NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C.
The examination met at 2 p. m.
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the eleventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that, in accordance with the examining officer's directive at the conclusion of his answer to 9. Q. (Record Page 136), he desired to make further answer, which, for the purpose of continuity, was inserted at the conclusion of his answer to 9. Q. With this addition, he pronounced his testimony correct, was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Captain Glover, I constitute an examining board acting under a precept from the Secretary of Navy to record testimony under oath concerning the facts surrounding the surprise attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The purpose of the recording is to have preserved testimony of witnesses who might not be available at some future time and will be needed for some purpose possibly not known now. The precept contains the words "pertinent to the facts", which constitute the gist of my instructions in that line. It appears that I have to make my own decisions as to what is pertinent and what is not, and in previous testimony facts come out which point the way to other facts, which, in the first instance, do not seem particularly connected but probably are. I believe that you are in position to testify concerning some of those points. I will be asking you to give testimony on things which were known to you over two years ago, and must ask you to testify from what you then knew, as well as you can, unaffected by what you have learned since. Please do your best in that respect. We will pause at any time for you to refresh your memory by consulting documents or otherwise. I will
give you an opportunity to verify your testimony in rough and correct it if necessary.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?
A. Captain Robert O. Glover, U. S. Navy, attached to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and also in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics Plans.
2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year of 1941?
A. I reported to the Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in January, 1941, and during 1941 was assigned various planning duties while in the office. Up to about August, 1941, my duties were in connection with all the color plans, with my principal attention being given on the Pacific and Asiatic areas. In August, 1941, the planning problem was concentrated by what is known as "WPL-46", or "Rainbow 5".
3. Q. Were you the specialist on Pacific plans in the War Plans Division during those months?
A. After August, I was given special cognizance of certain parts of WPL-46. These parts are: Part 3, Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2; Chapter III, Chapter V, Sections 2 and 3; Part 5, Appendix 2, Chapters II and IV and V. These sections generally dealt with the Pacific, Asiatic, and the Naval Transportation Service.
4. Q. On about what date did WPL-46 become effective?
A. About August, 1941. I think that's correct, Admiral. There ought to be a letter when it became effective.
5. Q. Did the plan contemplate Japan as an enemy?
A. Yes, sir. The plan divided possible enemies into two categories: first consideration being given to Germany as an enemy; the plan further considered Japan as an enemy.
6. Q. Was there anything in the plan, WPL-46, which indicated that hostilities with Japan could eventuate otherwise than at Japan's own initiative?
A. I don't recall the plan indicating by what means hostilities with Japan might occur, except to state possibly following a period of strained relations.
7. Q. Can you give the approximate date of the preparation of the plan?
A. The plan was completed in May. Preparation of the plan covered several months prior to that date. It was a continuing process.
8. Q. Was the plan based upon the forces which were then actually stationed in the Pacific or did it look forward to changes in those forces?
A. The plan states that deployment of forces had practically all been made. Redeployments of forces prior to May and up through June and August had been made. The plan contemplated the dispatch of certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic.
9. Q. What was the approximate composition of the forces thus detached, and about when was the actual detachment made?
A. As I remember, the forces set up in the plan to be detached was one cruiser division. Other detachments had been made during 1941.
prior to August. The approximate size of these forces were: one BB division, one crudiv, and one desrons.
10. Q. Was there any other considerable detachment of forces from the Pacific Fleet, detachments which were of a permanent nature or of a temporary nature, which continued over a considerable period?
A. The principal force involved were submarines, two divisions, No. 202 and 203, which were directed to remain in the Asiatic rather than being withdrawn to the Pacific Fleet.
11. Q. Was there a movement of forces to Australian waters which endured over any considerable period?
A. In July, 1941, a task force of cruisers was dispatched from Pearl for the purpose of escorting to Australia a Dutch ship loaded with aircraft and carrying, as passengers, Chinese air pilots. This task force remained in Australia approximately four days, and then returned to Pearl Harbor via Fiji.
12. Q. As regards reenforcements to the Pacific Fleet, did the War Plans Division not have in mind any increases in that force during the first few months after the plan became effective?
13. Q. Then was it the case that you intended WPL-46 to be a strictly "As-Is" plan, based entirely upon realism and what was actually available in the way of forces?
A. My concept, at that time, was that the plan made a deployment of forces on a realistic basis to meet the situation that might develop.
14. Q. Did you consider that there was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, an adequate logistic support for what the plan called for from forces under his command?
A. I believe that he had adequate logistic facilities for his initial defensive task assigned by the plan.
15. Q. Did the plan not call for offensive measures on the part of the Pacific Fleet?
A. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was given an offensive task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. He was also given the task to support the forces of the associated Powers, by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. My concept of the plan was that the initial attitude of the Pacific Fleet was defensive, and that it did not have the means available to assume an outright offensive, and it would not have the means available to assume an outright offensive attitude for sometime.
16. Q. However, was not the diversionary movement, which you have just mentioned, something to be classed as a decidedly offensive movement?
A. I believe his action in that case, to my mind, had better be described as by raids rather than by movement of total force.
17. Q. Did you consider that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was sufficient for such raids?
A. Yes, sir.
18. Q. In the course of your work, during the first half of 1941, did it occur to you that our general method of producing, issuing, and keeping up to date of basic war plans was in any way defective?
A. My initial impression, when I first joined the office in January, was that the preparation of our war plans was a very laborious and
slow process. WPL-46 was based on Staff conversations between the British, Canadians, and the United States. I, personally, did not take part in those conversations and my only connection with the plan was after it had been issued. I considered WPL-46 was prepared reasonably expeditiously, and issued to interested officers expeditiously. It represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time, and a calculated risk in the Pacific.
19. Q. You have just said, "at that time." Was it your feeling that WPL-46 tended to be too much frozen or was the plan, itself, and methods for employing it sufficiently elastic to meet situations as they would arise in the future?
A. I felt, at the time, that the plan was elastic. In fact, the plan did meet the situation in the future. Lines of communication were maintained to Australia, and the enemy denied the Pacific east of 180 degrees.
20. Q. Was any special provision included in the working methods of the War Plans Division for keeping the plan in step with forces available as changes therein would eventuate?
A. Yes, sir. On 21 August 1941, a memorandum from the Head of the Plans Section of the War Plans Division, was issued which states the following pertinent to the question:
"Plan Section, War Plans Division, is charged with (a) Preparation of changes in the plan made necessary by changes in the assumptions or in the strategic situation, or which may be required to keep the plan current with administrative action; (b) The preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect; and (c) The continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces operations, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan."
Note: The examining officer identified the memorandum mentioned above as being one dated August 21, 1941, classified Restricted, addressed to "Plans Section, War Plans Division", Subject:-"Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5", signed by Captain C. J. Moore, U. S. N. Said memorandum is on file in the War Plans Section, Commander-in-Chief office, Navy Department.
21. Q. Do you recall any action effecting the content of the plan, itself, in consequence of that directive from which you have just quoted?
A. As I recall, no change was made in the plan prior to December.
22. Q. Do you recall any consideration having been given in your offices to our Government's action in freezing the Japanese credits in this country sometime during the first half of 1941?
A. I can recall nothing definite in regard to freezing these credits as it affected war plans.
23. Q. Was the situation, the international situation, upon which any war plan is presumably based, reestimated in the light of Japan's probable position in being denied strategic materials incident to the freezing of credits.
A. I can only assume they were. I, personally, had no part in that matter. My only assumption is that Japanese action must have been considered during the aforementioned Staff conversations.
24. Q. Had such a reestimate been made, would you not have been concerned in it?
A. I would probably have known, if such was going on.
25. Q. As you recall, who would have actually made the estimate or the reestimate?
A. Probably Admiral Turner, assisted by Captain C. J. Moore.
26. Q. Was it well known to the War Plans Division that the situation visavis Japan grew in intensity from, say, June, '41 onward?
A. The intensity of the situation was common knowledge with the officers of the War Plans Division. I discussed the matter personally with Captain Wright, who was a special assistant to Admiral Turner.
27. Q. What was done toward a reestimate of the situation in the Pacific in the light of that tense situation?
A. No action, as far as I know, was taken to modify WPL-46.
28. Q. And no formal reestimate was made?
A. To my knowledge; no.
29. Q. Did the War Plans Division know that the Army took steps in the summer of 1941 to build up its forces in Hawaii and the Philippines?
A. Yes, sir; particularly the Philippines.
30. Q. Did the Division participate in any of the discussions or estimates which lead to that action by the Army?
A. I don't know; personally, I took no part in any such discussions. If held, they must have been held by the director.
31. Q. Do you recall if, at that time, you thought that such build-up was putting the Navy out of step with the Army or that it was a matter of getting the Army up into step with the Navy in the Pacific area?
A. In the case of the Philippines, my thought, at that time, was that our forces there, our Navy forces there, were only adequate for a defensive action, and the build-up of the Army would only add to their deficient strength. In the Hawaiian area, by view was that the build-up of the Army forces brought them more in line with the strength of the naval forces deployed.
32. Q. You have stated that a fundamental idea of the basic plan was that our attitude in the Pacific was defensive. Did that idea prevail in the War Plans Division right up to 7 December '41?
A. That was my personal view, and I believe it was the view held generally by the officers of the War Plans Division.
33. Q. That being the case, did the question arise in your offices in, say, October, '41, or thereafter, of the correctness of retaining the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters?
A. I do not recall any study either being made or any conversations pertinent to the question after August, 1941, when WPL-46 became effective.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
34. Q. Is it your recollection that during the latter half of 1941 the Fleet was being retained in Hawaiian waters primarily for the defense of our positions in those waters, or, to be in a position of readiness for making the offensive movements which the Plans called for?
A. My concept was that the Fleet was there for both purposes-first to assist in the protection of the United States east of the 180th Meridian, and, secondly, to be in a position from which raiding operations could be projected.
36. Q. What thought or consideration, if any, was given in your offices concerning the security of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area against a surprise attack by the Japanese?
A. Referring again to the order of August 21, 1941, signed by the head of the Plans Section, War Plans Division, one paragraph of this order designated Commander Ansel, in collaboration with Captain Wright, to draft daily and submit to the Director (Admiral Turner) a short strategic summary of the international military and political situation. Commander Ansel, in preparing these summaries, had made available to him dispatches of Military Intelligence Division, Naval Intelligence Division, the State Department, and the press. While a surprise attack by the Japanese was discussed no definite warning, as far as I know, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
The examining officer directed the reporter to re-read the question.
A. (Continued.) I don't think we were worried about it.
36. Q. Will you please ascertain if those daily studies by Commander Ansel are still on file in the Department, and, if so, enter data in the record from which they could be identified?
A. Yes, sir.
Note: From information later furnished by the witness, the examining officer identified the memoranda under discussion as being those contained in a notebook titled "Daily Information Summary-Op 12", now on file in the Combat Intelligence Section (F-20) of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet Room 3704, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
37. Q. Was that because of your low estimate of the probability that the Japs would attack in that way, or because of your belief in the security measures both by the Fleet and by the Army forces which were charged with the security of Pearl Harbor?
A. I don't believe it was generally felt by the officers in the Plans Division that the Japanese would strike in the way they did. In my own case, I did not feel so. I felt that there were adequate means available to the Army and Navy.
38. Q. By the last part of your answer, do you mean, among other things, that the Army forces on Oahu were fully adequate to the defense of Pearl Harbor against an air raid?
A. I felt we had adequate air forces there, adequate Army air forces there, to repel a Japanese air attack?
39. Q. During those days in which the situation with the Japanese was becoming so very tense, do you recall any concern within your offices over the possibility of severe damage by sabotage from the large number of Japanese on Oahu?
A. Yes, sir; I recall that matter being discussed. If my memory serves me right, it appeared in the warning dispatch either by the Army or the Navy, to the Commanders in the Hawaiian area.
40. Q. Do you remember if that caused any reconsideration of the retention of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters?
A. I have no knowledge of any discussions in regard to the question asked.
41. Q. Will you give, insofar as you can remember, the views held in your offices in, say, October, 1941, on the situation as regards the outlying islands such as Wake and Midway?
A. I discussed Wake with, as I recall, Captain Moore, and it was Moore's view and mine, that we should not attempt to fortify Wake.
The question was up because of a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, stating  that it was his intention to do so. I believe the decision was made to go along with the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation. As regards Midway, the view in the offices of the Plans Division was that we should attempt to maintain our position there. This view, as I remember, was concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief.
42. Q. Then as you recall-our sending forces in to Wake-was at the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
43. Q. Did the Pacific War Plan then current contain any provision for putting parts only of the plan into effect?
A. The plan provided for execution, in part, by dispatch, indicating the nations to be considered enemy and the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan, or additional tasks, thereof.
44. Q. In order to connect up the Board's record in general, will you explain, briefly, the meaning of "'M' Day", and the connection of that term with the Pacific War Plan then current?
A. "M" Day is commonly understood as the day of execution of a war plan. In the case of WPL-46, "M" Day, unless otherwise designated, was to be the date of an Alnav dispatch worded as follows: "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5." Upon receipt of this Alnav, the Naval establishment was to proceed with the execution of WPL-46, including acts of war. WPL-46 stated that all parts of the plan might be executed at once, or in part by dispatch indicating the enemy, tasks to be executed or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken.
45. Q. In, say, late November, 1941, could an "M" Day have been declared in such a way as to become effective only in the areas west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier areas?
A. Yes, that could have been done.
46. Q. What would have been the effect of such a declaration?
A. Naval forces based on Hawaii and on the Asiatic station could have been ordered to place WPL-46 in effect. Of necessity, the method used in declaring "M" Day west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier, would have required that these forces be informed that war had not been declared. The declaration would have had the effect of directing the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, the Governor of Samoa, and the Governor of Guam, to take certain mobilization deployments. The effect certainly would have been to alert all naval commanders at sea west of the Pacific Sea Frontier.
47. Q. Would you have thought, at that time, that such declaration would have been more effective in putting our forces upon the alert than the method actually used by the Department promised to be?
A. Using the method under discussion of "M" Day did not occur to me at that time. Possibly its use might have been more effective.
48. Q. Could a directive from the Department, placing portions of the current Pacific War Plan into effect, have served as a more definite means of putting our forces upon the alert?
A. I believe that the plan did not lend itself very easily to be put into effect as a means of warning only. The plan was based on war activities and if used only as a means of warning, would, in my opinion, have required quite a lengthy dispatch in explanation of what was exactly intended.
49. Q. Is it true that the War Plan then current really did not contemplate the advent of hostilities through surprise action of any enemy, but rather was primarily based upon our starting a war ourselves, through definitely offensive action, after a proper declaration of war?
A. It is my view that the plan contemplated the commencement of hostilities after a declaration of war.
50. Q. I pass you a document which, before this Board, is known as Exhibit No. B. Were you familiar with it?
A. Yes, I have seen this document before, when it was first issued.
51. Q. And it had been approved by the Navy Department?
A. Yes, sir.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
52. Q. What agency would be required in putting that plan in effect and how would he have to act?
A. The plan provided to become effective on "M" Day, or that certain features of it might be placed into effect by the War, Navy Department, or the local Commander prior to "M" Day. The plan states that "M" Day might precede a declaration of war.
53. Q. Was there any reason why the Department should not have ordered that plan into effect on or about 27 November?
A. No, sir, I see no reason why that plan could not have been made effective, if desired.
54. Q. At the time, would you have thought that action to be a very effective means of placing the forces in Hawaii on the alert?
A. Using that method didn't occur to me at that time, Admiral.
55. Q. Do you recall any discussion, or other happenings in your offices, during 1941, concerning putting into effect the unity of command project for Hawaii?
A. The matter was discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 4:05 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.