PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.
The examination met at 8: 15 a. m.
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twentieth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.
Richmond Kelly Turner, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.
Examined by the examining officer (Continued):
52. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated 16 October, which is Exhibit 6 in the testimony before this board. Did you have any part in the preparation of that dispatch?
A. I prepared the original version of the dispatch. It was discussed with the Army. I think the discussion took place at a joint board meeting, as well as informally between the Staff representatives. I also prepared the final form which is this dispatch. There was no substantial change in the wording, except that, in my original form of the dispatch, instead of  saying, "There is also a possibility that Japan may attack Britain and the United States," I made it a good deal stronger than that. I do not remember the exact wording; I think it was "a distinct probability Japan will attack Britain and the United States in the near future". Anyway, that was the meaning. That was felt by the Joint Board to be too strong a statement, and it was modified to the final wording.
53. Q. Do you recall that consultations with State Department officials preceded the sending of this dispatch?
A. I did not participate in any consultations with the State Department concerning this dispatch. As I recall it, the dispatch was shown to the Secretary of State and was discussed by him and the Chief of Naval Operations. It also was discussed by the Chief of Naval Operations with the President. I do not believe it was presented to a Cabinet meeting. In fact, I'm sure it wasn't; but I have the strong
impression that the President discussed its general features with the Secretary of State before it was sent.
64. Q. The next document which the board has in evidence bears the date of 24 November and is of somewhat similar tenor (indicating Exhibit 7). The intervening period is thirty-nine days. Do you recall any action by the Navy Department, any directives and so forth, of mayor import concerning the situation of the Pacific Fleet during that interim?
A. I don't recall any additional directives. The Navy Department and the War Department increased their efforts to get additional strength here in the Central Pacific and in the Philippines during that period. The situation was discussed at regular and at several special meetings of the Joint Board, and action was agreed to along several lines of effort by the Departments.
55. Q. Following your mention of Army efforts, do you recall any embarrassment coming upon the Navy Department, or its forces in the Pacific, incident to a very high estimate of numbers of B-17's which were to be ferried across the Pacific?
A. I don't recall any embarrassment. We made every effort and sent out directives to hasten the completion of the air fields at Midway and Wake, and we had to send additional men out there, in order to hasten completion of Navy airfields for use by the Army in ferrying planes to the Philippines. That took some of our shipping. The Army asked us to provide shipping for the fields at Canton and Christmas Islands, but we were unable to provide it for Christmas. We did provide some for Canton. Those fields had been started on my recommendation after talking to General Arnold. I told him we would lose Wake right away as soon as war broke out and if he wanted to get planes to the Philippines an alternative route ought to be provided via Australia and Pacific Ocean islands farther to the rear. That conversation took place at Argentia, during the Argentia Conference. The Navy was always heartily in favor of sending the planes to the Philippines, and we did what we could to assist the Army.
56. Q. Do you recall disappointment because the magnitude of that air reenforcement was very much less than what was projected?
A. Yes. The Navy Department was constantly urging the War Department to do all they possibly could in the way of getting additional strength in the Philippines. I will say that the War Department was also in favor of it. I think they sent out everything they could. I would like to add the following as a partial answer to a previous question regarding major steps that the Navy Department took which affected the Pacific situation. It was  at about this time that the Navy Department shifted all merchant and military shipping out of the Central Pacific, and sent it down south of New Guinea. It was also about this time that a directive was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to withdraw the Marines from China. The exact date of that dispatch, I do not recall.
57. Q. Do you recall if Mr. Kurusu's mission to Washington caused any particular change in opinions in your organization during this period of thirty-nine days?
A. His mission intensified our belief, already strong, that Japan was playing for time and was going to make an attack in the near future. The Kurusu mission seemed almost proof positive, had we not had proof already.
58. Q. Returning to the dispatch of 16 October. Do you recall approximately what steps Admiral Kimmel took to carry out the directive for a preparatory deployment?
A. He sent additional troops to the outlying islands and some fixed anti-aircraft guns and troops to Wake. He could not put the entire garrison in at Wake because of the large number of civilian workmen there, so he only sent a part of them out at this time. Then, just as war was breaking out, he dispatched another contingent to Wake, and he established an anti-submarine patrol in the Hawaiian Islands. I think he increased his air patrol, and he issued some orders to our own submarines, but I don't remember what they were. Our impression was that he was taking the necessary precautions. We had no doubts as to the readiness of the Pacific Fleet.
59. Q. During the aforesaid interim period of thirty-nine days, were the Department's directives concerning deployments ever rescinded?
A. No, sir.
60. Q. I pass you a dispatch dated 24 November, which is Exhibit 7 in this testimony. Did you have any part in the preparation of that dispatch?
A. I prepared this dispatch. It went through approximately the same processes as the October dispatch.
61. Q. Do you recall any particular collaboration of organizations, other than Army and Navy, in the preparation of that dispatch or which were in its background?
A. There were frequent conferences with the State Department during this period and frequent conferences between the Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the President. The Office of Naval Intelligence was in close touch with the Army Intelligence Service and with the F. B. I. concerning preventative measures being taken in the United States and in the Hawaiian Islands. I've forgotten just when the Coast Guard was taken over. I know there were conferences with the Coast Guard and the Treasury Department during this time in order to fit them into the deployment. I understood the situation was discussed several times in Cabinet meetings, and I believe that there were several conferences on the subject between the Cabinet officers most directly concerned.
62. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch of 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 in this testimony. Did you also have a part in the preparation of this dispatch?
A. The preparation of that dispatch followed approximately the same course as the other two. I prepared the original dispatch. It was considered by the Joint Board and was taken up with the State Department and  the White House. There were some few changes made in it until it took this form. As I recall, we were informed by the Secretary of State, at a small meeting at which I was present, that the State Department has no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Secretary of State requested advice from the Military Services as to any further steps that his Department might make. It was apparent, from the talks that were going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as from information received from intelligence sources, that the Japanese were killing time preparatory to an attack. We could not estimate the exact time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop movements and naval movements in the Far East toward the South.
It was at about this time that our search planes first picked up some of the Japanese ships moving along the coast of Indo-China. I think it may have been after the date of this dispatch that we instituted plane search of the China Sea, but we were conscious of definite amphibious movements being made before the dispatch we are discussing was sent. The radio traffic, during the first half and middle of November, had been very heavy on the part of the Japanese, and suddenly it almost stopped some time between the 20th and 25th of November, as I recall it. Very little traffic was then sent out. That convinced us that the Japanese Fleet had put to sea. I was concerned, and had been through this entire period, over whether or not Japanese traffic analyses were being made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I bought the subject up several times with the Director of Naval Communications and with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I was assured, each time, that the Commander-in-Chief was getting everything that we were getting in Washington, and was making proper traffic analyses here. Japanese radio traffic analyses were under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Communications, and I am not very familiar with the exact methods employed, nor of the distribution which was made of their deductions. The Director kept War Plans fully informed as to these deductions.
63. Q. In the discussion over the dispatch as you first drafted it, do you recall anything in particular as regards the phrase "war warning"; particularly discussion on what steps those words might lead the Pacific Fleet to take?
A. The words "war warning" were my own words and seemed to me to express the strong conviction on the part of the Department that war was surely coming. We expected all military services and outlying detachments to act in every way as if we were actually at war, except making attacks on the enemy, if encountered, or initiating movements against enemy forces.
64. Q. Will you, similarly, state what, in particular, the Department had in mind in the use of the words in this dispatch concerning "a deployment"?
A. It will be noted that the dispatch orders a defensive deployment. We expected all war scouting measures to be undertaken, submarines to be sent out to protect our Fleet and territory against enemy naval forces; we expected the carriers with their protective vessels to put to sea and stand in readiness for war; we expected, in the Asiatic the movement of ships to be made to the South in accordance with the plan agreed on. We expected a high degree of readiness on board ships against attack of any form; and on shore, we expected a high degree of readiness of defensive troops, including anti-aircraft. The dispatch was prepared jointly with the Army. We expected a deployment of the Army on shore appropriate with a defensive state of readiness, such as manning the coastal guns, and moving troops out to their deployment positions for defense of territory.
65. Q. Do you recall any discussion, during the preparation of this dispatch, over inclusion of a directive to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to report what means he was taking incident to this dispatch?
A. We saw the Army dispatch requiring a report as to measures taken before it went out, but the Chief of Naval Operations and his
advisers, so far as I can recall, did not even consider sending out such a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
66. Q. Or the inclusion of such a directive in this dispatch itself?
A. No, that is a point I do not recall coming up.
67. Q. Do you recall any discussion over the advisability of sending a naval operations officer of authority to Pearl Harbor in order to insure a meeting of minds?
A. No, sir. An inspection procedure of that nature was never considered, so far as I recall, at any time while I was in the Department. We had, in circulating war plans or agreements with the British, on one or two occasions, sent an officer to Hawaii and to Manila to go over the papers with the Commanders-in-Chief to insure that those officers thoroughly understood the Department's intentions and desires, but I heard no suggestions that an officer be sent out here to check on what the Commander-in-Chief was actually doing.
68. Q. It appears, from previous testimony, that the Department sent C-in-C Pacific another dispatch on 26 November, which originated some hours earlier than the other dispatch, and which preoccupied the High Commands in Oahu. It concerned the substitution of Army air and ground troops in outlying islands as then garrisoned by Marines. Do you recall that dispatch (showing Exhibit 12)?
A. Yes, I recall this dispatch and I am sure it was prepared in my office.
69. Q. Did it occur to you that the timing of these two important dispatches, sent on the same day, was not altogether desirable?
A. No, sir. In fact, the purpose of the dispatch was to strengthen Midway against attack, and while this dispatch probably took several days in preparation, I think we wouldn't have considered it a part of the war warning series but rather a part of the materiel preparation matters, on which dispatches were going out practically every day. I've never had the thought that this would have done anything except more or less reenforce the idea of complete readiness. The fact that the planes had to be taken on an aircraft carrier indicated the necessity for speed.
70. Q. Did the dispatches in question (Exhibits 12 and 13) contemplate exchange of ground troops? I understand from your testimony that you did not consider that the quite extensive administrative measures necessitated by such shifts in forces would get in the way of larger considerations; is that correct?
A. This dispatch does not contemplate the exchange of troops, but merely exchange of ground crews and personnel of the airplane squadrons The dispatch, Exhibit 13, contemplates reenforcement by infantry units of Marine defense battalions in position in the outlying islands. There was never any intention to relieve the Marine defense battalions, but they needed infantry reenforcement for proper security. Both of these dispatches, in my opinion, relate to a part of the immediate war measures which the Department considered essential. Administrative requirements for moving these forces to the forward positions were necessary. I consider the  dispatches relate to a movement which would add considerable strength to our defensive position in the Hawaiian Islands. I foresaw no administrative difficulties that would interfere with a proper defensive attitude of the Fleet and of the Army forces in Hawaii.
71. Q. Referring back to your testimony to the effect that you expected the Pacific Fleet to take up positions in readiness as a part of their reaction to the phrase "war warning", and so forth; do you recall if the logistic requirements which would be thereby entailed had ample attention in your minds at that time?
A. The Fleet actually had put to sea prior to this time, and they were then operating in about three or four task forces, and alternating in Pearl Harbor. The amount of fuel in Pearl Harbor was a constant matter of concern to War Plans and other agencies of the Navy Department. We felt that the logistic position out here was secure enough to execute those movements which we had in mind. I have never heard that it was not reasonably adequate.
72. Q. But if in consequence of such an understanding on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, his task groups had been at sea for several days prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, would they not have had to return to port for refueling?
A. I don't remember whether or not there were enough tankers here at that time to keep the Fleet at sea continuously without returning to port. My impression is that there were enough. The rotation of the task forces in Pearl Harbor was not brought to my attention or the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations until after December 7.
73. Q. Under the Department's directive as contained in Exhibit 8, the deployment was stated to be in preparation for carrying out the assigned tasks in the war plans. Did it occur to you, while framing that dispatch, that the result might well be the assemblage of the entire Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor in preparation to jump off on the initial movement which the plans called for?
A. There was no question about an immediate amphibious movement. The only thing which was possible, the only tasks of the war plan which were possible were defensive movements and raids against enemy outlying positions, and the immediate matter was the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and our outlying islands. The place to defend them for the Fleet was at sea.
74. Q. However, the first task imposed upon the Pacific Fleet though in the nature of a raid, required heavy forces and a blow projected at a long distance. In that view, would it have been unfair to expect that the Commander-in-Chief would assemble all three of his task forces in Pearl Harbor in preparation therefor?
A. The wording of the dispatch relating to that matter is as follows: "Execute appropriate deployment preparatory to carrying out the defensive tasks only assigned in WPL-46." That appears to me to be clear and to rule out, for the time being, any immediate preparation for an offensive move.
76. Q. Referring to my question regarding a directive to the Commander-in-Chief to state what measures he was taking, did you receive any report of action by Army forces, Oahu, which contained any indication that the actions taken in consequence of the 27 November dispatch had not been what was contemplated when they were sent?
A. I remember a dispatch being received by the War Department from General Short reporting the measures being taken in compliance with the War Department's directive. A copy of that dispatch was sent to me by the War Plans Officer of the General Staff.
I did not discuss the dispatch with the War Plans Officer of the General Staff. The impression made on me by the dispatch was that the Army was taking satisfactory dispositions, and since the dispatch seemed satisfactory to the War Department, I did not pursue the subject further. The dispatch did not create any impression on me that full and appropriate defensive deployments were not being made by the Army.
76. Q. I show you a dispatch from OpNav, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Do you recall having prepared it or having seen it at the time it was sent?
A. I saw it before it was sent. It was sent by Naval Intelligence.
77. Q. Did the information therein cause thought within your organization and among your associates as to the advisability of any further warnings or instructions to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A. No, sir. The fact that this was going out in this manner was considered all that was necessary to insure that the Commanders-in-Chief and the Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts thoroughly understood the urgency of the situation. In this connection, the Navy Department sent out orders to outlying islands and positions in China to burn all codes except such as were immediately essential; for example, to the ships in the Chinese rivers and to our stations in China, we sent orders to burn all except a single code and that was to be destroyed immediately in case of attack. We sent orders to Guam and orders to the Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts concerning the same subject. Most of these dispatches, or at least several of them, were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for information. The fact that we considered it necessary to burn codes was considered by the Department as an additional advisory warning to the Commanders-in-Chief.
78. Q. Admiral, did you feel that this dispatch of 3 December would create in the minds of the recipients an impression that the attack was coming in the Western Pacific rather than any possibility of an attack on Oahu, since it does not mention Honolulu as one of the points where codes were to be destroyed?
A. It is impossible for me to understand how anyone could receive such an impression. The enemy codes at Washington and Manila were to be destroyed, which definitely indicates war against the United States. Once the United States and Japan are at war or approaching war, then war-like actions may occur any place. Such an impression as you mention might have been created if neither Washington nor Manila had been included in the dispatch.
79. Admiral, do you recall anything other than what you have already testified to in the way of directives, warnings, and so forth, which were sent to Admiral Kimmel from, say, 25 November onward?
A. No, sir.
80. Q. Can you explain why the various dispatches from 24 November onward were in minor disagreement as to the actual objectives at which a Japanese surprise attack might be sent?
A. I can not see the disagreement you mention. Exhibit No. 8 mentions several possible objectives of an amphibious expedition. Included among the possible objectives is the Kra Peninsula. Exhibit No. 10, which is a report of what the British Mission in Washington had been told by their Government, mentions an am-
phibious expedition against the Kra Isthmus. Therefore, I see no essential difference.
81. Q. Sir, in the months preceding the chain of dispatches that appear in evidence in this examination, do you recall any other repeated warnings that war was imminent, might happen any day, or words to that effect, contained either in correspondence or dispatches with Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. I recall no official dispatches or official letters which gave repeated warnings. There were many official letters and dispatches, and there was personal correspondence between Admiral Stark and the Commander-in-Chief in which an effort was made to keep the Commanders-in-Chief constantly advised on the diplomatic situation and on the general thoughts and attitudes of the Department concerning the possibility of war, and also concerning the prosecution of measures in preparation for war. I recall nothing in the several months before Pearl Harbor except this series of dispatches which might indicate that the Department thought war might break out any day. I saw most, if not all, of the personal correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders-in-Chief and was permitted to comment on them prior to their dispatch. If there had been any such thing in his personal correspondence, I certainly would have recommended its deletion. Admiral Stark's opinion and mine on the situation were very close together from the Spring of 1941 on.
82. Q. There is some testimony to the effect that the repeated warnings to the Pacific Fleet were ineffective and that such repetition had one undesirable result wherein the recipients got into the frame of mind which I can most briefly describe as the "cry of 'wolf'" of the fable. Did it occur to you, on about, say, 27 November, that the Department could well put in effect certain portions of Rainbow 5 and thereby most certainly insure that proper steps would be taken by the Pacific Fleet?
A. I frequently heard that criticism made. I do not consider it in the slightest degree justified. I'm speaking now of the "cry of 'wolf', 'wolf'". So far as I know, there was only one dispatch that was a specific warning for war. The other dispatches relate to preparatory measures and were intended in keep the Commanders-in-Chief fully in touch with the situation as the Department saw it. The Department would have been, in my opinion, most derelict, had it permitted the war to approach closely without letting the Commanders-in-Chief know that it was convinced that war was coming. That exact feature of keeping from alarming the people at sea by frequent alarmist letters and dispatches was constantly kept in mind, and there were several occasions on which there were recommendations from one or another officer in the Department to send out preparatory warnings, but these were resisted until the approach of war was clear. As to putting in effect part of WPL-46, a careful study of that document will show that its mechanism does not permit such a step to be taken. It would be a very complicated procedure if properly done and would require considerable study on the part of the Department and the recipient of such messages, in order that the Commanders-in-Chief could see what the Department's ideas were.
I think nothing could be clearer than to start a dispatch by saying, "This is a war warning," and indicating the enemy and his probable major movements.
83. Q. Inasmuch as you have stated that WPL-46 did not lend itself to partial execution, would it have been practicable to have declared a mobilization over certain areas, notably the Pacific west of our Pacific Coast?
A. The fact is that the Navy had been mobilized for months, so far as its internal arrangements were concerned. Additional mobilization would, I believe, have accomplished nothing valuable, particularly as the powers that accrue to the military services on the outbreak of war, regarding to seizure of property and persons and regarding the interference with civilian activities, can not be undertaken in peacetime. The organic law of the Territory of Hawaii, I understand, permits martial law to be declared or to be requested by the Governor under certain conditions. That could have been done in peace provided those conditions existed, but would have been necessarily entirely public and would have created a state of mind in the civilian population and among the civilian officers of the Government that I believe would have had serious repercussions against the military. It must be remembered that very few people really believed war with Japan was imminent. Any public declaration, such as is necessary for establishing mobilization, would have been the one sure way of insuring war, and I'm positive that had such a move been made, the Government and the military would have been most severely criticized. We do not have the mobilization system which exists in military countries, and it is my opinion that mobilization by the United States could not legally be effected until a state of war exists. WPL-43 and WPL-46 were drawn up after considerable study of the question with the idea that mobilization prior to war is not practicable for the United States.
84. Q. I show you a document which is in testimony as Exhibit 5. Were you familiar with it prior to 7 December?
A. I had read it at the time it was approved by the Navy Department during the Summer of 1941.
85. Q. Could that plan, which provides for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, have been made effective at my time during the few days prior to 7 December?
A. To a very considerable extent that plan was already in effect prior to December 7, 1941. About the only thing that was not in effect were matters relating to the commission of acts of war. The machinery for cooperation between the Army and Navy had either been set up or was in the process of setting up for some months prior to the outbreak of war. I do not believe that it would have been useful to have placed this plan in effect. Rather, I'm inclined to think that it would have confused the issue.
86. Q. If you can recall, will you please state what constituted Admiral Stark's principal preoccupation and worry during November, '41, and up to 7 December.
A. I don't believe there was any one outstanding matter, other than the imminence of war. We were in a position where the military services strongly believed that we should have been in the war against Germany some months before. We were escorting convoys in the Atlantic, patrolling against German and Italian submarines and ships.
We had troops in Iceland. There were many problems in the Atlantic which required solution and action by the Chief of Naval Operations. There was the tremendous question as to manufacture of materiel and the expansion of the Navy. We had been unable to get the  funds or the authority to expand the Navy as much as we believed it should have been expanded, and that feature was always near the top of Admiral Stark's thoughts. There were the situations here in the Pacific and in the Asiatic which also were considered. Admiral Stark's thoughts were all about the close approach of war, and constantly in his mind was getting our forces into as complete a state of readiness as possible. We had established in Washington, since about April 1 of 1941, a British Military Mission, which grew to large proportions. That Mission had to do both with strategic matters and with the provision of lend-lease materials to Britain and other countries. Machinery for handling such materials was in process of expansion, but all during the Fall, a good deal of Admiral Stark's time was taken with talks with the British on strategic and lend-lease matters.
87. Q. During your incumbency as head of the War Plans Division, did you engage in any negotiations which looked toward the substantiation of the principle of unity of command for the joint action method which had been agreed upon for some years?
A. That had been discussed at great length with the Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain cases in WPL-46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on shore.
88. Q. Admiral, in the months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, was thought given in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the vulnerability of the Fleet units in Pearl Harbor to attack by torpedoes dropped from aircraft?
A. That apprehension existed in the Department prior to the time I went there as War Plans Officer. I had gone there from duty on a ship based in Pearl Harbor, and while here, I always felt that our ships were defenseless against such an attack, if it could be successfully made. As I recall it, the proposition of using anti-torpedo nets was put up to them out here first during the Summer of 1940. We again put it up to them in January of 1941 amongst other measures which we considered desirable for protection of the Fleet while in port. The use of anti-torpedo nets around ships in the Harbor was rejected by the authorities here in Hawaii, whether by the Commander-in-Chief or the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, I'm not certain at this time. I'll say this, that the Bureau of Ordnance sent out a letter while that matter was under consideration stating father categorically that, in their opinion, the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow to permit the dropping of torpedoes, and, unquestionably, that influenced the authorities here in determining not to use nets. I, personally, never accepted that opinion of the Bureau of Ordnance, because I see no reason whatsoever why torpedoes can not be made to drop in shallow water and run without a deep dive. We
now know that it can be done. That letter was changed, I think, in June, 1941, by the Bureau of Ordnance who sent then information substantially to the effect that they then believed that the Japanese had torpedoes that could be dropped from planes without diving, and it was possible to run them in thirty feet of water, as I recall the figure. Whatever the depth, it was indicated that it was possible to make successful drops of torpedoes from airplanes in Pearl Harbor. The subject of nets was then again taken up, but the manner of taking it up, I don't recall, because it was handled in another division of Operations and not  by War Plans. The Department was providing a good deal of anti-torpedo nets and I believe it could have been made available out here in time. The feeling, generally, in Operations, was that nets ought to be provided.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examination then, at 11:50 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.