NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C.
The examination met at 9:35 a. m.
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the tenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.
Captain M. E. Curtis, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eighth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned and withdrew.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the second and sixth days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present duty station.
A. William Satterlee Pye; Rear Admiral; United States Navy; President, Naval War College, and Commandant of the Naval Operating Base, Newport.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?
A. Commander, Battle Force, United States Pacific Fleet, and Commander of Task Force One.
3. Q. How long had you been with the Pacific Fleet and in what capacities?
A. From the 6th of July, 1937, to July 1939, as Commander Flotilla One, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet; from July, 1939, until January 1940, as Commander, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet; from January, 1940, to January, 1941, I was Commander, Battleships, United States Fleet from January, 1941, until after Pearl Harbor, Commander, Battle Force, United States Fleet.
4. Q. On 7 December, '41, were you the Senior Officer Present in the Pacific Fleet other than the Commander-in-Chief?
A. I was.
b. Q. Admiral, as best you can recall, will you give the periods working back from December 7, during which you were in port for the four months preceding December 7?
A. I was in port previous to December 7 from Thursday, November 27. I had been at sea with my Task Force since November 21. Preceding that period, I can not recall the exact dates of being in port and at sea, but the general program was one-third of the time at sea and two-thirds in port, the Fleet being operated in three task forces As I recall, it was about the middle of October until early in November that I had been on the West Coast with a temporarily organized task force. This task force left Honolulu for the West Coast somewhere around the 14th or 15th of October.
5a. Q. Admiral, how would you describe your relations with Admiral Kimmel with regard to the frequency with which he consulted with you, and the completeness of his consultations?
A. When the Commander-in-Chief moved his headquarters ashore he turned over to me, in effect, the training program, particularly that of Task Force 1, but, on each occasion when Task Force 1 had a period at sea, one of the other task forces worked with us for one day on tactical maneuvers. My effort during this period in Honolulu was primarily directed toward the training of the forces of the Fleet. In that respect, my consultations with the Commander-in-Chief were frequent. In regard to the general conditions, it was his practice, at least once upon each period in which I was in port, to call me to his office to show me those dispatches which he considered to be of interest, both with regard to the Fleet and to the general situation. He frequently also showed me letters which he had received from the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition to that, it was customary for him to call in his Intelligence Officer and to have him explain the situation of the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known or assumed by the Intelligence Section of his Staff. I considered Admiral Kimmel to have the greatest interest in all matters pertaining to the efficiency of the Fleet or to the use of the Fleet in the event of war. I have never known any Commander-in-Chief in the United States Fleet to be more interested in the training or activities of the Fleet. Due to the large amount of correspondence with regard to materiel, the general logistics situation, and to the international situation, he felt that he could not devote as much attention to training as he would like to have done and, therefore, gave me the responsibility for that particular function.
6. Q. Sir, in arriving at his decisions of a major nature, was it Admiral Kimmel's practice to consult freely, not only with members of his Staff, but also with other senior officers of the Fleet, to give full consideration to their advice, and did you feel that in forming his own decisions he acted on this advice?
A. I feel that during the three or four months preceding the war of December 7, that Admiral Kimmel consulted with all of the Flag Officers to obtain their reaction to the situation as he assumed it to be, and their opinion as to what could be done with the forces available in the event of war. About five months before the war, or December 7, a plan was developed for the use of the Fleet which included an air attack on the Marshall Islands by the carrier groups, supported by the battle line. This plan had been developed to the point where we considered it advisable to play it in the method of a chart maneuver. It was impossible to keep this maneuver going at the usual rate, but he did direct the various task group commanders to  make maneuvers corresponding to periods of time, whereupon all of their tracks of their respective forces were noted on a master plot in the Headquarters and any contacts noted, assuming that the Japanese forces would operate as the Commander-in-Chief's Staff considered that they would operate, that is, the Japanese Staff estimate was planned by Admiral Kimmel's Staff; the ships were maneuvered as they though such forces would operate. This chart maneuver had been carried on for a period of approximately a month but the game time was much less. Because of the frequent absence of forces from port, actually represented a period of about one week in game time. I cite this to show that the plan for the use of the Fleet as it existed had been made out with all Flag officers and Commanders, Task Forces, cognizant of it, and that we were endeavoring, by the use of the strategic chart maneuver, to throw some light on the soundness of the plan. With respect to the general situation, as Commander of Task Force 1, every time I came into port, I was informed of the situation so far as Admiral Kimmel understood it and was asked my opinion as to the significance of the messages or letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, which he showed me.
7. Q. Admiral, during this period, what was the situation as regards frequency of consultation with the high echelons of Army officers present in Oahu at that time?
A. That, I'm unable to say. Personally, I attended no conferences in which the situation was discussed by the Army high command.
8. Q. Admiral, with respect to your consultations with Admiral Kimmel, you were primarily concerned with Fleet operations, is that not correct, sir?
A. That's correct; only with Fleet Operations.
9. Q. The Army, of course, was concerned with security features. Would you say this was the reason you would most likely not be present when Admiral Kimmel consulted with the Army?
A. I should say so. As far as concerned the defense of the Fleet in port and of the area immediately adjacent to the Island, there were two people, other than myself, who were primarily responsible for advice to the Commander-in-Chief, namely, Commander of the Army Forces and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
10. Q. What did you consider to be the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet during the latter half of the year, 1941?
A. Training for the conduct of war, in order to be able to start operations immediately upon the declaration of war.
11. Q. Please outline, generally, the war tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet under the war plans then existing during the latter half of 1941.
A. The plan was to use the Fleet to create as much activity as possible in the Eastern Mandate area, to force the Japanese to send naval forces and air forces there in order to reduce as much as possible the strength of the enemy available in the Philippines and China Coast area.
12. Q. At that time, that is during the last six months of 1941, did you feel that the training mission of the Fleet was occupying such a predominate position in the minds of the Commanding Officers that the war tasks were being relegated to the background of the picture?
A. I did not, although I think the training was carried out more extensively than it ever had been before, and, in my opinion, the Fleet was in the highest state of efficiency that it ever had attained on December 7. The fact that  we had plans, that we were engaged in a strategic exercise to determine how those plans could be carried into effect, is evidence that the war operations were not being neglected.
13. Q. Admiral, during the period in question, could you state generally, what transfers were taking place as regards material and personnel to other areas other than the Pacific Fleet?
A. In June of 1941, there were detached from the battle force three battleships, four light cruisers, and one squadron of destroyers, with orders to report to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. if I recall correctly, there had been detached one division of destroyers previous to that time; so that the power of the Pacific Fleet had been materially reduced in order to strengthen the forces in the Atlantic. I do not consider that this detachment would actually have made much difference in what the Pacific Fleet could have accomplished, because the situation with regard to logistics was such that the Pacific Fleet could not have operated more than 2500 miles from Honolulu, no matter what its strength. The number of tankers available had been seriously reduced and the amount of fuel oil in Honolulu storage had likewise been reduced to purely the amount that was considered necessary as a reserve.
14. Q. Sir, in addition to the detachment of the units which you mentioned in your answer, was there any widespread detachment of individual officers to either the Atlantic Fleet, or returned to the mainland to man new construction?
A. There was. I couldn't state the percentage, but there was a tremendous depletion of the personnel of the Pacific Fleet in order to man new construction.
15. Q. That protest or recommendations were made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in regard to detachments of both units of the Fleet and personnel?
A. I don't recall that I have seen or did see any of his official correspondence in that respect. However, I recall many letters, personal letters, to the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to these detachments, in which he stated that the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet was being reduced to an unsatisfactory point for the conduct of war.
16. Q. Sir, do you recall the answer or reaction of the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Navy Department, to these representations by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
A. The reactions I received from the letters from the Chief of Naval Operations was that the situation in the Atlantic was very much more
dangerous than the one in the Pacific and that the Atlantic had to be taken care of first.
17. Q. What was the state of mind on the part of the Commander-in-chief, his Staff, and other senior officers of the Fleet, as to the correctness of this attitude on the part of the Department?
A. I can only state my own, it probably being indicative of theirs. The reaction in my mind was that whatever happened in the Pacific would be on the initiative of the United States; that I felt that our Government had decided that if we went into war, we would have to lick the Germans first, that we probably would not be engaged in war in the Pacific except at our own volition. I think that the basis of that was sound. I think that had the Japanese not attacked Pearl Harbor that we would have been months later in getting into the war in the Pacific. In my mind, the attack on Pearl Harbor was the worst psychological blunder that any nation has ever made.
18. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you expressed those opinions to the Commander-in-Chief and whether or not he made any statements to you as to whether or not he agreed or disagreed with your estimate?
A. I couldn't say that I ever used those words, because I don't think any of us felt that that attack would be made before a declaration of war, if ever. But I believe that that was the way most of us felt, and, confirming that as being the opinion in Washington, in a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations received about the time of the warning message, the Chief of Naval Operations used words somewhat of this tenor: "I do not know what this Country will do." In other words, it impressed me, and I think probably those others who saw it, that the option was going to rest with us.
19. Q. Admiral, on approximately what date did the Pacific Fleet move to Pearl Harbor as its base?
A. I think it was in April, 1940. We went out there presumably on a cruise anticipating remaining in Pearl Harbor for about a period of ten days, but before that ten day period was over, the Commander-in-Chief was directed to remain in Pearl Harbor, to retain the Fleet in Pearl Harbor.
20. Q. Sir, when it became known to the Commander-in-Chief and to you and others that the decision had been made to base the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor indefinitely, what were your reactions to the wisdom of this decision?
A. There were two reactions. The first was that it was a move towards Japan, which might incite them to take action; and the second was that it was a very poor time to make such a move because we were not prepared to move to the westward in case of war, because of the lack of proper logistics support. I think that all officers recognized the great advantage in having the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. That one was that in order to spend the money on the ships for repairs and overhaul in Pearl Harbor would permit the Navy Yard to be expanded at a greater rate and thus be better prepared to handle the Fleet in the event of a war in the Pacific.
21. Q. Admiral, in two or three of your answers. as I understand them, you've mentioned shortages, deficiencies in logistic support for the Pacific Fleet. Could you amplify that subject a bit, indicating what were the most critical of those shortages?
A. Probably the greatest deficiency was tankers. The other deficiency was the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. But Pearl Harbor Navy Yard was in a state of development and in order to continue that development, the money that was normally assigned to a yard performing repairs, would go to Pearl Harbor if the ships of the Fleet were to be repaired there, and, consequently, such action would permit the industrial element in the Yard to be built up.
22. Q. Admiral, did you feel, at that time, that these deficiencies or shortages in logistics were such that the Fleet was not in a condition of materiel readiness to carry out its offensive war tasks as outlined in the then existing war plans?
A. The existing war plans were rather indefinite as to what the Fleet could do. As I say, the estimate by the Commander-in-Chief, and I think agreed by all of the officers in responsible positions, was that the Fleet could not operate to the westward of the Marshall Islands. It was very questionable in my mind that even with plenty of tankers that the Fleet could have operated much farther west than that, because of the lack of adequate repair facilities or bases of any kind. Therefore, I considered the situation with regard to the Fleet was such that it could not have carried on an offensive as far to the westward as the Philippines or the Japanese Islands.
23. Q. Referring to your testimony to the effect that you did not think the Japanese would initiate a war. In the estimate behind that opinion, did you take into account the fact that steps had been taken to freeze the Japanese credits so that they would have at least great difficulty in obtaining petroleum products, tin, rubber, and so forth, from the East-Indies?
A. In my statement, with regard to the initiation of the war, it was the initiation of war against the United States that I referred to. It was firmly believed that the Japanese would go into the Dutch East Indies and possibly into Singapore and Thailand, so that while we had anticipated war, an extension of the war in the Pacific, we did not anticipate that they would take action against the United States at that time. May I add that they could have obtained the rubber, tin, and so forth, without initiating war with the United States.
24. Q. The logistic deficiencies, Admiral, were well known to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of course?
A. Yes, sir.
25. Q. Do you know of any action that he took with respect to remedying the situation?
A. I remember of being informed by him of numerous letters which he had written but I can not recall the letters or having seen the letters.
26. Q. Admiral, what response did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, get to his attempts to remedy his logistic deficiencies?
A. I should say very little. The rate at which the fuel oil was being used in Honolulu, during the training periods previous to December 7, was greater than the rate at which fuel was being delivered, and the reserve was being reduced.
27. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 16 October 1941, which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. When did you see that dispatch?
A. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time I've seen this dispatch. At the time it was received, I was in California with Task force 1 on a two weeks trip for recreation for personnel. My Force was in San Pedro at the time and I did receive a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief stating that the—I don't remember the words of the dispatch, but, in general terms, that the general situation was considered serious. I immediately put my Task Force on twelve hour notice preparatory to return to Pearl but no further word was received before the scheduled date of sailing on the return trip to Honolulu, which was sometime around the end of October.
28. Q. After your return to Pearl Harbor, were you apprised of the subject matter of the dispatch?
A. In general terms, yes, that the situation had been considered serious at that time. My return was two weeks or so after the date of this dispatch and while it was mentioned to me, so far as I am aware, I never saw the full dispatch before.
29. Q. Do you recall whether or not you were informed that the dispatch contained a statement to the effect that an attack by Japan on the United States was a possibility?
A. I don't believe I was so informed.
30. Q. Do you know of any additional security measures or other action undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific pursuant to this dispatch?
A. I was not there. The only information I have was the dispatch he sent to me, which indicated to me that he might want us to return almost immediately and I put the force on twelve hour notice. After I got back to Honolulu, I found he had sent another dispatch, which was never received by me, putting my Task Force on twelve hour notice. When he received my dispatch putting it on twelve hour notice, he thought it was in answer to his. We just happened to hit on the same twelve hour notice.
31. Q. Did any of the vessels of your task force return earlier than planned in the employment schedule?
A. Not that I know of.
32. Q. Admiral, you have stated that you were at sea during the period 21-27 November. I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac and other addressees, dated 24 November, which is Exhibit 7 before this examination. When did you first see this dispatch?
A. I saw this dispatch first on Saturday, November 29. Task Force 1 and Task Force 3 had been engaged in a strategic problem which ended on Sunday, the 23rd. My task force was not due to enter Pearl until Thursday, the 27th. On the night of the 24th, I received a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief to take all precautions against possible submarine activity. From the time of the receipt of that dispatch until after the entry of Task Force 1, complete defensive formations and operations against possible enemy submarine activities were taken. It had been the custom for the Commander-in-Chief to signal to incoming task force commanders when he desired to have a conference with them. No such signal was received upon my entry, nor later, but, upon Saturday morning, I went to the Commander-in-Chief for a conference on my own volition. It was at that time that he showed me this message. He called
in his Intelligence Officer and the Intelligence Officer explained the locations of the enemy forces, so far as he was able to judge, which indicated no unusual activity in the major forces of the Japanese Navy. He also showed me the latest letters he had received from the Chief of Naval Operations, which I mentioned, and in which the Chief of Naval Operations said, "I do not know what we will do," was one. We discussed any possible action that would be taken by Task Force 1 at that time, and Task Force 1 being the only task force with the exception of the battleships of Task Force 3, being in port we decided that there was no action that could be taken by that task force which would better prepare them for the possible action that might come. Task Force 2, under Vice Admiral Halsey, had gone out before my task force returned to port, and part of Task Force 3, as I recall it, left on the same day that I had entered. So that there were in Pearl Harbor, at the time I saw this message, no carriers and only the portion of the destroyers of the Fleet assigned to Task Force 1.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
Examined by the examining officer (Continued):
33. Q. Admiral, your attention is invited to certain wording in the dispatch before you to the effect that a surprise attack in any direction might be anticipated. Was any particular consideration given to that wording by the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers as regards the possibility of that direction being Oahu?
A. I was not present at any conferences between the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, or other senior officers. So far as I can recall there was, between Admiral Kimmel and myself, no discussion as to the possibility that Oahu might be attacked by air. There was, and had been for some months, a feeling that a surprise attack by submarines might be possible. The differentiation between these two attacks, at least so far as I was concerned, was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without definite proof that it was enemy action, whereas, an air attack could not. In the absence of any protection by carriers, it was felt that the Fleet in port, with the presumed effectiveness of the Army Air Forces, would be in a better position for defense than they would be at sea.
34. Q. Admiral, in the dispatch that you have before you there is a directive that Army officials be informed. Do you have any knowledge as to whether that was, in fact, done, and to what extent they were consulted?
A. I have no knowledge.
35. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 27 November 1941, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Will you state when you first saw this dispatch?
A. To the best of my recollection, on Saturday, the 29th of November.
36. Q: In other words, the two dispatches, Exhibits 7 and 8, were seen and discussed at the same time?
A. I am positive—yes, these two were seen at the same time, the 29th of November.
37. Q. In addition to the dispatch that you received at sea in regards to precautions against submarine attack, do you know what action was taken by the Commander-in-Chief pursuant to these two dispatches?
A. I don't recall any positive action other than his talking over with me these dispatches.
38. Q. In a previous answer, I understood you to say that the Commander-in-Chief called in his Intelligence Officer, into this conference on the morning of 29 November, and received a report from him as to the then whereabouts of various units of the Japanese Fleet. At that time, what degree of credibility did you assign to this intelligence report?
A. I think the credibility assigned was fairly high, in view of the fact that there was no other intelligence or information by which a comparison or evaluation of the respective points of view might be made.
39. Q. At that time, did you know what sources the Intelligence Officer was relying on for his information?
40. Q. In the dispatch of 27 November, Exhibit 8, what interpretation was placed on the wording, in general, which directs that certain deployments be made?
A. In order to execute the plan of the Fleet, it would have been necessary to recall the task forces which were at that time absent, in order to properly prepare them, from a logistic point of view, and consequently there was no deployment that could be made immediately that would have better prepared Task Force One than that which existed. Task Force Two was on its way to ferry some fighting planes to Wake and was not expected to return for over a week consequently there appeared to be no action to be taken by the Pacific Fleet that would have better prepared it against an indefinite date of beginning operations, than that which was then in progress.
41. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that the return of your task force to Pearl Harbor on 27 November was done in accordance with the then existing employment schedule?
A. It was.
42. Q. What was the nature of the employment of the task force for its scheduled time in port, beginning 27 November?
A. Overhaul and training and preparation for the next period at sea. In addition, and as a part of that training, the holding of a critique for the exercise which had been terminated on the Sunday previous to our entering port. That exercise had been one to develop air attack on an escorted convoy group, and alternatively, the defense of such a group. Task Force Three, containing a carrier, had been the force which attacked Task Force One, which was acting as escort to the convoy group. I state this primarily to indicate that the question of air attack at sea was uppermost in the minds of all of the officers during the period of training. The system of training that had been developed for these exercises was the most extensive that had ever been practiced by our Fleet. Before the problems were executed at sea, they were played out on the Maneuver Board which was established on shore at the Submarine Base Bachelor Officers' Quarters. The problems having been laid out and commented upon, on the Board, previous to the exercises at sea, were then carried out
as an exercise at sea. Upon return to port, the exercise was criticized the critique being held on the Maneuver Board, as had been done on the same exercise before the Fleet went to sea. So, for each exercise there were three distinct periods of mental training—the preparation and trial of the exercise before it was carried out at sea, the conduct of the exercise at sea, and the critique of the exercise after we returned from sea. This critique was to be held on Wednesday following our return to port, and with the exception of the Saturday morning when I went up to see Admiral Kimmel, I was primarily concerned with preparing the critique of this exercise for presentation on the Wednesday following.
43. Q. In other words, is it correct to say that no change in the scheduled employment of your task force was made by virtue of this dispatch?
A. No change was made. The only thing was that during the period at sea, from the time we got that dispatch we were especially careful about maintaining the maximum effectiveness of the anti-submarine defense.
44. Q. When was your task force next scheduled to go to sea, Admiral, if you recollect?
A. About December 11th, I should say,—we were generally in about two weeks.
45. Q. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you receive any orders changing that scheduled sortie?
A. No, I did not.
46. Q. Did you receive any orders or instructions changing the procedure while in port which would indicate any change in the contemplated use of your task force when it went to sea for its next scheduled period?
A. None that I recall
47. Q. Did your task force have its full allowance of ammunition and other stores such as would equip it for combat purposes in event of war?
A. To the best of my knowledge, every ship had adequate material on board to exercise its functions in time of war. Many requests had been made for modifications of the anti-aircraft armament, to include more machine guns, which had not been received, but the vessels themselves, in their then state of equipment, were ready to fight.
48. Q. What I had in mind, Admiral, was to determine from any action taken whether the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that on your next departure, you might be leaving on an assigned war task which would require additional ammunition or equipment, and as to whether any such was provided during this period.
A. Well, we were kept up to a point where we expected to be able to operate at any time, should it be required, and I don't think there would have been any hesitancy about going ahead and executing that plan which had been contemplated, had we gone to war under normal conditions.
49. Q. You feel that your ships, had they sortied in accordance with the schedule, would have been so prepared
50. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch dated 28 November, from Chief of Naval Operations, in which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, is an information addressee, which is Exhibit 9 before this examination. Will you state whether or not you saw that dispatch, and If so, when?
A. To the best of my knowledge, I did not see that dispatch before December 7th.
51. Q. Admiral, I hand you another dispatch, which CinCPac was only an information addressee, from OPNav to CinC Asiatic Fleet, dated 30 November, which is Exhibit 10 before this examination. Do you recall whether or not you saw that dispatch, and if so, when?
A. It is difficult for me to say whether or not I saw this dispatch previous to December 7th, but I believe that I saw it on Wednesday or Thursday, the 3rd or 4th of December, after the critique of the exercise which the Fleet had been holding—I saw the Commander-in-Chief for a short time and again on Thursday, the 4th. It is my opinion that on one of those two days he showed me this dispatch.
52. Q. Do you recall if the indications mentioned as to the direction of a Japanese attack caused any change of the attitude on your part over what you had had as a result of the preceding dispatches?
A. I think it tended to confirm the reaction of the previous dispatches that the activities were anticipated, even by the Department, in the Far East.
53. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch dated 3 December, from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you see that dispatch?
A. I saw this one on either Wednesday or Thursday— Wednesday, the 3rd, or Thursday, the 4th—this one I am confident I saw before December 7th. This one we discussed—I discussed with the Commander-in-Chief only to this point: "most of their codes", it said, it did not say "all", I don't suppose they could have said "all", but this same idea had been expressed in the newspapers of that day or the day before. We were completely unaware of the methods by which this information was received and we did feel that if inferences were to be drawn from this, that the best place to draw them was where they had the maximum information.
54. Q. In your discussions with the Commander-in-Chief as to the significance of this dispatch, was any particular mention made of the fact that among the places listed where it was thought the code and cyphers had been destroyed, were the capitols of the United States and the Philippines?
A. I don't recall any particular discussion of those two points, but it seemed perfectly evident that this could precede war by many days; that it was not to us indicative of immediate action; and we were also, as I say, unaware of the source of information. As this information had appeared in the papers, it probably did not mean as much to us as though we had been aware of flow the Department obtained it.
55. Q. Admiral, in addition to the series of dispatches that you have just seen, what other intelligence reports, or information were available to the Commander-in-Chief and to you, as one of his advisers, in making your estimates of the situation as regards the probability of immediate hostilities?
A. There were none available to me, and as I have previously stated my primary concern was the training of the Fleet. On no occasion was I called into conference with the other Flag Officers and Admiral Kimmel to discuss the possibility of immediate action by Japan.
56. Q. At that time did you feel that you, and the other commanding officers, in Oahu, were sufficiently informed as to the international situation, or did you feel that you were more or less operating in the dark, out there?
A. Well, I can only speak for myself. I don't know how the others felt. I felt we were operating pretty much in the dark.
57. Q. In making your own estimates of the situation, and in giving such advice to the Commander-in-Chief as you did, how much consideration was given to the fact that the Axis nations had been departing from the usual rules of the game, usually, in making surprise attacks without formal declarations of war?
A. I don't think—a great deal. It seems to me, and it seemed to me then, that in every case of a surprise attack there must be something to be gained by it to make it worth while. I felt, and I presume others felt the same way, that the reaction of the United States to a surprise attack would so arouse the people that it would be a very bad psychological blunder for any nation to do such an act against the United States.
58. Q. Also with relation to your estimates of the situation, do you recall any emphasis being given, or any consideration being given to the personal characteristics of the Japanese high command, with relation to any specific individuals of the Japanese high command?
A. If any such studies were available to the Commander-in-Chief, I have never seen them.
59. Q. Although it is apparent that the matter was not particularly discussed  in your presence, did you ever feel, during those days, that enough attention was being given to the study of the psychology of the Japanese in general, particularly their military cult?
A. Well, I had personally considered it quite extensively, but to what extent it was given consideration by the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, I don't know.
60. Q. Admiral, had you formulated an opinion as to the capability of the Japanese naval air arm prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. I think the general impression was that they were fairly good. I don't believe that we thought that they were as good as they appeared to be immediately after Pearl Harbor. In the rules that had been used for the exercises in relation to the efficiency of aircraft, I should say that full weight had been given to the value of air attack as indicated in the particular exercise that was completed by the First and Third Task Forces on Sunday, the 23rd of November. The complete convoy had been wiped out and many of the escorting vessels seriously damaged by constructive bombing. I feel that the attitude of the Fleet toward aviation was confirmed by the later effects. I do not believe that the air has proved any more efficient than we had given it credit for, with this one exception—that I don't believe any people before the war, especially not in the United States, believed that such a large percentage of the industrial capacity of the country, or any country, would be put into aviation. There is one thing with regard
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and aviation, which I think should e stated: Some discussion had been held between the Commander-in-Chief and the Bureau of Ordnance as to the possibility of using torpedo planes in shallow water. The Bureau of Ordnance had expressed an opinion that the use of torpedo planes in less than 75 feet of water would probably not be effective. As the water in Pearl Harbor was shallower than that, there was probably created an pinion in the minds of the officers of the Fleet, that the torpedo plane could not be used there as effectively as it was used.
61. Q. Admiral, in that connection, did you have any reason to question that information that you received from the Navy Department in regard to torpedo planes, and did you feel that the Fleet was relatively safe from torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor?
A. While I won't say that we felt we were relatively safe, we felt that the efficiency of any torpedoes used in that area would be very much below what might be expected in the open sea. Most of our own torpedoes, dropped from planes, at that time were diving in the neighborhood of 75 feet before they ran.
62. Q. You had no information to the effect that other nations might have developed torpedoes that would be effective at lesser depths?
A. We had no information as to what they actually had developed.
63. Q. Had you any information, sir, as to the aggressive spirit which the Japanese naval air arm displayed on that occasion,—any advance information?
A. No, I don't recall that we had any particular data with regard to that. I think everybody felt that they had plenty of spirit, if they decided to it, they would come in hard—there wasn't any question about that. We had had air raid drills frequently in port, and had a standard routine for it. The defenses of the Fleet, of course, were largely in the hands of the Army, and the condition of readiness was not set by the Fleet, itself, but was set by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
64. Q. Admiral, in several of your previous answers you have touched on your own estimate of the situation as regards the probability of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and on the reasons why you and other officers present did not rate it very high, as a possibility. Is there anything you can add to what you already said as to your estimate of that probability, and the reasons for that state of mind?
A. I don't know that there is much that I can add. I think I have explained, from my point of view, several features, and a primary feature of all was that I felt that Japan could gain more by delaying our entry in to the war than they could possibly gain by any damage hat they could do at Pearl Harbor. I am still firmly convinced that that was the case. I am also convinced that that was the opinion held in Washington, at least to this extent, that on the day the Secretary of the Navy arrived at Pearl Harbor, after the attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, one of the first statements he made was that no one at Washington had stated to him any possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner, who was the most aggressive minded of all. These are not quotations, but that is the sense of what he said. I think the feeling that was in Honolulu was greatly
influenced by the attitude of the Department through the preceding months, in taking away forces from the Pacific and indicating throughout that they considered the situation with Germany much more serious than with Japan, and that there was inadequate knowledge of a shift of opinion in Washington, if there was one; that there were no real definite instructions received out there after November 29, I think it was. The only other dispatch that I recall seeing was that one about the burning of the communications cipher code. During that period of about a week, many things were happening in Washington of which we in the Fleet were not cognizant. So far as I know, there was never any follow-up, either on that message received on the 16th of October—even after stating that condition existed, there was never any relaxation of a state of emergency indicated, and yet, six weeks went by before the attack. It seemed to me and I think it seemed to all, that they were merely additional confirmations of a general feeling that war was approaching, and that we, the Fleet, should be in a state of readiness to carry out our part in the plan. If any change or immediate indication of war had been made in the Department, it seems to me that the message previously referred to would have been followed up by further messages; at least to the extent of asking the Commander-in-Chief what he had done, or what he intended to do.
65. Q. The war plan which was current appears to have been dated sometime in May, 1941, and the growth in tenseness of the situation in which Japan was concerned, was rapid after that. During those months, did it occur to you that the effective war plan had become out of step with the real situation?
A. I think that the plan for the actual use of the Fleet had not become out of step, because due to lack of logistic facilities, it was impossible for the Fleet to take any more offensive action than the contemplated attack on the eastern Mandates in order to try to relieve the situation in the Far East.
66. Q. As regards the broader concept behind the plan, to the effect that our position in the Pacific was purely defensive, did you think that part had become out of step?
A. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, it seemed to me it was only one thing we could do and we were prepared to do that; we discussed, in this problem we were carrying on at the time what we could do with the Fleet. Well, you couldn't do much because it didn't have oil to get anywhere, and you didn't have repair facilities if you got there, and so far as the Fleet was concerned,  the only thing of any usefulness that could be done was to make an attack on the Marshalls with a view to drawing much of the enemy strength to the westward with a view to helping the Allied Forces around Manila and the East Indies. So, so far as I was concerned, the approach to that possible entry in the war had no particular effect on the thing that could be done with the Fleet. At the time I first learned about these messages, Task Force Two was bound out to Wake, part of Task Force Three had gone out to Johnston Island. There was, at that time, nothing that could be done by Task Force One, and it was felt if anything did occur, we should get the other task forces back as quickly as possible and prepare to carry out the plan that had been prepared—for the Fleet to move out to the Marshall Islands.
67. Q. Then no apparent fault in the basic war plans occurred to you during those months?
A. Well, my opinion about the plan, Rainbow Five, was that it was not kept up to date, that people were not sufficiently concerned with keeping the plan abreast the changing situation. If you go still farther back than that, I consider that the whole basic war plans, as I have known them for years, have really not been operations plans but development plans. They have been used as a lever to get more men and ships and naval shore establishment development.
68. Q. Admiral, I hand you an estimate drawn up by Commander Patrol Wing Two and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Army, dated 31 March 1941, which is a part of Exhibit 22 before this examination. Were you familiar with this estimate prior to December 7th?
A. To the best of my knowledge, I never saw it before December 7th.
69. Q. In this estimate your attention is invited to a statement made in Paragraph III(b), that "It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack." Do you feel that this estimate is completely out of step with the estimates of the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers present in Oahu at that time?
A. Well, in making an estimate of enemy capabilities, there are two methods of procedure: One is known as the method of intentions, and the other is the method of capabilities. The higher up you are in the scale of command, the more apt one is to use the method of intentions, or trying to determine what the enemy intends to do. In the lower echelons of command, in which Rear Admiral Bellinger was, at that time, he was more concerned with the physical capacity of the enemy to do certain things in relation to the activity which he is commanding. For that reason, Admiral Bellinger, being responsible for the use of the aircraft based on shore to cooperate with the Army in defense of the Fleet, or at least to obtain information for the Fleet in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, would have assumed situations which required action by his force, and naturally one of those was the information, preceding an offense against air attack on the Island of Oahu, of vessels in the immediate vicinity. I feel that this particular position of Admiral Bellinger led him to this conclusion as being necessary for him to make out his plan, and a perfectly legitimate assumption as a basis for his plan, but that does not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that than something else. So far as I can see Admiral Bellinger's assumptions do not indicate that he anticipated an attack in advance of a declaration of war.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
70. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that the Commander-in-Chief and his senior advisers all considered that the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet was training, and that that training would continue until such time as immediate hostilities were indicated?
A. That is correct. And with the tremendous shift in personnel that was constantly taking place, it was absolutely essential that training be kept up to the last moment.
71. Q. Did you feel at that time that all necessary steps had been taken to effectuate a rapid change from the training mission to the war mission when hostilities became imminent?
A. Yes, I considered that the Fleet was capable of proceeding on its war mission immediately.
72. Q. Referring back to the dispatches that you examined earlier, in the dispatch of 27 November, the statement was made to the effect that aggressive movements by Japan could be expected within the next few days. Did you feel that that statement on 27 November should have caused a change in the mission of the Fleet?
A. I did not consider that any change was necessary. This dispatch is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for action. It was common knowledge that was expected to make an aggressive move into Thailand, and there is nothing in this message that indicates specifically any apprehension on the part of the Department that the aggressive move is to be made against the United States. The extent to which an aggressive move against Thailand or against British or Dutch possessions in the Far East might influence the United States is not mentioned.
73. Q. Admiral, how often were the employment schedules for the Pacific Fleet drawn up and published?
A. I couldn't say definitely, but my estimate would be about once a month.
74. Q. What classification was given to those published documents?
A. Confidential, I should say, although I can't swear to it.
75. Q. In general, how wide a distribution did the employment schedules receive?
A. Through Commanding Officers, I should say, but, naturally, when each Commanding Officer knew the schedule, or each Task Force Commander knew the time he was going to be at sea, he had to make out an employment schedule still more in detail for the various ships, often including various types of target practice and tactical exercises. Those that included target practice, naturally information had to be given to the Gunnery Officers and the gunnery personnel of the ship. So it became well known. Such schedule generally provided for routine periods at sea for each of the three specific task forces.
76. Q. During the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, and in view of the tense international situation and the general feeling that war with Japan would come sooner or later, did you have any apprehension as to the wisdom of publishing such schedules, from a security point of view?
A. No, I can't say that I did. The schedules had to be worked in such a way that some of the ships were at sea all the time, and in order to carry out the exercise of the Fleet, the people that handled the target practice material, the drones, and so forth, had to know well in advance that certain exercises would be carried out. I don't feel it would have made any particular difference, if an air attack was to have been made on Pearl Harbor, what particular task force was in. The case as it occurred was probably the most advantageous to the United States, because had carriers been in Pearl Harbor under the conditions of the attack, they probably would have been sunk, and that the loss of obsolescent battleships was less serious than would have been the loss of carriers.
77. Q. Admiral, as a matter of fact, how closely did the ships present Pearl Harbor on December 7 correspond to the published employment schedule?
A. So far as I recall, Task Force 1 was scheduled to be in port at the time of the attack. Task Force 3, I believe, intended to be at sea. Because of some additional duty that had been given to Vice Admiral Brown, he proceeded with a part of his task force, I don't remember exactly, but not including the battleships, to Palmyra or Johnston, one of those, and as I recall it the three battleships of the first Division, which were normally in his task force, returned to port several days in advance of the normal schedule of that task force.
The witness was duly warned.
The examining officer then, at 11:50 a. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.
Rear Admiral William Satterlee Pye, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.
(Examination by the examining officer continued:)
78. Q. Admiral, upon whom did the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor against attack rest?
A. Primarily upon the Army. Naturally, the vessels and naval units in the Harbor were required to take such action as they could on their own behalf.
79. Q. Are you able to cite any plan or other commitment by the Army assuming responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. I never saw any plan gotten up by the Army, but by The Joint Action of the Army and Navy. The Army is charged with such responsibility.
80. Q. During the year 1941, what information did you have as to the ability of the Army to fulfill its commitments for the defense of Pearl Harbor and how did you evaluate this information?
A. It was definite knowledge that the air force available to the Army and the anti-aircraft installations were below those which were considered necessary for proper defense.
81. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, fully aware of this situation?
A. Yes, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I am quite confident that he had expressed this idea to the Chief of Naval Operations and also to the Army officer in command.
82. Q. Can you outline, in very general terms, what precautions the Army had taken against a surprise air attack?
A. The only direct information that I have came to me after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which was to the effect that in their interpretation of the order received, their primary active had been taken to prevent sabotage.
A3. Q. Are you familiar with the Army's anti-aircraft warning net?
A. Yes, of the fact they had many lookout stations in the Island, for visual observation of approaching planes. I was not familiar with the state of radar development. Radar at that time was considered a very secret instrument and while the Navy had made use of it to quite a moderate degree, it was my general understanding that the
Army was behind in this development. I had knowledge that the Army was intending to install radar equipment in the Island, but to the best of my knowledge and belief, I had no information that even one such instrument had been established.
84. Q. As contrasted with the available means for detecting the approach of hostile aircraft, what defenses did the Army have against such an attack, once the attack had arrived?
A. They had fighting planes and mobile anti-aircraft batteries. So far as I am aware, these mobile anti-aircraft batteries had been deployed for use by December 7.
85. Q. At that time, what was your appraisal of the state of readiness of the Army's fighter planes, and do you recall that this was discussed by the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers present there; what appraisal they made of the ability of the Army Fighter Command?
A. I don't recall any special discussion of that fact, other than the general position that the Army's installations were not what we'd like to have them. It was not known to me that at any time previous to December 7 the Army had taken any action which reduced the effectiveness of their aircraft defense.
86. Q. Admiral, I hand you the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and Fourteenth Naval District, which is Exhibit 5 before this examination. Were you familiar with this plan at all prior to December 7, 1941?
A. Yes, I had read that plan.
87. Q. By the terms of this plan, upon whom was the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance off Hawaii?
A. It would be, apparently, the Navy, under the direction of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
88. Q. Did you know whether or not such reconnaissance flights were being carried out by naval aircraft during the period from October through December '41?
A. I knew that such patrols were being carried out in certain instances, and that they were covering areas in which the operating forces of the Fleet were usually engaged in target practice. The immediate extent of the aircraft search, I did not know. The plan for that was not part of my immediate responsibility and I assumed they were doing the best they could with what they had.
89. Q. Sir, do you know whether any additional reconnaissance flights were ordered after the warning dispatch of 27 November?
A. I have no positive knowledge.
90. Q. As you would interpret the terms of this plan, upon whom was the responsibility to order such reconnaissance flights when the situation indicated that they would be necessary?
A. I think that under the plan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet would be responsible for designating a policy.
91. Q. Referring back to your earlier answer that the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers were aware of the inability of the Army to fully carry out its mission of the defense of Pearl Harbor against attacks of all kind, including air attack, what steps were taken by the Commander-in-Chief to augment the defenses of Pearl Harbor against such an attack?
A. Additional destroyer and small craft patrols in the areas off the entrance. So far as the air is concerned, I don't know what, if any, additional patrols were actually put in operation.
92. Q. Sir, I hand you Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2CL-41 (Revised), which is exhibit 4 before this examination. Were you familiar with the terms of that at the time of its issue?
A. I was.
93. Q. Admiral, in paragraph "G" of this 2CL letter, under the duties of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, is listed "advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain." It does not seem to be stated definitely who should order the condition of readiness, but is the interpretation of that that the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor should actually issue the order prescribing the condition of readiness?
A. My interpretation was that the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District would inform the Senior Officer Present Afloat as to the condition warranted by the existing circumstances, and the Senior Officer Embarked would order the Fleet to assume such condition.
94. Q. From 28 November to 7 December, were you the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor?
A. I was.
95. Q. Did you prescribe any condition of readiness for the ships in the Harbor pursuant to this?
A. Condition 3 had been prescribed as the standard condition and was in effect on December 7. It had been prescribed previous to our last entry but it was understood that Condition 3 would be the condition unless other notice was given.
96. Q. During the same period, did you receive any advice from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as to maintaining any other condition or any directive from the Commander-in-Chief as to maintaining a higher condition?
A. No, sir.
97. Q. Admiral, in the same paragraph, your attention is invited to a provision that "the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced". Were any Army guns actually emplaced at Pearl Harbor on December 7?
A. I believe that there were certain anti-aircraft, fixed defenses, not in the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor. I believe this order is interpreted to relate to the mobile guns. So far as I know, they had not been distributed with any intention of defense of the Naval Base previous to December 7.
98. Q. At what distance were these Army guns from the Base, the nearest of the Army guns?
A. I think there was one battery of guns at or near Kamehameha, which was near the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Others were not located within five miles of Pearl Harbor, but I think within two miles of the City of Honolulu. They were closer to the Port of Honolulu than they were to Pearl Harbor.
99. Q. Up until the time of the attack, did any naval officer have any authority over the use of those guns?
A. None that I know of.
100. Q. Sir, did the Navy have any anti-aircraft batteries on shore at Pearl Harbor on 7 December?
A. So far as I recall there were none until after the attack.
101. Q. Admiral, under subparagraph 5, of paragraph "G", of 2CL, the Senior Officer Present in each Sector, described in the preceding paragraph, is responsible for the fire in his own sector. Was that interpreted to mean that the Senior Officer Embarked could direct the Sector Commanders or was each one of them an entirely free agent?
A. The interpretation was that he was a free agent, because the time element would not permit the senior man to act. However, that paragraph was discussed many times with the Commander-in-Chief before December 7, pointing out to him with the possible distribution of any attacking planes, it would be impossible for anybody to direct fire. It actually was true on the morning of December 7, that the planes came from so many directions that it was impossible to control the fire of the ships in any one sector.
102. Q. Then, as I understand you, as a practical matter, each ship's batteries were their own directors?
A. As a practical matter, that's what it amounted to. Each ship knew the general direction that they were to guard and that they had a primary responsibility for that direction of approach, but I think when they found something they could shoot at in some other direction that they shot there too.
103. Q. Admiral, there's another subparagraph in this same paragraph "G" that I'll ask you to give your interpretation of. That is subsection "a" of subparagraph "9", which states that "the Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor shall execute the emergency sortie order" which will accomplish certain  results listed thereafter. "This order must be prepared and issued in advance." Does that mean that a plan for sortie was drawn up in advance and given to the Commanding Officers so that all that would be necessary, in the event of an emergency, would be an order for execution?
A. By the time that had been in effect for—this was in revision, the original was much earlier than this—there was a definite order of the sorties, the order of ships being the destroyers, cruisers, and battleships, and all that was necessary to give in this case was the order to execute an emergency sortie.
104. Q. In other words, the plan was in the hands of the various commanding officers?
A. The plan for sortie was in the hands of the commanding officers.
105. Q. Admiral, on the morning of December 7, when and by whom was the order for execution issued?
A. I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff informed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had first been made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first shots, some of the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside would be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of
submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the Commander-in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's with regard to the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There were no carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition after the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul.
106. Q. Under Condition 3, what was the approximate number of anti-aircraft guns which were being manned by each of the battleships in Pearl Harbor?
A. The battleships, as they were disposed there, were in two sectors. That required four guns in either sector. That required only eight guns to be manned, in accordance with the order, but I'm quite certain that there were more manned. I'm quite certain that there were at least two on each battleship manned. I believe that order was given by Commander of Battleships.
107. Q. About what percentage of the total anti-aircraft batteries of battleships would that be?
A. It varies somewhat. It would be about—most of them had eight; I think it probably would run about twenty-five per cent.
108. Q. Approximately what proportion of officers and men of the ships of  your task force were on board their ships by the time the Jap attack started?
A. A check of that was made after the attack and, as I recall it, at the time the attack started, there were about seventy per cent of the officers on board and ninety-eight per cent of the enlisted personnel.
109. Q. What was the condition of the ships as regards watertight integrity, meaning the closure of watertight doors and hatches?
A. Everything was supposed to be closed except during working hours. They were allowed to open whatever doors were necessary during the daytime to carry out their work.
110. Q. This being Sunday morning, you would normally expect practically everything to be closed then, was that the case?
A. That was not true on the CALIFORNIA, which happened to be my Flagship, because they were working on Sunday morning in the compartments. I can not say about the other ships, and I can only say that through information received from the Commanding Officer.
111. Q. In such a situation as developed under that attack by the Japanese, who, if anyone, would normally be expected to order fire opened by the anti-aircraft guns?
A. It was the general understanding in any attack that fire would be opened without waiting for orders.
112 Q. So far as you know, were any orders given?
A. Not to my knowledge, but I was not on board at the time.
113. Q. Do you know of any orders, other than that for sortie, which your Staff gave prior to your arrival?
114. Q. Admiral, did you feel, at the time, that the Commander-in-Chief's instructions adequately provided for the security of your task force when it was in Pearl Harbor?
A. The only thing that was questionable in my mind at all was the part about the sector fire control. I never felt that ships could be held to fire in one sector, nor did I think that if they had targets in another sector they should be confined to the one sector. That had been discussed with the Commander-in-Chief on several occasions. In fact, I had written a modification of the order which was not in effect but simply to eliminate the responsibility which I did not feel could be carried out by any Sector Commander; that if an attack should come and from different directions, that no one should be held responsible for designating targets, that ships should fire when they had the opportunity.
115. Q. Did you feel that the whole scheme of things there relating to the defense of Pearl Harbor were as good as could be done, looking at the overall picture?
A. Yes, I think that as far as the Fleet was concerned, and I can not say for the Army because we were not informed—I was not informed as to what the Army actually was doing.
116. Q. In connection with the command relationships, did you feel, at that  time, the need for unity of command there?
A. I felt that for at least ten years before.
117. Q. Unity of command, as a general project, had, for long, been a matter of discussion within the Navy, had it not?
118. Q. During those few weeks prior to 7 December, do you recall any specific discussions which actually looked to following through to an early improvement?
A. I couldn't place the exact time, but for more than a year previous to that time, I had been advising several Commanders-in-Chief that the coordination was not adequate and that they should get some Army officer on their Staff so that it could be better arranged at least.
119. Q. You looked upon that as a minimum step?
A. As a minimum step, due to the fact that it seemed impossible to get anything higher than that.
120. Q. Admiral, did you take part in the conferences with respect to the replacing of the Marines in the outlying islands with Army troops?
A. No. I was present during a part of one discussion between the Commanding General and Commander-in-Chief with regard to who should man several of the islands, but I was merely a listener and took no part.
121. Q. Had you discussed the defense of the outlying islands with the Commander-in-Chief?
122. Q. Do you know whether the position of those islands, with respect to defense, was a matter of grave concern to him?
A. I believe it was.
123. Q. But you didn't discuss it so as to be familiar with his views?
A. He didn't discuss it with me. He had his Marine and Army people, but he didn't discuss it with me.
121. Q. Returning to your testimony concerning the Army's radar installations' were you aware, in those days, of the great part which radar had played in the defense of Britain against the German bombing attack.
A. In a general sense; yes.
125. Q. Had you heard enough about it to bring home to you that was a most essential installation, essential to the security while in Pearl Harbor?
126. Q. Had the radar installations of ships of your own personal command arrived at a state of real efficiency by early December, '41?
A. The efficiency, compared to what it was a year later, might be considered low, but this was due more to the types of radar than to he personnel. The type on the PENNSYLVANIA was very satisfactory; the CALIFORNIA had a different type which was less satisfactory, but had been used with a very good success at maneuvers and the location of planes. Within a short trip, after the beginning of the war, while at sea, planes of the clipper type had been picked up and tracked distances of eight-five miles with the radar on the PENNSYLVANIA.
127. Q. Do you know of any reason why the Army's Signal Corps radar system should not have arrived at an equal state of development and efficiency?
A. None at all. As I have previously stated, it was known that the Army was trying to get radar out there and it was their intention install it, but I had never been informed that one set had arrived.
128. Q. Did it occur to you, at any time between your return to Pearl Harbor, about 27 November. and the Japanese attack, that would be well for you to take your battleships to sea in view of what you knew about the deficiencies in the defense abilities of the Army?
A. No, because it was our confirmed opinion that our greatest danger was from submarines, and that the Fleet at sea was certainly much more danger from submarines than it was in port. Also, in few of the fact that we had no carriers to go with us, we would have had no air cover at all, and had we run into an air attack at sea, we would have been in presumably a worse position than we were in port here the Army had some protection for us.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: I would like to state as my definite opinion that Admiral Kimmel was a most efficient Commander-in-Chief, that when he was nominated as the Commander-Chief, although I did not expect to stay at sea at that time, I wrote him a letter congratulating him on his selection, and I firmly believed that he was as good as any other officer that could have been selected.
He had shown tremendous interest in the tactical development of the Fleet while in the Command of Cruisers, and he and I had worked continuously together for six months in trying to develop the tactics of light forces. In this respect, his interest was superior to those of any Commander-in-Chief I had served with. He was also tremendously interested in the material and the logistic support of the Fleet, and worked conscientiously in all respects to bring the Fleet to its highest state of readiness in preparation for war.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 3:43 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m., Monday, March 20, 1944.