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                                  HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
                                                    AND SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE.

The examination met at 10 a. m.


Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Peter Urrutia, Chief Yeoman, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-sixth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Irving H. Mayfield, Captain, U. S. Navy, serving as Chief of Staff to the Deputy Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. From March 15,1941, until the end of the year, I was District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. Q. Captain, what previous experience had you had in intelligence work?

A. None, except about two weeks temporary duty in Washington prior to proceeding to the Fourteenth Naval District, and something slightly more than two years as Naval Attache in Chile.

4. Q. Will you please state the organization of the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, as you found it upon reporting for duty.

A. Upon reporting for duty, the organization consisted of approximately thirteen persons, of whom two were women, and we occupied office space on the sixth floor of the Young Hotel Building, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.

b. Q. Did you at that time consider this force to be adequate for performing the duties prescribed?

A. I did not.

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6. Q. Will you please outline developments in the office during your incumbency?

A. About one month after taking charge, I completed a survey of the District from the point of view of intelligence organization and submitted this survey with my recommendations for enlargements and opening of branch offices; other [309] similar details in connection with the organization to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. To the best of my recollection, this report was dated about April 22, 1941.

7. Q. Will you please state what action was taken in this respect; in regard to your recommendation?

A. The Commandant made a report to the Navy Department inclosing my report to him, and recommending certain additions as to personnel and material to be made as soon as practicable, and that thereafter the organization should proceed in an orderly fashion.

8. Q. By the Fall of 1941, had the organization of your Department been improved to the extent that you were satisfied as to its sufficiency?

A. It had not.

9. Q. Was any further action taken, or were recommendations submitted to improve the situation?

A. Constant requests were made for additional personnel and material, principally personnel. It was necessary, at that time, to obtain permission in many instances from the Navy Department before naval reserves actually enrolled for intelligence duties could be ordered to active duty. The procurement quota assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District was far less than the estimated complement, so that many of the personnel for the organization had to come from the mainland; many of the personnel supplied, both from local sources and from the mainland, were totally without training and many without any experience in intelligence work. It was necessary to take the most experienced and use them as instructors. In addition to recruiting and organizing a strictly intelligence organization, I was charged with recruiting, organizing, and training all personnel for radio and cable censorship. It is my considered opinion that the organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some months after December 7, 1941. This was due to consistent accessions of new and untrained personnel who had to be sent to a constantly expanding organization, which at the same time was endeavoring to carry a heavy load of intelligence work. I believe that the exact figures of the space occupied, and personnel of the various ranks and ratings are available in the District Intelligence Office in Honolulu.

10. Q. Captain, will you please tell us of the relations between your Department and the other investigating agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Army Intelligence of Hawaii, during your incumbency as District Intelligence Officer?

A. The three intelligence organizations were very cooperative, and during my entire tour of duty as District Intelligence Officer, the relationship and spirit of cooperation between the three organizations was excellent, the military intelligence, in my opinion, had far more personnel difficulties than Naval Intelligence. They had fewer men, and greater difficulty in expanding. The F. B. I., similarly, was shorthanded. The heads of the three organizations met at least once a

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week and were consistently exchanging visits between the regular meetings. The agents, both civilian and commissioned, were free to consult with the agents of the other organizations. My files were always open to an agent of either of the other two organizations, and we had no reason to believe that their files were not equally accessible to the men of my organization.

11. Q. Captain, similarly, will you please outline your relations with [310] the Intelligence Organizations of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and the other naval intelligence organization present in Hawaii?

A. The personal relationship between me and the Fleet Intelligence Officer was always cordial and cooperative. I considered it my duty to give every aid and assistance to the Fleet Intelligence Office that he might require. The Intelligence Organization under Commander Rochefort also received from my organization every possible assistance. I supplied him with personnel whenever he desired them, endeavoring to send to him only people, both officers and men, who would suit his needs, and this was done after careful study and selection.

12. Q. Captain, did you have information or indications prior to the launching of the attack that the Japanese contemplated any type of move against the United States in Hawaii?

A. None.

13. Q. The examining officer desires to have in the record information as to the possible sources which may have been used by the Japanese to obtain and to transmit to Japan, or to the Japanese Military and Naval Services, information regarding the Fleet and shore installations in Hawaii. Please state as well as you can remember what information you had prior to the attack, with respect to such sources.

A. It was possible for any person from innumerable points to observe the entrance or departure of any vessel into Honolulu or Pearl Harbor; the Japanese Navy tankers which entered the Port of Honolulu could observe any Fleet operations or arrivals or departures of the Fleet, and officers and crew were frequently entertained by the Consul General of Japan and other Japanese residents in the Island of Oahu. They were not restricted in taking automobile tours to points of interest, or trips around the Island. The road around Pearl Harbor was close to the water line and, at many points, the ships in Pearl Harbor and locations, the state of repair, or any other points of interest could easily be observed from the road. There were many points on slight elevations near Pearl Harbor from which constant observations could have been maintained. There were many points of greater height, at a greater distance from Pearl Harbor, where constant observations with binoculars could have been maintained and photographs taken. The Japanese freight and passenger lines making Honolulu a port of call could easily have brought in material or agents, or could have removed personnel or agents. The only inspections of which I am aware were the customary public health and customs inspections. The Consul General or a member of his Staff could visit these vessels, as could other visitors. The Master of the vessel and his officers were at liberty to call on the Consul General at his office or residence as they desired. I was aware that couriers were passengers on these liners. I know of specific instances which are a matter of record in the files of the District Intelligence Office where parties from

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vessels were taken on tours by the Consul General or members of his Staff, but I have no exact knowledge of any individual agent or document that entered Honolulu or left therefrom.

14. Q. Would you please state what you knew at the time of the activities of the Japanese Consul General and his Staff which may have been connected with the obtaining of intelligence and forwarding such information to Japan?

A. It is my belief, which I can not substantiate by actual facts, as the tenseness of the diplomatic situation between the United States and Japan increased that the efforts of the Consulate General to obtain and forward information to Japan increased. There were many Japanese societies and organizations whose reason for existence, at least on the surface, were [311] purely cultural or social. These societies numbered about fifteen hundred. The Japanese Consul General, in my opinion, endeavored to keep in touch with these various societies and Japanese Language schools for the purpose of keeping them tied to Japan as closely as possible. I believe that he did use the consular agents, of which there were some two hundred and fifty in number throughout the Territory. The ostensible use of the consular agents was for the purpose of registering births for the Consul General and the matters concerning citizenship.

15. Q. Were copies of the messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General by cable or radio made available to your organization?

A. They were not, until after the visit of Mr. Sarnoff, of the Radio Corporation of America. The Japanese Consulate General sent its traffic using the various communication companies alternately. The Mackay Radio Company, according to my recollection, handled the traffic during the month of November; traffic was switched to the Radio Corporation of America as of December 1, 1941. Thereafter, I was able to obtain all of his traffic from R. C. A., but since it was all in code and I had no reading organization, it was necessary to submit this traffic to another organization to be read.

16. Q. Were any of these dispatches read before the attack on 7 December?

A. That I can not answer definitely. since there would be no reason to send me copies of the messages that had been read, unless they had some intelligence value.

17. Q. Captain, did you learn the contents of any of these messages at any time subsequent to the attack

A. Yes.

18. Q. Will you please state the contents of such messages as you learned them subsequent to the attack?

A. Subsequent to the attack, to the best of my recollection-the first one was received by me on the 11th of December. Considerable information as to plans for reporting dates of arrivals and departures, and, in general, movements of the Fleet and other military forces, were to be made by the Consulate General, and the contents of the dispatches read indicated that certain reports were made. Many of us endeavored to take all these reports and compare them with the actual movements of ships of the Fleet. The reports made in many instances did not correspond with the actual movements, leading me to a possible supposition that they had been made carelessly or else on

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observation of agents not very conversant with the types of ships of our Navy.

19. Q. Captain, you have mentioned certain consular agents who were active in Hawaii; do you recall any action that was initiated there to subject these agents to control or prosecution?

A. Yes.

20. Q. Will you please state what transpired in respect thereto.

A. For some years, the Office of the District Intelligence Officer had been collecting data on Japanese consular agents. On organization of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this information, together with all other information desired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was given to that organization. The personnel of the District Intelligence Office, prior to 1940, consisted generally of one officer and one chief yeoman. With this small force, the amount of data collected could not be properly studied or [312] even methodically filed. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, with such assistance as my organization was able to give, collected information as to the known existence of approximately two hundred and fifty of these consular agents. It was the desire of the acting U. S. Attorney to prosecute these men as being agents of a foreign government who had failed to register as such. As District Intelligence Officer, I conferred with the Commandant, and with his knowledge and at his direction attended meetings that were held and recommended that some or all of these agents be brought to trial. These meetings were attended, as a rule, by the Acting U. S. Attorney, the Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Honolulu, the head of the Military Intelligence, and myself as the District Intelligence Officer. It was my recommendation that at least a group of perhaps twelve or fifteen be brought to trial. Admiral Bloch, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, made official recommendation to the Navy Department that these consular agents be prosecuted. The Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Acting U. S. Attorney also desired to proceed with the prosecution of these consular agents. The Military Intelligence Officer stated that the Army did not deem it wise to proceed with the prosecution; the main reason given being that at that time they were attempting to proceed with their policy of encouraging and promoting racial harmony, and felt that such a prosecution would be harmful to the policy of racial harmony. The matter was referred to the War Department and I believe to the Department of Justice, though I am not certain of the reference to the Justice Department, and the decision reached in Washington as passed to me by the Acting U. S. Attorney was that prosecution would not be proceeded with because of the objection by the War Department.

21. Q. What, if any, evidence did your Department uncover as to the use of Japanese fishing boats in intelligence work?

A. To the best of my recollection, there was never a definite incident of proven espionage on the part of these fishing boats, though I believe it to be definitely established that many of the fishermen had gone to school in Japan to learn fishing methods, and it is my personal conviction, unsupported by facts, that information they obtained from personal observation, including hydrographic data, was forwarded to Japan.

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22. Q. Did searches of any of these boats disclose any special radio or other equipment located in them that might have been used for this purpose?

A. Not to my knowledge.

23 Q. Prior to the attack, what information did you have as to the use of amateur or other radio transmitters to convey information to Japanese agencies?

A. I had no exact information that such amateur transmitters or receivers were used. There were, however, a number of amateur stations in the Territory of Hawaii, licensed by the Federal Communications Commission. There was one in particular near Pearl Harbor. Complete information on this station is available in the files of the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

24. Q. Captain, what information did you have prior to the attack with respect to the use of Japanese Language commercial radio broadcasts from local stations in Hawaii in connection with espionage or intelligence?

A. There were regular programs broadcast from the commercial broadcasting stations in the Territory in the Japanese Language. My office, from time to time, made spot checks of these broadcasts, but never did we find any information that we considered as improper information to broadcast. We had neither [313] the personnel nor the equipment to maintain a constant check, nor did the District Communication Officer have sufficient personnel or material to record and check these broadcasts continuously.

25. Q. What information did you have prior to the attack, with respect to the use of the trans-Pacific telephone system in transmitting information to Japan; military information to Japan?

A. The trans-Pacific telephone was available to the Japanese in the same fashion as to any other person who was willing to pay the toll. So far as I am aware, these conversations were not recorded or censored. I have no exact or personal knowledge of any harmful information transmitted over this circuit, but I see no reason why it could not have been used if the Japanese desired to do so.

26. Q. Keeping in mind these several matters which we have just been discussing, will you please outline the authority vested in you, or in the Commandant, to take measures to control or to in any way supervise these various sources of supplying information and any action taken by you under such authority?

A. According to my understanding, neither the Commandant nor I, as District Intelligence Officer, had any authority to exercise any control over any of the means by which information could be received in the Territory of Hawaii, or sent from the Territory. The only Federal control or supervision was that normally exercised by the representatives of Public Health, Immigration, Customs, and the Federal Communications Commission. My authority over civilian population extended only to those in the employ of the naval establishment and their families. Any information that I might have obtained indicating espionage on the part of persons beyond my jurisdiction I supplied to Military Intelligence or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whichever might have investigational jurisdiction.

27. Q. Were you at the time satisfied with the methods used, and the action taken, by these other agencies on recommendations made by you?

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A. Yes. It is my conviction that both of the other agencies did their best, considering their limitations as to personnel and equipment, principally personnel.

28. Q. Captain, during the period from about the middle of October, 1941, until the attack, were you furnished with any information which the Commandant of the District received from Washington sources with respect to the international situation, particularly the tense situation in the Pacific, to aid you in carrying out your intelligence duties?

A. Not to the best of my recollection, though I might say that I do not believe that such information would have enabled me to do more than I was then attempting to do with the means available to me.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.


Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer.

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. John Henry Newton, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Deputy Commander South Pacific and South Pacific Area.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. On or about February 1, I was given command of Cruisers Scouting Force and continued as Commander Cruisers Scouting Force during the remainder of that year.

3. Q. About what was the magnitude of that Command?

A. I had three divisions of heavy cruisers, four cruisers to each division.

4. Q. Did you consider it a large and important Command?

A. I did.

5. Q. Who was your immediate superior in command?

A. The Commander Scouting Force, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown.

6. Q. Then as I understand it, there was one and only one echelon of command between you and Commander-in-Chief?

A. That is correct.

7. Q. Admiral, did you command an expedition which went into southern latitudes during the early part of 1941?

A. I did.

8. Q. Will you give a brief narrative, covering the forces used, their movements, and in particular your instructions, formal or otherwise, prior to beginning that expedition.

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A. About the middle of March, while at sea in the operating area, I was directed to return to Pearl Harbor in the CHICAGO, and upon arrival was met at the buoy by an officer detailed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to inform me that I was to prepare a division, consisting of four cruisers, and one squadron of destroyers, for special service. The division of cruisers consisted of the CHICAGO, PORTLAND, SAVANNAH, and BROOKLYN. The squadron of destroyers, I can't recall the number, but it was commanded by Captain Mark Bowman; I believe it was Squadron Three. The squadron consisted of nine destroyers. My verbal instructions were that I would fill to capacity with every type of stores considered necessary for service which might keep me away from Pearl Harbor for an indefinite time. Also that this matter was to be considered highly secret and no word of any kind was to be permitted to get out regarding the sailing of this secret force. I immediately contacted Rear Admiral Theobald, who was Commander Destroyers Battle Force, and told him that I considered it necessary that destroyers immediately be checked to see that they had a maximum allowance of depth charges, that they put on war heads, [375] and get rid of exercise heads, and anything that was not considered necessary for war service. He said that he would issue the necessary instructions to his Squadron Commander. I contacted each Captain and told him of the secret instructions I had received and that I would leave it up to him to see that his ship was in all respects ready for war and for distant service, and to safeguard to the limit leakage of any information or conjecturing on the part of anybody of our possible destination, as I did not know that myself. I saw the Commander-in-Chief before the Fleet departed on an exercise of which I was to sortie with. He showed me the dispatch regarding the detail of a force that I was to command and said he had no information except what was contained in this brief dispatch, that I would proceed to Samoa and await further instructions. He could give no information as to my probable ultimate destination. I was furnished a tanker, the SANGAMON, to accompany, and in case my orders, after arrival at Samoa were such that the SANGAMON would not accompany me, I would, after fueling from her, have her supply what fuel was necessary for Samoa and return to Pearl Harbor. I sortied with the Fleet and, in accordance with previous verbal orders, I peeled off and headed for a rendezvous which I had given verbally to SANGAMON, Captain Bowman, the Squadron Commander, and each of the cruiser Captains. We proceeded from this rendezvous maintaining complete radio silence, and arrived at Samoa about one week after our departure. I did not inform Samoa by radio of my arrival but sent a plane in with my Staff Aviator to acquaint the Governor with the fact that I would arrive about one o'clock that day with a cruiser force, accompanied by the destroyers, and that I wanted to make sure no radio dispatch of my arrival was sent until I had seen him. We received orders the night of my arrival, as I recall, to split my force, sending two cruisers to Auckland, accompanied by one division of destroyers, and for me to take the other two, namely, the CHICAGO and PORTLAND, accompanied by the Squadron Commander and the other division of the squadron, to Sydney. The night before arriving, I sent a dis-

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patch to the Sydney authorities saying that I would be off the entrance at six a. m. the following morning. This was necessary in order that entrance to the harbor would be provided for and that I would have the necessary pilot available who would be familiar with the mine fields. I remained in Sydney for three days and sailed at the end of that time for Brisbane, where I remained for three days, and then sailed for Suva, from which port, after a two day stay, I sailed for Pearl Harbor. The division that went to Auckland had orders, upon departure from that port, to proceed to Tahiti and, after a two day visit there, to return to Pearl Harbor. I never received any information after my return as to the purpose of this trip, except I gathered that it was a trip desired by the State Department. I learned in Sydney that the State Department had notified the charge that we would arrive and that it was to be kept highly secret and only the highest officials informed.

9. Q. When you received your instructions from Admiral Kimmel, did it occur to you as unusual that an official carrying his responsibility was wholly uninformed as to the purpose of the voyage?

A. I was assured that he had no information or idea as to the purpose of this voyage, other than contained in the brief dispatch which said to send this force to Samoa and await further instructions, because he told me so.

10. Q. Insofar as you know, did Admiral Kimmel ever learn the purpose of that long voyage to southern waters?

A. If he did, he never informed me as to the purpose.

11. Q. Was curiosity expressed in Auckland or in Sydney as to the purpose of the visits there?


A. The authorities were agreeably surprised, and I tried to convey the impression that we were making a good will trip.

12. Q. Admiral, during that long voyage outward, do you recall that your state of mind would have been better had you not been in such great uncertainty concerning the purpose of the voyage?

A. No, I had an idea that we were going to wind up on the Asiatic Station and I put in a system of training, both day and night, that would fit us for any eventuality.

13. Q. During the voyage, did you maintain a high degree of battle readiness in all ships?

A. We did. We were in a condition watch the entire trip, day and night, and at night we cruised without lights.

14. Q. Do you recall if you, in fact, did consider it a valuable training cruise?

A. I consider it one of the finest battle training cruises possible.

15. Q. Admiral, can you recall the specific dates which comprised your last period in Pearl Harbor, prior to 7 December?

A. I had been in Pearl Harbor in my Flagship from about 27 November, 1941, until the morning of 7 December, when I went to sea.

16. Q. Do you recall what your particular personal employment was during that period?

A. I was in command of a task force, temporarily, as the Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Brown had departed about 4 December in the INDIANAPOLIS to make a cruise to Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions, in company with several Marine officers who were interested in amphibious operations. My personal employment was as Commander Cruisers Scouting Force.

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17. Q. Other than your usual duties as the type commander of cruisers, did you have any specific duties while in Pearl Harbor during that period up to Admiral Brown's departure?

A. I did not.

18. Q. Prior to Admiral Brown's departure, say, fairly immediately before it, did you receive from him any particular information concerning the international situation or any specific direction about it?

A. I did not.

19. Q. In general, during the few weeks prior to 7 December, '41, was it customary for Admiral Brown to bring you into conferences during which he set forth such information as he had obtained concerning the international situation, possible imminence of hostilities and so forth?

A. There may have been one or two conferences where precautionary measures might be stressed of preparing for what might happen, but, as I recall, we had all thought, for six months, that the situation was tense and each type commander had taken precautions to get his own type of ships ready for war, and I do not recall that there was any difference in this preparation immediately preceding 7 December than there had been a month before.

The witness was duly warned.

The examining officer then, at 12 o'clock noon, took a recess until 1:15 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.


Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Vice Admiral John Henry Newton, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the examining officer (continued):

20. Q. Admiral, going back to your presence in Pearl Harbor during periods preceding the one which ended on 5 December; do you recall having seen this dispatch, which is Exhibit 6 before this board, dated 16 October; or having been informed of the contents thereof?

A. I never saw nor was I informed of the contents of such a dispatch.

21. Q. And yet you were the Commander of the most powerful unit under Commander Scouting Force, were you not?

A. I was.

22. Q. During the period between 16 October, the date of this dispatch and, say, the middle of November, '41, do you recall being informed by Vice Admiral Brown concerning any other warnings or instructions mentioning preparatory deployments and so forth?

A. I do not recall having received any such warnings or instructions.

23. Q. Admiral, I hand you three dispatches, Exhibits 7, 8, and 11, what are in evidence in this record, all of which were from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief. Do you recall ever having seen any of these dispatches or having been informed by Admiral Brown or anyone else of their content?

A. I never saw nor heard of such dispatches before December 7, '41.

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24. Q. During that period, 26 November to 5 December, did you hear anything which indicated the rapid growth in the danger of the situation vis-a-vis Japan?

A. I did not, except what came in the press.

25. Q. Do you recall that a task force with Admiral Halsey in command went to sea early during your last period in port prior to 7 December?

A. I recall that it left about the same time as I came in port, or shortly after my arrival in port.

26. Q. Were you informed, prior to your own departure about 5 December, where Admiral Halsey's Task Force was and what was its mission?

A. I was not informed.

27. Q. What directive or order did you receive prior to your departure for sea on or about 5 December?

A. I was directed to proceed to a point, as I recall, about 300 miles, bearing 130 True from Midway, and arrive at that point and have the squadron of planes destined for Midway be ready to proceed in their flight from that point to Midway and guarded in that flight by planes that would meet me for this purpose.


28. Q. What ships did you have under your command?

A. I had the LEXINGTON, CHICAGO, my Flagship, the PORTLAND, and five destroyers, one of which was the destroyer leader and squadron Flagship PORTER. I do not recall the division number.

29. Q. Upon your departure on that mission, or during it, up to 7 December, did you have any knowledge or intimation which led you to suppose your mission to be other than a somewhat routine build-up of the forces on Midway?

A. I considered this mission solely one to reenforce Midway, but inasmuch as my orders said that upon completion of this duty to return to operating area and resume normal operations, that there was no special significance attached to it other than reenforcement.

30. Q. Do you recall having any particular concern over the fact that the mission was advancing your force over a thousand miles toward Japan?

A. I considered that I was going into waters that had not been frequented by our ships for some time and, as there might be more danger from submarines than we had considered in the past, I set a speed of 17 knots in day light and zig-zagged. Also, I had scouting flights made by planes to cover our advance.

31. Q. Were those measures something of an increase over normal security precautions of our forces at sea?

A. They were in that during our time in the operating area we carried on normal operations in connection with training, such as target practice, submarine operations, and, therefore, did not keep a patrol of our own planes as this was covered, I figured, by planes from the base at Pearl Harbor.

32. Q. Did the LEXINGTON have on board her regular complement of planes in addition to the squadron which you were transporting to Midway?

A. As far as I recall, she had her full outfit of planes, plus the additional squadron for Midway.

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33. Q. At any time during the outward voyage, did you arm the planes with guns, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, and so forth; or direct warheads installed by destroyers?

A. I did not, to the best of my recollection. I gave no special orders regarding arming of planes or making preparations for war other than had been routine.

34. Q. Admiral, I will ask you to give a brief narrative of what actually occurred with your Task Force from the time you went to sea on 5 December until you heard of the surprise attack made on 7 December.

A. I proceeded to sea on the morning of 5 December and headed for the designated point and arrived to within about fifty miles of that point about 0813 on the morning of 7 December, when we received the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor. I estimated that I would receive orders to intercept the enemy, which I felt must be to the Northard of Oahu, inasmuch as approach on Pearl Harbor from any other direction would probably have disclosed their presence by passing through or near our normal operating areas, which were to the Southard of the Islands. I signaled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was canceled as I assumed that Midway had probably been attacked as well as Pearl Harbor. I also sent my position to the Commander-in-Chief and told him I had canceled the Midway flight. Sometime during that morning, [319] after I had sent this dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, I received a dispatch from him to report to Admiral Halsey, who, I believe, had Task Force Eight.

35. Q. Did you know of the composition of Task Force Eight?

A. I did not.

36. Q. And I understand from your previous testimony you did not know where it went and, consequently, could have no idea where it was at the time; is that correct?

A. I will say that I knew normally that Task Force Eight had the ENTERPRISE as Flagship of Admiral Halsey, but I could not be sure what it consisted of at this particular time, as the Task Force might be changed in its composition from time to time due to vessels undergoing overhaul. I did not know what vessels Task Force Eight consisted of nor where it was located on the 7th of December.

37. Q. Nor where it had been?

A. Nor where it had been.

38. Q. Please proceed with the narrative, Admiral.

A. When I received orders to report to Admiral Halsey, I immediately realized that he might not know where I was, as I had not included him in my report of my position after I received news of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. I, therefore, sent him a dispatch giving my position. My message evidently crossed his telling me to join him in the vicinity of Oahu, and I realized that something had to be done about this as I was about 700 miles distant from him. However, I took a course for Oahu, taking me back South of the chain of reefs and took up a speed, as I remember, about twenty-five knots, standard for the Task Force. About 1000 or 1100 that morning, I received a message from Admiral Halsey to the effect that I was to assume enemy carriers about 200 miles South of Oahu at that time and retiring on the Marshalls. My orders were to intercept and destroy. I, thereupon, changed course to take me to the east-

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ward of Johnston Island and attempt, that afternoon, to contact enemy by planes and to make an attack by planes that afternoon in order to slow him down so that I could make physical contact during the night or the following day. I was in communication during all of this day with the INDIANAPOLIS and kept her informed of my movements as I expected to be joined by ComSoFor sometime early the following morning. We launched search planes from cruisers, using cruiser planes for the search on the flank, and carrier planes for search ahead, and proceeded on approximately a southeasterly course at a speed of about twenty-six knots. Our search results were negative. The INDIANAPOLIS appointed a rendezvous and we joined the morning of the 8th, and, as I recall, the search for the enemy was called off in that vicinity as the authorities at Pearl had gotten information which led them to believe that the attack had not been from carriers well to the Southard, but from the Northard. After the morning of the 8th, Admiral Brown had command of the force until our return to Pearl Harbor during the forenoon of the 13th or 14th.

39. Q. Were there any events which were particularly pertinent during that period, 8 to 13 or 14 December?

A. None except we carried on air patrol looking for any enemy forces in our area. We fueled cruisers and destroyers from a tanker and we had several scares due to erroneous reports of enemy forces which turned out to be false. The PORTLAND was bombed by one of our own planes from Pearl Harbor, but [320] fortunately, the bombs hit well astern. This plane reported the PORTLAND as an enemy carrier and the PORTER, who was guarding her while she recovered one of her planes, was reported as an accompanying cruiser.

10. Q. Reverting to the forenoon of 7 December, at which time it was your assumption that the Japanese carrier force was to the Northard; what were your intentions as regards to the use of your Task Force had you been left free to act?

A. My orders to the carrier was to prepare all planes immediately for action, as soon as I received word of the Pearl Harbor bombing. I had planned, if the enemy was reported to the Northard, to cross the shoals, which had plenty of water between the adjacent islands near me, and attempt to intercept the enemy at daylight the following morning by scout planes and immediately follow up with an attack by bombers.

41. Q. Did the LEXINGTON, at the time, possess normal or more than normal power of air attack?

A. She had more because she had the additional planes that were destined for Midway.

42. Q. On your own assumption that the enemy was to the Northard, did the Fleet have any other detachments at sea which were as favorably placed for an attack as was your force?

A. I'm such there was no other detachment as favorably placed as mine.

43. Q. Admiral, in view of your importance in the command echelons of the Pacific Fleet and, more particularly, because of the duties assigned you on or about 5 December, do you recall if you thought at the time that you were adequately informed and sufficiently in the confidence of the command echelons above you?

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A. I felt at that time that I probably had been furnished as much information as necessary for me to know, as I didn't realize until sometime afterwards that the dispatches that I saw had been received prior to my departure. However, I believe that the contents of those dispatches had probably been made know to the Task Force Commanders, and I became a Task Force Commander with the LEXINGTON and the two cruisers I have mentioned due to a sudden change in which Commander Scouting Force took the INDIANAPOLIS to go on a special trip to Johnston and Palmyra Islands. I have since thought that he, Vice Admiral Brown, had information that I should have had when I took charge of this Task Force.

44. Q. Do you recall if, when you were being passed a formal order governing your mission to Midway, you saw any of Admiral Kimmel's Staff who might well have ascertained if you were properly informed?

A. I saw Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff almost daily, as he lived in an adjacent apartment to where I lived, but he never mentioned any dispatches or secret information that had been received. I saw no others of the Admiral Kimmel's Staff who disclosed any secret information to me.

45. Q. And you had no conference with the Commander-in-Chief or any other high commander just before your departure or prior to 5 December?

A. As I recall, I saw Commander Scouting Force on his Flagship and he told me the purpose of his taking the INDIANAPOLIS to Johnston and Palmyra Islands and gave me a general idea of what he was going to do and when I might expect him back in the area for operations.


46. Q. At the time, did Admiral Brown know of your mission to Midway?

A. I am not sure, but I imagine he did.

47. Q. But it was not the subject of conversation between you on that occasion?

A. Not that I recall. There was nothing about my mission other than to proceed to a point, get rid of some planes, and return to the operating area and resume normal training operations.

48. Q. Do you recall the date of your receipt of your formal order and from whom it was issued?

A. I do not recall the date, but I believe it was about one day preceding my day of departure. I am not sure whether the Task Force Commander, Vice Admiral Brown, signed these orders or whether they were signed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Note: The examining officer identified the directive for this task in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as CinCPac secret dispatch 040237 of December, 1941, addressed to Comtaskfor 3, ComFourteen, and ComPatWing 2, information to Combatfor, Combasefor, Comairbatfor, and LEXINGTON. The examining officer was unsuccessful in ascertaining in what form this directive was passed from Comtaskfor 3 (Vice Admiral Brown) to the witness. The communications files of Comtaskfor 3 were transferred from his then Flagship, the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS, to the U.S.S. LEXINGTON, in January 1949, and said files were presumably lost when the latter vessel was sunk in action during 1942.

49. Q. Admiral, a somewhat hypothetical question: From what you subsequently learned of the area from which the Jap carriers launched their attack, what would have been the probabilities that you would

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have been able to put in an air attack on those carriers had you been left free to act or if you had been directed to attack to the Northard?

A. I think it might have been possible to have made contact by plane and possibly to have delivered a bombing attack. Of course, I don't know what course the enemy retired on after the bombing, but I understood that their carriers launched the Pearl Harbor attack from a point about 200 miles due North of Pearl, and I figured that they would retire, if they had not already bombed Midway, to a point to the Northard of Midway which would clear them of scouting planes picking them up from Midway.

50. Q. Then you would have launched your own air search from a point well to the Northard of the line Midway to Oahu?

A. I would. I could have gotten to a 0600 position, which would have had me well to the Northard of the Hawaiian Islands-Midway line, and to the westward of the enemy's best possible position.

51. Q. And would your fuel supply have permitted those movements?

A. It would, as I was fully fueled upon departure from Pearl and had been at sea only two days where speed, up to the morning of the 7th, had not been in excess of about seventeen knots.

52. Q. Admiral, do you recall the reasoning under which you arrived at the assumption that the Japanese carriers attacked from the North?

A. I do. I felt sure that the Japanese had a better chance for coming in with a force from the Northard without being observed than from any other direction because all ships to and from the Asiatic Station, for sometime preceding 7 December, had been routed by a Southerly route. I believe the [322] only traffic to the Northard was between Pearl Harbor and Midway. Also our training grounds were all to the Southard of the Hawaiian Islands, extending as far as two hundred miles South. We very seldom had exercises which took us to the Northard of the Isles. I felt sure the Japanese were fully cognizant of this. I was greatly surprised when I received the word to assume Japanese carriers to be two hundred miles South of Oahu and felt that my reasoning was faulty.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would like to add, at this time, that all hands had felt a gradual tautening of the situation for a period of several months preceding Pearl Harbor. Ships were not allowed to anchor in exposed positions and ships engaged in training exercises were cautioned to transfer observing parties prior to leaving port and to take all precautions not to stop or slow down in the operating areas unless absolutely necessary. We felt that a surprise might come and, for this reason, that we could not take chances of stopping in the area or taking speeds that would make it easy to have submarines make a successful surprise attack on us, especially at night. My ships were better fitted than most regarding radar. The NORTHAMPTON, CHICAGO, and PENSACOLA were all fitted

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with the CXAM. We kept this manned at night, usually for exercise in the early hours of evening and training but made frequent sweeps to make sure that our area was clear. I believe that the majority felt that the submarine menace was our greatest menace.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Admiral William F. Halsey, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-sixth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 2:35 p. m., took a recess until 5 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain Irving H. Mayfield, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Vice Admiral John Henry Newton, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously [323] taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 5:10 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

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