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PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
FRIDAY, MARCH 31, 1944
EIGHTEENTH DAY
                                         PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII. 

The examination met at 10: 20 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the seventeenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Edwin T. Layton, Captain, U. S. Navy, at present Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

3. Q. Previous to that time, did you spend some time in Japan learning the language?

A. I did, sir.

4. Q. When?

A. From September, 1929, until October, 1932. Again, when I returned to Japan as Assistant Naval Attache in April, 1937, until late March of 1939.

5. Q. And you are qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator?

A. I am, sir.

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6. Q. In addition to that qualification, have you made any particular study of the mental, moral, and psychological characteristics of the Japanese?

A. To the utmost of my ability; yes, sir.

7. Q. Have you devoted a good deal of effort in that line?

A. I have, yes, sir, both while in Japan and while in America, continuing study along things Japanese and Japanese history, person-

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alities, psychology, and particularly study of the characters in prominent positions in Japan, in civil, economic, and military life.

8. Q. As Fleet Intelligence Officer in 1941, from what sources did you obtain information concerning the Japanese Navy?

A. The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelligence reports, estimates of Fleet organizations position and Fleet Commanders, also from dispatches from Naval Attache, Tokyo, Naval Attache, Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and Washington, D. C.; also from Consular and State Department reports forwarded through ONI to the Commander-in-Chief; also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct through a representative attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu.

9. Q. Do you recall that in, say, October-November, 1941, you felt that you were obtaining from those sources as much and as good information as should have been supplied?

A. Intelligence being evaluated information and a commodity of which you can never have quite enough, it is difficult to say. I thought at the time in question that our Intelligence coverage was good, always, of course, leaving details of the picture incompletely filled, the task of filling which would be monumental. By this I mean it is like a jigsaw puzzle with parts missing; the whole picture is rarely available as important pieces are missing.

10. Q. Then as you recall, you at that time, felt that our intelligence sources were doing as well as could have been done?

A. They were doing as well as could have been done with the number of personnel available and the coverage commensurate therewith.

11. Q. Did you feel that available information originating in our State Department, or its agencies, was adequate as well as reliable?

A. The State Department and Consular reports were largely academic political studies, and intelligence-that is, military intelligence-goes, were practically valueless.

12. Did you feel that the State Department was probably in possession of information and estimates which would have been valuable if known to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Emphatically so. I say that knowing the type of reports made by the American Ambassador in Tokyo from 1937 until 1939 during a period of the beginning of the so-called "China incident." Knowing the character of those reports, I think that the State Department reports perhaps contained information in the period in question that would have been of value to the Commander-in-Chief in arriving at an estimate of the situation.

13. Q. As Fleet Intelligence Officer, did you intimately concern yourself with the results being obtained by the Combat Intelligence Organization?

A. Yes, sir.

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14. Q. Did you study the relationship between the results obtained by the three principal organizations?

A. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, the information from all sources was collected, collated, and used, but the results obtained and made available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were principally

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from the unit at Cavite and the local unit here at Pearl Harbor. In fact, almost nothing came from Washington.

14. Q. Did you make your own personal estimates of the distribution of Japanese naval forces?

A. Yes, sir. These estimates were made and placed in Fleet Intelligence Bulletins and distributed to the forces afloat, for their information and guidance in individual estimates.

16. Q. Did you feel that the principal unit in Washington might have contributed more toward the intelligence picture along those lines than actually was the case?

A. I did. As a matter of record, when the Japanese became active in the militarization of the Mandated islands about December, 1940, through my liaison with the local Communication Intelligence Branch, a very careful study and check was constantly made of this move. The Commander-in-Chief was kept constantly informed of the situation and when visiting Washington about June, 1941, a discussion regarding the situation apparently arose resulting in OpNav sending the Commander-in-Chief a dispatch stating, in substance, that the Pacific Fleet Intelligence organization apparently had some information on the organization and militarization of the Mandate naval units and requested it by dispatch. It was sent. This information was, at the same time, available in Washington but, apparently, had not been utilized or collated, much less disseminated.

17. Q. How often did you communicate the intelligence available, concerning the Japanese naval forces, to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Daily, at about eight-fifteen in the morning. If subsequent thereto an important dispatch was received generally from Cavite, or if important developments took place and reported from local communications intelligence unit, I would take it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity he was free.

18. Q. Did those daily visits to Commander-in-Chief usually bring forth discussion concerning the intelligence?

A. Yes, sir. A discussion concerning the intelligence submitted and as to the Japanese disposition, intentions, and future operations of the forces concerned, and a general discussion of the situation in general.

19. Q. Was it usual for any other members of the Staff or any of the Commanders of the Fleet's task forces to be present during those discussions?

A. The Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions, the senior War Plans Officer and the senior Operations Officer were called in and a discussion then held. Often during these discussions, I was no longer required and was permitted to retire. When Task Force Commanders, who were then operating out two weeks and in one week, approximately, would return to port, the Admiral would send for me and have me review for the benefit of the Task Force Commanders then in port the situation and developments that had taken place during their absence and a general discussion of Japanese potentialities, capabilities, strength, would ensue. Sometimes I was present and sometimes I was excused, as their discussions probably concerned future operations.

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20. Q. During those discussions with Admiral Kimmel, whether or not there were others present, were you in the habit of

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expressing your own estimates and opinions of the situation which confronted the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I did, sir, and Admiral Kimmel welcomed and encouraged my independent estimates or opinions, even though we would discuss them sometime if we did not have the same one.

21. Q. Captain, will you elaborate a little further concerning those discussions?

A. The discussions were very general, generally starting with the Japanese situation, both political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their apparent intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was particularly interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air and other bases, and these matters were discussed in general with the task force commanders and other officers present, such as whether or not the Japanese had radar, whether it had been received from the Germans via the trip of the ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly to Europe by the Panama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls, the estimated air strength in the area, the question as to whether sound contacts obtained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and so forth, a discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence of baby submarines-they were called "submerged submarines"-off Molokai, were submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature. The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject of conversations and discussions.

22. Q. During October and November, 1941, did you obtain, through Combat Intelligence, any definite information which they gained from the Japanese foreign service?

A. There were several messages that came from Washington regarding Japanese foreign service matters, particularly those concerning destruction of cryptographic devices or documents, and one concerning a hidden broadcast, a pseudo "weather broadcast": if it's "east wind and rain", it meant war with America, and "north wind and clear" meant war with Russia, and "west wind and showers" meant war with England, or some such phrases. There was another in particular I recall which spoke of an intrigue in Thailand, wherein the British were to be drawn into crossing the border on the West coast in reply to an alleged Japanese landing at Singora on the East coast. Insofar then as the British had crossed the border, the Siamese were to declare war, as the British had invaded them, and ask Japan for aid.

23. Q. I hand you a document which is attached to this record as Exhibit 11. Do you recall having seen that when received?

A. Yes, sir.

24. Q. Give. if you can recall it, your own personal reaction to the information contained therein

A. The reaction at that time was that Japan was prepared for war and was carrying out the previously indicated Southern move and was making preparations accordingly. The fact that Manila and Washington were included was considered highly significant.

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25. Q. Do you recall if this dispatch was delivered to the Commanding General, Hawaii?

[218]

A. I do not recall, sir.

26. Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time around 1 December or after?

A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.

27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to the attack?

A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other source.

28. Q. Were you in touch with any measures being employed by any organization on Oahu toward monitoring the so-called "amateur" radio traffic which might have been emanating from there?

A. No, sir. This subject had been discussed with the District Intelligence Officer and with the officer in charge, Combat Intelligence, and with the Fleet Communication Officer, Commander Curts. It was pointed out to me at this time, which was considerably before December, 1941, that this function was not a function of the U. S. naval service, nor the U. S. naval communication service; that under the joint action of the Army and Navy, the control of amateur broadcasts was vested in the Federal Communications Commission, and that the monitoring of other radio transmissions was, by agreement, vested in the Naval Communication Service and the Army Signal Corps by mutual agreement.

29. Q Did you, personally, inquire into the efficacy of the measures which you just mentioned?

A. I did not.

30. Q. And do I understand you to say that you were not put in touch with any of the results obtained by those organizations?

A. I received nothing from the F. C. C. or the Army, directly or indirectly, so far as I know, although the Japanese foreign office intelligence referred to previously may have come from one of these organizations via OpNav. I did not ask, nor was it considered proper to inquire, as to its source. I believe, however, that that was naval source and not Army Signal Intelligence or F. C. C. I would like to add that the District Intelligence Officer's office maintained certain monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward appreciation of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view. I do not recall the details of this, however.

31. Q. Were you frequently in touch with G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

A. About the early part of October or late September, the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, Colonel Edward Railey, called on me and said that he had been made, by the G-2 Hawaiian Department, the liaison between the Army and the Fleet here, insofar as the functions of the Army Command in this area would rely principally on air operations, and any coordinated action would undoubtedly be through the Hawaiian Air Force in conjunction with the naval units stationed or based here. From that time on, I saw Colonel Railey almost every day, sometimes two or three times a day, and we main-

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tained intimate liaison regarding the general situation in the Pacific and, specifically, regarding the rise in Japanese naval air strength in the Marshalls and the increased Japanese surface forces in that area also, insofar as they presented a definite problem in connection with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

[219]

32. Q. Did you obtain from Colonel Railey any valuable information which you had not received from other sources?

A. I did not receive from Colonel Railey, or any Army source, any information of the enemy. We received reports concerning the flight of Army B-17's to Manila by Midway and Wake and northern New Guinea, and we furnished them with weather and other information concerning the route.

33. Q. Will you now please state, chronologically, insofar as you can, the results which were obtained toward keeping track of movements of units of the Japanese Fleet from about 1 October on.

A. Commencing in late October, many reports were received from China, from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant Attaches in South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources, of the movements of considerable numbers of Japanese transports and troops to the South from Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton estuary, and the movements of troops southward from northern China through the Shanghai port of embarkation. The Naval Attache at Tokyo informed us, on about 1 November, that elaborate plans for the joint Army-Navy occupation of-Thailand by the Japanese were complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-Sacki area; that the invasion was to follow the lines of the German blitzkrieg of Holland and Belgium, and that considerable air forces were assembled in the Taiwan-Hainan area, and that the Indo-China forces were being strengthened to a total of 100,000. The withdrawal of the Japanese merchant ships from Western Hemisphere waters was noted locally as well as our being informed by OpNav. The movements of men and materiel to the Mandates was also observed in the early part of November. Reoccurring reports of movements of Japanese transports, escorted by destroyers, to the South along the China Coast, and their arrival in the French Indo-China area and Haiphong and Saigon were received from time to time. The loadings of some of these transports-that is, landing craft, tanks, troops, railroad equipment, motorboats-led to a belief that amphibious operations were being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the South, exact location as yet undetermined. In mid-November, our best intelligence sources detected the beginning of the formation of the Japanese surface-force task forces; concerned and associated with southern destinations, as well as the movements of naval aircraft to the Hainan Islands-Southern Formosa region. These were more or less confirmed by reports from the North China area by Army and Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by one report from the American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and activation of units of the Combined Fleet with southern destinations were noted and commented on by Admiral Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, specifically noted this activity as the forerunner of operations, judging from past experience, and Admiral Kimmel asked what we had received from other units. I replied, "Nothing yet." He then directed me to tell Commander Rochefort

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that he desired them to initiate a special message concerning the developments noted to OpNav and Cavite, Guam then being inactive. This resulted in a dispatch sent by the Com 14 Combat Intelligence Unit in which a task force organization was laid out in the general tenor as follows: That a task force under the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet which includes the First and second Base Forces and Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally, to our amphibious forces), the combined Air Force of the Shore-based Air Command, the Destroyer Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one squadron from the First Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship Division. These were estimated to be forming up for movement to the South China area and associated with the French Indo-China, Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihouku and Takao, Formosa. It was noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were [220] somewhat connected with this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that perhaps certain of these units might even proceed in that direction. It was noted, also, that there was a concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, and estimated that at least one Carrier Division, plus about a third of the submarine fleet, were in the Marshalls area. It was estimated that these forces would operate in the southern Asia area, with component part possibly operating from Palau and the Marshalls. Almost coincident with this time was an inquiry from the Dutch Naval Command as to the possibility of a Japanese seizure of Portuguese Timor and expressed the determination of the Dutch High Command that should Japanese forces carry out such an indicated thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an invasion and act accordingly. We were asked to comment on this development, but could find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After receipt of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of Japanese formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of movement, the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications noted here and estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and Third Fleets and Submarine Force were comprised into a loose-knit organization, apparently divided into two major sections. The majority of the strength of cruisers being in the first section and destined for the South China area. Minor strengths being probably destined for the Palau area, and that carriers of CarDiv 3 and possibly CarDiv 4 were concerned with the South China area movement of the No. 1 Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also estimated to be in the Sasebo-Kure area. Com 16's unit, however, could not confirm the supposition by 14's unit that carriers and submarines, in force, were in the Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of November, the Commander-in-Chief received a dispatch from OpNav which stated, in substance, that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations then pending in Washington were very doubtful, and expressed the opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, to be a possibility, and cautioned against anything that would complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. On the 27th, as I recall it, a war warning was received from OpNav. I believe that it was aided by the two dispatches I referred to from the Com 14 unit and the Com 16 unit. It stated that the negotiations

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Washington had ended and that an aggressive move by the Japanese within the next few days was expected, that an amphibious expedition was probably imminent against either the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. We were told the War Department was sending a similar warning. This message was passed in paraphrase form, which I wrote myself, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department. That same evening, incidentally, the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received separately, and showed this copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, and other high ranking officers present. I did not see the Army dispatch, but from the discussion that came up, I could conclude only that it was almost a duplicate as those words were used. This Navy Liaison Officer reported to me, subsequently, that he had returned the Army dispatch to the senior officer of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both General Short and his Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the Navy's paraphrased war warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver it in person to General Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to deliver it in person, he gave it to the Senior Staff. Officer on duty in G-3 with the statement that this was a very secret dispatch sent over from Admiral Kimmel for General Short. On the 28th, information was received by the British Consul, locally, [221] from a source usually reliable, stating that the Japanese would attack the Kra Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration of war. The main landing was to be at Singora. At this time, the message regarding the false weather broadcast to indicate a condition of war was also received, and from the State Department were reports of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and French Indo-China general area, substantiating previous estimates and reports of increased forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there was received a dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to regarding the intrigue in Thailand to get the British to attack, and in this Singora was again mentioned and seemed to fit in with previous dispatches regarding future Japanese activity in that area. On 2 December, reports received from CinCAF of Japanese submarines and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which checked previously indicated movements and previous information. On 3 December, there was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Exhibit 11, which tends to confirm the general picture presented to that time, that is, active military operations were about to commence with the "Southern Expansion Program" of the Jap Navy to be put into effect. On 6 December, a report from CinCAF received stated CinC China had reported a twenty-five ship convoy, six cruisers, and ten destroyers, in a position in the Gulf of Siam, as well as another convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and two cruisers in a different position, all on course West. Also that CinCAF forces sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 1 December, the Commander-in-Chief requested that I present to him a paper showing the approximate location of the Japanese naval units, which I prepared and submitted. In showed, briefly, that except for Battleships Divisions One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and

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Cruiser Division Eight, and possibly CruDiv Six-the latter was marked "May head for the Mandates?"-that all other important Japanese naval forces were South of Shanghai, the majority of which were in the Bako and Takao area, that a considerable concentration of shore-based aircraft, probably 250, under Commander, Combined Air Force, were in the Hainan-Takao area, and that the CinC Second Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the usual Fourth Fleet, consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight destroyers, one submarine tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelve auxiliary minelayers, patrol boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary transports, and 140 planes. Admiral Kimmel asked me how well identified and how well placed in Japan were the battleships and carrier divisions that I referred to previously. I told him that they were not positively identified in Japanese ports but were believer to be in Japanese waters, due to their past activity and lack of, or negative information.

34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in one division?

A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane guards to one division.

35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total?

A. That would mean that they had approximately five divisions. At the time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier Division One of the AKAGI and KAGA; Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and HIRYU; Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and one unknown carrier; Carrier Division Four of the KASUGA and it was believed another carrier that we didn't know, nor do I know to this date; Carrier Division Five of the new SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were just completing training and had not been particularly active with the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest carriers.

[222]

36. Q As regards what type of ship was the main disagreement between those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts?

A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit believed that a carrier division and one-third of the Japanese submarine force was in the Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance, that they could not confirm the supposition that the above forces were in the Marshalls.

37 Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards the numbers of carriers in home waters?

A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of disagreement or agreement, as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports to OpNav and any disagreement in these matters would be not so much errors in judgment, as the matter of available material, due to distance and other factors. OpNav made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the war, to reconcile or evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the general picture from the reports produced. There may have been messages passed between Fourteen and Sixteen, of which I had no knowledge.

38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27 November onward, did you, personally, make anything which constituted an estimate of the situation on the possibility of an organization containing carriers striking at Hawaii?

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A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made after 27 November, but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed at some time previous. This occurred in a discussion wherein Japanese potentialities and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and I told him of their books, written for their own propaganda purposes and increased armaments; that in this book the author stated that the American Commander-in-Chief, when his Fleet was concentrated in Hawaii, would be concerned with three possible Japanese measures of attack: (1) Attack on Pearl Harbor, using carriers, cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack on the Aleutians, including an occupation force; and (3) An attack on the American mainland. The discussion was in a broad sense but I do not recall any of the details thereof.

39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the set-up of forces as placed by your intelligence toward the end of November, the Japanese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers sufficient to form a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii?

A. I do not believe that point was made specifically. That, however, was my personal estimate; that with the allocation of forces to the southern movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly in destroyers and cruisers, although potentially powerful in offense; that is, the carriers. I expressed that as an opinion before the Roberts Commission and not as an estimate of the situation that I had expressed, formally or informally, to Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall having expressed that as a formal or informal estimate.

40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you had because of the lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence sources of the nature which you have just been discussing?

A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the week-end of the first of December, that I couldn't understand why Washington didn't give us more information, but presumed that perhaps they didn't have it. It was a source of considerable concern both to Commander Rochefort and me and we remained at our telephones throughout that week-end, although I was back at the office on the Sunday to confer with Admiral Kimmel.

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41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten days prior to 7 December, '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of the Japanese Navy was, in itself, an ominous sign?

A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese changed their call signs on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather ominous in view of the other information. The lack of identifiable traffic could be anticipated under those circumstances. The lack of great volumes of traffic does not always indicate an imminent move but it fitted very well with the picture of the southern movement discussed previously.

42. Q. Reverting to your answer to my question concerning general study of the Japanese characteristics and so forth, do you recall any advice and opinions which you gave Admiral Kimmel during the latter half of 1941, say, concerning the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders?

A. I believe that the discussion regarding Japanese naval leaders was before the end of 1941 but certainly was in the middle of 1941. I don't recall the exact date, but there was a discussion as to who the

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Japanese leaders were, particularly when General Tojo became the Premier. There were many discussions as to General Tojo, what sort of a policy he would follow, and also regarding the character, general background, of the leading Japanese naval officers. There were also discussions as to Admiral Nomura, their Ambassador to Washington, and Mr. Kurusu, and the probable negotiations and mission concerned therewith.

43. Q. Do you recall any particular estimate which you gave concerning Admiral Yamamoto?

A. I do. I knew Admiral Yamamoto personally. My estimate was, in effect, that he was very capable, a very thoroughly grounded and trained officer; that he possessed more brains than any other Japanese in the High Command. I illustrated it by saying that he could win at poker among good poker players, and could play better bridge than most good bridge players, and that I knew he was a champion in his own right of the Japanese chess game, "Go." I illustrated that to show that his mind was keen, alert, and that also from my personal observation and from general Japanese service reputation, he was an outstanding officer.

44. Q. Did you consider him one of the so-called "younger officer" element?

A. No, sir, I did not. I do not believe that he was associated with the so-called "young officer movement".

45. Q. Did you advise Admiral Kimmel of Admiral Yamamoto's previous experience in building up the Japanese naval air force?

A. I do not recall the exact details, but I think I discussed the fact that he was not only the Vice Naval Minister when I was in Tokyo, but was also the Commander of Naval Aviation Headquarters, the first that they appointed, and that he was, at the time of the first bombing of China in 1937, particularly concerned with the welfare and operation of the Japanese Naval Air Force. I do not recall, however, as to what degree this was discussed.

46. Q. Did you point out that Admiral Yamamoto was particularly venturesome?

A. No, sir, other than to say that he was an able opponent at poker or bridge, and that he always played a poor hand well.

47. Q. Did you ever specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that in view of these characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, or of others, there was probability of a carrier raid upon Oahu?

[224]

A. That matter was discussed at the time, as I previously mentioned. I gave a brief outline of the Japanese book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was specifically mentioned, and he asked me then what I thought of the chances. I said, "I only hope we can intercept them," and that "I hope that the air search will find them in plenty of time." In the discussion in general regarding Japan's strength, I believe that the subject of Japan's carriers was mentioned and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much wherein she might lose the war in the first battle when she had larger stakes, more vital stakes, at hand.

48. Q. Do you recall your own reaction to the phrase concerning war warning in the Department's dispatch of 27 November?

A. As it was the first dispatch that I had ever seen saying "This is a war warning", I took particular note of it. I thought it over

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considerably. Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping, meanwhile, to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations. It made me feel that the picture we had was a good picture, and perhaps complete, and that the times were very critical and perhaps the Department hoped for a last minute compromise in view of their statement that nothing should be done to aggravate an already serious situation. I saw the Army, that evening, take their condition of readiness, trucks moving, troops moving, and I thought I saw weapons moving in the street, and I presumed that they were going into full condition of readiness, including the emplacement of anti-aircraft and other mobile weapons around Pearl Harbor and other important points on Oahu.

49. Q. Did you then estimate that the Japs really would make an attack to the southward, perhaps beyond Thailand, leaving the Philippine position on their flank?

A. My estimate was unclear. I was not convinced that they would leave their flank unguarded. On the other hand, I was convinced that they would continue their southern advance perhaps depending on a compromise settlement in Washington to see to it we remained out of the hostilities due, first, the threat, and second, our relatively unpreparedness for war.

50. Q. Did your thinking along those lines at that time take into account the position in which the Japs found themselves, incident to frozen credits, under which they could not obtain petroleum products from the southern oil fields?

A. It did. The freezing of credits wherein their supplies from America were cut off, crystallized my belief in the "expansion to the South" being for the means of obtaining, by military means, if necessary, the petroleum products for which they had fruitlessly negotiated with the Nei through Yoshizawa earlier in the year.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I have one matter which I think should be properly included in the record. Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned [225] before, always consulted with his Task Force Commanders, District Commandant, on the war warning for instance, and had with them, many times in my hearing, a complete, free, and frank discussion of the situation, and asked and received their opinions regarding it. I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CinCAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message but others they had seen and discussed.

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That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down. Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversation, in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank. It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds. I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:12 p. m., took a recess until 2:10 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced George Warrington, Jr., Yeoman First Class, U. S. Navy, who was duly sworn.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing on December 7, 1941?

A. I was Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet, on board my Flagship, the U. S. S. ARGONNE at ten-ten dock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

[226]

3. Q. Admiral, what opportunity did you have to observe the condition of the officers and men of the Fleet on 7 December 1941 in regards to sobriety or drunkenness?

A. One of my duties as Commander Base Force was in charge of Shore Patrol. At about twenty-five or twenty-seven minutes after eight o'clock on the morning of 7 December 1941, I was entering through the main gate of Pearl Harbor. It was necessary to clear a way for me as traffic conditions were quite crowded. On one or two occasions I had to get out of one car and into another car and I passed many officers and men returning to their ships. Realizing the importance of getting these men off promptly to their commands, I stopped long enough to talk to the beach guard and patrol officer on the dock and saw that both were being efficiently and properly handled and the people were readily and rapidly being returned to their ships. At about 0845, I arrived at ten-ten dock and on board

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the ARGONNE and thereafter used all of our boats and commandeered many other boats to return officers and men to the Fleet. Admiral Kimmel had directed that I take charge of all activities on the waterfront. Ships not having full crews aboard, getting up steam, and ready to go to sea were directed to apply to Commander Base Force and I made up details of men whose ships had already proceeded to sea and sent them to ships, principally destroyers. I, personally, rubbed shoulders with hundreds of officers and literally thousands of men that morning. And it is with a feeling of pride that I can state that they were extremely orderly and cold sober, naturally, to some extent, awed and surprised by the events of the morning, but they were all a well-behaved, very sober group of officers and men, who had only one desire and that was to return to a ship in which they could render service. One the forenoon of December 7, 1941, I sent my Flag Secretary and Flag Lieutenant, whom I ordered the moment I went aboard the ARGONNE that morning to go to the various landings and in the yard and circulate among the men with exactly the idea of seeing what was their conduct. In 1923, I commanded the U. S. S. YOUNG, Destroyer 312, lost at Honda. I well remembered on that Sunday morning, December 7, how the papers of the West Coast of the United States had commented on drunkenness and published cartoons of drunken men and officers in the Honda wreck. With this thought in mind, that is why I personally sent my Flag Secretary and Flag Lieutenant to generally observe the conduct of the men and officers of the Fleet while assisting in boat transportation and carrying out other waterfront duties while so observing. My Flag Secretary was Lieutenant E. P. Southwick, now Commander Southwick, and my Flag Lieutenant was Lieutenant Harry Johnson, now Commander Johnson. Both of these officers and the Beach Guard Officer on duty at the Fleet Landing that morning reported to me that the conduct of all hands was excellent. I can not recall having seen one officer or man who was not cold sober. That is a fairly large order, as it was a week-end crowd that had been in town with no idea of sudden return to duty early that Sunday morning.

4. Q. Sir, were arrests by the Shore Patrol for drunkenness on the night preceding the attack greater than was usual for a Saturday night?

A. No, on the contrary our records show that for the two or three weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor that there had been almost no disorderly conduct at any time except an occasional boy here or there who had too many beers in the heat of the tropical sun.

5. Q. Do you recall the orders affecting the men belonging to ships as to determination of liberty on the week-end?

A. Yes. All liberty except for special cases and passes, and except for those married men of the former Hawaiian Detachment who had their families [227] here, was up at one a. m. Overnight liberty was granted for Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class. Commanding Officers were granted fairly wide latitude and over this particular week-end a fairly large liberty party was ashore, consisting of married men, Chief Petty Officers, and Petty Officers First Class, and other special passes granted to men who had their homes in the Hawaiian Area. I should state that a great number of

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people who crowded the roadway there when I passed through the main gate of the Navy Yard were attached to the Fourteenth Naval District who lived out in the housing area and were quartered there. There were certainly two or three hundred officers concerned and seven to eight hundred men who had liberty in accordance with existing orders. At that time, there must have been at least fifty thousand enlisted men here in the Fleet and I consider that a very small percentage of people ashore over a week-end. A much higher percentage of officers were ashore than of enlisted men.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I became Commander Base Force when Admiral C. C. Bloch was Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. I served as Commander Base Force, through the entire period of command of Admiral J. O. Richardson who relieved Admiral Bloch as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and I continued to serve as Commander Base Force throughout the entire period of Admiral Kimmel's command of the U. S. Fleet. The morale, conduct, and behavior of the officers and men of the Fleet were well known to me. I did not go to sea in task forces. In addition to my other duties, I was in charge of Shore Patrol, and was also in charge of the Off-shore--In-shore Security Patrol until relieved of them by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in February-March, 1940. The Fleet was in a healthy state of training. The conduct of the officers and men after the surprise attack on Sunday morning, and the way they fought back when they did get going, is certainly one of the finest traditions of the United States Navy. I attended all conferences. Admiral Kimmel gave to all Flag Officers in his Fleet every bit of information which he had which he was permitted to pass along to us. I know that the Commanders of the three Task Forces, into which the Fleet was divided, Task Force One, Two, and Three, headed by Vice Admirals Pye, Brown, and Halsey when they were in port, received this same information because I sat there and heard it. I never missed the Admiral's conferences, because I was always in port. I give as my considered opinion, as one of the senior Rear Admirals here at that time, that Admiral Kimmel would have gladly entertained from any officer under his command any suggestion at any time for the betterment and safety of the Fleet. He repeatedly asked at conferences, when he informed us what he was doing, if anybody had any suggestion for change. Having signed for almost two years the orders for the Security Patrol, which included the Off-shore destroyer patrols and close-in destroyer patrols, until relieved by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District some months prior to the Japanese sneak attack, I do know that most of the emphasis on security was placed on the fact that we were protecting ourselves against the acts of irresponsible nationals. The last order issued by me stated: "As an assumption that responsible foreign powers will not provoke war under existing conditions by attacks on the Fleet or Base, that irresponsible and misdirected

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[238]

nationals of foreign powers might attempt sabotage or block the channel to Pearl Harbor or to lay magnetic mines outside of Pearl Harbor, or to make submarine attacks without warning." I did not hold or entertain any idea that as long as there was a Minister of Peace in Washington, from Japan, that there would be any imminence of attack. Had I held that opinion, I would have stated it to Admiral Kimmel and I feel sure that nearly every other officer here felt the same as I. We did not expect any immediate sneak attack by the Japanese at the time it came. When I say "we", I mean from the conversations and discussions which I heard almost daily in the Commander-in-Chief's office, where certainly some of the best talent of the Navy was collected. I knew of Admiral Kimmel's orders for patrol and how he was using what little he had, and did not have any suggestion to offer to improve the situation. I would have felt free to make suggestions if I had had them. The attack came as a complete one hundred per cent surprise to me and it was only the terrible tragedy of the morning that really made me believe it had occurred. There was one occasion when acting in charge of Off-shore patrol that a destroyer reported he had contacted a submerged submarine and asked for instructions. At that time, I was Senior Officer Present Afloat, the Fleet being out under command of Admiral Richardson. I gave orders if they had contacted a submarine submerged in the restricted defensive sea area and could not identify it as our own to attack it with depth charges and destroy it. These orders held until Admiral Richardson and the Fleet returned to port and were very soon thereafter canceled by him. In giving me this order of cancellation, he informed me that it was done on the orders of higher authority. This occurred some time in August or September, 1940, during a period when the entire Fleet was ordered to sea in secrecy. The Fleet took a course, later known to be to the South and Eastward of the Island of Hawaii and stayed out of touch with everybody and everything, in radio silence, for a period of seven or eight days. I know that there was much newspaper comment as to where was the Fleet.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:03 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.


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