3's for PBY-5's after which they returned to Hawaii. During this same period the third squadron of Patrol Wing 1, equipped with 12 new PBY-5's left the west coast for Hawaii. This represents an over-all increase of 36 in the number of patrol planes between January 1 and November 30 1941. [38] During the period February 1 to November 30, 1941, 146 planes were assigned to carriers in the Pacific; and on May 13, 1941, 18 planes arrived at Ewa Field, Hawaii, being assigned to a marine scout bomber squadron. [39] The Committee did not inquire into the matter of allocations, generally, of Army and Navy planes or other equipment to points other than to Hawaii. There is no evidence before us that General Marshall and Admiral Stark made dispositions of the materiel available [40] inconsistent with their best judgment in the light of the situation as it could be viewed in the days before Pearl Harbor. [41] The question of whether Japan would have struck Hawaii had additional equipment been available there must be considered in light of the fact that in their estimates made in the fall of 1941, the Japanese placed the number of aircraft in Hawaii at roughly twice that of the actual air strength. Further, during the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor striking force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating units. [41a] It was specifically assumed that one Akagi- class carrier and one Soryu-class carrier would be lost. It is clear that immediately after December 7 every effort was made to increase the materiel facilities in Hawaii as much as possible, [36] Memorandum from War Department dated December 13, 1945. See committee record p. 14595. A study contemplating 360 long-distance reconnaissance and attacks, submitted by the commander of the Army Air Forces in Hawaii on August 20, 1941, and endorsed by the Army commander, called for 180 Army 4- engine bombers, the B-17's. Committee exhibit No. 13. As of December 7, there were only 148 B-17's in the entire Army; 35 of these were in the Philippines, 12 at Hawaii, 8 in the Caribbean area, 6 at Atlantic bases, and 87 in the continental United States. Committee record, pp. 2865, 2866. [37] Army aircraft in Hawaiian Department as reflected by AAF monthly inventories. See also committee exhibit No. 5. [38] See enclosure to Navy memorandum for committee counsel dated April 12, 1946. Committee exhibit No. 172. [39] Id. [40] As expressed by Mr. Stimson "During those days in November 1941 we at the War Department had been informed and believed that Hawaii had been more generously equipped from the Nation's inadequate supplies of men and ammunitions than either of the other three important Pacific outposts, and we believed that with the fleet at hand there it was more capable of defense." Statement of Mr. Stimson to the committee. Committee record, p. 14,407. [41] Admiral Stark testified that he gave to Admiral Kimmel all that he could of what he had Committee record, pp. 5701-5704. He said: "We were not able to give the commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet all the ships and men he wanted but neither were we able to put in the Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet the strength we knew they wanted." Committee record, p. 5575. On November 25, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, in part; "We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two- ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy." Committee record, p. 5578. [41a] See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a letter of the same date from Commander Walter Wilds, Office of the Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Committee record, p. 14626. See further, committee record, p. 457. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 167 necessarily at the expense of sacrificing the needs of other installations. The evidence reflects, however, that it was a very considerable period of time after the attack before the Nation's production of war materials was sufficient to approach satisfaction of all the Hawaiian requirements. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short had repeatedly requested more equipment, and that their needs and requests were not ignored [42] is made clear by the improved situation effected during 1941. [43] The same requests made by the Hawaiian commanders were coming from many other commanders and many other quarters. As virtually all witnesses have testified, alert commanders are always striving to improve and increase their equipment, facilities, and personnel; and it is doubtful if at any time even during the war any commander ever had all he wanted or thought he needed. [44] It is necessarily speculative as to how additional equipment in Hawaii might have altered the situation on December 7 inasmuch as the facilities which were available were not brought into the fight. [45] TRANSFER OF PACIFIC FLEET UNITS TO THE ATLANTIC In May of 1941 three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic. This shift was contemplated by the Navy basic war plan, WPL-46. [46] In a letter to Admiral Stark dated September 12, 1941, Admiral Kimmel expressed concern regarding possible further transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic: [47] "The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan-a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the status quo out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced and, in event of hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive. [48]" [43] In an aide memoir concerning "Defense of Hawaii" submitted by the War Department to the President in May of 1941, the following observations were made: "*The Island of Oahu*, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world. "To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of approximately 35,000 men, manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 antiaircraft weapons, and more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach defense. Without air superiority this is an impossible task. "*Air Defense*. With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of approximately, 50 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when within 200 miles of the objective the enemy forces will be subject to attack by all types of bombardment closely supported by our most modern pursuit. "Hawaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air. With this force available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable. "In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be high]y desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East." Committee exhibit No. 59. [43] As pointed out by Admiral Stark, "During 1940 and 1941, many of the shortcomings of Pearl Harbor as a base, disclosed by the long stay of the Pacific Fleet, were remedied." Committee record, p. 5587. See in this connection the Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, for the year ending June 30, 1941. Committee record pp. 5587-5589. [44] See testimony of Admiral Turner committee record, p. 5254, concerning the insatiable desire of field commanders for materiel. He said: "* * * you never have enough, you always want more and you want things to be better." [45] Admiral Turner testified he believed that the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii was sufficient on December 7 1941, to have defeated or greatly reduced the effect of the Japanese raid on Hawaii if it had been fully alerted Committee record, pp. 5258, 5259. [46] See statement of Admiral Stark, committee record, p. 5591. [47] Committee exhibit No. 106. See testimony of Admiral Stark, committee record, p. 5591. [48] Admiral Kimmel commented in his prepared statement to the committee: "When I was in Washington in June 1941, it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detachment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer was not made." Committee record, p. 6680. 168 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Replying on September 23, Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet: [49] "We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year." The transfer of the Pacific Fleet units in May of 1941, it would appear, had as its immediate objective the possibility of their engaging in an expedition to take the Azores, [50] in order that these vital Portuguese possessions might not fall into German hands. The occasion for taking the Azores, however, did not materialize and, as stated by Admiral Stark, "it just went on diplomatically there". [51] The fleet units, formerly attached to the Pacific Fleet, were not returned to Pearl Harbor but were employed further to augment the Atlantic Fleet, particularly in the vicinity of Iceland. The record reflects that the transfer of a portion of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic in May of 1941 was in line with the basic war plans which recognized the Atlantic as the principal theater of operations and was designed to forestall the possibility of an indispensable strategic area falling into German hands. The transfer was an inextricable part of the over-all military policies prepared to meet the Axis threat. [52] "ABCD" UNDERSTANDING? A great deal of inquiry was made during the course of proceedings to determine whether the government of the United States had entered into an agreement with Great Britain and the Netherlands committing this Nation to war upon Japan in the event British or Dutch possessions were attacked by the Japanese. [52a] It is clear from evidence before the committee that no agreement was entered into in this regard. The President and his Cabinet, while momentarily expecting an attack by Japan, recognized and observed the constitutional mandate that this government could only be committed to war by a declaration of the Congress. Recognizing the inevitable Consequences of the Tripartite Pact, representatives of the War and Navy Departments participated during 1941 in a series of staff conversations with military and naval experts [49] Committee exhibit No. 106. [50] In a letter to Admiral Kimmel of May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark stated, among other things, "Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an overall limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly reinforced. The Army, of course, will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines will bear the brunt." Committee record, pp. 5607, 5608. [51] Committee record, pp. 13977, 13978. In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: "How would you attack and take the Azores without a declaration of war on Portugal? She owned them." He replied: "I can tell you one way. Suppose the Germans had taken Portugal. Would we have to declare war on Portugal to take the Azores? I don't think we would have. * * * I always construed that situation, with regard to the Azores, as to have plans ready, and be ready if an emergency arose there." Committee record. p. 13979. [52] See Part I, pp. 10-13, supra, this report. It does not appear from the evidence that additional Fleet units would have assisted in detecting the approaching Japanese striking force, in view of the dispositions made by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, or otherwise have materially aided in the defense against an air attack. As previously suggested, had the major Fleet units transferred to the Atlantic in May of 1941 been in Pearl Harbor on December 7 they, too, would in all probability have been destroyed. See in the latter connection, Part II, pp. 69 72, this report. [52] This inquiry appears to have been largely precipitated by a remark attributed to Prime Minister Churchill during an address before the House of Commons on January 27, 1942. He is quoted as having stated "On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectations had not been falsified by the events." See Committee record, p. 1286. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 169 of Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands. [53] The first of these meetings, initiated by the Chief of Naval Operations [54] and limited to American and British representatives, was held in Washington from January 29 to March 27, 1941. The official report of the conversations, referred to as "ABC-1," points out specifically that the discussions were held with a view "to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, *should the United States be compelled to resort to war*." [56] The report states clearly that the plans to accomplish this purpose, as embodied in the report, were subject to confirmation by the highest military authorities in the United States and Great Britain and by the governments of both countries as well. [56] This was in accord with the joint statement of the position the American representatives would take, made by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff on January 27 at the outset of the conversations. [57] "ABC-1" was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy and by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, [58] thereafter being submitted to the President on June 2, 1941. On June 7 the President returned "ABC-1" without formal approval; pointing out that since the plan had not been finally approved by the British Government, he would not approve it at that time but that in case of war the report should be returned to him for approval. [59] Shortly after the staff conversations in Washington military and naval representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands conferred in April of 1941 at Singapore in order to draft a plan for the conduct of operations in the Far East based on "ABC-1." In the instructions sent the commander in chief of our Asiatic Fleet [60] prior to the Singapore conversations it was emphatically pointed out that the results of such conversations were likewise subject to ratification by the governments concerned and were to involve no political commitment by the United States. [61] The report of the conversations, [62] referred to as "ADB", explicitly recognized that no political commitments were implied. [63] Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff withheld their approval feeling that [53] Admiral Stark said: "In our planning, we assumed that if the United States was drawn into war, it would be alined with Great Britain and against the Axis Powers. We also knew that while our most immediate concern was with the war then in progress in the Atlantic and in Europe, we might also be faced-perhaps concurrently-with a war in the Pacific. With these thoughts in mind, we held extensive staff conversations with the British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversations was embodied in a document known as ABC-1, dated March 27, 1941." Committee record, p 5572. [54] Admiral Stark was asked; "* * * it was in 1940, the fall of 1940 that you communicated with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound of the British Navy, requesting that he send his naval experts to the United States to discuss collaboration between the two navies?" Admiral STARK: "That is correct, in case of war." Question: "Upon whose responsibility was that message sent?" Admiral STARK: "My own." Question: "Did you discuss the subject with the President?" Admiral STARK; "I sent that on my own, and I did not notify the President until later I had done it." [55] See committee exhibit No. 49 for a full report of the staff conversations. [56] Committee exhibit No. 49. [57] Id. [58] See committee record, p. 2617. [59] Id., at pp. 2619, 2620. [60] Id,, at p. 6320. [61] Id., at p. 5123. [62] For the report of the Singapore conversations, see committee exhibit No. 50. [63] In testifying concerning the Singapore conversations, Admiral Turner said: "In none of these papers was there ever a political commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of action, or these were plans of action based on assumptions that should the United States enter the war, then these papers would be effective, provided they were approved by the proper authorities. "None of the ADB papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War or the President, although all of those officers as well as the Secretary of State were aware that these conversations were being held from time to time." Committee record. p. 5122. 170 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK some of the statements in the report had political implications. [64] One of the proposals of the Singapore conference, however, was subsequently incorporated *as a recommendation* in the joint memoranda of November 5 and 27 which the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations submitted to the President; i. e., that military counteraction should be undertaken in the event Japan attacked or directly. threatened the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or if the Japanese moved forces into Thailand west of 100 east or south of 10 north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. [65] As elsewhere pointed out, it was mutually understood at the Atlantic Conference in August of 1941 by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill that the Governments of both the United States and Great Britain needed more time to prepare for resistance against possible Japanese attack in the Far East. [66] It was agreed, however, that steps should be taken to make clear to Japan that further aggressive action by her against neighboring countries would result in each country being compelled to take all necessary measures to safeguard the legitimate rights of its country and nationals and to insure its country's safety and security. [67] Accordingly, upon returning to Washington the President on August 17, 1941 informed the Japanese Ambassador that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in line with a program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United States. [68] During the latter half of 1941 negotiations to meet the American objections to the "ADB" report proceeded slowly until discussions were opened in the Far East in November between Admiral Hart, commander in chief of our Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Phillips, the British Far Eastern naval commander. Soon after the out-break of war, the two commanders completed arrangements for initial American and British naval dispositions to meet probable Japanese action in the Far East. Admiral Hart's report of his conversations with Admiral Phillips was received in the Navy Department about 11 p. m., December 6, 1941, and was approved in a dispatch sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations on December 7 after the attack on Pearl Harbor. [69] On December 6, 1941, Admiral Hart cabled the Chief of Naval Operations concerning a report received from Singapore that the United States had "assured British armed support under three or four eventualities". [70] None of the witnesses who were questioned on this [64] See committee exhibit No. 65. Also testimony Of Admiral Turner, committee record, pp. 5118, 6119. [65] See section, infra, Avoidance of War. [66] See Part I, this report. [67] Id. [68] Id. [69] See testimony of Admiral Stark before the joint committee. [70] Admiral Hart's dispatch was based on a communication which he had received on December 6, l941, from Capt. John M, Creighton, who was a naval attache in Singapore, as follows: "Brooke Popham received Saturday from War Department London Quote We have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: Affirm we are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Siam; Baker if Dutch Indies are attacked and we go to their defense; Cast if Japs attack us the British. Therefore without reference to London put plan in action if first you have good info Jap expedition advancing with the apparent intention of landing in Kra, second if the Nips violate any part of Thailand Para if NEI are attacked put into operation plans agreed upon between British and Dutch. Unquote." Committee record, pp. 13520,13521. In the course of his testimony before the committee Captain Creighton stated he had no knowledge of an agreement between the United States and Great Britain or the Dutch and that the report transmitted to Admiral Hart must have come to him second-hand. Committee record, pp. 13516- 13637. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 171 point, including Admiral Hart, [71] was aware of any evidence to substantiate the report. In his testimony, the Chief of Naval Operations suggested that the report may have been based on a misconception as to the state of negotiations following the Singapore conference. [72] There is no evidence to indicate that Japanese knowledge of the "ABC" and "ADB" conversations was an inducing factor to Japan's decision to attack the United States coincident with her thrust to the south. Indeed, the idea of attacking us at Pearl Harbor was conceived before these conversations were initiated. [73] Manifestly any estimate which the Japanese made of American probable action was based on this country's long-standing Far Eastern policy and the course of diplomatic negotiations, and not on nonpolitical, technical discussions on a staff level. [74] It should be noted that on November 7 the President took an informal vote of his Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American people would support a strike against Japan in the event she should attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move. The following significant statement appears in the diary of Secretary Stimson for December 2: "The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. [75]" From all of the evidence, as earlier indicated, there is no basis for the conclusion that an agreement had been effected committing he United States to war against Japan in the event of an attack by her upon the British or the Dutch. It is indisputable that the President and his Cabinet contemplated presenting the problem to the Congress should our position in the Far East become intolerable. [76] Further, the reports of the 1941 staff conversations contain clear disclaimers of any political commitments and the voluminous records relating to these conversations will be searched in vain for any suggestion that an agreement binding the United States to go to war was made. Additionally, all the witnesses who were questioned on the point [77]-including the ranking military and naval leaders of he country at the time-testified that *in these meetings the constitutional prerogative of the Congress to declare war was scrupulously re- [71] Committee record, pp. 12785-12875. [72] Id., at p. 6317. [73] See Part II, this report re Japanese plans for the attack. [74] Before the committee, General Marshall was asked: "Let us assume first that they (the Japanese) knew that we were going to go to war if they attacked Malaya or any portion of that land there. Let us assume on the other hand that they knew we were not going to participate unless we were directly attacked ourselves. To what extent would their decisions as to action be affected by that knowledge?" He replied: "Japanese Psychology being what it is and the Japanese Army domination being what it was their general scheme for the assumption of power throughout the Far East, particularly the Southwest Pacific being known now, I don't think that would have had any particular effect one way or the other." Committee record, p. 13786. [75] See statement of Mr. Stimson. Committee record, p. 14427. [76] Admiral Stark said: "Under our Constitution the Congress had to declare war, and we could not take any independent action, so far as hostilities were concerned." Committee record, p. 13875. Again, " * * * as to our striking after declaration of war on our part, if the situation became intolerable us, and our national safety, if the Japs had not struck and we thought then that our safety was imperiled we did not fight, I think it would have been done in a constitutional manner." Committee record, pp. 13892-12893. Further, " * * * I do again make the statement, and I want it clear on the record, so far as my thoughts were concerned, that if Japan had not attacked and if conditions had become intolerable to our national safety because of what she was doing, and that would have been through the Congress." Committee record, p. 13895. [77] See testimony of Secretary Hull, Sumner Welles, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, General Gerow before the committee. 172 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK spected. [78] The preliminary planning done at these conferences manifested commendable foresight and indeed our military leaders would have been inexcusably negligent had they not participated in these conversations in the face of the clear pattern of conquest mapped out by the Axis. [79] This planning saved precious time and lives once Japan struck. While no binding agreement existed, it would appear from the record that the Japanese were inclined to the belief that the United States Britain and the Netherlands would act in concert. An intercepted November 30 dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin stated in pertinent part: [80] "* * * it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations (England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China) and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy." A message of December 3 which was intercepted from the Washington Embassy to Tokyo related: [81] "Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war is a definite certainty, in the event of an occupation of Thailand." There is nothing, however, in the foregoing intelligence having any relationship to the Hawaiian situation;-to have advised the commanders there that the Japanese regarded an attack upon the British or Dutch as tantamount to an attack upon the United States would have added nothing- they had already been categorically warned that hostile action by Japan against the United States itself was possible at any moment. AVOIDANCE OF WAR As has been seen in considering the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack, every effort was made compatible with national honor to forestall the inevitable conflict with Japan. The policy of the United States *condemned aggression*; the policy of Japan was *predicated on aggression*. It was only a question of time, therefore, before these two irreconcilable principles would engender war. [82] Officials of our Government were faced with the problem of effecting a delicate balance between gaining time to improve our military preparedness on the one hand and not forsaking our principles, national honor, and Allies on the other. [78] That the certain prerogative of the Congress to declare war was recognized in discussions with other governments is revealed by the following dispatch from Ambassador Winant to the State Department dated November 30, 1941, transmitting a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt: "It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. *I realize your constitutional difficulties* but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near you should not *say that 'any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress*' or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war." Committee exhibit No. 24. See also testimony of General Marshall, committee record, pp. 2785 2786. [79] In the course of counsel's examination, General Gerow was asked: "* * * has it been the practice of the War Plans Division from time immemorial to make all sorts of plans about war operations on the contingency that some day or other we might be involved in hostilities with other nations?" He replied: "Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept current plans for operations against any major power or combination of major powers, sir * * * at one time I think we had plans against almost everybody sir, and I think that is the practice of every general staff of every nation." Committee record pp. 2673, 2674. As stated by Admiral Stark, "It is our business to draw up plans for any contingency." Committee record, p, 13977. [80] Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 205. [81] Id., at p. 227. For a full treatment of the matter, however, indicating that no agreement whatsoever existed for military action on our part in the event of a Japanese invasion of Thailand, see committee exhibit No. 169. [82] See Part I, supra, this report. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 173 In summing up the salient features of the situation as they appeared o him in November of 1941, Mr. Stimson said: [83] "1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable. "2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were then desperately fighting Germany-England, Russia, or China-should be knocked out of the war before the time came when we would be required to go in. "3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare, nevertheless we felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight against Japan for the Philippines even if we had to enter the war at that time, in view of the air power that we were building up in the Philippines. "4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view of unified support of our own people as well as for the record of history, that we should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggressor." It should be noted that in October of 1940 the President advised Admiral Richardson that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies the United States would not enter the war- "that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war. [84]" On October 30, 1941, a message was received from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek indicating his belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming (Yunnan), located on the Burma Road, was imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. [85] The Secretary of State requested the advice of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as to the attitude which this Government should assume toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road. In a joint memorandum for the President dated November 5 they set forth the following conclusions and recommendations, after reviewing the situation in China: [86] "The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions: "(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy. "(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies: "(1) *A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies*; "(2) *The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the loyalty Islands*. "(c) If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position. [83] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14385. [84] Testimony of Admiral Richardson, committee record, pp. 683, 684. [85] See committee exhibit No. 16A. Similar messages were received through the American ambassador in Chungking, the Magruder Mission and the United States naval attache. Exhibits Nos. 16, 16A. [86] Committee exhibit No. 16. 174 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan. "(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government. "(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies. "The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions. "Specifically, they recommend: "That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved. "That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces. "That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent. "That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." The reply of the President to Chiang Kai-shek's message was handed to the Chinese Ambassador on November 14 and followed the recommendations of General Marshall and Admiral Stark. It pointed out that it did not appear preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack and observed, among other things: [87] " * * * Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military, and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our lend- lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition. Our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible." In a joint memorandum for the President, prepared under date of November 27, 1941, General Marshall and Admiral Stark pointed out that "if the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces." [88] They observed that: "*The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time*. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence. *Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. [87] Id. [88] Committee exhibit No. 17. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 175 Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China. "After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken *only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, Portuguese Timor, Nets Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands* [89] "Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken. "It is recommended that: "Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory, as above outlined; "In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war, prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken; "Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning. [90]" It is to be noted that the foregoing memorandum was dated November 27, 1941, the day after the Secretary of State had delivered our Government's reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20. The evidence shows, however, that the memorandum was considered at an Army- Navy Joint Board meeting on the morning of November 26, following the meeting of the War Council on the preceding day at which Secretary Hull had stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. [91] The memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations conveys two cardinal thoughts governing the approach of the military to the negotiations; i. e., *the most essential thing was to gain time, and the precipitance of military action should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. In this connection General Marshall referred to the reaction of the Army and Navy to the dropping of the thought of a modus vivendi in the following terms: [92] "My recollection is, and I have a fairly clear recollection of our disappointment that from the military point of view, meaning Army and Navy, that we would not gain any more time; our relationship to these discussions was on the one side the desire to gain as much time as we possibly could and on the other to see that commitments were not made that endangered us from a military point of view." [89] General Marshall testified that this paragraph referred to the conference of military leaders held in Singapore in April of 1941. He was asked: "When you say that the Dutch, British, and the United States military authorities had *agreed* to that action did you mean that they had made an agreement on behalf of the United States, or agreed to recommend it to their governments?" General Marshall replied: "*Agreed to recommend it*. They had no power whatever to agree for our government and it was so stipulated * * *." Committee record, pp. 2784, 2785. [90] See note 78, supra, and note 111, infra. [91] With reference to the Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President dated November 27, 1941 (exhibit No. 17), Admiral Ingersoll recalled that he "* * * presented at a Joint Board Meeting on apparently the day before this memorandum was sent, I presented at that meeting the arguments why we should not precipitate a war, and when I came back here to Washington 4 years later, I had forgotten completely that I had ever presented such a memorandum at the Joint Board Meeting. The only satisfaction I had was that it didn't sound silly after 4 years. And this was based on that." Committee record, p. 11366. [92] Committee record, p. 13775. 176 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK In pointing out the distinction between his approach and that of Secretary Stimson, [93] General Marshall said: [94] "He [Secretary Stimson] was very much afraid-he feared that we would find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when the Japanese actually broke peace. "He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great deal more than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, that we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that. "My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular time. "So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a hopeless situation before the peace was broken, and mine, which as I say, were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been, that we should get as much time as we could in order to make good the terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrangements." It is apparent from the memorandum of November 27 that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations desired more time insofar as consistent with national policy and not at the expense of forsaking the honor of the Nation. As General Marshall testified: [95] "Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was struggling with the means to fight. * * * *I wanted time, and the question was how much time could be given to us and still maintain the honor of the United States and not get ourselves in a hopeless position.*" Further, the memorandum relates to the matter of precipitance of war by the United States; that is, no affirmative steps should be taken by the United States to bring about war with Japan-"precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy." As observed in reviewing the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack, the November 26 note of our Government to Japan was not a precipitant of war-it was merely a laudable restatement of the principles for which we had stood for many years in the Orient. There can, therefore, be no question that the delivery to Japan of the American note of November 26 was not in any way in contravention of the expressed position of our own military. Furthermore, Tokyo advised her emissaries in Washington on November 20 that a modus vivendi would not be acceptable to Japan, [96] and in consequence had our Government submitted a modus vivendi to the Japanese, no more time would have been afforded the Army and Navy. General Marshall and Admiral Stark had themselves recommended that we take military counter-action should Japan attack the very territory which she was already poised to attack in the event she failed to secure the demands contained in the Japanese ultimatum of November 20*. [97] Indeed, at the very time Japan's ambassadors were discussing a temporary truce, her military was continuing its move to the South. Secretary Stimson's diary for November 26, 1941, reflects the following comments, among others: [98] [93] In this diary for November 27, Mr. Stimson commented: "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part." Committee record p. 14422. [94] Committee record, p. 13821. [95] Id., at p. 13822. [96] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 160. [97] Id., No. 17. [98] Committee record, p. 14420 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 177 ". . . . I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down towards Indo-China. He fairly blew up-jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen it and that that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce-an entire withdrawal (from China)-they should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-China. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special messenger." It is to be noted that Mr. Stimson's diary for November 25, 1941, describes a meeting at the White House attended by the President; Secretaries Hull, Knox, and Stimson; General Marshall; and Admiral Stark. It states, in part: [99] "There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade [100] brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked (as soon as) next Monday without warning, and the question was what we should do. *The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition*." [101] In referring to Mr. Stimson's comment concerning maneuvering the Japanese into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves, [102] General Marshall testified: [103] "* * * they were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a military arrangement." The Chief of Staff stated that Secretary Stimson was referring to what the *diplomatic* procedure was to be; not the *military* procedure. [104] On November 28 Secretary Stimson called upon the President inasmuch as Military Intelligence had supplied him a summary of the information in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East and "it amounted to such a statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up." Referring to his conversation with the President on this occasion, Mr. Stimson wrote in his diary: [105] "He (the President) branched into an analysis of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed, saying there were three alternatives and only three that he could see before us. I told him I could see two. His alternatives were-first, [99] Id., at p. 14418. [100] This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in case of war in Europe. [101] Mr. Stimson pointed out in this connection that our military and naval advisers had warned us that we could not safely allow the Japanese to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it. Committee record, p. 14418. [102] In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: "Now, I want to know why if you know, there was a distinction between the Atlantic and the Pacific about the firing of the first shot." He replied: "Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships in June. She had attacked three destroyers in the Atlantic, sinking one of them-I think it was in October or November, along in there, between September and October. And certainly the 1st of December she had attacked and wounded badly one tanker, the Salinas, I believe it was, which got back to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the United States had voted billions for material to go to Britain. We considered it our job to get that material through not simply to use this money for material and let it be sunk without taking any action on it. There were certain waters defined, and limits established, which, I believe, we called our waters. The President's speech shows it very plainly, in which he stated, if the Germans came within that area they would do so at their peril. They came in and attacked us. As a result, we got together what we called the hemispheric defense plans, which I have outlined previously and which provided for shooting at any German combatant ships which came within that area, and we did do it * * * I think that that situation is not comparable to what was going on in the Pacific, where the Japs had not attacked our ships, unless you go back to the Panay incident." Committee record, pp. 13981, 13982. [103] Committee record, p. 13801. [104] Id., at p. 13799. [105] Id., at p. 14423. 178 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. I told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one." Mr. Stimson set forth the following observations concerning the War Council meeting on November 28: [106] "It was the consensus that the present move (by the Japanese)-that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing some where completely changed the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indochina. It was now the opinion of every one that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. *It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed*. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of going. "It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think we could-that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President. In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the United States and I thought that the best form of a message would be an address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the final decision at that time and the President asked Hull, and Knox and myself to try to draft such papers." Mr. Stimson's diary for December 2, 1941, contains the following comments concerning a meeting at the White House: [107] "The President went step by step over the situation and I think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles what they intend by this new occupation of southern Indo-China-just what they are going to do-and has demanded a quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that *he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when he left us*." On December 6 President Roosevelt dispatched his appeal to the Emperor; and, after the bombs had already fallen on Hawaii, our Ambassador in Tokyo was informed that it was desired the Japanese Memorandum of December 7, which was keyed for delivery to the United States coincident with the attack on Pearl Harbor, be regarded as the Emperor's reply to the President. [108] [106] Id., at pp. 14424, 14425. [107] Id., at p. 14427. [108] See Part I, supra, this report. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 179 It is clear from the evidence that the feeling of the President and his advisers that the United States must fight if the British and Dutch ere attacked was predicated on the necessities of our own security and not occasioned by reason of any formal commitment or agreement requiring such action on the part of the United States. [109] That our Government was hoping to avoid war long after any real hope existed [110] made manifest by the fact that the President contemplated sending warning to Japan on "Tuesday afternoon or evening" (December 9) if no answer was received from the Emperor by Monday (December 8.) [111] In referring to the appeal to the Emperor, Mr. Hull said: [112] "The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of course knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping- off place in Indochina which from our viewpoint meant that the danger of attack could not have been more imminent. Nevertheless, *the President believed that he should not neglect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute appeal might save the situation. It also served to make clear to the American people and to the world our interest in maintaining peace up to the very last minute*." INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON THE "MAGIC" With the exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness, regarded by the committee as meriting the highest commendation, the War and Navy Departments collaborated in breaking the Japanese diplomatic codes. Through the exploitation of intercepted and decoded messages between Japan and her diplomatic establishments, the so-called Magic, a wealth of intelligence concerning the purposes of the Japanese was available in Washington. [113] Both the Army and Navy maintained several stations throughout the United States and in the Pacific for the purpose of intercepting Japanese radio communications. These stations operated under instructions mandating from Washington and forwarded the intercepted traffic to Washington without themselves endeavoring to decode or translate the material. The only exception to this procedure was in the case of the Corregidor station which had been provided with facilities for exploiting many of the Japanese diplomatic messages in view of its advantageous location from the standpoint of intercepting Tokyo traffic. [114] Insofar as the commanding officers in Hawaii were concerned they received none of the Magic save as it was supplied them by the War and Navy Departments in the original, paraphrased, or captioned form or, operationally, through instructions predicated on this source of intelligence. While the highest military officials in Washington did not know the precise nature of radio intelligence activities in Hawaii, it is clear that those charged with handling the Magic did not [109] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14418. Also committee exhibits Nos. 16,17. [110] Admiral Stark was asked: "Was not that our intention (of doing anything possible to prevent war with the Japanese) right up to December 7, if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and principles?" He replied: "Yes, sir, and we had been working for months on that, and the record is complete in that regard." Committee record, p. 13915. [111] See committee record, pp. 13741, 13742. [112] See Secretary Hull's replies to committee interrogatories. Committee record, p. 14266. [113] See committee exhibits Nos. I and 2. For a discussion of Magic and its great significance to the prosecution of the war see letters dated September 25 and 27, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey. Committee record pp. 2979-2989. [114] For a discussion of the mechanics of the Magic see testimony of Admiral Noyes and Capts. L. F Safford and A. D. Kramer of the Navy, and Cols. Otis K. Sadtler and Rufus Bratton of the Army; before the committee. 180 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK rely upon either the Army or Navy in Hawaii being able to decode the diplomatic messages which were decoded in Washington. However both Admirals Stark and Turner testified that they were under the impression that Japanese diplomatic messages were being decode by the Navy in Hawaii. [115] No justification for this impression existed in fact apart from the failure of these officers to inform themselves adequately concerning Navy establishments. [116] Under arrangements existing during 1941 between the Army and the Navy in Washington the decoding and translating of Magic was divided between the Army Signal Intelligence Service under the direction of the Chief Signal Officer and a unit in the Navy, known as OP-20-G, under the control of the Director of Naval Communications. The responsibility for decoding and translating messages was allocated between the two services on the basis of the dates of the messages with each service ordinarily handling all messages originated on alternate days, the Army being responsible for even dates and the Navy, for odd dates This procedure was flexible in that it was departed from in order to expedite the handling of material as the occasion demanded or in the case of any unusual situation that might prevail in one or the other of the services. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO DISSEMINATION OF MAGIC The Magic intelligence was regarded as preeminently confidential and the policy with respect to its restricted distribution was dictated by a desire to safeguard the secret that the Japanese diplomatic codes were being broken. [117] Delivery of the English texts of the intercepted messages was limited, within the War Department, to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division; within the Navy, to the Secretary of Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the State Department; and to the President's naval aide for transmittal to the President. By agreement between the Army and Navy in Washington, the Army was responsible for distribution of Magic within the War Department and to the State Department; the Navy, for distribution within the Navy Department and to the White House. Any disclosure of the fact that the Japanese messages were being decoded or any disclosure of information obtainable only from that source would inevitably have resulted in Japan's changing her codes with attendant loss completely of the vital Magic. This fact was responsible for the translated material being closely held among a [115] See committee record, p. 5095. [116] Admiral Stark testified: "I inquired on two or three occasions as to whether or not Kimmel could read certain dispatches when they came up and which we were interpreting and sending our own messages and I was told that he could. *However, I want to make it plain that that did not influence me in the slightest regarding what I sent*. I felt it my responsibility to keep the commanders in the field and to see to it that they were kept informed of the main trends and of information which (would) be of high interest to them. Regardless of what dispatches I might have seen, they may have formed background for me but I saw that affirmative action was taken from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in the field on matters which I thought they should have." Committee record, p. 5793 [117] During the course of his testimony, General Miles was asked: "Who made the decision that these messages should not be sent to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is concerned?" He replied: "That followed from the general policy laid down by the Chief of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of these messages or our ability to decode them should be confirmed to the least possible number of persons; no distribution should be made outside of Washington. * * * "The value of that secret, the secret that we could and did decode Japanese messages, in their best code, was of incalculable value to us, both in the period when war threatened and most definitely during our waging of that war. That was the basic reason for the limitation on the distribution of those messages and of the constantly increasing closing in, as I might express it, on any possible leaks in that secret." Committee record, pp. 2092, 2093. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 181 few key individuals, in addition necessarily to those who processed the messages. The policy generally prevailed in the days before Pearl Harbor that the Magic materials were not ordinarily to be disseminated to field commanders. [118] This policy was prescribed for the reason that (1) the Japanese might conceivably intercept the relayed Magic intelligence and learn of our success in decrypting Japanese codes: [119] (2) the volume of intercepted traffic was so great that its transmission, particularly during the critical period of diplomatic negotiations, would have overtaxed communication facilities; and (3) responsibility for evaluation of this material which was largely diplomatic in nature was properly in Washington, where the Magic could be considered along with other pertinent diplomatic information obtained from the State Department and other sources. There was no inflexible rule, however, which precluded sending to theater commanders in proper instances, either in its original form as paraphrased or in the form of estimates, conclusions, or orders based wholly or in part upon Magic. Important information derived therefrom was from time to time sent to the Hawaiian commanders by the Navy Department in paraphrased form or in the form of estimates. [120] The War Department, on the other and, did not send the Magic to the field, for the reason that the Army code was not believed to be as secure as that of the Navy. [121] For purposes of the investigation Magic fell generally into two categories: first, messages relating to diplomatic matters of the Japanese Government; [122] and second, messages relating to espionage activities by Japanese diplomatic representatives, particularly with respect to American military installations and establishments. [123] The decision not to endeavor to supply field commanders all of the Magic intelligence as such was a reasonable one under the circumstances. However, it is incumbent to determine whether responsible commanding officers were otherwise supplied the equivalent of intelligence obtained from the Magic materials. "SHIPS IN HARBOR" REPORTS NATURE OF CONSULAR ESPIONAGE In addition to the Magic materials relating strictly to diplomatic negotiations, a great many messages between Japan and her diplomatic establishments were intercepted reflecting espionage activities by the consular staffs. [124] These intercepts related in the main to instructions sent by Tokyo and replies pursuant thereto concerning the movement and location of American ships and the nature of military and defensive installations. [118] For a discussion concerning this matter, see letter dated April 22, 1941, from Capt. Arthur N. McCollum in Washington to Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer. Committee record, pp. 12917- 12923. [119] This factor applied principally to the Army. See testimony of General Miles. Note 121, infra. [120] See committee exhibit No. 37, pp. 4-12, 40, 41. [121] In testifying concerning the matter of distributing Magic to field commanders General Miles was asked; "Do I understand from your answer that these messages intercepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii by the Army?" He replied: "They were not. In some cases the substance of some messages were sent to Hawaii, and all most always in naval code, I think always in naval code, because the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army code." Committee record, pp. 2091, 2092. [122] Committee exhibit No. 1. [123] Id., No. 2. [124] Id. 182 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The Hawaiian commanders have strongly insisted that messages to and from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu clearly indicated Japan's intention to attack the fleet at Pearl Harbor. They contend they were wrongfully deprived of this information, basing this contention to a great extent on an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo of September 24, 1941 [125] issuing the following instructions to its Honolulu Consulate: [126] "Strictly secret. "Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible: "1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.) "Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. "Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.) "Area C. East Loch. "Area D. Middle Loch. "Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes. "2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.) [127]" The foregoing message, No. 83, has been gratuitously characterized throughout the proceedings as the "bomb plot message", the "harbor berthing plan", and by similar terms. Three other intercepted messages relate in a pertinent manner to the September 24 dispatch and to Tokyo's interest in the fleet at Pearl Harbor: (1) In a message from Tokyo to the Honolulu Consul, dated November 15, 1941 (translated December 3, 1941) it was stated: [128] "As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy." (2) An intercept from Tokyo dated November 20, 1941 (translated December 4) read: [129] "Please investigate comprehensively the fleet-bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation." (3) An intercept of November 29 (translated December 5) stated: [130] "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements?" Referring to the indicated messages, Admiral Kimmel testified: [131] "In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harbor followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information [125] Translated October 9. [126] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 12. [127] Some of the subsequent reports from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu were made pursuant to the instructions contained in the September 24 dispatch from Tokyo. See committee exhibit No. 2 pp. 13 and 14. [128] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 13. [129] Id., at p. 15. Captain Kramer testified with respect to the blank, a garble, in this message between the words "fleet" and "bases" that he believed the original Japanese version in ungarbled form if it were available would read: "Please investigate comprehensively the fleet air bases." Committee record, pp. 1162-1163 [130] Committee exhibit No. 2, 15 p. [131] Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK l83 which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual character and outside the realm of reasonable suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed by Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. *These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor*. The information sought and obtained with such painstaking detail had no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost completely when the ships left their reported berthings in Pearl Harbor." In the same connection General Short testified: [132] "While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me know about the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track of our naval ships, they should certainly have let me know that the Japanese were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor, which might indicate more than just keeping track, *because such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack in Hawaii*. As early as October 9, 1941, G-2 in Washington new of this Japanese espionage. *This message, analyzed critically, is really a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor*." In endeavoring to evaluate the intercepted dispatch of September 4 and related dispatches, it is to be borne in mind that the Japanese were insistent in their desire to secure information concerning the location and movements of American vessels everywhere and not merely at Pearl Harbor. There are no other dispatches before the committee, however, in which *Tokyo* manifested an interest concerning the disposition of ships *within* a harbor, as in the case of the "berthing plan," as distinguished from the desire to know whether a vessel was at a particular harbor. Viewing the September 24 instructions to her Honolulu consul in this light, it would appear that Tokyo vas manifesting an unusual interest in the presence of our Pacific fleet and the detailed location thereof in Pearl Harbor. The evidence reflects, however, that no one in Washington attached he significance to the "berthing plan" which it is now possible to read into it. To determine whether failure to appreciate the plan represents a lack of imagination and a dereliction of duty, we consider now the contentions of the officers who saw this intelligence before December 7, 1941, and the circumstances under which it was received in Washington. At the time the "berthing plan" was translated, the practice was being followed by Captain Kramer of preparing a gist of intercepted messages to expedite consideration of them by recipients. [133] Asterisks were employed along with the gist to provide an indication of the significance of messages-one asterisk meant "interesting messages"; two asterisks, "especially important or urgent messages." [134] The gist relating to the berthing plan read: [135] "Tokyo directs special reports In ships with(in) Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact location" and was indicated by one asterisk [132] Id., at p. 7989 [133] The practice of preparing gists is indicated to have been discontinued during the month of November 1941, for the reason that the President insisted on seeing the original messages "because he was afraid when they tried to condense them, someone would change the meaning." See testimony of Captain Safford, Hewitt Inquiry Record, p. 408, also Clarke Inquiry Exhibit No. 23. [134] Committee record pp. 11206, 11207. [135] Id., at pp. 11207, 11208. 184 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK as being an "interesting message". In explaining his estimate of the message, Captain Kramer testified: l36 "* * * Your interpretation, Senator, that this was a bombing map, I do not believe, from conversations I had at the time in showing and going over days' traffic with various recipients; I do not believe it was interpreted by any of those persons as being materially different than other messages concerning ship movements being reported by the Japanese diplomatic service. "I recollect that this was interpreted. I am uncertain of the precise wording of the interpretation. This was considered, and *I believe it was, approximately, my consideration at the time as being an attempt on the part of the Japanese diplomatic service to simplify communications.* "That view is substantiated by many factors. "One is that the Japanese were repeatedly and continually directing their diplomatic service to cut down traffic. They were repeatedly preparing and sending out abbreviations to be used with codes already in existence. Diplomatic codes were frequently asking for additional funds for quarterly allotments, and so forth to cover telegraphic expenses. Those expenses were usually paid and furnished in part when so requested by Tokyo. Those and other considerations I think explain, probably, the handling of this particular message, sir." Upon being asked what evaluation he placed on the harbor berthing plan and related intercepts, Admiral Wilkinson testified: [137] "The Japanese for many years had the reputation, and the facts bore out that reputation, of being meticulous seekers for every scrap of information, whether by photography or by written report or otherwise. "We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and I think three Japanese naval officers on the west coast making investigations of Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach, and San Diego. In the reports that we had gotten from them there had been indications of movements and locations of ships; in the papers that they had there were instructions for them to find out the movements and locations of ships except in Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that these fellows that were planted in America, these naval officers, were not to be responsible for movements in Hawaii and the Philippines because there were agencies finding that information there. "My general impression of adding all this reputation and this fact and these data together was that these dispatches were part of the general information system established by the Japanese. We knew also that certain information had been sought in Panama and again in Manila. I did not, I regret now, of course attribute to them the bombing target significance which now appears." And again: [138] "* * * the location of the ship, whether it was alongside of a dock or elsewhere, did give an inference of work going on aboard her which would be of value to the question of when she might be moved, what her state of readiness was and the inference that we drew from this was that they wanted to know everything they could not only about the movement of the ships and those that were present and, therefore, accounted for and not a threat to them in some other waters, but also with reference to those that were present where they were located with reference to state of repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in Pearl Harbor might be in repair and not ready to go to sea, whereas those at anchor in the stream would be ready, or would be so on short notice. Those at doublebanked piers might not be, particularly the inside one might take some time to go out." Admiral Wilkinson thought he had mentioned to one or more officers that the Japanese seemed curious as to the lay-port in Pearl Harbor and testified "at the time I thought that that was an evidence of their nicety of intelligence." [139] On the other hand, Admiral Stark, who stated he had no recollection of having seen the berthing plan and accompanying messages prior to the attack, testified: [140] [136] Id., at p. 1160. [137] Id., at pp. 4620, 4621. [138] Id., at pp. 4622, 4623. [139] Id., at p. 4624. [140] Id., at pp. 5788, 5789. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 185 "These messages are of a class of message which gives positions of ships in harbor, gives locations. The message, however, is distinctly different from the usual type of ship report, which simply would say, "So many ships" or give their names, in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch is different in that it calls for the location of ship in the harbor in her particular berth. "I recall no such request from Tokyo to the field; that is, to the Japanese people, to report like that except for Pearl Harbor. There might have been. We did not see it. I believe there are one or two places were ships were reported like in Puget Sound, in a certain berth or a dock, alongside of a dock, but this dispatch while of a class is of a character which is different. "In the light of hindsight it stands out very clearly, with what we can read into now, as indicating the possibility or at least the ground work for a Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. That significance which we now have in the light of hindsight was not pointed out to me by anyone, nor do I have the slightest recollection of anybody ever having given that significance at the time." Asked if he felt significance should have been attached to the plan at the time it was received, Admiral Stark said: [141] "It is very difficult to separate hindsight from foresight. I can only say that it went through our people, it went through the Army, who were likewise vitality interested in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I do not recollect anyone having pointed it out. There was literally a mass of material coming in. We knew the Japanese appetite was almost insatiable for detail in all respects. The dispatch might have been put down as just another example of their great attention to detail. "If I had seen it myself I do not know what I would have done. I might have said, "Well, my goodness, look at this detail," or I might have read into it because it is different, I might have said, "Well, this is unusual. I wonder why they want it?" I might have gone on, and diagnosed it or I might not. I simply did not know. We read it now in the light of what has happened." Captain McCollum, [142] who was not in Washington at the time the harbor berthing plan was intercepted or translated, suggested certain reasons why the plan would not have been interpreted as a "bombing plot." [143] He observed that beginning in 1935 the Japanese Navy was apparently not satisfied with the type of intelligence forwarded by the consular agents and in consequence undertook to set up an observation net of its own, particularly on the west coast of the United States, but that it was his feeling the Japanese had been unable to put naval observers into the consulate at Honolulu. Therefore. As he testified: [144] "As we estimated it, the consul general at Honolulu was receiving, through the Foreign Office at the instance of the Japanese Naval Department, explicit directions of the type of intelligence that was needed, much more in detail than any of the other key consulates on the west coast, because he did not have the benefit of the services of a Japanese Naval Intelligence officer within his consulate. "Therefore this thing here, if I saw it, I am quite certain I would have felt it was just another move to get explicit information, to cut down the frequently voluble type of reports made by consular officials which the Jap Navy did not like." Captain McCollum further pointed out that the matter of how ships were anchored and where they were anchored was designed to indicate the facility with which the fleet was prepared to *sortie*, considering that the anchorage at Pearl Harbor is "chopped up" into a number of more or less independent locks. He testified: [145] "To give a general statement of where the ships were, the stuff they are requiring here, would require a rather long-winded dispatch, where the same device such as breaking it up into areas A, B, and C, such a simple device could be used. With [141 Id., at pp. 5790, 6791. [142] Capt. Arthur N. McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence. [143] Captain McCollum left Washington on September 24 and did not return until October 11. Committee record, p. 9195. [144] Committee record, pp. 9140, 9141. [145] Id., at pp. 9178, 9179. 186 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK this area discovered, a rather simple and short dispatch would suffice to give the essential information as to the location of the fleet and also an indication of their readiness for sortie. I would suggest that that is a reasonable, tenable hypothesis as to why they wished information, apparently, in this detail." In summary, Captain McCollum stated he would not now necessarily regard the harbor berthing plan as a "bombing plan" unless "I had known Pearl Harbor had been bombed." [140] It appears clear that there were many other messages between Tokyo and her consulates, received in Washington, indicating a likely Japanese purpose to attack at points other than at Hawaii. [147] These messages indicate a definite interest in the state of defenses at many points. A dispatch from Tokyo on October 16 to its Seattle consul instructed "Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes report it at once." [148] In the same message the Consulate was instructed to report on the movement and basing of warships at least once every 10 days, "As long as there is no great change," but a report was to be submitted "Should more than 10 vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time." A June 23, 1941 dispatch from Tokyo to Mexico instructed: [149] "Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have career attache Kihara make an official trip to Panama * * *. Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the naval attache, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns." While no instructions from Tokyo to Panama are available subsequent to August 2, 1941, the reports to Tokyo contain detailed information concerning the location of airfields, air strength, ammunition, location and camouflage of petroleum supply tanks, location and strength of artillery patrols, radar detectors and their range, map procurement and other matters which would obviously be of interest only if an attack on the Panama Canal were contemplated. [150] While some of these messages were translated after December 7, they have a distinct bearing on whether, before the event, the harbor berthing plan was reasonably designed to be a harbinger of the December 7 attack. [151] With respect to other messages concerning defenses, Tokyo on August 1 requested Manila to obtain information "regarding the camouflage and distinguishing marks of the American naval and military aeroplanes in Manila". [152] On October 4 Tokyo instructed Manila "to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west, and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc." [153] Tokyo instructed Manila on November 5, pursuant to a request of the "Naval General Staff", to obtain information with respect to each port of call concerning "(1) conditions at airports on land", "(2) types of planes at each, and number of planes", "(3) warships; also machinery belonging to land forces", and "(4) state or progress being made on all equipment and establishments." [154] On November 15 Tokyo requested Manila to "make investigations again" as to the number of large bombers in [146] Id., at p. 9141. [147] See committee exhibit No. 2. [148] Id., at p. 111. [149] Id., at p. 122. [150] Id., at pp. 31-52 [151] General Marshall stated he was always in fear of a surprise attack on United States territory but the probabilities pointed to the Panama Canal and to the Philippines before Hawaii. Navy Court of inquiry record, p. 863. [152] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 54. [153] Id., at p. 72. [154] Id., at p. 82, PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 187 the Philippines. [155] Some 50 messages between Manila and Tokyo during the period August 1 to December 1, 1941, contained detailed information concerning airfields, air strength and activity, strength and activity of land forces, location of antiaircraft guns, and other items of defense. [156] Seattle advised Tokyo on September 20 that a warship under repair at Bremerton, Wash. Had "the upper part of the bridge and left side of the bow spotted here and there with red paint". [157] A message of September 6 from Tokyo to Singapore and Batavia requested detailed information concerning various types of fishing vessels should Japan "require the use of these fishing vessels". [158] On October 22 a message from Tokyo to Singapore reflected a specific request, on behalf of the vice chief of the Japanese General Staff, for information concerning the air forces stationed in the Federated Malay States. [159] Another dispatch from Tokyo to Batavia on the same day stated that the Assistant Chief of Staff desired an inspection and report "on the air force in the Dutch Indies" in regard to training, information, and aerial combat methods; organization, types, number, and location of planes; and types and number of planes being sent from England and the United States. [160] The exhibits are replete with evidence of the interest of Tokyo not only in the state of defenses but in ships as well, at many different points. For example, an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to San Francisco of November 29 read: [161] "Make full report beginning December 1 on the following: Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed (or at which it arrived), and port of destination (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea." Nor was the Honolulu consul the only one reporting the exact location of ships in harbor. Manila advised Tokyo on November 12 that on the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port-"She is tied up at dock No. 7 * *