NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C.
The examination met at 2: 45 p. m.
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fourth day until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.
The examining officer introduced in evidence a copy of a letter, dated 10 March 1944, from the examining officer to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, informing him of the progress of proceedings had under the precept, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 20".
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station, sir.
A. Walter S. DeLany, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness, of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941, sir?
A. Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.
3. Q. And how long had you been performing those duties?
A. Well, since February, 1941, when Admiral Kimmel took command, and previous to that, I had been his Chief of Staff when he was ComCruBatFor.
4. Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on 7 December 1941. Please state the facts within your knowledge concerning the attack and the major events leading up thereto. It is
especially desired that you cover the following, and a written copy of this question is handed you so that you may refer to it as you testify: Forces available to CinCPac, with organization thereof. Briefly, the general nature of the tasks assigned in the War Plans to the Fleet during the early phases of war with Japan. Methods of training the Fleet prior to the attack and the relationship of this  training to the war tasks. Consideration given by CinCPac and his Staff to the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor and security measures adopted with respect thereto. Information available as regards the imminence of hostilities with Japan with the source thereof. Action taken by CinCPac during the weeks preceding the attack in the light of such information. Relations with the Army Command on Oahu, particularly with respect to mutual cooperation in the preparation for war.
A. Well, I think so far as the first question there, "Forces available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with the organization thereof," the most accurate statement of the forces available appears in the Commander-in-Chief's Confidential Letter 14CL-41, of 31 October 1941, which canceled a previous organization of a similar nature, and is a revision of the task force organization.
5. Q. May I interrupt, sir? Do you have in your custody a copy of that order? I would like to introduce it in evidence and then give it back to you, so we would know where it is.
A. I have the Chief of Naval Operation's file copy of it, because when I saw this question, I went to the files of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and got his copy.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
NOTE: because of the confidential nature of the document it was returned to Admiral DeLany. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked Exhibit 21.
A. (Continued) I would like to have this included. I want to point out that this reference is not a new concept of the organization of the Pacific Fleet, because the Fleet had been organized into task force organizations, the same as this, ever since about April of 1941. The main difference between this and the previous letter was that it made the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District a task force commander under the Commander-in-Chief whose primary mission was to train, organize, and develop the island bases in order to insure their defense and provide efficient service to the Fleet units engaged in operations. It also provided on paper for the organization of submarines and patrol planes into task forces, although this was true before this letter of 31 October placed it into the Fleet Organization on paper.
6. Q. Would you like to go right ahead, sir?
A. So far as this next general statement is concerned, the War Plans Section of the Staff was continually keeping Pacific plans up to date, and was forced to revise them continually because I think you are familiar with the fact that the Pacific Fleet had been rapidly decimated in that carriers and battleships and destroyers and transports and other types had been withdrawn from the Fleet. The concept of what could be done in the Fleet with the forces available had to be changed continually, with the reduction of the forces that became available to the Commander-in-Chief. So far as the situation around
Pearl Harbor was concerned, we did keep a plan which was in possession of the Duty Officer continually, on what would be done with the forces in the Fleet that were available in the  in the event that we were informed that war had been declared against Japan. One of the things was the raiding forces to the northward, and another, as I recall it, was a strike in the Marshalls. It was not possible to make those things effective because of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Plans were actually available and the people on the Staff knew what they were, and everybody knew what they were supposed to do.
This question of "training the Fleet" I think I have already mentioned the fact that one of the first things the Commander-in-Chief did when he assumed command out there was to change the organization of the Fleet from a type organization into a task force organization, with the available forces in the Pacific Fleet roughly divided into three task forces, so that the types of the Fleet could become familiar with the requirements of inter-type tactics in a combined task force. That even went so far as to require the patrol planes and the submarines to be assigned to the surface ship task forces. In all training exercises in the operating areas, the surface, submarine, and air forces available in the Pacific area conducted coordinated and inter-type tactics. In addition to that, the Army Air Forces were always invited and usually did participate in the exercises at sea. Their long-range planes would come out and look for the task forces operating in that area. It is my personal belief that so far as that joint training was concerned, there was a very clear understanding between the people of my own echelon of what the joint problem in the area was.
I believe that there is, there must be, copies of the letters on file which were issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which required Army planes to land on Navy fields and to be serviced by the Navy, and required Navy planes to land on Army fields and be serviced by them. I think there was a very definite understanding between the people that Army and Navy bombs had to have certain modifications in order to fit into each other's planes, and all that had been taken care of in the training exercises that had been conducted before this 7th day of December.
The Fleet letter which the Commander-in-Chief issued early in February and then kept modernized, so to speak, indicates the concept which everybody had out there, that it was a joint responsibility and a joint job to do what they could do to defend Pearl Harbor in in the event of an attack. I think everybody realized that the defense of the Island did depend on the Navy there, because certainly the Army didn't have any ground forces, anti-aircraft installations, radar, or any thing else that would make Pearl Harbor a well-defended operating base. The training of the Fleet had been given such consideration, and as I say, it was organized into what the Commander-in-Chief's concept of a war task force would be. I believe his concept has been shown to be correct because if we look at any of the task forces that appear in this letter we see that their organization is almost identical with the present carrier task forces.
Our training operations were not confined to particular areas. We operated to the northward of the Island and operated to the southward of the Island. The Commander-in-Chief personally discussed this training with the Commanding General out there, and I know,
so far as any relations with the Army on my  own level were concerned, that we discussed them frequently. We used Army facilities in our range-finding checks. We developed the use of smoke outside the harbor. And the Army was enthusiastic about the training cooperation they got from us because they had high-speed targets running around the Island that they had never had before and I am sure that we appreciated very much the service we got from them I know the same thing existed about air, because I mentioned that before. The training was not only conducted with the idea of training the Fleet in seagoing tactics in the operating areas, but as that letter there shows, we also had given quite some consideration to the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I believe that you are familiar with the defense letter that shows how carefully the ships had been moored in Pearl Harbor and how the sectors were assigned and what the whole concept of the defense was.
We did conduct numerous air raid drills, and whenever a drill was conducted, we carefully analyzed what had been done at the drill, so far as communications and joint cooperation was concerned. In that connection, I feel that the Commandant of the District there, too, was entirely familiar with the whole concept of the thing because he was the Base Defense Officer, so far as local defense was concerned, and as I pointed out, in this letter here he was actually a task force commander within the Pacific Fleet organization for outlying bases. It wasn't only the defense of Pearl Harbor that was involved but also the defense of the outlying islands with which the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was concerned. I know that nothing was undertaken having to do with the training for the defense of the bases that the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General of the area were not consulted about.
This next thing of "surprise attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor"-I will say it this way-from my own personal point of view, and with a rather complete knowledge of the dispatches and correspondence within the command out there, I did not and never would have expected that the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor as they did. I believe that everyone there was of the opinion that our danger lay in the fact that submarines might operate in the area and also that there might be sabotage on the Island. The general concept of our defense of the Island and the security of the Base there was based on that idea. I believe that you know that in several instances that it was suspected that submarines might be operating off the Island and I think probably it is a part of the previous record, the decision that the Commander-in-Chief took regarding his defense of the Island against submarines and the exchange of correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department on the question of dropping depth charges on what was supposed to be sound contacts off the Island.
I have covered the training and general set-up that we had for the security measures around the Island, and I believe that the security letter of the Commander-in-Chief's which was in effect at the time was quite indicative of our concept of what might happen there.
7. Q. May I interrupt, Admiral? This is Exhibit 4 before the examination. May I ask if that is the letter to which you have been referring?
A. Yes, 2CL-41 of October 14, which revised previous letters on that same subject.
8. Q. And that is the one to which you referred?
9. Q. I just wanted to get the record straight.
A. (Continued.) This question of "Information available as regards the imminence of hostilities with Japan", I believe I saw every dispatch that came into the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters out there, and there had been a series of these dispatches, but I think in no single instance was there any expression in any dispatch which indicated that anybody here in Washington, or anybody any place else, had the belief that hostilities would open with an attack on Pearl Harbor. The information, I think, indicated that there were movement of transports and the Japanese Fleet. There was every indication that something was going to break because the dispatches indicated burning codes, and so forth, but from my own point of view there as I said before, there was nothing in any dispatch which indicated that hostilities would be started the way they did.
"Action taken by the Commander-in-Chief during the weeks preceding the attack", I know that the Commander-in-Chief was fully aware of the fact that a tense condition was existing, he appreciated that, and, in my opinion, he took proper precautions to safeguard the Fleet whenever it was in the operating areas conducting vital training exercises. I believe that he was familiar with the terribly weak defense of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense of the place from an air attack lay in the anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet and I believe that his letter there, which we referred to before, his security measures, indicated that he had given a lot of thought to that. As I mentioned previously, he did have a plan which everyone on the staff knew about, as to what would be done with the Fleet there in event hostilities did break out, and I feel certain that the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Area, and every senior officer in the Fleet organization was given the information that the Commander-in-Chief had. I know that the Commandant and the Commanding General attended numerous conferences when this whole matter was discussed.
This "Relations with the Army Command on Oahu, particularly with respect to mutual cooperation in the preparation for war"-I think that the Commander-in-Chief, as I said before, discussed all matters with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Area, and that there was a mutual understanding of what cooperation was going to he required under a joint effort in the Hawaiian Area. I think that the Army was entirely familiar with the efforts that the Navy was making to secure more equipment for the Navy in the area, and I believe, too, that the Navy was familiar with the communications that went on between the Commanding General and the War Department in his effort to get more material into the Hawaiian Area. They both appreciated that whether it was anti-aircraft, radar, or aircraft, or anything else, the whole area was woefully weak and both of them knew of the efforts that the other one was making to get snore of such materials. I feel that the training exercises that were conducted by the joint effort out there indicates that there was an understanding of the problem, and I can certainly say that the re-
lationships between the Army and the Navy out there was one of complete understanding and very close relationship.
10 Q. Admiral. do you feel that everything was done that was possible with the forces under your disposal, under the Commander-in-Chief's disposal, to secure early information of possible attack considering the shortage of aircraft suitable for that purpose, and the shortage of ships, the necessity  for carrying on the training program, the general situation, in the light of the warning dispatches-did you consider that you had done everything reasonable?
A. Yes, within our concept, as I said before, and the belief that enemy activity within the area would be confined to submarine activities and sabotage within the Island.
11. Q. Admiral, are you familiar with the dispatch that was received on the 27th of November which contained a war warning which is Exhibit 8 before this examination?
12. Q. Do you know, sir, whether Admiral Kimmel discussed this dispatch with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?
A. I believe that he did, and, as I say, that with the feeling that I don't believe any dispatch ever came to the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters of this importance that was not discussed before the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General.
13. Q. Were you present at this discussion?
A. Yes, I am quite sure I was.
14. Q. Did it discuss an interpretation of the meaning of the dispatch with respect to the war warning angle?
A. Yes, and. as I recall the thing, I believe that the Island was alerted on this dispatch and I believe that the Commander-in-Chief put certain aspects of that security letter in effect with the forces afloat.
15. Q. Admiral, this dispatch, Exhibit 8, requires certain action in the nature of deployment. Will you please state, as well as you can recollect, your reaction to the meaning of that provision?
A. I think the fact that the Fleet was organized into task forces which, from the concept of the organization and the missions assigned to them were to be offensive in nature, indicates the actual deployment of the Fleet. The fact that the Commander-in-Chief issued, or rather, directed compliance with certain paragraphs in 2CL was indicative of the fact that he appreciated a situation had arisen wherein he had to take action to prevent a surprise attack on the Fleet at sea from submarines which, as I said before, was the general concept that everybody had of the way that action might be taken in the Hawaiian Area. No further action so far as offensive deployment or offensive steps should be taken in this thing because the very nature of the organization of the Fleet was such that the Fleet had been organized and ready for a deployment for offensive action.
16. Q. Admiral, do you know of any action taken by the Commander-in-Chief other than that you have outlined in compliance with that directive?
A. So far as aircraft is concerned, Commander ComPatWingTwo was given orders to accelerate the refitting of all the planes in the
Hawaiian Area which had come to us without self-sealing tanks and other offensive war equipment on board. I don't remember when the submarines were sent out on patrol at Midway and Wake: I don't recall whether that was incident to this dispatch, but I am quite sure it was very close to this time.
17. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with the Army's aircraft warning service-radar?
A. Yes, I think I was. Of course there wasn't very much to be familiar with.
18. Q. Do you recall its condition as to readiness for use on the 7th of December?
A. I believe that the radar itself was operative, and that certain periods were assigned for training operators. I know that not only the Commander-in-Chief's Staff but the people in the Naval District and the Army and ComPat Wing Two's Staff had paid a lot of attention to the aircraft warning set-up that was to go into the District, because the organization actually appeared on paper, a diagram of the stations, the personnel that were required to man it, had all been actually prepared and, well, all we needed was the equipment which just didn't get there.
19. Q. The Commander-in-Chief's Staff, then, didn't rely on it for any information at that time.
A. No, because the whole warning service that was in existence on that day was just the normal telephone communication that existed in the Island, and as I said, the radar itself had just been installed and was being used for training operators. The idea that the Island would have an air warning service was fully accepted, and we knew that we were supposed to get the equipment but it had not arrived and we were prepared to use it as soon as we could get the equipment because, as I said before, the actual diagram and layout of the whole warning service, organization, equipment, personnel, and the need for the respective stations had all been drawn up.
20. Q. Admiral, you stated several times that you and other members of the Staff didn't think a surprise attack by air possible at Pearl Harbor. Could you develop your reasons why that wasn't taken into consideration, or was deemed an improbability?
A. I believe that I am correct in stating that the last information which we had regarding the location of the Japanese Fleet placed them in home waters. I believe the idea that the Japanese Fleet would come to the Pearl Harbor area for an attack was not considered likely because of the inherent danger that was involved, and also the fact that from my own point of view, and that was discussed out there, there was one thing that would inflame Americans into war and that was an attack on their home territory. We frankly felt that with the indecision that we knew and interpreted from the dispatches as to what America would do if Japan went into the Malays or went into India, or went into any other place,-it was such that the Japanese must have been of the same opinion that we had there, that the one way to incite America into the war was to come over and attack the Hawaiian Islands and I believe, and still feel as I always felt that the one single thing that put America in the war with a bang, was the attack on Pearl Harbor and I don't believe anything else would have done it. I think that there was a lot of discussion about that around the Pearl
Harbor area as to just what an attack of Pearl Harbor would mean to the United States, and to throwing the United States into a full war effort, and all-out against Japan.
21. Q. In that formulation of opinion did you give much weight to the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders, Admiral Yamamoto, in particular, who had been described as bold, reckless, an air expert, a man who built up the Japanese Naval air forces; was that given much weight?
A. Yes, I think that that was discussed, among other things, in the general concept of what might happen in the event that Japan decided to take some offensive action.
22. Q. During that tense period preceding 7 December, were the outlying islands, notably Midway, Guam, and Wake in particular, a matter of great concern to the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?
A. Yes, sir, very definitely so, and it was at the insistence of the Commander-in-Chief that the defenses of Midway and Wake were pushed and strengthened, because I think he appreciated the value of those two places. As you know, prior to this time, the Army and Navy out there were quite involved in a discussion which originated here in the Navy Department as to putting planes on those islands. The Commander-in-Chief made the decision, himself, to put Navy planes on those islands and as you know, the task force was out there at the time of the attack putting planes on both the islands. In addition, everything was set up and patrol planes were actually operating from Midway.
23. Q. Did the Departments' proposal to make certain shifts in those garrisons from Marines to the Army cause additional worry and concern?
A. Yes, they did; because so much was involved in the thing. There are differences in the tables of organization of the Army and the Marines. The Marines are set up with a defense battalion organization and I believe I am correct in saying that there is nothing comparable to that in the Army setup. And, there was the fact that it would have meant shifting not only personnel but equipment, with vital shipping and other things involved. Then there was a continued discussion as to whether Army fighters would go into the islands, and we just couldn't see how that could be done, and that caused a lot of concern and was a subject of many conferences not only between the Commander-in-Chief and the Commanding General but also between the respective members of the Army and Navy Staffs out there.
24. Q. And it came at a bad time?
A. Yes, sir; I think it was just about the time this dispatch was received, if I remember correctly. (Exhibit 8.)
25. Q. In late 1941, what were your own thoughts concerning the correctness of the Department's action in continued basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?
A. Well, to be very frank, Admiral, it is my own opinion and I believe it is the opinion of other people that were there, that we could not see the consistency in basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, with the idea of having it as a threat to Japan, and at the same time being continually advised of the fact that whenever we asked for material, we were more or less told that the war was in the Atlantic, and that we were continually being picked upon to get units of the Pacific Fleet
moved into the Atlantic Ocean. Admiral Kimmel had the same point of view because I believe that his trip to Washington, here, in the early summer of 1941, one of the subjects of discussion, involved that very thing.
26. Q. As seen by you as the Operations Officer, were the attendant difficulties of maintenance of supplies and materials, supplies for the Fleet, health and morale of personnel, such as to make that long-continued basing out there questionable?
A. So far as the morale of the officers and enlisted men of the Fleet was concerned, the biggest single factor that came into that was the one of indecisiveness. I believe that the sailorman's nature is such that he is satisfied to serve where he is ordered, if he knows that is what he is going to do. The rather indecisive attitude about whether you were going to stay at Pearl Harbor or whether you were going back to the Coast, and what you were going to do, was a matter of concern to everybody out there because it did make it very difficult to handle the whole morale situation. As you know, we did attempt to send units back to the Coast to let them get a bit of a blow back there, but I do believe that the question of nobody knowing just what was going to happen, whether the Fleet was going to stay out there, was a difficult thing to overcome. So far as the material conditions of the Fleet were concerned, it is my opinion that the organization of the Fleet into task forces which required the operating part of the Fleet to be at sea for as long as ten days, in which they were continually busy, and then permitting them to come into port for a period of ten days, contributed to the betterment of the material conditions of the Fleet because you had a long enough time in port to overhaul, and people knew that they were going to be in for that length of time and the entire up-keep project for that period could be laid out. I do believe that the material condition of the Fleet was improved by the operations of the Fleet by the task forces. I don't believe that the continued steaming for ten days, under normal conditions, so far as maintenance, engineering plant, and so on, were concerned, affected the material condition of the Fleet. So far as supplies, and so forth, were concerned, well we just didn't get any of the new material that we read about in letters and books that came to us, so that we weren't too much affected by that except to hope and pray that our turn would come to get something.
27. Q. The Fleet's presence out there increased the war-mindedness of the personnel, did it not?
A. It resulted in the development of a lot of war time practices which were beneficial to the Fleet when war was declared, in that every type of ship out there was required to fuel at sea, every type of ship was required to go into a reasonable organization that was practical, battle organization, instead of just a paper one, because when the Fleet went to sea they actually stood condition watches, and a lot of paper organization that existed in all types had to be revised to meet war time conditions. I think that the fact that the Fleet was required to steam darkened, and the fact that they exercised inter-type tactics developed an understanding between the task force commanders and the lower echelons of the different types, that proved invaluable in war. As to whether or not people became war conscious out there, I believe that everyone realized that the situation was getting graver and that there
would be a war with Japan, but I believe that the war-mindedness turned more toward war time training than it did toward the actual thought that today or tomorrow we were going to be in a war.
28. Q. One of the personal duties of the Operations Officer was the getting out of a periodical known as "Schedule of Employment", is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
29. Q. For what period did you get them out-how long ?
A. They were originally prepared on a quarterly basis which attempted to match up task force operating periods with navy yard overhauls, and also the  requirement that certain types be degaussed, and have the new anti-aircraft splinter protection put on I believe I am safe in saying that practically none of those quarterly employment schedules were ever carried out in their entirety because different units of the Fleet would be detached and either sent to the Atlantic, or in the later summer, instituted the convoy systems to the Philippines, so that all those employment schedules were deleted or continually under revision.
30. Q. But they were gotten out for a three months period, at the time?
A. Yes, sir.
31. Q. About how long before a period began was the coming schedule issued?
A. As I recall it, about six weeks before the end of the quarter the task force commanders were required to submit their next quarter's schedule, and that they had about ten days to put that in, and then at the end of that time, the whole quarterly schedule of requirement for services, such as aircraft, and target vessels, and things like that, were discussed and the schedule appeared probably three weeks before the beginning of the next quarter. That is my recollection of it.
32. Q. The schedules were printed?
A. Yes, sir.
33. Q. Under what classification?
A. I believe that up until about June or July they appeared in a Restricted Classification, and after that, they were Confidential. That is my off-hand remembrance of the thing.
34. Q. About how many copies of that were printed each time?
A. I don't know.
35. Q. Was it available for the scrutiny of a good many people?
A. I would say that every commanding officer and all the heads of departments on board ships had access to the thing, in view of the fact that all of the heads of departments of the ships were interested in the ship from a training and material point of view, on the schedule.
36. Q. Well, I gather from that testimony that for any potential enemy who is bent on a surprise attack, possession of one of those schedules would have been invaluable, would it not?
A. Under normal conditions, yes, sir; but as it developed, I think the schedule that appeared in print for the last-for the second quarter of the year, was not actually effective on the 7th of December because it did not, as I recall, contain the carrier trips to either Midway or Wake. That is something that has to be verified, but that is my own recollection.
37. Q. But I understand that there were a considerable number of copies of that printed document, and in all, they were in the hands of a good many individuals?
A. That is correct.
The reporter withdrew and Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
38. Q. Admiral, coming back to this Exhibit 4, which is Pacific Fleet confidential letter 2CL-41, we have been given to understand that the preparation of this document was in the hands of your operational section of the Staff, is that correct, sir
A. Yes, sir.
39. Q. With respect to the air patrols that were to be maintained, this provides for daily search of the operating areas, air patrols covering entries and sorties. Would you please state why, if you recollect, air patrols were limited solely to these patrols?
A. Well, the main reason was we felt that the possibility of a submarine attack in the operating area was something that we had to guard against. The patrols on sortie and entrance were definitely with the idea of attempting to prevent any blocking of the channel in and out of Pearl Harbor. The patrols that were maintained were a part of the routine work of the patrol planes there, entirely separate from long-distance training flights which the Commanders of the Patrol Wings there carried out, and were also dependent on the number of long-range patrol planes which were available in the area actually flyable and the limited number of pilots that were available.
40. Q. Were you familiar with the large type Army airplanes that were available to the Hawaiian air force in the months preceding Pearl Harbor?
A. Generally, yes.
41. Q. Was consideration given to the augmenting of the overseas patrol with this type of plane?
A. Not as a part of the regular long-distance search, but I believe I'm correct when I say that long-range Army planes actually trained with and flew with Navy patrol planes for Army training in navigation and overseas flights.
42. Q. Admiral, as Assistant Chief of Staff, were you and the other members of the Staff thoroughly satisfied with the intelligence reports you were getting; in other words, did you feel that you could rely on the information that you had? I'm referring back to the earlier questions as to why the air attack was so much discounted as a possibility.
A. In answering that, I'll say that I believe that the information that was furnished us from our own Staff Intelligence Officers and from the Intelligence Officers of the Fourteenth Naval District, between whom there was very close cooperation, was the best information that those two sources could assemble and prepare for presentation to the Commander-in-Chief from what they were able to get in the area.
43. Q. Were you fully aware that their sources were inadequate, in a sense?
A. Yes. I feel that there was a general feeling among all of us out there that we were more or less operating in the dark, not only from the information that we were able to collect by our own means in the Pearl Harbor area but also the information that was furnished us from other sources.
44. Q. Would that answer be descriptive of your attitude both as to location of Japanese units and as to the international situation and probabilities of an immediate war?
A. Definitely yes to both.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 4:10 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.