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PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 1944
THIRD DAY
                                                        NAVY DEPARTMENT,
                                                        Washington, D. C. 

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the second day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Admiral Smith, I am directed by the Secretary of Navy to record testimony pertinent to the facts attending the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December. My precept states that this is for the purpose of having on record testimony which eventually might be lost due to death or any cause which might make a witness unavailable when the time comes. There is possibility that this testimony will be used in future legal proceedings. Now, in such testimony as you give us, I ask that as far as you can, you speak from your knowledge which you had prior to 7 December and from facts which presented themselves to you before that date. I realize that that is a long distance back, and if at any time you have means of refreshing your memory from documents, or otherwise, we will stop and permit you to do so.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. W. W. Smith, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, serving as Director, Naval Transportation Service, Naval Operations.

2. Q. What was your assignment of duty on 7 December 1941?

A. Chief of Staff, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. On what date did you assume the duties of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet?

A. On February 1, 1941, the date on which Admiral Kimmel became Commander-in-Chief. I might add that I served a year and a half, prior to that date, as Captain of one of the Admiral's cruisers

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when he was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet; and before that date I don't recollect having seen him.

4. Q. As the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific or United States Fleet, did you supervise all the divisions of the Staff?

A. Yes, everything.

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5. Q. Then everything that transpired between the Staff members and the Commander-in-Chief passed back and forth through you?

A. Yes, it did. The Commander-in-Chief very frequently would have certain members of his Staff in his office, and spent a great deal of time down in the War Plans Office, and I had other things to do, but nothing was ever completed without my knowledge. I was in his confidence all the time.

6. Q. Did this relate only to matters of major importance?

A. To everything. The usual thing in the morning was to look over the dispatches and talk with him, and then the Fleet Intelligence Officer would come in with his later information. Then, the members of the Staff would be called together at least once a day, not always a full conference, but the people concerned.

7. Q. Were you shown all confidential, secret intelligence concerning the Japanese, both from the Navy Department and from the Staff organizations on Oahu?

A. Yes. My recollection is, we got very little on Oahu except Fleet Intelligence, which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on the war, but we had radio intelligence, and every time the three Force Commanders were in port, or even one or two of them, as a matter of fact, the Commander-in-Chief would have them over, and his Type Commanders who were in port, and have the Intelligence Officer point out on the chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of where all units of the Japanese Fleet were, at the time.

8. Q. Were you present at such conferences?

A. Yes, all of them.

9. Q. What other members of the Staff were fully informed of all intelligence in this manner?

A. Always the War Plans Officer, who was Captain, now Rear Admiral, McMorris; and the Operations Officer, Captain DeLany, now Rear Admiral DeLany; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, and the Fleet Communications Officer, and as many others as the Commander-in-Chief thought necessary, but those four were always in on it.

10. Q. By "Fleet Intelligence Officer", do you mean Layton?

A. Yes, sir; Commander Layton.

11. Q. You don't include Rochefort?

A. No, sir. Rochefort was Combat Intelligence Officer under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and was not brought into these conferences at all.

12. Q. Do you feel that the Commander-in-Chief kept you fully advised as to his thoughts and reactions to all such intelligence information?

A. I do. The Commander-in-Chief showed me every letter he wrote, or received-wrote to or received from the Chief of Naval Operations. These letters were usually personal letters because the Chief of Naval Operations had used that form of correspondence for long before Admiral Kimmel took over, and these papers had to be considered

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as official papers and they were filed, although they were personal letters. The Commander-in-Chief numbered them all, and I saw everything that he wrote or received.

13. Q. Do you know where that file is, at present?

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A. So far as I know, it is still in there with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It was there when Admiral Nimitz took over, as are also the letters of Admiral Richardson, who preceded him; he left his personal file there, too, because he said it was official business.

14. Q. Were you afforded an opportunity to express your views to the Commander-in-Chief concerning matters of major importance?

A. Yes, sir; always. I might add that that was one of the first things the Commander-in-Chief told me when he took over, that he had had experiences in the past where people were not kept informed and he wanted me to remind him to keep his Force and Type Commanders informed of everything that was going on.

15. Q. What members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff messed with him?

A. Only the Fleet Operations Officer, who was Assistant Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff, i. e. Admiral Kimmel, DeLany, and myself. When McMorris, War Plans Officer, was with us at sea, he also was a member. Now, when he moved ashore the mess was increased to include the War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris; the Fleet Aviator, Captain A. C. Davis, now Rear Admiral Davis-and I think that is all.

16. Q. The Staff conference-was it a daily routine matter?

A. No, sir. There was no set hour for it. He had a conference practically every day, and he would send for the people that he wanted. He would usually have over there officers from the Fleet at the same time. He also very frequently, at his conferences, would send for Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye. l have known him to have Admiral Pye over there two or three times a day. Admiral Pye was important.

17. Q. Admiral, would you please advise us as to the organization of the Pacific Fleet just prior to Pearl Harbor, both as to the Type Organization and the Task Force Organization, as you recall it?

A. The Type Organization had existed for considerable time. That is, the Commander Battleships, Commander Destroyers, Commander Cruisers, and the Commander Scouting Force, who was Admiral Brown. One of the first things that Admiral Kimmel did was to split them up into three task forces, exclusive of submarines. Admiral Pye, who commanded the battleships, had one task force consisting of battleships and destroyers; Admiral Halsey had a task force of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers; and Admiral Brown-Wilson Brown-had the third task force, in which he had a carrier, cruisers, and destroyers; and for operation or exercise purposes, battleships would be transferred to those task forces. One task force was always at sea and very often two, and they held exercises against each other. Sometimes all three would be at sea.

18. Q. Were there task forces, other than those you have mentioned, which were composed of the combatant ships?

A. No, sir; except the submarines and the service force, there were only those three major task forces. Patrol Wing Two was organized as a task force to operate with the Fleet.

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19. Q. How about the forces ashore, sir?

A. Well, with the exception of the Fourteenth Naval District, the Navy had no forces ashore. Of course, they had Marines and an offshore patrol of destroyers, under Com 14.

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20. Q. Was the Fourteenth Naval District a Task Force, a subdivision of Admiral Kimmel's command?

A. Yes, the Fourteenth Naval District was under Admiral Kimmel's command, and it was listed as a Task Force under his command. I have forgotten just exactly what it was called, but the Fourteenth Naval District has always been under the command of the Commander-in-Chief.

21. Q. How did Patrol Wing Two fit into this Task organization?

A. Patrol Wing Two was under the Commander-in-Chief, based on land, and furnished planes-was used mostly for a constant patrol of the areas in which the Forces were operating. There was a daily patrol at all times, regardless of whether the Fleet was operating south of Oahu or north, the operating area was always protected by planes, against a possible submarine attack, and, of course, Patrol Wing Two also had planes at Midway, and made trips to Midway and Wake. The Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Admiral Bellinger, was very often brought over to the Commander-in-Chief's and assigned a task in connection with the operations that were projected.

22. Q. Did the Commander of Patrol Wing Two come under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, he did.

23. Q. Would you explain just how that relationship works?

A. You see, he was based on Ford Island and was within the Commandant's jurisdiction, but both were under the Commander-in-Chief, and he was subordinate to the Fourteenth Naval District, but Admiral Kimmel very frequently would assign him a task, without going to Admiral Bloch.

24. Q. Was the organization of the Pacific Fleet by Forces and Types a published document?

A. My recollection is that it was issued monthly.

25. Q. Was the Task Force organization similarly published?

A. Yes, it is all a matter of record.

26. Q. Admiral, would you please explain the relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander, in Hawaii?

A. Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a week or two before General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken over as Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see him, both were in civilian clothing, and discussed all the problems of the Pacific as Kimmel saw them. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were better than those I had ever seen between a commanding general and an admiral, either there or in other places. They were together, I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with their Staffs, and sometimes more frequently than that. We always invited the Army to take part in our exercises, and then developed a relation such that Army planes would use Navy fields and Navy planes would use Army fields. It was found that the bombs of one would not fit the racks of the other, and that was remedied. The relations between the Army and the Navy out there were excellent.

27. Q. Under the official set-up, Admiral Bloch, rather than Admiral Kimmel, was the opposite of General Short, was he not?

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A. No, sir. Admiral Kimmel never looked upon it that way. He felt that he was General Short's opposite.

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28. Q. Was it not the case that the War Plans, and other official documents, were based upon the probability or possibility that Admiral Kimmel would be absent from Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir; and in the book known as "Joint Army and Navy Action", the chart shows Admiral Bloch as the one, and the diagram leads to units of the U. S. Fleet, if present; but Admiral Kimmel felt that when he was present, he was the man who should deal with the Army and with everything else. He took that responsibility.

29. Q. But nothing in the way of official arrangements on paper to that effect, was ever drawn up, was it?

A. To my knowledge-no, sir.

30. Q. That seems to have been an arrangement which might have left Admiral Bloch in some state of uncertainty as to his own relationship with the Commanding General. Do you recall any difficulties incident to that?

A. No, sir, I do not. As I have said before, Admiral Kimmel sent for Admiral Bloch very frequently and I never saw anything in Admiral Bloch's attitude indicating that he resented that. I have known occasions when Admiral Kimmel went to Admiral Bloch's house at night, on receipt of information, to talk things over and ask his advice. He had a great deal of respect for Admiral Bloch.

31. Q. Admiral, under the provisions of the Joint Action Army and Navy, what method of command as between the Army and Navy was in effect at Hawaii?

A. My recollection is that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had the predominate interest, and I think General Short recognized that fact.

32. Q. Although the mutual cooperation method was actually in effect, was it not?

A. Yes, sir. You see, when Admiral Kimmel took over, the first thing that I did before assuming the duty as Chief of Staff, was to inquire all of the means of defense of Oahu. Pearl Harbor had no defense whatever, in itself. I was informed that the Army had no airplanes less than six years old-six years, in design. The Army had some 36 portable 3-inch guns that could be thrown around Pearl Harbor for the air defense. We were not very much impressed with that and realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor would have to be by the Fleet, itself, which it was.

83. Q. Returning to this Kimmel-Bloch-Short relationship, the War Plans, Joint Action Pamphlet, and all, very definitely put the Navy's part of the responsibility for the security upon Bloch, did it not?

A. Yes, sir.

34. Q. Was the reason that the Army and Navy business was between Kimmel and Short, instead of between Bloch and Short, duo to the fact that Bloch had practically no force, or was it due more to the physical presence of Kimmel in Pearl Harbor during those months?

A. Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under his command and that when he was in port he had the responsibility and he dealt directly with Short. Probably one reason was that he had a force that Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that Bloch was his subordi-

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nate while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army. Usually however, he would call in Admiral Bloch if he had anything important to say.

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35. Q. Then the primary reason was Kimmel's physical presence at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir; and, of course, when he moved ashore, which was in the summer of 1941, after he moved ashore and was there all the time practically, he just assumed that responsibility of a permanent nature.

36. Q. In speaking of responsibility, do you include responsibility for the Fleet units' safety, as well as for the installations, themselves at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. The plan put out by the Admiral, fifteen days after he took over, directed the Fourteenth Naval District, as well as the Fleet units, what to do in case of an air attack or a submarine attack. The ships' moorings were changed so that they were moored in sectors where each ship would have a clear arc of fire, and all the moorings would be covered, and if one task force was out, the moorings were shifted to maintain that arc of fire; and if one area was not occupied. the one task force coming in was told where to distribute their ships and where to tie them up so that every arc of fire could be covered It was realized that the only defense was by the Fleet. There was no defense ashore, except the net or the gate.

37. Q. Was this letter that you referred to subsequently revised?

A. It was revised about the middle of October, 1941.

38. Q. I show you Exhibit 4 before this examination. Could you identify that?

A. Yes, that is the one, revised. The original issue was the 15th of February. This was revised the 14th of October.

39. Q. Does this document, Exhibit 4, contain all instructions that Admiral Kimmel issued with respect to the defense of the base at Pearl-the security of the base at Pearl Harbor?

A. To the best of my recollection-it is a long time ago, of course- everything is in that letter. I don't recall anything else

40. Q. This letter, Exhibit 4, prescribes certain tasks in connection with the security of Pearl Harbor, to be performed by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Many of these tasks involved coordination with the Army. Was it Admiral Kimmel's intention that Admiral Bloch operate directly, or cooperate directly, with the Army in this connection, or through him?

A. I think, directly; I am quite certain, directly. You see, the Commander-in-Chief occasionally went to sea for tactical exercises and Admiral Bloch had to carry on directly with the Army

41. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief apprised of all the plans that were adopted between the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, sir.

42. Q. Were you familiar with the Joint Defense Plan which was signed by the Commanding General of the Hawaii Department, General Short, and Admiral Bloch, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. I don't remember it.

43. Q. This is Exhibit 5 before this examination, and is that plan?

A. Frankly, I do not remember having seen that document before.

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44. Q. Admiral, was the status of the Fleet, with respect to materiel and personnel, satisfactory to Admiral Kimmel at the time he assumed the command thereof; that is, of the Pacific Fleet?

A. No, it was not; he demanded such things as radar-at the time he took over, to my knowledge, there were only radars on four cruisers and on the carriers. He asked for it on all ships. He asked for additional aircraft guns. He asked for self-sealing tanks for airplanes, and when he finally got them, they had to be installed at Pearl Harbor. He continually asked for men. He demanded them so many times that some members of the Staff advised him that he was only boring the Department with it, because he usually got an answer back that the men were not available. He would ask for 20,000 men; 10,000 to fill vacancies in the Fleet, and 10,000 for more training, because he knew that men had to be sent back for new construction, and the answer he invariably got was that, "The men are not available. They are needed in the Atlantic." In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor, we received an official letter stating, "I know that you would like to have 20,000 men, and we would like to give them to you." As I remember the exact wording: "The war is in the Atlantic and we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific." That letter was actually received a few days after Pearl Harbor, although written before, of course.

Note: The examining officer identified the letter mentioned by the witness as being one in the form of a personal letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to Admiral H. E. Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941, file No. FF12/MM(55), and copy is now on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room of the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

A. (Continued.) The letters from the Chief of Naval Operations were usually personal letters, but they were along the same line, such as, "I have seen the President and I am sorry but he will not give you any more men." And while talking along that line, I might say that in-I think it was towards the end of May, 1941, while at sea, we issued orders by calling destroyers alongside, and detached the YORKTOWN; Battleship Division Three, which was then the strongest division of the Fleet; Cruiser Division Eight, of four modern cruisers; and, I believe, two squadrons of destroyers, which sailed under sealed orders, went through the Panama Canal and into the Atlantic. Those ships were all returned after war was declared, and they were equipped with all of the modern devices that we had tried to get for them while they were in the Pacific Fleet.

46. Q. What was the result, in your opinion, of these personnel and materiel shortages on the training program-the efficiency of the training program of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I think it did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet. As a matter of fact, the complements had just been revised and I have always felt that they were unnecessarily large. The Fleet was adequately manned, and I considered the ships very efficient and the efficiency of the Fleet was not harmed by this; but, the Commander-in-Chief was looking into the future when he would have to send these men home for new construction.

46. Q. Did that condition ever develop, prior to the 7th of December, whereby the Fleet was reduced due to transfers to new construction?

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A. No, it did not; not below the level necessary.

47. Q. Did any of these matters affect the maintenance of the Fleet and the efficient condition of maintenance of materiel?

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A. No. Units of the Fleet were sent to the Coast shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed his duties of Commander-in-Chief for degaussing and the installation of armor-what do you call it-splinter armor around the decks and anti-aircraft guns. We had a plan mapped out approximately a year in advance for the overhaul of ships when they needed docking and repairs, and that was continued and was in effect when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The materiel condition of the Fleet was all right. It was satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief.

48. Q. Were you able to keep abreast of the program of alterations as laid down by the materiel bureaus of the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir; pretty well.

49. Q. Did it interfere with the operations and training of the Fleet to carry out this program

A. No, it did not.

50. Q. Did these conditions such as you have outlined have any adverse effect on the morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet?

A. As far as morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet is concerned, remember that the Fleet went out there in April of 1940, with the idea of carrying on a six-weeks Fleet problem, and was held out there indefinitely. The morale of the Fleet did not suffer. In the summer of 1941, we arranged a schedule whereby small task forces of one or two battleships, cruisers, and destroyers would proceed to the coast of California and remain there for a period of approximately ten days, and return. The force was never large enough to weaken the Fleet, and this step was not taken until at a conference with his Flag Officers, the Commander-in-Chief discussed the question and it was decided by all that it would be a very good thing for the Fleet to keep some of them constantly going back to the coast. About this time, we had completed a stadium which seated about 5,000 men. That took care of the morale of the men pretty well. There may have been a question in the minds of the Flag Officers, and some Captains, as to why they were being kept out there-I had heard discussions of that, unofficially-knowing that part of the Fleet had been moved to the Atlantic Coast. A great many felt that the Administration was keeping them out there unnecessarily since there was no danger of war in the Pacific. The movement of part of the Fleet to the Atlantic Coast undoubtedly had some effect on the minds of the personnel in the Fleet. The health of the officers and men of the Fleet was never impaired by remaining in Pearl Harbor, in fact, it was excellent.

51. Q. Did the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor, rather than on the mainland, affect the materiel conditions and the materiel readiness of the Fleet?

A. No, it did not.

52. Q. For war?

A. No, it did not. I might add to that last statement, that he often discussed the question of the condition of the Fleet, and we felt that it was better out there than when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Commander-in-Chief making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for

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the day and shooting, that he found the best thing was for them to take them out for a week and keep them going day and night.

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53. Q. Within your knowledge, did Kimmel ever make any definite recommendations that the custom of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor should be changed-during 1941, I am speaking of-and returning to the old way of basing on the California Coast?

A. To my absolute knowledge, he never made such a recommendation by letter or dispatch. In July, I think, 1941, he made a trip to Washington. He was accompanied only by Captain McMorris. If he ever made any such recommendation, it might have been done at that time, but I think I should have heard about it. I never heard him say to me or any member of his Staff, that the Fleet should return to the Coast, although he knew that his predecessor had recommended it.

54. Q. Referring to your statement about feeling within the command which was promoted by the transfer of certain powerful units to the Atlantic Coast, do you think that the mental attitude of the various senior officers in the Fleet was in any way adversely affected by the long maintenance of the position in Hawaii?

A. No, I do not. By that statement, I meant that the danger of immediate outbreak of war might have been more evident to them had the units of the Fleet not been taken away. There was no dissatisfaction or loss of morale.

55. Q. Then, I understand you to mean that, in your opinion, the general war-mindedness of the personnel of the Fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii?

A. Yes, sir, I think it was. You see, in the early part of our stay out there, the entire Fleet was anchored at Lahaina Roads, with all lights on. I think the Fleet did get war-minded, because they began moving into Pearl Harbor, and even moved the carriers in-moved everything in, and, of course, invariably operated without lights.

56. Q. Admiral, you have stated that when you assumed the duties of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, you made a survey of the Army's ability to defend Pearl Harbor. Please state any knowledge you have of subsequent improvements in the situation m that respect, if any?

A. The situation was considerably improved after the arrival of General Short. He had modern planes out there, modern fighters, before the war broke, P-40's, some Flying Fortresses, and I have traveled across the Island and seen the fighters staked out. When the attack came on Pearl Harbor, after the warnings they had, the Army had assumed, as perhaps they had been trained to, that if there was to be an attack, there would be sabotage, and they feared sabotage more than an attack, and brought them all in the hangars, and that is why they were all burned up.

57. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel familiar with the state of personnel and materiel readiness of the Army to carry out its commitments as to the defense of Pearl Harbor, just prior to the Japanese attack?

A. Yes. He had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the Marines-off of the outlying islands, and all the Marine and Navy planes in the outlying islands, and replacing them

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with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they [41] would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke beforehand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports", or words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out.

58. Q. This was a definite order issued by the two Departments?

A. Yes, sir; by dispatch.

59. Q. About what date?

A. To the best of my recollection, about seven days before Pearl Harbor.

60. Q. What was to be done with the Marines and the Marine planes?

A. That we did not know. We wondered why-whether they were needed elsewhere. We thought perhaps that it was planned to prepare an expedition force and the Marines were needed elsewhere. No member of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff knew why that was done, and we still don't understand why it was not carried out, or what they had in mind-what the Department had in mind at the time.

61. Q. Had the Army situation with respect to anti-aircraft artillery been bettered?

A. Not to my knowledge, no.

62. Q. Did they have facilities for obtaining early information of the arrival of enemy forces by water or air?

A. The Army?

63. Q. The Army.

A. No. The Army had just built a radar station, but it was not in operation. They had a Naval officer named Taylor, a Reserve, who had had considerable experience in England, and he was assigned to the Army with the idea of teaching them how to operate the radar. but it was not in full operation, and of course the radar of the ships was no good because they couldn't go through the hills surrounding Pearl Harbor.

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64. Q. The fact that the Army radar station was not functioning was known to Admiral Kimmel, was it not?

A. Yes. It had just been completed and was not ready for operation. It had been on that morning of 7 December but he hadn't known it.

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65. Q. Were you familiar with the local defense forces available to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to execute his functions in connection with the security of Pearl Harbor?

A. I was, at the time. I doubt if I could quote them now, however.

66. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel also familiar with this situation?

A. Yes.

67. Q. Was it your belief that the Army and Navy, operating through the local defense forces, were capable of furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack?

A. We thought so at the time. I realize now, we were not.

68. Q. Were you familiar with the plans for reconnaissance and inshore-off-shore patrol then in effect?

A. Yes.

69. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel take any action, to your knowledge, to augment the forces of the Army and the Fourteenth Naval District prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, at any time, in order to enable them to carry out their defense functions?

A. He continually asked for more Navy planes. What recommendations he made for the Army, I don't recall, or what recommendations General Short made, but I know that they conferred on it very frequently. I don't believe that Admiral Kimmel made recommendations for building up the Army-General Short would make those recommendations to the War Department.

70. Q. Did he augment the local forces with any aircraft or vessels of the Fleet, to your knowledge, for defense purposes?

A. Well, he had a destroyer off-shore patrol that was built up, and, as I say, the operating forces were always protected by air coverage against submarines. We were very submarine-conscious and one reason for that was that we had several sound contacts-perhaps all of them were false. On one occasion, which was in the month of February, before Admiral Kimmel had been in command a month, we had a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head, and it moved slowly so that they had it for 36 hours. It occurred again a month later. We never found exactly what it was, but we had officers go over to the Bishop Museum to learn all they could about the waters around Honolulu, and came to the conclusion that it was two different water levels, or water temperatures. The destroyers had claimed that they had heard propeller noises. At one time, Admiral Kimmel, about 6 o'clock in the morning, told me to issue orders to Admiral Draemel to bomb this thing, depth charge it. Before the order went out, however, he canceled it, and reported the fact to the Chief of Naval Operations, saying that he had no authority to do this, except within the three-mile limit around Pearl Harbor, and the reply he got was "Thank God you didn't. It might have caused international difficulties," or words to that effect. So, we had so many of these contacts, probably all of them false, that we were submarine conscious more than air-conscious, and I think every one in the Fleet expected if an attack came, it would be by submarines

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rather than aircraft. You will notice that that order covers both air and submarine attack, but I believe that the people of the Fleet felt little danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

71. Q. Was this off-shore patrol maintained at all times, or intermittently?

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A. At all times.

72. Q. What belt around Oahu did it cover, in distances?

A. The area south of Pearl Harbor. Occasionally we had destroyers go around the Island at night, but our destroyers at that time were not equipped with radar, they were equipped with sound. There was not a constant patrol around the Island, we didn't have enough destroyers for that purpose, but there was a constant patrol in the operating area south of Pearl Harbor.

73. Q. Do you know if any other patrol, either air or destroyer, was maintained by either the Army or the Navy?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there was no patrol maintained by the Army. The patrol maintained by the Navy was as extensive as Commander PatWing Two felt he could make it. He claimed that he did not have enough planes to maintain a patrol, daily patrol, in all directions from Oahu, and for that reason the air patrol was confined to the operating areas-the regular patrol.

74. Q. Do you know whether the statement or views of Commander PatWing Two were based upon the fact that a continuous air patrol would fatigue personnel and wear out materiel, or was he referring to his inability to make such a patrol over short periods of time?

A. Based entirely on materiel.

76. Q. Long-range, every day?

A. Yes. The planes wouldn't stand it.

76. Q. Then the only two types of normal patrol maintained, say, a month before Pearl Harbor, that you know of were destroyers offshore, and the air patrol covering the operating areas?

A. Well, we had a Patrol Wing at Midway. of course, and the very frequently patrolled back and forth, going by way of Johnston's Island; and of course we had planes on Wake, but there was no patrol such as we use today, the long-range, daily patrol.

77. Q. Would you please explain what action was taken by the Task Forces while at sea to obtain information of important enemy movements in the close vicinity of Pearl Harbor?

A. When the Task Forces were engaged in operations, they were blacked out at night. They had destroyer protection. There was no long-range search, however, made by the carriers with planes, against an enemy.

78. Q. They were not, then, considered as a part of the reconnaissance facilities for the defense or security of Pearl Harbor?

A. Not until the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when Admiral Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, was given instructions by Admiral Kimmel not to return with the Task Force but to take 18 Marine fighters out to within 200 miles of Wake and fly them off, because the Commander-in-Chief was not satisfied with the defenses of Wake, and of course it was for that reason that the ENTERPRISE was not lost, because she was due to be in the port, where the UTAH was tied up, during the attack. Before he left, Admiral Halsey said "This is a very secret movement. What shall I do in case I meet

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Japanese forces?" And Admiral Kimmel said "In that case, use your own discretion." And Admiral Halsey replied "Those are the best orders I have ever received, and to keep my movements secret, if I find even a Japanese sampan, I will sink it." So that trip I believe Admiral Halsey had an air search out all the time, in fact, I know he did.

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79. Q. Under the Army-Navy agreement, responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack, bombardment from ships, and landing forces, of course is all Army responsibility. Are you sure that you have conveyed to us all steps known to have been taken to ascertain the Army's readiness to meet their commitments on Oahu?

A. Yes, sir.

80. Q. About how many Army pursuit planes did you understand to be available on Oahu?

A. Something in the vicinity of a hundred, I should say.

81. Q. What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards personnel?

A. Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based upon our observations during Fleet Operations, when their Flying Fortresses would come over at almost smoke-stack level, and showed an utter disregard for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not very good.

82. Q. Now, you are talking about the Army bombers, or the Army pursuits?

A. Both.

83. Q. Insofar as you did give thought to the possibility of a Japanese air raid, what did you consider the most effective defense against it?

A. The most efficacious defense against it, we felt, was from our own carrier planes, and when the attack occurred, our carriers were all at sea.

84. Q. Do you say that because of the doubt you had of the efficiency of Army aircraft?

A. That is part of it, yes, sir. I may be unjust to the Army in that. It may have been prejudice on the part of Navy fliers, but the opinions expressed by our aviators, as I saw, were not very complimentary to the Army fliers.

85. Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning?

A. Yes, sir.

86. Q. Then, if you realized the danger of such an air raid, which events proved was not only possible but probable, you would have seen that outside of anti-aircraft gunfire, there was no security to our installations in Pearl Harbor, including the Fleet,-is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

87. Q. Do you recall the Fleet Aviation Officer having given any opinions or advice on the matter?

A. No, sir; I do not recall that he ever did.

88 Q. Admiral, you were familiar with the basic War Plans in effect in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, were you not?

A. Yes.

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89. Q. Were you familiar with the missions assigned therein to the United States Pacific Fleet?

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A. I do not recall what the detailed mission of the Pacific Fleet was, except that we had no orders what to do in case of war, or where to go.

90. Q. Do you recall whether the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were offensive or defensive, in their nature?

A. My recollection is-they were defensive.

91. Q. Do you recall whether they called for any contemplated movement to the westward?

A. I am positive they did not. I am now thoroughly familiar with the War Plans, but I know that the Fleet had no orders or plans to move to the far westward, such as to relieve the U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

The witness was directed to refresh his memory on the point in question, and be prepared to answer in more detail later.

The reporter withdrew and Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

92. Q. Admiral, what intelligence organizations were available to the Commander-in-Chief to give him enemy intelligence, with respect to the Japanese particularly?

A. There was the intelligence organization of the Fourteenth District, and there was the intelligence officer. The Fleet Intelligence officer and his assistant, a Lieutenant Hudson, were both Japanese-language-speaking officers. Just what intelligence they got from the Army, I do not recall. We had our dispatches, of course, from the Department and radio intelligence. The Fleet Intelligence officer believed he knew where all units of the Japanese Fleet were and would report them from day to day. Of course, it turned out he was wrong.

93. Q. The Commander-in-Chief then was given the intelligence information available in the Combat Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Oh, yes.

94. Q. Were you also acquainted with such information?

A. Yes, every morning the Fleet Intelligence officer came to the Commander-in-Chief about nine o'clock in the morning, after the Commander-in-Chief had read the morning dispatches, and gave him the latest information. I was always present when he did.

95. Q. Did the Office of Naval Intelligence provide the Commander-in-Chief with periodic information as to Japanese current movements?

A. I can recall only their pamphlets, stuff that they regularly put out. I don't recall any dispatches from Naval Intelligence.

96 Q. Are you familiar with their fortnightly summaries that they provide to the senior command afloat?

A. Yes.

97. Q. What information was furnished concerning Japanese naval leaders?

A. The best information that we received on Japanese naval leaders came through Commander McCrea on his return from a mission to the Commander-in- [56] Chief Asiatic. That was a week before Admiral Kimmel took over and gave Admiral Hart's estimate of each one of these Japanese naval leaders and was the best estimate we ever received. I can not recall that we ever received one from Naval intelligence or from the Navy Department.

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98. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel receive this information from Commander McCrea?

A. Yes, he and Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, the War plans officer, and I were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in the commander-in-chief's cabin when McCrea came through and we had an all afternoon conference. McCrea read out from this little book that he carried these comments. They were copied down and put in the secret file.

99. Q. Did his information include information concerning Japanese Admiral Yamamoto?

A. Very much so; yes. As I recall the comment on him, he was efficient and bold, a poker player, and dangerous. I may have those words wrong but that's the impression I got at the time.

100. Q. During 1941, was Admiral Kimmel informed as to the duties being performed by Admiral Yamamoto in the Japanese Navy, as to his position?

A. I'm quite certain; yes.

101. Q. The Commander-in-Chief was in touch with anything vital in the way of local intelligence obtained in Hawaii, was he not?

A. Yes, sir, except that we did not have access to the files of the cable office. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some effort to get these files. My recollection, it was taken to Mr. Mackey of the Postal Telegraph, being contrary to the United States law to divulge a telegraph or cable message. At that time, there were certain Japanese codes which we could break and the intelligence officer felt that if he could get those messages he might learn what was going on. We didn't get them until three days after Pearl Harbor. We never got anything from that before the war.

102. Q. Do you know anything of an attempt having been made to arrest or otherwise segregate suspected Japanese agents?

A. I remember an incident a few months before the war where an American came from San Francisco; he had communicated with the Fleet Intelligence Officer before doing so. He was in the employ of the Japanese and was sent out by the Japanese, by plane. The intelligence officer made contact with him by placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we removed from the files two or three papers, mostly on the results of target practice, and gave them to this American who flew back to the West Coast and, as the result of all this, a Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe a Charlie Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Department intervened and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was returned to Japan. What happened to the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew that the money had come from the Japanese Embassy. We did not know of the activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii, although it had been developed years before that some of the priests were ex-Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick, who had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was made to deport one of these priests, but is was found nothing could be done because of an old agreement between the United Stated and Japan, based upon our missionary activities of the past, that once a man in the religious status arrived in the country, if he chose to undertake other activities, nothing could be done about [47] it. I know that Admiral Bloch knew of that case. In the summer of 1940, when

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Admiral Richardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the entire Fleet one afternoon well off shore and a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that no one beyond the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief knew why we were out. We changed course after dark and stayed at sea for a week or more, preserving radio silence, and engaged in no real tactical operations. What this was all about, I have never learned. But on our return to port, I learned, through Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the part of Japanese communication between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii trying to learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were Japanese agents working but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Commander-in-Chief did not know who these Japanese agents were. We suspected all of them.

103. Q. Then you do not recall a discussion between the Army and Navy at Oahu concerning the rather wholesale arrests or segregation of some agents?

A. No, sir, I do not. I believe that the Army did have certain Japanese spotted with the idea of taking them in, in case of war, but I did not take any active part in discussions of that.

104. Q. Other than daily reports by Layton, in which he considered that he knew the location of all important Japanese naval units, do you recall receiving any other similar intelligence during the last few weeks of 1941?

A. We had frequent dispatches on the course of events from the Navy Department. The last of which I believe was the 27th of November. No, sir, all that I received was through the Fleet Intelligence Office.

105. Q. On or about 1 December '41, where do you recall that information to have indicated the important Japanese naval units to be?

A. I can not recall that in detail. One Fleet was supposed to be at Truk, and, to the best of my recollection, the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in Empire waters.

106. Q. What about the carriers?

A. We had no knowledge of those; no. The Fleet Intelligence Officer said that he did not know where they were.

107. Q. Do you recall any difference of opinion between the radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning the location of enemy carriers?

A. No, sir, I do not.

108. Q. Admiral, you have referred to certain dispatches received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Navy Department with relation to the international situation in the Pacific. I have here Exhibit 6 before this examination, dispatch of 16 October 1941, addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets, which I will give to you and ask whether you are familiar with that dispatch

A. Yes, sir, I remember it.

109. Q. This dispatch was received by the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, sir.

110. Q. It is noted that this dispatch refers to the grave international situation and indicates possible action, aggressive action, on the part of [48] the Japanese. Do you recall whether the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff made any estimate of the situation in the Pacific in the light of the contents of this dispatch?

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A. To the best of my recollection, no specific change of plan was made because we had received warnings constantly-I should say weekly-for a period of more than a year; warnings long before the commander-in-Chief ever took over, or Admiral Kimmel ever took over. These were in the form of letters, usually from the Chief of Naval Operations, who frequently wound up his letters by saying "It may happen tomorrow." So that the Fleet had been pretty much on the alert from the time it got out there. I don't recall that anything was done particularly about that dispatch; the 16th.

111. Q. The dispatch also provides that the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet inform appropriate Army and Navy District authorities. Do you know that this was done?

A. Yes. I may get that mixed up with a later dispatch. Frequently, those dispatches of that nature were taken over by the Fleet intelligence Officer in person to General Short and Admiral Bloch was always asked to come over and read them in the Commander-in-Chief's office. In a later dispatch, General Short was sent for; a dispatch of that nature which I think was dated the 27th of November. There were so many of those that I may confuse one with the other.

112. Q. We'll get to the others shortly and you may have some comment on them in general. Now I'd like you to confine your testimony about what you know about the individual ones. Do you know whether or not any discussion of the meaning and the possible repercussions which might follow, meaning of the contents of this dispatch, were discussed by the Commander-in-Chief with General Short or with Admiral Bloch or both?

A. I can not recall in this specific case, but I believe that every one of the messages of that nature were discussed by General Short, Kimmel, and Admiral Bloch.

113. Q. What was the nature of such discussions?

A. Well, usually we would call in members of the Staff and, as I said before, Admiral Pye, if in port, and would exchange ideas and information on it.

114. Q. Did these discussions include coordinated efforts to resist any attempt by the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?

A. Frankly, I do not believe that the Commanding General or Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel expected an attack upon Pearl Harbor, except by submarine.

115. Q. Was there any discussion as to the availability of the proper means on the part of any of the Services to carry out its functions in protecting Pearl Harbor in the light of the warning?

A. The warning was not made that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. The warning indicated that the attack would go elsewhere. We never received a warning about an attack on Pearl Harbor.

116. Q. Was there any contemplation by any of the parties that conferred of an attack on Hawaii by air, any time that you recall?

[49]

A. No, I do not, except, as I stated before, the ships were so berthed that they had a clear arc of fire for anti-aircraft guns in all four sectors, and that when a task force came in, the senior officer of a sector invariably reported that he had taken over command of that sector. I believe that's laid out in that October 15 letter.

117. Q. Do you ever recall that General Short asked for any assistance from Admiral Kimmel in providing for the defense of Pearl Harbor should it be attacked by air?

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A. No.

118. Q. Do you ever recall Admiral Bloch asking for assistance from the Fleet carrying out the functions assigned him by the security letter, Exhibit 4?

A. No, never.

119. Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 6, further provides that the Commanders-in-Chief addressed, including Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, should take precautions, including preparatory deployment as will not constitute strategic intention or constitute provocative action against Japan. Do you recall the action taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in response to this directive?

A. My recollection is that in each one of those cases, including the one you mentioned, his alert was sent to the forces in the operating areas and, on those occasions, the training exercises were halted and the ships assembled with their destroyer screen and placed, until further orders, as a Fleet and still kept at sea. The ships in port however, were not moved out. Conditions of readiness were prescribed for ships in port.

120. Q. You speak of the task forces being alerted. Do you mean that a prescribed state of readiness was designated?

A. I believe the October 14 letter told what to do. The message was sent out: Task force operating at sea. Dispatch striking unit. Make appropriate defense disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea. Dispatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Defense Officer and Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

121. Q. It is your belief then that after receipt of this dispatch of October 15 and its further promulgation to the forces afloat, that the action-preparations were made to take the action contemplated by the security letter?

A. On several occasions that was done.

122. Q. Was this concentrating of ships intended as a protective measure for the task force or for offensive action, or as a protection to the base?

A. Not for the protection of the base. For the protection of the heavy ships in the task force and to organize a striking force if the enemy were sighted. There was no idea of protecting the base with the Fleet.

123. Q. Are you familiar with any movements of forces other than those incidentally at sea which resulted from action taken as a result of this dispatch, Exhibit 6?

A. That's not quite clear.

[50]

124. Q. Are you familiar with any other deployment made or movement of ships or aircraft or personnel in compliance with the directive contained in this dispatch, other than the concentration of task forces incidentally at sea?

A. No, I'm not.

125. Q. I show you here a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic, Pacific Fleet, and certain Naval District Commandants, Exhibit 7 for this examination. Are you familiar with that document?

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A. I recall it vaguely. It does not stand out in my memory. As I say, it was one of several. I may confuse one with the other, but I notice that it speaks of attack on the Philippines or Guam.

126. Q. Do you know whether this dispatch was received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not swear to it; no.

127. Q. I have here Exhibit 8 before this examination which is a dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets for action. Are you familiar with that dispatch?

A. Very much. This is the one that I remember above all others. This was received somewhere in mid-afternoon of the 27th of November. General Short was immediately sent for and the conference was held and by six o'clock that evening the Army was on the march. Unfortunately, what they did was to station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, the bridges-in other words, they alerted against sabotage; sabotage because it was the consensus from this dispatch that the attack would, as it states, be against the Philippines or Thai or Kra Peninsula, possibly Borneo. What was considered most likely by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at sea and, by the Army, sabotage from the enormous Japanese population in the Islands. At that time, we had two of the three task forces at sea and one of these returned on the 5th of December, which placed two in port, 1 at sea, but the carrier of the task force returning on 5 December remained at sea to deliver planes to Wake.

128. Q. Admiral, at the conference with General Short, was this dispatch carefully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers so as to determine its exact meaning, insofar as it could be determined?

A. I should say yes, certainly.

129. Q. Was the study made in the nature of an estimate of the situation?

A. No. But remember this is only one of a great many warnings.

130. Q. Were any decisions arrived at as to coordinated action to be taken with respect to the security or defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of this warning?

A. I think the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except the danger of sabotage by the large Japanese population in the Islands. That's to the best of my recollection.

131. Q. Did the question of possible attack by air arise?

A. No.

[51]

132. Q. Was the Navy fully apprised at that time of the contemplated action of the Army; I mean the alert against sabotage only?

A. I was not. I don't believe the Commander-in-Chief was.

133. Q. Was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District present at this conference?

A. Yes. He got there before General Short did.

139. Q. Were measures to be taken by his task force-that is the Commandant's Task Force-discussed?

A. I don't recall.

135. Q. Was any action taken in the light of this dispatch to augment the forces of either the Army or the Commandant of the Four-

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teenth Naval District, so as to assist them in defense from air attack? A. Not that I recall, although a squadron of B-17's took off from the Coast a few days later and actually arrived on the morning of Pearl Harbor. Whether that was instigated by the Commanding General or by the War Department, I do not know. They arrived with machine guns mounted and no ammunition, during the attack.

136. Q. Were the task force commanders at sea apprised of this warning?

A. Yes, they were apprised of all warnings received

137. Q. Were they given any specific directives with respect to action to be taken by the task forces in the light of the warning?

A. Only that as laid down in the directive of 15th of October.

138. Q. Was any action taken to change the condition of readiness of the vessels at Pearl Harbor in the light of this warning?

A. It is very difficult for me to recall that because I get confused between that period and the period immediately afterwards when we shifted from Condition 1, 2, and 3 so frequently. I believe that we did before the war, but I may possibly be in error on it.

139. Q. You mean the condition of readiness of the ships in the Harbor were changed during that period?

A. Yes, they were frequently done for drill purposes also, before.

140. Q. But you do not know what condition of readiness was taken following the receipt-

A. (Interposing) No, I do not. It should be shown in the files however, of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

141. Q. Admiral, you will note in the dispatch a directive concerning a deployment. State what you considered that directive to mean when you saw it.

A. It was impossible to keep the entire Fleet at sea at all times and had we put the entire Fleet at sea, every time we got a warning, the Fleet would have been worn out. As it was, we were fueling our task forces at sea. As I remember the decision was made to take the precautions that we had for months laid down in case of one of these warnings, but to make no change in the disposition of the forces in port. As I say, at the time of this warning, two of the three task forces were at sea. It was at this time, however, that the Commander in-Chief sent the ENTERPRISE task force to deliver planes to Wake and that Force was fully prepared to take offensive action against anything it might meet. There was no disposition made by the Fleet for the defense of Pearl Harbor, because I believe that no one on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff or his force believed that an air attack would be made on Pearl Harbor.

[52]

142. Q. Was what the dispatch says concerning a preparation for doing something else a consideration when it was decided not to change any movements?

A. We had sufficient forces at sea to do what the war plan called for.

143. Q. Do you recall what ships were returned to Pearl Harbor between the receipt of this dispatch and 7 December?

A. Yes, sir, the task force-I believe it was Admiral Pye's Task Force that returned on the 5th of December, two days before Pearl Harbor, with the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers; also part of Admiral Halsey's Task Force.

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144. Q. Did that considerably increase the number of ships that were in the Harbor?

A. Very considerably. When that task force entered Admiral Brown's Task Force departed, I think on the 4th of December, and that Task Force had no battleships in it. He had the LEXINGTON and some cruisers and destroyers in his Task Force. So the result was we had two of the task forces in port when this thing happened; two of the task forces, with the exception of the ENTERPRISE, Admiral Halsey-and accompanying light forces of Task Force Two.

145. Q. Then, in effect, rather than a deployment involving movement outward, there really was a movement of ships inward after the receipt of the war warning?

A. Yes, but not as a result of the war warning. This was our planned operations for the month. It may very well be that these plans were known to the Japanese and that they chose their time when we had scheduled two task forces in port. They were operating on schedule. It was not changed as a result of this.

146. Q. In other words, the operating schedule made and printed weeks previously was not departed from?

A. Yes, sir, that's correct, with the exception of the one outfit going to Wake.

147. Q. This particular dispatch (indicating Exhibit 8) is different from all other warnings received previously in that the words "War Warning" were used. What was your own reaction to those particular words?

A. My reaction was we knew that negotiations were still going on; Mr. Kurusu had flown through a few days before; we were in great doubt as to what was happening. Mr. Kurusu's plane broke down in Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and I said, "No, it may be that the plane was told by the Administration to break down. They know more what's going on than we do. Let him stay there."

148. Q. Didn't that happen considerable time previously?

A. Not very long previously, to my recollection. Previous to this dispatch, yes.

149. Q. But this dispatch states that negotiations have ceased.

A. As a matter of fact, they had not ceased, Admiral.

150. Q. Then the use of the words "War Warning" did not impress you as requiring any increase in security precautions or any departure from the scheduled routine deployment?

A. No, sir, with the exception of the protection of ships at sea as laid down in our October 15 directive. They did not impress me that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

[53]

151. Q. And in your recollection, all others with whom you were officially associated had reactions similar to yours?

A. Yes, sir

152. Q. After the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral, is it not true that you realized that a greater part of the arc of approaches to the Pearl Harbor area were not covered by any air or surface forces to give information as to the approach of any possible enemy?

A. Yes, sir.

153. Q. Was this matter discussed at the conferences, either with the Army or by Admiral Kimmel?

Page

A. The danger of ever having an attack on Pearl Harbor?

154 Q. The fact that so much of the arc was not covered by any means.

A. No, sir. That is the last warning that I recall, except that we got one about 5:30 p.m. on the 7th of December, through the Army. It had originated the day before and was sent by cable. It was delivered by General Short's Aide to us some ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

155. Q. I have here Exhibit 9 before this examination, Admiral, which is a dispatch transmitted by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief-to certain Frontier Commanders, with copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It is dated November 28, 1941. Are you familiar with it?

A. I don't recall this message. I probably saw it at the time but I don't recall it. I note that it states that this WPL will not be placed in effect in the Pacific.

156. Q. Admiral, I have here a dispatch, Exhibit 11 before this examination, addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and Commandants Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, dated December 3, 1941 Are you familiar with that dispatch, sir?

A. Yes, I remember that.

157. Q. Upon seeing this, did you not consider that the steps being taken by the Japanese were extremely significant as point out future action?

A. I did.

158. Q. Did it leave much, if any, doubt in your mind that they were about to make a hostile move?

A. No. In fact, as I recall, we had, by that time, received word from the Asiatic Fleet that heavy Japanese movements were on the way to the southward. It did not occur to us, however, that the attack was coming in our direction.

159. Q. That is, your reaction was that the Japs were about to go to war with someone but it, in no way, conveyed to you any increased imminence of danger of an attack against Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir. I believed, from previous warnings that we had had, that the attack was going to be possibly against the Philippines but toward the Malay Peninsula.

160. Q. And within your remembrance, was the reaction of the others with whom you were associated at Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters quite similar to yours?

A. Yes, sir, it was.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:30 p. m., adjourned until 9:80 a. m., tomorrow.