Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159
Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159
Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163
Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167
"ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168
Avoidance of war ................................................ 172
Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179
The "Magic" .................................................. 179
Policy with respect to dissemination of magic ................ 180
"Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181
Nature of consular espionage ................................. 181
Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports ........ 189
The "Winds code" ................................................ 191
"Hidden word" code .............................................. 192
The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193
Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after
November 28, 1941 ............................................. 195
Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of
November 27 ................................................... 198
Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201
The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204
Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205
The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206
VII C O N T E N T S
Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington-Continued Page
Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209
The "Pilot message" ........................................... 210
The fourteen part memorandum .................................. 211
First thirteen parts ........................................ 211
Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper .... 212
Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages
apart from messages proper ................................ 219
The fourteenth part ....................................... 221
"One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222
Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch ...... 224
Choice of facilities ......................................... 225
Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction
messages ................................................... 226
Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228
Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses ..................... 228
Considerations responsible for delays in translations ......... 230
Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in
Washington which was not supplied Hawaii ...................... 232
Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234
Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237
Duties in Hawaii ............................................. 237
Duties in Washington ......................................... 238
Unity of command ................................................ 240
General observations ............................................ 245
The "Wyman Matter" ........................................... 245
The Philippine Attack ........................................ 246
Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack ........... 246
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 159
PART IV. RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON
BASING THE PACIFIC FLEET AT HAWAII
Beginning in May of 1940 the entire American Pacific Fleet operated in
the Hawaiian theater with Pearl Harbor as its base. [1] Prior to that
time the fleet had been based on the west coast with certain contingents
operating from time to time in the Hawaiian area. Admiral James O.
Richardson, who was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in 1940,
stated that while the fleet was in Hawaii incident to exercises during
the summer of 1940 he received instructions to announce to the press
that "at his request" the fleet would continue at Hawaii for the purpose
of carrying out further exercises. [2] It was his understanding that the
decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was with a view to
its providing a restraining influence on Japan. [3] At the time of
original contemplation it appears that the fleet was to remain at Hawaii
on a relatively temporary basis. [4] Admiral Richardson did not concur
in the decision to station the fleet there and so informed the Chief of
Naval Operations. [5] He testified with respect to his objections as
follows: [6]
"My objections for remaining there were, primarily, that you only had
one port, secure port, and very crowded, no recreation facilities for
the men, a long distance from Pearl Harbor to the city of Honolulu,
inadequate transportation inadequate airfields.
"A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from the carrier
deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway at substantial
speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever carriers are
training their squadrons there must be flying fields available, so that
while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair, or upkeep, the
planes may conduct training, flying from the flying fields
"There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the fleet;
to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time.
"Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are perfectly
willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when there is a job
to be done and they can see the reason for their being there, but to
keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal peacetimes, away
from the coast and away from their families, away from recreation,
rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of morale that is
essential to successful training.
"For those reasons, and because I believed that the fleet could be
better prepared for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted to
return to the west coast."
As a result of a visit to Washington in July of 1940, Admiral Richardson
stated he gained three distinct impressions: [7]
"*First*. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to
support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese
aggressive action;
"*Second*. That there was no intention of embarking on actual
hostilities against Japan;
"*Third*. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated
training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum
condition of
[1] See committee exhibit No. 9 for file of correspondence between
Admirals Stark and Richardson concerning, among other things, the matter
of basing the fleet at Hawaii. For a description of the base at Pearl
Harbor see appendix F to this report.
[2] Committee record, p. 669.
[3] See committee record, p. 682, also Navy Court of Inquiry, pp. 1057,
1058.
[4] Committee record, p 668.
[5] See committee exhibit No. 9.
[6] Committee record, pp. 674, 675.
[7] See memorandum dated October 22 1940 from Admiral Richardson to the
Chief of Naval Operations. Committee exhibit No.
160 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the
Hawaii area."
In a memorandum for the Secretary of Navy dated September 12, 1940,
Admiral Richardson pointed out several disadvantages from a Navy point
of view of retaining the fleet in the Hawaiian area and stated: [8]
"If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision
as to where the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors
should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the
probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other
words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic
representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area,
than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by
basing the major part of it on normal Pacific coast bases?"
During October of 1940 while in Washington he talked with President
Roosevelt at which time the President informed him that the Pacific
Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a
restraining influence on the actions of Japan. Admiral Richardson
testified: [9]
"I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might
influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military
government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for
war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not
undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the Fleet in
Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action. I
further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we
meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the
Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully
supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then
stripped for war operations."
He stated that the President's comment to the foregoing was in effect,
"Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the
Hawaiian area, has had, and is now having a restraining influence on the
actions of Japan." [10]
Admiral Richardson testified that he replied that he still did not
believe this to be the case and that he knew the Pacific Fleet was
disadvantageously disposed to prepare for or to initiate war operations,
whereupon the President said: [11] "I can be convinced of the
desirability of returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be
given a good statement which will convince the American people and the
Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the west coast
we are not stepping backward."
It is clear from consideration of the evidence that Admiral Richardson's
position was based on the feeling that the fleet could be better
prepared for war if based on the west coast and not because he feared
for the security of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. [12] In a letter to
Admiral Stark on November 28 concerning the matter of the security of
the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area he said : [13] "*This feature of
the problem
[8] Committee exhibit No. 9.
[9] Committee record pp. 682, 683.
[10] Committee record, p. 683.
[11] See, however, in this connection the testimony of Mr. Sumner
Welles, committee record, pp. 1124,1125.
[12] Committee exhibit No. 9. This comment was made by Admiral
Richardson pursuant to a letter from Admiral Stark dated November 22,
1940, in which the latter had stated, among other things: "Since the
Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor,
already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with
possible activities on the part of the Japanese residents of Hawaii and
with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most
profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet
units based in that area. Without question the safety of the units is
paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a
responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of
Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are
giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is
to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should
be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective
measures."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 161
does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily
provided for.*" Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Richardson did not
raise any question concerning the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor as
a reason for bringing it back to the west coast. [14]
Referring to the decision to base the fleet at Hawaii Admiral Kimmel
stated: [15]
"When I assumed command, the decision to base the Fleet in the Hawaiian
area was an historical fact. The target and base facilities required to
train the Fleet for war were in the process of being moved from the West
Coast to Hawaii. The Fleet had been practically without gunnery practice
for nearly a year due to the previous uncertainty as to the location of
its base. Any further uncertainty would have delayed the availability of
the mobile facilities to maintain, repair and train the Fleet. The
resulting loss of time in starting intensive training would have been
disastrous. This was my view when I took command. My appointment was in
no wise contingent upon any acquiescence on my part in a decision
already made months before to keep the Fleet in Hawaiian waters."
Admiral Kimmel stated that during his visit to Washington in June of
1941, he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers to the
fleet at Pearl Harbor, including air attack, blocking of the harbor and
similar matters. He said that generally he felt the fleet should not
remain at Pearl Harbor but he made no protests and submitted no
recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or carriers.
[16]
Regardless of the position taken by the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet during 1940 with respect to basing the fleet at Pearl
Harbor, extensive measures were taken thereafter and long before the
outbreak of war to improve the fleet's security at Hawaii. [17] The
Secretary of State, as well as our Ambassador to Japan were satisfied
that the presence of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor did in fact prove
a deterrent to Japanese action as did the Chief of Naval Operations.
[18] Referring to the presence of our fleet at Hawaii, the Japanese
Foreign Minister in June of 1940 stated to Ambassador Grew that "the
continued stay of our fleet in those waters (Hawaiian) constitutes an
implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands
East Indies and the South Seas * * *." [19] As Secretary Hull stated,
[20] "The worst bandit * * * doesn't like for the most innocent citizen
to point an unloaded pistol or an unloaded gun at him at * *. They will
take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on the high seas,
whether fully equipped or not." The degree to which the presence of the
Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters influenced Japanese action necessarily
cannot be precisely determined but the fact is the Japanese did not
strike at the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay barrier for more
than a year and a half after it was contemplated she would make such a
move.
The wisdom and merit of the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii
cannot be divorced from the high Government policy of which that
decision was a part. As has elsewhere been observed, the traditional
interest of the United States in the Pacific and our determination
[14] committee record, p. 5687.
[15] committee record, pp. 6661, 6662.
[16] Navy court of inquiry record, p. 367.
[17] See section, infra, "Defensive Facilities Available in Hawaii."'
[18] See testimony of secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1203-1205,
1452, 1464, 1603, 1608; testimony of Mr. Grew, committee record, pp.
1570, 1738, 1919, 1969.
In a letter of April 3, 1941, to the commanders in chief, Pacific Fleet,
Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Stark expressed the feeling
that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a
stabilizing effect in the Far East. See committee exhibit No. 106.
[19] See "Foreign Relations," vol. II, p. 69.
[20] Committee record, p. 1603.
162 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to aid the valiant Chinese fighting under insuperable odds the
Juggernaut of Japanese aggression made imperative our taking every
reasonable step which would assist in deterring the insatiable Japanese
ambition for conquest and at the same time bolster flagging Chinese
morale. Basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor was but one of the steps
taken in this direction. [21]
The fact that it had been decided to make Hawaii the base of the fleet
did not require that all of the battleships and other substantial fleet
units should be *in* Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 after the
responsible commander had been warned of war and ordered to execute an
appropriate *defensive deployment*. [22] The very words defensive
deployment could have meant nothing if not that the fleet should be
moved and stationed in such manner as to afford maximum defensive
security not only to the fleet itself but to the Hawaiian Islands, the
west coast, and the Panama Canal as well. This order required the
deploying of vessels in the Hawaiian waters; which afforded the
commander in chief a vast scope of operations, and it was left to his
judgment and discretion as to what specific action was required
consistent with his responsibilities. It has certainly never been
suggested that because a particular harbor has been designated as the
base for a fleet its vessels are thereby restricted to that harbor,
particularly after an order has been issued for their employment.
It remains a debatable question as to whether the Pacific Fleet as
exposed to any greater danger by reason of the fact that it was based at
Hawaii. The 360 perimeter of the islands afforded unlimited avenues for
operations and the maximum channels for escape in the event of attack by
a hostile superior force. The west coast, on the other hand, afforded
only a 180 scope of operation with no avenues for escape from a
superior attacking force and left only the alternative of proceeding
into the teeth of such a force. Nor does it appear that the fleet was
exposed to any greater danger from the standpoint of espionage by reason
of its being at Hawaii. [23] The evidence before this Committee reflects
that Tokyo was receiving as much information, if not more information,
from its diplomatic establishments which operated outside the
restraining counterespionage efforts of our own Government, located in
Panama, on the west coast, and in Manila as from the Honolulu consulate.
[24] There is a strong possibility that Japan would have taken the
Hawaiian Islands by amphibious operations as she did in the case of so
many other outlying Pacific Islands had the fleet not been based at
Pearl Harbor. [25] Fur-
[21] See Part I, supra, "Diplomatic Background of the Pearl Harbor
Attack."
[22] In the course of counsel's examination, Admiral Turner was asked:
"During this time after around November 27 to December 7, in all your
discussions around the Navy with those in authority was any
consideration given to the question of whether the fleet should be moved
out of Pearl Harbor and sent to sea?"
Admiral TURNER. "No, there was not that I recall. I assumed that most or
all of it would be at sea."
Question. "Well, why did you assume that?"
Admiral TURNER. "Well, that was the place for them under Admiral
Kimmel's operating plan for their deployment." Committee record, pp.
5224, 5225.
The evidence reflects that the Office of Naval Operations in Washington
did not know the exact location of the various units of the Pacific
Fleet. See committee record, p. 13956.
[23] See section "The Role of Espionage in the Attack," Part III, this
report.
[24] In referring to Japanese espionage activity, Admiral Stark said:
"We had felt that *not only in Hawaii* but at practically all our given
posts the Japs knew everything we were doing." Committee record, p.
5707.
[25] In the course of his testimony before the committee, General Short
was asked whether he believed, assuming that the fleet had been
withdrawn to the west coast and conditions at Pearl Harbor were other
wise the same, the Japanese could have made a landing with the striking
air forces that they had and brought the planes down as they did. He
replied: "It would have been thoroughly possible. If they had sent as
large a force as they sent against the Philippines they could have made
the landing." Committee record pp. 8293, 8294.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 163
thermore, had the fleet been based on the west coast a raid on our west
coast cities and the Panama Canal could not have been entirely repulsed.
For it is agreed as a military proposition that even with the most
effective resistance to an enemy air attack some units will inevitably
get through the screen of defense and carry home the attack.
In this connection, the opinion has been expressed by several naval
witnesses that it was their belief Japan would attack our Pacific Fleet
*wherever it might be* at the very outset of hostilities with a view to
immobilizing it, temporarily at least, as a restraining and deterring
influence on Japanese sea-borne operations in Pacific Far Eastern
waters. [26] Under this view, which has the weight of logic and the
experience of December 7, the fact the fleet was based at Hawaii bore no
conclusive relationship to nor conditioned the Japanese decision to
attack our Pacific Fleet.
As has been indicated, the basing of the fleet at Hawaii is inseparable
from the global plan of operations in which the Pacific Fleet was to
perform only one phase. It was an integral part of our policy and action
in the Atlantic and can only be questioned save as one presumes to
challenge the policies of the United States Government from 1937 to 1941
and our determination to aid the impoverished free peoples of the world
striving in desperation to stem the overpowering tide of Axis aggression
and world conquest.
DEFENSIVE FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN HAWAII
There can be no question that Hawaii was regarded as the best equipped
of our outposts and possessed the greatest potential for its own
defense. [27] In this connection General Marshall testified: [28]
"I will say as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, we felt that was a vital
installation, but *we also felt that that was the only installation we
had anywhere that was reasonably well equipped. Therefore, we were not
worried about it. In our opinion, the commanders had been alerted. In
our opinion, there was nothing more we could give them at the time for
the purpose of defense. In our opinion, that was one place that had
enough within itself to put up a reasonable defense*.
"MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning to get something. His
position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of complete flux,
with the ships on the ocean en route out there and the planes half
delivered and half still to go.
"The Panama Canal was quite inadequate at that period, seriously
inadequate in planes and, of course, of vast importance to anything in
the Pacific.
"*The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for that
reason we had less concern about Hawaii because we had worked on it very
industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspondence about it,
and we felt reasonably secure at that one point*.
"Therefore we felt that it would be a great hazard for the Japanese to
attack it."
The correspondence between the Chief of Staff and General Short during
1941, [29] as well as that between the Chief of Naval Operations and
Admiral Kimmel, [30] manifest clearly the mutual desire to improve
[26] See section, supra, Part III, "The Role of Espionage in the
Attack."
[27] In the course of committee examination Admiral Turner was asked:
"Did you consider the fleet in Hawaii prepared for that attack at the
time it did come?"
Admiral TURNER. "Yes, sir, within the limits of the material
improvements program, I felt that the fleet was efficient and was ready
for war."
Question. "You felt confident that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl
Harbor was ready for war on December 7, 1941?"
Admiral TURNER. "Yes, sir, and further that the district was ready for
war within the limits of the material that we had been able to provide.
*We all had the utmost confidence in the command of the fleet and the
command ashore*." Committee record, pp. 5253, 5254.
[28] Committee record, pp. 13792, 13793.
[29] See committee exhibit No. 53.
[30] Id., No. 106.
164 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the utmost the defensive facilities available to the Hawaiian
commanders. But both General Marshall and Admiral Stark, in addition to
their interest in Hawaii, had the enormous task and responsibility of
allocating to many places, consistent with an ever-expanding global
conflict, the military and naval equipment that was produced during the
year 1941. [31] They had the obligation to spread the results of our
productive efforts in those quarters where the needs and exigencies
appeared in their best judgment to be most pressing. Our defensive
facilities on the mainland were in great need of improvement Panama and
the Philippines were in woeful need of additional equipment; the Nation
had committed itself to aiding the Chinese who had been fighting
Japanese aggression for 4 years with little more than sheer courage and
the will to exist as a nation; we were determined that supplies being
shipped under lend-lease should not be destroyed by German and Italian
raiders before they reached their destination necessitating thereby the
building up of our naval power in the Atlantic: we were determined to
aid Britain and Russia to the extent of our capacity for our own self-
protection before the overpowering might of the German war machine had
destroyed the last vestige of resistance on the continent of Europe and
we were left alone to stem the Axis thrust for world conquest-all of
these considerations were a part of the problem posed for the Chief of
Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations in making allocations of the
materiel at hand. It should be noted that most of the lend-lease
transfers effected prior to December 7, 1941, were in a category in
which, by the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, it was provided that
transfers to foreign governments could be made only after consultation
with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of
the Navy. The Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations personally
approved these transfers. [32]
The only justifiable allegation concerning the shortage of equipment at
Hawaii relating to the failure to detect the Japanese task force was the
fact that insufficient long-range patrol planes were available to
conduct a 360 distant search from Oahu. As has been seen, however,
adequate patrol planes were on hand to cover the vital and more
dangerous sectors. [33] Referring to the lack of long-range planes, it
is in order to determine the extent to which such planes were available
and conceivably might have been sent to Hawaii.
In the case of 210 B-17's and B-24's, Army heavy bombers adaptable for
distant reconnaissance, delivered between February 1 and November 30,
1941, none were shipped under lend-lease and a total
[31] In a letter of November 7,1941, Admiral Stark pointed out to
Admiral Kimmel the difficulties experienced through shortage of material
needs: "I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific
Fleet-particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any*
destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect
bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate
your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now
have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of
King's troubles but he is up against it for DDs for escort-and defense
against raiders." (Admiral King at the time was commander in chief of
the Atlantic Fleet.) Committee record, p. 5575.
[32] See letter from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office of
Foreign Liquidation Commissions, Department of State, concerning the
organization of Lend-Lease. Committee record, p. 14095 et seq.
[33] See Part III, supra.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 165
of 113 were sold for cash to foreign countries; 12 B-17's were shipped
to Hawaii and 35 to the Philippines. [34]
With respect to Navy planes, there were no lend-lease transfers of long-
range patrol bombers or scout bombers during the same period. Of a total
of 835 Navy planes of all types delivered during this period, February 1
to November 30, 582 were delivered to the Navy and 253 to foreign
countries (Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Norway)
under cash transactions. Of the 582 planes delivered to the Navy, 218
were sent to the Hawaiian area, 146 of the planes being assigned to
carriers. [35]
It appears that of 3,128 Army and Navy planes of various types delivered
between February 1 and November 30, 1941, only 177 were shipped under
lend-lease to foreign countries and none of these were capable of
performing distant reconnaissance. The record is clear, therefore, that
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations did not prejudice
our own defenses in approving excessive allocations to foreign
governments. A brief review of the improvement effected in the Hawaiian
situation during the year 1941 will serve to demonstrate the manner in
which the exigencies and problems prevailing in the Pacific were
recognized.
The total number of Army planes in the Hawaiian Department was virtually
doubled between January 31 and December 7, 1941, having been increased
from 124 to 227 planes. The number of B-17 four-motored bombers was
increased from none on January 31 to 21 as of May 31, 1941, this number
subsequently being reduced to 12 by reason of the transfer of 9 B-17's
to the Philippines in September. As of September 1, 1941, the United
States possessed 109 13-17's
[34] See enclosure to War Department memorandum to committee counsel
dated March 20,1946, committee exhibit No. 172. In response to a request
of the general counsel of the Committee, the War Department on March 20,
1946, transmitted a tabulation supplied by the Army Air Forces
reflecting, among other things the total deliveries and types of
American-produced planes delivered between February 1 and November 30,
1941, without any break-down as to months. This tabulation reflects a
total of 579 planes delivered having a maximum range *without bombs* in
excess of 1,600 miles. In addition to this figure, the tabulation shows
836 planes delivered having ranges of 2,000 and 1,120 miles with no
break-down indicating how many planes were produced in a particular
range category. The tabulation of plane deliveries was not introduced as
an exhibit by the general counsel until May 23, 1946. General Marshall
appeared before the committee for the second time on April 9, 1946, but
he was asked no questions concerning the dispositions of these planes,
it being noted that General Marshall had earlier testified that Hawaii
had received priority consideration in the disposition of equipment.
Although the tabulation delivered by the War Department on March 20 was
available to the Committee counsel it was not available to the members
of the committee for consideration and examination at the time General
Marshall appeared on April 9.
The committee has thus been placed in the position of not having
inquired concerning the adaptability, design, and potentialities of
these planes with ranges exceeding 1,600 miles; of not having determined
where they may otherwise have been disposed and the exigencies requiring
such dispositions; of not having determined whether there were crews
available to man these planes, of not having determined whether ferrying
facilities were available had they been directed to Hawaii; of not
having determined exactly when the planes were delivered to determine
whether they could have been sent to Hawaii before December 7, 1941; and
of not having determined whether they would satisfy the distant
reconnaissance requirements in Hawaii, among other things.
In the latter connection, however, it is to be noted that General
Martin, commanding general of the Hawaiian Air Forces, under date of
August 20, 1941, recommended the War Department give consideration to
the allotment of "B-17D type airplanes or *other four-engine* bombers
with equal or better performance and operating range" for reconnaissance
purposes, committee exhibit No. 13. It would appear that in the making
of aircraft dispositions the indicated needs of the Hawaiian Department
would be a controlling consideration.
It appears from the evidence before the committee that only 210 of the
Army-type planes delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941,
were four-engine bombers of a type adaptable to the type of long
distance reconnaissance required by the plans and requirements of the
Hawaiian commanders. It is to be noted that a tabulation of factory
deliveries of bombers to foreign countries appearing on page 12991 of
the Committee record is superseded by Committee exhibit No. 172.
[35] See enclosure to Navy Department memorandum to committee counsel
dated April 12, 1946. Committee exhibit No. 172.
166 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
disposed: 21 in Hawaii, 7 in Panama, and 81 in the continental United
States. [36] The number of P-40 pursuit planes was increased from none
in January to 99 as of November 30; and the number of P-36's from 19 to
39. [37]
In the case of the Navy at Hawaii, during January of 1941 a squadron of
12 PBY-3's left the west coast for the Hawaiian area. In April a second
squadron equipped with 12 PBY-3's also moved to Hawaii. In October and
November of 1941, 3 squadrons of 12 planes each and 1 squadron of 6
planes, then in the Hawaiian area, returned to the west coast and
exchanged their PBY-3's for PBY-5's after which they returned to Hawaii.
During this same period the third squadron of Patrol Wing 1, equipped
with 12 new PBY-5's left the west coast for Hawaii. This represents an
over-all increase of 36 in the number of patrol planes between January 1
and November 30 1941. [38] During the period February 1 to November 30,
1941, 146 planes were assigned to carriers in the Pacific; and on May
13, 1941, 18 planes arrived at Ewa Field, Hawaii, being assigned to a
marine scout bomber squadron. [39]
The Committee did not inquire into the matter of allocations, generally,
of Army and Navy planes or other equipment to points other than to
Hawaii. There is no evidence before us that General Marshall and Admiral
Stark made dispositions of the materiel available [40] inconsistent with
their best judgment in the light of the situation as it could be viewed
in the days before Pearl Harbor. [41]
The question of whether Japan would have struck Hawaii had additional
equipment been available there must be considered in light of the fact
that in their estimates made in the fall of 1941, the Japanese placed
the number of aircraft in Hawaii at roughly twice that of the actual air
strength. Further, during the war games carried on at the Naval War
College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, it was assumed that the
Pearl Harbor striking force would suffer the loss of one-third of its
participating units. [41a] It was specifically assumed that one Akagi-
class carrier and one Soryu-class carrier would be lost.
It is clear that immediately after December 7 every effort was made to
increase the materiel facilities in Hawaii as much as possible,
[36] Memorandum from War Department dated December 13, 1945. See
committee record p. 14595.
A study contemplating 360 long-distance reconnaissance and attacks,
submitted by the commander of the Army Air Forces in Hawaii on August
20, 1941, and endorsed by the Army commander, called for 180 Army 4-
engine bombers, the B-17's. Committee exhibit No. 13. As of December 7,
there were only 148 B-17's in the entire Army; 35 of these were in the
Philippines, 12 at Hawaii, 8 in the Caribbean area, 6 at Atlantic bases,
and 87 in the continental United States. Committee record, pp. 2865,
2866.
[37] Army aircraft in Hawaiian Department as reflected by AAF monthly
inventories. See also committee exhibit No. 5.
[38] See enclosure to Navy memorandum for committee counsel dated April
12, 1946. Committee exhibit No. 172.
[39] Id.
[40] As expressed by Mr. Stimson "During those days in November 1941 we
at the War Department had been informed and believed that Hawaii had
been more generously equipped from the Nation's inadequate supplies of
men and ammunitions than either of the other three important Pacific
outposts, and we believed that with the fleet at hand there it was more
capable of defense." Statement of Mr. Stimson to the committee.
Committee record, p. 14,407.
[41] Admiral Stark testified that he gave to Admiral Kimmel all that he
could of what he had Committee record, pp. 5701-5704.
He said: "We were not able to give the commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
all the ships and men he wanted but neither were we able to put in the
Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet the strength we knew they wanted."
Committee record, p. 5575.
On November 25, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, in part; "We have
sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two-
ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into
two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this
reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing
the Navy." Committee record, p. 5578.
[41a] See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a
letter of the same date from Commander Walter Wilds, Office of the
Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Committee
record, p. 14626. See further, committee record, p. 457.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 167
necessarily at the expense of sacrificing the needs of other
installations. The evidence reflects, however, that it was a very
considerable period of time after the attack before the Nation's
production of war materials was sufficient to approach satisfaction of
all the Hawaiian requirements.
Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short had repeatedly requested more
equipment, and that their needs and requests were not ignored [42] is
made clear by the improved situation effected during 1941. [43] The same
requests made by the Hawaiian commanders were coming from many other
commanders and many other quarters. As virtually all witnesses have
testified, alert commanders are always striving to improve and increase
their equipment, facilities, and personnel; and it is doubtful if at any
time even during the war any commander ever had all he wanted or thought
he needed. [44]
It is necessarily speculative as to how additional equipment in Hawaii
might have altered the situation on December 7 inasmuch as the
facilities which were available were not brought into the fight. [45]
TRANSFER OF PACIFIC FLEET UNITS TO THE ATLANTIC
In May of 1941 three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers,
and nine destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred
to the Atlantic. This shift was contemplated by the Navy basic war plan,
WPL-46. [46] In a letter to Admiral Stark dated September 12, 1941,
Admiral Kimmel expressed concern regarding possible further transfers
from the Pacific to the Atlantic: [47]
"The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up
the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong
Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan-a weaker one may be
an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of
the status quo out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of
this Fleet. It must not be reduced and, in event of hostilities, must be
increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive. [48]"
[43] In an aide memoir concerning "Defense of Hawaii" submitted by the
War Department to the President in May of 1941, the following
observations were made:
"*The Island of Oahu*, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its
physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in
the world.
"To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force
capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of
approximately 35,000 men, manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211
antiaircraft weapons, and more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic
weapons available for beach defense. Without air superiority this is an
impossible task.
"*Air Defense*. With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts
and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of
approximately, 50 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until
when within 200 miles of the objective the enemy forces will be subject
to attack by all types of bombardment closely supported by our most
modern pursuit.
"Hawaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in
progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying
fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of
which 105 are of our most modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of
reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air. With this force
available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable.
"In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within
a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order
to assure strong control, it would be high]y desirable to set up a
military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our
involvement in the Far East." Committee exhibit No. 59.
[43] As pointed out by Admiral Stark, "During 1940 and 1941, many of the
shortcomings of Pearl Harbor as a base, disclosed by the long stay of
the Pacific Fleet, were remedied." Committee record, p. 5587. See in
this connection the Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, United
States Pacific Fleet, for the year ending June 30, 1941. Committee
record pp. 5587-5589.
[44] See testimony of Admiral Turner committee record, p. 5254,
concerning the insatiable desire of field commanders for materiel. He
said: "* * * you never have enough, you always want more and you want
things to be better."
[45] Admiral Turner testified he believed that the Pacific Fleet at
Hawaii was sufficient on December 7 1941, to have defeated or greatly
reduced the effect of the Japanese raid on Hawaii if it had been fully
alerted Committee record, pp. 5258, 5259.
[46] See statement of Admiral Stark, committee record, p. 5591.
[47] Committee exhibit No. 106. See testimony of Admiral Stark,
committee record, p. 5591.
[48] Admiral Kimmel commented in his prepared statement to the
committee: "When I was in Washington in June 1941, it was seriously
proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional
detachment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons
of destroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer
was not made." Committee record, p. 6680.
168 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Replying on September 23, Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet: [49]
"We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that
prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about
one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing
force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned
your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next
year."
The transfer of the Pacific Fleet units in May of 1941, it would appear,
had as its immediate objective the possibility of their engaging in an
expedition to take the Azores, [50] in order that these vital Portuguese
possessions might not fall into German hands. The occasion for taking
the Azores, however, did not materialize and, as stated by Admiral
Stark, "it just went on diplomatically there". [51] The fleet units,
formerly attached to the Pacific Fleet, were not returned to Pearl
Harbor but were employed further to augment the Atlantic Fleet,
particularly in the vicinity of Iceland.
The record reflects that the transfer of a portion of the Pacific Fleet
to the Atlantic in May of 1941 was in line with the basic war plans
which recognized the Atlantic as the principal theater of operations and
was designed to forestall the possibility of an indispensable strategic
area falling into German hands. The transfer was an inextricable part of
the over-all military policies prepared to meet the Axis threat. [52]
"ABCD" UNDERSTANDING?
A great deal of inquiry was made during the course of proceedings to
determine whether the government of the United States had entered into
an agreement with Great Britain and the Netherlands committing this
Nation to war upon Japan in the event British or Dutch possessions were
attacked by the Japanese. [52a] It is clear from evidence before the
committee that no agreement was entered into in this regard. The
President and his Cabinet, while momentarily expecting an attack by
Japan, recognized and observed the constitutional mandate that this
government could only be committed to war by a declaration of the
Congress.
Recognizing the inevitable Consequences of the Tripartite Pact,
representatives of the War and Navy Departments participated during 1941
in a series of staff conversations with military and naval experts
[49] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[50] In a letter to Admiral Kimmel of May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark
stated, among other things, "Day before yesterday afternoon the
President gave me an overall limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready
an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether
or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully
prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job
particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly
reinforced. The Army, of course, will be in on this but the Navy and the
Marines will bear the brunt." Committee record, pp. 5607, 5608.
[51] Committee record, pp. 13977, 13978.
In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: "How
would you attack and take the Azores without a declaration of war on
Portugal? She owned them."
He replied: "I can tell you one way. Suppose the Germans had taken
Portugal. Would we have to declare war on Portugal to take the Azores? I
don't think we would have. * * * I always construed that situation, with
regard to the Azores, as to have plans ready, and be ready if an
emergency arose there." Committee record. p. 13979.
[52] See Part I, pp. 10-13, supra, this report. It does not appear from
the evidence that additional Fleet units would have assisted in
detecting the approaching Japanese striking force, in view of the
dispositions made by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, or
otherwise have materially aided in the defense against an air attack. As
previously suggested, had the major Fleet units transferred to the
Atlantic in May of 1941 been in Pearl Harbor on December 7 they, too,
would in all probability have been destroyed. See in the latter
connection, Part II, pp. 69 72, this report.
[52] This inquiry appears to have been largely precipitated by a remark
attributed to Prime Minister Churchill during an address before the
House of Commons on January 27, 1942. He is quoted as having stated "On
the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference at which
I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United
States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far
East and thus make the final victory sure, seems to allay some of these
anxieties, and that expectations had not been falsified by the events."
See Committee record, p. 1286.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 169
of Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands. [53] The first of these
meetings, initiated by the Chief of Naval Operations [54] and limited to
American and British representatives, was held in Washington from
January 29 to March 27, 1941. The official report of the conversations,
referred to as "ABC-1," points out specifically that the discussions
were held with a view "to determine the best methods by which the armed
forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present
allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, *should the
United States be compelled to resort to war*." [56] The report states
clearly that the plans to accomplish this purpose, as embodied in the
report, were subject to confirmation by the highest military authorities
in the United States and Great Britain and by the governments of both
countries as well. [56] This was in accord with the joint statement of
the position the American representatives would take, made by the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff on January 27 at the outset
of the conversations. [57]
"ABC-1" was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary
of the Navy and by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, [58]
thereafter being submitted to the President on June 2, 1941. On June 7
the President returned "ABC-1" without formal approval; pointing out
that since the plan had not been finally approved by the British
Government, he would not approve it at that time but that in case of war
the report should be returned to him for approval. [59]
Shortly after the staff conversations in Washington military and naval
representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands
conferred in April of 1941 at Singapore in order to draft a plan for the
conduct of operations in the Far East based on "ABC-1." In the
instructions sent the commander in chief of our Asiatic Fleet [60] prior
to the Singapore conversations it was emphatically pointed out that the
results of such conversations were likewise subject to ratification by
the governments concerned and were to involve no political commitment by
the United States. [61] The report of the conversations, [62] referred
to as "ADB", explicitly recognized that no political commitments were
implied. [63] Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief
of Staff withheld their approval feeling that
[53] Admiral Stark said: "In our planning, we assumed that if the United
States was drawn into war, it would be alined with Great Britain and
against the Axis Powers. We also knew that while our most immediate
concern was with the war then in progress in the Atlantic and in Europe,
we might also be faced-perhaps concurrently-with a war in the Pacific.
With these thoughts in mind, we held extensive staff conversations with
the British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these
conversations was embodied in a document known as ABC-1, dated March 27,
1941." Committee record, p 5572.
[54] Admiral Stark was asked; "* * * it was in 1940, the fall of 1940
that you communicated with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound of the British Navy,
requesting that he send his naval experts to the United States to
discuss collaboration between the two navies?"
Admiral STARK: "That is correct, in case of war."
Question: "Upon whose responsibility was that message sent?"
Admiral STARK: "My own."
Question: "Did you discuss the subject with the President?"
Admiral STARK; "I sent that on my own, and I did not notify the
President until later I had done it."
[55] See committee exhibit No. 49 for a full report of the staff
conversations.
[56] Committee exhibit No. 49.
[57] Id.
[58] See committee record, p. 2617.
[59] Id., at pp. 2619, 2620.
[60] Id,, at p. 6320.
[61] Id., at p. 5123.
[62] For the report of the Singapore conversations, see committee
exhibit No. 50.
[63] In testifying concerning the Singapore conversations, Admiral
Turner said: "In none of these papers was there ever a political
commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of
action, or these were plans of action based on assumptions that should
the United States enter the war, then these papers would be effective,
provided they were approved by the proper authorities. "None of the ADB
papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of the Navy or the
Secretary of War or the President, although all of those officers as
well as the Secretary of State were aware that these conversations were
being held from time to time." Committee record. p. 5122.
170 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
some of the statements in the report had political implications. [64]
One of the proposals of the Singapore conference, however, was
subsequently incorporated *as a recommendation* in the joint memoranda
of November 5 and 27 which the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
Operations submitted to the President; i. e., that military
counteraction should be undertaken in the event Japan attacked or
directly. threatened the territory or mandated territory of the United
States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or if
the Japanese moved forces into Thailand west of 100 east or south of
10 north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. [65]
As elsewhere pointed out, it was mutually understood at the Atlantic
Conference in August of 1941 by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill that the Governments of both the United States and Great
Britain needed more time to prepare for resistance against possible
Japanese attack in the Far East. [66] It was agreed, however, that steps
should be taken to make clear to Japan that further aggressive action by
her against neighboring countries would result in each country being
compelled to take all necessary measures to safeguard the legitimate
rights of its country and nationals and to insure its country's safety
and security. [67] Accordingly, upon returning to Washington the
President on August 17, 1941 informed the Japanese Ambassador that if
the Japanese Government took any further steps in line with a program of
military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring
countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to
take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate
rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United
States. [68]
During the latter half of 1941 negotiations to meet the American
objections to the "ADB" report proceeded slowly until discussions were
opened in the Far East in November between Admiral Hart, commander in
chief of our Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Phillips, the British Far
Eastern naval commander. Soon after the out-break of war, the two
commanders completed arrangements for initial American and British naval
dispositions to meet probable Japanese action in the Far East. Admiral
Hart's report of his conversations with Admiral Phillips was received in
the Navy Department about 11 p. m., December 6, 1941, and was approved
in a dispatch sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations on December 7
after the attack on Pearl Harbor. [69]
On December 6, 1941, Admiral Hart cabled the Chief of Naval Operations
concerning a report received from Singapore that the United States had
"assured British armed support under three or four eventualities". [70]
None of the witnesses who were questioned on this
[64] See committee exhibit No. 65. Also testimony Of Admiral Turner,
committee record, pp. 5118, 6119.
[65] See section, infra, Avoidance of War.
[66] See Part I, this report.
[67] Id.
[68] Id.
[69] See testimony of Admiral Stark before the joint committee.
[70] Admiral Hart's dispatch was based on a communication which he had
received on December 6, l941, from Capt. John M, Creighton, who was a
naval attache in Singapore, as follows: "Brooke Popham received
Saturday from War Department London Quote We have now received assurance
of American armed support in cases as follows: Affirm we are obliged
execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take
action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Siam; Baker if Dutch
Indies are attacked and we go to their defense; Cast if Japs attack us
the British. Therefore without reference to London put plan in action if
first you have good info Jap expedition advancing with the apparent
intention of landing in Kra, second if the Nips violate any part of
Thailand Para if NEI are attacked put into operation plans agreed upon
between British and Dutch. Unquote." Committee record, pp. 13520,13521.
In the course of his testimony before the committee Captain Creighton
stated he had no knowledge of an agreement between the United States and
Great Britain or the Dutch and that the report transmitted to Admiral
Hart must have come to him second-hand. Committee record, pp. 13516-
13637.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 171
point, including Admiral Hart, [71] was aware of any evidence to
substantiate the report. In his testimony, the Chief of Naval Operations
suggested that the report may have been based on a misconception as to
the state of negotiations following the Singapore conference. [72] There
is no evidence to indicate that Japanese knowledge of the "ABC" and
"ADB" conversations was an inducing factor to Japan's decision to attack
the United States coincident with her thrust to the south. Indeed, the
idea of attacking us at Pearl Harbor was conceived before these
conversations were initiated. [73] Manifestly any estimate which the
Japanese made of American probable action was based on this country's
long-standing Far Eastern policy and the course of diplomatic
negotiations, and not on nonpolitical, technical discussions on a staff
level. [74]
It should be noted that on November 7 the President took an informal
vote of his Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American people
would support a strike against Japan in the event she should attack
England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The cabinet was
unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move. The
following significant statement appears in the diary of Secretary
Stimson for December 2:
"The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the
Emperor although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in
addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a
Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to
the country. [75]"
From all of the evidence, as earlier indicated, there is no basis for
the conclusion that an agreement had been effected committing he United
States to war against Japan in the event of an attack by her upon the
British or the Dutch. It is indisputable that the President and his
Cabinet contemplated presenting the problem to the Congress should our
position in the Far East become intolerable. [76] Further, the reports
of the 1941 staff conversations contain clear disclaimers of any
political commitments and the voluminous records relating to these
conversations will be searched in vain for any suggestion that an
agreement binding the United States to go to war was made. Additionally,
all the witnesses who were questioned on the point [77]-including the
ranking military and naval leaders of he country at the time-testified
that *in these meetings the constitutional prerogative of the Congress
to declare war was scrupulously re-
[71] Committee record, pp. 12785-12875.
[72] Id., at p. 6317.
[73] See Part II, this report re Japanese plans for the attack.
[74] Before the committee, General Marshall was asked: "Let us assume
first that they (the Japanese) knew that we were going to go to war if
they attacked Malaya or any portion of that land there. Let us assume on
the other hand that they knew we were not going to participate unless we
were directly attacked ourselves. To what extent would their decisions
as to action be affected by that knowledge?"
He replied: "Japanese Psychology being what it is and the Japanese Army
domination being what it was their general scheme for the assumption of
power throughout the Far East, particularly the Southwest Pacific being
known now, I don't think that would have had any particular effect one
way or the other." Committee record, p. 13786.
[75] See statement of Mr. Stimson. Committee record, p. 14427.
[76] Admiral Stark said: "Under our Constitution the Congress had to
declare war, and we could not take any independent action, so far as
hostilities were concerned." Committee record, p. 13875.
Again, " * * * as to our striking after declaration of war on our part,
if the situation became intolerable us, and our national safety, if the
Japs had not struck and we thought then that our safety was imperiled we
did not fight, I think it would have been done in a constitutional
manner." Committee record, pp. 13892-12893.
Further, " * * * I do again make the statement, and I want it clear on
the record, so far as my thoughts were concerned, that if Japan had not
attacked and if conditions had become intolerable to our national safety
because of what she was doing, and that would have been through the
Congress." Committee record, p. 13895.
[77] See testimony of Secretary Hull, Sumner Welles, General Marshall,
Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, General Gerow before
the committee.
172 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
spected. [78] The preliminary planning done at these conferences
manifested commendable foresight and indeed our military leaders would
have been inexcusably negligent had they not participated in these
conversations in the face of the clear pattern of conquest mapped out by
the Axis. [79] This planning saved precious time and lives once Japan
struck.
While no binding agreement existed, it would appear from the record that
the Japanese were inclined to the belief that the United States Britain
and the Netherlands would act in concert. An intercepted November 30
dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin stated in pertinent part: [80]
"* * * it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those
nations (England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China) and has decided
to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."
A message of December 3 which was intercepted from the Washington
Embassy to Tokyo related: [81]
"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action
between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a
declaration of war is a definite certainty, in the event of an
occupation of Thailand."
There is nothing, however, in the foregoing intelligence having any
relationship to the Hawaiian situation;-to have advised the commanders
there that the Japanese regarded an attack upon the British or Dutch as
tantamount to an attack upon the United States would have added nothing-
they had already been categorically warned that hostile action by Japan
against the United States itself was possible at any moment.
AVOIDANCE OF WAR
As has been seen in considering the diplomatic background of the Pearl
Harbor attack, every effort was made compatible with national honor to
forestall the inevitable conflict with Japan. The policy of the United
States *condemned aggression*; the policy of Japan was *predicated on
aggression*. It was only a question of time, therefore, before these two
irreconcilable principles would engender war. [82] Officials of our
Government were faced with the problem of effecting a delicate balance
between gaining time to improve our military preparedness on the one
hand and not forsaking our principles, national honor, and Allies on the
other.
[78] That the certain prerogative of the Congress to declare war was
recognized in discussions with other governments is revealed by the
following dispatch from Ambassador Winant to the State Department dated
November 30, 1941, transmitting a message from Prime Minister Churchill
to President Roosevelt:
"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war
between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret
or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by
Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. *I realize your
constitutional difficulties* but it would be tragic if Japan drifted
into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely
the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider
whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near you
should not *say that 'any further Japanese aggression would compel you
to place the gravest issues before Congress*' or words to that effect.
We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint
declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize
our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to
press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all
the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war." Committee
exhibit No. 24. See also testimony of General Marshall, committee
record, pp. 2785 2786.
[79] In the course of counsel's examination, General Gerow was asked: "*
* * has it been the practice of the War Plans Division from time
immemorial to make all sorts of plans about war operations on the
contingency that some day or other we might be involved in hostilities
with other nations?"
He replied: "Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept current plans for
operations against any major power or combination of major powers, sir *
* * at one time I think we had plans against almost everybody sir, and I
think that is the practice of every general staff of every nation."
Committee record pp. 2673, 2674.
As stated by Admiral Stark, "It is our business to draw up plans for any
contingency." Committee record, p, 13977.
[80] Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 205.
[81] Id., at p. 227. For a full treatment of the matter, however,
indicating that no agreement whatsoever existed for military action on
our part in the event of a Japanese invasion of Thailand, see committee
exhibit No. 169.
[82] See Part I, supra, this report.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 173
In summing up the salient features of the situation as they appeared o
him in November of 1941, Mr. Stimson said: [83]
"1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable.
"2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were then
desperately fighting Germany-England, Russia, or China-should be knocked
out of the war before the time came when we would be required to go in.
"3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare,
nevertheless we felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight
against Japan for the Philippines even if we had to enter the war at
that time, in view of the air power that we were building up in the
Philippines.
"4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view of
unified support of our own people as well as for the record of history,
that we should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot,
if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but Japan should
appear in her true role as the real aggressor."
It should be noted that in October of 1940 the President advised Admiral
Richardson that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula,
or the Dutch East Indies the United States would not enter the war-
"that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would
enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid
making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations
expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter
the war. [84]"
On October 30, 1941, a message was received from Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek indicating his belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming
(Yunnan), located on the Burma Road, was imminent, and that military
support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States
and British air units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. [85]
The Secretary of State requested the advice of the Chief of Staff and
the Chief of Naval Operations as to the attitude which this Government
should assume toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma
Road. In a joint memorandum for the President dated November 5 they set
forth the following conclusions and recommendations, after reviewing the
situation in China: [86]
"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in
the following conclusions:
"(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United
States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective
of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and
Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In
any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against
Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the
Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.
"(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while
building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan
attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United
States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should
be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:
"(1) *A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory
or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or
the Netherlands East Indies*;
"(2) *The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100
degrees East or south of 10 degrees North; or into Portuguese Timor, New
Caledonia, or the loyalty Islands*.
"(c) If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the strategic
lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be
primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening
Japan's economic position.
[83] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14385.
[84] Testimony of Admiral Richardson, committee record, pp. 683, 684.
[85] See committee exhibit No. 16A. Similar messages were received
through the American ambassador in Chungking, the Magruder Mission and
the United States naval attache. Exhibits Nos. 16, 16A.
[86] Committee exhibit No. 16.
174 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming,
into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia,
would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.
"(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be
extended to the Chinese Central Government.
"(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete
coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields,
should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British
Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.
"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.
"Specifically, they recommend:
"That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention
against Japan in China be disapproved.
"That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of
Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
"That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated
to the maximum practicable extent.
"That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."
The reply of the President to Chiang Kai-shek's message was handed to
the Chinese Ambassador on November 14 and followed the recommendations
of General Marshall and Admiral Stark. It pointed out that it did not
appear preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had
advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of
an attack and observed, among other things: [87]
" * * * Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the
world situation in its political, military, and economic aspects, we
feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this
moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our lend-
lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American
volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are
subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in
many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great
Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other
countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In
addition. Our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our
rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and
with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward
achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use.
Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard
to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented,
with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable
ways possible."
In a joint memorandum for the President, prepared under date of November
27, 1941, General Marshall and Admiral Stark pointed out that "if the
current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma
Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines;
the Russian Maritime Provinces." [88] They observed that:
"*The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to
gain time*. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed
to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached.
The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate
concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine
Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000
are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is
important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before
hostilities commence. *Precipitance of military action on our part
should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. The
longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention
of these islands as a naval and air base.
[87] Id.
[88] Committee exhibit No. 17.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 175
Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps
seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with
Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and
probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.
"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch
military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military
counteraction against Japan should be undertaken *only in case Japan
attacks or directly threatens the territory mandated territory of the
United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies,
or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees
East or south of 10 degrees North, Portuguese Timor, Nets Caledonia, or
the Loyalty Islands* [89]
"Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is
advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of
communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a
Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees
North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is
patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which
might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.
"It is recommended that:
"Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military
counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens
United States, British, or Dutch territory, as above outlined;
"In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the
United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance
beyond the lines indicated may lead to war, prior to such warning no
joint military opposition be undertaken;
"Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and
Dutch for the issuance of such warning. [90]"
It is to be noted that the foregoing memorandum was dated November 27,
1941, the day after the Secretary of State had delivered our
Government's reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20. The
evidence shows, however, that the memorandum was considered at an Army-
Navy Joint Board meeting on the morning of November 26, following the
meeting of the War Council on the preceding day at which Secretary Hull
had stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement
being achieved with Japan. [91] The memorandum of the Chief of Staff and
the Chief of Naval Operations conveys two cardinal thoughts governing
the approach of the military to the negotiations; i. e., *the most
essential thing was to gain time, and the precipitance of military
action should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. In
this connection General Marshall referred to the reaction of the Army
and Navy to the dropping of the thought of a modus vivendi in the
following terms: [92]
"My recollection is, and I have a fairly clear recollection of our
disappointment that from the military point of view, meaning Army and
Navy, that we would not gain any more time; our relationship to these
discussions was on the one side the desire to gain as much time as we
possibly could and on the other to see that commitments were not made
that endangered us from a military point of view."
[89] General Marshall testified that this paragraph referred to the
conference of military leaders held in Singapore in April of 1941. He
was asked: "When you say that the Dutch, British, and the United States
military authorities had *agreed* to that action did you mean that they
had made an agreement on behalf of the United States, or agreed to
recommend it to their governments?"
General Marshall replied: "*Agreed to recommend it*. They had no power
whatever to agree for our government and it was so stipulated * * *."
Committee record, pp. 2784, 2785.
[90] See note 78, supra, and note 111, infra.
[91] With reference to the Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President
dated November 27, 1941 (exhibit No. 17), Admiral Ingersoll recalled
that he "* * * presented at a Joint Board Meeting on apparently the day
before this memorandum was sent, I presented at that meeting the
arguments why we should not precipitate a war, and when I came back here
to Washington 4 years later, I had forgotten completely that I had ever
presented such a memorandum at the Joint Board Meeting. The only
satisfaction I had was that it didn't sound silly after 4 years. And
this was based on that." Committee record, p. 11366.
[92] Committee record, p. 13775.
176 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In pointing out the distinction between his approach and that of
Secretary Stimson, [93] General Marshall said: [94]
"He [Secretary Stimson] was very much afraid-he feared that we would
find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our
disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when
the Japanese actually broke peace.
"He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great deal
more than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, that
we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to
sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that.
"My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I
was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we
would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular
time.
"So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will
say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which
allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a
hopeless situation before the peace was broken, and mine, which as I
say, were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been,
that we should get as much time as we could in order to make good the
terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrangements."
It is apparent from the memorandum of November 27 that the Chief of
Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations desired more time insofar as
consistent with national policy and not at the expense of forsaking the
honor of the Nation. As General Marshall testified: [95]
"Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was struggling with the means
to fight. * * * *I wanted time, and the question was how much time could
be given to us and still maintain the honor of the United States and not
get ourselves in a hopeless position.*"
Further, the memorandum relates to the matter of precipitance of war by
the United States; that is, no affirmative steps should be taken by the
United States to bring about war with Japan-"precipitance of military
action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national
policy."
As observed in reviewing the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor
attack, the November 26 note of our Government to Japan was not a
precipitant of war-it was merely a laudable restatement of the
principles for which we had stood for many years in the Orient. There
can, therefore, be no question that the delivery to Japan of the
American note of November 26 was not in any way in contravention of the
expressed position of our own military. Furthermore, Tokyo advised her
emissaries in Washington on November 20 that a modus vivendi would not
be acceptable to Japan, [96] and in consequence had our Government
submitted a modus vivendi to the Japanese, no more time would have been
afforded the Army and Navy. General Marshall and Admiral Stark had
themselves recommended that we take military counter-action should Japan
attack the very territory which she was already poised to attack in the
event she failed to secure the demands contained in the Japanese
ultimatum of November 20*. [97]
Indeed, at the very time Japan's ambassadors were discussing a temporary
truce, her military was continuing its move to the South. Secretary
Stimson's diary for November 26, 1941, reflects the following comments,
among others: [98]
[93] In this diary for November 27, Mr. Stimson commented: "Knox and
Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow.
Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very
much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and
Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I
didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States
or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part."
Committee record p. 14422.
[94] Committee record, p. 13821.
[95] Id., at p. 13822.
[96] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 160.
[97] Id., No. 17.
[98] Committee record, p. 14420
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 177
". . . . I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him
whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night
about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down
towards Indo-China. He fairly blew up-jumped up into the air, so to
speak, and said he hadn't seen it and that that changed the whole
situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the
Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce-an entire
withdrawal (from China)-they should be sending this expedition down
there to Indo-China. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me
through G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got
another copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him
by special messenger."
It is to be noted that Mr. Stimson's diary for November 25, 1941,
describes a meeting at the White House attended by the President;
Secretaries Hull, Knox, and Stimson; General Marshall; and Admiral
Stark. It states, in part: [99] "There the President, instead of
bringing up the Victory Parade [100] brought up entirely the relations
with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be
attacked (as soon as) next Monday without warning, and the question was
what we should do. *The question was how we should maneuver them into
the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger
to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition*." [101]
In referring to Mr. Stimson's comment concerning maneuvering the
Japanese into the position of firing the first shot without too much
danger to ourselves, [102] General Marshall testified: [103]
"* * * they were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than
firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by
arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a
dangerous way, but also anything they did do, they would be forced to
take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for
the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a
military arrangement."
The Chief of Staff stated that Secretary Stimson was referring to what
the *diplomatic* procedure was to be; not the *military* procedure.
[104]
On November 28 Secretary Stimson called upon the President inasmuch as
Military Intelligence had supplied him a summary of the information in
regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East and "it amounted
to such a statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it
to the President before he got up." Referring to his conversation with
the President on this occasion, Mr. Stimson wrote in his diary: [105]
"He (the President) branched into an analysis of the situation himself
as he sat there on his bed, saying there were three alternatives and
only three that he could see before us. I told him I could see two. His
alternatives were-first,
[99] Id., at p. 14418.
[100] This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan
of national action in case of war in Europe.
[101] Mr. Stimson pointed out in this connection that our military and
naval advisers had warned us that we could not safely allow the Japanese
to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without
attempting to prevent it. Committee record, p. 14418.
[102] In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked:
"Now, I want to know why if you know, there was a distinction between
the Atlantic and the Pacific about the firing of the first shot."
He replied: "Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships in June. She
had attacked three destroyers in the Atlantic, sinking one of them-I
think it was in October or November, along in there, between September
and October. And certainly the 1st of December she had attacked and
wounded badly one tanker, the Salinas, I believe it was, which got back
to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the United States had voted
billions for material to go to Britain. We considered it our job to get
that material through not simply to use this money for material and let
it be sunk without taking any action on it. There were certain waters
defined, and limits established, which, I believe, we called our waters.
The President's speech shows it very plainly, in which he stated, if the
Germans came within that area they would do so at their peril. They came
in and attacked us. As a result, we got together what we called the
hemispheric defense plans, which I have outlined previously and which
provided for shooting at any German combatant ships which came within
that area, and we did do it * * * I think that that situation is not
comparable to what was going on in the Pacific, where the Japs had not
attacked our ships, unless you go back to the Panay incident." Committee
record, pp. 13981, 13982.
[103] Committee record, p. 13801.
[104] Id., at p. 13799.
[105] Id., at p. 14423.
178 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum
again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at
once. I told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think
anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said
of the other two my choice was the latter one."
Mr. Stimson set forth the following observations concerning the War
Council meeting on November 28: [106]
"It was the consensus that the present move (by the Japanese)-that there
was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops
aimed for a landing some where completely changed the situation when we
last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan
about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indochina. It
was now the opinion of every one that if this expedition was allowed to
get around the southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the
Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific
blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore the Netherlands,
and ourselves in the Philippines. *It was the consensus of everybody
that this must not be allowed*. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It
was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British
would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would
have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was
allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of
disastrous events would be set on foot of going.
"It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the
force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't
think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the
other, which we didn't think we could-that the only thing for us to do
was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a
certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The
President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from
himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at
the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem
to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President.
In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be
couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn
an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of
the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I
said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the
United States and I thought that the best form of a message would be an
address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have
to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea of a
message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his
letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not
publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send
his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and
then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more
understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the
final decision at that time and the President asked Hull, and Knox and
myself to try to draft such papers."
Mr. Stimson's diary for December 2, 1941, contains the following
comments concerning a meeting at the White House: [107]
"The President went step by step over the situation and I think has made
up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles
what they intend by this new occupation of southern Indo-China-just what
they are going to do-and has demanded a quick reply. The President is
still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although
all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that *he is
quite settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress and
will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he
was going to take the matters right up when he left us*."
On December 6 President Roosevelt dispatched his appeal to the Emperor;
and, after the bombs had already fallen on Hawaii, our Ambassador in
Tokyo was informed that it was desired the Japanese Memorandum of
December 7, which was keyed for delivery to the United States coincident
with the attack on Pearl Harbor, be regarded as the Emperor's reply to
the President. [108]
[106] Id., at pp. 14424, 14425.
[107] Id., at p. 14427.
[108] See Part I, supra, this report.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 179
It is clear from the evidence that the feeling of the President and his
advisers that the United States must fight if the British and Dutch ere
attacked was predicated on the necessities of our own security and not
occasioned by reason of any formal commitment or agreement requiring
such action on the part of the United States. [109] That our Government
was hoping to avoid war long after any real hope existed [110] made
manifest by the fact that the President contemplated sending warning to
Japan on "Tuesday afternoon or evening" (December 9) if no answer was
received from the Emperor by Monday (December 8.) [111] In referring to
the appeal to the Emperor, Mr. Hull said: [112]
"The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of
course knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping-
off place in Indochina which from our viewpoint meant that the danger of
attack could not have been more imminent. Nevertheless, *the President
believed that he should not neglect even the slim chance that an
additional last-minute appeal might save the situation. It also served
to make clear to the American people and to the world our interest in
maintaining peace up to the very last minute*."
INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON
THE "MAGIC"
With the exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness,
regarded by the committee as meriting the highest commendation, the War
and Navy Departments collaborated in breaking the Japanese diplomatic
codes. Through the exploitation of intercepted and decoded messages
between Japan and her diplomatic establishments, the so-called Magic, a
wealth of intelligence concerning the purposes of the Japanese was
available in Washington. [113]
Both the Army and Navy maintained several stations throughout the United
States and in the Pacific for the purpose of intercepting Japanese radio
communications. These stations operated under instructions mandating
from Washington and forwarded the intercepted traffic to Washington
without themselves endeavoring to decode or translate the material. The
only exception to this procedure was in the case of the Corregidor
station which had been provided with facilities for exploiting many of
the Japanese diplomatic messages in view of its advantageous location
from the standpoint of intercepting Tokyo traffic. [114]
Insofar as the commanding officers in Hawaii were concerned they
received none of the Magic save as it was supplied them by the War and
Navy Departments in the original, paraphrased, or captioned form or,
operationally, through instructions predicated on this source of
intelligence. While the highest military officials in Washington did not
know the precise nature of radio intelligence activities in Hawaii, it
is clear that those charged with handling the Magic did not
[109] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14418. Also
committee exhibits Nos. 16,17.
[110] Admiral Stark was asked: "Was not that our intention (of doing
anything possible to prevent war with the Japanese) right up to December
7, if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and
principles?"
He replied: "Yes, sir, and we had been working for months on that, and
the record is complete in that regard." Committee record, p. 13915.
[111] See committee record, pp. 13741, 13742.
[112] See Secretary Hull's replies to committee interrogatories.
Committee record, p. 14266.
[113] See committee exhibits Nos. I and 2. For a discussion of Magic and
its great significance to the prosecution of the war see letters dated
September 25 and 27, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey.
Committee record pp. 2979-2989.
[114] For a discussion of the mechanics of the Magic see testimony of
Admiral Noyes and Capts. L. F Safford and A. D. Kramer of the Navy, and
Cols. Otis K. Sadtler and Rufus Bratton of the Army; before the
committee.
180 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rely upon either the Army or Navy in Hawaii being able to decode the
diplomatic messages which were decoded in Washington. However both
Admirals Stark and Turner testified that they were under the impression
that Japanese diplomatic messages were being decode by the Navy in
Hawaii. [115] No justification for this impression existed in fact apart
from the failure of these officers to inform themselves adequately
concerning Navy establishments. [116] Under arrangements existing during
1941 between the Army and the Navy in Washington the decoding and
translating of Magic was divided between the Army Signal Intelligence
Service under the direction of the Chief Signal Officer and a unit in
the Navy, known as OP-20-G, under the control of the Director of Naval
Communications. The responsibility for decoding and translating messages
was allocated between the two services on the basis of the dates of the
messages with each service ordinarily handling all messages originated
on alternate days, the Army being responsible for even dates and the
Navy, for odd dates This procedure was flexible in that it was departed
from in order to expedite the handling of material as the occasion
demanded or in the case of any unusual situation that might prevail in
one or the other of the services.
POLICY WITH RESPECT TO DISSEMINATION OF MAGIC
The Magic intelligence was regarded as preeminently confidential and the
policy with respect to its restricted distribution was dictated by a
desire to safeguard the secret that the Japanese diplomatic codes were
being broken. [117] Delivery of the English texts of the intercepted
messages was limited, within the War Department, to the Secretary of
War, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the
Chief of the Military Intelligence Division; within the Navy, to the
Secretary of Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the War
Plans Division, and the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the State
Department; and to the President's naval aide for transmittal to the
President. By agreement between the Army and Navy in Washington, the
Army was responsible for distribution of Magic within the War Department
and to the State Department; the Navy, for distribution within the Navy
Department and to the White House. Any disclosure of the fact that the
Japanese messages were being decoded or any disclosure of information
obtainable only from that source would inevitably have resulted in
Japan's changing her codes with attendant loss completely of the vital
Magic. This fact was responsible for the translated material being
closely held among a
[115] See committee record, p. 5095.
[116] Admiral Stark testified: "I inquired on two or three occasions as
to whether or not Kimmel could read certain dispatches when they came up
and which we were interpreting and sending our own messages and I was
told that he could. *However, I want to make it plain that that did not
influence me in the slightest regarding what I sent*. I felt it my
responsibility to keep the commanders in the field and to see to it that
they were kept informed of the main trends and of information which
(would) be of high interest to them. Regardless of what dispatches I
might have seen, they may have formed background for me but I saw that
affirmative action was taken from the Chief of Naval Operations to the
commanders in the field on matters which I thought they should have."
Committee record, p. 5793
[117] During the course of his testimony, General Miles was asked: "Who
made the decision that these messages should not be sent to Hawaii as
they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is concerned?"
He replied: "That followed from the general policy laid down by the
Chief of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of
these messages or our ability to decode them should be confirmed to the
least possible number of persons; no distribution should be made outside
of Washington. * * *
"The value of that secret, the secret that we could and did decode
Japanese messages, in their best code, was of incalculable value to us,
both in the period when war threatened and most definitely during our
waging of that war. That was the basic reason for the limitation on the
distribution of those messages and of the constantly increasing closing
in, as I might express it, on any possible leaks in that secret."
Committee record, pp. 2092, 2093.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 181
few key individuals, in addition necessarily to those who processed the
messages.
The policy generally prevailed in the days before Pearl Harbor that the
Magic materials were not ordinarily to be disseminated to field
commanders. [118] This policy was prescribed for the reason that (1) the
Japanese might conceivably intercept the relayed Magic intelligence and
learn of our success in decrypting Japanese codes: [119] (2) the volume
of intercepted traffic was so great that its transmission, particularly
during the critical period of diplomatic negotiations, would have
overtaxed communication facilities; and (3) responsibility for
evaluation of this material which was largely diplomatic in nature was
properly in Washington, where the Magic could be considered along with
other pertinent diplomatic information obtained from the State
Department and other sources. There was no inflexible rule, however,
which precluded sending to theater commanders in proper instances,
either in its original form as paraphrased or in the form of estimates,
conclusions, or orders based wholly or in part upon Magic. Important
information derived therefrom was from time to time sent to the Hawaiian
commanders by the Navy Department in paraphrased form or in the form of
estimates. [120] The War Department, on the other and, did not send the
Magic to the field, for the reason that the Army code was not believed
to be as secure as that of the Navy. [121]
For purposes of the investigation Magic fell generally into two
categories: first, messages relating to diplomatic matters of the
Japanese Government; [122] and second, messages relating to espionage
activities by Japanese diplomatic representatives, particularly with
respect to American military installations and establishments. [123]
The decision not to endeavor to supply field commanders all of the Magic
intelligence as such was a reasonable one under the circumstances.
However, it is incumbent to determine whether responsible commanding
officers were otherwise supplied the equivalent of intelligence obtained
from the Magic materials.
"SHIPS IN HARBOR" REPORTS
NATURE OF CONSULAR ESPIONAGE
In addition to the Magic materials relating strictly to diplomatic
negotiations, a great many messages between Japan and her diplomatic
establishments were intercepted reflecting espionage activities by the
consular staffs. [124] These intercepts related in the main to
instructions sent by Tokyo and replies pursuant thereto concerning the
movement and location of American ships and the nature of military and
defensive installations.
[118] For a discussion concerning this matter, see letter dated April
22, 1941, from Capt. Arthur N. McCollum in Washington to Capt. Edwin T.
Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer. Committee record, pp. 12917-
12923.
[119] This factor applied principally to the Army. See testimony of
General Miles. Note 121, infra.
[120] See committee exhibit No. 37, pp. 4-12, 40, 41.
[121] In testifying concerning the matter of distributing Magic to field
commanders General Miles was asked; "Do I understand from your answer
that these messages intercepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii
by the Army?"
He replied: "They were not. In some cases the substance of some
messages were sent to Hawaii, and all most always in naval code, I think
always in naval code, because the naval code was considered to be more
secure than the Army code." Committee record, pp. 2091, 2092.
[122] Committee exhibit No. 1.
[123] Id., No. 2.
[124] Id.
182 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Hawaiian commanders have strongly insisted that messages to and from
the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu clearly indicated Japan's intention
to attack the fleet at Pearl Harbor. They contend they were wrongfully
deprived of this information, basing this contention to a great extent
on an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo of September 24, 1941 [125]
issuing the following instructions to its Honolulu Consulate: [126]
"Strictly secret.
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as possible:
"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five
subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you
like.)
"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there
are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.) [127]"
The foregoing message, No. 83, has been gratuitously characterized
throughout the proceedings as the "bomb plot message", the "harbor
berthing plan", and by similar terms. Three other intercepted messages
relate in a pertinent manner to the September 24 dispatch and to Tokyo's
interest in the fleet at Pearl Harbor:
(1) In a message from Tokyo to the Honolulu Consul, dated November 15,
1941 (translated December 3, 1941) it was stated: [128]
"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.
Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to
maintain secrecy."
(2) An intercept from Tokyo dated November 20, 1941 (translated December
4) read: [129]
"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet-bases in the neighborhood
of the Hawaiian military reservation."
(3) An intercept of November 29 (translated December 5) stated: [130]
"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in
future will you also report even when there are no movements?"
Referring to the indicated messages, Admiral Kimmel testified: [131]
"In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to
whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the
dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and
obtained about Pearl Harbor followed the general pattern of their
interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might
suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of
September 24, 1941, and those which followed there was a significant and
ominous change in the character of the information
[125] Translated October 9.
[126] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 12.
[127] Some of the subsequent reports from the Japanese Consulate in
Honolulu were made pursuant to the instructions contained in the
September 24 dispatch from Tokyo. See committee exhibit No. 2 pp. 13 and
14.
[128] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 13.
[129] Id., at p. 15.
Captain Kramer testified with respect to the blank, a garble, in this
message between the words "fleet" and "bases" that he believed the
original Japanese version in ungarbled form if it were available would
read: "Please investigate comprehensively the fleet air bases."
Committee record, pp. 1162-1163
[130] Committee exhibit No. 2, 15 p.
[131] Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK l83
which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then
directed was of an unusual character and outside the realm of reasonable
suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general
whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of
particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what
ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately
preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed by
Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in and out of
Pearl Harbor. *These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an
attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor*. The information sought
and obtained with such painstaking detail had no other conceivable
usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and
executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost
completely when the ships left their reported berthings in Pearl
Harbor."
In the same connection General Short testified: [132]
"While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me know
about the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track of our
naval ships, they should certainly have let me know that the Japanese
were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor,
which might indicate more than just keeping track, *because such details
would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack in
Hawaii*. As early as October 9, 1941, G-2 in Washington new of this
Japanese espionage. *This message, analyzed critically, is really a
bombing plan for Pearl Harbor*."
In endeavoring to evaluate the intercepted dispatch of September 4 and
related dispatches, it is to be borne in mind that the Japanese were
insistent in their desire to secure information concerning the location
and movements of American vessels everywhere and not merely at Pearl
Harbor. There are no other dispatches before the committee, however, in
which *Tokyo* manifested an interest concerning the disposition of ships
*within* a harbor, as in the case of the "berthing plan," as
distinguished from the desire to know whether a vessel was at a
particular harbor. Viewing the September 24 instructions to her Honolulu
consul in this light, it would appear that Tokyo vas manifesting an
unusual interest in the presence of our Pacific fleet and the detailed
location thereof in Pearl Harbor.
The evidence reflects, however, that no one in Washington attached he
significance to the "berthing plan" which it is now possible to read
into it. To determine whether failure to appreciate the plan represents
a lack of imagination and a dereliction of duty, we consider now the
contentions of the officers who saw this intelligence before December 7,
1941, and the circumstances under which it was received in Washington.
At the time the "berthing plan" was translated, the practice was being
followed by Captain Kramer of preparing a gist of intercepted messages
to expedite consideration of them by recipients. [133] Asterisks were
employed along with the gist to provide an indication of the
significance of messages-one asterisk meant "interesting messages"; two
asterisks, "especially important or urgent messages." [134] The gist
relating to the berthing plan read: [135] "Tokyo directs special reports
In ships with(in) Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the
purpose of showing exact location" and was indicated by one asterisk
[132] Id., at p. 7989
[133] The practice of preparing gists is indicated to have been
discontinued during the month of November 1941, for the reason that the
President insisted on seeing the original messages "because he was
afraid when they tried to condense them, someone would change the
meaning." See testimony of Captain Safford, Hewitt Inquiry Record, p.
408, also Clarke Inquiry Exhibit No. 23.
[134] Committee record pp. 11206, 11207.
[135] Id., at pp. 11207, 11208.
184 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
as being an "interesting message". In explaining his estimate of the
message, Captain Kramer testified: l36
"* * * Your interpretation, Senator, that this was a bombing map, I do
not believe, from conversations I had at the time in showing and going
over days' traffic with various recipients; I do not believe it was
interpreted by any of those persons as being materially different than
other messages concerning ship movements being reported by the Japanese
diplomatic service.
"I recollect that this was interpreted. I am uncertain of the precise
wording of the interpretation. This was considered, and *I believe it
was, approximately, my consideration at the time as being an attempt on
the part of the Japanese diplomatic service to simplify communications.*
"That view is substantiated by many factors.
"One is that the Japanese were repeatedly and continually directing
their diplomatic service to cut down traffic. They were repeatedly
preparing and sending out abbreviations to be used with codes already in
existence. Diplomatic codes were frequently asking for additional funds
for quarterly allotments, and so forth to cover telegraphic expenses.
Those expenses were usually paid and furnished in part when so requested
by Tokyo. Those and other considerations I think explain, probably, the
handling of this particular message, sir."
Upon being asked what evaluation he placed on the harbor berthing plan
and related intercepts, Admiral Wilkinson testified: [137]
"The Japanese for many years had the reputation, and the facts bore out
that reputation, of being meticulous seekers for every scrap of
information, whether by photography or by written report or otherwise.
"We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and I think three
Japanese naval officers on the west coast making investigations of
Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach, and San Diego. In the reports that we
had gotten from them there had been indications of movements and
locations of ships; in the papers that they had there were instructions
for them to find out the movements and locations of ships except in
Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that these fellows that
were planted in America, these naval officers, were not to be
responsible for movements in Hawaii and the Philippines because there
were agencies finding that information there.
"My general impression of adding all this reputation and this fact and
these data together was that these dispatches were part of the general
information system established by the Japanese. We knew also that
certain information had been sought in Panama and again in Manila. I did
not, I regret now, of course attribute to them the bombing target
significance which now appears."
And again: [138]
"* * * the location of the ship, whether it was alongside of a dock or
elsewhere, did give an inference of work going on aboard her which would
be of value to the question of when she might be moved, what her state
of readiness was and the inference that we drew from this was that they
wanted to know everything they could not only about the movement of the
ships and those that were present and, therefore, accounted for and not
a threat to them in some other waters, but also with reference to those
that were present where they were located with reference to state of
repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in Pearl Harbor
might be in repair and not ready to go to sea, whereas those at anchor
in the stream would be ready, or would be so on short notice. Those at
doublebanked piers might not be, particularly the inside one might take
some time to go out."
Admiral Wilkinson thought he had mentioned to one or more officers that
the Japanese seemed curious as to the lay-port in Pearl Harbor and
testified "at the time I thought that that was an evidence of their
nicety of intelligence." [139]
On the other hand, Admiral Stark, who stated he had no recollection of
having seen the berthing plan and accompanying messages prior to the
attack, testified: [140]
[136] Id., at p. 1160.
[137] Id., at pp. 4620, 4621.
[138] Id., at pp. 4622, 4623.
[139] Id., at p. 4624.
[140] Id., at pp. 5788, 5789.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 185
"These messages are of a class of message which gives positions of ships
in harbor, gives locations. The message, however, is distinctly
different from the usual type of ship report, which simply would say,
"So many ships" or give their names, in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch is
different in that it calls for the location of ship in the harbor in her
particular berth.
"I recall no such request from Tokyo to the field; that is, to the
Japanese people, to report like that except for Pearl Harbor. There
might have been. We did not see it. I believe there are one or two
places were ships were reported like in Puget Sound, in a certain berth
or a dock, alongside of a dock, but this dispatch while of a class is of
a character which is different.
"In the light of hindsight it stands out very clearly, with what we can
read into now, as indicating the possibility or at least the ground work
for a Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. That significance which we now have
in the light of hindsight was not pointed out to me by anyone, nor do I
have the slightest recollection of anybody ever having given that
significance at the time."
Asked if he felt significance should have been attached to the plan at
the time it was received, Admiral Stark said: [141]
"It is very difficult to separate hindsight from foresight. I can only
say that it went through our people, it went through the Army, who were
likewise vitality interested in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I do
not recollect anyone having pointed it out. There was literally a mass
of material coming in. We knew the Japanese appetite was almost
insatiable for detail in all respects. The dispatch might have been put
down as just another example of their great attention to detail.
"If I had seen it myself I do not know what I would have done. I might
have said, "Well, my goodness, look at this detail," or I might have
read into it because it is different, I might have said, "Well, this is
unusual. I wonder why they want it?" I might have gone on, and diagnosed
it or I might not. I simply did not know. We read it now in the light of
what has happened."
Captain McCollum, [142] who was not in Washington at the time the harbor
berthing plan was intercepted or translated, suggested certain reasons
why the plan would not have been interpreted as a "bombing plot." [143]
He observed that beginning in 1935 the Japanese Navy was apparently not
satisfied with the type of intelligence forwarded by the consular agents
and in consequence undertook to set up an observation net of its own,
particularly on the west coast of the United States, but that it was his
feeling the Japanese had been unable to put naval observers into the
consulate at Honolulu. Therefore. As he testified: [144]
"As we estimated it, the consul general at Honolulu was receiving,
through the Foreign Office at the instance of the Japanese Naval
Department, explicit directions of the type of intelligence that was
needed, much more in detail than any of the other key consulates on the
west coast, because he did not have the benefit of the services of a
Japanese Naval Intelligence officer within his consulate.
"Therefore this thing here, if I saw it, I am quite certain I would have
felt it was just another move to get explicit information, to cut down
the frequently voluble type of reports made by consular officials which
the Jap Navy did not like."
Captain McCollum further pointed out that the matter of how ships were
anchored and where they were anchored was designed to indicate the
facility with which the fleet was prepared to *sortie*, considering that
the anchorage at Pearl Harbor is "chopped up" into a number of more or
less independent locks. He testified: [145]
"To give a general statement of where the ships were, the stuff they are
requiring here, would require a rather long-winded dispatch, where the
same device such as breaking it up into areas A, B, and C, such a simple
device could be used. With
[141 Id., at pp. 5790, 6791.
[142] Capt. Arthur N. McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of
Naval Intelligence.
[143] Captain McCollum left Washington on September 24 and did not
return until October 11. Committee record, p. 9195.
[144] Committee record, pp. 9140, 9141.
[145] Id., at pp. 9178, 9179.
186 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
this area discovered, a rather simple and short dispatch would suffice
to give the essential information as to the location of the fleet and
also an indication of their readiness for sortie. I would suggest that
that is a reasonable, tenable hypothesis as to why they wished
information, apparently, in this detail."
In summary, Captain McCollum stated he would not now necessarily regard
the harbor berthing plan as a "bombing plan" unless "I had known Pearl
Harbor had been bombed." [140]
It appears clear that there were many other messages between Tokyo and
her consulates, received in Washington, indicating a likely Japanese
purpose to attack at points other than at Hawaii. [147]
These messages indicate a definite interest in the state of defenses at
many points. A dispatch from Tokyo on October 16 to its Seattle consul
instructed "Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes report it
at once." [148] In the same message the Consulate was instructed to
report on the movement and basing of warships at least once every 10
days, "As long as there is no great change," but a report was to be
submitted "Should more than 10 vessels of any type arrive or depart from
port at one time." A June 23, 1941 dispatch from Tokyo to Mexico
instructed: [149] "Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama
Canal and vicinity, please have career attache Kihara make an official
trip to Panama * * *. Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have
Sato, the naval attache, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns."
While no instructions from Tokyo to Panama are available subsequent to
August 2, 1941, the reports to Tokyo contain detailed information
concerning the location of airfields, air strength, ammunition, location
and camouflage of petroleum supply tanks, location and strength of
artillery patrols, radar detectors and their range, map procurement and
other matters which would obviously be of interest only if an attack on
the Panama Canal were contemplated. [150] While some of these messages
were translated after December 7, they have a distinct bearing on
whether, before the event, the harbor berthing plan was reasonably
designed to be a harbinger of the December 7 attack. [151]
With respect to other messages concerning defenses, Tokyo on August 1
requested Manila to obtain information "regarding the camouflage and
distinguishing marks of the American naval and military aeroplanes in
Manila". [152] On October 4 Tokyo instructed Manila "to make a
reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west, and
southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress,
strength, etc." [153] Tokyo instructed Manila on November 5, pursuant to
a request of the "Naval General Staff", to obtain information with
respect to each port of call concerning "(1) conditions at airports on
land", "(2) types of planes at each, and number of planes", "(3)
warships; also machinery belonging to land forces", and "(4) state or
progress being made on all equipment and establishments." [154] On
November 15 Tokyo requested Manila to "make investigations again" as to
the number of large bombers in
[146] Id., at p. 9141.
[147] See committee exhibit No. 2.
[148] Id., at p. 111.
[149] Id., at p. 122.
[150] Id., at pp. 31-52
[151] General Marshall stated he was always in fear of a surprise attack
on United States territory but the probabilities pointed to the Panama
Canal and to the Philippines before Hawaii. Navy Court of inquiry
record, p. 863.
[152] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 54.
[153] Id., at p. 72.
[154] Id., at p. 82,
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 187
the Philippines. [155] Some 50 messages between Manila and Tokyo during
the period August 1 to December 1, 1941, contained detailed information
concerning airfields, air strength and activity, strength and activity
of land forces, location of antiaircraft guns, and other items of
defense. [156]
Seattle advised Tokyo on September 20 that a warship under repair at
Bremerton, Wash. Had "the upper part of the bridge and left side of the
bow spotted here and there with red paint". [157] A message of September
6 from Tokyo to Singapore and Batavia requested detailed information
concerning various types of fishing vessels should Japan "require the
use of these fishing vessels". [158] On October 22 a message from Tokyo
to Singapore reflected a specific request, on behalf of the vice chief
of the Japanese General Staff, for information concerning the air forces
stationed in the Federated Malay States. [159] Another dispatch from
Tokyo to Batavia on the same day stated that the Assistant Chief of
Staff desired an inspection and report "on the air force in the Dutch
Indies" in regard to training, information, and aerial combat methods;
organization, types, number, and location of planes; and types and
number of planes being sent from England and the United States. [160]
The exhibits are replete with evidence of the interest of Tokyo not only
in the state of defenses but in ships as well, at many different points.
For example, an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to San Francisco of
November 29 read: [161] "Make full report beginning December 1 on the
following: Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed
(or at which it arrived), and port of destination (or from where it
started), date of departure, etc., in detail of all foreign commercial
and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea."
Nor was the Honolulu consul the only one reporting the exact location of
ships in harbor. Manila advised Tokyo on November 12 that on the morning
of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port-"She
is tied up at dock No. 7 * *