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                                         PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII. 

The examination met at 9:15 a. m.


Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the nineteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: This is a board acting under a precept by the Secretary of Navy to record testimony, under oath, surrounding the facts pertaining to the incident of 7 December 1941, comprising the attack on Pearl Harbor. The purpose is to record testimony which might otherwise be lost and be unavailable at some future time, when it may be needed and perhaps used in legal proceedings; or for other purposes. It is necessary for witnesses to testify from facts known to them on or before 7 December 1941, insofar as it is possible to do. I ask them to make every endeavor to that end. I give full opportunity to verify testimony and interpret that liberally to include amendments, as well as corrections; this I feel it necessary to do because of the great amount of elapsed time since those events. There is a significant phrase in the precept-"pertinent to the facts." It has been the experience that interpretation of that phrase is required, which I have to do inasmuch as facts come out in testimony that point back to other facts which, at first, might not appear to be pertinent. You are called as a witness whom I consider to be in possession of such facts.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Richmond Kelly Turner, Vice Admiral (Temporary Grade), United States Navy, in command of the Amphibious Forces of the Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was the War Plans Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Q. How long previously had you been so detailed?

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A. I reported to that duty on October 25, 1940, having come from command of the U. S. S. ASTORIA, then a part of the Hawaiian Detachment of the Pacific Fleet.

4. Q. Were you, particularly during 1941, closely associated with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, even beyond the association which the preparation of formal war plans called for?


A. I was. I considered myself one of Admiral Stark's principal advisers. We were close personal friends, as well as closely associated officially.

5. Q. What was the official designation of the Department's basic war plan which was current during the latter half of 1941?

A. WPL 46; Rainbow 5, it was known as. That war plan was a joint plan between the Army and the Navy. It had its basis in an international agreement with the British Army, Navy, and Air Force. The conversations with the British leading up to preparation of that plan were held in February and March of 1941. It was a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air, of the entire world in which it was conceived that the British Commonwealth and the United States might be jointly engaged in action against any enemy. On the conclusion of that agreement with the British, the WPL-46 was prepared after a great many talks with the Army and was approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and by the President. The Navy issued their form of that war plan in May of 1941, and it is my recollection the Army form of it was issued about August.

6. Q. Did WPL-46 contemplate any Allies, other than the British Empire?

A. It contemplated associated Powers, including the Netherlands East Indies, and such colonies of British Allies as were still in the war, for example, the Loyalist French Colonies.

7. Q. Against what prospective enemy nations was the plan intended?

A. It was intended against the Axis Powers: Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Powers that were allied with those principal Powers. It did not include any particular participation for the purpose of the plan by the Government of China. It did not include any association by Russia, as it was prepared and promulgated before the Russians were at war with Germany. After its promulgation, the War and Navy Departments made several tentative efforts to bring Russia within the scope of this or a modified plan. During the Fall of 1941 the Joint Board prepared some tentative bases for military conversations with Russia. The representatives of the Joint Board on two or three occasions discussed with the Russian military representative in Washington the question of making a common war plan, but nothing ever eventuated from those conversations during the time I remained in Washington.

8. Q. Did the plan, as put into effect, envisage alternative combinations of enemy nations?

A. It did. Without referring to the plan to aid memory, I believe it envisaged war in which either Germany and her European Allies were the sole enemies, or in which Japan was also engaged. The main basis of the plan, however, was a global war in which both Germany and her European Allies and Japan were at war with United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies. It was

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agreed that if war was initiated by Japan, Germany would be brought in by offensive action against her by the United States.

9. Q. Then, during the period immediately preceding the issuing of WPL-46, I understand you to say that there was in the minds of your organization that the most likely combination of enemies would include Japan?

A. Yes sir.

10. Q. In either or both of the alternative enemy combinations, what attitude, defensive or offensive, did the plan contemplate over the Pacific Ocean Areas?

A. The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the principal associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy [252] Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period, this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe. We felt that it was encumbent on our side to defeat Germany, to launch our principal efforts against Germany first, and to conduct a limited offensive in the Central Pacific, and a strictly defensive effort in the Asiatic.

11. Q. At about what date was the Contributory Plan of the Commander, Pacific Fleet, approved by the Navy Department?

A. It was about September. Referring to the plan, it appears to have been distributed on July 21. As I recall it, there was some correspondence concerning some of the features, but I believe it was during September that it was finally approved by the Department.

12. Q. Was that interim correspondence cause by any particular disagreement on the part of your own organization with what had been advanced by Admiral Kimmel?

A. No essential disagreement whatsoever. The delay, as I recall it, was due, principally to technical reasons and time required for a careful review of the plan by various agencies in the Department.

13. Q. Do you recall Admiral Kimmel having in any way expressed disagreement with the defensive versus the offensive attitudes which were laid down in the basic plan, WPL-46?

A. So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls. The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and organizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a comparatively short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether in writing or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the forces suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There was no disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory. But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it.

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While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany-that view I may add, was also held by the War Department-we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific. The British Government did not hold such a view. They felt that our principal naval effort ought to be in the Atlantic and in the Asiatic. The United States believed that our strongest naval concentration and naval effort ought to be in the Central Pacific.

14. Q. Other than as you have just testified, were there any other considerations lying behind the transfer of a considerable detachment of Admiral Kimmel's forces to the Atlantic, which step was somewhat concurrent with the date of issue of WPL-46?


A. In May of 1941, decision was reached jointly with the British Government to occupy the Azores. The force which was withdrawn from the Pacific at that time consisted of some Marine troops and transports, one or two carriers, I think a division of cruisers, some destroyers, and, as I recall, three battleships. Something like that was withdrawn from the Pacific for the purpose of supporting the occupation of the Azores. That project was abandoned and the occupation of Iceland by American troops was substituted. Some of the forces which were withdrawn for that purpose were then returned to the Pacific. The Department consistently made every possible effort to set up, in all of the theatres, the exact distribution of force which is set forth in WPL-4, and, at the time of the outbreak of war, substantially the forces established in that volume were present in all of the theatres.

15. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel make any particular protest against the transfer of that detachment from his command?

A. I recall no official protest. He did not approve it. As a matter of fact, he was not at once informed of the reasons for it. As I recall it, he asked to have those vessels returned as soon as they could be spared from the Atlantic. He felt that his strength here was none too great. That opinion was also held by the Department. There are two points that I would like to mention. In the first place, as you have said, I do not have at hand records of the correspondence which passed between the Department and Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7. As an assistant to Admiral Stark, I presented what Admiral Stark considered to be the principal papers in that case to the Roberts Commission and they can be found in the transcript of proceedings of that Commission. I remember most of those letters and dispatches, but am none too sure about the exact contents of each nor the dates. The second statement which I believe is pertinent is that the feeling by Admiral Stark and by all members of the Department with whom I ever talked was that of a very complete loyalty to the principal Commanders-in-Chief, who were Admiral Hart in the Asiatic, Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific, and Admiral King in the Atlantic. I know Admiral Stark felt and I know I felt, that war was coming and we had, in those three officers, the best possible selection of officers in the Navy for the sea commands. The Department made every effort possible to hold their hands up, and such adjustments as had to be made between the three Fleets, due to many reasons, were considered at length and very carefully before they were made. But I believe that that feeling of essential loyalty ought to be recorded, as

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well as Admiral Stark's policy of avoiding minor directives and interferences with the Commanders-in-Chief. He was especially careful, at all times, to give them as full a scope of action as it was possible to give.

16. Q. Both parts of that statement are considered to be entirely pertinent. There can well be added to the record the general belief throughout the forces in the field that such trust and confidence obtained throughout the period leading up to the war. There was the fact that we contemplated Allies, if we became engaged in the war. The examination returns to the incident of that transfer of forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. As you recall the innermost opinions held by you and your associates, was that transfer in accord with your own conceptions of what the situation demanded or was it somewhat over-influenced by the British insistence?

A. The decision was made after a great deal of discussion. Of course, there were differences of opinion, but the Department was entirely loyal to that decision. The British did not insist too greatly. In fact, the expedition was canceled at the request of the British when they became [254] convinced that the Portuguese would resist the seizure of the Islands.

17. Q. It is in previous testimony that there was, some time during the Summer of 1941, a temporary detachment of surface vessels toward Australia. Did that have any particular part in the overall picture which was confronting the Navy Department?

A. That detachment went to Australia for the purpose of indicating to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests were attacked that the United States would enter the war on the side of the British. Admiral Stark kept the Commanders-in-Chief informed, to the best of his ability, as to the international political situation and the probabilities of the future. While the Government could not guarantee that we would enter the war if Japan attacked Great Britain, they fully believed that we would do so. In our conversations with the British, we never could make a firm commitment that at any particular time the United States would enter the war, for the reason that unless we were attacked first, the Executive Department did not have the power to put the Country into war. Conversations were held in the Far East with the Dutch and the British authorities, and joint plans, not too definite in nature, were drawn up, but we never could be sure that if the Netherlands East Indies or the British were attacked the United States would surely come into the war.

18. Q. During June and July, 1941, formal action was taken by our Federal Government to freeze Japanese credits. At that time, or afterward, did your organization make a reestimate of the international situation in the light of the probability that the Japanese would be badly squeezed in obtaining strategic materials and so forth?

A. The possibility and consequences of action of that nature by the United States Government against Japan were thoroughly considered during our conversations with the British and during our preparation of WPL-46. We felt that that action was going to come sooner or later. We also felt, and I believe that the War Department felt the same way, that action of that nature would almost surely result in

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war with Japan within a comparatively short period of time. While the subject of economic sanctions was discussed, we felt that there was no necessity for making any change in our planning.

19. Q. Then was it the case that such circumstances had really been included in the situation estimate which laid behind WPL-46 in the first place?

A. Yes.

20. Q. Did it occur to you, during 1941 or previously, that the Navy Department's general method of preparing, and of the administrative handling of its war plans, including keeping them in touch with events and developments, was in any way defective?

A. I shared the opinion with many others that the war plans which were in existence during 1940 were defective in the extreme. They were not realistic, they were highly theoretical, they set up forces to be ready for use at the outbreak of war, or shortly after, which could not possibly have been made available, and they were not kept up to date. When I went as War Plans Officer in October of 1940, I was shocked at the state of the war plans. There was the feeling then in Washington, which I did not share, that war with Japan might eventuate at any moment, and there was no plan for war with Japan. Immediately after my arrival and after a thorough discussion of the matter, we initiated the preparation and issue of WPL-43, Rainbow 3, which was a Navy Department War Plan not concurred in by the War Department. This [255] called for a war with Japan alone, and with an entirely defensive attitude in the Atlantic. That plan was issued about January of 1941. We felt that it would be implemented by the War Department if war should eventuate. It must be understood that a war plan issued by the Navy Department, or by the Government, is principally a mobilization plan for placing in the hands of the Commanders-in-Chief the forces with which they are to initiate war and to give those Commanders-in-Chief general directives as to the strategic attitude which they should pursue. Rainbow 3 was, to all intents and purposes, and so far as the Pacific is concerned, approximately the same as Rainbow 5. Rainbow 3 did contemplate association with the British and the Netherlands East Indies on the Far East, but it did not go so far in that regard as Rainbow 5. Rainbow 3 was an interim plan. It was necessary, we all felt, to get out a war plan which the Government could carry out. Therefore, every effort was made to strip from the previous plans the unrealistic features, and to give to the new plan forces which could be provided and tasks which could probably be executed by Commanders-in-Chief. As soon as we issued Rainbow 3 and as soon as we issued Rainbow 5, the Navy Department immediately began moving forces to the different theatres in accord with the commitments made in those two plans.

21. Q. Then am I correct in understanding you to the effect that you did consider Rainbow 5 realistic, well described by the word "As-Is", not frozen, and sufficiently elastic insofar as developments could be seen?

A. Yes.

22. Q. Did you, during the Summer of 1941, make any special provision for keeping WPL-46 in step with changes in the general situation and with changes in availability of forces?

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A. Yes, I organized the War Plans Division into sections charged with maintaining close cognizance of the different war theatres of the world, and made every effort to keep Rainbow 5 up to date. Rather extensive amendments were practically ready for issue when war broke out. They were not issued in the form in which prepared.

23. Q. In pursuance of that objective, or for any other reasons, were any estimates of the situation, other than running estimates, made by the War Plans Division during the period of, say, August to December, 1941?

A. None other than running estimates. I believed then, and I still believe that those are the most valuable kind of estimates. The long, formalized estimates, as used in the War College, are useful for training, but I have not found them particularly useful during war or preparation for war.

24. Q. Was there, during that period from August on, any particular redistribution of the naval forces of our respective Allies actually made or promised?

A. The British promised to set up the Eastern Fleet as contemplated by our Joint Agreement which would consist of about six battleships, two or three aircraft carriers, and some additional cruisers and destroyers. This Fleet was to be based in the Indian Ocean. Its principal base was Trincomalee with an advance base at Singapore. They actually moved the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE and four destroyers to Singapore. En route there were, as I recall it, three battleships and one aircraft carrier additional to the HERMES at the time of the outbreak of war. Also a few destroyers and one or two cruisers. They were, so far as possible, making a loyal effort to carry out their commitments as to the distribution of forces for war. They also moved additional troops and additional aircraft to Malaya. We delivered, [256] under lend-lease, some aircraft to them in the Far East and sent groups of experts and mechanics out to Malaya to show them how to use our airplanes.

25. Q. During the same period, did our own War Department plan and effect any increase in ground or air strength in the Pacific Ocean Area?

A. Yes, as soon as Rainbow 5 was agreed to, the War Department immediately initiated steps for reenforcing the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines. They actually moved a considerable number of airplanes to the Philippines and considerable additional troops. They also initiated a very greatly accelerated training of Philippine soldiers and, during the Fall of 1941, undertook what was essentially a mobilization of the Philippine Army.

26. Q. Was your organization kept in touch and frequently consulted concerning other than the basic considerations leading to those steps?

A. We were consulted in detail every time the War Department contemplated a movement of that sort. We had prolonged discussions of ways and means. Our opinion was frequently asked as to the advisability of such and such a movement. At that time, the War Department did not dispose of many trained elements which could be moved overseas without a very bad interruption of their training: program. The War Department, after June of 1941, was, I believe, as thoroughly convinced as the Navy Department that war with Germany and Japan was not far distant.

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27. Q. Was your organization able to keep touch, during the latter half of 1941, with the actual ability of the Army forces, Hawaii, to meet their commitments?

A. Yes, sir, we had a very definite opinion on the subject. It was substantially the same as was held, I believe, by the War Department, that it would be highly desirable to have considerably greater strength in antiaircraft and airplanes and troops in Hawaii.

28. Q. Narrowing the examination down to the Hawaiian Area and forces therein; did the War Plans Division, through the latter half of 1941, consider that the Pacific Fleet had sufficient forces to carry out its initial tasks?

A. We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover that was being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up defenses in outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston Island, and Samoa. These places were all strengthened, air fields were built or in process of building, and we were distributing forces to those positions. The principal reason for building the defenses there was to detect and ward off enemy attacks against Hawaii, and to afford defensive cover for the sea operations of our Fleet. It was not possible, of course, to provide such a cover to the northward, and that was always recognized as a weak spot in our defense. I may say that I, personally was not in favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was too far removed for proper support, and was certain to fall at an early date after the war broke out unless we could have an early successful engagement with the Japanese Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other positions were considered of great value and work was pushed on all of them to the limit of our available resources. As regards the strength of the Pacific Fleet, we felt that it was adequate for the tasks assigned to it, although we would have been happy to have had greater strength.

29. Q. Did you consider the Fleet's logistics support to be adequate?


A. We believed it to be adequate for the initial Fleet operations, such as I have mentioned. We did not consider that it was adequate for an early offensive movement for setting up bases in the Marshalls. We did not have the units assembled for setting up such bases and we did not have the shipping to support the Fleet at an advance base, but we believed that we could obtain those forces within a reasonable time after the outbreak of war. That estimate, I believe, has been proved sound by events. We have provided far greater logistics support in the Pacific Ocean than I would have believed possible before the outbreak of war. I refer to our tremendous logistic effort in the South Pacific immediately following the outbreak of war.

30. Q. During the period of preparation of basic Rainbow 5, was it the opinion in your organization and among your associates that if war with Japan eventuated, it would be at our initiative or at that of the Japanese?

A. Always at the initiative of the Japanese. We did not believe it politically possible to initiate war against the Japanese. I, personally, did not believe it politically advisable.

31. Q. And did those opinions endure throughout 1941 up until 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

32. Q. Please state the methods of liaison with the State Department which were in effect from the summer of 1941 onward, or even

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previously, through which you kept in touch with developments in the diplomatic and political fields, and including also the economic field, insofar as it was pertinent

A. The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries, and at the meetings with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy Department to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling.

33. Q. Is it your impression now that much transpired in those relationships with the Department of which no official record was kept and which rests now only in the minds of individuals?


A. I don't know what records the State Department kept. The Navy Department representative, the Liaison Officer, usually prepared notes of formal conferences which he put in the files. I kept no notes whatsoever.

34. Q. Was it your impression that there were relationships, conferences, and so forth, on the part of State Department and Army officials in which our representatives had no part?

A. There were such conferences but, I believe that we were kept fully informed as to the general features of any such conferences.

35. Q. Insofar as your own participation was concerned, did you gather the impression that State Department officials had a correct realization of the naval and military potentialities on our side and that they kept their own actions in step therewith.

A. I think any broad generalization in an answer to that question could not fairly be made. There were individuals in the State De-

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partment who had an unrealistic point of view, in my opinion, just the same as there were individuals in the War and Navy Departments who had an unrealistic point of view of the world situation. I'll say that on the whole, I have no complaint nor criticism of the attitude of the State Department.

36. Q. In continuance of your testimony concerning the attitude, of certain individuals, will you go further as respects the individuals who specialized in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

A. I encountered the opinion, held alike by some people in the State Department and in the military service, that we could bluff Japan. I have been fortunate enough to have been associated with the Japanese on several occasions and had made a considerable study of the Japanese character and life and history. I was always of the opinion that you can not bluff the Japanese and that that is not the way to deal with them. But I believe that I, prior to the war, was in a very small minority in that view, so that I can not say that I criticize anyone for holding such views.

37. Q. Do you recall if it was represented to the State Department, at any time in 1941, and particularly upon the decision to build up Army forces in our holdings in the Pacific, that the element of timing in diplomatic and political moves was highly important?

A. That factor was thoroughly considered in every diplomatic and military move that was made, so far as I recall. The matter would be discussed as to whether this was the time to do a certain move or some other time. That was always present. There were sometimes disagreements as to timing.

38. Q. As an example, and in order to be more specific, was our own potentiality in the Pacific properly considered when the date for freezing the Japanese credits was decided upon?

A. It was considered. The State Department was kept well informed as to our strength and advised as to what we could do. What considerations lead to that decision at that particular time, I'm not aware, because I was informed of it after the decision was made and did not participate in any discussion of it in advance.

39. Q. Admiral, will you make a general statement as to the adequacy and reliability of the intelligence furnished concerning Japan in all fields through 1941 for the necessary purposes of the War Plans Division?


A. Of course, we never have enough intelligence. It is particularly true that, as is well known, correct intelligence concerning Japan is very difficult to obtain. However, I think our intelligence regarding Japanese activities and intentions was quite good. In general terms, it was adequate for the preparation of war plans and for the direction of affairs. I believe that the Chief of Naval Operations, during the greater part of 1941, had a very realistic and sound concept as to Japanese general intentions. We received information from undercover sources that was of great value. Those who have studied the Japanese and had realized their character and reactions could draw conclusions, usually sound, from public statements, actions of their diplomats, actions of their Government, which were valuable in estimating their intentions. From these various sources, I became convinced, even before going to the Department, that war with Japan was inevitable within the next year or two. I did not believe that

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war was imminent with Japan, unless precipitated by some incident, until the time it occurred. I did believe, from the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, which, I believe, was in June or July of 1941, that matters then were definitely in train for an attack by Japan on the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies. During November of 1941, I believed that the attack would be made by Japan about the last day of that month, but during the last ten days of November, I became convinced it had been postponed for a few days. The attack of December 7 came as no surprise whatsoever to me, nor to the Chief of Naval Operations.

40. Q. Were you, however, surprised that one of the objectives of the Japanese attack was Pearl Harbor itself?

A. Not in the least. I had originated a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War in January of 1941 concerning the defenses of Hawaii, in which an air, sea, and submarine attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor was set forth as one of the most probable forms that the initiation of war with Japan would take. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, about that same time, wrote letters to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commanding General in Hawaii, pointing out these features and asking that steps be taken within the power of those officers to be prepared for such an attack. Those letters were not intended to be construed as indicating an immediate attack, but they attempted to initiate rather long-range preparatory plans.

41. Q. Through 1941, and particularly during the months which saw the increase of tension with Japan, was your organization much concerned and worried as regards the security of units of the Pacific Fleet, as based in Hawaiian waters? I mean, in particular, security against surprise attack.

A. That factor was never absent from our consideration of the problems of war with Japan. We endeavored to do what we could with other parts of the Department, and with the Commander-in-Chief, to push measures that would insure adequate security. The letters and dispatches on that subject initiated by my office are not many because we felt, and it was the Chief of Naval Operation's policy, not to nag on matters of that sort. The problem was put where it belonged, in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.

42. Q. In those intra-office discussions, was a surprise attack through the air particularly in your mind?

A. We felt that would probably accompany any attack unless such were confined solely to submarines. Attacks by submarines were, of course, an almost certainty, and might well have been the only form of attack.


43. Q. While holding that frame of mind, during that crucial period, did you also have in mind the actual state of readiness of Army forces, Oahu, for repelling carrier raid?

A. Yes. On several occasions, we went over in detail the exact forces the Army had available, both anti-aircraft and air, their distribution, and whether or not they were deployed in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor permanently. I am sure there is considerable correspondence in general terms on that subject, but I do not remember whether or not we specifically asked the War Department to deploy their anti-aircraft guns permanently in the immediate vicinity of

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Pearl Harbor. I know that we asked them orally to keep their principal anti-aircraft force, deployed around Pearl Harbor, and my impression is that they carried that out. We knew that the three inch anti-aircraft gun was not a very able weapon, but the new ninety millimeter and the Army thirty-seven millimeter and the fifty calibre guns were either not available then or available only in small numbers. I believe that the War Department did everything that they could to meet these requests.

44. Q. Were you cognizant of the state of training and readiness of the Army air forces, Oahu, for repelling or interfering with an air raid?

A. No. We knew the types of planes they had had here were of the older models and not particularly valuable in combat. In order to correct that quickly, in the latter part of 1941, we made, I think, two carrier trips from the Coast carrying the later types of Army pursuit planes. They were newly formed organizations and we did not expect their training to be of a very high order. The purpose of those trips by carriers and the purpose of the Army transfers of the later types of pursuit planes and bombers in the latter part of '41 was to deal with exactly the situation that occurred.

4D. Q. Did you have knowledge of the state of readiness of the Army's radar equipment and organization?

A. In general terms, yes. When I went to War Plans, the Army had, under manufacture, eight or ten large radar installations of a permanent type. The priority at that time of assignment was, first to Panama, and, I think, second on the West Coast of the United States. On our recommendation, they changed that priority to first, I think, the Philippines, and, second Hawaii; or it may have been the other way. I'm not too certain about that. The first may have been Midway, but the Philippines, Hawaii, and Midway were placed by the War Department very high on the list. Now the installation, the permanent fixed installation in Hawaii, I do not believe was completed at the time of Pearl Harbor, but it was being pushed hard. The Army had, however, moved out here, quite recently to that date, several sets of the mobile type of radar, and we knew that these were being operated.

46. Q. But you did not know anything specific about the relative inefficiencies of the operation; is that correct?

A. That is correct. I knew nothing whatever about radar except what it was intended to do.

47. Q. Continuing as regards the security of units of the Fleet against surprise attack while in Hawaii, and specifically Pearl Harbor, were there, during the months leading up to the war, any specific considerations in your organization as to the advisability of continuing to base the Fleet in Hawaiian waters; if so, please state them.

A. Consideration was given to withdrawing the Fleet from the Base in Hawaii to California throughout the entire time I was in the Department, [261] until a very short period before Pearl Harbor. There were several factors that entered into that consideration. One was political, whether or not the presence of the Fleet here would be more likely or less likely to bring on war with Japan. Another consideration was the welfare of the crews of the ships, the men did not like Hawaii, and there was a certain amount of discontent

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among them in not getting back more frequently to the States. Another was the upkeep of the Fleet. Another consideration was its safety in case of attack. I suppose the matter was discussed rather exhaustively a dozen times, and each time the decision was made to leave the Fleet here. For some time previous to the attack, the use of the anchorage at Lahaina Roads had been abandoned on the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief, because it was felt to be too exposed, both against submarines and against air attack. It was believed that when the Fleet was not at sea, Pearl Harbor offered better protection than any other place in that vicinity.

48. Q. Then you do not recall any occasion on which decision to withdraw from these waters to the Coast, for security reasons only, came anywhere near to being reached?

A. No, sir.

49. Q. Sir, was the estimate that you stated a few minutes ago that you considered a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor a strong possibility shared by the Chief of Naval Operations and his other senior assistants?

A. Yes, because they approved the letters that we drew up, without any question. They made some improvements in the letters, but the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, as well as my own assistants, all believed that the letters were entirely sound.

50. Q. What was the understanding in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as to the estimate prevailing in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as regards the possibilities of air surprise attack on Oahu?

A. We believed that he held exactly the same views that we did. What his attitude was towards the imminence of such an attack, I have no idea, but the fact that he, himself, had abandoned the use of Lahaina Roads indicated that his attitude toward attack was entirely correct.

51. Q. Did you feel, at that time, that all necessary steps were taken to apprise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet of the apprehension of the Chief of Naval Operations as to a surprise air attack on Oahu?

A. There was no specific warning sent out against attack on the Fleet here at the time the war warnings were dispatched. The only measures that we estimated specifically the Japanese would take were the general forms of his major attack, which was on Malay, the Philippines, and possibly Borneo, initially. That is, it was the major movement with which we were concerned in the Department. It was against policy-rightly so, I believe-to be too specific in details as to tactical matters. The idea was that we would give the Commanders-in-Chief general tasks, provide them with full information, and assign to them forces adequate for executing those tasks. We looked to the officers in the field to decide all tactical matters and methods. We did not wish to hamper them with detailed instructions concerning matters within their own fields of action. This was particularly important in the case of the Pacific and Asiatic Commands, which are so far distant from Washington that the officers there can never be adequately advised as to events and conditions.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.


Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that

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his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eighteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Commander Granville C. Briant, U. S. Naval Reserve, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the nineteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:03 p. m., adjourned until 9:15 a. m., tomorrow.

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