NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C.
The examination met at 10:14 a. m.
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the ninth day of the examination until such time at is shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Wilson Brown, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President of the United States.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 7th of December, 1941, sir?
A. I was in command of what was known as Task Force 3 of the Pacific Fleet. My orders to sea duty designated me as Commander, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet; I am not quite sure whether my orders from the Navy Department were ever changed from Scouting Fleet to Commander of the Task Force. The thought has just occurred to me, I rather think they were, but my orders on December 7 as Commander, Scouting Force, may not be correct.
3. Q. In the weeks leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you not have administrative duties in connection with the Scouting Force, in addition to your duties as Task Force Commander?
4. No, I never had any administrative duties. The administration was carried out by type commanders and as the Commander of the Scouting Force, I had no matters of administration. I had, by designation, some administrative duties ashore which had to do with some of the recreation bases for the men and other administrative duties that had to do with preparation for amphibious warfare.
4. Q. Did you perform such duties as the approval of the employment schedule, which included submarines and aircraft of the Scouting force?
A. I don't understand that.
5. Q. Did your duties include the approval of the quarterly employment schedule for submarines which were included in the Scouting Force?
A. No, the employment schedule for the Fleet was prepared by the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, after discussion and consultation with task force commanders, but the schedule was prepared by the Commander-in-Chief for the entire Fleet and all of its units.
6. Q. Admiral, will you please state where you personally were on the 7th of December, 1941?
A. I was on board the U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS, which was my Flagship at that time. I arrived at Johnston Island almost at the exact moment that we received a dispatch that Pearl Harbor had been attacked.
7. Q. Admiral, this is a calendar covering that period; it is in columns here, sir. We would like, if you can give it, your statement as to where you were during the period from the 26th of November through the 6th of December?
A. Well, I tried to refresh my memory yesterday from reading the record that was given to me of the Roberts Board testimony, and there still remains in my mind some doubt as to whether I returned from a tour at sea of about ten days on the 26th of November or the 27th. It was about that time. In other words; I know that I left Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December. I had been in Pearl Harbor for a period of about one week, possibly eight days, and if it was a week, that would have meant returning on the 28th, and if it was ten days, it would have meant returning on the 26th. So there is an element of doubt in my mind as to when I arrived. I could find out from my record, if it is a matter of moment.
8. Q. Admiral, you stated that you returned to Pearl Harbor, after a period at sea, at about the 26th to the 28th of November. Could you please state how long you had been at sea prior to your return at that time?
A. Not with certainty. My belief is that it was a period of about eight or nine days at sea.
9. Q.. How long had you been in port prior to that period at sea?
A. I have records at home from which I can give those exact dates, but my memory is not sufficiently accurate for me to attempt to say without consulting them. In general, the periods at sea and the periods in port varied between one week and ten days.
Memo: The examining officer directed the witness to consult his records and make such further response as they indicate necessary to complete his answer before verifying his testimony.
A. (Continued. See Record Page 170.) My personal records indicate that Task Force 3 returned to Pearl Harbor from sea on 26 November; remained in port until 5 December and sailed for assigned missions at sea on 5 December.
10. Q. Admiral, as a Task Force Commander, and one of the senior Admirals of the Pacific Fleet, during the period preceding the attack on earl Harbor, it is believed that you were familiar with the em-
ployment and training of the Fleet and the reasons for such employment, also with the security measures prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Please outline, briefly, the facts within your knowledge with respect thereto and state your opinion at the time as to the soundness of the methods used, particularly with respect  to the possible sacrifice of some elements of security to further training.
A. I would like to divide my answer in two parts. First, I should like to refer to the statement that as a senior Task Force Commander I was "familiar with the security measures". I think that statement is not accurate. I was not familiar with the details of the employment of submarines, of the extent and nature of the air search, of the Army defense measures, or with the measures of internal defense on the Island of Oahu, other than in the most general terms as I was able to gather them from frequent conferences held by the Commander-in-Chief with the Army and with the Navy on various subjects. I was also not familiar with the details of the defense measures under way to establish the security of the outlying Islands: Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, and Midway, except that I knew that the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval were bending every effort to complete the defense of those outposts before the outbreak of war. To answer the second part of the question, about the effect of training on security measures of the Fleet, I would like to go back to a period six months before December 7 when the Fleet was divided into three task forces. That reorganization assigned to me the task of developing the technique and assembling materials for amphibious warfare. Before the reorganization, I had expressed my keen interest in that subject and a conviction that the Fleet should develop a major part of its energy to that form of naval warfare. Therefore, during the six months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, my own energies and the energies of my Staff were directed primarily to the subject of amphibious warfare. We also took part in Fleet tactical problems which were held for the training of officers and men in the Fleet, and involved a vast amount of work and preparation for review on the game board at the completion of exercises. For over a year before Pearl Harbor, I believe that all major task force commanders recognized that the primary mission of the Fleet was one of training, because of the large naval building program then in progress and the known need of rapid education of officers and men to man the ships that would soon join the Fleet. During that year, it is my impression that we must have had at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would break with the Japanese at any moment. At each alarm, the question arose and was debated as to whether we should take defensive measures or whether we should continue our training. By "defensive measures", I mean whether each ship of the Fleet should go to Condition Three, which would involve so many night watches that little could be accomplished during daytime in training and education. My feeling was, and I think it was shared by most of the others, that in order to complete our training as far as possible, we must continue training exercises until the moment that war developed, which is what happened in the Fleet. During the last days of November, 1941, the subject of defense measures was discussed by the Commander-in-Chief
in conference with a group of senior officers, of whom I was one. My recollection of those conferences is that our greatest concern was the security of the outlying islands. We had all believed that Japanese submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when they declared war, when the Japanese decided to go to war. We had discussed the possibility of an air raid on the Islands and my own opinion was that it was possible but highly improbable, and that Fleet dispositions should be made for the defense of Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra, rather than for the defense of Pearl Harbor, where we all believed the greatest threat was from local sabotage. On December 7, two of the three task forces were at sea, all engaged in some form of support for the outlying Islands, while continuing sea training in going to and from assigned stations. My own Task Force Three was divided into two parts, the carrier and two of the cruisers and some destroyers  were enroute to Wake Island with Marines and air reenforcements. I had the INDIANAPOLIS with six old destroyers converted to sweepers engaged in an attack mission and exercise on Johnston Island. We had with us, at the time, a number of the local authorities on South Sea Island formations. They were with us for the purpose of demonstrating what could be done with dynamite to break through barrier reefs on the weather side to a sufficient extent to allow small boats to attack from the weather side, rather than from the lee side where the attack might be expected. I cite that simply to indicate that my particular group were at Johnston because of our preoccupation with the exposed position and the probability that if an attack was directed at the Hawaiian Islands, those outlying stations would be attacked first before they were ready to defend themselves; while the second part of my task force was engaged on a similar mission to Wake. It is my recollection that Admiral Halsey had taken reenforcements to Midway. I'm not sure. He was up in the neighborhood for some purpose connected with the reenforcement of one of the outlying islands. I would like to complete the comment on that phase with the statement that as I look back on the year 1941, I feel that the entire Fleet, officers and men, were very conscious that war was coming, that all hands were working to their utmost endurance to accomplish as much for the improvement of the Fleet as they could in whatever time might remain available to use for preparation, and that spirit animated all hands through that year.
11. Q. Admiral, how frequently did you confer with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, concerning matters of importance to the Fleet?
A. I think it is correct to say that, in general, the task forces were at sea nearly sixty per cent of their time, and in port about forty per cent. During the time in port, reviews of tactical exercises were held on the game board and such reviews usually required about two days. During the week before December 7, I think I was in almost daily conference with the Commander-in-Chief. During previous weeks, I think I always had at least one and sometimes more during our period in port. In other words. I was present a greater number of times the first week in December than at any other time.
12. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel express his views freely to you with respect to Fleet activities?
A. I don't know that I can answer that question. Admiral Kimmel always had a definite purpose in mind in sending for me and he usually had very clear-cut instructions to issue or definite questions to ask. I think he was more apt to ask other people's opinion than he was to tell other people his own until he was ready to issue instructions, and when he issued instructions they were clear-cut and positive.
13. Q. Admiral, were you kept informed of intelligence received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, concerning the international situation and the movement of the Japanese land and naval forces?
A. All senior officers received the naval intelligence bulletins. The Commander-in-Chief showed some of us some of his correspondence with the Department. I have no way of telling whether he showed us all that he received, or not. My feeling is that it was his wish to keep the senior officer fully informed of the situation and what he was doing about it, and what he looked to us to do about it. His method of carrying out that wish was to send for us when he wished to issue instructions or seek our counsel. And, at that time, he would pass around a file of dispatches which we read there in his office, in turn. That method had the virtue of limiting knowledge of controversies and alarms to a small group. It had the disadvantage that sometimes  we had to read dispatches while others were talking and discussion was going on that I found interfered with my strict attention to what I was reading. I go into that detail because I wish to explain why, in the Roberts Board hearing, I was not able to say positively whether I had seen all of the dispatches that they showed me, or not. I feel I was shown, while I was in port, all of the important messages. Whether I saw the particular one that they quoted of 27 November, I do not yet remember.
14. Q. Admiral, were the Commanding Generals of the Army stationed in Hawaii present at any of these conferences which you attended with the Commander-in Chief?
A. They were present, at about half of them, I should say.
15. Q. And they were advised of information in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief and consulted in the manner you have outlined as to the method used to consult you and the other senior naval officers, were they?
A. I think so. I could see no distinction between Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. The Commander-in-Chief summoned those whose duties had to do with the subject he had to discuss, and when it was a matter of security, naturally the Army was just as much involved, or possibly more, than any of us at sea.
16. Q. in discussing dispatches and intelligence information received, did the Commander-in-Chief express his interpretation of the meaning of such information for the benefit of other officers?
A. I think, as a rule, the dispatches spoke for themselves pretty clearly. I can't recollect any particular dispatch that left any doubt in the mind of the readers what it meant. If you have particularly in mind the warning that was imminent, which was the general tenor of the message that was received on the 27th of November, as I understand it, it is my recollection that there was a prolonged discussion as to what that might involve for our forces and what we should do about it, and what our opinion was about the probable developments; where the Japanese would attack, and when, and how.
17. Q. And opinions with respect to such matters were freely expressed and welcomed?
18. Q. Did this also include action being contemplated by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in the light of such information?
A. I remember quite distinctly an alarm that we had in February, '41, when the Commander-in-Chief contemplated very radical changes in the movement of ships, the assemblage of forces, because of the threatened outbreak of war, and I remember that I, for one, advised against making any such changes at that time on the general theory that the changes contemplated would have seriously delayed many of our training processes and set us back probably as much as a month. And I remember that my feeling then in February, '41, and also in November, '41, was, as I have stated before, that as far as the units of the Fleet were concerned, our training must remain the major effort until the moment of outbreak of war, which might require other dispositions.
19. Q. Admiral, do you recall seeing the dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on 16 October 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor? This is the dispatch which I refer to; it is Exhibit 6 before this examination.
A. I remember being informed of the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and of the tense situation that could be expected to follow. I can't say definitely whether I saw this dispatch, or not I was informed of the sense of it whether I saw the dispatch, or not.
20. Q. Do you recall any conference with respect to the situation as outlined in this dispatch held by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. Not distinctly, but, as I said before, I think there were at least six alarms of similar nature in the course of the year 1941.
21. Do you recall, Admiral, any change of the deployment of the task forces or the disposition of vessels or aircraft made shortly after this date, 16 October 1941, which you may attribute to the directions contained in this dispatch, Exhibit 6?
A. I think that about that time the haste in the preparation of the outlying islands was increased, if that's possible. It certainly became a greater source of concern to all those in authority. I remember in my own case that I had prepared, about that time, a written recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief that shore defenses be established on the Rat Islands and a request that I be permitted to take a portion of my task force to visit the Aleutians. I sent in the recommendation about the defending the Aleutians. I did not send in my request to go up because of the strained situation and the evident necessity of keeping our naval forces concentrated.
22. Q. Do you recall any additional security measures effected shortly after that date which might be attributed to the dispatch of 16 October 1941?
A. Oh, yes. It is my impression that about that time all available anti-aircraft guns from the Army were assembled in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, and in view of the pitiful shortage of such weapons, that all available automatic weapons were borrowed from Marines and ships established in the general area of the Navy Yard and of the air fields. The Fleet had anti-aircraft watches prescribed, not
round the clock in order not to interfere too greatly with training. The practice from about October on was to have anti-aircraft ammunition at the guns. And as I look back on it, it seems to me that those measures were reasonable and probably as thorough as are now being carried out in various theatres of war. I noted with interest in visiting Africa that some of our air fields within easy bombing distance of enemy bases don't appear to be any more strongly defended than Pearl Harbor was during November '41.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken as still binding.
23. Q. Admiral, you have already mentioned the dispatch of November 27, but, despite that, I would like to have you look at it as Exhibit 8 before this examination to see if you can now recall having seen it prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
A. I remember being shown this report by the Roberts Committee. I did not then and I do not now remember seeing a dispatch which started, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." I was familiar, at the time, with the other statements made in this dispatch. Whether I obtained that message through reading it or being informed of it verbally, I do not now remember.
24. Q. Do you recall having seen in a dispatch any phrasing similar to what appears about the word "deployment", in this dispatch?
A. I think so, yes.
25. Q. Do you recall your reaction at the time to those words-any wonder as to the meaning, or what the Navy Department intended should be done by those orders, or in the light of those orders?
A. I think that the two task forces were sent to the general vicinity of the outlying islands in pursuance of those instructions.
26. Q. I understood, from your previous testimony, that those task forces were engaged in building up the defenses of those islands by carrying reinforcements in to them?
A. Yes, that is true; but they were also in a position to attack any attackers of those places.
27. Q. Were there instructions to remain there for that purpose?
28. Q. But still you think that the movements of those forces did amount to the kind of deployment which is mentioned in that dispatch?
A. I remember that we discussed what we ought to do, as a result of the warning by the Department. What the Commander-in-Chief had in mind in directing these moves, beyond reinforcing the islands, I don't know. I do not recollect that any other course of action occurred to me at the time, such as, we will say, getting all hands to sea, and having the Fleet formed against an attack by the Japanese fleet, because the thought that the Japanese fleet would attack never occurred to me. I can only speak for myself. I don't know what the Commander-in-Chief had in his mind.
29. Q. Do you recall any quandary in your mind as to the apparent mixture of defensive and offensive attitude which seems to surround that phrasing?
A. No, sir; I do not, because I have no clear recollection of seeing this entire message, or in studying it, or discussing it. I remember only the general discussion for several days of what we ought to do to meet the threatened situation.
30. Q. Admiral, do you recollect the attendance of any of the Army high command at these discussions, at that time?
In order to facilitate the verification of testimony given by Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, U. S. Navy, who is now available, the examining officer directed that the present witness withdraw and that Rear Admiral Davis be recalled.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination prior to the recalling of Rear Admiral Davis, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.
(Examination by the examining officer continued:)
31. Q. Did these discussions at which the Army was represented constitute a full and complete discussion of the entire situation in the Pacific, Admiral?
A. I don't remember ever attending a formal-a conference where the entire situation was discussed from beginning to end, as a formal, joint discussion of joint action.
32. Q. Did they go so far as to discuss courses of action which might be available to the Japanese in the event they decided to start a war against the United States?
A. My rather vague recollections of the discussions in which the Army took part are that they had mostly to do with internal security on the island, and secondly, with what shortages existed in defense weapons such as radar, antiaircraft weapons, and various forms of aircraft.
33. Q. Do you recall any discussion of a surprise air attack on Hawaii?
A. I remember one time, I would say in November, when somebody suggested that that might happen.
34. Q. Was the Army present at that time, sir?
A. I don't remember that. I remember that Admiral Halsey was present and that I expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were not capable of executing such a mission successfully, and that if they did, we should certainly be able to follow their planes back to their carriers and destroy the carriers so that it would be a very expensive experiment.
35. Q. Were you cognizant, at that time, of the personal characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, in general, as a naval officer, but in particular as regards his interest and work in building up the Japanese Naval Air Force?
A. I knew that Admiral Yamamoto was a very zealous, enterprising officer. I knew that the Japanese Naval Air Force was considered to
be much more efficient than the Army Air Force. My erroneous belief, at that time, was that all Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior to American fliers. I based that opinion on a conversation I had with an American who had spent twenty years in Japan as head of the Singer Sewing Machine, sometime late in November. That gentleman was brought to my cabin by my Intelligence Officer because of the opportunities that he had had to observe the Japanese at first-hand. He stated that of course he had had no opportunity to observe either naval or Army fliers, but that the civilian aviation in Japan was so badly kept up that the Singer Sewing Machine Company had issued instructions to all their employees forbidding them to ever ride in Japanese commercial aviation, and that the general belief was that the Army and the Navy were not very much better. I do not remember ever seeing intelligence reports, prior to Pearl Harbor, that gave a different picture of the skill of the Japanese fliers.
36. Q. Do you recollect any change in the employment of the vessels and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet occurring between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, which you may attribute to the receipt of the information contained in this dispatch; other than the movements you have already referred to?
A. The published schedule of employment had to do only with the dates on  which task forces would go to sea and the date on which they would return. Their employment during periods at sea was usually not settled until a few days before leaving port, so that I do not know how the forces might have been employed the week before Pearl Harbor, had we not realized that war was imminent.
37. Q. Do you recall any additional security measures which were placed in effect during that week which you may attribute to the receipt of the dispatch or the information contained therein?
A. I don't remember the date when instructions were issued about the anti-aircraft alert, and special anti-submarine instructions, but sometime during November, I feel sure that we were all warned to be more,-very much on guard, be prepared for air attack, be prepared and always on guard against submarine attack. I can not say when those instructions were given. I am inclined to think that they were reiterated from time to time during November, probably October.
38. Q. Admiral, the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 27 November that you have before you now contains a directive in general terms regarding certain deployments. Do you recall whether or not in the discussions of the contents of this dispatch, any mention was made of the necessity of reporting to the Navy Department what deployments or what defensive measures had been carried out pursuant to this directive?
A. No, I don't remember; but I would not be apt to be consulted about what report would be made to the Department.
39. Q. Admiral, normally would you consider that the recipient of such a directive as that you have before you should make a report to the Navy Department of what had been done pursuant to that?
A. No, I would not except it. I would not have made a report, had I been in Admiral Kimmel's position.
40. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with this document which is Exhibit 4 before this examination?
A. I undoubtedly was familiar, at that time, with this order. I had forgotten about it up to-the present moment, except that it confirms what I had said before, that it was my impression that the Fleet had been made conscious of possibilities and directed to be on guard.
41. Q. Did you feel, Admiral, prior to the December 7 attack, that this order adequately provided for the security of your task force while at Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes. I was very conscious that the defenses of Pearl Harbor were quite inadequate in anti-aircraft guns, radar, and planes-types and numbers of planes. I was also aware that these shortages had been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Department, and that we were informed that it was not possible to meet those shortages because of more pressing needs in the war in the Atlantic.
42. Q. Will you elaborate that reply in so far as concerns the ability of the Army on Oahu to meet its commitments toward the security of Pearl Harbor?
A. It is my recollection that I overheard Admiral Kimmel frequently question General Short as to what equipment the Army had to defend Pearl  Harbor against enemy air attack, and that General Short replied that his equipment was wholly inadequate and that he had done everything possible to try to have it increased.
43. Q. In those discussions, or at other times, did you ever hear anything which gave you the impression that the highest Army command echelons expected our Fleet to intercept any carrier raid initiated by the Japanese?
A. I don't know that I ever overheard any discussion with the Army about a carrier raid, but it was my understanding then, and it is my understanding now, that at that time the general agreement between the Army and Navy was that the Navy should do the scouting at sea and the Army's function was to attack the enemy when located by the Navy.
44. Q. But you do not recall hearing of any impression that the Army was depending upon the ships of the Pacific Fleet to intercept a carrier raid?
A. Not that they were depending upon the ships, but I would have expected them to depend upon naval planes to discover the approach of the enemy.
45. Q. While your task force was at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, did you, on your own initiative, prescribe any additional security measures?
A. I did not. I felt that the instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief were well considered and thorough.
46. Q. To what extent did you feel that the vessels of the Fleet present at Pearl Harbor would be required to contribute to the defense of Pearl Harbor in the event of an air attack?
A. Knowing that the Army defenses were wholly inadequate, I think the whole Fleet felt that the ships would have to depend upon their own anti-aircraft for their own defense, while in Pearl Harbor, as well as at sea.
47. Q. Admiral, this Exhibit No. 4, provides, under part G, which is labeled "Defense Against Air Attack", that "the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as Naval Base Defense Officer, advise the Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor, exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain."
Were you, at any time, the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, that is any time prior to December 7?
A. I think not. I was the junior of the three Task Force Commanders-wait a minute-I might have been. I would like to change that-I may have been.
48. Q. Under the setup here established, did you feel that you would have prescribed conditions of readiness to be maintained by the vessels present, or that you should rely on the advice of the Commandant in this respect?
A. I had complete confidence that the orders issued by the Commandant were all that the circumstances required.
49. Q. Do you recall having received any advice or orders concerning the condition of readiness to be maintained by vessels in Pearl Harbor?
A. Not prior to December 7.
50. Q. The schedule of employment for the Fleet was a printed document, was it not?
A. Yes, it was in the form of a graph which showed the periods at sea for each task force, the general nature of their employment at sea, and periods in port and that covered a period, I think, of about three months.
51. Q. Was the quarterly issue in effect that which was to terminate at the end of December?
A. Yes, sir.
52. Q. Were there a good many copies printed and issued?
A. I do not know about that. I'm trying to think how many were issued to my own force; I can not say; I know that the information was treated as confidential, not as secret, that for at least six months a very determined effort had been made to impress on all hands the necessity for being very cautious in ever discussing fleet movements; the families were well indoctrinated with the idea that they might be tricked into answering a question as to whether their husbands were in port or out; that very severe penalties were threatened to anybody who was not security conscious; but, of course, I believe that the Japanese were quite familiar with everything about our proposed schedule.
53. Q. You think it is quite possible that the Japanese, in effect, had a copy of that employment schedule?
A. I think it is quite probable.
54. Q. As you recall, do you think it was essential to print scheduled movements of ships of the Fleet so far in advance?
A. Not essential, but it was very helpful in planning work and educational training schedules. I did not think of it, at the time, as being an unwise practice; as I look back on it now, I think it would have been better had we not issued it.
55. Q. We have considerable testimony from other officers of the Pacific Fleet to the effect that there was rather common agreement that if the Japanese made a surprise attack upon Hawaii, it most likely would be either by submarine or by saboteurs. Did you entirely share that opinion in October-November, '41?
A. I did.
56. Q. Then you considered the possibility of a carrier air raid extremely slight?
A. I thought it extremely slight.
57. Q. During those last few days prior to 7 December, when your own task force was in Pearl Harbor, did it ever occur to you that they were in a dangerous position and, during this period of waiting, would be better off at sea?
A. No, on the contrary, I felt, as I have said before, that the chance of an air attack was extremely remote because of my misunderstanding of Japanese air ability. I did not consider the air a menace. I was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor. And I thought it very necessary-because of the intensity of the training schedule at sea and the hours that men were called upon to work that when they returned to port they should get rest and diversion in preparation for the following tour at sea. Perhaps, I may be permitted to say at this time that I had watched the threat of war with Japan, of course, with tremendous interest. I directed the thoughts and studies of my Staff to all the books about the Japanese and the Japanese methods of waging war. My Staff and I were in almost daily conference, discussion, about possibilities. My own estimate in December was that the Japanese, having observed a reactionary Congress and the reluctance of the people of the United States to go to war, would avoid an open break with the United States and confine their first attack to one against the  Dutch or the British. I probably banked too much on that estimate of the situation.
58. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, on 3 December 1941. It is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Are you familiar, or were you familiar, with that dispatch prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. I think so, but I am not certain as it must have come about the time I went to sea. I believe, however, that I did see it and I do not remember to have been impressed by the significance of the alleged instructions to Japanese representatives in Manila and Washington. It occurs to me now, however, that the inclusion of Manila and Washington does not necessarily indicate an intention to attack us but might be in order that they would not be found at fault in case we made war because of their attack on one of our-because of their attack against another country.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to snake any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: The sinking of the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE, as well as our own losses at Midway and the Coral Sea, fully demonstrated the ability of Japanese naval fliers to inflict heavy damage on naval vessels no matter how well ships might be prepared for attack nor how fully manned the then anti-aircraft batteries. These demonstrations of the ability and determination of Japanese fliers must now make it evident
to all that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl Harbor on December 7,1941, might have been, we were bound to suffer great damage even though a more effective alert would have destroyed more Japanese planes. Even if we had known the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor, we could not have kept our ships at sea indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall. Japanese agents in Honolulu were always free to pick the date and hour of attack. It seems to me that to find fault with individuals for the lack of weapons, for the lack of alertness, or for incomplete deployment will not assure security or the future. On the other hand, the high state of efficiency maintained while doubling the size of our Fleet in two years, the seamanship, gunnery, and fighting ability of our Navy during two years of war reflects the quality of our naval leadership and of our training processes during the pre-war period as well as during the war period. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese dared to risk an attack on our feet at Pearl Harbor only because they had complete information about our dispositions; their agents ashore were able to observe and report the state of our defenses; and their so-called diplomatic agents on the spot were able to direct the moment of attack. I wish to go on record as being of the opinion that the major lesson for the nation to learn from the attack on Pearl Harbor is that we should never gain allow enemy aliens within sighting distance of a major operating base from which considerable portions of our naval and air forces can be observed.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 11:45 a. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., Saturday, March 18, 1944.