NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C.
The examination met at 9:07 a. m.
Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.
The examining officer introduced Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter.
The record of proceedings of the first day of the examination was read and approved.
The examining officer and the reporter were duly sworn.
The examining officer read a copy of a letter, dated 4 March 1944, from the examining officer to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, retired, interested party, informing him of the beginning of proceedings in the present examination of witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the precept, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 3 (1) and (2) ".
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: This examination is convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944, for the purpose of examining witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941. The precept states that certain members of the naval forces, who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matter, are now or soon may be on dangerous assignments and that it is now deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain members of the naval forces, that their testimony pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack be recorded and preserved. From available records, it is believed that you have knowledge pertinent of the aforementioned attack. The examining officer asks your statement of facts personally known to you covering certain points. In such statement you should, as far as you can, speak from your knowledge prior to the event and as the situation presented itself before the actual attack. In making such statement, your attention is invited to Sections 280 and 281 of Naval Courts and Boards, regarding the use of documents to refresh and supplement your recollection.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. Admiral, will you please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, on duty as a member of the General Board, Navy Department.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941, Sir?
A. I was Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Commandant of the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor, and Commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier.
3. Q. For how long had you been Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?
A. I reported on April 10, 1940.
4. Q. Who was your immediate superior in performing these duties, Sir?
A. By order of the Navy Department, I was a member of the forces afloat, Subordinate to Commander of the U. S. Fleet.
5. Q. Will you please explain the nature of your organization underthe Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet.
A. Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson as Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet in February, 1941, and almost immediately thereafter he issued a Base Defense Order known as "2CL". Its date was in February sometime. And in that order, the Commandant of the District, who was me, was Commander of the Base Defense Force object of that order, as I understand it, was to assure the security of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet insofar as the Commander-in-Chief and his forces could augment the forces of the Army, who really had the responsibility for the defense of all land areas, and Pearl Harbor particularly. This order was subsequently revised in October, 1941, by another order known as "2CL (Revised)", and in that order some changes were made in the original order. In the Fall of 1940, as Commandant of the District and having a very close liaison with the Army, I became convinced that the Army's means of defense, insofar as it related to aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, was insufficient, and I discussed this matter with the Commander-in-Chief, which was Admiral Richardson. I told him my views and he became alarmed and he asked me how many guns the Army had, anti-aircraft guns, how many fighter planes, and how many bombing planes. And I told him approximately how many I understood that they had and, as the result of that conversation, Admiral Richardson went to the Commanding General, General Herron, and asked General Herron to go around with him and interview, first-hand, the officers and find out what guns, what planes, and what forces the Army had there. At the conclusion of this tour around the Army posts, Admiral Richardson gave me a memo informing me of a number of anti-aircraft guns, the number of planes, marks and models, that were in existence at Oahu and discussed the matter again with me. As the result of this information and my conversation with Admiral Richardson, I wrote a letter to the Navy Department setting forth the numbers and that I considered the defense inadequate and presented the entire matter to the Department. This letter was taken by Admiral Richardson and he put a strong endorsement on it and sent it to the Navy Department.
Note The letter mentioned by the witness was later introduced as Exhibit 23 of his testimony when he was recalled at a later date. Record page 87.
A. (Continued) That correspondence was the basis of a letter written by the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War, under date of 24 January 1941 in which the Secretary of Navy presented this condition to the War Department and expressed his anxiety about the security of Pearl Harbor, and asked  that some action be taken immediately.
Note: The letter mentioned by the witness has been identified by the examining officer as being a letter from the Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War dated January 24 1941 file No. Op-12B-9-McC, (SC) A7-2(2)FF1 Serial 09112, and copy of which is now on file in the Secret-Confidential File room with the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington D. C. The answer of the Secretary of war to this letter has been identified by the examining officer as being letter of February 7, 1941 subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii", the original of which is on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room with the Chief of Naval Operations Navy Department Washington D. C. (Subsequently both letters were introduced in evidence as "Exhibit 40", Record Page 407.)
A. (Continued) Before we received any information from the Navy Department about what was happening about this letter, Admiral Kimmel superseded to the duties of Commander-in-Chief and he was even more concerned--or equally concerned, I'll say, not more concerned, with the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor from an air attack. And when I refer to "air attack", I don't mean an air attack necessarily which would initiate a war but I mean any air attack which might develop in the course of a war. So he went over certain information that had been left by Admiral Richardson and decided that as long as the ships in the harbor had certain anti-aircraft batteries themselves, they should be used to the fullest extent in increasing the volume of fire and protection that the Fleet would have in the harbor, over what could be furnished by the Army itself. Furthermore, he decided that inasmuch as the Navy also had a lot of planes on shore--usually had a lot of planes on shore, a great many of them carrier planes that had been sent ashore while the carriers were alongside, they should also be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned to me Admiral Halsey from his command and Admiral Bellinger from his command to talk over with the Army how we could coordinate the action of the planes. They reported to me before they had their meeting with the Army authorities, and, I suggested to them that all the fighting planes that we had on shore, at any time that an attack might be made, would be placed under the Army's command for fighter purposes, to be run by the Army in such way as they saw fit; that all bombers that the Army had which were capable of going to sea would be likewise turned over to the Navy command for fighting off ships and carriers. That agreement was reached and signed. Then we had in the security order the use of the ships' batteries for anti-aircraft purposes, all Navy planes, fighting planes, to be consolidated for use in attacks under the Army, and all Army bombing planes capable of flying over the seas to be consolidated with Navy bombers under Admiral Bellinger. Concerning the order itself, insofar as it related to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was a task force under this order; it specifically assigned to him the duty of operating the gates, sweeping mines, and using local defense forces a certain ways for patrol of the harbor, and also, in one paragraph, more or less summarized the duties of the task force commander.
6. Q. Admiral, I show you a document. Can you identify it, sir?
A. This is "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2CL-1941 (Revised)" and it is the order of which I spoke in my testimony.
The letter was thereupon filed in evidence and is appended marked "Exhibit 4 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6)".
7. Q. Where was Admiral Kimmel on the morning of December 7, Admiral?
A. Admiral Kimmel's Fleet Headquarters were on the second floor of the Submarine Base, which is immediately adjacent to the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor. I have no first-hand information where he was at the time of the attack but I believe he was in his residence, which was about a half mile away from the Submarine Base.
8. Q. Had he been physically present in Oahu during several days before the attack?
9. Q. Where were your headquarters, Sir?
A. My headquarters were in the office building which is located in the heart of the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor.
10. Q. In carrying out the functions you have outlined as a Task Force Commander, you have referred to an agreement had with the Army. Could you further identify that, Sir, does it have a name?
A. I don't believe that I know the title of it. The agreement was a local agreement between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Short, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. After the agreement was made, it was submitted by me to the Commander-in-Chief for his approval and he did approve it. I do not believe that it was sent to the Navy Department in the first instance, but I have a definite recollection that at a later date Admiral Stark asked for a copy of it because someone had told him about it and he said that so far as he knew it was the first agreement of its kind between the Army and Navy and he wanted a copy here to see if he couldn't get similar agreements in other districts, and I believe a copy was sent to him.
11. Q. Admiral, I show you a document. Can you identify it, Sir?
A. This is a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department, Fourteenth Naval District, short title "JCD", I think we called it, "'42". It was signed on April 11 by the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
12. Q. Is that the document to which you have just referred, the agreement to which you have just referred?
A. No, this is not the one. This is not the one that I just referred to.
13. Q. The agreement to which you referred and this document, both relate to agreements between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Can you give the relationship between the two?
A. This later document, which I now have before me, JCD, Hawaiian Department, '42, is a part of the War Plans known as "Rainbow 1", and it was a requirement that all commandants submit such a plan of their joint action. The other agreement which I refer to was supplemental to this and was made in order to clarify a situation with regard to command relations between the  air forces of the Army and the Navy Air; and I'm sorry that I can't remember the exact date of it, nor have I been able to find a copy in
the Department since I have been here, though I looked once. It must
14. Q. Was this document now before you the plan under which you were operating on 7 December 1941?
A. That was the plan, the joint agreement, for the Hawaiian coastal defense that was effective from the date of signature, but all features there were not in execution by the terms of the plan itself. The plan was not to be executed until "M" day, unless the War and Navy Departments decided to put it into effect sooner or unless the Commanding General and Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District should mutually agree that certain parts of it or the whole thing should go into effect sooner. Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features of that plan were in effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy, in paragraph 18 (a) was required to furnish inshore patrol. We had an inshore patrol working on 7 December. By (b), we were required to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol of an intermittent character, forces being furnished by the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of sortie. (c) and (d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this joint air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting planes on shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to the Army. (e), which is the harbor control post, was effective and in active operation. (f), which was installation and operation of an underwater defense, was effective. We had some buoys, sono-buoys. I'm not sure whether the magnetic loops had been laid, or not. I think they had been and were in operation. Nets, torpedo nets, at the entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in operation. (h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every day. (i) distant reconnaissance; the district had no forces capable of performing that task, as the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department knew. We had been informed that 108 patrol planes would be furnished us at the earliest possible date but none had come to Pearl Harbor, and I believe, on that particular point, that I had asked Admiral Kimmel about the distant reconnaissance and asked him if he would furnish me patrol planes, and he told me he would do what he could, but he couldn't make any promises of furnishing a force because there was a possibility of the Fleet leaving and taking its forces with it. (k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that was effective. (l): with regard to supplying local communication service for prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked on and largely effective. (m): all preparations had been made to assume censorship of the part that the Navy was to assume censorship of and was put into effect immediately after the attack. (o): supply and hospitalization provisions had been made for that.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to War Plans Division, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet's Office, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 5".
15. Q. This joint plan, you stated, is based on Rainbow No. 1 Plan, Admiral. Did it also take into consideration the provisions of the letter 2CL-41?
A. This plan JCD-42 was a Navy Department plan. 2CL-41 was the Commander-in-Chief's order and I do not believe they are in conflict. As a matter of fact, I think 2CL-41 contains certain provisions that are also in JCD-42. But, the difference was that 2CL-41 was effective from the date of its signature and was in execution the entire time, but JCD-42 does not necessarily go into execution until "M" Day, except insofar as it relates to items agreed to for execution ahead of time.
16. Q. Your agreement with respect to the use of aircraft was effective on December 7?
A. That was effective from the date of signature and to be in execution in the same manner as JCD-2.
17. Q. Admiral, did you look upon Admiral Kimmel's physical presence in Pearl Harbor as having become a fairly permanent condition?
A. Admiral Kimmel moved his offices ashore in February, 1941, almost immediately after he assumed command, and with exception of possibly a couple trips at sea and one trip to Washington, he was there the entire time, so I looked on him as being permanent, although he told me that in time of hostilities that he would go to sea. That was his intention.
18. Q. Did you, during those last few weeks prior to 7 December and in carrying out the duties which had been imposed upon you or which you had assumed in connection with security, feel any embarrassment or, say, unhappiness in your required cooperation with the Army on account of Admiral Kimmel's presence?
A. Well, I wasn't unhappy and I can't say that I was embarrassed. My relations with Admiral Kimmel were extremely good, extremely cordial; my relations with the Commanding General were cordial and our cooperation, I thought, was good. But the Commanding General had a right to go to the Commander-in-Chief directly and he also had a right to discuss matters with me, and, on one or two occasions, I didn't know exactly whether he had discussed matters with Admiral Kimmel before or whether he was coming to me in the first instance, but I can't say that it caused any disagreement because I talked everything over quite fully with Admiral Kimmel and I don't think there was any doubt in my mind as to where I stood in the picture.
19. Q. Admiral, this plan, Exhibit 5, JCD, required of both the Army and Navy certain functions, many of which would require close coordination. Will you please make a statement of anything within your knowledge as to how this plan worked out in the days leading up to the 7th of December, particularly with respect to coordination between the Army and Navy in preparing to execute this plan, and in carrying out the planning functions for which it provides, the Joint Planning Committee and representatives and all?
A. I had subordinates who dealt with the Army constantly, about the details of the plan, two in particular, the Chief of Staff, Captain J. B. Earle, and the War Plans Officer, Commander C. B. Momsen. They had to carry the load, but they were almost in constant contact with the Army. And the District Communication Officer, Captain Graham, I think he was just before Pearl Harbor, was in constant communication, getting communications straightened out, making preparations for the necessary teletypes and telephones, radio. While
we had differences of opinion, there were none of them serious. Some of them  were referred to Washington but they were always settled and I don't know that you can ask any more than that. I thought that our preparations were being prosecuted very vigorously.
20. Q. During the time that your representatives were working with the Army, were you kept fully advised as to the work of the Joint Planning Committee and the other representatives?
A. I think so.
21. Q. This joint coastal plan requires considerable on the part of the Army. Was there brought to your attention in any way the ability of the Army, from the viewpoint of both materiel and personnel, to carry out the commitments of the plan?
A. As I have stated before, we knew the Army was deficient in anti-aircraft guns and fighting planes and bombing planes, back in the Fall of 1940. After the Secretary of Navy wrote his letter of January 24, 1941, subsequent to that date a large number of fighters were sent out to Hawaii. Some bombers; a large number of fighters and some bombers. So far as I know, no additional anti-aircraft guns were sent. So it was my knowledge that their fighter strength had been increased considerably. I believe they had somewhat in excess of 250 fighting planes on the 7th of December, but their anti-aircraft guns were deficient in number and we knew that. We knew nothing about the deficiencies of the coast guns, the coast artillery. I had no knowledge as to whether the personnel of the Army was deficient or adequate, but was very definitely of the opinion that it was being increased all the time and was considered, with certain minor deficiencies, adequate by the Army for its task.
22. Q. Similarly, you previously stated that there were certain deficiencies in your force.
A. Well, I knew the Army had a deficiency in numbers and types of planes capable of performing one of their agreed functions. That's the inshore air patrol. They had told me they only had three planes capable of performing that duty and they knew that I had no reconnaissance planes attached to the District.
23. Q. Did you or your representatives, together with the Army officers in Hawaii, endeavor to make any sort of makeshift arrangements to fill these deficiencies caused by shortage of personnel or materiel, prior to the 7th of December?
A. I had pressed the Bureau of Personnel on the question of officers very vigorously; I had quite a number of reserve officers, but I wanted, in the key posts, more experienced officers and I was never able to get what I considered an adequate number in those positions.
24. Q. What I had in mind, Admiral, was that there are certain functions, such as distant reconnaissance, that you could not carry out, which the war plans called for, similar-
A. (Interposing) I had represented that to the Navy Department and asked for aircraft. I had taken it up, talked with the Commander-in-chief, about it and asked him if he would supply the planes for it and he told me he could not commit himself to that duty, except insofar as was possible on any  occasion; that he might have to go away from the locality and take his forces with him and the District should really have its own forces.
25. Q. What I was getting after, Sir, was the practical problem as to what was done in the absence of the ability to fill all the commitments, to do as much as you could with what you had.
A. It is my very definite understanding that, in the absence of any planes of my own, any missions of reconnaissance to be performed would have to be performed by the Fleet planes. That's the patrol planes belonging to the Fleet; and, it was also my very definite understanding that Admiral Kimmel reserved, to himself or his command, his echelon of command, the handling of patrol planes for oversee work; although, order 2CL did, insofar as it related to an air attack place dispatch of essential planes under the Commandant of the District in a supervisory way. Actually, it was done by a Fleet officer, Rear Admiral Bellinger. He was Commander of the Patrol Squadrons of the Fleet. He was also in command of the Base Defense Air Force. So, while the order says that the Commandant of the District would dispatch planes to look for carriers and enemy vessels in the case of air attack, actually it was done by Admiral Bellinger, and it seems obvious that the Commandant of the District couldn't use patrol planes without permission of the Fleet because the planes were employed by the Fleet on other missions. It had to be done by the Fleet, and I don't believe there was any confusion of thought. It was well understood, and, owing to the fact that Admiral Bellinger was both my Task Group Commander and a Fleet Air Commander, Admiral Kimmel actually would be the officer--or somebody delegated by him would be the officer who designated what reconnaissance was to be made.
26. Q. Admiral, you gave in numbers of Army fighters what really amounts to a very strong force. What did you know of the relative efficiency of the personnel of the fighter command?
A. Well, my knowledge of the capabilities of personnel is not first-hand information. I heard from other people. I think though it is fair to state that they had some good pilots and many inexperienced ones.
27. Q. Did you have an airman on your staff?
A. Up 'till the summer of 1941, I had no airman on my staff whom I could use. At that time, I was able to obtain, by calling into active duty from the reserve at Honolulu, quite a good man except that he had been out of the Navy for a number of year; he was a good flyer and a dependable and loyal man. Admiral Kimmel was very cooperative. He placed Admiral Halsey and Admiral Bellinger at my disposal on a number of occasions and I never hesitated to call on them, and I also had the Commanding Officers at the Air Stations at Kaneohe and Pearl Harbor, who were in my command. I could talk with them. They were difficult to get hold of but I could and did talk with them.
28. Q. Did you get advice from any of those officers concerning the efficiency of any of those officers--the efficiency of the Army pilots?
A. I can't say that I did. As usual in conversation, after our joint exercises, and we had a great many of them, I would hear the usual criminations and recriminations between the Army and Navy as to about how poor the other fellow had been and what he failed to do, and so forth and so on, but whether they were correct or not, I don't know.
29. Q. Inasmuch as even in those days, it was rather generally known that the best defense against an enemy air attack
lay in fighters, numbers of planes, and efficiency was highly important, was it not?
A. I think it was generally accepted that, in view of the deficiency of the guns of the Army for anti-aircraft purposes, that we had to depend largely on the fighters. In addition to these 250 fighters that the Army had of their own, that is my recollection of the number, the Navy usually had quite a large number of fighters available that were to be turned over to the Army. Each morning at eight o'clock Admiral Bellinger, who was Air Commander under 2CL, would give the Army a list of the planes that were available to them that day for fighters and they were supposed to send to him at that same time a list of Army bombers that were available to the Navy. That was done. That was routine. Whether it was done on the 7th of December, I don't know.
30. Q. Admiral, do you know of any other instructions issued to you or to other officers in Hawaii at the time relating to--by Admiral Kimmel, concerning the defense of the Island, other than this 2CL-41?
A. 2CL is a governing order for base defense. It also governs sorties and a number of other things. Contributory to that order, of course every task force commander got out a great many orders of their own. For instance, the Commandant of the District, the Base Defense Officer, had to get out an order about the minesweepers, about the nets. I also got out one order which required the Air Commander of the Base Defense Force, Admiral Bellinger, to get out an order about the air defense. All of those were contributory to the plan and were not signed by Admiral Kimmel. The Army had copies of them and at first we had hopes, when we had the drills--we had an air raid drill and blackout drill once a week to start with and, later on, we couldn't have it that often--and we had hopes the Army would come in on the drills. They didn't always come in. On occasions we'd have a carrier at sea coming in and she would send her air group in and on those occasions nearly always the Army joined. We had some interferences because the time I would choose for the air raid drill wasn't always agreeable to other forces, it interfered with their work, the force commanders at sea. Some of them complained. Then just about the time this order was issued we decided that we would set the dates two or three months ahead, certain definite dates when everyone would know they were going to happen on that day. We definitely prefaced every air raid drill by broadcasts on a frequency that all ships at sea were guarding and all ships in port and all stations, telling that this was a drill so there would be no mistake between the real thing and a drill. We always let them know, ahead of time, when we would have a drill. But I know of no other order issued by Admiral Kimmel.
31. Q. In your conversations with Admiral Kimmel, did he indicate that this was his basic order, so far as his participation in the defense was concerned?
A. No, I don't know that he ever said that. If you are trying to establish command relations, I think it was thoroughly well understood by Admiral Kimmel, and by the Commandant of the District, that the Commandant of the District would do everything in his power and everything would be done to the best of the Commandant's ability.
32. Q. Admiral, JCD, as of course you will recall, has several entries concerning what would be done when certain reinforcements were available, the  plan, of course, to be effective, on "M" Day when it was declared. In the meantime, and prior to such declaration, of course some plan for security of the Fleet was necessary. My understanding of your testimony was that you look upon the 2CL-41 as, in effect, being the security plan and putting into effect everything in the way of precaution which was required by the JCD and for which you had forces available; is that right?
A. No, that is not correct, in this respect. While I think that 2CL-41 is consistent with JCD, it actually puts into execution certain requirements of JCD but not all of them. For instance, it puts in the minesweeping, it puts in the inshore patrol, it puts in the underwater defenses-that is the nets, but it did not-I see no place in 2CL-41 where the distant reconnaissance was put in force.
33. Q. That is about the only-
A. (Interposing) If you will examine JCD, you will find that the Army is charged with the defense of the land insofar as it relates to the coast and anti-aircraft defenses and with particular respect to Pearl Harbor. In other words that was their specific responsibility: it might be said that the Navy had no responsibility because there is nothing said in JCD to the effect that the Navy had any responsibility for protecting Pearl Harbor against an air attack, but yet, by 2CL the Commander-in-Chief felt the necessity, on account of the fact that he had means that he could use, that he must help out.
34. Q. Admiral, the Army's warning system, particularly the radar part of it; what steps did you take to ascertain the Army s efficiency in that respect?
A. Such information as I had about the Army's warning I had received from the Army and the contacts of my subordinates with Army subordinates. I made no formal requests for information but I kept in touch by contact-occasionally, General Short would tell me something about it and frequently some of my subordinates would contact the Army and let me know the situation. When I arrived in Honolulu in 1940, General Herron was in command and he told me at that time-that was in April, 1940-they were putting in this warning net, that they were starting to put in the radar, that they were making the surveys and selecting the sites. And he told me how wonderful it was and I told him I knew very little about it, although some of our ships had it. When General Short came in February, we talked about it and as the net progressed in completion, he came to me-I think it was in September or October, 1941-and told me he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train his operators. None of the Army knew how to train them and he wanted to know if there was anything I could do to help him. I told him I had no means myself but the Fleet had radar operators and the Fleet had radar installations, and I made the request on the Commander-in- Chief to permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea, which he did. In November, it was my knowledge that they were training the operators and that they were having difficulties; this information came to me-I don't know whether General Short came to me or whether my subordinates told me, having obtained it from their opposite numbers in the Army-and as of December I thought
that the net was still in the condition where all the kinks were not out of it and they were still training operators and could not be depended upon, but I had no knowledge as to whether or not they were standing regular watches on it, nor did I make any inquiries about it. And I would like to supplement that statement by  saying at that time, December 7 or thereabouts, that we had not developed a means for controlling our own aircraft to the degree that we knew where they were at all times-or that the Army had not developed any means to know where all the planes were at all times-friendly planes, so that they could differentiate friendly planes and other planes.
35. Q. Admiral, will you please explain the facilities you had for obtaining intelligence of possible enemies, what your setup was.
A. We had a unit at Pearl Harbor, when I arrived, composed of communicators and intelligence people, Japanese language students, and they were separated into two units and their information had to be coordinated, and all the information we got from that intelligence, by radio intelligence and such other information as we got from that unit was transmitted to Cavite and the Navy Department. They had a private circuit or private channel,, they talked to us and we to them telling what we were getting, and the material was correlated and sent out. That was our principal source of Japanese intelligence; We also got the intelligence that was collected at Cavite. That was sent to us over this private channel and we knew that. When I arrived, I was dissatisfied with the organization and I organized it into one unit known as "Combat Intelligence" where they were under one head, which unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors, and all the other things they had with one officer in charge. In the middle of July, 1941, when we had the facilities, we put them in one big room in the basement of the office building, a secure place, with their own channels of communications to the radio stations and radio direction finders, and so on; I always did my best to augment the force by getting more men and better men. In addition to that unit, we had the District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army intelligence and the FBI; we had local intelligence that way, and, we also had such reports as were sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. We kept touch with the Commander-in-Chief as best we could. He was on shore and within a mile and a half of us. I never had any way to know whether I got everything, or not, but I had the feeling that we were getting everything that was pertinent. The Commander-in-Chief had many sources of information that I didn't have. He had all of his subordinates in the Fleet. He unquestionably had a good many reports from ONI and the Chief of Operations that I knew nothing about unless I happened to hear about them; I think he conscientiously endeavored to give me everything that he thought I should have. I had a very definite feeling that the Navy Department knew more about the situation and were able to evaluate matters far better than we were because they had the liaison of the State Department, the political situation, the Department of War, and the President. I thought their knowledge was far greater than ours about actual conditions.
36. Q. Please state the name of the Intelligence Officer in command of this Combat Intelligence unit.
A. Rochefort; I think his name is Commander J. J. Rochefort.
37. Q. He was a subordinate of yours?
A. He was a subordinate of mine and, in a way, he was also, while he had no orders to be, a subordinate in the Fleet. This unit was a Fleet unit and the Commander-in-Chief had the right to take any man away if he wanted to for other purposes.
38. Q. Was the information that they received always delivered to the Commander-in-Chief?
A. All of it. As a matter of fact, my Staff, my subordinates, had orders to send the Fleet everything that could possibly have any bearing on movements: ships coming in or going out, enemy, or anything new. This had to be done as the Commander-in-Chief was physically present in the place; it was very simple to do it. I think he was also on our teletypes to the Army and he had the same telephone lines to the Army that we had, so he was in a position to get the information over these circuits.
39. Q. Did you also receive intelligence or other dispatches from the Navy Department relating to the international situation and possible enemy action?
A. My recollection is that originally, in 1940, they were sent to the Commandant as an addressee and, later on, they were all sent to the Commander-in-Chief, as the addressee, and I was not always included as an addressee, although, on some occasions, I was. On other occasions, it was stated in the dispatch that I was to be shown this dispatch. While I have no way of knowing whether I saw everything that came in, or not, I think that Admiral Kimmel endeavored to keep me informed. Of course, it must be borne in mind that Admiral Kimmel, as well as Admiral Richardson, had almost constant communication with the Chief of Naval Operations by mail. Occasionally, I would see one of the letters, but not always.
40. Q. Can you recall any specific messages relating to the international situation in the Pacific or intelligence of Japan which were received in the two months preceding Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, I can, and I would like to go back to the summer of 1940, if I may, because I think it is pertinent to this examination. Sometime in the summer of 1940, the date I can not recall, General Herron, the Commanding General, came to my office and stated that he had just received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the effect that an overseas raid was impending and that he was to go on the full alert at once. He told me that he had received this dispatch, that it was a bolt from the blue, that he knew nothing about it, but he had gone on the alert and came down to see me and wanted to know if I had received a similar dispatch. I told him, no; I knew nothing about it. He then said that he was very much disturbed about this, he didn't know the nature of the raid, didn't know when it was going to be, what it was about, but he wanted my advice. And I said, "Well, I'm not the senior officer present in the Fleet. While I am an officer of the Fleet, there is a superior officer here, Vice Admiral Andrews, and I think you had better show him the dispatch."
We went aboard the Flagship and told Admiral Andrews about this, and after conference, it was decided by Admiral Andrews that we would have morning and dusk reconnaissance patrols, and patrols were then ordered to be sent out. The Commander-in-Chief was Admiral
Richardson, but he was not present. Admiral Andrews sent him a dispatch telling him of the condition. Admiral Richardson flew in and as he had never heard of the warning, he sent a dispatch to the Chief of Operations and it was my recollection that he never received a reply to it. Now this alert continued for some two or three weeks. When the Army had this alert, had been warned of an overseas raid, they were not told it was an exercise or drill, they were told it was an overseas raid that was expected. The Navy was in a  position of knowing nothing about it. I think, subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief got information about it here in Washington, but, so far as I know, we got nothing there. To go ahead with your question, the Neutrality Act was in effect. The President had issued an order covering the movement of submarines in our territorial waters, and about the maintenance of neutrality and the responsibilities of commandants and Naval officers and Army officers in connection with it. In 1941, possibly July or August, some tense situation arose and I can not recall how we received information of it, whether it was by letter to the Commander-in-Chief or the radio. At any rate, Admiral Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advisability of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes with the median line of the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 or 20 degrees. And we sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted the suggestion and sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued. In October, I remember distinctly a dispatch, but I do not remember whether I was an addressee or whether the Commander-in-Chief informed me, but I remember a dispatch to the effect that there was a change in the Japanese Government and we might expect things to happen in the next few days. I'm quite sure Admiral Kimmel had a conference after that, although it is hard for me to remember when we had the conferences because I saw Admiral Kimmel practically every day; I can not remember whether General Short was present, or Admiral Pye, Admiral Halsey, or who was present. Again, on November 27, a warning was received which was stated to be a war warning. That dispatch was received, I think, on Thursday, the 27th of November in the afternoon, somewhere around four o'clock. I was not on the station. I had gone up town to the hospital to see a patient and when I returned the Chief of Staff telephoned to me and told me he would like to come over and see me. He came over and he had a paraphrase of this dispatch. As I recall it, I saw Admiral Kimmel the next morning. I can not recall who was present besides myself. There were other persons there. In that dispatch there was a term used whereby he was directed to take defensive deployment. Just exactly what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was, I don't know, but it is a fact, at that time, there were four submarines deployed to the westward, two at Midway and two at Wake. They were there for information purposes and defense. I don't know what orders they had. Some other instances came up in the Summer of 1941, prior to this warning on the 16th and prior to this warning on the 27th that caused me to write letters to the commanding officers of the outlying bases. Under the District, we had outlying bases at Palmyra and Johnston, we had one at Midway, and one was under construction and being garrisoned at Wake. The substance of my letter to these commanding officers was to try and train their civilian workers there in the use of the arms to
supplement the armed forces. Somewhere about that same time, Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, having been designated as defensive sea areas by Executive Order of the President, I gave the commanding officers instructions about the planes that came in there that were not identified as being friendly; they were to be fired on. I think that all those actions were taken as the result of some warning or some feeling on my part, derived from some definite information I had received that the situation was tense. Now there were a lot of other dispatches that were received and I am unable to remember now whether my knowledge of those dispatches, warning dispatches, was information that's been acquired since the 7th of December or whether it was before.
41. Q. Were you receiving, during those few days prior to 7 December, any radio intelligence which was supplied by your Combat Intelligence Unit based upon things which they received from Japanese in Oahu?
A. We received nothing from the Japanese on Oahu, except I had knowledge from the District Intelligence Officer of the existence of about 200 representatives of the Japanese Consulate spread over Oahu and who were not registered agents of the Japanese Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had definite information to convict these men of being unregistered agents. While anxious that they be indicted and tried, the Army would not agree and the matter was referred to Washington and the War and Navy Departments agreed that they would not be brought to trial.
Note: A letter on this subject written by the witness has been identified by the examining officer as being one from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District to the Chief of Naval Operations, classified Secret, dated November 10, 1941, file S-A8-5/EF37/ND14, Serial 01216. The reply thereto is identified as letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classified Secret, dated 6 December 1941, file (SC)A8-5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both of the above mentioned letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
42. Q. Then you were unable to get any information at all based upon communications which those Japanese were sending out?
A. We were unable to get any information based on dispatches being transmitted by the Japanese. The various communication companies, commercial communication companies, did not and would not give us dispatches.
43. Q. Did those dispatches go entirely by cable?
A. They went by cable.
44. Q. None by radio?
A. So far as I know, none by radio.
45. Q. You have mentioned, Admiral, the warnings received prior to December 7. Will you please state what you felt to be the probabilities and possibilities of surprise hostile action on the part of the Japs, if you have any thought beyond what you've given us?
A. The dispatch of November 27 had as its preface that negotiations with Japan, looking toward a stabilization of the Pacific area, had stopped. Then the dispatch went ahead to say that they expected action on the part of Japan within the next few days, based on that premise. Then the dispatch went on to some extent in giving a deployment of Japanese forces, amphibious forces, pointing to general war on the south coast of China, Siam, and also a statement in the dispatch to
the effect that this was a war warning. Subsequent to the receipt of that dispatch, negotiations were resumed. That had a very definite effect on my mind; that while the negotiations had stopped once, and this was the reason that they thought that action by Japan was due in a few days; subsequently, negotiations were resumed; there was uncertainty in my mind as to whether anything was likely to happen immediately. Furthermore, as I stated before in this examination, I felt that the authorities in Washington had far more information, were far abler to evaluate the situation than I was and I had no apprehension around December 7 that any hostile action in that area was imminent. I know now, and, as I stated before, I'm not sure whether I knew  this before the 7th of December, or not, that a dispatch had been sent about the end of November to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet giving him a warning that something was likely to happen, and I believe in that dispatch it was mentioned that the action might be against the Philippines. I can not recall it exactly but I have that impression. But so far as the Hawaiian area was concerned, I had no feeling of impending hostilities around the 7th of December.
46. Q. Will you please relate what action was taken by the Army and Navy with respect to the security of Pearl Harbor after the receipt of the dispatches of November 27, of which you know.
A. I knew that the Army had been alerted and I thought they were in a general alert. I believe that General Short told me they were alert and I thought it was a general alert. Either on the 7th or 8th of December, I asked General Short about it and he told me, no, it was only a partial alert, what they call alert No. 1. He might have told me they were alert No. 1 and I confused it with our condition 1. Our highest form is 1 and their lowest form is 1. So far as the Navy is concerned, I know of nothing particular, except the Commander of the Inshore Patrol at Pearl Harbor had called in the Commanding Officers of Destroyer Division No. 80-they were the only four ships that I had for the inshore patrol and only one of those was equipped with listening gear-and had given them a pep talk. Admiral Kimmel had issued an order about the 27th of November to the effect that any submarines found running submerged in the defensive sea area should be depth charged, and at this pep talk these young men were told to be on their toes. It was my own thought that any action taken by Japan prior to a declaration of war, or after a declaration of war, would be in the form of concentrated submarine attack on the ships of the Fleet, in the operating areas, and they might make an effort to get in the Harbor. That was the reason for the pep talk. I know no other action was taken as a consequence of the warning of the 27th of November.
47. Q. The letter here, Exhibit 4, or 2CL-41, provides for three conditions of readiness. Would you please state, with respect to these conditions, the condition that existed on December 7, prior to the attack?
A. So far as I know, there was no condition prescribed by the Commander-in-chief and the order gives, as a duty for the Commander of the Base Defense, the duty of advising the senior officer present and afloat the conditions of readiness, advising him what condition of readiness should be kept. What the Fleet orders were in addition
to the advice that they were to receive from the Commander of the Base Defense Force, I don't know.
48. Q. Did you take any action as Commander-
A. (Interposing) So far as I know, I advised no condition of readiness. I might say that I felt that I could not independently advise a condition of readiness without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief; I believe the order has a parenthetical expression in it that says I shall advise, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of readiness that shall be kept, which indicates that the Commander-in-Chief would already know; I felt any action that I might take should be consistent with the other things in the Fleet, the conditions of employment, that they had been in or were in, and the future movements. This belief of mine was borne out subsequent to the 7th of December when I advised the condition of readiness, and I was informed by the acting Commander-in-Chief that he wanted a different condition of readiness.
49. Q. Please state anything within your knowledge relating to any effort which was made after the warning contained in the dispatch of November 27 to establish a distant reconnaissance.
A. There were orders contained in 2CL about the patrol of the operating areas and the covering of the forces going out and coming in, and, in addition to that, either the Commander-in-Chief or the Commander of Air Force Scouting Fleet were undertaking other reconnaissances of which I was not intimately informed of; so far as any additional reconnaissances being conducted by air, I have no knowledge. In other words, I know of no additional aerial reconnaissance that was made as the result of the dispatch of the 27th of November. I did take one other step that I have forgotten to mention that has just occurred to me. The Honolulu area was under command of the District Coast Guard Office. The Coast Guard had been placed under my command prior to the 7th of December. They had three cutters. Captain Finlay, who was the District Coast Guard Officer, was the Port Commander of Honolulu and I required him, on receipt of this dispatch of 27th of November, to put an inshore patrol out of Honolulu, the same as we had at Pearl Harbor, except at Pearl Harbor it would be conducted by Destroyer Division 80.
50. Q. Do you know of any otter steps that were taken to counter possible enemy action on the morning of December 7?
A. No, I do not.
51. Q. I understand that you made no recommendation toward instituting distant air reconnaissance?
A. No, I did not.
52. Q. Going back to communications from the Department and your reaction thereto, do you recall being informed that the Japanese had been detected destroying some of their codes and files in certain localities?
A. I recall the existence of certain dispatches to the effect that the Japanese were believed to be destroying their papers, dispatches.
53. Q. Do you remember the dates; was it after the 27th of November?
A. I think it was around the 3rd of December.
54. Q. What was your reaction to that intelligence?
A. Well, I'm not sure that I remember exactly what my reaction was; except that they might be doing it and they might not be doing it, and I didn't know, I had no way of knowing what they were destroying and what they were burning and whether it was something that was really filled with meaning, or not. It might be and it might not be. But I still had a belief that as long as there were negotiations going on in Washington there was a possibility of this period of waiting being extended. I had a very definite feeling that we were going to have war sometime in the future, but just how far in the future, I was unable to predict.
55. Q. Was the subject of the dispatch to which you have just referred discussed between you and Admiral Kimmel?
A. The dispatch of the 27th?
56. Q. Of the 3rd. about destroying the codes.
A. Perhaps it may have been. I don't remember.
57. Q. Was any action of any kind that related to the defense of Pearl Harbor taken as the result of that dispatch?
A. The security measures prescribed and the additional inshore patrol in Honolulu, and the warning that was given the destroyer captains, and the fact that I believed that the Army was on a full alert, were the only measures that I know that were taken.
58. Q. The JCD plan calls for planning between your representatives and those of the Army. Do you know whether these warning messages were available to this planning group?
A. I do not believe that they were informed. The messages were secret messages and we were admonished to keep them secret to prevent alarming people, and one thing and another, and I'm not sure-my own War Plans officer knew about them but I don't know whether the Army's War Plan people knew about them.
59. Q. Did you consider it a function of the joint planning representative and other planning representatives to keep abreast of such developments and take them into consideration in the preparation of plans?
A. Not as a joint organization. I considered that I had to keep my own war planner advised and I did. He knew everything that came in.
60. Q. But the planning of any action taken as the result of such warning messages, you felt to be a matter personal between you and the Commanding General, so far as it affected your joint plans?
A. I felt there was a definite agreement between the General and myself as to our responsibilities, and within my own responsibilities the planning that I did could be done independently of him, but something that involved joint planning, of course, it had to be taken up with the joint planners, and I had to take it up with the General. And if you visualize the fact that General Short and I saw each other very frequently, Admiral Kimmel and I saw each other practically every day, it is hard to believe that anything of any importance should take place or that anything should be received of even small importance that wasn't discussed between us, because it is only fair to assume that we discussed everything.
61. Q. But any joint planning which would be necessary as the result of such warning would be the function of the highest echelon of commands? And all information that you had, such as condition of the
Army with respect to alerting their personnel, you received from the Commanding General and not through any liaison or other channels?
A. He had in my office an Army Colonel who was a representative of the General and was known as a liaison officer, and I had in the General's office a Lieutenant of the Naval Reserve of the Fourteenth District who was my representative up there and was a liaison officer, and these men were supposed to be informed, although I will say that my liaison officer did not know of dispatches that had been received be cause I didn't consider it was proper to tell him. He was quite inexperienced. Nor am I sure that the liaison officer from the Army in my office knew about them, but we were in close touch through those liaison officers who were there for that purpose and we felt we knew what was going on. Indications are that there are some things we were not correctly advised on or informed about.
62. Q. Admiral, please explain the method of rapid communications which existed between your headquarters and those of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.
A. The communication plan gotten out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from the Base Defense Commander to all ships and points. I don't recall the frequency but every station was required to keep a broadcast receiver of standard wave length and we gave all of our notices of air raid drills, commence fire, cease fire, what was taking place, over that and it was supposed to be listened to at all times by all ships at sea and by the group commanders in port and by my own stations, like Kaneohe and the ammunition depot and the air station at Pearl Harbor and the net depot, and various other places, submarine base. In addition to that, we were actively prosecuting the rapid communication by telephone under JCD. We had teletypes between Army Headquarters and my Headquarters. I think there was a branch of that in Admiral Kimmel's office. We had difficulty in getting direct line to Kaneohe, and I think it had just been established. Formerly we had to go through central in Honolulu but I think we had just succeeded in having the Army put down a special line for us to Kaneohe. We had a telephone from the Harbor Control and Command Posts, both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, to the gates. I had a telephone between the Harbor Control and the Artillery Headquarters. I think we had a direct line between my headquarters and General Short's headquarters in what he called his "Message Center". My Harbor Control and Operation room was manned twenty-four hours a day. There were always talkers, listeners, and officers on duty there. In addition to that, we had duty officers on duty in the building. The Chief of Staff and the War Plans operation officer and myself all lived close to the Harbor Control Post and could be gotten by yard telephone. All of the lines planned had not been finished. We had means for rapid communication.
63. Q. Did this include communications with the Army warning net system; warning net?
A. The Army warning net lines came into a certain place known as the "Interceptor Command" where they had the plotting room. I'm not sure how well organized the Interceptor Command was prior to December 7, but I think it was just in the forming. There was a means for communicating-for providing a communication from that room to my headquarters, which I immediately put into effect after
the attack on the 7th of December. My talkers, teletype operators, who operated with the various Army places connected with, were there all of the time, twenty-four hours a day, and they were in constant practice communication with these outlying places, but it is my recollection that I was told on several occasions that the Army ends of the line always went dead in the evening' that they could not get anybody on it. It had been a matter that we had taken up, or tried to take up to get rectified, because we wanted Army twenty-four hour a day communication.
64. Q. Did you have in effect any liaison or the presence of a naval officer with the Interceptor Command?
A. There was no officer detailed specifically at the Interceptor Command. As I said before, I don't think the Interceptor Command was completely formed up and I am very definitely of the opinion that the Army did not keep a twenty-four hour watch in the place. The place was not completely organized. Immediately after December 7, they staffed the place by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and training them in their duties and, at that time, they asked for watch officers there to communicate with the Navy, although it  had been my plan that the communications would be sent by Army people to us and received by the Navy people, but we sent Navy people there on December 7.
65. Q. This net had been in use during some of your tactical exercises, had it not?
A. I think not. I have no recollection of it ever having been used in any tactical operations. The Army was training operators principally and trying to get the system so it would work. There was a great deal of trouble with the electronics in it and they had asked for help; they had come to me once and wanted assistance, had been referred to the Commander-in-Chief, and there was some officer who was transiently present at the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters whom he sent up there to help them, but, that officer was on his way to join some ship, and when he joined up, another officer, by the name of Taylor, appeared. He had had a great deal of experience in radar and he was sent by the Commander-in-Chief to help the Army; but, that was an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's net going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison, and while I knew he was there, I had no idea that he was there in any other capacity other than as an expert to try to assist them with their electrical and mechanical difficulties.
66. Q. Just how far did you feel you could rely on this net to assist you in obtaining a warning of approaching aircraft prior to December 7?
A. I had no feeling of confidence or reliance on it because I was very definitely of the opinion that it wasn't completely formed up; the operators were not completely trained, and we had no way-no way was then established so we could tell what planes of our own were where they could be completely identified
67. Q. Were the Army and Navy planes operating in the Hawaiian area at that time equipped with any modern recognition devices, such as IFF?
A. No. We had a standard procedure of entrance to Oahu and of departure from Oahu; certain grooves Army and Navy planes must
fly in coming in and going out in order that we might know, assuming the planes that flew in those grooves were our planes and those that flew somewhere else were not ours. In addition to Army and Navy planes, there were commercial companies operating from Oahu, inter-island companies operating planes to adjacent islands, Pan American operating planes to the trans-Pacific, and there was an air school located on the municipal airport, John Rogers Field, which had planes up and these planes were controlled by the Civil Aeronautics Authorities.
68. Q. Did the Army warning net have any set up for visual observation of approaching aircraft, if you know?
A. The Army had a number of observation posts around the Island of Oahu and on adjacent islands, but unless they were in a full out alert these posts would not be manned, but they were of no real use be cause they all didn't have means of rapid communication direct from the post to headquarters.
69. Q. Was there any arrangement made by the Navy for obtaining information with respect to approaching ships or aircraft by visual observation?
A. None that I know of, except the signal tower.
70. Q. Do you recall ever having given General Short any ground for supposing that our task forces at sea were anywhere near an adequate guard against a surprise attack by carriers?
A. I gave General Short no reason for believing that our forces at sea were adequate warning against hostile attack.
71. Q. Referring to the Army's force of fighters, were the flying fields available on Oahu adequate for the use of all those planes?
A. The Army's main fighter field was Wheeler Field, which was near Schofield Barracks. They had another fighter field at Bellows Field, which was on the northeast side of the Island, and an improvised field somewheres in the neighborhood of Haleiwa. Some three to four months previous to December 7, General Short had made a request on me to release a field which the Navy had at Kahuku Point to the Army and I had taken it up with the Commander-in-Chief and, as a result, we had appointed Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey to discuss the entire matter with Army air authorities. This joint conference made a report in which they recommended that the Navy keep Kahuku Field. I endorsed on the report to the Commander-in-Chief my opinion that it should be given to the Army and he approved my recommendation. There were other things in the recommendation but that was the principal thing. He approved my recommendation and it was sent to the Navy Department. So far as I know, no reply had been received to that prior to the 7th of December. In my opinion, the Army did not have an adequate number of fields to disperse their fighters on.
72. Q. This is a matter of defensive attitude. As regards operation, were they hampered as regards inadequacy of fields
A. I can not answer that.
73. Q. Admiral, what provisions were made for obtaining and disseminating to the Army, particularly, any intelligence information, and particularly contact reports, obtained by any of the task forces or other forces operating in the Hawaiian area?
A. All such reports would be received in the headquarters of the commander-in-chief who had two courses of action open. One was to have them sent to the Army through the District Headquarters, informing the District at the same time, or else sending them direct to both places, as he had direct means of communication on the same telephone line that we had--teletypes that we had.
74. Q. Was any such information actually received on the morning of December 7?
A. On the morning of December 7, the only contact that was made prior to the air raid was with an enemy submarine. This submarine was sighted by U. S. S. WARD, which was inshore patrol, and the U. S. S. ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the ANTARES. I did receive at 7:12 a. m. a telephone message from the Chief of Staff telling me that he had received a dispatch from the WARD that was somewhat difficult to understand, that he had been attacked and was counterattacking a submarine at the entrance to the channel at Pearl Harbor. He further stated that he was then engaged  in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu. The Chief of Staff gave me this message. I asked him what it was; is it a real submarine or is it a report? We had had a number of false reports in the past and he said he didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the nature of the dispatch whether it was bona fide or sound contact or sight contact, whether he had been fired upon or had fired, and I asked him to get it cleared up immediately. Captain Momsen was sent immediately to headquarters: dispatched another destroyer and tried to get information from the WARD. Before we got the information straightened out, the air attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed--at least his operations watch officer was informed about the entire matter just at the same time we were.
75. Q. Do you know whether that information was conveyed to the Army?
A. So far as I know, it was not. I'm not sure; but, I don't think it was.
76. Q. And there were no other similar information received to your knowledge?
A. No other contacts.
77. Q. Reverting to that dispatch from the Department, 27 November, containing the war warning, there was also a directive to effect a defensive deployment. It really was a directive, was it not?
A. I think it was.
78. Q. Did you give any thought at the time to what you considered that directive to mean for the Navy forces, other than those belonging to the District?
A. I have a distinct recollection of Admiral Kimmel discussing that matter in my presence with someone else. Who it was, I can not recall. Probably some member of his Staff. The terminology employed is not one that I've ever heard used before. In dealing with war plans, naval tactics, it has always been our practice to use very precise terminology with definite known meanings. So far as I know, I have never encountered that terminology before. It's quite possible--this is a matter of opinion--that Admiral Kimmel might have construed that the fact that he had submarines at Wake and Midway was a
defensive deployment or he may have asked Admiral Stark what it was. I don't know whether he did, or not.
79. Q. What did it mean to you?
A. I don't know.
80. Q. The war warning message, of course, was also to be communicated to the Hawaiian Department. Those words "defensive deployment" being, as you say, unusual, did it occur to anyone to discuss with the Army whether or not those words had a definite meaning which might be obscure to you?
A. Not so far as I know, although I believe the dispatch directed the Commander-in-Chief to transmit a copy of this dispatch to the Commanding General.
81. Q. Then, in effect, it was somewhat in the nature of a dispatch to both Services?
A. It was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief; he was the action addressee. He was told to inform Commandant Fourteen and the Commanding General.
82. Q. Admiral, this dispatch of 27 November, which will be introduced as an exhibit before you finish your testimony and we'll ask you to identify it then, went on to direct appropriate deployment preparatory of carrying out defensive tasks assigned in WPL 46, which was the Rainbow 5 Plan. I note that your Join Coast Defense Plan expressly states it is based on plan Rainbow No. 1. Would you please explain anything you know or anything within your knowledge with respect to the situation among the higher echelons of command in Hawaii as to which plan, Rainbow 1 or Rainbow 5, should form the basis for planning or which was considered as the plan which would probably be used in the event of war?
A. Rainbow 1 contemplated the United States being against the Axis Powers and Japan without any assistance except, maybe, some of the South American Republics. We had had that and JCD was based on that. Rainbow 3 had been received some two or three months before and Rainbow 3 was based on the assumption that the United States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the Axis Nations and Japan. And the disposition of the Hawaiian Department in that was just the same as in Rainbow 1. Now I don't recall Rainbow 5 distinctly, when we had received it, if we had received it or how long before we had received it, but it is my impression that the provisions in there were about the same as they were in 1 also, that is in so far as related to the Fourteenth Naval District.
83. Q. Are you familiar with the general nature of the task assigned to the United States Pacific Fleet in these plans; were there specific references to whether the plans called for offensive or defensive action?
A. No. 1 was defensive, purely defensive. No. 3, as I recall it, had offensive tasks in it. I remember for our Forces we had to sever the lines of communication from Japan in the East and I think it required certain offensive action from the Asiatic Fleet which was to be reinforced from the United States Fleet. Rainbow 5, I don't recall the tasks in there, although I've read them. I don't recall them no.
84. Q. You did know, however, did you not, that an early offensive movement was required of the Pacific Fleet in the event of hostilities with Japan?
A. In Rainbow 3, I knew it was required and I assume I knew it was required in 5 if the record shows I received it. It is not quite clear in my mind. But I knew that offensive action was required in 3 and if 5 had been received, and I assume that it had been received, I'm not sure about it, I knew that offensive action was required. But Rainbow 1 was the only one where we were on purely the defensive.
85. Q. That being the case, that CinCPac Fleet was expected to make an offensive movement quite early, did it seem to you at the time that such requirement was difficult to reconcile with the requirements for security of the Fleet which obtained up to the outbreak of war?
A. Admiral Kimmel had told me on the occasions which I had asked him for patrol planes to supply the District's deficiencies in that respect, that he would do what he could and supply them when he could, but he couldn't make any commitments because he expected the Fleet, parts of the Fleet, to leave there in the case of hostilities and he might go. He didn't say he might go but he would go. So far as I was concerned, I can not say that I gave any very deep study to what the Fleet was going to do, how they were going to do it, when they were going, or how we could preserve the security  of the place after they were gone because I had so many things to do that I could only do so many. I was very much dissatisfied with the deficiency in my forces that were required for me to perform my tasks, and JCD had been approved by both the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department, it was not only my plan but their plan. I had made representations to the Navy Department about the deficiencies of the forces, both surface and air. As late as the Summer, I had made a reappraisal of the forces and made definite and urgent recommendations to the Navy Department for ships and planes, which they had promised to do as soon as they could. What went on in the minds of the planners and operating people of the Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, I don't know but I know they did have plans for offensive action.
86. Q. Then nothing was represented to you by the Commander-in-Chief to the effect that he could not take any other particular or specific security measures because of his commitments for those offensive movements?
A. No, I remember no such representations.
87. Q. Admiral, as Commandant of the Navy Yard, much of your time and thought was given to the employment of its forces on both maintenance and alterations to ships of the Fleet. Those alterations directed made by the Department were considerable, were they not?
A. Our principal activity in the Navy Yard was a twenty-four hour a day schedule of docking, keeping ships' bottoms clean. This had been in effect for over a year. The first instance the Department sent a schedule of docking out in order to keep the ships in condition, which required a lot of ships to go to the coast for docking, and we told them by working three shifts a day we could absorb a lot of this at Pearl Harbor and this was done. So far as alterations to the Fleet were concerned, I don't know of a great many which were being done at Pearl Harbor, although unquestionably we had some in the nature of adding more guns to the anti-aircraft battery and also some radar installations' but I don't recall any tremendous number of other alterations. To understand how the Navy Yard worked, we worked
in close touch with the Commander-in-Chief's people. We worked on the ships and they sent us the work to do. The force was expanding rapidly. In April, 1940, I think there were two thousand total employees, which included maintenance and office force in Pearl Harbor, and by December 7, I think that had been built up to something like eight or ten thousand. I'm not sure of the exact size. It was expanding very rapidly.
88. Q. Then the alterations directed by the Department to be made at Pearl Harbor were never any considerable embarrassment, insofar as you know, concerning affecting the operations of the Fleet?
A. Well, I can not answer that categorically because I don't know. We took the work load that was thrown on us. They knew how much we could take; we told them what we could do at all times. They knew what we had to do and we did it as fast as we could. However, whether that interfered with the mobility of the Fleet, I'm not prepared to state. I don't know.
89. Q. Admiral, you stated, sometime back, that Admiral Bellinger, acting as your subordinate in the matter of relations with the Army, advised the Army each morning as to the number of fighter planes available for Army use  in the event of emergency or hostilities. Do you know how many planes were available to the Army at the time of the December 7 attack?
A. There were, or had been, four carriers at Pearl Harbor at various times, and on December 7 two carriers, the LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE were away from Pearl Harbor on missions. The SARATOGA and YORKTOWN were on the coast. It is my recollection that both those ships carried the planes to the coast. It is my recollection that the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE had their planes with them so the only planes that were left at the air station at Pearl Harbor at Ewa Field were a number of Marine fighting planes belonging to the Fleet Marine Force. I believe there were about 70 Marine planes. How many were available on that morning, I do not know
90. Q. Do you know what number of the 250 Army planes were effective planes, in condition for use?
A. The Army had a number of P-36's, I think they were, when I arrived in Pearl Harbor. And after the letter from the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War, the Army sent a large number of fighter planes out; sent them out by Navy carriers and put them ashore for the Army air fields, and I think most of those planes were the type known as P-40. There might have been some P-36's with them but mostly P-40. It is possible I may be mistaken in saying P-39, but I think that's what it was. I guess I'm wrong, it probably was a P-36. P-40's came and they were supposed to be the latest thing. They were a disappointment in the respect that they were only good for about fifty-five minutes in the air and they couldn't go out of sight of land, or only a little out of sight of land, or they'd have difficulty in getting back.
91. Q. Do you know whether the fighter planes were, in fact, used for inshore air patrol purposes?
A. They were not. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Frederick Martin, told me that he only had three planes for inshore air patrol. He couldn't use the bombers because
they couldn't see and he couldn't use the fighters because they couldn't carry bombs and couldn't see very well either. I believe that prior to December 7 one of the planes cracked up so he only had two planes on December 7.
92. Q. Did the Army make a similar report to you or your subordinate commander concerning the number of bombers available for patrol?
A. I think they did.
93 Q. Do you know the number of such planes that were available on the morning of December 7?
A. I don't know what the Army report said. It is my belief that the Army had a few old bombers that were obsolescent, that there were in 1940, and after the Secretary of Navy's letter they had started sending in some B-17's. I think the ones they originally had, were known as the B-18, and they were obsolescent and we began to get in some B-17's. I think that the first B-17's came out were ferried on to the Far East, some twenty-five or thirty of them. That was somewheres in September or October. And that on December 7 that in addition to the B-18's, there probably were not over ten or fifteen B-17's there. As a matter of fact, a squadron of B-17's  has been dispatched from San Francisco on the night of December 6 and they arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the air attack and some of them were lost.
94. Q. Just how did the command over these planes pass from the Army squadron or other commanders to the naval commanders?
A. My general understanding is that Admiral Bellinger would direct his fighters, his fighters that were assigned for the day, to report to the Army and this man would go up and report to the Army. They had a frequency. And the Army bombers reported to the Navy the same way.
95. Q. After they were air-borne?
A. Yes, after they were air-borne.
96. Q. Do you know whether those able to fly did so report during or after the attack?
A. I don't know, definitely.
97. Q. Admiral, aerial torpedoes were used in the attack, were they not?
A. Yes. sir.
98. Q. Would you please outline the facts related to the protecting of ships in Pearl Harbor with respect to attack by aerial torpedoes, what had been done and so on?
A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet had received a letter from the Chief of Operations in which the question of placing nets around ships in Pearl Harbor was discussed. It gave the information that one net, a single net, was forty per cent effective and another net, if spaced 100 feet apart, was ninety per cent effective. That made the outer net 190 feet from the ship's side. CNO wanted recommendations from the Commander-in-Chief concerning the netting in of ships The Commander-in-Chief and I discussed the matter. I was not very familiar with the capabilities of aircraft torpedoes but I recollect the Commander-in-Chief asked the Navy Department, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, in what depth of water could an aerial torpedo be expected to be used effectively. I remember a letter
coming back from the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance which stated, in effect, that judging from our own torpedoes that seventy feet was necessary for their effective use; seventy feet of water. The water in Pearl Harbor is forty-five feet deep, and I think when the Commander-in-Chief got that information that he then wrote a letter to the Chief of Operations and the Navy Department. The Chief of Operations and the Commander-in-Chief agreed that there was no need for netting in the ships. I have heard subsequently that a letter was afterwards written by the Bureau of Ordnance modifying the original letter. I never saw the modifying letter and I'm unfamiliar with it.
99. Q. Would you consider the matter of safety through static means of the ships, from attack by torpedo while in Pearl Harbor, as your responsibility?
A. The operation of netting in the ships would be a function of the District forces; the net depot would handle that task, using their craft and their nets. If I had thought it necessary, I would have recommended it to the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief might have had other ideas. One of our seaplane take-offs is right up the Pearl Harbor channel; the best take-off area  we had. And at one point in this take-off it had to pass within, I think, two hundred feet of one of the berths in order to get the necessary straight runway to take-off with a loaded seaplane. Naturally, I didn't want to place any obstructions in the Harbor unless it were absolutely necessary. Moreover, the question of getting ships in and out quickly was affected by whether or not they had nets around them and I don't think the Commander-in-Chief or the Commandant of the District wanted to hamper their mobility or their ready mobility unless it was absolutely necessary. I knew little or nothing about the effectiveness of the net except what I was told by the Bureau of Ordnance: forty per cent by the single net and ninety per cent with the double net. I knew very little about whether torpedoes could be used in shallow water of forty-five feet and I depended on the technical sources of information. When the matter was referred to the Commander-in-Chief by the Chief of Operations and he reached a conclusion, I assumed that that was final. I agreed with him and did not protest his decision. After all, the matter was referred to Washington and the Bureaus in Washington probably had more information--certainly had more information than we had on the subject--so no question was raised about it at all. The practice is today there to net ships. Of course, they have ample supplies of nets there for that purpose. At the time this question was brought up, we didn't have enough nets to maintain the gates; when we first put the gates down in the Harbor, we had to use old net which was left over from the first World War and didn't get our new nets--we didn't get our nets for Midway until quite late. In other words, regular nets weren't forthcoming in quantity.
100. Q. About how late did you get a sufficient supply of nets for the gates at Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Midway, and so forth?
A. We had our nets in Honolulu installed in the summer of 1941, but, as I recall it, the Honolulu gate was made up of 1918 net and sometime subsequent to that we received enough net to replace that with new net. I don't know how late it was. As far as Midway is
concerned, we had projects at Midway for installation of nets but I don't believe that at the beginning of war they had been actually installed at Midway. That's my recollection. I'm quite certain after the 7th of December when I wanted nets for dry docks, caissons, floating dry docks, and for ships at anchor, we didn't have nets and we had to improvise. We tore down fences, tore down the fence between Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, took the extruded material that was used for the fence and welded it, lapwelded it to other sections in order to get a sufficient baffle that we could hang in the water at the ends of docks and around ships. And in so doing, of course, we had no knowledge whether that kind of net would be any good at all, but it was the best we had. We also took all of the target rafts we had and hung sections of fence below them and put them in front of the dock caissons and some of the important repair docks.
101. Q. Are you able to say that the nets would not have been forthcoming had you asked the Department for them?
A. I'm unable to say that with any authority.
102. Q. Admiral, was it necessary that this seaplane area, to which you have referred here as requiring the passing of the vicinity of the berth, be used at all times? I mean were there times when only that one seaplane area take-off was available?
A. We had two areas. One was north of Ford Island and one was south of Ford Island. That area was the best area for taking off and was used when  possible. Sometimes it was not possible to use that area. Sometimes it was not possible to use the other area because we were continually conducting dredging operations in the Harbor and had these dredges and piles stuck out and we might have to use the other area. Pan American planes usually use the area north of Ford Island. There were times though that either one or the other could not be used.
103. Q. What types of ships use the berth adjacent to this take-off area south of Ford Island?
A. We had one carrier berth there and I think four or five battleship berths, although the battleship berths could take other types depending upon whether they were filled, or not.
104. Q. On the 7th of December, were the berths alongside of the south side of Ford Island filled with battleships?
A. Yes, with the exception of one ship, I think they were in pairs; two ships in each place, an outer and inner ship. The practice was for the battleships to come in north about Ford Island and go down and head out. They were always moored heading out, and the arrangement of the berthing was made by Commander, Battleships. The berths were assigned to him and he could assign them as he saw fit; he usually assigned them in the sequence for sorties: so they could move right out.
105. Q. It was he who made the decision to moor them in pairs, although that practice wasn't in compliance with the letter 2CL-41?
A. He made the decision how they were to be berthed. He was limited in his choice by the number of berths he had available and the number of ships he had in port. The battleships, I think, were in two separate task forces, and, one was supposed to be at sea while the other one was in port, so that the station and liberty facilities would
not be congested. But on the morning of December 7, I think all available battleships were in Pearl Harbor, both task forces, eight battleships.
106. Q. Were those most severely damaged in the outer position at the moorings?
A. Yes, sir. The ones in the inner berths practically escaped torpedoes except in the case of the--I think it was the HELENA and the OGLALA were moored abreast at 1010 pier. The HELENA was torpedoed; she was outside. She was torpedoed but the explosive effect was enough to sink the inner ship too, the OGLALA.
107. Q. There were no other berths available so that the use of pairs could have been avoided?
A. I think not. There were two carrier berths on the north side of Ford Island. I think they were known at F-7 and 8, or F-8 and 9. I've forgotten the numbers. They were built for carriers and, on this occasion, one had been assigned to the UTAH and one had been assigned to the RALEIGH.
108. Q. Who was the senior officer present at Pearl Harbor other than the Commander-in-Chief?
A. Vice Admiral Pye was present. He was the next senior. He was not on board his Flagship at the time of the attack.
109. Q. Do you know whether a sortie order was issued following the attack?
A. I believe it was. An order was issued to sortie in accordance with the security plan and quite a number of ships went out; small ships. The NEVADA was attempting to go out when she was attacked and torpedoed. She was the only battleship that actually got under way.
110. Q. Do you know who issued the sortie order?
A. I'm not sure but I think it was issued from the Flagship of Admiral Pye.
111. Q. Admiral, during 1941, do you recall having received from the Navy Department any intelligence concerning professional, personal characteristics of the leading Japanese Admirals?
A. No, I don't recall any.
112. Q. Did you ever hear the characteristics of Yamamoto, for instance, discussed?
A. Not prior to December 7.
The witness was advised that he would be recalled at a later date for further examination, was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 12:28 p. m., took a recess until 2:30 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.
The examining officer introduced Leonard D. Brown, civilian, as reporter, who was duly sworn.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the examination, and was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Benjamin Katz, Commander, U. S. Navy, Officer in charge of the Code Room of the Navy Department.
2. Q. Commander, are you the regular custodian of the classified communication files of the Navy Department?
A. Yes, sir, I am the custodian of classified dispatch files.
3. Q. There are certain dispatches which this examination would like to have. I will give you the dates of those and if you are the custodian and have them in your custody, will you please produce them. The first is a dispatch of 16 October 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
A. I have one that is addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and also to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 6".
4. Q. If you have the dispatch of 24 November from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, please produce it.
A. I have the message.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 7".
5. Q. If you have a dispatch addressed to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, by the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 27 November 1941, please produce it.
A. I have that message also.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked Exhibit "8".
6. Q. If you have a dispatch addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations on 29 November, please produce it.
A. Yes, sir, this is it.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room Navy Department Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked Exhibit "9".
7. Q. If you have a dispatch in your custody addressed to the Commander-in-chief Asiatic Fleet, information Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, by the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November 1941, please produce it.
A. I have it, sir.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department Washington, D. C . A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked Exhibit "10".
8. Q. If you have in your custody the dispatch of 3 December, 1941,  addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, please produce it.
A. I have that.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department Washington, D. C . A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked Exhibit "11".
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 2:50 p.m., adjourned until 9:30 a.m. tomorrow.