EXHIBIT NO. 24 (HART INQUIRY)
[1]

PW2/A16-3/022
                                          PATROL WING TWO,
Confidential                          U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
                             Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A., 16 Jan. 1941

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: (1) The Commander Scouting force.
     (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject: Patrol Wing TWO-Readiness of.

Reference: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander-in-Chief,
           U. S. Fleet-"Protection of Fleet Air-Craft."

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

2. (a) War Readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons but also on many operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facilities and shops all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.

(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection" As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing TWO, this [2] evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and; that Patrol Wing TWO will be practically the last Wing to be furnished new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.

3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide and to anticipate such needs.

(b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably

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more attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are to perform according to expectations.

4. It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific, that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late"

5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to above:

[3]

(a) For Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.

3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present, the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the U. S. S. WRIGHT and the U. S. S. SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul until March 17 1941.

(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate [4] operating needs both now and as estimated for the future, through addition of shop space additional shops, additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts and stock.

2. Increase and improve bomb storage and ammunition storage through enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling equipment.

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.

5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from Ammunition Depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply personnel (officer and enlisted), additional facilities for handling supplies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage at some suitable location readily accessible to the [5] Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons in

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tended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary personnel, supplying equipment for the various buildings, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War requirements.

(d) For Keehi Lagoon.

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a patrol plane base.

(e) For Outlying Bases, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition SUPPLY and stowage; concrete ramps and parking area.

(f) For Midway.

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying Operating base with the assignment [6] of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.

(g) General.

1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

                                                      P. N. L. Bellinger
                                                      P. N. L. BELLINGER

Copy to:
   Comairscofor.
   Com. 14.
   N. A. S., P. H., T. H.
   Prosp. C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe.

C S. F. File No. A16-3/(035)

                                     UNITED STATES FLEET SCOUTING FORCE,
                                        U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS, Flagship,
                                     Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 21, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to CPW2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.
From: Commander Scouting Force.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Patrol Wing TWO-Readiness of.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Scouting Force appreciates that the efforts of the Department toward the completion of adequate defense measures must necessarily be based upon the development of the entire Naval Establishment rather than concentration upon one point. He believes, however, that the importance of Pearl Harbor as the spear-head of our defenses in the Pacific, and the essential role of Patrol Wing TWO not only in the defense of Pearl Harbor but also in any Operations to the westward, warrant early and full attention to the needs cited by the Commander of that Wing.

3. Commander Scouting Force has, since his arrival in this area as Commander Hawaiian Detachment, been much concerned at the lack of adequate material and facilities for proper and efficient operation of Patrol Wing TWO in war. He has effected such remedial measures as lay within his power, and has urged upon the Department such matters as the enlargement of the originally-planned installation at Kaneohe Bay and the provision of gasoline and lubricating of reserve supplies at outlying-island bases so that these bases might be utilized temporarily without awaiting the arrival of tenders.

4. In view of the location of Pearl Harbor and the island bases, and the functions of Patrol Wing TWO in war in the Pacific, the Commander Scouting Force therefore recommends strongly that measures toward fulfilling the needs cited

Page 545

by Commander Patrol Wing TWO be given the highest priority in the Department's program and accomplished at the earliest practicable moment.

                                                       Adolphus Andrews,
                                                       ADOLPHUS ANDREws,

Copy to:
   Comairscofor Compatwing Two
   ComFOURTEEN
   NAS, Pearl Harbor
   Prosp. CO, NAS, Kaneohe.

CinC File No. A16-1/A4-1/VZ/(0178)

                                              UNITED STATES FLEET,
                                       U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
                                     Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 31, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to CPW2 Conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Patrol Wing TWO-Readiness of.

1. Forwarded, concurring with the basic recommendation and with the first endorsement by Commander Scouting Force.

2. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the spirit in which the basic letter, urging action toward effective readiness for missions that may be demanded of Patrol Wing TWO, has been written. He also appreciates the fact that action has already been initiated or, in some cases, is not readily practicable at this time with respect to a number of the basic recommendations; and that separate correspondence with respect to much of this material is already in circulation.

3. It is the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, however, that the basic letter, summarizing as it does the entire patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian area, presents a very valuable picture of the overall requirements that are urgently needed if the potentialities expected of patrol planes are to be even approximately realized. Therefore, full review of the subject, accompanied by appropriate action toward expediting or initiating needed developments, is urged.

4. Attention is particularly invited to:

(a) The desirability of better priority in the delivery of improved patrol planes to Patrol Wing TWO.

(b) The great importance of increased bomb and torpedo supply, including not only bulk storage, but also ready storage at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with suitable handling and loading equipment at the Air Station, and improved transportation from bulk storage. In this connection, provision at the Naval Air Station should include two "fills" for five patrol plane squadrons and one aircraft carrier group.

(c) The vital necessity of expediting the readiness at outlying island developments of the basic essentials: gasoline and oil storage, bomb and ammunition storage, parking area, ramps and dredged approaches thereto. This latter subject has been discussed informally with representatives of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and is understood to be receiving full consideration. Departmental support, if and as needed, is urged.

                                                       J. O. Richardson.
                                                       J. O. RIcHARDsoN.

Copy to:
   Comscofor
   Comairscofor
   Compatwing-2
   Com-14
   NAS P. H.
   NAS Kaneohe

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OP-23-H-KB 2/19
CONFIDENTIAL
(SC) A16-1/PW2
Serial 015823

                                                          FEB. 27, 1941.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To:   Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.
      Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.
      Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks.
      Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

Subject: Patrol Wing Two-Readiness of.

Reference: (a) Compatwing Two Confid. Ltr. PW2/A16-3/022 of 16 January
               1941.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

2 In separate correspondence the Chief of Naval Operations has already indicated his desires on the following items of paragraph 5 of reference (a)

           (a) 1. (a) 3. (b) 2. (b) 4.
           (a) 2. (a) 4. (b) 3. (b) 5.

3. In regard to the remaining items and to the general situation the Chief of Naval Operations desires the addressees to be guided by the following policy: In case of hostilities practically all the aircraft of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets may be dependent upon the Hawaiian Area for logistics. The Area should be prepared expeditiously to handle this contingency. Needs that can be foreseen should be supplied by the Bureaus in advance of requisition.

                                                R. E. INGERSOLL, Acting.

Copy to: Cincpac, Comscofor
         Comairscofor, Compatwing 2,
         Com. 14, NAS Pearl.

[1]

                            CONFIDENTIAL

C-A16-1/A7-3(2)/ND14 (0135)
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.

                                 HEADQUARTERS 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT,
                                 Pearl Harbor, T. H., 14 February, 1941.

SUBJECT: Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.
To: Officers named in par. 2, herein.

1. Reference is directed to the following:

A. Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on the above subject, dated 4 February 1941, (CinC serial (0195)).

B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Navy short title, 14ND-JCD-13;

Army short title, HCF-39) Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, dated 14 April, 1939.

2. In order to study and make recommendations to the Planning Representatives, (Paragraph 4, Reference B), for measures relating to increasing the combat efficiency of Army and Navy aircraft stationed in Hawaiian waters and to improve the effectiveness of the defenses against hostile air attacks, the following joint committees (Paragraph 5, Reference B) are appointed:

a. Air Operations Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 a, c, and d, Reference A, and to prepare plans for the conduct of joint exercises, on a weekly or more frequent basis, to insure the readiness of joint defensive measures in Oahu against surprise aircraft raids.

Army Members:                         Navy Members:
   Haw. Air Force:                       NAS Operations Officer
      Lt. Col. W. S. Streett, AC            Lt. Comdr. H. F. Carlson
   H. S. G. A. B.:                       Staff, Com. AirBatFor.
      Major R. T. Frederick, 64th           CA Comdr. M. R. Browning
                                         Patrol Wing 2 C. O. Patron 22
                                            Lt. Comdr. G. Van Deurs

Enc. (A) Com 14 serial (0410) 1 May 1941.

[2] b. Communications Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraph 5 b., Reference A.

Page 547

Army Members:                       Navy Members:
   Hq. Haw. Dept.:                     PatWingTwo C. O. Patron 22:
      Lt. Col. W. E. Murphy, SC           Lt. Comdr. W. P. Cogswell
   Haw. Air Force:                     14th Communication Officer
      Lt. Col. C. I. Hoppough, SC         Comdr. H. L. Thompson
   H. S. C. A. B.:                     Staff ComAirBatFor
      Major I. H. Ritchie, CAC         Communication Officer:
                                           Lt. L. J. Dow

c. Air-Antiaircraft Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 e, f, and h of Reference A, to prepare plans for the effective coordination of ship and short antiaircraft artillery gun fire against surprise aircraft raids, and to consider the desirability of using balloon barrages in the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area.

Army Members:                         Navy Members:
   Haw. Air Force:                       14ND District Marine Officer:
      Lt. Col. Hegenberger, AC              Col. H. K. Pickett
   H. S. C. A. B.:                       BatFor Gunnery Officer,
      Major R. T. Frederick, 64th CA     USS Missis.
      Capt. M G. Weber, CAC                 Lt. Comdr. W. W. Juvenal
                                        Ass't. Air Officer, USS Yorktown
                                            Lt. Comdr. H. F. Macomsey

d. Armament Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraph 5 g of Reference A:

Army Members:                     Navy Members:
   Hq. Haw. Dept.:                   14ND IOC NAD Oahu:
      Lt. Col. M. W. Marsh, Inf.        Comdr. W. W. Meek
      Major R. McK. Smith, OD.       Staff ComAirBatFor, Gunnery:
   Haw. Air Force:                      Lt. Comdr. S. E. Burroughs, Jr.
      Lt. Col. A. B. Custis, OD.     Staff, ComPatWingTwo, Gunnery:
                                        Lt. H. P. Cooper

[3]

e. Chemical Warfare Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to measures to screen the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area from air attack by the use of smoke or by other devices:

Army Members:                         Navy Members:
   Hq. Haw. Dept:                        14ND CO Barracks Detachment:
      Col. J. W. Lyon, CWS                  Major J. M. Smith, USMC
   Haw. Air Force:                       PatWingTwo CO Patron 21:
      Major M. E. Jennings, CWS             Lt. Comdr. J. W. Harris
   H. S. C. A. B.:
      Major F. T. Ostenberg, 64th CA

3. The studies and recommendations of the Committees will be based upon existing conditions and steps which may be taken in the near future to improve these conditions. The senior officer of each committee will act as its chairman. Direct consultation by committee members with any units under the control of the Department Commander or of the District Commandant is authorized and encouraged. Reports containing the recommendations of the committees will be submitted to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4 Reference B) not later than 1 March, 1941, with a view to the immediate preparation of joint operation plans for defense against air attacks.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has detailed the fleet members for the committees as indicated in paragraph 2 above.

5. All members of all committees who are not temporarily absent from Oahu on other duty will assemble at 0930 seventeen February in Office of Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter.

WALTER C. SHORT                        C. C. BLOCH
   Lieutenant General, U. S. Army      Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
      Commanding Hawaiian Department   Fourteenth Naval District

Copies to: C. G., H. A. F.             Copies to: CinCus
           Fort Shafter, T. H.                    ComBatFor
           C. G., H. S. G. A. B.                  ComScoFor
           Fort DeRussy, T. H.                    ComAirBatFor
           C. G., Schofield Barracks              ComPatWingTwo


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