Section III. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO THE ATTACK 
 
[60] A. The Organization of Naval Intelligence in General; Sources of  
Information, and Relations with the Pacific Fleet.  
 
The Office of Naval Intelligence, which was under the Chief of Naval  
Operations, consisted of two main branches-Domestic and Foreign. The  
Domestic Branch had to do with internal espionage and other subversive  
activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national  
and particularly naval welfare. It maintained branch offices in various  
of the principal cities of the United States, including Honolulu. The  
Foreign Branch was organized into a number of sections, of which one was  
the Far Eastern Section. The Director of Naval Intelligence was Rear  
Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Jr. The officer in charge of the Far Eastern  
Section of the Foreign Branch was Commander Arthur H. McCollum.  
 
The primary sources of information which the Far Eastern Section had  
were Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers' reports from  
various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of  
the Asiatic Fleet and from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet,  
including reports as to radio intelligence, and reports of  
investigations conducted by the domestic branch of ONI, particularly  
from Honolulu, and State Department reports at Washington. A most  
important part of the information provided to the Far Eastern Section  
was supplied by a unit at Washington known as OP-20-G. This was under  
the command of Commander Laurence F. Safford and supplied information  
obtained from communication or radio intelligence. This section was  
staffed both by Communications officers and Intelligence officers. The  
information received by OP-20-G was supplied to Lt. Comdr. Alvin D.  
Kramer of ONI, who was working with that section, and was transmitted by  
him to the head of the Far Eastern Section and to the Director of Naval  
Intelligence.  
 
The section known as OP-20-G was concerned with the interception,  
decryption, and translation of Japanese messages. In addition it was  
 
Page 432 
 
responsible for furnishing the Navy's own codes and ciphers and for the  
supervision of the security of the Navy's own communications. Japanese  
messages were intercepted by various methods, including radio  
interception by a number of radio intercept stations located in the  
United States, which transmitted the Japanese communications, as  
intercepted by them to OP-20-G for decryption and translation. In  
addition to reports from intercept stations located in the United  
States, this section received reports from communication intelligence  
units located at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. This unit was  
concerned with the plans and intentions of foreign governments,  
principally Japan, and with intelligence relating to naval operations in  
the Atlantic. The communications intelligence organization at Pearl  
Harbor, which had subsidiary stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch  
Harbor, was concerned primarily with the dispositions and [61] plans of  
naval forces in the Pacific and with surveillance of Japanese naval  
communications. The communications intelligence unit in the Philippines,  
which was located at Corregidor, was concerned with Japanese naval  
communications and Japanese diplomatic communications. The Officer in  
Charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was Lt.  
Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort. The officer in charge of the communications  
intelligence unit at Corregidor until September, 1941 was Lt. Comdr.  
Rudolph J. Fabian. He remained thereafter assisting that unit.  
 
Japanese diplomatic communications were in various codes, such as the  
code known as the "purple" code, the "red" code, the "J-19" code, the  
"PA-K2" code, and the "LA" code. The so-called "purple" code contained  
the most important Japanese diplomatic messages. Messages in this and in  
other diplomatic codes were intercepted and read at the Philippines  
primarily for the purpose of local information. They were sent, as  
intercepted, to the Navy Department in one of the Navy's own codes. All  
intercepted diplomatic traffic was sent to Washington whether or not it  
was deciphered and read at the Philippines. None of this information was  
sent from the Philippines to Pearl Harbor. The unit at Pearl Harbor was  
intercepting and decrypting no Japanese diplomatic traffic. It had been  
directed to concentrate on Japanese naval systems. The unit at  
Washington was charged with the general control of the units at  
Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and at Washington, and handled the Japanese  
diplomatic systems and also handled some Japanese naval systems.  
 
Intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic received by the Washington unit  
was pooled with similar traffic intercepted by the Army and was  
decrypted and translated by the Navy and the Army on an alternate bay  
basis. The resulting information was distributed daily by ONI to the  
Chief of Naval Operations, and to others in the Navy Department. The  
President and the State Department similarly were furnished this  
information daily.  
 
It appears that, although the Navy enjoyed considerable success in  
decrypting Japanese diplomatic communications, the Japanese naval codes  
were not being read. Information obtained by radio intelligence,  
therefore, from Japanese naval traffic was based almost entirely on so- 
called "traffic analysis" and not upon reading of the messages  
themselves.  
 
The units at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines advised the Washington  
unit of the results of their traffic analysis of Japanese naval 
 
Page 433 
 
communications, and of the estimated location and movement of Japanese  
naval forces, and also exchanged information with one another on that  
subject. The units also exchanged information on technical subjects,  
that is, pertaining to codes and ciphers and keys for deciphering codes.  
 
Information developed from the reading of the "purple" messages was not  
sent to the Pearl Harbor unit as such. It does appear, however, that  
various of the warning messages and other dispatches sent by the Chief  
of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based  
upon information derived from the Japanese diplomatic messages. [62]  
Thus it appears that the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief of the  
Pacific Fleet as to the status of diplomatic relations with Japan  
depended primarily upon the messages sent to him by the Chief of Naval  
Operations. The information received by the radio intelligence unit at  
Pearl Harbor as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces  
was, however, brought directly to the attention of the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet daily by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, as  
was other material of an intelligence nature.  
 
B. The Approach of War: Intercepted Communications Available at  
Washington, and Messages Sent by CNO to Admiral Kimmel.  
 
It should be noted that the Japanese communications which were  
intercepted and decoded and translated by the War and Navy Departments,  
as set forth in this section, were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. Various  
of the messages sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations  
were based on these Japanese communications.  
 
(1) The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th dispatch.  
 
On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to  
Cinclant, CincPac and CincAF (Exhibit 13, Naval Court), reading as  
follows:  
 
"The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X  
If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic  
and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be  
that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include  
rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and  
Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held  
responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a  
possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these  
possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory  
deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute  
provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform  
appropriate Army and Navy district authorities X Acknowledge" 
 
On 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 38  
Naval Court). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been  
"popping" here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches  
Admiral Kimmel knew about all that they did. He said, "Personally, I do  
not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I  
sent you merely stated the 'possibility ;' in fact, I tempered the  
message handed me considerably. Perhaps I was wrong, but I hope not. In  
any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we  
should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."  
 
[63] Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in an  
earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Jap- 
 
Page 434 
 
anese attack on Siberia in August, Admiral Stark had said that his own  
judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the  
Russian situation showed a definite trend. In this letter he said that  
he thought this whole thing worked up together. He stated that efforts  
would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it  
could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. Hull  
were working on it. To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in  
part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some  
sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at  
Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I  
told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that  
I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese  
ships as far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island  
carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on  
guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to  
worry."  
 
Also annexed was a memorandum of 17 October 1941, by Rear Admiral  
Schuirmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese  
Cabinet. The substance of this analysis was that the military would  
determine Japanese action whether to attack Russia or move southward,  
and would make that decision on the basis of opportunity and what they  
could get away with, and that it would not be determined by the cabinet  
in power.  
 
(2) Japanese messages concerning German attitude; Nomura's desire to  
resign.  
 
On 18 October 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese  
communication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 1 October 1941, which stated  
that the Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's  
position, particularly because Japan was not advising Germany of the  
negotiations with the United States, although the United States was  
advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).  
 
A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 16 October 1941, was  
intercepted and translated on 17 October 1941. In this Toyoda advised  
Nomura that although he had been requested by both the German and  
Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on  
the Japanese-United States negotiations, he had, in consideration of the  
nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early in  
October, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the  
consequent revival of the movement for revision of the neutrality act,  
the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to  
the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt Administration  
continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation would  
inevitably arise between Germany, Italy, and the United States, which,  
under the Three-Power Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately  
the war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message  
was being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of  
postponement (Document 3, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).  
 
[64] On 22 October 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was  
intercepted and translated on 23 October 1941, in which he said that he  
was sure that he, too, should go out with the former cabinet; that he  
knew that the Secretary of State realized how sincere he was and yet how  
little influence he had in Japan; that there were some  
 
Page 435 
 
Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better for  
him, but that their encouragement was not enough; that among his  
confreres in the United States there were some who felt the same way,  
but they were all poor deluded souls; that the instructions could be  
carried out by Wakasugi; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a  
dead horse; that he did not want to continue "this hypocritical  
existence, deceiving other people;" that he was not trying to flee from  
the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open  
for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan  
(Document 5, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).  
 
On 23 October 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington-of the same date  
was intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was  
making were appreciated; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of  
those negotiations had a great bearing upon the decision as to which  
road the Imperial Government would proceed that as such it was an  
exceedingly important matter; that they were placing all of their  
reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this matter; that for  
these reasons they hoped that he would see fit to sacrifice his personal  
wishes and remain at his post (Document 6 Exhibit 63, Naval Court).  
 
(3) Action taken by Admiral Kimmel.  
 
Admiral Kimmel advised, in a letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14 Naval  
Court), that the action taken included maintaining two submarines for  
patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, preparing  
to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at  
Midway from Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Wake, and sending  
additional Marines and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to  
Palmyra, placing Admiral Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice,  
getting six submarines ready to depart for Japan on short notice,  
putting some additional security measures in effect in the operating  
areas outside Pearl Harbor.  
 
On 7 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 74,  
Naval Court) in reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 22nd. He  
stated, among other things, "O. K. on the dispositions which you made in  
connection with recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The big question  
is-what next?!" Also, "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a  
crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The  
principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before;  
it continually gets 'worser and worser'! A month may see, literally,  
most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever- 
particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look  
good."  
 
[65]

(4) The first Japanese deadline message: Japanese interest in  
American ships.  
 
On 5 November 1941, the Navy translated a message from Tokyo to  
Washington, reading as follows:  
 
"(Of utmost secrecy). 
 
"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all  
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th  
of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the  
circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this  
thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. Relations  
from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination  
and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.  
 
"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only." 
 
Page 436 
 
During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington  
various intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships and planes  
at Manila and Seattle (Documents 1-8, Exhibit 68, Naval Court).  
According to one of these messages, which was dated 5 November 1941, the  
Navy General Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the  
conditions of airports, types of planes and numbers of planes there,  
warships there, machinery belonging to land forces, and the state of  
progress being made on all equipment and establishments.  
 
(5) Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall recommendations as to  
ultimatum.  
 
The situation existing early in November was summarized by Nomura, in a  
report to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, intercepted on November 12th  
(Document 8, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) by reference to a report from the  
legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who had conferred with Senator  
Thomas and Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that  
if Japan invaded again, the United States would fight with Japan, that  
psychologically the American people were ready, that the Navy was ready  
and prepared for action. Nomura also reported that he had a conversation  
with "a certain Cabinet member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a  
dear friend, that he would tell him alone this: that the American  
government was receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again  
and did not believe that Nomura's visit to the President, or coming of  
Kurusu, would have any effect on the general situation. Nomura said that  
he had explained how impatient the Japanese had become since the  
freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did  
not desire a Japanese-American war, and how they hoped for peace until  
the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and  
Secretary of State believed "those reports."  [66] Nomura also said that  
his friend had stated that the United States could not stop because if  
Japan moved, something would have to be done to save the "face" of the  
United States. 
 
Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better  
understanding between the United States and Japan would come from  
Kurusu's visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile  
the Japanese and American views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel  
by letter dated 14 November 1941 (Exhibit 39, Naval Court). With this  
letter Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum,  
dated 5 November 1941, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall for the  
President. This was concerned with the belief of Chiang-Kai-shek that a  
Japanese attack on Kumming was imminent and that outside military  
support was the sole hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum  
considered whether the United States would be justified in undertaking  
offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent her from severing  
the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific was  
inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlimited  
strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the  
middle of December, 1911, United States air and submarine strength in  
the Philippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese  
operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that  
all aid short of war be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to  
Japan. 
 
Page 437 
 
(6) Further and Final Japanese "deadline messages."  
 
At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese  
Government had established a further and final deadline for the  
completion of diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages  
from Tokyo to Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the  
Army, as follows:  
 
(a) A translation on 17 November 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63, Naval  
Court), of a dispatch, dated November 16th, the highlights of which  
were:  
 
"* * * The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days  
so please fight harder than you ever did before.  
 
"What you say is of course so * * * but I have only to refer you to the  
fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that  
conditions within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in  
reaching a settlement with the United States) * * * try to realize what  
that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war  
takes and remain patient * * * the situation renders this out of the  
question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in  
my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You  
see how [67] short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United  
States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press  
them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to  
bring about an immediate solution." 
 
(b) On 22 November 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), a  
translation of a dispatch of the same date, reading in substance:  
 
"To both you Ambassadors. 
 
"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my  
#736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick  
to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to  
bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your  
ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by  
the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your  
conversations with the Americans, if the signing can be completed by the  
29th (let me write it out for you-twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes  
can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and  
the Netherlands, and in short if everything can be finished. We have  
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline  
absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going  
to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work  
harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the  
information of you two Ambassadors alone." 
 
(7) The November 24th dispatch to CincPac and others.  
 
On 24 November 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which before the Naval  
Court Admiral Stark said was based in part on the "deadline" intercept- 
page 775), was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac,  
ComELEVEN, ComTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:  
 
"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X  
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and  
movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a  
surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on  
Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this  
dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior army  
officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to  
complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X  
Guam will be informed separately" 
 
[68] On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 47, Naval Court), Admiral Stark wrote  
to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of 17 October 1941, on the  
inadequacy of local defense forces in Hawaii (Exhibit 46, Naval Court).  
Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his  
responsibilities in connection with tasks per- 
 
Page 438 
 
taining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces available  
in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the  
actual operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the  
numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local  
defense tasks. Admiral Stark's letter continued by summarizing the  
situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among  
other things, pointed out that the Department had no additional  
airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval District. A  
marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in Hawaii,  
stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the  
Fleet has offensive work to do." 
 
On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 16, Naval Court), Admiral Stark also wrote  
a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that  
Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in  
Japanese home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase  
in the strength of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC-1 nor  
Rainbow-5 contemplated this as a general policy; after the British  
strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious occasions,  
opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present themselves. But  
this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to this  
letter stated that both Air. Hull and the President confirmed the  
gravity of the situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark  
sent a day or two before. It stated further that neither the President  
nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack; that  
from many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most  
embarrassing thing that could happen to us; and there were some who  
thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated: "I do not give  
it the weight others do. But I included it because of the strong feeling  
among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the  
time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I  
still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road  
area as the most likely.... I won't go into the pros and cons of what  
the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The  
only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only  
thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing-I think it is more  
likely to be anything."  
 
(8) Dispatches concerning reinforcement of Wake and Midway.  
 
On 26 November 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40, Naval Court) was sent by  
the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Army had  
offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense  
battalions now on station, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable  
also, that the Army proposed to prepare, in Hawaii, garrison troops for  
advance bases which Admiral Kimmel might occupy, but was unable to  
provide any antiaircraft units. Admiral Kimmel was instructed to take  
this into consideration and [69] advise when practicable the number of  
troops desired and recommended armament. 
 
Also on 26 November 1941; another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to  
CincPac, which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second  
Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, OpNav had  
requested the Army, and the Army had agreed, to station twenty-five Army  
pursuits at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided CincPac  
considered this feasible and desirable; that it would be neces- 
 
Page 439 
 
sary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to  
these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown  
off at destination; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and  
essential spare parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the  
carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels; that the Army  
understood that these forces must be quartered in tents; that the Navy  
must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting  
other Army supplies; that the stationing of these planes must not be  
allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to the  
Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be laid promptly  
if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy bombs at  
outlying positions could be carried by Army bombers which might fly to  
those positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was  
directed to confer with the Commanding General and advise as soon as  
practicable.  
 
(9) Intercepted: Japanese communications of November 26th and 27th. 
 
On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional  
intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as  
follows:  
 
(a) A Navy translation on 27 November 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63,  
Naval Court) of a message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so- 
called "Purple" code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated:  
 
"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not  
reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them  
(defer?) for a while." 
 
(b) A Navy translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63,  
Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating  
that:  
 
"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we add the  
following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence  
broadcasts: 
 
"(1) if it is Japan-U. S. relations "HIGASHI".  
"(2) Japan-Russia relations "KITA".  
"(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai Malaya and N. E. I.)  
"NISHI".  
 
[70] "The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning  
and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires Mexico city San  
Francisco." 
 
(c) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 9, Exhibit 68,  
Naval Court), of a message to Manila, dated 20 November 1941, in the  
"purple" code, marked "Strictly Secret" and stating:  
 
"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the  
type of draft - presumed to he in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay.  
(Near Manila, P. I.)  
 
"Furthermore please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as  
to Tokyo." 
 
(d) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63,  
Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 26 November 1941, in the  
"purple" code, which stated:  
 
"To be handled in Government Code.  
 
"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too  
long. Therefore will you cut down the substance of your reports of  
negotiations to the minimum and on occasion call up Chief YAMAMOTO of  
the American Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At  
that time we will use the following code: (Codes were then set forth.)" 
 
Page 440  
 
(10) The State Department note of November 26th and Japanese reaction  
thereto: the war warning of November 27th.  
 
The diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese representatives, Nomura  
and Kurusu, came to a head on 26 November 1941. At that time, the State  
Department presented a proposal to the Japanese and that Department  
reported to the Navy Department, among others, that it had no further  
hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Japanese reaction to  
this proposal appears from dispatches which were subsequently decrypted  
and translated. They are as follows:  
 
(a) An Army translation (Document 17 Exhibit 63) Naval Court) of a  
message from Washington (Nomuru [sic]) to Tokyo dated 26 November 1941,  
in the "purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," which stated:  
 
"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with  
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours. 
 
"HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been  
getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully  
with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented  
by Japan on [71] the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that  
we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose  
a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of  
difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September  
25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:  
 
"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'  
 
"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo,  
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.  
 
"(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the  
Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China  
and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.  
 
"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all  
French Indo-China. 
 
"(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no  
regime in China but that of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.  
 
"(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.  
 
"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the  
United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.  
 
"(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.  
 
"(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.  
 
"(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States  
has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that  
these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of  
this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of  
course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)  
 
"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and  
said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to  
Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why  
did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well,  
England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then,  
too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a  
number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike  
at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that  
we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her  
national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or  
we think so." 
 
[72] (b) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63 Naval Court) of a  
message from Washington to Tokyo dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple"  
code and marked "Extremely Urgent," Message #1180, reading:  
 
"From NOMURA and KURUSU.  
 
"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of  
having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we  
let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so,  
the negotiations 
 
Page 441 
 
will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called  
so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing  
for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might  
propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of  
posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate in  
the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us  
what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an  
arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a  
cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also  
gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the  
United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their  
protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I  
think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including  
French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last  
September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo- 
China and Thai.)  
 
"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not  
necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we  
break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is  
to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack  
them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is  
whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the  
treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that  
the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this  
world war before it could possibly be settled.  
 
"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will  
have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least  
to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope  
that you will wire back instantly." 
 
(C) An Army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a  
message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 28 November 1941, in the  
"purple" code, reading: 
 
"[73] Re your #1189.  
 
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite  
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating  
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The  
Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations.  
Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this  
American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the  
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I  
do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken  
off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that,  
although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to  
your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just  
claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the  
Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and  
conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States  
has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish  
negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man  
you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present  
circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do  
the best you can." 
 
(Note: The man is the Navy Minister.)  
 
On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO, which  
has been termed the "war warning." It read:  
 
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with  
Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have  
ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few  
days x the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization  
of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either  
the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly  
Borneo x execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to  
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x inform district and Army  
authorities x a similar warning is being sent by War Department x  
spenavo inform British-x continental districts Guam Samoa directed take  
appropriate measures against sabotage." 
 
(11) The dispatch of November 28th: 
 
Page 442 
 
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a  
dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th  
(Exhibit 19, Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent  
by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:  
 
"[74]  Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical  
purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government  
might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action  
unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities  
cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit  
the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as  
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense  
X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such  
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these  
measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil  
population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate  
message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities  
in the United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the  
tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit  
dissemination of this highly Secret information to minimum essential  
officers" 
 
The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the  
Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as  
then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It  
stated further:  
 
"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X  
Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply  
to Japan in case hostilities occur." 
 
(12) Intercepted diplomatic communications, November 29 to December 6,  
1491.  
 
On 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from  
Tokyo to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated 29 November 1941  
(Document 19, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), requesting that they make one  
more attempt to discuss the situation with the United States, and to  
state that the United States had always taken a fair position in the  
past; that the Imperial Government could not understand why the United  
States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese proposals could not  
be the basis of discussion, but instead had made new proposals which  
ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would greatly injure  
the prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States should  
be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States  
had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the  
United States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries  
were directed in carrying out this instruction to be careful that this  
did not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations. 
 
[75]   Also on 30 November 1941 there was a Navy translation of a trans- 
Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to  
Yamamoto in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was used (Document 20,  
Exhibit 63, Naval Court). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long  
message ("probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals"); that the  
President was returning apparently because of the speech of the Japanese  
Premier which Kurusu said was having strong repercussions here; that  
Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used greater caution in  
speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult  
position; that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they  
were being careful; that 
 
Page 443 
 
Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here had  
expected to hear something different-some good word-but instead got this  
(the Premier's speech); that the Japanese-American negotiations were to  
continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out; that Kurusu  
needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both the Premier and the  
Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their speeches and  
that all would have to use some discretion; that Yamamoto said the real  
problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happenings  
in the South.  
 
There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on 1  
December 1941, as follows:  
 
(a) Navy translation-(Document 21, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)  
 
"From: Tokyo 
"To: Washington 
"1 December 1941 
"(Purple CA) 
"#865  Re my #857 
 
"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation  
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United  
States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press  
and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and  
the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for  
only your information.)  
 
"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S.  
Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message  
#1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.  
 
"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the  
capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that  
the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far  
Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter." 
 
[76] (b) Army translation-(Document 22, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)  
 
"From: Tokyo 
"To: Berlin  
"November 30, 1941 
"Purple  
"#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)  
"(Secret outside the Department)  
 
"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this  
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that  
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite  
Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the  
vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of  
diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based  
her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance.  
With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in  
the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these  
negotiations.  
 
"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the  
view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and  
equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past.  
However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of  
troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation  
of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in  
opposition to each other. 
 
"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we  
first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its  
traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations,  
re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in  
the conversations carried on between the United States and England in  
the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was  
brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by  
Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say,  
the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as  
 
Page 444 
 
the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could  
be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United  
States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to  
demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government  
from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting.  
That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few  
days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial  
Government could no longer [77] continue negotiations with the United  
States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would  
inevitably be detrimental to our cause. 
 
"(Part 2 of 2) 
 
"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this  
attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting  
clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into  
with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon  
the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the  
Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in  
case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese  
Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It  
is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others makes it  
impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations.  
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they  
conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China-they did  
so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in  
collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with  
Germany and Italy, as an enemy." 
 
(c) On 1 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted message from  
Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, dated 30 November 1941  
(Document 6, Exhibit 13), which in substance stated:  
 
"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say  
very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that  
war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan,  
and that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than  
anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for  
the time being would prefer to refrain from any indirect moves on the  
north.... Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is." 
 
(d) Army translation-(Document 23, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)  
 
"From: Washington (Nomura) 
"To: Tokyo 
"November 28, 1941 
"Purple #1214  To be handled in Government Code.  
 
"Re my #1190.  
 
"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the  
United States however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are  
out and headlines like [78] this are appearing in the papers: "Hull  
Hands Peace Plan to Japanese" and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The  
papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal  
with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the  
responsibility would be upon Japan. 
 
"This we must carefully note." 
 
On 3 December 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report  
by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated 2 December 1941 (Document 2S,  
Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated:  
 
"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under- 
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by  
saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the  
United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire  
#1233. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the  
slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will  
transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home  
Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing  
as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20."  
The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the  
United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts  
of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other  
countries have pyramided economic 
 
Page 445 
 
pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement  
that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We  
haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the  
rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure,  
and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to  
this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to  
realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find  
themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the  
President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.  
Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent  
American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound  
consideration to his important question which has to do with our  
national destiny." Under-Secretary WELLES said: "I am well aware of  
that." I continued "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as  
Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new  
American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the  
21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our  
greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In  
spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it  
has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful  
consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth  
and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to  
evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in [79] the event of a  
settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of just  
peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental  
questions, the question of the representations of this date would  
naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and  
then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the  
necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the  
internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinion  
that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer  
with the Secretary." I got the impression from the manner in which he  
spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the  
26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary  
of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that  
the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current  
difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about  
a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in  
your considerations our reply to the new American proposals and to my  
separate wire #1233." 
 
There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest  
available on 4 December 1941, as follows: 
 
(a) Navy translation (Document 26, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 
 
"From: Tokyo  
"To: Hsinking  
"1 December 1941  
"(Purple)  
"#893 
 
". . . In the event that Manchuria participates in the war . . . in view  
of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to  
participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps  
toward England and America at this country will take in case war breaks  
out. A summary follows: 
 
"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be  
recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the  
sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be  
forbidden.). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them  
after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan  
accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.  
 
"[80]  2. The treatment accorded to British and American public  
property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be  
comparable to that accorded by Japan.  
 
"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their  
consular offices and interests will not be recognized.  
 
"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be  
equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.  
 
"4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform  
the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall  
be exercised not to antagonize Russia. 
 
Page 446 
 
(b) Navy translation (Document 27, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)  
 
"From: Washington 
"To: Tokyo 
"1 December 1941 
"(Purple) 
" #1227  
 
"(This raised the question of a possibility of a conference between  
persons in whom the leaders have confidence to have the make one final  
effort to reach some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway  
point, such as Honolulu. . . It was said that this last effort might  
facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.)" 
 
(c) Navy translation (Document 29, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)  
 
"From: Tokyo 
"To: Washington 
"3 December 1941 
"(Purple) 
"#875 Chief of Office routing. 
 
"Re your #1232 
 
"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following  
lines:  
 
"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in  
French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently  
there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in  
the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we  
have [81] increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China.  
There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as  
a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the  
exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way  
violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense  
agreement."  
 
(d) Navy translation (Document 31, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 
 
"From: Washington 
"To: Tokyo 
"3 December 1941 
"(Purple) 
"#1243 
 
"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is  
expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore  
consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with  
the evacuation of the consuls." 
 
On 5 December 1941, there were available translations of additional  
intercepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic  
negotiations, as follows:  
 
(a) Army translation (Document 33, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)  
 
"From: Washington 
"To: Tokyo 
"3 December 1941 
"(Purple) 
"#1243 
 
"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action  
between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a  
declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an  
occupation of Thailand." 
 
(b) Navy translation (Document 34, Exhibit 63, Naval Court,)  
 
"From: Washington 
"To: Tokyo 
"1 December 1941 
"(Purple) 
"#1225 
 
"(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives  
with Secretary HULL on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese  
Premier's speech, the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and  
apparent agreements as to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)"  
 
Page 447 
 
[82]

(13) Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between 29 November  
and 6 December 1941.  
 
During this period there were available to the Navy and to the Army in  
Washington translations of intercepted Japanese espionage reports  
concerning Manila, San Francisco, and Honolulu. From these it appeared  
that the Japanese were interested in the movements of ships to and from  
those ports. The messages relating to Honolulu were as follows:  
 
(a) On December 3rd, the Navy Department translated a communication from  
Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 15 November 1941 (Document 24, Exhibit 63,  
Naval Court), which stated that since relations between Japan and the  
United States were most critical, the "Ships in the harbor report"  
should be made irregularly but at the rate of twice a week and that  
extra care should be taken to maintain secrecy.  
 
(b) On December 5th, there was available at the War Department a  
translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 18 November 1941,  
requesting reports on vessels in certain areas of Pearl Harbor and  
directing that the investigation be made with great Secrecy (Document 37  
Exhibit 63, Naval Court).  
 
(c) Also available on December 5th at the Navy Department was a  
translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 1941,  
stating that reports had been received on ship movements but in the  
future Honolulu was also to report even when there were no movements  
(Document 36, Exhibit 63. Naval Court).  
 
(d) On December 6th, there was available at the War Department a  
translation of a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 18 November 1941,  
(Document 40, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), reporting on ships anchored in  
Pearl Harbor and in certain areas of the harbor and pointing out that  
the Saratoga was not in harbor and that the Enterprise or some other  
vessel was in a particular area. This message also reported on the  
course of certain destroyers which had been observed entering the  
harbor. 
 
(14) Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by Japanese and  
first thirteen parts of reply-6 December 1941.  
 
On 6 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese  
communication (Document 38, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), from Tokyo to  
Washington, which read:  
 
"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of  
the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for  
the United states contained in my separate message #902 (in English)  
 
"[83]  2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in  
fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am  
not sure the situation is extremely delicate and when you receive it I  
want you please to keep it secret for the time being.  
 
"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United  
States, I will wire you in a separate message. However I want you in the  
meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to  
present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."  
 
Also on 6 December 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of  
the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which had  
been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It  
may be noted that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which  
were originally indicated as Navy translations were corrected so as to  
indicate that they were translated by he Army. These 13 parts which are  
not set forth here, but particularly part 13, disclosed that the  
Japanese were of the view that the  
 
Page 448 
 
American proposal, viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the  
Japanese as a basis of negotiations.  
 
The message concerning delivery of the Japanese reply, and the first  
thirteen parts of that reply, were received in the Navy Department by 3  
p. m. on 6 December 1941. After decryption and translation by about 9 p.  
m. on December 6th, they were distributed by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to the  
White House and to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of War and  
Secretary of State apparently also received copies and a meeting was  
called of the three Secretaries for ten o'clock on the following  
morning.  
 
(15) Communications intercepted on 7 December 1941.  
 
The Japanese communications which were translated and available on the  
morning of 7 December 1941 included the following:  
 
"(a) From: Washington ( Nomura ) 
"To: Tokyo 
"December 3, 1941 
"Purple ((Urgent) 
"#1256. Re your #875 
 
"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this  
reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The  
United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this  
reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it  
is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key  
deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United  
States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will  
take a bold step depending [84] upon how our reply is made. If it is  
really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the  
explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor  
prevent them taking the bold step referred to-even if your reply is made  
for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in  
view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to  
the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives  
a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore,  
reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once." 
 
"(b) From: Washington 
"To: Tokyo 
"December 6, 1941 
"Purple (Urgent) 
"#1272  
 
"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and  
HULL we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members  
having close relations with the President and through individuals  
equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State  
Department, please keep this point strictly Secret). Up until this  
moment we have the following to report:  
 
"(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and  
advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the  
"introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President  
did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this  
attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the  
President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question,  
I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.  
 
"(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November  
20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections  
in the United States proposal of November 26th which are either  
innocuous or advantageous to us------------------(Message  
Incomplete)-----------------------" 
 
"(c) From: Budapest 
"To: Tokyo 
"December 7 1941 
"LA 
"#104 Re my #103  
 
"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this  
country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of  
war would break out on the 7th.  
 
"Relayed to Berlin." 
 
Page 449 
 
[85] (d) Navy translation (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)  
 
"From: Tokyo 
"To: Washington 
"7 December 1941 
"(Purple-Eng ) 
"#902  Part 14 of 14  
 
"(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling  
this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")  
 
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire  
with treat Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts  
toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in  
East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and  
interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been  
revealed clearly during the course of the resent negotiations. Thus, the  
earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American  
relations and to preserve and promote the peace of he Pacific through  
cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.  
 
"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American  
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it  
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through  
further negotiations."  
 
(e) Army translation (Document 41, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)  
 
"From: Tokyo 
"To: Washington 
"December 7, 1941 
"Purple (Urgent-Very Important) 
"#907 To be handled in government code.  
 
"Re my #902. 
 
"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if  
possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at  
1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time." 
 
(16) Delivery of Part 14 and the 1 p. m. message and action taken. 
 
The evidence indicates that Part 14 of the Japanese reply, which  
required decoding but not translation, was received between 0305 and 700  
on 7 December 1941, and that it and the first 13 parts were distributed  
[86] by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to Admiral Stark's office between 0900 and  
0930, and then to the White House and to the State Department. The "1 p.  
m. delivery message" was not distributed at this time. Kramer testified  
that he returned to the Navy Department at about 10:20 and found that  
message and certain other messages, such as a message which directed the  
destruction of Japanese codes, still on hand and another which thanked  
the Ambassador for is services. This material, Kramer testified, was  
delivered to Admiral Stark at about 10:30, and then to the White House  
and to the State Department. 
 
The evidence indicates that the "1 p. m. message" was decrypted and was  
available in Japanese in the Navy Department prior to 0700 on 7 December  
1941, and that because there was no Japanese translator on duty it was  
sent to the Army for translation at about 0700. It is not clear when the  
Army returned the translation of that message. Kramer stated that it was  
not in the Navy Department when he left to distribute the fourteen-part  
reply between 0900 and 0930 that morning, but that he found it upon his  
return to the Navy Department at about 10:20. It would appear,  
therefore, that the Army returned its trans- 
 
Page 450 
 
lation of the "1 p. m. message" some time between 0900 and 1020 on 7  
December 1941. It further appears that several hours' advance notice of  
the contents of that message may have been lost because there was no  
Japanese translator on duty at the Navy Department on that Sunday  
morning, and because it was necessary to wait for an Army translation.  
 
Prior investigations developed the fact that, after consultation with  
Admiral Stark that morning, General Marshall sent a message to various  
Army commands, including the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.  
The message read:  
 
"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what  
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code  
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we  
do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of  
this communication." 
 
The prior investigations also developed the fact that the Army radio was  
unable to raise Hawaii that morning and accordingly sent that message by  
commercial cable in code. The message, according to General Short's  
prior testimony, was received by the Signal Officer at Hawaii at 1145,  
and decoded some four hours after the attack.  
 
Whether or not the Army message would have reached the Commanding  
General, Hawaiian Department, prior to the attack if a Navy translator  
had been on duty on the morning of 7 December 1941, or if the Army had  
immediately translated and returned the "1 p. m. message," is  
speculative. It is, moreover, also speculative as to what action might  
have been taken by General Short or Admiral Kimmel had they received  
that Army message prior to the attack.  
 
[87]

(17) Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between 29 November and 7  
December 1941.  
 
The messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel  
during this period dealt primarily with the destruction of codes by the  
Japanese and with the advisability of destruction of United States codes  
at Guam. The messages are discussed subsequently in this report.  
 
(18) Admiral Kimmel's failure to transmit information to subordinate  
commanders.  
 
It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his  
investigation that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on a December 1941  
with a powerful force consisting of the Lexington, Chicago, Portland,  
and five destroyers, to deliver a squadron of planes to Midway. He  
testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding the  
arming of planes or regarding preparation for war, other than the  
ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was he ever informed of  
the contents of the October 16th dispatch concerning the resignation of  
the Japanese cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch advising of the  
possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any  
direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, or the November  
27th war warning. He said that except for what he read in the  
newspapers, he did not learn anything during the period November 26th to  
December 5th which indicated the increased danger of hostilities with  
Japan.  
 
Admiral Bellinger, who was commander of Task Force Nine, consisting of  
the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified in this investi- 
 
Page 451 
 
gation that he never saw nor did he learn the contents of the October  
16th, November 24th, or November 27th dispatches from the Chief of Naval  
Operations.  
 
[88]

C. The Interception of Japanese Telephone and Cable Messages.  
 
It appears that in Washington, D. C., the Navy was receiving information  
obtained from intercepted Japanese telephone and cable messages. For  
example, on 30 November 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a trans- 
Pacific radio telephone conversation in code between Kurusu in  
Washington and Yamamoto in Tokyo (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).  
And, on 10 October 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a cable  
message from Honolulu to Washington, in which a code was established for  
reporting the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor, which message had  
been photographed in the cable office in Washington and thus obtained by  
the Navy (Document 3, Exhibit 13).  
 
For many months prior to the attack, the Office of Naval Intelligence at  
Honolulu had been tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and  
of the Japanese Vice Consul. For a period of time also the home  
telephones of these officials had been tapped. The taps on the lines of  
the Consulate were removed on 2 December 1941 by direction of Captain  
Mayfield, who was then the District Intelligence Officer. The evidence  
indicates that he took this action because he was fearful that the  
existence of such telephone taps would be discovered by the Japanese  
Consul. His fear arose from the fact that an FBI tap on the lines of a  
Japanese official of the NYK had been detected by a telephone company  
employee who had advised the District Intelligence Office of this. A  
representative of the District Intelligence Office subsequently had  
informed the local FBI office. It was learned that the FBI office had  
complained to the telephone company concerning the disclosure of its  
tap. In light of this situation, Captain Mayfield directed that the Navy  
taps be removed.  
 
It appears that no important military information was intercepted by  
means of the Navy Intelligence taps on the lines of the Japanese  
Consulate General. Exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation consist of  
photostatic copies of the notes made of the telephone conversation over  
the Japanese Consul General's line and the Japanese Vice Consul's line  
during the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941.  
 
Subsequent to 2 December 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
apparently continued its telephone taps and in this fashion on or about  
5 December 1941 learned the contents of a telephone conversation between  
a man named Mori in Hawaii and a person in Japan. The fact of this  
conversation was brought to the attention of the District Intelligence  
Officer, and on 6 December 1941, a transcript of the conversation was  
furnished to him and arrangements were made for a representative of the  
District Intelligence Office to listen to the recording of the telephone  
conversation; this, however, was not done until after the attack. A  
transcript of the telephone conversation, with marginal notes made by  
the District Intelligence representative after he attack, is Exhibit 39  
of this investigation. It may be noted that it  
 
 
 
Page 452 
 
appears from prior investigations that this conversation was brought to  
the attention of General Short [89] on the evening of 6 December 1941,  
and apparently nothing could be made out of it and no action was taken  
concerning it. There is no evidence indicating that this telephone  
conversation was brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention prior to the  
attack.  
 
In the conversation, there was mention of the flights of airplanes  
daily, the number of sailors present, the attitude of local Japanese,  
the local construction projects, the size of the local population, the  
precautionary measures taken at night time, the use of searchlights at  
night, the emphasis in Honolulu newspapers on the southern advance of  
Japan into French Indo-Chinas the visit of Kurusu, the local climate,  
the visit of Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador, the recent return of a  
Japanese from Honolulu to Japan, and the number of Japanese in the  
United States Army. The person in Japan inquired for information about  
the United States Fleet. Mori stated that he knew nothing about the  
Fleet, and that since they tried to avoid talking about such matters  
they did not know much about the Fleet. He said he didn't know whether  
all of the Fleet had gone, but that the Fleet present seemed small, and  
it seemed that the Fleet had left. The person in Japan then inquired  
whether that was so and what kind of flowers were in bloom in Hawaii.  
Mori stated that the flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole  
year, however that the hibiscus and the poinsettia were in bloom. He  
later stated that the Japanese chrysanthemums were in full bloom.  
 
There is some reason to believe that the statements concerning flowers  
in the Mori telephone conversation were the use of code words indicating  
the absence of presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. In this connection,  
the Operation Order for the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl  
Harbor (Exhibit 3) provided for the use of a radio broadcast code in  
which the statement "the cherry blossoms are in all their glory" would  
signify that there were "No warships in Pearl Harbor." This lends  
support to the theory advanced by representatives of the District  
Intelligence Office in their testimony to the effect that the primary  
purpose of the Mori telephone conversation over the trans-Pacific radio  
was to provide information to Japanese Fleet units which would be  
listening in on that frequency.  
 
The espionage reports submitted by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu have  
been previously discussed. It will be recalled that in those coded  
messages considerable information was given of the movement of ships and  
location of ships in Pearl Harbor and of defense preparations at Oahu.  
Certain messages sent during the first week of their glory" would  
signify that there were "No warships in Pearl Harbor. [sic, LWJ] The  
Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu transmitted its messages via  
commercial companies using the various communications companies  
alternately. During the month of November, the McKay Radio Company  
handled the messages primarily, and during the month of December, 1941,  
RCA was transmitting the messages.  
 
[90] Prior to December, 1941, efforts had been made by the District  
Intelligence Officer to get access to the files of the communications  
companies and thus to secure copies of the Japanese Consul General's  
messages. These efforts were without success, in view of the legal  
prohibitions against the disclosure of such messages. During a 
 
Page 453 
 
visit by Mr. Sarnoff, President of RCA, the District Intelligence  
Officer requested him to cooperate with the Navy by making such messages  
available, and pointed out the importance to the country of giving the  
Navy access to such messages.  
 
On 5 December 1941, RCA Communications, at Honolulu, turned over to  
Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, copies of some  
messages which had been sent by the Japanese Consul via RCA on the third  
and fourth of December. These messages, with the exception of a few  
unimportant plain language messages, were in code. Captain Mayfield  
turned them over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication  
Intelligence Unit, headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort, for  
decryption and translation. That organization had not been working on  
Japanese diplomatic traffic. Efforts were immediately made to decrypt  
and to translate those messages. The messages so received by Captain  
Mayfield and turned over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication  
Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation were not identified in  
any record made at the time. Lieutenant Woodward, who did the decryption  
of them has identified, to the best of his recollection, the messages  
received on December 5th as those set forth in Exhibit 56 and at pages  
7-11 of Exhibit 56A of this investigation.  
 
Various Japanese codes were used in the messages, including the "LA"  
code, which was the simplest and evidently the least important. The  
messages in that code, and the plain language messages, were decoded and  
read prior to the attack. The "LA" code messages so read are pages 1-5  
of Exhibit 56. They contained no important military information. One,  
for example, reported the departure of a transport and another related  
to the cost of sending families home to Japan.  
 
The testimony of Lieutenant Woodward, who decrypted the message, of  
Colonel Lasswell and Captain Finnegan, who translated various of the  
messages, of Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the unit, and of  
Admiral Mayfield, who was District Intelligence Officer, indicate that  
no information of military importance was obtained prior to the attack  
from any of the Japanese Consulate's messages. It has been testified  
that various of the other messages received on 5 December 1941 were in a  
Japanese code known as the "PA" or "PA-K2" system and that efforts to  
decrypt these were not successful until after the attack. These  
messages, as identified by Lieutenant Woodward, will be found at pages  
6-23 of Exhibit 56 (supplied by the Radio Intelligence Unit) and at  
pages 7-12 of Exhibit 56A (supplied by the District Intelligence  
Office). They were as follows:  
 
(1) December 3rd to Tokyo-Advising that a freighter in military service  
departed on the second and that a named ship arrived on the third (p.  
10, Exhibit 56A).  
 
(2) December 3rd to Tokyo-Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane  
tenders left port. The balance of the message was not recovered (p. 8,  
Exhibit 56A).  
 
[91] (3) December 3rd to Tokyo-In connection with the handling of  
expenses for steamer passage to Japan.  
 
(4) December 3rd to Tokyo-Advising of a change in method of  
communicating by signals, so that each of the numbers one to eight had a  
certain meaning as to departures and dates of departure of ships, which  
numbers were to be communicated by lights in beach  
 
 
Page 454 
 
houses, by the use of a sailboat, by certain want ads to be broadcast  
over a local radio station, and by bonfires at certain points if the  
previous signals could not be made (p 12, Exhibit 56).  
 
(5) December 3rd to Tokyo and elsewhere-Regarding money taken in for  
sale of tickets (p. 16 Exhibit 56).  
 
(6) December 3rd to Tokyo-Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane  
tenders departed the third (p. 22, Exhibit 56).  
 
(7) December 3rd to Tokyo and San Francisco-Advising that a transport  
had sailed for the Mainland and that a ship had arrived from San  
Francisco (p. 20, Exhibit 56).  
 
A photostatic copy of the December, 1941, bill of RCA Communications at  
Honolulu, covering the Japanese Consul General's messages in November  
and December, 1941, was received from the District Intelligence Office  
at Honolulu (Exhibit 55). This indicates that there were four radiograms  
sent on November 2nd, two on November 13th, four on December 1st, and  
two on December 2nd. The testimony concerning these is to the effect  
that they were not received or read prior to the attack, that they were  
received later and were thought to be in more complex codes, probably  
machine codes, as there were no indicators by which they could be  
identified.  
 
It further appears from Exhibit 55 that there were various other  
radiograms charged to the Japanese Consul General for December 4th and  
5th, and three for December 6th. The testimony concerning these  
indicates that none was obtained prior to the attack.  
 
The two messages listed on the RCA bill for December 4th, according to  
Lieutenant Woodward, were among a group of messages received on the  
night of December 7th (p. 4-5, Exhibit 56A). It was later learned that  
one advised Tokyo that an English gunboat arrived on the third and  
departed and that the sailors had come ashore and had received mail at  
the British Consulate; the other advised that a light cruiser had  
departed hastily on the fourth (Exhibit 57).  
 
The five radiograms listed on the RCA bill for December 5th were  
received after the attack and were actually two messages to Tokyo, the  
second having been sent also to San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington,  
D. C. The first message reported the arrival on the morning of the 5th  
of three battleships, which had been at sea for eight days, also that  
the LEXINGTON and five cruisers had left the same day, and that eight  
battleships, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers were in port. The  
second message has not been translated. It relates to funds of the  
Consulate General (Exhibit 57).  
 
[92] The three radiograms charged for December 6th were actually two  
messages in "PA-K2" code (Exhibit 57) . The first, which was translated  
after the attack, was sent to Tokyo and to Washington at 6:01 p. m. on 6  
December 1941. It set forth the ships observed at anchor on the sixth  
and stated: 
 
". . .9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17  
destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers  
lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).  
 
"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the  
fleet air arm." 
 
The other message of December 6th, which was filed at 12:58 p. m. that  
day, was, after decryption, translated by Joseph Finnegan, now a  
Captain, U. S. N., who reported for duty in the radio intelligence  
 
Page 455 
 
unit on the 9th or 10th of December, 1941.  He translated that message  
(Exhibit 57) as follows: 
 
"From: KITA 
"To: F. M. TOKYO                                              6 Dec. 41. 
 
"Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123.  
 
"1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp  
Davis, N. C. on the American mainland. They considered (at that time)  
the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and  
Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no  
locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing  
moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen.  
It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they  
were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby  
Hickam Field, EWA Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have  
been dropped.  
 
"2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the nonuse of nets for  
torpedo defense of battleships and will report further." 
 
Captain Finnegan admitted in his testimony that the last sentence of the  
first paragraph of his translation was an incorrect translation. As  
appears from an Army translation of that message (Exhibit 57) that  
sentence, correctly translated, was as follows: 
 
"I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity  
left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places." 
 
As previously noted, among the messages turned over to the District  
Intelligence Officer and to ComFOURTEEN Communication Intelligence Unit  
for decryption and translation on 5 December 1941, was the [93] message  
from Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 December 1941, which established a system  
of signals to be used from Oahu by means of lights at beach houses, the  
use of a sailboat, by wants ads on a radio station, and bonfires. This  
message was in the possession of the Radio Communications Intelligence  
Unit from a December to 10 December 1941, at which time it was  
successfully decrypted and translated. The Japanese Consul General's  
signal message of December 3rd was not only in the possession of the  
Navy at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, but was also in the possession  
of the Navy Department at Washington prior to the attack. A copy of that  
message as contained in the Op-20-G files at the Navy Department,  
indicates that it was translated on 11 December 1941, and that it had  
been intercepted by any Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Va.  
(Document 22, Exhibit 13). In fact however, that message was decrypted  
and translated in rough form prior to 1 p. m., 6 December 1941, by Mrs.  
Edgers. A translator assigned to the Op-20-G Unit, Navy Department. She  
testified that she believed that it was shown that afternoon to Kramer  
and that he examined it in rough form. Kramer did not recall this but  
did recall going over the message thoroughly on December 5th. Evidently  
further work on this message was deferred on December 6th because of the  
pressure of work on the thirteen parts of the Japanese fourteen-part  
reply which were being decrypted that afternoon and evening.  
 
It should be noted that a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 2  
December 1941, was intercepted by the Army radio intercept unit at Fort  
Shafter, Hawaii (Document 24, Exhibit 13). This message stated that in  
view of the present situation the presence of warships, airplane  
carriers and cruisers was of utmost importance, that there should be  
daily reports, that there should be reports whether or not there were  
observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or an indications  
 
 
Page 456 
 
that they would be set up, and whether or not the warships were provided  
with anti-mine nets. The message apparently was forwarded from Fort  
Shafter by mail to the Army. The Army translation of the message bears a  
note that the message was received on December 23rd and translated on 30  
December 1941, by the Army. It has been testified by Brigadier General  
Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, that no decryption was done  
at Fort Shafter, but that all intercepted traffic was forwarded to  
Washington for decryption and translation.  
 
Finally, it appears that the two highly significant messages sent by the  
Japanese Consul General during the afternoon of December 6th were both  
intercepted by the Army intercept station at San Francisco and forwarded  
to the Army in Washington by teletype (Docs. 14, 15, Exhibit 13). Both  
of these were in the Japanese code known as the "PA-K2" code and are  
indicated to have been translated by the Army on Monday, December 8,  
1940, [sic] According to Captain Safford, the longer message, stating  
that there was "considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a  
surprise attack" against Pearl Harbor, and that the battleships did not  
have torpedo nets, could have been decrypted in about an hour and a  
half; and the shorter message, which stated in part that no air  
reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm, could have been  
decrypted in less than an hour.  
 
[94] D. The "Winds Code" and the Alleged "Winds Message." 
 
In the latter half of November, 1941, the Japanese Government by  
messages to Washington and elsewhere established two codes to be used  
for communication between Tokyo and elsewhere. The first has been  
referred to as the "winds code." In that code certain Japanese words  
were to be added in the middle and at the end of the daily Japanese  
language short-wave news broadcasts and could also be used in Morse code  
messages, which words would apparently be weather reports. Thus, the  
Japanese words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" which meant "East wind rain," would  
actually mean that Japan-United States relations were in danger. Words  
were also supplied for Japan-Russian relations and for Japan-British  
relations. The existence of this code was brought to the attention of  
the Navy Department late in November through the interception and  
decryption of Japanese messages establishing the code, and also through  
information to the same effect received from other sources such as the  
United States Naval Attache at Batavia. It appeared that the use of the  
code words would indicate a breaking off of diplomatic relations or  
possibly war between the countries designated.  
 
The Japanese also established, late in November, 1941, a code system  
which has been referred to as the "hidden word code." This code was not  
discussed in previous investigations. The establishment of the code was  
first learned through the interception and decryption in Washington, D.  
C. of several Japanese diplomatic communications which had been sent  
from Tokyo on and after 2 December 1941 (Documents 6, 8, 12, 17 and 20,  
Exhibit 13). This code was intended to be used, when telegraphic  
communications might be severed, as a means of informing Japanese  
diplomats of the situation concerning the country in which they were  
located. Thus the word "KODAMA" meant Japan, the word "KOYANATI" meant  
England, the word "MINAMI" meant United States, and the word "HATTORI"  
meant that relations between Japan and another country, to be identified  
by a  
 
Page 457 
 
code word, were not in accordance with expectations. It may be noted  
that the meaning of the last word, as set forth in the Navy translation  
of the "hidden word code," differs from the meaning which the War  
Department cryptanalyst testified should have been given to the word.  
According to his testimony, the word should have been translated as  
meaning that relations were on the verge of crisis or that hostilities  
might commence. 
 
Prior investigations conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the  
Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry resulted in findings that prior to 7  
December 1941 there had been a "winds code message" by the Japanese in  
which the code words relating to the United States were used, and that  
this message had been intercepted by the Navy Department prior to the  
attack and communicated to the Army, but that no copy of it could be  
found in the Army or Navy files. It appears that these findings were  
based primarily on the testimony of Captain Safford and of Captain  
Kramer of the Navy Department.  
 
It should be noted that a Japanese message using the "winds code" words  
relating to the United States, if received on 3 or 4 December, or at any  
other time prior to 7 December 1941, would have conveyed no information  
of importance which the Navy and War Departments did not already  
possess. Such a message would have indicated either a break in  
diplomatic relations or possibly war with the United States. That both  
the Navy Department and the War Department, and Admiral Kimmel as well,  
were already aware that a break in diplomatic relations or war with the  
United States was imminent, is clearly established by the [95] November  
27th "war warning" to Admiral Kimmel, and by the repetition on November  
28th by the Navy of the Army's warning dispatch to General Short.  
 
In view, however, of the findings by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the  
Army Pearl Harbor Board that a "winds message" relating to the United  
States was received about 3 December 1941, and that no copy of it could  
be found, further investigation on this point was deemed necessary.  
 
(1) Prior investigations.  
 
(a) The Naval Court of Inquiry:  
 
In the "Addendum" to its findings, the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of  
Inquiry stated concerning the "Winds Code" as follows:  
 
"From 26 November to 7 December 1941 there was much diplomatic dispatch  
traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in  
Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and  
which was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific. A message  
dated 19 November 1941, Tokyo to Washington translated on 28 November,  
1941 and referred to as "The Winds Code" was as follows:  
 
" "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.  
 
" "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)  
and the cutting off of international communications the following  
warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short  
wave news broadcast.  
 
" "(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. Relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.  
[1] 
 
" "(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. Relations: KOTANOKAZE KUMORI. [2] 
 
" "(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE. [3] 
 
" "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather  
forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard  
please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely  
secret arrangement. 
 
" "Forward as urgent intelligence." " 
 
[1] East wind rain. 
[2] North wind cloudy. 
[3] West wind clear. 
 
 
Page 458 
 
"[96]  The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November 1941 sent  
to the Chief of Naval Operations information to Commander-in-Chief  
Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and commandant 14th Naval  
District substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5  
December 1941 the United states Naval Attach, Batavia, sent to the Chief  
of naval Operations substantially the same information. These messages  
stated that at some future date information would be sent by Japan  
indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war  
between countries designated.  
 
"All officers of the communication and Intelligence Divisions in the  
Navy Department considering the expected information most important were  
on the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4  
December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was  
received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject  
to two interpretations either a breaking off of diplomatic relations  
between Japan and the United States or war this information was not  
transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet or to other  
Commanders afloat.  
 
"It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief  
Pacific and Asiatic Fleets were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this  
code and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy  
Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl  
Harbor when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor.  
No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this  
information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by  
other Commanders afloat. 
 
"Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it although Admiral  
Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that  
Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy  
Department." 
 
(b) The Army Pearl Harbor Board:  
 
The "Top Secret" and separate portion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board's  
report referred to the "Winds Message." The report stated that a winds  
execute message reading "War with the United States, war with Britain,  
including the Netherlands East Indies, except peace with Russia" had  
been received in the Navy Department on 3 December 1941; that the Navy  
admitted that that message was received prior to December 6th; and, that  
the War Department files contained no copy of the message. The report  
referred in this connection to testimony by Captain Safford, who stated  
that such message had been received by Commander Kramer, who had been  
[97] notified by Brotherhood of its receipt, and that it had been seen  
by Safford at 8:00 a. m. on December 4th. Safford stated that no copy of  
the message could be found in the Navy Department files.  
 
The Army report further stated that on December 5th, Admiral Noyes  
called Colonel Sadtler, at 9:30 a. m., saying: "Sadtler, the message is  
in." Apparently based on Sadtler's testimony, the report also stated  
that Sadtler did not know whether this meant war with the United States,  
but believed it meant war with either the United States, Russia or Great  
Britain; that he discussed it with his superiors and was instructed to  
confer with Admiral Noyes; and that he telephoned Admiral Noyes, who  
said that he was too busy and would have to confer with Sadtler later.  
Sadtler then saw various officers in the War Department, all of whom did  
not think that any further information should be sent to Hawaii.  
 
It also appeared that the Army Board had received testimony on this  
matter from Colonel Bratton, who said that Sadtler, acting on behalf of  
Colonel Bratton, had arranged for the FCC to monitor Japanese  
broadcasts. Apparently Bratton testified that no information reached him  
before December 7th which indicating a break in relations with the  
United States and that he did not think that any such information had  
reached anyone else. He referred to an FCC intercept which was not the  
message for which they had been looking. 
 
Page 459 
 
(2) The basis of the previous findings that there was a Winds Execute  
message prior to the attack.  
 
The basis for the Army Pearl Harbor Board finding that a "winds message"  
relating to the United States had been received appears, to the extent  
known by the Navy, in the above summary of the top secret portion of the  
Army Board's report. That indicates that primarily the basis for the  
finding was the testimony of Captain Safford. In addition to Safford's  
testimony, there was apparently testimony by Sadtler of a conversation  
with Admiral Noyes in which he referred to a "winds message" but not to  
the contents of that message. 
 
Captain Safford testified before Admiral Hart and before the Naval Pearl  
Harbor Court of Inquiry. His testimony was the primary basis for the  
Naval Court of Inquiry's findings that a "winds message" relating to the  
United States had been received. In addition to his testimony, the Naval  
Court of Inquiry had testimony from Captain Kramer bearing on this  
subject which tended to support the finding. 
 
In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford said:  
 
"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning  
message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets,  
summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds  
Message", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent.  
Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral  
Noyes in my [98] presence I was given the message to read after Admiral  
Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on  
December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked "What do you think of the  
message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult to the  
intelligence of the Commander in Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated "I do  
not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of  
things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and  
I do. I think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given  
this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the  
front office." Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes  
later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought  
that this message of warning had been sent, and did not realize until  
two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that  
McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above  
statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to  
explain what is meant by the "Winds Message". The "Winds Message" was a  
name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence  
duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a  
fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese  
Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain  
(including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip off from the  
British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately  
forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander in Chief U. S. Asiatic  
Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander in Chief, Pacific  
Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the  
American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The  
Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the  
State Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of  
Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor  
Radio Tokyo to catch the "Winds Message" when it should be sent, and  
this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo  
broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as  
follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii  
and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four  
or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept  
stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all  
Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran  
up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The "Winds  
Message" was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941  
(Washington Time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo  
time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation  
was such that the "Winds Message" was heard only on the East Coast of  
the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations  
that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I.  
Units, not hearing the "Winds Message" themselves and not receiving any  
word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed  [99] 
 
Page 460 
 
that the "Winds Message" had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese  
Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the  
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at  
Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished  
as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the  
War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information  
that the "Winds Message" had been sent by Tokyo. The "Winds Message" was  
received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941,  
while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch.  
There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message  
really meant because it came in a different form from what had been  
anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came  
down that evening and identified the message as the "Winds Message" we  
had been looking for. The significant part of the "Winds Message" read:  
"HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO  
KAZE KUMORI". The literal translation of these phrases is: "EAST WIND  
RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY." The meaning of  
this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: "War with the  
United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with  
Russia." I first saw the "Winds Message" about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday,  
December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my  
office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and  
said, "Here it is!" as he handed me the "Winds Message." As I remember  
it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant "Winds"  
underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom.  
Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and  
distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department.  
As the direct result of the "Winds Message," I prepared a total of five  
messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering  
the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential  
papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result  
of the "Winds Message," McCollum drafted the long warning message,  
previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but  
which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval  
Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the "Winds  
Message" as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with  
the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates  
had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese  
would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the  
latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the  
"Winds Message": Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander  
F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S.  
N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following  
officers knew by hearsay that the "Winds Message" had been intercepted  
but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N.;  
Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.; Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S.  
N.; Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. * * * 
 
"[100]  The "Winds Message" was last seen by myself about December 14,  
1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were  
assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the  
Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts  
Commission, according to my understanding at the time." 
 
Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain Safford repeated in substance  
his prior testimony and stated that Lieutenant Murray or possibly Kramer  
brought him the message; that he couldn't determine from what Navy  
intercept station the message had come; that he had a vague recollection  
of a second "Winds Message", but had been unable to find any trace of it  
until he testified before Admiral Hart; that since that time he learned  
that the FCC had intercepted a "Winds Message" at Portland, but that he  
did not recognize that message. He did not recall any of the FCC  
intercepts contained in Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, none  
of which indicated a break with the United States. He stated further  
that despite repeated search since November, 1943, no copy of the "Winds  
Message" could be found in the files; that Lieutenant Commander  
Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them, but did  
not care to tell Safford.  
 
Page 461 
 
Also Safford said that he knew what had happened to the Army copies of  
that message through very "second hand and devious sources." He also  
repeated his prior testimony to the effect that about the middle of the  
first week in December, 1944, Commander McCollum had drafted a long  
dispatch which included information about the "Winds Message," and which  
dispatch had not been sent out.  
 
Commander Kramer in his testimony before the Naval Court, said that on  
December 3rd or 4th he had been shown a "Winds Message" by the watch  
officer and took it immediately to Captain Safford, who took it to  
Admiral Noyes. This was a plain-language message and, as shown to him,  
contained the phrase translated as "East Wind Rain" which meant strained  
relations or a break with the United States. The message had been on  
teletype paper and indicated that it had come through an USN intercept  
station.  
 
Among the witnesses before the Naval Court of Inquiry who testified that  
so far as they knew there had never been a "Winds Message" relating to  
the United States were Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and Admiral  
Noyes. Neither Admiral Wilkinson nor Commander McCollum, who were  
alleged by Safford to have had knowledge of the "Winds Message," was a  
witness before the Naval Court of Inquiry. As both were at the time  
actively engaged in combat operations.  
 
(3) Evidence Obtained in this Investigation Concerning "Winds Message."  
 
(a) Testimony of Captain Safford:  
 
Captain Safford testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that  
there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He  
realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his  
memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get [101]  
information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use  
in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no  
reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had  
drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at  
the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give  
him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of  
memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people.  
 
Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that  
Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford  
about the disposition of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when  
Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it  
and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had  
been referring to the false "Winds Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of  
the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a  
genuine weather broadcast.  
 
Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the  
Army's copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be  
confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the Army  
investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through  
W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the  
information was that the copies of the "Winds Message" had been  
destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct  
orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of  
the War Department had had some question  
 
Page 462 
 
about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of  
the original of the "Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused  
to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he  
said, should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army  
investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of the Army knew  
that the "Winds Message" had been received.  
 
Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his  
testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier  
impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message" and various other  
intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts  
Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to  
Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also  
said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message"  
specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's  
message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in  
McCollum's draft dispatch.  
 
Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds  
Message" was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington  
time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were  
on duty recollected only the false "Winds Message," and not the "true  
"Winds Message." The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted  
in the message being intercepted only on the East Coast of the United  
States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that  
they had to call on Corrigedor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits  
because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast,   
[102] West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about  
fifty percent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval  
station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the  
station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor,  
Maine. He stated that the logs of those stations and of the Navy  
Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no  
record had been kept.  
 
Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander  
Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he  
said that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to  
use the "winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine  
weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to  
Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not  
what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that  
message was received twelve hours or more after what he referred to as  
the "true winds message."  
 
Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65 as a true "winds" message  
relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the  
attack on Pearl Harbor.  
 
Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been  
monitoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack  
they had intercepted no such message.  
 
(b) Captain Kramer's Testimony:  
 
Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the  
"winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the  
light of thinking it over since that time. He said that he had had no  
recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to  
him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford some of the  
details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall a message  
some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did  
recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walking with  
him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it  
over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that the message had  
been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it  
might have been one using the code words referring to the United States,  
as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now that he  
had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this  
revision of his view was that on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp  
recollection that in the latter part of the week preceding the attack  
there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the  
Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when he  
testified during this investigation that the message referred to England  
and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it  
may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall.  
 
Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese  
"hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by  
him as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other  
messages. The message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between  
Great Britain and Japan are not in accordance with expectations"  
(Exhibit 20). In his [103] haste, Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI"  
which was contained in the Japanese Message and which referred to the  
United States. He testified that after he returned to the Navy  
Department and shortly before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he discovered his  
mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the  
translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several  
telephone calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the  
officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G- 
2 of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy  
Department's files do not disclose any correction of the translation  
(Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this that a number of copies  
of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly his  
correction was made on another copy which has since been discarded.  
 
Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until  
he testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of  
7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a  
"hidden word message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word  
message", which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was  
among the group of messages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December  
1941, when he hastily reviewed a folder of that traffic for Mr.  
Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the fact that previously  
Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material.  
 
(c) Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood's Testimony:  
 
Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch  
officers who were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the  
 
 
 
Page 464 
 
first week of December, 1941. He said that he had never received an  
intercept or message wherein the "Winds Code" words relating to the  
United States were used. He said that about December 4th, he received a  
telephone message from the FCC in which the words apparently relating to  
Russia were used; that he called Admiral Noyes, who commented that the  
wind was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brotherhood, did  
not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brotherhood  
stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had  
had a conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called  
him about December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had  
arrived. Brotherhood said he did not recall the telephone conversation  
and that he believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at  
that time.  
 
(d) Lieutenant Commander Linn's Testimony:  
 
Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's  
section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the  
four officers who stood that watch during the first week in December,  
1941. Any intercept which had come into that section, he said, would  
have had to come through one of the four watch officers. He was familiar  
with the "Winds Code" and he never saw any intercept [104] prior to 7  
December 1941 in which the "winds" code words relating to the United  
States were used.  
 
(e) Lieutenant Commander Pering's Testimony:  
 
Pering testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing  
watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's  
section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw  
any intercept using the code words relating to the United States.  
 
(f) Lieutenant Commander Murray's Testimony:  
 
Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a  
twenty-four hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first  
week in December, 1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute  
relating to the United States ever came to his attention during that  
week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a "winds"  
message had come in on 7 December 1941.  
 
(g) Lieutenant Freeman's Testimony:  
 
Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI  
intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his  
unit worked very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every  
effort was made to monitor for a " winds" message." Freeman was one of  
the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony before  
Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of a "winds"  
message relating to the United States. He testified that he never knew  
of any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States.  
 
(h) Captain McCollum's testimony:  
 
Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds"  
code; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which  
contained the words relating to the United States; that the message  
which contained the words apparently relating to Russia had been  
received during the first week of December, 1941, but that in his  
opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further that during  
the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch 
 
Page 465 
 
summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he  
remembered no reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and,  
that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941  
which did not refer to a "winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know  
whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been  
submitted to Admiral Wilkinson.  
 
(i) Admiral Wilkinson's Testimony:  
 
Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds"  
code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander  
McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had  
been received. Possibly, he said, it was the message received on the 7th  
using the words relating to England. He did not recall anything about  
the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted and which [105] Captain  
Safford had testified Admiral Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out.  
 
(j) Captain Mason's and Commander Fabian's Testimony:  
 
Captain Mason who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and  
Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor,  
both testified that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for  
any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was  
received wherein the words relating to the United States were used. In  
this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy  
Department that the unit at Corregidor, because of its geographical  
location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio  
broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see  
Exhibit 8).  
 
They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British  
Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been  
monitoring for a "winds" message also, and that had such a message been  
received by the British, they most certainly would have been advised of  
its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as  
to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the attack.  
 
(k) Captain Layton's Testimony:  
 
Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he  
had been familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to  
monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language  
officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to  
cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up  
each day with Commander Rochefort and that no "winds" intercept was  
received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch  
from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.  
 
(l) Captain Safford recalled:  
 
Captain Safford was recalled and testified that he never had a  
conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds"  
message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he  
received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood  
advised of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds"  
code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds"  
message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He  
said further, however, that until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or  
knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were  
used.  
 
 
Page 466 
 
(m) Mr. Friedman's Testimony: 
 
Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to  
7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds"  
message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several  
conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one  
about a year and a half ago, and none later than six months prior to his  
[106] testimony in this investigation. He said that Safford had  
indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a  
"winds" message but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files,  
and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East  
Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half  
ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a  
"winds" message had come in on the 4th or 5th of December: that he had  
been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly  
Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some  
question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that  
Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that  
Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification  
from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2  
authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently  
nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said  
that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message  
and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by  
somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by  
General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly  
inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably  
just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and  
that he had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr.  
Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the  
existence of a "winds" message relating to the united States, apart from  
his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler.  
 
(n) Captain Rochefort's Testimony:  
 
Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at  
Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code  
message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a twenty-four hour  
basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made  
an exhaustive search into all available Navy records and could find no  
trace of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941.  
 
[107]

E. Information Concerning the Organization of the Japanese Navy.  
 
(1) ONI Report of 29 July 1941.  
 
On July 29th, the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report,  
which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the  
organization of the Japanese Navy. This stated that, as a result of  
information which had been received, it was possible to give a much more  
complete picture of the organization of the Japanese Navy. It stated  
that the Japanese naval forces afloat were organized into two main  
commands-the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval-Forces in China. The  
Combined Fleet included:  
 
(a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.  
 
Page 467 
 
(b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.  
(c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.  
(d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.  
(e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).  
 
The Combined Fleet and First-Fleet, under the command of Admiral  
Yamamota [sic], consisted of various BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs  
and two destroyer squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA)  
was included. The carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU);  
CarDiv 5 (RYUJO, HOSHO) and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO).  
 
The Second Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included  
various cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and two destroyer  
squadrons. CruDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier  
divisions were: (CarDiv I (AKAGI and KAGA), and CarDiv 2 (SORYU and  
HIRYU).)  
 
The Third Fleet included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA MARU) and various  
minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force and sub-chaser  
squadrons.  
 
The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the  
Submarine Fleet and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also  
given. (Exhibit 81)  
 
(2) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45-41.  
 
On 27 November 1941 (when the "war warning" was received), the Commander  
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin  
Number 45-41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of  
the Japanese Navy and with Japanese Forces and installations in the  
Mandated Islands. It was a revision of the ONI bulletin above summarized  
and replaced that bulletin on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This  
stated:  
 
"The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of  
fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers  
and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of  
special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo- 
China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable [108] specialization  
within the various commands, as shown below:  
 
Major Fleet Commands 
 
1. First Fleet (Battle Force) .................... 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 
                                                     2 Desrons.  
2. Second Fleet (Scouting Force) ................. 4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, 
                                                     etc.  
3. Third Fleet (Blockade & Transport ............. Small Craft.  
                              Force)  
4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate Defense Force) .......... 1 Desron, 1 Subron, 
                                                     and many small  
                                                     units. 
5. Fifth Fleet (?) ............................... (?) 
6. Sixth Fleet (Submarine Fleet) ................. 6 Subrons. 
7. Carrier Fleet (Aircraft Carriers) ............. 5 Cardivs. 
8. Combined Air Force (Seaplane tenders, ......... 4 Airrons, & shore 
                                   etc.)             based planes. 
 
II. Japanese Naval Forces in China (Staff ........ 1 PG and 3 DD's. 
                             Headquarters)  
 
1. First China Exped. Fleet (Central China) ...... Gunboats.  
2. Second China Exped. Fleet (South China) ....... 1 CA, 1 CL and small 
                                                     craft.  
3. Third China Exped. Fleet (North China) ........ Torpedo Boats, etc.  
4. Southern Exped. Fleet (Saigon) ................ 1 CL, transports and 
                                                     mine craft.  
 
The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever  
before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the  
line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the  
time. The base  
 
Page 468 
 
forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly  
increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing." 
 
The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin included  
three BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and  
HARUNA-as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during  
1941 and was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a  
cruiser division and two destroyer squadrons.  
 
The Second Fleet included four CruDiv and two destroyer squadrons. One  
of the CruDiv was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA).  
 
The composition of the Third, Fourth and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was  
given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated  
"The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has  
been reported at Maizuru."  
 
[109] The composition of the Carrier Fleet, with the KAGA as flagship,  
and consisting of ten carriers and sixteen destroyers, was listed as  
follows:  
 
CarDiv 1: AKAGI, KAGA (F) and a destroyer division.  
CarDiv 2: SORYU (F) and HIRYU and a destroyer division  
CarDiv 3: RYUJO (F) and HOSHO and a destroyer division.  
CarDiv 4: ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU and a destroyer division.  
CarDiv-: KORYU and KASUGA (MARU).  
 
As will appear subsequently, the forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7  
December 1941 included six carriers, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1), the  
SORYU and HIRYU (CarDiv 2), and the ZUIKAKU and SHAKAKU [sic]. The  
latter two carriers had been identified as CarDiv 4 in the Pacific Fleet  
Intelligence Bulletin, as CarDiv 3 (annexed to the First Fleet) in the  
earlier ONI bulletin, and as CarDiv 5, in Exhibit 3, which sets forth  
the composition of the attacking force.  
 
Also included in the attacking force were the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two  
of the battleships of BatDiv 3) which had been listed in the  
intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Combined Fleet and First  
Fleet, and the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8) which had been listed in the  
Intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Second Fleet.  
 
[110]

 F. Information Concerning the Location and Movements of Japanese  
Naval Forces 
 
The evidence indicates that there were no formal arrangements whereby  
the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and  
movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section  
of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained  
in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing  
such information, and had access to radio intelligence information  
available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with  
them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force  
received some general information concerning Japanese movements, from  
the Fleet Intelligence Officer.  
 
(1) Information available at the time of the "War Warning."  
 
The procedure for handling radio intelligence information concerning  
Japanese movements was set forth in a dispatch of 24 November 1941 from  
OpNav to CincAF, information ComSIXTEEN, CincPac, ALUSNA Chungking,  
ASTALUSNA Shanghai, and  
 
Page 469 
 
ALUSNA Tokyo (Exhibit 8). This dispatch stated that Japanese naval  
movements as reported by the individual information addresses were often  
conflicting because of their necessarily fragmentary nature and that  
since (ComSIXTEEN intercepts were considered most reliable, it was  
suggested that other reports be carefully evaluated and sent to  
ComSIXTEEN for action and to OpNav for information and, that after  
combining all incoming reports, ComSIXTEEN was to direct dispatches to  
OpNav, info CincPac, based on all information received and indicating  
the ComSIXTEEN evaluation.  
 
The Japanese naval situation as estimated by ComFOURTEEN on 26 November  
1941, was set forth in a dispatch of that date to OpNav, information  
CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN. This dispatch stated that for the past  
month the Commander of the Second Fleet had been organizing a task force  
consisting of Second Fleet and other units and, after discussing various  
other units, stated: "There is believed to be strong concentration of  
submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airon [sic]  
24, at least one carrier division unit, plus probably one-third of the  
submarine fleet. Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be  
preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts may  
operate from Palao and Marshalls."  
 
On the same day ComSIXTEEN sent a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav,  
ComFOURTEEN and CincAF, discussing in considerable detail the estimate  
of ComSIXTEEN concerning the location and probable movements of Japanese  
Fleet units (Exhibit 8). This stated that traffic analysis for the past  
few days had indicated that the Commander-In-Chief of the Second Fleet  
was directing some units of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Fleets  
in a loose-knit task force organization that apparently would be divided  
into two sections. One section expected to operate in the South China  
area, was referred to in the dispatch as the "first section." The "first  
section" was estimated to consist of CruDiv 7, AirRon 6, Defense  
Division 1, Desron 3, and Subron 6. The "second section" consisted of  
units expected to [111] operate in the Mandates. The "second section"  
was believed to include Crudiv 5, Cardiv 3, RYUJO and one MARU. It was  
indicated that BatDiv 3 might be included in the "second section." But  
that this could not be clarified yet. The dispatch further stated:  
"Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in  
the Mandates X Our best indications are that all known First and Second  
Fleet carriers still in Sesebo [sic] -Kure area." The evaluation was  
considered to be reliable.  
 
During this time, the Office of Naval Intelligence was issuing  
fortnightly summaries of current national situations. The summary for  
December 1941 (Exhibit 9) was distributed by air mail. The statements  
therein as to the Japanese naval situation, which portion was prepared  
by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, were based upon information which had  
been received at least three or four days prior to the date of the  
document. This stated:  
 
"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that  
extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time  
troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan  
and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo- 
China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be  
carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an  
extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take  
sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force,  
 
Page 470 
 
under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet appears to be  
subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off  
the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes  
a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the  
Combined Air Force destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one  
division of battleships also may be assigned the major capital ship  
strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the  
carriers.  
 
"The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment including  
landing boats in considerable numbers. Activities in the Mandates under  
naval control consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel  
aircraft munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen  
engineers etc." 
 
(2) Admiral Kimmel's sources of information after the "war warning."  
 
The ComFOURTEEN communication intelligence unit continued the practice,  
which had been followed for some time past, of preparing daily  
communications intelligence summaries for submission to Admiral Kimmel  
via Lt. Comdr. Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Photostatic  
copies of the communication intelligence summaries from 14 October to 14  
December 1941, [112] constitute Exhibit 22 of this investigation.  
Lieutenant Commander Layton, who presented these summaries to Admiral  
Kimmel, also prepared daily intelligence reports which were distributed  
to various members of CincPac's staff. The intelligence memoranda were  
not given to the Admiral or Chief of Staff because they saw the basic  
material upon which the reports were based. The intelligence reports by  
Layton for the period 6 October to 2 December 1941 constitute Exhibit  
26. None was prepared after December 2nd, according to Layton. 
 
The daily communication intelligence summaries together with the  
dispatches received by Admiral Kimmel from other organizations during  
the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, constituted the only sources  
of information which he had during that period concerning the location  
and movements of Japanese naval forces. 
 
(3) Information received by Admiral Kimmel after the "war warning."  
 
The critical period commenced on 27 November 1941, when the Japanese  
force, which was to attack Pearl Harbor, secretly left Tankan Bay,  
Etorofu Island and, in radio silence, proceeded undetected toward Pearl  
Harbor. The Japanese force, which included three of a Japan's Carrier  
Divisions, CarDiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA; CarDiv 2, HIRYU, SORYU; CarDiv 5,  
SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; BatDiv 3, first section, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA; CruDiv 8,  
CHIKUMA; and other lighter vessels, cruised for ten days to a point 200  
miles north of Oahu, where the planes were launched for the attack on  
Pearl Harbor.  
 
It will be recalled that the November 24th dispatch from CNO in part had  
stated that the diplomatic situation and statements of the Japanese  
Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicated  
that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack  
on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility. The "war warning" of the  
27th had stated that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the  
next few days and that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and  
the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition  
against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly  
Borneo.  
 
Page 471 
 
The information which Admiral Kimmel subsequently received as to the  
location and movements of Japanese naval forces was as follows: 
 
28 November 1941: 
 
The Naval Attache at Shanghai reported in his dispatch 270855 the  
sightings by the master of a foreign vessel, which had left Hong Kong en  
route to Shanghai, of many transports proceeding south singly or in  
small groups.  
 
[113] The November 27th ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary delivered  
on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little  
below normal, due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the  
Tokvo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic  
was heard, intercepted from carriers, Bako, Sama and Saigon were active  
as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity  
which sent five dispatches to he major commanders. The direction finder  
activity was very high. Is to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there  
was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area.  
The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of  
general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The  
Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third  
Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there  
was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander,  
it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense  
forces in the Mandates, and also that there was no further information  
on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander  
Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area.  
Concerning air forces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in  
the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that  
"Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initialed  
by Admiral Kimmel.  
 
It appears, therefore, that as of this time the ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN,  
and Washington radio intelligence units were of the opinion that the  
major portion of the Japanese carriers were in "home waters;" that  
ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that a carrier unit was in the Marshalls,  
and that ComSIXTEEN expected CarDiv 3 to operate in the Mandates. The  
evidence disclosed that the term "home waters" was understood  
differently by the Far Eastern Section of OWI, which prepared the 1  
December 1941 ONI estimate, and by the Fleet Intelligence Officer,  
Pacific Fleet. Captain McCollum testified that the term meant the normal  
cruising grounds of the Japanese Fleet, roughly west of the 180 meridian  
of longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa, and included the  
Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians. Captain Layton, the Fleet  
Intelligence Officer, testified that "home waters" meant to him, and was  
understood by Admiral Kimmel to mean, the drill grounds of the Inland  
Sea and approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay  
Area; in general the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, but  
not including northern Japan and the Kuriles, to a point about 60 miles  
east of Japan. 
 
 
Page 472 
 
29 November 1941:  
 
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a  
dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th  
(Exhibit 19, Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent  
by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:  
 
"[114] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical  
purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government  
might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action  
unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities  
cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit  
the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as  
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense  
X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such  
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these  
measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil  
population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate  
message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities  
in the United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the  
tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit  
dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential  
officers"  
 
The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the  
Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as  
then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It  
stated further:  
 
"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X  
Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply  
to Japan in case hostilities occur" 
 
On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav, information  
CincAF, and stated:  
 
"Following received by British consul from usually reliable source X  
Japanese will attack Krakow [sic] Isthmus from sea on one December  
without ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and  
Singapore X Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main  
landing to be made at Songkhola X (Singora)" 
 
ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF, OpNav,  
CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship believed to be a  
light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as flagship, Southern  
Expeditionary Fleet; that this ship was now in the Camranh Bay-Saigon  
area.  
 
OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPac, ComSIXTEEN,  
ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State Department, from  
Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that five days previously    
[115] Orange troops and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking  
up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops had landed and that  
10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during the same period; that  
the total troops in South Indo-China totaled 70,000. It observed that  
there was an estimate of some 128,000, but considered that too high. It  
reported that many trucks had landed and were moving troops and supplies  
to the interior. It observed that this movement is of large proportions  
and indicates hostilities against Thailand may begin soon. It also  
forwarded information from Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated  
November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particularly  
railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even recently  
augmented and are being transshipped south. Among recently landed  
artillery are anti-tank guns; that the Japanese had 
 
Page 473 
 
recently purchased a considerable number of native boats along the coast  
of Tongking Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500.  
These boats were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated  
November 25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable  
information that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that  
around 1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum,  
Nippon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army would  
advance on Thailand; that great increased troop landings and movements  
were noted south; that during last few days about 4,000 men have landed.  
On November 25th and 26th. 1,500 would go south by special train; that  
in Tongking there were approximately 25,000 Jap troops and at Gillam  
there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated November 26th Hanoi,  
was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong mayor had  
advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended to sequester  
all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had demanded keys to  
all warehouses by noon November 25th. 
 
The ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered the  
29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to  
and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were very  
heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence  
net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed  
to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this  
command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet  
commanders. It was said that "This activity is interpreted to indicate  
that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S.  
Naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet,  
it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its  
units. As to the Third Fleet there was little activity from its units  
save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said  
to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet  
originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively  
for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in  
Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity.  
This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel. 
 
[116] The ComSIXTEEN communication intelligence unit sent a dispatch on  
the 29th noting various recent developments from radio intelligence such  
as various encrypted addresses noted in the preceding two days traffic,  
that various additional units now appeared to be associated with the  
"first section" (South China area), referred to in ComSIXTEEN's November  
26th dispatch, that the Hiyei (which in fact was en route to Pearl  
Harbor) and Kongo appeared to be associated definitely with the "first  
section," but no movement from the Takao area had been noted, and, that  
the Cinc Combined Fleet was to leave the Kure zone that day, the Sasebo  
zone on December 1st, and enter the Bako zone on the 2nd. 
 
30 November 1941: 
 
On 30 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to  
CincPac for information (Exhibit 76, Naval Court), which advised in  
part:  
 
"Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra by overseas  
expedition . . . desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on  
three days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch X . . ." 
 

Page 474 
 
A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77,  
Naval Court) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were  
no contacts and the information were all negative.  
 
The communication intelligence summary of the 29th delivered this day  
stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the  
traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic  
was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence  
sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders both ashore and  
afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long  
messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally  
reporting to Tokyo radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This  
station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction  
finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with  
much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AlNav, and the  
naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleets Third Fleet,  
Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been  
addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address  
was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he  
had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this  
had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was  
intentional in making positively known the existence of an air fleet.  
Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units  
were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second  
Fleet, including Cardiv 3, and the Third Fleet.  
 
Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships but their  
assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the  
Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication  
with [117] the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The Cinc  
Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area.  
There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at  
Chichyima [sic] the previous day, and also some traffic from the  
Commander in Chief, China Fleet. 
 
1 December 1941: 
 
A copy of a dispatch by CNO to CincAF, 301709, was received by CincPac,  
referring to the previous dispatch which had directed an air search on  
the line Manila to Camranh Bay, directing that a report be made daily  
even if the information were all negative (Exhibit 77, Naval Court).  
 
A dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 December 1941, was also received  
referring to a Thailand-Japanese intrigue aimed at forcing the British  
to attack Thai as a counter-move to a Japanese landing in Kota Bharu,  
whereupon Thai would declare war and ask Japanese help.  
 
A dispatch of 1 December from ComSIXTEEN advised of radio intelligence  
information indicating that various units under Cinc Third Fleet were in  
the Takao area and that Cinc Second Fleet had shifted from Kure to  
Sasebo apparently en route to South China waters.  
 
The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on  
December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the  
past few days, that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing  
old dates. No reason could be given for the re-transmission of these  
messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had  
prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches  
originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard  
was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs. As to the Combined  
Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets  
were in Kure. In the same message, the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was  
not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was  
at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his  
usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces, but also  
included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members  
of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As  
to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the  
location of the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, which gives the strong  
impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be  
still in the Truk area. It was said that the continued association of  
Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus his known progress from the  
Empire to Chichijime [sic] to Saipan made his destination obviously the  
Marshalls; also that since one of his large units arrived in the  
Marshalls some time ago, that unit could not agree with ComSIXTEEN that  
there was not a submarine concentration in that area. "Every evidence  
points to a concentration, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines  
there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the  
Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane  
guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the  
Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication  
summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War  
Plans Officer.  
 
[118] A dispatch was received from ComSIXTEEN, addressed to OpNav,  
information CincAF, CincPac, and ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a  
reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight.  
 
2 December 1941:  
 
On 2 December 1941, ComSIXTEEN reported that Cinc Second and Cinc Third  
Fleets were in the Takao area, and, that broadcasts to fleet units were  
being sent to Takao or Bako in addition to Tokyo. Also reported was the  
fact that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok had requested permission to  
destroy codes.  
 
CincAF also reported that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on  
a southerly course in the South China Sea between Camranh Bay and the  
Philippines. Also that three submarines were sighted 070 from Saigon,  
180 miles, heading south, and that twenty-one transports, with air  
patrol overhead, were at Camranh Bay. 
 
A report from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of the  
arrival of 14,000 troops sailing from there the week ending the 22nd.  
 
The communication intelligence summary for the previous day stated  
generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly  
at 0000 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a  
period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November  
1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month  
 
 
Page 476 
 
indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active  
operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to  
the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of  
dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the  
Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of  
traffic prior to 0000 1 December indicated that an effort was made to  
deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change  
of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and  
consequent confusion and compromise. Either that, or the large number of  
old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it  
appear as if nothing unusual were pending. It should be noted that the  
sentence in the above summary reading "The fact that service calls  
lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in  
preparing for active operations on a large scale" was underscored in red  
pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton  
testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by  
Admiral Kimmel at the time.  
 
The summary further stated as to the First Fleet "nothing to indicate  
that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to  
the Second Fleet, it was stated "This fleet is believed proceeding from  
the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China;"  
Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic;  
consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up  
Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report  
except that the [119] same associations of Second Third Fleets and  
Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continued. As  
to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to  
Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a  
large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area  
eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it  
was stated "No change." As to carriers, it was said "No change." This  
summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.  
 
In accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, Layton, the Fleet  
Intelligence Officer, prepared a memorandum for the Admiral dealing with  
the location of the Japanese Fleet. This memorandum was prepared,  
according to Layton, on the evening of 1 December and was submitted by  
him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum is  
Exhibit 23. The memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which,  
Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to  
submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, and which reflected the  
later information received after preparation of the memorandum on the  
night of December 1st-2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations  
which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This  
memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the  
location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to  
him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.  
 
Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units  
of the Orange (Japanese) were "*thought*" to be located as listed in the  
memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of  
the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six  
battleships, "(?)", and other units. He listed  
 
Page 477 
 
the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then  
corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure- 
Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.  
 
In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief,  
China Fleet, the Shanghai base force, and an air group. 
 
In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons  
and various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force with  
numerous air groups and the KASUGA MARU (thought to be a converted  
carrier with 36 planes). He estimated hat the Commander in Chief, Second  
Fleet, had been en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to  
indicate that he was at Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and  
with "Cardiv 4-two CV and four DD; Cardiv 3-two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3  
less HARUNA-3 BB (maybe 2 BB)" and, he added in red pencil, certain  
cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.  
 
In the Hainon-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the  
South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In  
the French Indo-China area, he located the Commander in Chief of an  
Expeditionary Fleet with various ships including 21 transports and some  
base forces among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an  
air group [120] and task force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the  
Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air  
group. At Saipan, he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine  
force with possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force.  
In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier  
"KORYU? plus plane guards", and several submarine squadrons and base  
force. 
 
Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of  
Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en  
route to attack Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941,  
during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and  
commented on the absence of information concerning Japanese Carrier  
Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described the conversation on  
this point as follows:  
 
"Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you  
said as best you recall it?  
 
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You  
don't now where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I  
replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do  
not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty  
confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as  
sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially  
with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could  
be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that  
effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or  
words to that effect . . . 
 
"Mr. SONNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me,  
arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye  
when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion  
about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or  
jocular one?  
 
"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said,  
"Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but  
if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area  
since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be  
refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and  
it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you mean to  
say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In  
other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their  
exact location.  
 
 
Page 478 
 
"Mr. SONNETT.  He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information  
about those carriers?  
 
"[121] Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do  
not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a  
statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where  
they are but hadn't so indicated their location." 
 
3 December 1941:  
 
It will be recalled that on December 3rd dispatches were sent by CNO to  
CincPac and others advising that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts  
at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had  
been ordered to destroy the "purple" machine and most of the codes and  
ciphers.  
 
Layton testified that at the time Admiral Kimmel asked him what the  
"purple machine" was; that he did not know and made inquiry; that he  
advised Admiral Kimmel that it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical  
coding machine; that he did not then know whether or not the Japanese  
consul at Hawaii had such a machine; and, that he subsequently learned  
that the Japanese consul there did not have such a machine.  
 
The communication intelligence summary delivered on the 3rd, covering  
the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic  
was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major  
parts of the Japanese Fleet. There was instances where the same dispatch  
was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast  
and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had  
previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEEN had reported Second and  
Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting  
traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered  
at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one  
indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several  
instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It  
was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed  
that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has  
left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good  
communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was  
further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this  
office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now  
in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai  
radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was  
originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was  
pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high  
precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As  
to the First Fleet, it was stated that despite the lack of positive  
identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that  
"from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a  
split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may  
be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing  
indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third  
Fleets, and apparently in company, while another combined fleet call  
appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the  
Second Fleet, it was stated "No units have stood out prominently in    
[122] the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new  
identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large  
part of  
 
Page 479 
 
the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said  
there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the  
association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.  
 
Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete lack of  
information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat  
promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls  
have been partially identified since the change on the first of December  
and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier  
traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.  
 
4 December 1941:  
 
On 4 December 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21, Naval Court) to  
NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN and  
ComSIXTEEN for information stating:  
 
"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other  
classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special  
intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for  
essential communications with CinCAF CincPAC ComFOURTEEN ComSIXTEEN and  
Opnav X be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all  
classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained." 
 
ComSIXTEEN advised, in a dispatch received on December 4th, that seven  
transports had been sighted of Saigon on 15 November 1941, and on the  
20th a seaplane carrier northeast of Amoy. 
 
The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised, in a dispatch received 4  
December, that several large liners had been carrying supplies and  
personnel to the Carolines, that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit and  
that certain islands were being specially developed. 
 
The Naval Attach,, Tokyo, advised in a dispatch received this day that a  
transport loaded with aircraft and another with naval personnel had left  
Yokohama on 27 November 1941. 
 
The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated under the  
heading "General," that traffic volume was normal with receiving  
conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much  
detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate  
calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these  
units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief  
of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the  
Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo  
intelligence originated nine [123] dispatches to the same addresses. It  
was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in  
Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it  
was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway,  
but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also  
stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands  
but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no  
information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initialed by  
Admiral Kimmel. 
 
5 December 1941: 
 
There were no dispatches of an intelligence nature received by CincPac.  
The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated that in  
general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving 
 
Page 480 
 
conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system using the  
prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in  
operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao  
broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages most of these  
from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated  
messages to the Chiefs of Staff. China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third  
Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-(China Force, and same. In all,  
this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the  
Combined Fleet, it was stated "The outstanding item of today's traffic  
is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and  
Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative  
commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well  
identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed  
to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now  
believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity  
of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic  
destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CincSecond Fleet is still  
copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in  
Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be  
made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that  
Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with  
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South  
China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator  
addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between  
South China commanders. All units in that area were quiet. This summary  
was initialed by Admiral Kimmel. 
 
6 December 1941:  
 
Several dispatches dated 6 December 1941 were found in the CincPac  
files, but it does not appear whether or not they were received prior to  
the attack. One was an OpNav dispatch authorizing CincPac to direct the  
destruction of secret and confidential documents at our outlying islands  
"in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our  
outlying Pacific islands." (Exhibit 22, Naval Court.) Other dispatches  
dated the 6th, from the Naval Observer at Wellington, advised of  
Japanese destruction of codes; from the Assistant Naval Attache,  
Shanghai, advised of the departure south of Japanese troops and increase  
of Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai; and, from CincAF, advised of  
a [124] 25-ship convoy, a 10-ship convoy, and 3 ships, off Saigon French  
Indo-China, all of which appeared to be headed in a westerly direction,  
also 30 ships and a cruiser were sighted in Camranh Bay.  
 
The radio intelligence summary for 5 December, which was delivered on  
the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the  
attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circuits  
were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo  
Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept  
schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was  
several days old which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in  
the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence  
which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits. A  
plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo  
to Takao, prob- 
 
Page 481 
 
ably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs  
Bureau saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you said is  
considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing,  
specific orders will be issued soon."  
 
As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor  
Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still  
frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts.  
It was stated that "They are undoubtedly in the Takao area or farther  
south since the Takao broadcasts handles nearly all the; traffic. No  
traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen  
either."  
 
There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic for that  
fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet addressed at  
Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth  
Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China where was much traffic  
addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako  
continued as an active originator with man dispatches to the Second and  
Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with  
the movement of air corps several of which were moving probably to Indo- 
China.  
 
[125] 29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire  
information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese  
Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese  
diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington,  
D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese  
Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic situation of the  
Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the act that  
hostilities were impending and imminent.  
 
30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of  
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at  
Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to he Chief of Naval  
Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department and to  
the President.  
 
31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of  
Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic  
negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully  
informed on this subject. 
 
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at  
Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet  
as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the  
Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's  
success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted  
messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during  
the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications  
facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations  
to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac of the important  
facts learned. 
 
33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval  
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on he  
information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.  
 
34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, during  
November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early  
December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the 
 
 
Page 482 
 
diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent and  
that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment. 
 
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief,  
Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating  
interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more  
specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in  
the movements of ships to or from other ports. 
 
[126] 36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised  
of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages  
after the November 27th "war warning," which made it further evident the  
termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese  
intention to wage war. 
 
37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the  
attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in  
which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present  
to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply  
terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact  
that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the  
middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated  
an air attack at Pearl Harbor. 
 
38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one  
sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at  
Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy  
Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy  
Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for  
translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy  
Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by  
a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army  
until after 0900. 
 
39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information  
several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby  
the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel  
immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army,  
Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any  
message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a  
message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be  
furnished also to Admiral Kimmel. 
 
40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it  
necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December  
and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but  
that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message  
that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the  
naval radio system. 
 
41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was  
received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an  
ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code  
machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might  
have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and  
that the naval authorities were to be informed. 
 
42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific  
Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on  
November 24th, that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction,  
including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possi- 
 
Page 483 
 
bility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the  
Japanese is expected [127] within the next few days. The number and  
equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces  
indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai  
or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."  
 
43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval  
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to  
probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of  
Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of  
Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware  
of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not  
regard such an attack as probable.  
 
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1911, which were  
to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives  
information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the  
United States, and other countries. These were known as the "winds" code  
and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a  
break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the  
United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain  
Japanese words signifying wind direction.  
 
45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States  
during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any  
information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the  
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.  
 
46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was  
received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom  
such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy  
Department. No such message was intercepted by the Radio intelligence  
units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts  
were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The  
evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the  
British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message.  
Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the  
Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence  
Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence,  
recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations. The Director  
of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled  
no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was  
received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of  
Op-20-G, a communications security section of the Navy Department, who  
stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it  
related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the  
Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain  
Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he  
stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those  
officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other  
testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by  
Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said  
that he recalled that there was a message but could not recall whether  
or not it related to the United States or England or 
 
 
Page 484 
 
Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this [128]  
investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word"  
message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds"  
message. 
 
47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code  
message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of  
delivering other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he  
overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the  
message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are  
not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later  
discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p. m. on December 7th,  
he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of  
Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence. 
 
48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code  
message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect  
previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message  
was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question. 
 
49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition  
to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of  
the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the  
Pacific Fleet. 
 
50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the  
FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul  
General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some  
months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941  
because the District Intelligence Officer feared that the existence of  
such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications.  
No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means  
of the telephone taps. 
 
51. On 6 December 1941 the local representative of the Federal Bureau of  
Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer  
a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a  
person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined  
by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the  
conversation should be further studied by a Japanese linguist of the  
District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the recording of the  
conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript  
furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was  
interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from  
Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation,  
references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been  
code words signifying the presence or absence of ships, and a method of  
conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which  
presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior  
investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to  
the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941. 
 
[129] 52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of  
the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and  
to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial  
communications company, were obtained during the first week of December,  
1941. This was the first time that such mes- 
 
Page 485 
 
sages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made  
immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted  
before the attack. These contained no information of particular  
significance. 
 
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the  
telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese  
Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl  
Harbor.  
 
54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by  
the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to  
the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a  
message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as  
the "PA-K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence  
Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the  
Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been  
established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby  
lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads  
to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey  
information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships  
of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl  
Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the  
message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by  
a civilian translator in Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington.  
That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept  
station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no  
specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the  
attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown  
to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of  
work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was  
taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.  
 
55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received  
a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing  
situation, the presence of the ships in port was of utmost importance,  
that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise  
whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and  
whether or not the warships were provided with antitorpedo nets. This  
message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort  
Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War  
Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by  
the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.  
 
56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at  
Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the  
likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs  
of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability  
there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise  
attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the  
battleships [130] did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported  
on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that  
no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These  
messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to  
the attack.  
 
 
Page 486 
 
They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San  
Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations  
of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were  
translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and  
translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.  
 
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to  
the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval  
forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at  
Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division  
of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had  
access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy  
Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor,  
an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general  
information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence  
Officer.  
 
58. The War Department had information which led that Department to  
believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November,  
1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to  
General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special  
photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order  
to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location  
of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special  
Army planes were not made ready.  
 
59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence bulletin was  
distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command.  
This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the  
organization of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the  
same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further  
increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping  
of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The  
bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet  
consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each  
having two carriers.  
 
60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the  
location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the  
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer,  
who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl  
Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio  
Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of  
Naval Intelligence in Washington,  
 
61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of  
Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These  
included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces  
which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl  
Harbor and at the Philippines.  
 
[131] 62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav,  
information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the  
information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio  
Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The  
dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a  
task force comprising units of 
 
Page 487 
 
various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a  
strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls,  
which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a  
carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate  
was that a strong force night be preparing to operate in southeastern  
Asia while component parts might operate from Palao and the Marshalls.  
 
63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in She  
Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of  
the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence  
unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others,  
commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic  
analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander-in- 
Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleets units in a loose-knit  
task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first  
section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second  
section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that  
the second section included "Car Div 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This  
dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the  
supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates,  
and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still  
in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was  
considered to be reliable.  
 
64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports  
from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were  
received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important  
Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not  
report the movement of carriers.  
 
65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor  
continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information  
received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval  
communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence  
Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning.  
Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries daily on and after  
27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December  
5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack. 
 
66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication  
intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other  
things, that there was no further information on the presence of a  
carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still locate in  
home waters." The next day, he received the November 28th summary which  
indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio  
intelligence net was [132] operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval  
communications and "IS GETTING; RESULTS." There was no information set  
forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral  
Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other  
things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate  
command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st,  
Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to  
carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated  
the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had  
not been confirmed 
 
 
Page 488 
 
67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received stated that  
all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly  
at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed  
after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last  
changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by  
Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month  
indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on  
a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number  
of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and  
Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."  
 
68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which  
Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained  
Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the  
location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako- 
Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included  
four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted  
carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?) plus plane guards"  
in the Marshalls area.  
 
69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier  
Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was  
deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information  
as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a  
reliable estimate of their whereabouts.  
 
70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following  
conversation:  
 
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You  
don't know there carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I  
replied, "NO, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do  
not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty  
confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as  
sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially  
with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could  
be rounding Diamond head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that  
effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or  
words to that effect. * * *  
 
"[133] Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he  
said, "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely,  
but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure  
area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be  
refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and  
it was then when he with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you mean to say  
they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In other  
words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact  
location. * * *  
 
"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not  
say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a  
statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where  
they are but hadn't so indicated their location." 
 
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to  
Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:  
 
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of  
identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However,  
since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the  
change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been  
recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." 
 
72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on  
December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or  
carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention 
 
Page 489 
 
of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No  
traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen  
either."  
 



Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/12/96 Updated: 12/12/96