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[179]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1944
THIRTEENTH DAY
                                                          NAVY DEPARTMENT,
                                                          Washington, D. C. 

The examination met at 9:50 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twelfth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Commander Paul C. Crosley, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, Postal Affairs, Division Naval Communications.

2. Q. Where were you serving on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. On the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as Flag Secretary.

3. Q. Do you have in your possession the Pacific Fleet Employment Schedule covering the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942?

A. I do. I have the copy issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated August 13, 1941, in which the schedule is outlined and was duly authenticated and distributed to Force and Type Commanders, Pacific Fleet, OpNav, CinCLant, Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District; ten copies each to action addresses, and three copies each to the Type Commanders.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 25".

4. Q. Is this copy, this document complete?

A. No. When drawn from the files, it was observed that enclosure (A) thereto was missing.

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5. Q. What is the nature of enclosure (A)?

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A. Enclosure (A) is a photostatic copy of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter.

6. Q. Do you have an employment schedule for any other quarter which has attached to it such a photostatic copy?

A. Yes; I also drew from the files of the Chief of Naval Operations proposed employment schedule for the ensuing quarter, schedule dated 10 November 1941, which has an enclosure similar in form to that one originally contained in the schedule dated August 13, Exhibit 25.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the document it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations Navy Department Washington D. C. A description Of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 26".

7. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to the present location of the missing enclosure to Exhibit 26?

A. No, I do not, and when inquiry was made as to its location, the Secret File Room stated that they did not know what disposition had been made of it.

8. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when it was found to be missing from the letter?

A. No, sir, I do not, except that the file room informed my officer messenger that previous requests had been made for copies of this correspondence.

9. Q. In addition to the copies of this letter required for the distribution you have outlined, to the best of your recollection, how many other copies were made at the time?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there were no spare copies made except for the files of the Commander-in-Chief, which we usually did with all correspondence in case an additional copy was required by some visiting Flag Officer; in other words, someone would come in to see the Admiral and he'd want to give them one of the copies. We always kept a record of it if that was done. The only way we could determine whether any additional copies of this were issued, would be to check the receipt record in Honolulu and Pearl Harbor.

10. Q. Were copies distributed among the members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?

A. They were.

11. Q. To what members, as you recall?

A. The Operations Officer, the War Plans Section, and that was all, the other was a copy that was routed around. Oh, one other; the Admiral kept one in his book.

12. Q. Was any method of accounting prescribed for the copies that were distributed?

A. None other than the usual receipt cards system where the addressee would send back a card acknowledging receipt of a letter or the usual registered receipt handled through the guard mail system.

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13. Q. Did the Task Force Commander supplement this employment schedule with schedules of their own?

A. They did. Each Task Force Commander printed this schedule and gave it a distribution in accordance with the Pacific Fleet mail distribution list.

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14. Q. Do you have in your possession copies of the employment schedules for the three task forces covering the second quarter for the fiscal year of 1942?

A. I do. I have Task Force One, Two, and Three schedules.

The documents were introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the documents, they were returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the documents introduced in evidence are appended marked "Exhibit 27," "Exhibit 28," and "Exhibit 29" respectively.

15. Q. It is noted that the three Task Force Schedules, Exhibits 27, 28, and 29, are all in printed form. Where would the printing of these schedules take place?

A. Usually it can be determined by the printer's symbols on the schedule. Normally, it is done by the Flagship of the Task Force Commander, or, if he is at sea, he will leave the printing work to be accomplished ashore by whatever print shop is designated by the Force Commander of the Commander-in-Chief, depending upon what printing facilities are available. Some of the printing in Pearl Harbor was done by the Submarine Base, some by the Commander Service Force, most of it by the Commander Service Force's Flagship. But for rush work, the Flagship of the particular Command involved was usually used. Task Force One Schedule does not indicate what ship it was printed on, but the CALIFORNIA, at that time, was doing most of their work and it is safe to assume that the CALIFORNIA printed that schedule. Task Force Two likewise does not show the printing shop but the ENTERPRISE had printing equipment and as the Flagship of Commander, Task Force Two; it is safe to assume that the ENTERPRISE did the work. Task Force Three, with the LOUISVILLE as Flagship, does not indicate the print shop but it is also safe to assume that ship did the printing. I might add, that these printing jobs were normally supervised by an Ensign, commissioned officer, attached to the Staff or to the ship's complement, and the practice was for that officer to watch and maintain custody of the schedules to and from the print shop to the point of distribution.

16. Q. It is noted that the schedules are assigned no registered numbers. What system was in use for accounting for copies distributed?

A. No system of accounting was maintained as it was treated the same as confidential correspondence.

17. Q. Have you information as to the number of copies that were actually struck off in the print shops of these schedules?

A. The printer did not include that information on the three Task Force Schedules, but a close estimate can be made from the distribution list.

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18. Q. That list does not show the spare copies printed, does it?

A. No, sir. I might add, the consensus of opinion seems to be that it was necessary to give these schedules as wide a distribution as possible because of the various activities concerned in the operations outlined therein, such as supplies, gunnery schedules, and other important operations requiring close coordination between the various Type Commanders. This was particularly emphasized in the shift-over

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to the task forces, when ships of different types were operating in the various task forces.

19. Q. Will you please state the distribution made of one of the employment schedules, say Exhibit 27, Task Force One, to whom copies were distributed, and how many copies to each?

A. The distribution list for the Task Force One Employment Schedule included as special distribution: the Chief of Naval Operations (50 copies), the Navy Department bureaus (3 to 20 copies), the Fleet Personnel Officer (2 copies), the Commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Naval Districts (2 or 3 copies), the West Coast Receiving Ships, Ammunition Depots and Supply Depot (1 copy each), the West Coast and Pearl Harbor Navy Yards (3 or 4 copies), Battle Force Mail Clerk (2 copies), Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (1 copy), Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Atlantic Fleets (8 copies each); plus the regular distribution to the Task Force including Type, Squadron, division and commanding officers ships, Marine and aircraft units (1 to 5 copies each). Total distribution, 729 copies. I have estimated that it would take approximately 600 copies of each of the Employment Schedules of the other two task forces to complete the distribution prescribed for those schedules. Thus, a total of approximately 1,929 copies of the three task force employment schedules were required to complete all designated distributions.

20. Q. With reference to the Commander-in-Chief's employment schedule, Exhibit 25, does that show the movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and the dates which it was planned that they would be present therein?

A. It infers the same information by stating when the operating period commences and ends, as well as the upkeep period. It also includes tactical periods. These schedules could not be religiously followed because of diversions and other incidental changes that occurred from time to time, but they were very closely followed.

21. Q. Then one in possession of that schedule could calculate, in advance, the ships that were likely to be in Pearl Harbor on any given date?

A. That is correct. To the best of my memory, the WEST VIRGINIA was an exception. As I recall, the WEST VIRGINIA was scheduled for overhaul period on the West Coast and I was present in the Admiral's cabin at the time the desirability of retaining her at Pearl Harbor was discussed, and, at that particular time, he had lost the service, temporarily, of two of his battleships and considered it desirable to retain the WEST VIRGINIA and defer her overhaul period until the balance of battleship power was back to normal. I believe, otherwise, the WEST VIRGINIA would have been on the West Coast on that date (7 December 1941).

22. Q. Similarly, from the employment schedules of the Task Force Commanders, could one determine in advance what ships would normally be present in Pearl Harbor on a given day?

A. Yes, because the Task Force Commanders' schedules were much more in [183] detail, whereas the Commander-in-chief's schedule was a general schedule. I might add that it is my positive conviction that if any leakage of schedule information occurred, it could be obtained much more easily from the Task Force command

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schedule, and subsequent correspondence, than from the Commander-in-Chief's schedule, because everyone recognized that the latter was always subject to detailed changes after its issue. Also, the mimeographing and printing of the Commander-in-Chief's schedule was under very close supervision in a very small office; any spare copies misdirected could easily be detected.

23. Q. Do you recollect anything which indicates any particular attention to be given to the security of the information contained in the Task Force Commanders' employment schedules?

A. No, sir, I do not.

24. Q. Inasmuch as a great number of copies of the Task Force Commanders' schedules were actually printed and issued, did it occur to you, during that time, that security of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters was being thereby endangered?

A. No, sir. Everybody had been thoroughly indoctrinated and instructed not to discuss the proposed ship movements, repeated letters had been issued on the subject, and warnings by the Commander-in-Chief. The actual movements of the ships could easily be observed from any vantage point in Pearl Harbor or from merchants in town, but I do not ever recall having heard anyone discussing prospective movements.

25. Q. Did you ever hear anyone discuss the possibility of a spy obtaining one or more copies of the Schedules containing this information, which would be vital because it indicated movements of units of the Fleet so far in advance?

A. No, sir. It would have been quite easy for anyone to obtain the information, if they had so desired, by copying it from the schedules in the various offices of the addressees, although I believe it would have been difficult for an agent to have obtained a copy without its disappearance being noted, because the schedules were frequently referred to by the persons concerned with carrying them out.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I have no written documents to back up my statement, but I was frequently present when Admiral Kimmel would receive or send correspondence to the Navy Department, both official and unofficial, personal or otherwise, and I repeatedly heard him complain that he could not get what he was asking for, materiel and personnel that he considered essential to put the Fleet in the proper fighting condition, and I know that this worried him considerably and that he never ceased trying. In some cases, he was successful, but in those cases, it appeared to be purely action which he initiated himself rather than outside assistance. As an example, the security measures that he placed into effect in Pearl Harbor, as well as the training of the crews in gunnery and tactical drilling. I recall a particular message, (although I did not have custody of it), I recall [184] a particular message which arrived shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor and I distinctly recall that

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the impression of all those who read the message was similar to other messages of that nature that had been received, and it did not strike anyone as being any more critical, although I never heard individual opinions expressed on the subject by the Admiral. I believe this message to which I refer is the one about which there was considerable publicity after the attack. I recall, one day, I can not tell accurately whether it was before the receipt of this message or after, but the Admiral walked to the chart in his office and said something like, "I wonder what those rascals are up to now". I believe it was at the time when the Japanese were reported en route to the East Indies area. The impression that I'm trying to create is that everyone that I had contact with on the Staff, as well as visitors to the Headquarters, felt that the situation bore watching, but that with the representations being made in Washington, at that time, that there had been no critical change other than would normally be expected, and that no definite word indicated that we could believe otherwise.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 10:50 a. m., took a recess until 2 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the third and fourth days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Commander Benjamin Katz, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the second and fourth days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

[185]

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Sir, will you state your name, rank, and present duty station?

A. Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?

A. I was Fleet Gunnery Officer of the U. S. Fleet-U. S. Pacific Fleet.

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3. Q. And how long had you been on Admiral Kimmel's Staff in that capacity?

A. Since the first day of February, 1941.

4. Q. Admiral, would you make a statement as to your relations with Admiral Kimmel, with these points in mind: The frequency with which he consulted you, and whether or not those were individual consultations or general Staff meetings?

A. My relations with Admiral Kimmel were quite close and intimate, both personally and officially. I had served with Admiral Kimmel intermittently since 1918. I had served part of every sea cruise with Admiral Kimmel except one, when he served in the Orient and I served in the Pacific Fleet on the West Coast. My official relations and contacts with Admiral Kimmel were frequent, but in general not in Staff meetings and consultations. I was, as Fleet Gunnery Officer, part of the Operations Division of the Staff, and Staff consultations were generally attended by the Chief of Staff, the Operations Officer, the War Plans Officer, and Intelligence Officer. However, Captain, now Admiral, DeLany, who was Operations Officer, passed on all information in which members of the Operations Division of the Staff had interest. Aside from that, I had very close and frequent contact with the Admiral several times a week, and usually alone, in that my primary duties, as he had laid down for me when I first joined the Staff, were the gunnery training of the Fleet-more than the gunnery training, the general Training of the Fleet; a matter in which he was greatly interested and which he continually checked up with me about.

5. Q. Admiral, did you feel that the attention of the Commander-in-Chief was primarily occupied with the training mission of the Fleet, to a point where war readiness was somewhat relegated to the background?

A. Well, you must understand that I was the Training Officer and the Gunnery Officer of the Fleet; therefore matters that he discussed with me dealt with those problems. I know they held a very high place in his mind and he was greatly concerned about furthering the training of the Fleet and took many, what at the time appeared to be, radical steps, in bringing that about. As to his interest in training occupying him to the extent that the war readiness of the Fleet was neglected, that doesn't follow. I do not think that he was unduly occupied with training matters to the extent that he lost sight of the other aspects of readiness and security.

6. Q. Sir, prior to December 7th, were you shown, or were you familiar with the contents of various dispatches coming from the Navy Department containing warnings of the possibility of hostilities?

A. I was not shown any warning dispatch. It is my understanding that those were revealed and discussed at Staff conferences which, in general, I did not attend. However, the purport of all those that had anything to do with my particular work on the Staff was passed to me and I did know of the general tenor of some of the warnings. I can not state as to how many of those were [186] passed on to me by Admiral DeLany.

7. Q. Admiral, prior to December 7, 1941, what was your own personal estimate as to the probability of an air attack on Oahu?

A. My own personal opinion was that an attack on Oahu was definitely possible. I think my opinion was reflected in a Fleet Circular

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Letter which I helped compile, that is, 2CL-41, which by my recollection was revised a couple of times. I think it was first written in February or March, 1941. As a matter of fact, seven or eight months after the attack on Pearl Harbor its major part was still in effect in the Fleet. One of the chief considerations of that letter was that the Fleet could be attacked and if it were attacked, it would be by submarine attack, an air attack, or a combination of the two. It was widely discussed between Captain, now Admiral, DeLaney, and myself, that the presence of either submarines or aircraft would lead us to look for the other. I haven't access to that letter, but I believe that thought was written into one of the drafts. I did not think the attack-an air attack on Pearl Harbor was probable, but it was considered as a very serious possibility.

8. Q. Admiral, I hand you a letter from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, dated October 14,1941, styled "2CL-41 (Revised) ", which is Exhibit 4 before this examination. Is this the letter to which you referred in your last answer?

A. This letter is a revision of the letter to which I referred. I think this letter follows very closely the previous and original draft. I probably had nothing to do with the draft of the revision because at the time it was issued I was on temporary duty in Washington.

9. Q. Would you give the approximate date of that temporary duty in Washington, the time you were absent from Pearl Harbor?

A. I left Pearl Harbor on 6 October, 1941, and returned on 8 November, 1941.

10. Q. Referring back two questions to your answer that you did not consider a surprise air attack a probability but a strong possibility would you say that that represented the consensus of opinion of other members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff?

A. Yes sir. This letter, which I consider one of the most important letters which was issued to the Fleet, so states.

11. Q. Sir, can you amplify a bit the reasoning behind this statement that you have made, which is, as you say, contained in 2CL-41; can you amplify on the reasons behind the basis for this statement?

A. Well, a large part of the world was at war. We were engaged in quasi-war in the Atlantic-this is all my opinion, my reasoning-we were engaged in a diplomatic controversy with Japan which finally ended in conferences in Washington. I, personally, had been in the Hawaiian detachment and had arrived at Pearl Harbor in the Fall of 1939, and all the signs indicated to me, and I can't speak for other members of the Staff, but I feel that they were of like mind, in the discussions with them, that it would be very difficult for us to avoid eventual war.

12. Q. Admiral, at that time, what was your evaluation of the intelligence reports available to you and other members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, as regards the relations between the United States and Japan?

[187]

A. Well, my evaluation of the situation, my own evaluation of the situation, was somewhat colored by a secret message which I delivered by word of mouth from Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief exactly one month before Pearl Harbor. I had been absent from the Fleet for thirty days, and prior to that time I had not, as a regular routine, attended the Staff conferences-I was in

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what you might call the second echelon-I did, through conversations with the Fleet Intelligence Officer, know the estimate was that the Japanese were on the move in the Far East and it was a matter of common knowledge in the press that we were trying to persuade Japan to move no further, and that representatives of the Japanese had gone on to Washington to discuss the matter. My estimate as to it, I saw, was colored by the message I brought from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which I did not interpret in any way to Admiral Kimmel other than learning the message by rote. The only interpretation I made of it was to myself. I told no one of this message except Admiral Kimmel, himself. My own conclusion was that the probability was that the move would be in the Far East.

13. Q. Admiral, can you state the contents of that message from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Yes. Admiral Stark outlined one or more courses of action which the Japanese might follow, and the United States' probable reaction thereto. A surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was in no wise presaged by that message which I carried.

14. Q. Sir, upon your return from Washington to CinCPac Headquarters, what was your feeling at that time as to whether the Department here in Washington was furnishing full information to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific in regard to the Japanese situation?

A. Having carried that message, I could personally have no other thought but that information, as it was available here in Washington, was furnished, in that case, to the Commander-in-Chief.

15. Q. During the month or six weeks prior to December 7th, what information was available to you and other members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff, as regards the then location of the Japanese Fleet?

A. I can not speak as to what knowledge other members of the Staff had. My recollection is that I had knowledge of a large concentration of Japanese naval forces near Camranh Bay. From the time I returned from Washington until the attack on Pearl Harbor, I had not seen any warning messages.

16. Q. Sir, in considering the possibility of a surprise air attack, was any great emphasis placed upon the form that the attack might take-whether by bombs or by torpedoes?

A. All methods of air attack were considered-by high bombers, dive bombers, and by torpedo planes. The danger of a particular type of attack, that is the torpedo plane attack, was minimized in my mind by information contained in one or more letters from the Chief of Naval Operations. I can not quote or recollect the exact phraseology or the figures given. However, to me and in my recollection, the purport of that information was that the success of a torpedo attack, against ships in a harbor with a depth of less than ten fathoms was improbable. In discussions with the War Plans Division of the Staff, my recollection is that we wanted nets to counter such an attack, but the information at the time as to the probability of the success of such an [188] attack allowed us to put the nets, which were not available and hard to get, on a lower priority than other war materials which we needed. There was never a feeling in my own mind that such an attack was impossible, or that nets being available, we should not have them, but the nets definitely took a low priority.

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I draw no conclusions for anyone else but myself-they took low priority in my mind. I have a recollection of more than one letter received from the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject of torpedo nets. And, serving in the Bureau of Ordnance, I have had made a search of Bureau of Ordnance files for any letters written by the Bureau of Ordnance dealing with torpedo nets and addressed to the Commandant of the District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and have been unable to locate any. The only letter I have been able to locate is a copy of one from the Chief of Naval Operations to the various Commandants, with information copies to CinCPac.

17. Q. Admiral, I hand you a letter from Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts, with the information copy for CinCPac, dated June 13, 1941, which is Exhibit 19 before this examination. Do you recall having seen that letter?

A. I think I did see this letter. I do not remember it exactly, but I am led to believe I have seen it before because the figure of "10 Fathoms" which had been in my mind in the past two years, is in this letter, and I imagine I got that date from this letter. I do not recollect the letter in detail.

18. Q. Admiral, during the period in question, what information was available to you as to the frequency with which the Japanese had used torpedo plane attack?

A. I do not believe I had any information at all as to what the Japanese, up until the attack on Pearl Harbor, had been able to do with torpedo planes and torpedoes as an aircraft weapon. As I look back on it now, I know of no instance where they used the torpedo plane in action. Although they were undoubtedly well drilled in its use, I had no information on it.

19. Q. Sir, were any additional security measures against torpedo plane attack undertaken pursuant to the statements of the letter of June 13 that you just examined?

A. I have no access to the files, but I have a definite impression that the idea of torpedo nets was not abandoned but was given a low priority, a lower priority than other material which was required. I do not recollect any conversations with the Commandant of the District, to whom these letters were addressed, with copies to CinCPac, although quite possibly conversations were had with them. They were frequent visitors at our Headquarters, and these matters were discussed from time to time. My recollection was that the nets were not available, that the ships would have to be left free to maneuver and make quick exits from the Harbor if necessary, and that the non-availability of the nets and desire not to have the Harbor cluttered up had a bearing on our placing the nets at that time in a relatively low priority.

20. Q. Admiral, who was responsible for the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor against an attack of any kind?

A. Well, not referring to this letter, 2CL-41, but to my memory of the letter, which I think is important because I helped to write it-the thought behind the letter-we had spent a great deal of time and effort and ammunition in the training of the Fleet in anti-aircraft gunnery. The defense of [189] Pearl Harbor, since it was a shore base, was, in accordance with the terms of this letter, placed in the hands of the District Commandant, and when one or more ships of the

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Fleet were in Pearl Harbor, the guns of the Fleet were turned over to the District Commandant in the person of the Harbor Control Officer, as anti-aircraft weapons in the defense of the harbor. When I say responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was placed in the hands of the Commandant, I mean to the extent that alerts were passed on to the ships by him, the conditions of readiness, and the red, yellow, and green signals were all controlled by the Harbor Control Post. I had a fairly intimate knowledge of the setup there in that the Harbor Control Post was one of the CP's, or Command Posts, in the anti-aircraft setup on the Island. The whole anti-aircraft defense of the Island was headed up by an officer of the U. S. Army Air Forces, a Brigadier General. It was placed in his hands because he was the Fighter-Interceptor Commander for the Army, and aircraft attacks were to be countered by fighters and gunners. The Army Anti-Aircraft, the Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft Brigade, was under the tactical command of this Air Force General, and the Harbor Control Post was a Command Post of the Anti-Aircraft. My recollection is that in the one or more revisions of this letter, we slightly changed the sectors which would be covered by various ships in the Harbor, and I think the second draft of this letter was improved by insuring that at least one ship should be in any one sector. My recollection is that when we first put this into effect, and we had drills from time to time, when few ships were in the Harbor, one sector was left vacant. The guns of the Fleet were under the control of the Harbor Control Post in Pearl Harbor and that Harbor Control Post, which was under the Commandant of the Navy Yard, was a part of the anti-aircraft and interceptor-fighter setup of the Island. The Harbor Control Post received its orders and its directions from the Anti-Aircraft Gun Commander.

21. Q. What portions of the anti-aircraft defense were the direct responsibility of the Army?

A. All those not mounted aboard ship, with the exception of, I believe, one battery of three-inch anti-aircraft artillery, mobile, that the Marines had at the barracks in the Yard. That battery, as I recollect, was part of the equipment of a Defense Battalion which was forming to proceed to one of the outlying islands.

22. Q. Admiral, what Army guns were placed close enough to Pearl Harbor to defend the ships there from dive or torpedo bombing?

A. It eventuated that at the time of the attack that there were not any, except fixed batteries, three-inch guns, at Fort DeRussey, some distance from Pearl Harbor, and I believe on Sand Island, the western side of Honolulu Harbor. The Army's anti-aircraft batteries, aside from fixed batteries, were mobile batteries of three-inch anti-aircraft guns. I believe that no ninety millimeter modern guns reached the Island until after the attack. There may have been one battery on the Island of Oahu, but it was not in operating condition. There were mobile batteries actively engaged in training and firing target practice west of Pearl Harbor at a training camp on the beach.

23. Q. Admiral, on the morning of December 7, do you know the condition of readiness of the Army guns that you mentioned as regards the presence of personnel and availability of ammunition?

A. They were not in place in the field, but were in their gun parks ready to move.

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[190]

24. Q. In addition to the one battery that the Marines had at the Pearl Harbor base, did the Navy have any other shore anti-aircraft batteries at Pearl Harbor?

A. Not before the attack; we had many afterward.

25. Q. Do you know anything of the condition of readiness of that one Marine battery?

A. No, except that it was emplaced on that day.

26. Q. In general terms, will you describe the anti-aircraft armament of the ships in the Harbor, by types, as to number and calibre?

A. Yes. The battleships were equipped generally with 3-inch 50 calibre AA guns which were mounted in emplacements which were destined to take 1.1 quadruple mounts. They had their regular batteries of 5-inch 25 AA guns, and were equipped with-

27. Q. Just give the total number and calibre?

A. Eight 5-inch 25 guns; six to eight 3-inch 50 guns; and about twelve 50-calibre machine guns. I might state that the 3-inch 50 guns were interim armament in lieu of 1.1 automatic guns, quadruple mounts. Cruisers were equipped with eight 5-inch 25-calibre guns, except two which had 5-inch 38-calibre guns. Some had 3-inch 50 AA guns in lieu of 1.1 quadruple guns, and some had 1.1 quadruple mounts, four in each case, and eight to twelve 50-calibre machine guns. There were no 20-millimeter guns mounted in vessels of the Fleet, nor were there any 40-millimeter quadruple mounts.

28. Q. Admiral, what fire control plans were in effect for coordinating the fire of the ships and the limited number of shore guns available in the event of an air attack?

A. Speaking of Army guns, now?

29. Q. Overall. Was there any unity of command?

A. The strength of the Army AA defense rested in their mobile mounts and to my knowledge, none of them went into action on that day. The plan for the ships was for ships to cover their regularly assigned sectors, the Senior Commanding Officer in the sector in general command of that sector. The alerts and the orders, general overall fire control orders, were to come from the Harbor Control Post. The overall command of anti-aircraft defense, in accordance with the plan, rested in the Brigadier General of the Army Air Forces, whose station was at the Army Fighter Station. He commanded fighters, interceptors, and the gun defense of the Island,-of Pearl Harbor. The Anti-Aircraft Brigade Commander, under this Brigadier General, had three commands; gun batteries, automatic weapon batteries, and searchlight batteries. The gun batteries of the Fleet were under the command of this Anti-Aircraft Brigade Commander through the Harbor Control Post.

30. Q. Were those control arrangements really in effect-working order?

A. They did not work, sir.

31. Q. Could they have been worked, had the personnel been properly alert?

A. As a matter of opinion, sir, I would say-probably. Certainly it would have worked better than it did, if the mobile batteries had been properly emplaced.

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32. Q. How would the Central Control Station on shore, in Pearl Harbor, communicate fire control orders to the ships' guns?

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A. By lights on the big water tower, sir, the signal tower, and by voice radio.

33. Q. In view of the speed of the targets for aircraft batteries, do you think such method of communication would have been effective, or did you think they would have been effective?

A. Yes, sir. Under the plan which was in effect in the ships, and I base this opinion on many drills held after the attack, when this plan, with little or no major change, remained in effect.

34. Q. Where were communications from the voice radio intended to be received on the ships?

A. Well, I cannot state that exactly, sir; various ships had various arrangements. In general a radio watch was kept on that circuit. No too great dependence was placed on that radio communication. The regular alert signals, sirens and lights, and search lights flashing the signal from the water tower were in effect, and before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and afterwards, actual fighting of a battery aboard ship was the responsibility of the commanding officer to take the proper targets under fire. The fire control of the Harbor Control Post over the ships in the Harbor was one of warning and alerting, and no attempt was made, before or after the bitter experience at Pearl Harbor, to require the Harbor Control Officer to pick out targets and direct fire on those targets.

35. Q. Was the system of assignment of fire sectors for the various ships sufficient to prevent confusion when various ships were firing?

A. I think when the attack actually came, that any targets which presented themselves to a ship were taken under fire provided the guns of that ship would bear. The chief reason for assigning sectors was to insure the presence of an even distribution, to insure that no sectors of the 360-degrees around the Fleet anchorage would be left uncovered; so that guns would not bear on any bearing. When the attack came, gunners followed the targets through where ever they presented themselves.

35. Q. Admiral, what fire control orders were actually issued on the morning of December 7, by whom, and how effective?

A. I do not believe that any orders as fire control other than those issued by the ships' commanding officers were issued. The alert came at the moment of the attack. There was one fire control order which was issued by the Commander-in-Chief on the evening of December 7, when some ships of the Fleet opened fire on what appeared to us on the Staff to be friendly planes, and there was broadcast from the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters, "Cease firing," I believe, "friendly planes". In other words, we stepped in.

36. Q. Was any damage done to the friendly planes by that mistake?

A. I believe that one or two friendly planes were shot down that night, sir.

37. Q. Admiral, again speaking in general terms, what was the condition of readiness of the shipboard anti-aircraft batteries, as regards presence of personnel and availability of ammunition, immediately prior to the attack on December 7?

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A. I think I would have to refer to this letter, to give an accurate answer. I was not actually in the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters when the attack came, but I believe that the Fleet was

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in Condition 3, in accordance with this letter. I do know, from first hand accounts, that ready ammunition was available on the required ships standing watch in the sectors and that fire against the attacking planes was promptly taken up.

38. Q. Do you know who issued the order for that condition of readiness, Condition 3 and when that was put into effect?

A. Well, the Naval Base Defense Officer was the Commandant and he set conditions of readiness.

39. Q. Admiral, do you know of any modification prescribed with respect to this Condition 3 in the battleships?

A. No, sir, I do not. I recollect one modification in conditions of readiness which was permitted by the Commander-in-Chief and that was after the attack on Pearl Harbor. He permitted one or two submarine tenders, moored to docks at the Submarine Base, to modify Condition 3 so that a fewer number of guns need be manned in Condition 3. That was because of the crew of those ships being occupied with submarine overhaul. I might state that my recollection of some of these things is a recollection of immediately before and after Pearl Harbor, because I was Fleet Gunnery Officer for nine months after the attack.

40. Q. What were the dimensions of the sectors which anti-aircraft batteries were assigned, which were assigned by 2CL-41?

A. As I remember it, there were four sectors, and refreshing my mind with the letter, I see there were four.

41. Q. That is ninety degrees each?

A. Not exactly, Admiral. The sector to the southeastward was 135 degrees; the sector to the northeastward was 45 degrees; and the other two were 90 degrees.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

42. Q. At the time of the attack of 7 December these instructions insured the readiness of only a relatively small proportion of the total number of anti-aircraft guns which could have fired into the southeast sector; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

4 3. Q. About what percentage?

A. A small percentage actually manned with men on watch.

44. Q. Admiral, did the ships of the Pacific Fleet have on board their full wartime allowance of ammunition and other ordnance materials on the morning of December 7?

A. The Fleet not only had its full allowance of ammunition aboard but, in general, had its mobilization allowance, which is an extra amount of ammunition. This statement applies to all categories of ammunition. There was, however, a shortage of .50 calibre ammunition for anti-aircraft machine guns throughout the Navy and throughout the Fleet. This particular shortage had no effect on the attack because no ship expended all of its ammunition that it had on board.

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45. Q. Were the conditions of ordnance material satisfactory to you prior to the attack?

A. Absolutely, except for numbers and types which were destined to come to the Fleet and had not yet reached the Fleet. May I ex-

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plain. Many ships had three inch .50 calibre AA guns which were interim-armament and were to be replaced by 1.1 quadruple mounts. Some ships, notably cruisers, would have a mixed battery of three inch .50 calibre AA guns and 1.1's, because a sufficient number of 1.1 mounts had not arrived for the Fleet. The Fleet was destined to receive 20 mm machine guns and only two had been received. Sufficient ammunition, aside from these shortages I just spoke of, was available in the ammunition depot and within twenty-four hours all ships, except those that were very seriously damaged, had their ammunition replaced.

46. Q. Keeping in mind the strained international situation and the imminence of war, and the war tasks of the Pacific Fleet, will you give us the views of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as you knew them at the time, with respect to his satisfaction with ordnance and gunnery conditions as they existed in the period leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack.

A. I think that the Commander-in-Chief was well satisfied with the state of training of the men in the Fleet, considering personnel shortages which existed in the Fleet and very large turnovers of men which we had had continuously for the previous year. Target practice allowances had been greatly increased during the previous ten months. The number of practices that the ships fired had been increased, in some cases, by using a certain amount of ammunition for two or more practices, firing less in one practice and a smaller number of guns. Night surface firing had been stressed and drones had been made available in quite sufficient numbers, and anti-aircraft firings had increased, I would say, three or four hundred per cent, considering the additional targets, drones, and the better anti-aircraft visibility conditions existing in the islands.

47. Q. Were the status of your fire control doctrines well established at that time to your satisfaction?

A. Yes, sir, and I feel that is borne out by the splendid performance that the anti-aircraft batteries of the Fleet put forth on the 7th of December. My recollection can be checked by the report of Pearl Harbor, which I helped draw up, and I believe at least twenty-eight planes were shot down by vessels of the Fleet. Not a bad performance for men who had never fired a shot in action and considering the number of guns engaged. I might state that the planes shot down, no matter what their number was, were very carefully screened and identified as to where they landed and what happened to them.

48. Q. In the last several months leading up to the attack, had the gunnery training of the Fleet involved advance practices?

A. Yes, sir, of all kinds. First of all, short-range battle practice, or short-range practice, as we had known it before, had practically passed out of the picture; sled targets were used in place of raft targets. That resulted in higher speeds. I might state, along with gunnery training, I think this has a bearing, that at Admiral Kimmel's insistence the Fleet Gunnery Officer, the Force Gunnery Officer, and Type Gunnery Officer were given flight orders and required to witness practices of their forces from the air, so that immediate corrective actions could be taken by the ships as soon as they came into port. No observation parties were allowed to be transferred at sea.

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49. Q. In these advance practices, using your established fire control doctrines, were the results obtained satisfactory to the

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Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as practices held in a period when war was quite imminent?

A. I don't think Admiral Kimmel would have ever been satisfied with any performance. He was a perfectionist and nothing less than perfection would do. The people who were responsible for the gunnery training of the Fleet were greatly pleased with the state of training and the progress that was being made daily, and I thing secretly Admiral Kimmel felt that a good job was being done. I don't think Admiral Kimmel would have ever been satisfied with any results; completely satisfied.

50. Q. Of those twenty-eight enemy planes which you estimated to have been shot down, how many were recovered and examined?

A. Admiral, I'd have to refer to the report, because in that report we actually spotted where the planes landed. Several of them-I can t give you the exact number-landed in the water. Some of those that landed in the water were recovered. Several, number I can not recollect, landed in the cane fields and burned almost completely. There was a large recovery of junk.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: Admiral, I would like to add, even at the expense of perhaps repeating some of the things I have said here in answer to questions, and in view of the fact that the apparent readiness and state of training of the Fleet has been one of the questions that has been foremost here in this testimony, that I do no know what more could have been done, under a Commander who was a very hard taskmaster, to put the Pacific Fleet in a higher state of training than it was on the morning of Pearl Harbor. I think that state was very high and I know that if there was anything left undone in making it higher, it is something that I, as an afterthought, have not been able to think of.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter dated 16 March 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired examining officer, from Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the ninth day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 30".

The examination then, at 4:05 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.


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