PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.The examination met at 1: 30 p. m.
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-seventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. William B. Stephenson, Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve, attached to the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District.
2. Q. When were you called to active duty as a Naval Reserve Officer?
A. 23 June 1941.
3. Q. Please state the duties performed by you during the calendar year 1941 after you were called to active duty.
A. Until approximately 1 July 1941, I was in indoctrination status, and from and after approximately 1 July 1941, I was designated as head of Section B7J, which, in Naval Intelligence parlance, at that time, meant the Japanese Counter-Espionage Desk of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District.
4. Q. In performing your duties in connection with counter-espionage in Hawaii, did you have occasion to handle matters concerning certain consular agents who, at that time, were in the Territory?
A. I did, sir.
5. Q. Please outline such information as you have relating to those
A. The so-called "consular agents" are what the Japanese call "toritsuginin". I am informed by competent Japanese translators that this term literally means "agent man", or "intermediary", or "come-in-
between man". That is a literal Japanese interpretation of that term, but, for sake of consistency, I will refer to them as "consular agents". These consular agents operated as such in the Hawaiian Islands for fifteen or twenty years before the present war. Their functions were to assist resident Japanese aliens and citizens of the United States to fill out written report forms required to be made periodically by Japanese national law. The average Japanese in Hawaii, being fairly illiterate, was unable to accomplish these forms by himself, and, in the furtherance of Japanese extraterritorial control over its residents abroad, the Japanese Consulate General of Honolulu appointed or recognized certain literate Japanese in the community as consular agents to assist other residents in filling out the prescribed forms. As of the year 1941, there were approximately 240 such consular agents actively engaged in their duties in the Hawaiian Islands and residing on all principal Islands of this group. The consular agents were largely drawn from Japanese priests, Japanese language school teachers, and Japanese hotel keepers. These consular agents were recognized by the Consulate in two ways. Up until 1939, the Consulate annually released to the Japanese press of these Islands a list of recognized consular agents. Second, the Japanese Consulate General provided these agents with certificates certifying their apparent official connection with the Consulate. These agents held themselves out to the public as such and they should not be understood to be in any sense secret espionage agents, insofar as their routine consular duties were concerned. However, in counter-espionage work here, it was recognized by the District Intelligence Officer and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that this group of 240 or more consular agents provided a substantial reservoir of information-collecting agents who could just as well be used by the Consul for economic, political, and military espionage purposes. It was known before the war that for a number of years some consular agents did render economic survey reports to the Consulate. In one instance, and only one instance, that occurring in June, 1940 (and officially reported in the files of the District Intelligence Office), it was learned from a most reliable informant, whose accuracy has since the war on this point been fully established, that one consular agent on the Island of Maui, whose residence overlooked Lahaina Roads, was requested by the Japanese Vice Consul to report on the presence of the United States Fleet at Lahaina Roads and report the fact of its departure when and if it departed. It was further reliably established that such a report was made by this consular agent to the Japanese Vice Consul. Outside of that one instance, there was no information in the files of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, that clearly indicated any prewar espionage of the consular agent group. However, the potentialities of the agents to engage in espionage and the fact that one, in June, 1940, did so, was believed to be reasonable basis for such investigation of these men as could be made within limitations of personnel and facilities available. Investigation of individual cases, up until the start of the war, revealed no further espionage activity apparent. Perhaps the most significant question facing the United States Government with relation to these consular agents in 1941, was the question whether prosecution should be instituted against the consular agents for their having failed to register as the agents of a foreign  government, as required by Act of Congress, 8 June 1938, as amended 7 August 1939.
Following the discovery of the June, 1940, espionage incident involving one consular agent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted numerous investigations of individual consular agents. Their reports were sent forward to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington and eventually reached the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. I may state, parenthetically, that my testimony on this point is predicated upon a review of files of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, and of the United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii. On 22 May 1941, the United States Attorney General wrote the District Attorney asking the latter's views with reference to whether these consular agents should be prosecuted The District Attorney conferred shortly thereafter with representatives of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On 4 June 1941, the District Attorney wrote the Attorney General the result of his conference with these representatives and the files of the District Intelligence Office contain a copy of the District Attorney's letter to the Attorney General of that date.
6. Q. Have you a copy of the letter which appears in the files of the District Intelligence Office in your possession?
A. I do, sir.
7. Q. Will you please present it?
The witness produced a copy of the letter and it was offered in evidence by the examining officer, copy received and appended marked "Exhibit 32 (1) and (2)".
8. Q. Will you please proceed with your statement.
A. The correspondence running between the District Attorney and the Attorney General reveals that the Attorney General, several times up to and including 18 September 1941, asked the District Attorney for further detailed statements of the District Attorney's views in this matter. That correspondence shows that the District Attorney conferred again with the Assistant Chief of Staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in one instance, personally, with Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding that Department. The District Attorney persisted in his views, as stated in Exhibit 32, that these consular agents should be prosecuted. He made no further reference, however, to the continuing opinion of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as expressed through the District Intelligence Officer, that such agents should be prosecuted. That correspondence does not reveal further conferences with the District Intelligence Officer, but, on the basis of my personal recollection, I may state that at a time I believe to have been late in September, 1941, Captain I. H. Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, in conversation with Lieutenant George P. Kimball, U. S. N. R., and myself, stated that he had had occasion to discuss the consular agent question again with the Commandant and with the United States District Attorney, and that the Commandant's and his own view was unchanged, that is, they both considered prosecution of these agents in order and required by law. The correspondence I have referred to shows, and it was the statement of the District Intelligence Officer to me at the time these conferences were current, that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, took the position that he was responsible for internal security in the Hawaiian Islands and that the
arrest and prosecution of several hundred Japanese consular agents would be detrimental to the development of the program  of the Army then in progress, which program was calculated to convince the local Japanese that they would receive the utmost fair treatment in the event of a crisis here, in return for their loyalty to the United States. I noted from the correspondence a letter of the Attorney General to the District Attorney, dated 2 August 1941, inclosing a photostatic copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to the General, the Secretary of War's letter being dated 25 July 1941. In this photostatic copy, the view of the Secretary of War was expressed that he concurred with the view of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, that prosecution of the consular agents would be unwise for the reasons stated. There were no prosecutions of these consular agents instituted prior to the war.
9. Q. Please outline other sources available to the Japanese in the Hawaiian area for obtaining information which came to your attention prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
A. Counter-espionage study in the Hawaiian Islands was based on a number of assumptions as to the probable source of Japanese espionage. Suspected and known sources were investigated as soon as possible and as fully as possible. Investigation was done concurrently by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the District Intelligence Officer by virtue of a Presidential directive giving those two services concurrent jurisdiction in the Japanese field. The files of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, contained considerable information gained by investigation from 1935 until the outbreak of war, and from this reported data, as it developed before the war, the counter-espionage section of the District Intelligence Office, in which I was responsible for the Japanese Section, felt that there were, among many, the following important sources of Japanese espionage information here: (1) The overt and secret activities of the accredited Japanese Consular officials; (2) The officers and men of visiting Japanese naval vessels, and, to a lesser degree, the crews of Japanese merchant vessels; (3) Local residents, chiefly Japanese but not necessarily exclusively Japanese, who, because of loyalty to Japan or other consideration, were willing to give information to Japan detrimental to the United States; (4) Visiting Japanese passing through or temporarily sojourning in the Territory of Hawaii; (5) The public press. I will attempt to elaborate on each one of those sources. It was an operating premise of counter-espionage that Japan must be using its Consular officials in Hawaii to gather military information. The incident of June, 1940, wherein the Vice Consul requested military information of a consular agent, to cite a specific example, supports the correctness of this assumption. However, in operating against the Consulate, counterespionage agents were at a decided disadvantage. They could do nothing at the critical times following 27 May 1941, to impair the negotiations being carried on by the State Department. This meant, in effect, that only the most limited physical surveillance of the Consulate could be maintained and it was fully recognized that within the limitations imposed by national policy, counter-espionage could not be too effective against the Consulate. The Consulate was in a position to effect daily contact and consultation with the most pro-Japanese organizations in the Territory, including the Japanese press, the
NYK line, the Japanese banks, the Japanese language schools, and Japanese religious groups. It was believed, prior to the war, that the Consulate took full advantage of this liaison and, in effect, extended its information-gathering activities to the farthest corners of the Hawaiian Islands through the Japanese business, religious, and educational groups that he contacted. This group of suspected collaborators (newspapermen, priests, school teachers, merchants, etc.) of the Japanese Consul numbered well over a thousand persons, most of them aliens. Surveillance or other investigation of all of these persons was virtually impossible with only thirty or forty F. B. I. and Naval Intelligence investigators  available. Another important source of information, both from the standpoint of its collection and its transmission to Japan, was believed to have been in the activities of visiting Japanese naval personnel. Naval training squadrons of the Japanese Navy made periodic visits to the Hawaiian Islands for training cruises, the last of which was in the Fall of 1939. In addition, Japanese naval oil tankers, which regularly plied between Japan and California, regularly stopped in Honolulu. There is very strong evidence, though not conclusive, that it was a regular practice for the Japanese tankers to leave personnel behind in Honolulu and for these personnel to return to Japan on a succeeding tanker. The clear implication of this practice, which was reasonably established by tallying the total number of Japanese leaving and boarding a tanker while in port, was that personnel left behind were left here for espionage purposes. It was also believed that these personnel were brought to Hawaii with the farsighted view in mind of making them personally familiar with the Island of Oahu, and thereby more valuable in the future. Parenthetically, it may be noted that several of the personnel of Japanese midget submarines, which were in these waters prior to and at the time of the attack of 7 December 1941, are now known to have visited Honolulu prior to the war as midshipmen or enlisted men on Japanese naval training vessels. Full reports of the activities of visiting Japanese naval personnel, insofar as they could be determined, were made promptly to the Navy Department by the District Intelligence Officer. As early as 1938, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, strongly urged the Navy Department to attempt to induce the State Department to permit no more visits of Japanese public vessels to Hawaiian ports. The last Japanese naval oiler called at Honolulu in 1940. The crewmen of merchant vessels, particularly the NYK passenger liners, were also quite active in sight-seeing and photographing activities on the Island of Oahu, as were the Japanese naval personnel before them. These men were thus in a position to gain visual impressions of our most vital defense installations and of Pearl Harbor, and return to their ships and immediately record in writing what information they had gained a few hours previously. Information thus recorded was beyond the efforts of any United States agency to control or prevent from reaching Japan. Efforts were made by the District Intelligence Officer to secure the assistance of other Government Departments through their local representatives in Honolulu to restrict, insofar as possible, the shore leave of Japanese merchant crewmen. When the TAIYO MARU, the last Japanese liner to call at Honolulu before the war, was in the port of Honolulu, from the morning of 1 November 1941 until the
evening of 5 November 1941, the Customs authorities did restrict shore leave privileges of all personnel of the TAIYO MARU except those certified by the master of that vessel to be ashore in the interests of maintenance and operation of the vessel. The District Intelligence Officer, at the same time, was active in his efforts to prevent mail being carried out of the United States on the TAIYO MARU on that voyage. Upon representations made to the Postmaster General in Washington, through channels of which I do not have knowledge, an order was made and enforced that no United States mail, other than second class matter, could be taken from the United States by the TAIYO MARU on that voyage. However, the effect of this counter-espionage measure probably was diminished in that public notice was made of the fact that the TAIYO MARU would not carry first class mail. In cooperation with Customs authorities, searches were effected of the persons and baggage of all persons leaving Honolulu on the last voyage of the TAIYO MARU, in an effort to prevent the transmission to Japan of any vital intelligence. Further, no visitors from shore were allowed aboard the vessel, and the departing passengers, once aboard the vessel, were not allowed back on the dock. Thus, in general, with reference to this particular vessel, the most stringent security measures possible under  the law were taken and it was only in this instance, and this instance alone, that the measures so highly desired by counter-espionage agencies in Hawaii were realized.
10. Q. Did you think, at the time, that those measures were effective, in case there was a determination of an adequate prior preparation on the part of the Japanese spies here to get word back home by that ship?
A. It was our view-and by "our view", I mean the view of the District Intelligence Officer, as I heard him express it-that the measures taken were the very best we could do to prevent information reaching the enemy aboard the TAIYO MARU. It was realized, however, that there were two serious loopholes, even as regards the TAIYO MARU: (1) The fact that departing passengers could take with them such information as they might remember in their minds; (2) That such information as might be placed in a sealed Consulate pouch and delivered to the TAIYO MARU for passage to the Japanese foreign office could not be examined. It, therefore, boiled down to this, that the measures taken would tend to force the Japanese espionage system here to send more information through Consular channels and, second, in all likelihood, prevent the transmission of bulky pictorial or physical intelligence. At that time, the Island of Oahu was experiencing considerable construction of military and naval installations. For example, the underground fuel storage depot at Red Hill, and several auxiliary military landing fields, in which connection, I think it is perhaps pertinent to observe that the only effective fighter plane resistance put up against the Japanese on 7 December 1941 came from certain Army pursuit planes based at a newly constructed emergency landing field. I am informed that this landing field was constructed, although not fully completed, after the departure of the TAIYO MARU. Charts of the Island of Oahu recovered from Japanese aircraft shot down on 7 December 1941 failed to show the existence of this emergency or auxiliary landing field, at, I believe, Mokuleia.
Insofar as my knowledge of the military and naval installations as of November 1941 is concerned, I believe that the charts of this Island used by the Japanese attacking aviators were fairly accurate as to information dated prior to 5 November 1941, but did not contain information of later date except for data on vessels in Pearl Harbor. The third type of source I believe I mentioned was to be found in the loyal individuals believed to be chiefly Japanese who would aid Japan in securing military information. I have been careful to note that the District Intelligence Officer never assumed that this group of individuals would necessarily be all Japanese. The District Intelligence Officer, for example, was the only officer, to my knowledge, who, at a time a year or more before the war, saw the possibility that Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, a resident German alien, might be a Japanese espionage agent. Kuehn was generally regarded in Honolulu as a suspicious character and loosely characterized a Nazi spy but, from the functional standpoint, the District Intelligence Officer realized that Kuehn might be acting for Germany or Japan, or both, and the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington was so notified. This is merely given by way of example; however, it was a fact that our best estimate was the large majority of individual spies or information-gatherers would be found among the Japanese. The Japanese population, as of the date of the outbreak of war, was approximately 160,000, about 37,500 of whom were aliens. In the neighborhood of fifty per cent of the 122,500 citizen Japanese also possessed Japanese citizenship and were, therefore, dual citizens. Specific subversive activities of these individuals were difficult to detect but some were detected prior to the war. For example, the Japanese community openly solicited and subscribed to Japanese war bonds to finance the Japan war effort against China. Japanese residents of the Island of Hawaii openly  subscribed sufficient money to buy a military airplane for the Japanese Navy, which airplane was presented in Japan by a loyal representative of the Hawaii Island Japanese and was christened by the Japanese Navy "The Spirit of Hawaii". The Japanese residents, right down to the youngest school children, saved and collected tin foil, lead foil, and other valuable salvageable material which was systematically collected and then transmitted to Japan on Japanese naval vessels or other ships. Not publicly, the Japanese Government solicited local residents, who were in a position to do so, to purchase valuable machine tools for shipment to Japan and this was done as early as 1938. The District Intelligence Officer had contemporary knowledge of these activities through informants. Loyal residents made periodic trips to Japan as they were able to do, and it was always suspected that when in Japan they must have been interrogated as to their knowledge of the defenses of these Islands. The lack of adequate restricted areas and the geographical constitution of the Island of Oahu, made it possible that any Japanese resident here would have a wealth of information concerning military and naval installations here. There was no way the counter-espionage agencies could prevent local residents transmitting that information, if they were in Japan as travelers. Similarly, until the departure of the last Japanese vessel, 5 November 1941, there was no power to supervise the mails and such information could have been transmitted in that
mariner. Local residents were hand-picked for their information and then patronized and solicited by the Government of Japan in any of many ways. Local residents were freely invited to call aboard visiting Japanese naval vessels, at the docks in Honolulu and at out-ports, and the disaffected persons among those local residents, we assumed freely gave such information as they had at their command. I do not wish it to appear that my detailing of the activities of local Japanese residents is full and complete. I think that that suffices to give a broad view of what those activities were. Visiting Japanese, or, for that matter, any visitor whatsoever, who passed through Honolulu on a trans-Pacific voyage or who stayed here a few days, could, in the space of a very few hours, tour Oahu by taxi cab readily available at the dock, and gather a wealth of information concerning the defenses of this Island. It is known that certain visitors passing through here did that, including Japanese naval officers who were traveling in civilian clothes on NYK liners. On several occasions, these visitors were trailed by agents of the District Intelligence Office and almost invariably they would drive from downtown Honolulu to Aiea Heights overlooking Pearl Harbor, thence around the public highway encompassing the lochs of Pearl Harbor, then to Waianea, which was considered one of the three most vulnerable landing spots on the Island of Oahu. On occasions, visitors also called at the Japanese Consulate General. These activities, whether by visiting Japanese naval personnel, civilians, or non-Japanese, were wholly without our capacity to prevent. In closing my discussion of sources, I include the local press, including the two leading dailys of Honolulu. For approximately the first half of 1941, the District Intelligence Officer also supervised Public Relations and, therefore, relations with the press, for the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. It was found that in many instances one of the leading Honolulu newspapers, "Honolulu Star Bulletin", would not cooperate fully in withholding news of interest to the national defense, which, because of the inadequacy of our laws, could not be legally suppressed. It was known that the Japanese Consul General subscribed to six copies per day of the Honolulu Star Bulletin and he regularly analyzed and clipped this paper. I recall one incident when the floating drydock was brought to the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor early in 1941 and a local newspaper, the "Star Bulletin", I believe, went out of its way to take a photograph of the drydock while off port and publish it in the newspaper. The Japanese Consul General  at Honolulu is known to have transmitted information of one kind or another to Japan in the performance of his duties. He used facilities of the international mails, the Commercial Pacific Cable Company, Radio Corporation of America, Mackay Wireless, and, I believe, Globe Wireless. In addition, the Consular pouch was transmitted manually from a representative of the Consul General to Japanese naval commanders when naval vessels were in port, or to Masters of commercial Japanese vessels when they called here. The Consular pouch was also carried, at times, by couriers plying between Tokyo and Washington. In addition, there was available, although proof of its use is lacking, any trustworthy local resident returning to Japan on any vessel as late as the TAIYO MARU, 5 November 1941, who could have been deputized by the Consul to act as a courier.
11. Q. What was your occupation prior to coming on active duty with the Navy?
A. I was an attorney at law, practicing in all the courts of the Territory of Hawaii.
12. Q. How long had you been practicing law?
A. Since November, 1938.
13. Q. Will you please now outline the authority of the District intelligence Officer to control espionage by the Japanese and such action of a counterespionage nature as was taken under these powers prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
A. The District Intelligence Officer, as a member of the Commandant's Staff, but having certain direct responsibilities to the Chief of Naval Operations in the professional field of counter-espionage, had no authority whatsoever to invoke practical counter-espionage measures. His investigative jurisdiction was complete insofar as investigations of naval personnel or investigations on area under control of the Navy Department was concerned, but even in that field he had only the power to recommend, through the Commandant or through appropriate commanding officers, action to be taken. So far as civilians were concerned, and therein we believe before the war lay the greatest danger in the espionage field, the District Intelligence Officer had concurrent investigative authority with F. B. I. in cases involving Japanese persons, but espionage by other than Japanese was to be investigated only by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In any event, the District Intelligence Officer, if he investigated Japanese in the general civilian population, had no power whatsoever, nor did, for that matter, anyone in the Navy Department have power to take active steps to invoke counter-espionage measures. Prosecuting espionage agents was never considered an adequate answer to Japanese espionage, and even insofar as prosecution was concerned, that lay entirely with the United States District Attorney. Active counter-espionage encompasses such matters as supervision of communications, registration of aliens, erection of physical barriers and pass systems at vital installations, as well as under-cover investigation and neutralization of suspected agents. To a large degree, the affirmative steps that might have been taken to deny information to Japan before the war lay within the province of other government agencies or were wholly illegal under our system of law. As I previously noted, one of the most compelling restrictions on counter-espionage activity was the fact that the State Department was engaged in crucial negotiations whose ultimate success must not be endangered by open measures that might have been taken against the Japanese Consulate General here. Just to give one very good example, but very relevant to the success of the attack on 7 December 1941, the Japanese Consulate was believed, and on the basis of information acquired after the attack is known, to have been sending intelligence to Japan by encrypted messages filed  with the commercial communication companies in Honolulu. There was no authority in any of the counter-espionage agencies to examine or supervise, in any way, this Consular traffic. It is known, on the basis of information acquired after the war, that the Consulate used commercial communications facilities for the transmission of vital intelligence from and after 3 December 1941. After the beginning of the war and starting approximately at 1100 on the 11th of December 1941,
I was engaged at length in an investigation and analysis of certain information transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General to Japan prior to the war. The purpose of this investigation was not to reconstruct a historical account but to determine whether any vestiges of the pre-war Japanese espionage system possibly remained to operate during the period of war. For reference, I may state that this investigation, in its first stages, including extensive analysis of the available Japanese intelligence traffic of December, 1941, was written principally by myself and submitted over the signature of the District Intelligence Officer to the Office of Naval Intelligence. These reports were carried under the caption "Japanese Consulate Honolulu-Espionage Activities of." The first two reports were dated 9 February 1942 and 14 February 1942. and five copies of each were transmitted to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C. Subsequent reports, under the same title but dealing with different phases of the Consulate's espionage activities, are also on file in the Office of Naval Intelligence Washington. For additional information on the pre-war espionage activities of the Consulate, I would also refer to the District Intelligence Officer's secret "An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands," dated 20 April 1943, available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington. Paragraphs 81-100 thereof briefly outline the type of information collected by the Consulate, personnel used, and methods of collection, evaluation, and transmission of such information.
Note: The examining officer has identified the reports mentioned by the witness as being ones on file in the following locations: (a) Two reports titled "Japanese Consulate Honolulu-Espionage Activities of", dated 9 February 1942 and 14 February 1942, on file in General Files of the Office of Naval Intelligence (Op 16-A-7), Navy Department, in the case history Jacket of Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, File No. 3919; (b) Report titled "An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands", dated 20 April 1943, on file in the Counter Intelligence Branch (Op 16-B-7), Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
14. Q. What was your opinion, say, during the Fall of 1941, with respect to the adequacy of the security afforded to vital military information in Hawaii under the intelligence set-up as you have outlined it?
A. I'll have to answer this in two phases. I believe that the quality of attention devoted to the problem by the District Intelligence Officer and Federal Bureau of Investigation was quite satisfactory, but the quantity woefully insufficient. By that I mean, as I have said earlier, there were insufficient personnel, and more so, insufficient trained personnel, to cope with the espionage problem. The second phase, namely, the physical safeguarding of information concerning various military and naval installations by the Commanding Officers, I can merely state that no outstanding examples of lack of physical security whereby information might have been compromised came to my attention. The most vital information was before the war conceived to be the information concerning Fleet movements insofar as presence of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor or the entry or departure of Fleet units from Pearl Harbor was concerned. Except as to Fleet units that might depart under cover of darkness, there was virtually no security that could be afforded Fleet movements. Aiea Heights, overlooking Pearl Harbor, and Pearl City Peninsula, jutting into
Pearl Harbor, and being within two hundred yards of a new carrier berth, were areas both populated by Japanese, among them suspects. Nothing could be done to remove them from these areas in the absence of conclusive legal evidence that would sustain an espionage prosecution. In  addition, any businessman in Honolulu, whose office happened to look to seaward, could see vessels passing by, and those on the fourth and fifth stories of certain buildings could, with the naked eye, assuming the usual good visibility, determine the numbers and types of battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers entering or leaving Pearl Harbor. Thus a fairly accurate count of the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor at any given time of day could be made from Aiea Heights and Pearl City, and entries and departures be observed from even downtown Honolulu as well as more proximate localities on the beach.
15. Q. Did any means of adding to the security of ships movements occur to the personnel of the District Intelligence Office at that time?
A. Realizing the impossibility of preventing the collection of this vital information, we early worked on the premise that our job should be to try to detect the means whereby it was being transmitted to the effective enemy destination, namely, Japan. As I have previously outlined, various public and private means of communication, not subject to official supervision and so manifold as to be impossible of total regulation, were available to Japanese espionage for transmission of this information. It was unnecessary for the Japanese to resort to anything so romantic as illegal radio transmitters in the hills or anything like that.
16. Q. Had you any information prior to the attack concerning the use of Japanese-manned or controlled fishing vessels in espionage?
A. For many years, the Japanese sampan fleet in Hawaii was openly suspect. It was almost entirely manned by Japanese aliens, many of them known to be ex-Japanese naval enlisted men. It was known that many of the crewmen had entered the United States illegally, that these sampans had, to some extent, assisted in the smuggling of narcotics, and it was rumored, but never proved, that they sometimes contacted Japanese submarines off these Islands. Numerous reports were received from Commanders afloat concerning the presence of Japanese fishing sampans proximate to Navy units engaged in target practice or tactical maneuvers. However, it was never satisfactorily established that these meetings were other than innocent coincidences. The normal fishing grounds which these sampans plied, extended, in some instances, hundreds of miles off Oahu, and it was recognized that perhaps, in effect, the Fleet units were "trespassing" on fishing grounds which the Japanese sampans had long used. However, it was recognized, but without any power available to limit their operations, that these sampans could be used to reconnoiter Fleet units at sea and also to establish to what extent, if at all, air and surface patrols operated from Oahu. No evidence that any sampan crewmen gathered vital intelligence and transmitted it to Japan has ever been found.
17. Q. Will you state what information you had prior to 7 December or that you learned thereafter concerning other intelligence sources which operated in Oahu. other than that which funneled through the
Japanese Consul here, during the week immediately preceding 7 December?
A. No information has come to the attention of the District Intelligence Officer to indicate that any intelligence was transmitted from here to Japan in the last week before the war except that which was transmitted by the Japanese Consulate. However, there was one suspicious fact that came to the attention of F.B.I., G-2, and the District Intelligence Officer immediately preceding the war that may have been a transmission of intelligence. On 4 December 1941, the editor of the most militaristic daily newspaper in Tokyo wired his local correspondent in Honolulu, Mrs. Motokazu Mori, that he wished to interview, by trans-Pacific radio-telephone, some prominent Hawaiian Japanese with respect to the conditions in Hawaii, and the editor requested that Mrs. Mori arrange for such an interview. Mrs. Mori was unable to secure any prominent local Japanese who would permit himself to be so interviewed and so, when the Tokyo editor placed a call on 5 December 1941 to Mrs. Mori at Honolulu, she asked her husband, Dr. Motokazu Mori, to permit himself to be  interviewed. At the time this trans-Pacific telephone call was made, a confidential source furnished the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Honolulu with a transcription of the telephone conversation. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the facts I have just related about this incident were not fully known until after the war started. However, it was known on 6 December 1941 the following had occurred: About 1400 on 6 December 1941, the duty officer at the District Intelligence Office was apprised by representative of F.B.I., Honolulu, that F.B.I. had a written transcript of the telephone call of Dr. Mori and the Tokyo editor and that the same was available for inspection by the District Intelligence Officer, or his representative. The Duty Officer, Lieutenant Commander-then Lieutenant-Denzel Carr, U.S.N.R., and Lieutenant George P. Kimball, U.S.N.R., head of District Intelligence Office, Counter-Espionage Section, immediately communicated with Captain Mayfield at his quarters, Pearl Harbor, and advised him they believed the matter of sufficient importance that he should return to his office and then confer with F.B.I. Captain Mayfield returned to the District Intelligence Office, discussed the matter with Lieutenants Carr and Kimball, and then proceeded to F.B.I. Office, where he examined the transcript, discussed its import with Mr. Robert L. Shivers, local F.B.I. head, and Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Bicknell, in charge of G-2 counter-espionage activities. An examination of this transcript, both by Captain Mayfield and Lieutenant Carr-Lieutenant Carr being an internationally recognized language scholar and very proficient in Japanese-impelled these two officers to the conclusion that the original transcription of this conversation should be examined immediately by Lieutenant Carr in order to study any possible hidden meanings in the conversation that might be concealed in the inflections of the voice, this conversation having been in Japanese. Lieutenant Carr stated, at that time, that certain of the passages, as translated by the F.B.I. translator, appeared somewhat incongruous in the Japanese speech, that he, personally, felt he should examine the whole recording. Lieutenant Carr wished to do this immediately but F.B.I., for some reason, stated the recording would not be available for his study until 1000 on 7 December 1941. Lieutenant Carr, sometime after
the attack, was allowed to listen to the recording and he was unable to conclude therefrom that it did contain military information in any hidden form. Lieutenant Carr subsequently participated in an intensive interrogation of Dr. Mori and Mrs. Mori and was of the opinion, which was concurred in by interrogators of the other Government agencies present, that the Moris were absolutely blameless and wholly surprised by this so-called trans-Pacific telephonic interview. A study of the transcript itself, which is available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, will show that there was an open conveyance of some military information in this telephone call. For example, the reference to the presence or absence of planes in the sky and armed force personnel on the streets of Honolulu, Dr. Mori having answered directly questions put to him by the Tokyo editor. I, personally, believe it unlikely, from my extensive study of this incident, that it was a calculated transmission of information from Honolulu to Japan, because other, more efficient, more concealed methods of transmission, namely the use of encrypted dispatches by public communications, were open to the Consulate.
18. Q. Reverting to your testimony concerning the refusal to prosecute the Japanese agents for non-registration, did that failure to get results, in a step which your office felt should have been taken, adversely affect the esprit of your office and reduce its efforts in other directions?
A. I feel that I can state categorically that the failure to prosecute these consular agents did not adversely affect the esprit of the District Intelligence organization and its operations, principally because the matter was one of policy, not generally known in the organization, and because there  were so many other unsolved problems, possible leakages, to be worked on continually.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: I think it should be added, in conclusion, that the Commandant authorized the District Intelligence Officer to deal directly with the Fleet Intelligence Officer on all matters conceived to be of importance to the Fleet in the interest of speedy transmission of information to the Fleet. To my knowledge, in every instance where the District Intelligence Officer secured information of possible value to the Fleet, that was immediately transmitted, generally by Captain Mayfield personally calling on the Fleet Intelligence Officer. It was recognized that there was some possibility that local events and happenings in the espionage field might provide some clue, however remote, as to the prospective enemy's intentions, and in this respect the Commandant was most liberal in allowing free flow of information. However, there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence organization, which, at that time, included a section whose responsibilities have since passed to the District Security Officer, that the Commandant, namely, Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, was not security conscious, nor was he too mindful of the en-
emy espionage potential here. I can state, from personal recollection, that on many occasions before the war, this apparent attitude of the Commandant was the cause of minor depression amongst officers in the District Intelligence organization. This was particularly apparent with regard to the Commandant's attitude toward physical security measures that the Security Section of the District Intelligence thought were necessary to the safeguarding of both the physical plant and information available in the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor. I can, however, cite no causel connection between the Commandant's apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack here.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examination then, at 4 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.