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MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1944
                                                      THE ROOSEVELT HOTEL,
                                                       New York, New York. 
The examination met at 8:30 a. m.


Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-ninth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the examination, and was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Joel William Bunkley; Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired; Supervisor, New York Harbor.

2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing during the last six months of the calendar year of 1941?

A. Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, attached to the Pacific Fleet at that time based at Pearl Harbor.

3. Q. Admiral, what condition of readiness and what security precautions were being taken aboard your ship while in port in the middle of October, 1941?

A. As I remember it, we were not under any condition of readiness in port; that is, conditions one, two, or three. We had two machine guns manned at all times with about 400 rounds of ammunition at hand, and we had 50 rounds of ammunition for two five-inch guns in the ready boxes on the topside (locked, with keys in hands of the O.O.D.) and the crews of those two guns standing by. We were operating under the security order (U.S. Fleet letter #3L-40 revised, as I recall) promulgated by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, prior to October, 1941. We were also operating under Executive Order No. 41-40, U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, dated 27 December 1940, which was revised from time to time and which was a security order to prevent sabotage. This order required a Security Patrol consisting of armed roving patrols on topside and below decks in vital parts of the ship.

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4. Q. Did that readiness of a portion of the battery begin to be in effect as early as October, '41?

A. Yes.

5. Q. Do you remember when you did begin to carry it out?

A. No, but some months prior to December 7, 1941.


6. Q. Then I understand that this condition of readiness in port was set sometime before 7 December. By whose order was that done?

A. By order of Rear Admiral Anderson.

7. Q. At that time, did you have any information as to what motivated that order?

A. None whatsoever except that we all thought there was a possibility of war. Like all others, I didn't, at the time, think they were going to attack Pearl Harbor. We thought possibly it would be submarine attacks.

8. Q. Were any further changes ordered prior to 7 December?

A. None that I remember.

9. Q. In other words, the condition you've just described was the condition aboard your ship on 7 December?

A. Yes.

10. Q. Your testimony to the effect that the two five-inch crews were standing by; just what did that entail in the way of readiness?

A. Originally, I believe, they were to stay in the immediate vicinity of the guns, but, later on, this was modified so that the crews merely had to be on call.

11. Q. Was it a definite watch or did it last throughout the twenty-four hours for each lot of men so detailed?

A. It was a twenty-four hour detail.

12. Q. During the period in port prior to and including 7 December, what precautions were in effect as regards watertight integrity of the ships-the closure of doors, hatches, and so forth?

A. None other than as stated in the Navy Regulations for watertight integrity in port.

13. Q. Was your ship Admiral Pye's Flagship?

A. Yes.

14. Q. Do you recall any conversations with Admiral Pye, or senior members of his Staff, concerning war warnings or anything else especially pertaining to the tenseness of the situation during the latter part of November and early December?

A. None whatsoever. I had no idea of any warnings having been sent.

15. Q. Do you recall gaining any secret intelligence or other information from which you, yourself, could estimate that a dangerous situation was at hand?

A. None whatever.

16. Q. Sir, state, as best you can recall, the consensus of opinion of officers of your rank and position there as regards the danger of an attack on Pearl Harbor, specifically an air attack on the Fleet there, during the last three months of the calendar year 1941, giving, if possible, the reasons why this opinion was held.

A. It was my opinion, and I think the opinion of most of the officers, that there was not any danger of an attack by air on Pearl Harbor at that time. It was my opinion that the attack would come in the Philippines and not at Pearl Harbor.

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17. Q. While at sea during the aforesaid period, the battleships, I understand, did maintain conditions of readiness, zig-zag, darkened ship at night, and so forth. Did you have the feeling that those precautions were carried out as a matter of training and habituating personnel to war conditions, or because of real danger of surprise attack while at sea?

A. In my opinion, it was for both.

18. Q. And what particular form of surprise attack were you apprehending?

A. Submarine attack.

19. Q. Did you worry while at sea over the possibility of air attack?

A. No.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: On October 15, the CALIFORNIA was in Long Beach. We were ordered there for the purpose of giving leave and liberty to the officers and the crew, and had arrived there about 5 October. We had previously stopped at San Francisco for four or five days for drydocking and had let a small portion of the crew go on leave from that port. On the night of our arrival at Long Beach, I received orders from Commander Battle Force, Admiral Pye, who was on board the CALIFORNIA, to recall all men on leave and be ready to sail twenty-four hours hence. Before the expiration of twenty-four hours, I was ordered to remain at Long Beach but to be ready to sail upon twenty-four hours' notice. From that time until our departure, to the best of my memory (the latter part of October or the first part of November) we were standing by under the twenty-four hour sailing orders. A telephone watch was maintained on shore and all men on liberty had to telephone at midnight to find out if liberty would be up at midnight or at eight a. m. the following morning. To prevent sabotage we had a patrol boat, with junior officer on board, circling the ship while at anchor, contact all approaching boats. I simply received and carried out these drastic changes of orders without being taken into the confidence of Admiral Pye as to any messages received to cause such a change of plans. The U. S. S. CALIFORNIA was Admiral Pye's Flagship.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 8:55 a. m., took a recess until 9:20 a. m., at which time the examination was reconvened in the U. S. S. VIXEN.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Admiral, this is a board acting under a precept of the Secretary of the Navy directing that testimony be taken, under oath, concerning the facts attending on the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

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A significant phrase of the precept is "testimony pertinent to the facts" and there is available no interpretation of the word "pertinent" other than my own. In examining witnesses who were at or [416] near Pearl Harbor, various testimony was obtained which indicates I that there is other testimony pertinent to the facts within the knowledge of officers who were not there, particularly officers in the Navy Department, and you are called as being one of those believed to be in possession of such knowledge. This calls upon you to testify as best you can from facts which were known to you on or before 7 December 1941. That, of course, is difficult because it will be asking you to leave out what became known to you only after that date. It probably is impossible not to be influenced by things that have turned up since, but you must do the best you can to confine your testimony to what you then knew. Our procedure is informal in that we pause at any time for explanation of questions, to better define what is wanted, give opportunity for refreshing memory, consulting documents, and so on. The transcript of your testimony will be given you for verification and in that I expect you to modify your testimony, if, upon further reflection you see the necessity to do so, the object being to have the truest possible record. What you give as your first recollection, you may later realize needs amplification or even correction. I will examine you directly and then request that you submit anything else which was not brought out but which, in your opinion, is pertinent.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:


1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Royal E. Ingersoll; Admiral, U. S. Navy; Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations during the entire year, except the last two or three days of that year. I do not recall the exact date on which I was detached.

3. Q. As the first and principal assistant to the CNO, what was the working arrangement between you as regards the division of the duties of the office?

A. As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I had no duties that pertained solely to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, that is, I did not have original cognizance of any matters. All matters for the consideration of Chief of Naval Operations were taken up with me before presenting to the Chief of Naval Operations. All matters of policy, of course, were referred to the Chief of Naval Operations. Once he had decided upon a policy, I then endeavored to carry out the details without further reference to him unless it was a question of which I thought he should know. I signed most of the correspondence except letters going to heads of other government departments or letters to Commanders-in-Chief which embodied orders to them. I frequently released many dispatches that had previously been considered by the Chief of Naval Operations after I knew they were in the form in which he wished them sent.

4. Did you feel that in matters of great import, particularly in policy, you always knew what was in the CNO's mind and were you always called in for the discussions and conferences with senior naval officers and representatives of other departments?

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A. Generally speaking, I now feel that Admiral Stark kept me fully informed of all matters of which I should have had knowledge. I was usually present when conferences were held with other officers of the Navy Department or officers of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I was not always present when Admiral Stark conferred with officials of the State Department or with officials of the War Department. Frequently these conferences took place in the State Department or in the War Department and I usually did not accompany Admiral Stark for such conferences. I felt, however, that when these were over that Admiral Stark told me everything that I should know. I do not recall now anything that transpired of which I was riot told and of which I thought I should have been told. There may have been conferences between Admiral Stark and the President and the Secretary of State of which he did not tell me all the details.

5. Q. As regards information, meaning information obtained by ONI and including that obtained by study of radio intercepts; were you always given all important information from those sources?

A. I don't know. I do not recall receiving any information regarding so-called "radio intelligence" obtained by analysis of traffic or analysis of traffic derived from call signs. During the later months of the year, I saw many of the messages-Japanese messages-which were received at the Navy Department.

6. Q. Do you recall daily visits by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who [418] brought to the CNO information concerning the Pacific area which was obtained by various secret methods?

A. Yes, I do. I recall frequent visits by an officer from Naval Communications, but whether I saw them every day, or not, and saw every message, I don't know. I saw a great number and saw them very often.

7. Q. When Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, about February, 1941, the Department had already decided that that area would be the general station of the Fleet, pending further developments. Do you recall what considerations led to that decision?

A. In 1938, an advance detachment under Vice Admiral Andrews had been sent to the Hawaiian Islands to be kept there indefinitely. Later, in the early part of 1940, while Admiral Richardson was still in command, the Pacific Fleet went out to the Hawaiian area and never returned to the West Coast except units for overhaul and training. I was not in the Navy Department at that time. When I left the Hawaiian Islands in the middle of 1940, the major part of the Pacific Fleet was in the Hawaiian Islands.

8. Q. Do you recall at any time during the Winter, 1940-41, while you were stationed in the Department, any reconsideration being given to the decision to base the Fleet in Hawaii, rather than on the Pacific Coast?

A. Yes. The question of the Fleet returning to the West Coast was brought up. The decision was made that the Fleet should continue to base at Pearl Harbor, although units might be sent back to the West Coast for stripping ship, landing excess equipment, and for training. It was considered that Hawaii was the most advantageous point for the operations contemplated in case of war with Japan and also as the best point from which to cover Alaska and the Pacific Coast.

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9. Q. In such reconsideration of the decision for the retention of the Fleet in Hawaii, did the question of the Fleet's security as against surprise attack ever get into the argument?

A. I do not recall that particular point, although I do know that from time to time representations were made to the War Department regarding increase of anti-aircraft protection and searchlights at Hawaii.

10. Q. Do you recall any protest by Admiral Kimmel, or any representation by him, concerning the Fleet's security as thus based?

A. I have no recollection of a protest.

11. Q Do you recall whether or not the Navy Department was in any way influenced by the State Department in its decision to base the Fleet in Hawaii?

A. I do not know. I have no recollection that pressure was put on the Navy Department to keep the Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

12. Q. Admiral, I hand you a file of correspondence, which is Exhibit 40 in this record, which begins with a representation by the Secretary of Navy to the War Department to the effect that, within the Army's province, the situation as regards the security of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not satisfactory. State what you can remember of conferences and discussions between representatives of War and Navy Department, at the dates of these letters or subsequently concerning this subject.

A. I saw the letter of January 24, 1941, from the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War. I do not recall having seen the reply, although I must have seen it. The only part of the reply of the Secretary of War which [419] brings up anything in my memory is the question of balloon barrages and the use of smoke. It is my recollection that the Pacific Fleet did not wish balloon barrages at Pearl Harbor due to the interference with plane operations. I do not now recall any specific conferences on this subject except I seem to recall information being received that additional Army aircraft would be sent to the Hawaiian Islands. I also recall that we received information of the installation of radar equipment, four stations I believe being set up on the various islands of the Hawaiian group. There may have been discussions between the War Plans Divisions of the Navy and War Departments and there may have been discussions in the Joint board meetings. but I can not now recall any further specific action.

13. Q. It appears (as per Exhibit 40) that, on 24 January 1941, the Secretary of Navy pointed out what were thought to be major deficiencies in the Army's readiness to meet its commitments over Oahu; in particular, deficiencies in air raid warning facilities, anti-aircraft artillery, and in opposing aircraft, which, naturally, would be Army pursuit. Did the Navy Department not further urge the Army to overcome those deficiencies, between that date and 7 December '41?

A. I have no specific recollection of any further formal representations being made to the War Department on the subject of deficiencies noted in the letter of January 24. I have recollection of a later discussion in connection with balloon barrages, which, as I recall, the Fleet did not want because of interference with the operations of Navy aircraft. I seem to recall receiving information that additional planes would be dispatched and also that aircraft detection apparatus was being installed on the tops of four mountains in the Hawaiian

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group. Neither were in place at Pearl Harbor in 1939. I recall the placing of nets at Pearl Harbor, although the nets were Navy responsibility and not Army.

14. Q. Do you think that as regards those major deficiencies in antiaircraft artillery, air warning system, and pursuit aircraft, the Navy failed to further represent the situation due to a reluctance to unduly press its sister service about something which was entirely in its own province?

A. If any reason can be given, I think that was probably the one. The defense of a permanent naval base under the province of joint Army and Navy Action was an Army responsibility. The naval base was supposed to be a position at which the Fleet could remain for repairs, for rest, for replenishment of supplies, for dry-docking, without the necessity of being in a state of readiness for action twenty-four hours a day.

15. Q. Do you recall if, within the Offices of the CNO, this state of unreadiness of the Army at Pearl Harbor was a matter of more or less constant concern and that those offices kept themselves informed on the situation, in an up-to-date fashion?

A. We knew the number of troops, the number of guns, searchlights, the number of planes, that the Army had in Hawaii. We knew when changes took place. I do not recall that we had exact information as to the actual condition of readiness in which the anti-aircraft guns, troops, aircraft detection devices, were maintained.

16. Q. Incident to the general state of readiness, along the lines pointed out in SecNav's letter of 24 January '41, do you recall any reestimate within the CNO's offices as regards the security factor for Admiral Kimmel's Fleet while in Pearl Harbor?

A. No.


17. Q. Admiral, I hand you a file which is Exhibit 22 which contains an estimate of the situation at Pearl Harbor, signed by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Major General Martin, dated 31 March '41, which, on its page three, sets forth that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. Do you recall having seen this correspondence in the Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I undoubtedly saw the letter of May 1 from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District with its inclosure (Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan) because I have a distinct recollection of this plan being sent to other naval districts as a pattern upon which to form joint frontier defense plans.

18. Q. Did that portion of this file, to some extent predicting an air raid on Pearl Harbor, serve as an occasion for further urging the Army to improve its anti-aircraft defenses on Oahu?

A. I have no recollection that any further formal representation was made to the War Department after the receipt of this plan.

19. Q. Admiral, a considerable detachment involving battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and one carrier was, in the Spring of 1941, transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Will you give the considerations which led to the transfer of forces?

A. That transfer of forces was in accordance with the general concept of the war as visualized in WPL-46 that the initial major effort would be in the Atlantic. The Pacific Fleet was given defensive

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tasks, with the exception of a diversion toward the Marshalls and Carolines to relieve pressure on the Malay Barrier. There were other offensive tasks against Japanese communications and shipping, but those were largely tasks for submarines.

20. Q. Inasmuch as the entire British Navy was opposed by relatively small German naval forces, why did the Department conceive it necessary to reenforce the Atlantic when there were so much more powerful potential enemy forces in the Pacific?

A. My recollection was that it was feared that the fast, heavy German ships might get past the British forces stationed in the United Kingdom and get into the Western Atlantic. At that time, there were no United States battleships, other than the very old battleships, in the Atlantic, capable of coping with the German capital ships.

21. Q. Why was the danger from the German naval ships considered to be of more moment than the danger from the entire Japanese Navy which also was a potential enemy nation.

A. With the detachment of the force from the Pacific, which was transferred to the Atlantic, there was left in the Pacific a number of capital ships equal to those in the Japanese Navy. The reason was that the center of gravity of the initial naval effort of the United States in WPL-46 was to be in the Atlantic and not in the Pacific where the role was primarily defensive.

22. Q. Was there involved in this transfer of our naval forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic any agreement with our potential ally, Britain, to transfer some of their capital ships' strength to the Indian Ocean where they would be near the Western Pacific theatre?

A. The transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic was in accordance with WPL-46, which, in turn was based on the United States-British conversations which culminated in the plan known as "ABC-1". That plan [421] specifically stated that Germany was the predominate member of the Axis Powers and the Atlantic and European areas were considered to be the decisive theatres, and that, therefore, the principal U. S. military effort would be exercised in that theatre. U. S. operations elsewhere would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort. It was stated in ABC-1 that the United States intended to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean area so that the British Commonwealth would be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

23. Q. It appears that we met our own commitment, as per those plans, without delay and effected the transfer of forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic in the Spring of 1941. Can you explain why it was not until November, '41, that any British capital ships arrived in the Indian Ocean and that even then it was only a small detachment?

A. No; I don't know.

24. Q. Admiral, do you recall if, in the Office of Naval Operations, there was any decided disagreement with the concept that Germany constituted the major of our potential enemies?

A. Naturally, there was a discussion of the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized that if Japan entered the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Nevertheless, the United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive warfare in both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major

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effort would be made in one ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy to be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member, Italy, and that after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could concentrate on Japan. I do not recall that there was any formal representations made to the Chief of Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At some time during 1941, the general features of WPL-46 were explained at a conference in the Navy Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary Hull, and I believe the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were present. I'm quite sure that the general consensus of opinion was that Germany should be eliminated first, after Italy, and then Japan.

25. Q. Do you recall if Admiral Kimmel expressed any disagreement with that concept or if he ever made any protest against transfer of some of his forces to the Atlantic?

A. I do not now recall any formal protest or any informal protest.

26. Q. Did you hear the matter discussed when Admiral Kimmel visited the Navy Department in the Summer of 1941?

A. No, I do not now recall any such representations being made by Admiral Kimmel.

27. Q. Narrowing the matter down to the Pacific Fleet alone, what was the prevalent opinion in OpNav as regards the readiness to carry out the mission-assigned by WPL-46 to that Fleet?

A. Since the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet in WPL-46 were primarily defensive, with the exception of the diversionary trips toward the Marshalls and Carolines, it was felt that the forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet were adequate for the tasks assigned.

28. Q. What was the general logistic readiness in mid-Pacific for carrying out those tasks?


A. The forces that were necessary to give logistic support to the Fleet were not available during '41 and the war plan called for the acquisition of the necessary auxiliaries to support the logistic effort of the Pacific Fleet. On the other hand, none of the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet carried it very far afield from the Hawaiian Islands until it was required to execute the tasks of the occupation of the Caroline and Marshall Islands and ultimately the establishment of a base at Truk. These operations, however, were not contemplated in the initial days of the war; only the diversionary raids against the Carolines and Marshalls.

29. Q. It appears in previous testimony that the entire Pacific Fleet, while in Hawaiian waters, was very much preoccupied in training, incident to the fluid state of its personnel. Do you recall any representations or requirements by OpNav on that subject which, during the latter part of 1941, tended to concentrate the Commander-in-Chief's thought upon that subject?

A. In order to obtain a nucleus of trained men to place new ships in commission, it was necessary for all ships in the Navy, not only the Pacific Fleet but all other ships of the Navy, to send men back to the United States for this purpose. Naturally, the raw recruits who replaced these experienced men had to be trained. That condition pertains today. Our ships are constantly engaged in training new personnel for new construction in time of war. I also recall that I think

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permission was given to send ships to the West Coast in small numbers for intensive gunnery training in the San Pedro area.

30. Q. Then do I understand from your answer that this condition was fully realized in OpNav and that it was unavailable?

A. Yes, because there was no other reservoir of trained personnel with which to man new ships except the personnel of ships that were already in commission in all Fleets.

31. Q. Were you aware, during the latter part of 1941, that there had grown up in the Pacific Fleet the thought that training constituted its primary mission?

A. Until war was actually upon us, I cannot see that it had any better mission than to train its personnel for war.

32. Q. Did you sense, during the last few weeks or even days of peace, that there was a considerable preoccupation in that direction on the part of the senior officers of the Pacific Fleet?

A. No.

33. Q. It appears that on 24 July 1941, or thereabouts, the State Department effected an Executive Order which froze all Japanese credits and virtually stopped our trade with Japan. Do you recall if the Navy Department was consulted prior to taking that step and considered that it was in balance with our general situation as regards readiness for war?

A. I do not recall whether or not the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing that order. I do not know whether they consulted the Navy Department regarding its bearing on our readiness to wage war.

34. Q. Do you recall if there was a proper appreciation and estimate within the OpNav offices as to the probable effect of that step of 24 July 1941?

A. I do not recall any formal estimate of the results of that particular order. It was only one of an accumulative set of circumstances putting pressure on Japan.


35. Q. Incidentally, do you recall any prevalent opinion in OpNav that we could either bluff Japan or restrain her by such squeezing methods as embargoes and so forth?

A. I think that the impression in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was that war with Japan was inevitable and the only question was when it would occur. Issuance of WPL-46 and the Staff conversations with the British all are evidence that the Navy Department considered that war with Japan was inevitable.

36. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch of 16 October, which is Exhibit 6 in this record. I have been unable to find any evidence of any opinion being expressed by the State Department to the Navy Department which set forth the gravity of the situation mentioned as created by the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet. Have you any recollection of such a representation?

A. I have no recollection of any correspondence from the State Department to the Navy Department which would have formed the basis for this dispatch.

37. Q. Do you think that this dispatch indicating the seriousness of the situation vis-a-vis Japan was, therefore, based upon a Navy Department estimate?

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A. Yes I think it was based upon an estimate made by Admiral Stark and by the Chief of the War Plans Division, then Captain Turner, that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet would result in the situation mentioned in that dispatch. I do recall, definitely, that both Admiral Stark and Captain Turner saw the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, on several occasions at which the situation between Japan and the United States was discussed. It is quite probable that this dispatch was based on their impressions received from their conversations with the Japanese Ambassador, although I cannot state specifically that it did result from any particular conversation.

38. Q. Admiral, do you recall what the CNO meant in his directive to make preparatory deployments as contained in this dispatch of 16 October?

A. I think the preparatory deployments that would not constitute provocative action and disclose strategic intention against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the southern Philippines, rather than to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here, in connection with this dispatch and others which followed, that they were released by me. In all cases, such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In many cases, I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Department and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character. The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft was presented and corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not to bother him further, I released the dispatch in the form which he had approved.

39. Q. Were you advised as to the action taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, pursuant to that directive concerning a deployment?

A. I do not recall any specific dispatch in response to this one stating what deployments were to be made by the Pacific Fleet. I do not recall that we expected the Pacific Fleet, as distinguished from the Asiatic Fleet, to make any important new dispositions.


40. Q. Between the date of the aforesaid dispatch, (16 October), and 24 November, I find no specific directive or informatory dispatches addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. During that period, it appears that the relations with Japan were rapidly deteriorating. Do you recall any reason why no other important communications were sent to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during that period?

A. No, I do not recall why no further dispatches were sent until November 24. That dispatch held out no hope for the betterment of conditions.

41. Q. Admiral, in late November, 1941, how well informed were you concerning the actual disposition from day to day of all forces under Admiral Kimmel?

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A. At some time during 1941, the exact date I do not recall, but I believe it was quite early in '41, we established an operational plot on which the disposition of U. S. forces was plotted, and as far as we knew, the position of Japanese and German forces were plotted. The system of reporting ship movements had been placed in a confidential status and these continued to be received and plotted in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. As I now recall, we did not receive the reports of purely local movements in the Hawaiian Islands, so long as the ships remained based in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. That is, we did not receive reports of ships going out for two or three days' operations to return to Pearl Harbor. It is also possible that certain movements may have been known to us but were not shown on the operations plotting board because we did not wish, for reasons of security, to show them. I recall one or two instances in the Atlantic where ships were purposely omitted from the operations plot.

42. Q. As you recall the events of early December, 1941, were the dispositions of all of Admiral Kimmel's ships which were definitely beyond the Fleet's usual drill areas, entirely known in the plotting room in OpNav? I have particular reference to early December movements to Wake Island, Johnston Island, and Midway Islands.

A. I think these movements were known when they took place. However, I may be in error and that I now know of them from what we knew later.

43. Q. In keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kimmel's ships, do you recall if the quarterly schedule of employment was mainly relied upon?

A. No, the reports of movements which were received through the movement report system were relied upon.

44. Q. Did you know at the time of the Pacific Fleet's routine of going to sea in rotation for the three Task Groups into which the forces had been divided?

A. Yes. We knew that was the system under which the Pacific Fleet was normally conducting its training and upkeep.

45. Q. Admiral, do you recall, on or about the 10th of November, '41, becoming cognizant of certain dispatches which had passed between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, concerning a method of reporting the exact positions of large ships of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not now recall them. I may have seen them and forgotten.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.


The examining officer then, at 11:55 a. m., adjourned until 2:15 p. m., tomorrow, in the Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

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