Section III. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO THE ATTACK
[60] A. The Organization of Naval Intelligence in General; Sources of
Information, and Relations with the Pacific Fleet.
The Office of Naval Intelligence, which was under the Chief of Naval
Operations, consisted of two main branches-Domestic and Foreign. The
Domestic Branch had to do with internal espionage and other subversive
activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national
and particularly naval welfare. It maintained branch offices in various
of the principal cities of the United States, including Honolulu. The
Foreign Branch was organized into a number of sections, of which one was
the Far Eastern Section. The Director of Naval Intelligence was Rear
Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Jr. The officer in charge of the Far Eastern
Section of the Foreign Branch was Commander Arthur H. McCollum.
The primary sources of information which the Far Eastern Section had
were Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers' reports from
various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of
the Asiatic Fleet and from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet,
including reports as to radio intelligence, and reports of
investigations conducted by the domestic branch of ONI, particularly
from Honolulu, and State Department reports at Washington. A most
important part of the information provided to the Far Eastern Section
was supplied by a unit at Washington known as OP-20-G. This was under
the command of Commander Laurence F. Safford and supplied information
obtained from communication or radio intelligence. This section was
staffed both by Communications officers and Intelligence officers. The
information received by OP-20-G was supplied to Lt. Comdr. Alvin D.
Kramer of ONI, who was working with that section, and was transmitted by
him to the head of the Far Eastern Section and to the Director of Naval
Intelligence.
The section known as OP-20-G was concerned with the interception,
decryption, and translation of Japanese messages. In addition it was
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responsible for furnishing the Navy's own codes and ciphers and for the
supervision of the security of the Navy's own communications. Japanese
messages were intercepted by various methods, including radio
interception by a number of radio intercept stations located in the
United States, which transmitted the Japanese communications, as
intercepted by them to OP-20-G for decryption and translation. In
addition to reports from intercept stations located in the United
States, this section received reports from communication intelligence
units located at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. This unit was
concerned with the plans and intentions of foreign governments,
principally Japan, and with intelligence relating to naval operations in
the Atlantic. The communications intelligence organization at Pearl
Harbor, which had subsidiary stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch
Harbor, was concerned primarily with the dispositions and [61] plans of
naval forces in the Pacific and with surveillance of Japanese naval
communications. The communications intelligence unit in the Philippines,
which was located at Corregidor, was concerned with Japanese naval
communications and Japanese diplomatic communications. The Officer in
Charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was Lt.
Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort. The officer in charge of the communications
intelligence unit at Corregidor until September, 1941 was Lt. Comdr.
Rudolph J. Fabian. He remained thereafter assisting that unit.
Japanese diplomatic communications were in various codes, such as the
code known as the "purple" code, the "red" code, the "J-19" code, the
"PA-K2" code, and the "LA" code. The so-called "purple" code contained
the most important Japanese diplomatic messages. Messages in this and in
other diplomatic codes were intercepted and read at the Philippines
primarily for the purpose of local information. They were sent, as
intercepted, to the Navy Department in one of the Navy's own codes. All
intercepted diplomatic traffic was sent to Washington whether or not it
was deciphered and read at the Philippines. None of this information was
sent from the Philippines to Pearl Harbor. The unit at Pearl Harbor was
intercepting and decrypting no Japanese diplomatic traffic. It had been
directed to concentrate on Japanese naval systems. The unit at
Washington was charged with the general control of the units at
Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and at Washington, and handled the Japanese
diplomatic systems and also handled some Japanese naval systems.
Intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic received by the Washington unit
was pooled with similar traffic intercepted by the Army and was
decrypted and translated by the Navy and the Army on an alternate bay
basis. The resulting information was distributed daily by ONI to the
Chief of Naval Operations, and to others in the Navy Department. The
President and the State Department similarly were furnished this
information daily.
It appears that, although the Navy enjoyed considerable success in
decrypting Japanese diplomatic communications, the Japanese naval codes
were not being read. Information obtained by radio intelligence,
therefore, from Japanese naval traffic was based almost entirely on so-
called "traffic analysis" and not upon reading of the messages
themselves.
The units at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines advised the Washington
unit of the results of their traffic analysis of Japanese naval
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communications, and of the estimated location and movement of Japanese
naval forces, and also exchanged information with one another on that
subject. The units also exchanged information on technical subjects,
that is, pertaining to codes and ciphers and keys for deciphering codes.
Information developed from the reading of the "purple" messages was not
sent to the Pearl Harbor unit as such. It does appear, however, that
various of the warning messages and other dispatches sent by the Chief
of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based
upon information derived from the Japanese diplomatic messages. [62]
Thus it appears that the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet as to the status of diplomatic relations with Japan
depended primarily upon the messages sent to him by the Chief of Naval
Operations. The information received by the radio intelligence unit at
Pearl Harbor as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces
was, however, brought directly to the attention of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet daily by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, as
was other material of an intelligence nature.
B. The Approach of War: Intercepted Communications Available at
Washington, and Messages Sent by CNO to Admiral Kimmel.
It should be noted that the Japanese communications which were
intercepted and decoded and translated by the War and Navy Departments,
as set forth in this section, were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. Various
of the messages sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations
were based on these Japanese communications.
(1) The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th dispatch.
On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to
Cinclant, CincPac and CincAF (Exhibit 13, Naval Court), reading as
follows:
"The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X
If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic
and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be
that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include
rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and
Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held
responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a
possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these
possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory
deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute
provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform
appropriate Army and Navy district authorities X Acknowledge"
On 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 38
Naval Court). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been
"popping" here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches
Admiral Kimmel knew about all that they did. He said, "Personally, I do
not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I
sent you merely stated the 'possibility ;' in fact, I tempered the
message handed me considerably. Perhaps I was wrong, but I hope not. In
any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we
should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."
[63] Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in an
earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Jap-
Page 434
anese attack on Siberia in August, Admiral Stark had said that his own
judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the
Russian situation showed a definite trend. In this letter he said that
he thought this whole thing worked up together. He stated that efforts
would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it
could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. Hull
were working on it. To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in
part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some
sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at
Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I
told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that
I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese
ships as far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island
carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on
guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to
worry."
Also annexed was a memorandum of 17 October 1941, by Rear Admiral
Schuirmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese
Cabinet. The substance of this analysis was that the military would
determine Japanese action whether to attack Russia or move southward,
and would make that decision on the basis of opportunity and what they
could get away with, and that it would not be determined by the cabinet
in power.
(2) Japanese messages concerning German attitude; Nomura's desire to
resign.
On 18 October 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese
communication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 1 October 1941, which stated
that the Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's
position, particularly because Japan was not advising Germany of the
negotiations with the United States, although the United States was
advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 16 October 1941, was
intercepted and translated on 17 October 1941. In this Toyoda advised
Nomura that although he had been requested by both the German and
Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on
the Japanese-United States negotiations, he had, in consideration of the
nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early in
October, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the
consequent revival of the movement for revision of the neutrality act,
the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to
the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt Administration
continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation would
inevitably arise between Germany, Italy, and the United States, which,
under the Three-Power Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately
the war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message
was being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of
postponement (Document 3, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
[64] On 22 October 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was
intercepted and translated on 23 October 1941, in which he said that he
was sure that he, too, should go out with the former cabinet; that he
knew that the Secretary of State realized how sincere he was and yet how
little influence he had in Japan; that there were some
Page 435
Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better for
him, but that their encouragement was not enough; that among his
confreres in the United States there were some who felt the same way,
but they were all poor deluded souls; that the instructions could be
carried out by Wakasugi; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a
dead horse; that he did not want to continue "this hypocritical
existence, deceiving other people;" that he was not trying to flee from
the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open
for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan
(Document 5, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
On 23 October 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington-of the same date
was intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was
making were appreciated; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of
those negotiations had a great bearing upon the decision as to which
road the Imperial Government would proceed that as such it was an
exceedingly important matter; that they were placing all of their
reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this matter; that for
these reasons they hoped that he would see fit to sacrifice his personal
wishes and remain at his post (Document 6 Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
(3) Action taken by Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Kimmel advised, in a letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14 Naval
Court), that the action taken included maintaining two submarines for
patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, preparing
to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at
Midway from Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Wake, and sending
additional Marines and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to
Palmyra, placing Admiral Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice,
getting six submarines ready to depart for Japan on short notice,
putting some additional security measures in effect in the operating
areas outside Pearl Harbor.
On 7 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 74,
Naval Court) in reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 22nd. He
stated, among other things, "O. K. on the dispositions which you made in
connection with recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The big question
is-what next?!" Also, "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a
crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The
principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before;
it continually gets 'worser and worser'! A month may see, literally,
most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever-
particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look
good."
[65]
(4) The first Japanese deadline message: Japanese interest in
American ships.
On 5 November 1941, the Navy translated a message from Tokyo to
Washington, reading as follows:
"(Of utmost secrecy).
"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th
of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the
circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this
thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. Relations
from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination
and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only."
Page 436
During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington
various intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships and planes
at Manila and Seattle (Documents 1-8, Exhibit 68, Naval Court).
According to one of these messages, which was dated 5 November 1941, the
Navy General Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the
conditions of airports, types of planes and numbers of planes there,
warships there, machinery belonging to land forces, and the state of
progress being made on all equipment and establishments.
(5) Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall recommendations as to
ultimatum.
The situation existing early in November was summarized by Nomura, in a
report to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, intercepted on November 12th
(Document 8, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) by reference to a report from the
legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who had conferred with Senator
Thomas and Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that
if Japan invaded again, the United States would fight with Japan, that
psychologically the American people were ready, that the Navy was ready
and prepared for action. Nomura also reported that he had a conversation
with "a certain Cabinet member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a
dear friend, that he would tell him alone this: that the American
government was receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again
and did not believe that Nomura's visit to the President, or coming of
Kurusu, would have any effect on the general situation. Nomura said that
he had explained how impatient the Japanese had become since the
freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did
not desire a Japanese-American war, and how they hoped for peace until
the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and
Secretary of State believed "those reports." [66] Nomura also said that
his friend had stated that the United States could not stop because if
Japan moved, something would have to be done to save the "face" of the
United States.
Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better
understanding between the United States and Japan would come from
Kurusu's visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile
the Japanese and American views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel
by letter dated 14 November 1941 (Exhibit 39, Naval Court). With this
letter Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum,
dated 5 November 1941, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall for the
President. This was concerned with the belief of Chiang-Kai-shek that a
Japanese attack on Kumming was imminent and that outside military
support was the sole hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum
considered whether the United States would be justified in undertaking
offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent her from severing
the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific was
inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlimited
strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the
middle of December, 1911, United States air and submarine strength in
the Philippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese
operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that
all aid short of war be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to
Japan.
Page 437
(6) Further and Final Japanese "deadline messages."
At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese
Government had established a further and final deadline for the
completion of diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages
from Tokyo to Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the
Army, as follows:
(a) A translation on 17 November 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63, Naval
Court), of a dispatch, dated November 16th, the highlights of which
were:
"* * * The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days
so please fight harder than you ever did before.
"What you say is of course so * * * but I have only to refer you to the
fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that
conditions within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in
reaching a settlement with the United States) * * * try to realize what
that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war
takes and remain patient * * * the situation renders this out of the
question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in
my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You
see how [67] short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United
States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press
them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to
bring about an immediate solution."
(b) On 22 November 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), a
translation of a dispatch of the same date, reading in substance:
"To both you Ambassadors.
"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my
#736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick
to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to
bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your
ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by
the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your
conversations with the Americans, if the signing can be completed by the
29th (let me write it out for you-twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes
can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and
the Netherlands, and in short if everything can be finished. We have
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline
absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going
to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work
harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the
information of you two Ambassadors alone."
(7) The November 24th dispatch to CincPac and others.
On 24 November 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which before the Naval
Court Admiral Stark said was based in part on the "deadline" intercept-
page 775), was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac,
ComELEVEN, ComTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:
"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and
movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on
Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this
dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior army
officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to
complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X
Guam will be informed separately"
[68] On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 47, Naval Court), Admiral Stark wrote
to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of 17 October 1941, on the
inadequacy of local defense forces in Hawaii (Exhibit 46, Naval Court).
Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his
responsibilities in connection with tasks per-
Page 438
taining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces available
in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the
actual operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the
numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local
defense tasks. Admiral Stark's letter continued by summarizing the
situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among
other things, pointed out that the Department had no additional
airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval District. A
marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in Hawaii,
stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the
Fleet has offensive work to do."
On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 16, Naval Court), Admiral Stark also wrote
a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that
Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in
Japanese home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase
in the strength of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC-1 nor
Rainbow-5 contemplated this as a general policy; after the British
strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious occasions,
opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present themselves. But
this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to this
letter stated that both Air. Hull and the President confirmed the
gravity of the situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark
sent a day or two before. It stated further that neither the President
nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack; that
from many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most
embarrassing thing that could happen to us; and there were some who
thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated: "I do not give
it the weight others do. But I included it because of the strong feeling
among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the
time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I
still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road
area as the most likely.... I won't go into the pros and cons of what
the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The
only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only
thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing-I think it is more
likely to be anything."
(8) Dispatches concerning reinforcement of Wake and Midway.
On 26 November 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40, Naval Court) was sent by
the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Army had
offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense
battalions now on station, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable
also, that the Army proposed to prepare, in Hawaii, garrison troops for
advance bases which Admiral Kimmel might occupy, but was unable to
provide any antiaircraft units. Admiral Kimmel was instructed to take
this into consideration and [69] advise when practicable the number of
troops desired and recommended armament.
Also on 26 November 1941; another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to
CincPac, which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second
Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, OpNav had
requested the Army, and the Army had agreed, to station twenty-five Army
pursuits at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided CincPac
considered this feasible and desirable; that it would be neces-
Page 439
sary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to
these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown
off at destination; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and
essential spare parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the
carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels; that the Army
understood that these forces must be quartered in tents; that the Navy
must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting
other Army supplies; that the stationing of these planes must not be
allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to the
Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be laid promptly
if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy bombs at
outlying positions could be carried by Army bombers which might fly to
those positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was
directed to confer with the Commanding General and advise as soon as
practicable.
(9) Intercepted: Japanese communications of November 26th and 27th.
On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional
intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as
follows:
(a) A Navy translation on 27 November 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63,
Naval Court) of a message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-
called "Purple" code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated:
"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not
reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them
(defer?) for a while."
(b) A Navy translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63,
Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating
that:
"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we add the
following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence
broadcasts:
"(1) if it is Japan-U. S. relations "HIGASHI".
"(2) Japan-Russia relations "KITA".
"(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai Malaya and N. E. I.)
"NISHI".
[70] "The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning
and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires Mexico city San
Francisco."
(c) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 9, Exhibit 68,
Naval Court), of a message to Manila, dated 20 November 1941, in the
"purple" code, marked "Strictly Secret" and stating:
"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the
type of draft - presumed to he in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay.
(Near Manila, P. I.)
"Furthermore please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as
to Tokyo."
(d) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63,
Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 26 November 1941, in the
"purple" code, which stated:
"To be handled in Government Code.
"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too
long. Therefore will you cut down the substance of your reports of
negotiations to the minimum and on occasion call up Chief YAMAMOTO of
the American Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At
that time we will use the following code: (Codes were then set forth.)"
Page 440
(10) The State Department note of November 26th and Japanese reaction
thereto: the war warning of November 27th.
The diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese representatives, Nomura
and Kurusu, came to a head on 26 November 1941. At that time, the State
Department presented a proposal to the Japanese and that Department
reported to the Navy Department, among others, that it had no further
hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Japanese reaction to
this proposal appears from dispatches which were subsequently decrypted
and translated. They are as follows:
(a) An Army translation (Document 17 Exhibit 63) Naval Court) of a
message from Washington (Nomuru [sic]) to Tokyo dated 26 November 1941,
in the "purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," which stated:
"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.
"HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been
getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully
with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented
by Japan on [71] the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that
we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose
a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of
difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September
25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:
"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'
"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo,
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
"(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the
Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China
and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.
"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all
French Indo-China.
"(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no
regime in China but that of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.
"(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.
"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the
United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
"(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
"(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
"(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States
has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that
these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of
this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of
course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)
"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and
said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to
Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why
did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well,
England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then,
too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a
number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike
at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that
we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her
national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or
we think so."
[72] (b) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63 Naval Court) of a
message from Washington to Tokyo dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple"
code and marked "Extremely Urgent," Message #1180, reading:
"From NOMURA and KURUSU.
"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of
having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we
let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so,
the negotiations
Page 441
will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called
so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing
for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might
propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of
posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate in
the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us
what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an
arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a
cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also
gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the
United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their
protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I
think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including
French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last
September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-
China and Thai.)
"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not
necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we
break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is
to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack
them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is
whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the
treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that
the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this
world war before it could possibly be settled.
"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will
have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least
to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope
that you will wire back instantly."
(C) An Army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a
message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 28 November 1941, in the
"purple" code, reading:
"[73] Re your #1189.
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The
Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations.
Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this
American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I
do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken
off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that,
although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to
your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just
claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the
Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and
conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States
has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish
negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man
you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present
circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do
the best you can."
(Note: The man is the Navy Minister.)
On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO, which
has been termed the "war warning." It read:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with
Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have
ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few
days x the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization
of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either
the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly
Borneo x execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x inform district and Army
authorities x a similar warning is being sent by War Department x
spenavo inform British-x continental districts Guam Samoa directed take
appropriate measures against sabotage."
(11) The dispatch of November 28th:
Page 442
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a
dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th
(Exhibit 19, Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent
by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:
"[74] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action
unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities
cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit
the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense
X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these
measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil
population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate
message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities
in the United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the
tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit
dissemination of this highly Secret information to minimum essential
officers"
The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the
Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as
then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It
stated further:
"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X
Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply
to Japan in case hostilities occur."
(12) Intercepted diplomatic communications, November 29 to December 6,
1491.
On 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from
Tokyo to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated 29 November 1941
(Document 19, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), requesting that they make one
more attempt to discuss the situation with the United States, and to
state that the United States had always taken a fair position in the
past; that the Imperial Government could not understand why the United
States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese proposals could not
be the basis of discussion, but instead had made new proposals which
ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would greatly injure
the prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States should
be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States
had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the
United States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries
were directed in carrying out this instruction to be careful that this
did not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.
[75] Also on 30 November 1941 there was a Navy translation of a trans-
Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to
Yamamoto in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was used (Document 20,
Exhibit 63, Naval Court). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long
message ("probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals"); that the
President was returning apparently because of the speech of the Japanese
Premier which Kurusu said was having strong repercussions here; that
Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used greater caution in
speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult
position; that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they
were being careful; that
Page 443
Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here had
expected to hear something different-some good word-but instead got this
(the Premier's speech); that the Japanese-American negotiations were to
continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out; that Kurusu
needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both the Premier and the
Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their speeches and
that all would have to use some discretion; that Yamamoto said the real
problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happenings
in the South.
There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on 1
December 1941, as follows:
(a) Navy translation-(Document 21, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"1 December 1941
"(Purple CA)
"#865 Re my #857
"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United
States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press
and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and
the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for
only your information.)
"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S.
Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message
#1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.
"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the
capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that
the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far
Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter."
[76] (b) Army translation-(Document 22, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Berlin
"November 30, 1941
"Purple
"#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)
"(Secret outside the Department)
"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite
Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the
vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of
diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based
her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance.
With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in
the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these
negotiations.
"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the
view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and
equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past.
However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of
troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation
of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in
opposition to each other.
"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we
first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its
traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations,
re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in
the conversations carried on between the United States and England in
the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was
brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by
Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say,
the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as
Page 444
the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could
be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United
States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to
demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government
from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting.
That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few
days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial
Government could no longer [77] continue negotiations with the United
States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would
inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
"(Part 2 of 2)
"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this
attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting
clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into
with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon
the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the
Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in
case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese
Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It
is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others makes it
impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations.
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they
conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China-they did
so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in
collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with
Germany and Italy, as an enemy."
(c) On 1 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted message from
Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, dated 30 November 1941
(Document 6, Exhibit 13), which in substance stated:
"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say
very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that
war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan,
and that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than
anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for
the time being would prefer to refrain from any indirect moves on the
north.... Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is."
(d) Army translation-(Document 23, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Washington (Nomura)
"To: Tokyo
"November 28, 1941
"Purple #1214 To be handled in Government Code.
"Re my #1190.
"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the
United States however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are
out and headlines like [78] this are appearing in the papers: "Hull
Hands Peace Plan to Japanese" and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The
papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal
with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the
responsibility would be upon Japan.
"This we must carefully note."
On 3 December 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report
by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated 2 December 1941 (Document 2S,
Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated:
"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by
saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the
United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire
#1233. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the
slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will
transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home
Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing
as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20."
The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the
United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts
of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other
countries have pyramided economic
Page 445
pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement
that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We
haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the
rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure,
and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to
this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to
realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find
themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the
President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.
Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent
American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound
consideration to his important question which has to do with our
national destiny." Under-Secretary WELLES said: "I am well aware of
that." I continued "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as
Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new
American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the
21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our
greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In
spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it
has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful
consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth
and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to
evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in [79] the event of a
settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of just
peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental
questions, the question of the representations of this date would
naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and
then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the
necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the
internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinion
that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer
with the Secretary." I got the impression from the manner in which he
spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the
26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary
of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that
the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current
difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about
a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in
your considerations our reply to the new American proposals and to my
separate wire #1233."
There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest
available on 4 December 1941, as follows:
(a) Navy translation (Document 26, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Hsinking
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#893
". . . In the event that Manchuria participates in the war . . . in view
of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to
participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps
toward England and America at this country will take in case war breaks
out. A summary follows:
"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be
recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the
sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be
forbidden.). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them
after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan
accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.
"[80] 2. The treatment accorded to British and American public
property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be
comparable to that accorded by Japan.
"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their
consular offices and interests will not be recognized.
"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be
equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.
"4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform
the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall
be exercised not to antagonize Russia.
Page 446
(b) Navy translation (Document 27, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
" #1227
"(This raised the question of a possibility of a conference between
persons in whom the leaders have confidence to have the make one final
effort to reach some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway
point, such as Honolulu. . . It was said that this last effort might
facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.)"
(c) Navy translation (Document 29, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#875 Chief of Office routing.
"Re your #1232
"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following
lines:
"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in
French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently
there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in
the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we
have [81] increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China.
There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as
a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the
exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way
violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense
agreement."
(d) Navy translation (Document 31, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1243
"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is
expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore
consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with
the evacuation of the consuls."
On 5 December 1941, there were available translations of additional
intercepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic
negotiations, as follows:
(a) Army translation (Document 33, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1243
"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action
between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a
declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an
occupation of Thailand."
(b) Navy translation (Document 34, Exhibit 63, Naval Court,)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1225
"(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives
with Secretary HULL on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese
Premier's speech, the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and
apparent agreements as to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)"
Page 447
[82]
(13) Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between 29 November
and 6 December 1941.
During this period there were available to the Navy and to the Army in
Washington translations of intercepted Japanese espionage reports
concerning Manila, San Francisco, and Honolulu. From these it appeared
that the Japanese were interested in the movements of ships to and from
those ports. The messages relating to Honolulu were as follows:
(a) On December 3rd, the Navy Department translated a communication from
Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 15 November 1941 (Document 24, Exhibit 63,
Naval Court), which stated that since relations between Japan and the
United States were most critical, the "Ships in the harbor report"
should be made irregularly but at the rate of twice a week and that
extra care should be taken to maintain secrecy.
(b) On December 5th, there was available at the War Department a
translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 18 November 1941,
requesting reports on vessels in certain areas of Pearl Harbor and
directing that the investigation be made with great Secrecy (Document 37
Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
(c) Also available on December 5th at the Navy Department was a
translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 1941,
stating that reports had been received on ship movements but in the
future Honolulu was also to report even when there were no movements
(Document 36, Exhibit 63. Naval Court).
(d) On December 6th, there was available at the War Department a
translation of a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 18 November 1941,
(Document 40, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), reporting on ships anchored in
Pearl Harbor and in certain areas of the harbor and pointing out that
the Saratoga was not in harbor and that the Enterprise or some other
vessel was in a particular area. This message also reported on the
course of certain destroyers which had been observed entering the
harbor.
(14) Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by Japanese and
first thirteen parts of reply-6 December 1941.
On 6 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese
communication (Document 38, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), from Tokyo to
Washington, which read:
"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of
the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for
the United states contained in my separate message #902 (in English)
"[83] 2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in
fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am
not sure the situation is extremely delicate and when you receive it I
want you please to keep it secret for the time being.
"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United
States, I will wire you in a separate message. However I want you in the
meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to
present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."
Also on 6 December 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of
the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which had
been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It
may be noted that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which
were originally indicated as Navy translations were corrected so as to
indicate that they were translated by he Army. These 13 parts which are
not set forth here, but particularly part 13, disclosed that the
Japanese were of the view that the
Page 448
American proposal, viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the
Japanese as a basis of negotiations.
The message concerning delivery of the Japanese reply, and the first
thirteen parts of that reply, were received in the Navy Department by 3
p. m. on 6 December 1941. After decryption and translation by about 9 p.
m. on December 6th, they were distributed by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to the
White House and to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of War and
Secretary of State apparently also received copies and a meeting was
called of the three Secretaries for ten o'clock on the following
morning.
(15) Communications intercepted on 7 December 1941.
The Japanese communications which were translated and available on the
morning of 7 December 1941 included the following:
"(a) From: Washington ( Nomura )
"To: Tokyo
"December 3, 1941
"Purple ((Urgent)
"#1256. Re your #875
"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this
reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The
United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this
reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it
is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key
deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United
States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will
take a bold step depending [84] upon how our reply is made. If it is
really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the
explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor
prevent them taking the bold step referred to-even if your reply is made
for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in
view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to
the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives
a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore,
reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once."
"(b) From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"Purple (Urgent)
"#1272
"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and
HULL we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members
having close relations with the President and through individuals
equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State
Department, please keep this point strictly Secret). Up until this
moment we have the following to report:
"(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and
advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the
"introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President
did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this
attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the
President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question,
I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.
"(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November
20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections
in the United States proposal of November 26th which are either
innocuous or advantageous to us------------------(Message
Incomplete)-----------------------"
"(c) From: Budapest
"To: Tokyo
"December 7 1941
"LA
"#104 Re my #103
"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this
country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of
war would break out on the 7th.
"Relayed to Berlin."
Page 449
[85] (d) Navy translation (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"7 December 1941
"(Purple-Eng )
"#902 Part 14 of 14
"(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling
this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire
with treat Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts
toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in
East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and
interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been
revealed clearly during the course of the resent negotiations. Thus, the
earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American
relations and to preserve and promote the peace of he Pacific through
cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations."
(e) Army translation (Document 41, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"December 7, 1941
"Purple (Urgent-Very Important)
"#907 To be handled in government code.
"Re my #902.
"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if
possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at
1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time."
(16) Delivery of Part 14 and the 1 p. m. message and action taken.
The evidence indicates that Part 14 of the Japanese reply, which
required decoding but not translation, was received between 0305 and 700
on 7 December 1941, and that it and the first 13 parts were distributed
[86] by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to Admiral Stark's office between 0900 and
0930, and then to the White House and to the State Department. The "1 p.
m. delivery message" was not distributed at this time. Kramer testified
that he returned to the Navy Department at about 10:20 and found that
message and certain other messages, such as a message which directed the
destruction of Japanese codes, still on hand and another which thanked
the Ambassador for is services. This material, Kramer testified, was
delivered to Admiral Stark at about 10:30, and then to the White House
and to the State Department.
The evidence indicates that the "1 p. m. message" was decrypted and was
available in Japanese in the Navy Department prior to 0700 on 7 December
1941, and that because there was no Japanese translator on duty it was
sent to the Army for translation at about 0700. It is not clear when the
Army returned the translation of that message. Kramer stated that it was
not in the Navy Department when he left to distribute the fourteen-part
reply between 0900 and 0930 that morning, but that he found it upon his
return to the Navy Department at about 10:20. It would appear,
therefore, that the Army returned its trans-
Page 450
lation of the "1 p. m. message" some time between 0900 and 1020 on 7
December 1941. It further appears that several hours' advance notice of
the contents of that message may have been lost because there was no
Japanese translator on duty at the Navy Department on that Sunday
morning, and because it was necessary to wait for an Army translation.
Prior investigations developed the fact that, after consultation with
Admiral Stark that morning, General Marshall sent a message to various
Army commands, including the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
The message read:
"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we
do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of
this communication."
The prior investigations also developed the fact that the Army radio was
unable to raise Hawaii that morning and accordingly sent that message by
commercial cable in code. The message, according to General Short's
prior testimony, was received by the Signal Officer at Hawaii at 1145,
and decoded some four hours after the attack.
Whether or not the Army message would have reached the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, prior to the attack if a Navy translator
had been on duty on the morning of 7 December 1941, or if the Army had
immediately translated and returned the "1 p. m. message," is
speculative. It is, moreover, also speculative as to what action might
have been taken by General Short or Admiral Kimmel had they received
that Army message prior to the attack.
[87]
(17) Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between 29 November and 7
December 1941.
The messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel
during this period dealt primarily with the destruction of codes by the
Japanese and with the advisability of destruction of United States codes
at Guam. The messages are discussed subsequently in this report.
(18) Admiral Kimmel's failure to transmit information to subordinate
commanders.
It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his
investigation that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on a December 1941
with a powerful force consisting of the Lexington, Chicago, Portland,
and five destroyers, to deliver a squadron of planes to Midway. He
testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding the
arming of planes or regarding preparation for war, other than the
ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was he ever informed of
the contents of the October 16th dispatch concerning the resignation of
the Japanese cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch advising of the
possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any
direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, or the November
27th war warning. He said that except for what he read in the
newspapers, he did not learn anything during the period November 26th to
December 5th which indicated the increased danger of hostilities with
Japan.
Admiral Bellinger, who was commander of Task Force Nine, consisting of
the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified in this investi-
Page 451
gation that he never saw nor did he learn the contents of the October
16th, November 24th, or November 27th dispatches from the Chief of Naval
Operations.
[88]
C. The Interception of Japanese Telephone and Cable Messages.
It appears that in Washington, D. C., the Navy was receiving information
obtained from intercepted Japanese telephone and cable messages. For
example, on 30 November 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a trans-
Pacific radio telephone conversation in code between Kurusu in
Washington and Yamamoto in Tokyo (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
And, on 10 October 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a cable
message from Honolulu to Washington, in which a code was established for
reporting the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor, which message had
been photographed in the cable office in Washington and thus obtained by
the Navy (Document 3, Exhibit 13).
For many months prior to the attack, the Office of Naval Intelligence at
Honolulu had been tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and
of the Japanese Vice Consul. For a period of time also the home
telephones of these officials had been tapped. The taps on the lines of
the Consulate were removed on 2 December 1941 by direction of Captain
Mayfield, who was then the District Intelligence Officer. The evidence
indicates that he took this action because he was fearful that the
existence of such telephone taps would be discovered by the Japanese
Consul. His fear arose from the fact that an FBI tap on the lines of a
Japanese official of the NYK had been detected by a telephone company
employee who had advised the District Intelligence Office of this. A
representative of the District Intelligence Office subsequently had
informed the local FBI office. It was learned that the FBI office had
complained to the telephone company concerning the disclosure of its
tap. In light of this situation, Captain Mayfield directed that the Navy
taps be removed.
It appears that no important military information was intercepted by
means of the Navy Intelligence taps on the lines of the Japanese
Consulate General. Exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation consist of
photostatic copies of the notes made of the telephone conversation over
the Japanese Consul General's line and the Japanese Vice Consul's line
during the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941.
Subsequent to 2 December 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
apparently continued its telephone taps and in this fashion on or about
5 December 1941 learned the contents of a telephone conversation between
a man named Mori in Hawaii and a person in Japan. The fact of this
conversation was brought to the attention of the District Intelligence
Officer, and on 6 December 1941, a transcript of the conversation was
furnished to him and arrangements were made for a representative of the
District Intelligence Office to listen to the recording of the telephone
conversation; this, however, was not done until after the attack. A
transcript of the telephone conversation, with marginal notes made by
the District Intelligence representative after he attack, is Exhibit 39
of this investigation. It may be noted that it
Page 452
appears from prior investigations that this conversation was brought to
the attention of General Short [89] on the evening of 6 December 1941,
and apparently nothing could be made out of it and no action was taken
concerning it. There is no evidence indicating that this telephone
conversation was brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention prior to the
attack.
In the conversation, there was mention of the flights of airplanes
daily, the number of sailors present, the attitude of local Japanese,
the local construction projects, the size of the local population, the
precautionary measures taken at night time, the use of searchlights at
night, the emphasis in Honolulu newspapers on the southern advance of
Japan into French Indo-Chinas the visit of Kurusu, the local climate,
the visit of Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador, the recent return of a
Japanese from Honolulu to Japan, and the number of Japanese in the
United States Army. The person in Japan inquired for information about
the United States Fleet. Mori stated that he knew nothing about the
Fleet, and that since they tried to avoid talking about such matters
they did not know much about the Fleet. He said he didn't know whether
all of the Fleet had gone, but that the Fleet present seemed small, and
it seemed that the Fleet had left. The person in Japan then inquired
whether that was so and what kind of flowers were in bloom in Hawaii.
Mori stated that the flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole
year, however that the hibiscus and the poinsettia were in bloom. He
later stated that the Japanese chrysanthemums were in full bloom.
There is some reason to believe that the statements concerning flowers
in the Mori telephone conversation were the use of code words indicating
the absence of presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. In this connection,
the Operation Order for the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl
Harbor (Exhibit 3) provided for the use of a radio broadcast code in
which the statement "the cherry blossoms are in all their glory" would
signify that there were "No warships in Pearl Harbor." This lends
support to the theory advanced by representatives of the District
Intelligence Office in their testimony to the effect that the primary
purpose of the Mori telephone conversation over the trans-Pacific radio
was to provide information to Japanese Fleet units which would be
listening in on that frequency.
The espionage reports submitted by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu have
been previously discussed. It will be recalled that in those coded
messages considerable information was given of the movement of ships and
location of ships in Pearl Harbor and of defense preparations at Oahu.
Certain messages sent during the first week of their glory" would
signify that there were "No warships in Pearl Harbor. [sic, LWJ] The
Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu transmitted its messages via
commercial companies using the various communications companies
alternately. During the month of November, the McKay Radio Company
handled the messages primarily, and during the month of December, 1941,
RCA was transmitting the messages.
[90] Prior to December, 1941, efforts had been made by the District
Intelligence Officer to get access to the files of the communications
companies and thus to secure copies of the Japanese Consul General's
messages. These efforts were without success, in view of the legal
prohibitions against the disclosure of such messages. During a
Page 453
visit by Mr. Sarnoff, President of RCA, the District Intelligence
Officer requested him to cooperate with the Navy by making such messages
available, and pointed out the importance to the country of giving the
Navy access to such messages.
On 5 December 1941, RCA Communications, at Honolulu, turned over to
Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, copies of some
messages which had been sent by the Japanese Consul via RCA on the third
and fourth of December. These messages, with the exception of a few
unimportant plain language messages, were in code. Captain Mayfield
turned them over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication
Intelligence Unit, headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort, for
decryption and translation. That organization had not been working on
Japanese diplomatic traffic. Efforts were immediately made to decrypt
and to translate those messages. The messages so received by Captain
Mayfield and turned over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication
Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation were not identified in
any record made at the time. Lieutenant Woodward, who did the decryption
of them has identified, to the best of his recollection, the messages
received on December 5th as those set forth in Exhibit 56 and at pages
7-11 of Exhibit 56A of this investigation.
Various Japanese codes were used in the messages, including the "LA"
code, which was the simplest and evidently the least important. The
messages in that code, and the plain language messages, were decoded and
read prior to the attack. The "LA" code messages so read are pages 1-5
of Exhibit 56. They contained no important military information. One,
for example, reported the departure of a transport and another related
to the cost of sending families home to Japan.
The testimony of Lieutenant Woodward, who decrypted the message, of
Colonel Lasswell and Captain Finnegan, who translated various of the
messages, of Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the unit, and of
Admiral Mayfield, who was District Intelligence Officer, indicate that
no information of military importance was obtained prior to the attack
from any of the Japanese Consulate's messages. It has been testified
that various of the other messages received on 5 December 1941 were in a
Japanese code known as the "PA" or "PA-K2" system and that efforts to
decrypt these were not successful until after the attack. These
messages, as identified by Lieutenant Woodward, will be found at pages
6-23 of Exhibit 56 (supplied by the Radio Intelligence Unit) and at
pages 7-12 of Exhibit 56A (supplied by the District Intelligence
Office). They were as follows:
(1) December 3rd to Tokyo-Advising that a freighter in military service
departed on the second and that a named ship arrived on the third (p.
10, Exhibit 56A).
(2) December 3rd to Tokyo-Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane
tenders left port. The balance of the message was not recovered (p. 8,
Exhibit 56A).
[91] (3) December 3rd to Tokyo-In connection with the handling of
expenses for steamer passage to Japan.
(4) December 3rd to Tokyo-Advising of a change in method of
communicating by signals, so that each of the numbers one to eight had a
certain meaning as to departures and dates of departure of ships, which
numbers were to be communicated by lights in beach
Page 454
houses, by the use of a sailboat, by certain want ads to be broadcast
over a local radio station, and by bonfires at certain points if the
previous signals could not be made (p 12, Exhibit 56).
(5) December 3rd to Tokyo and elsewhere-Regarding money taken in for
sale of tickets (p. 16 Exhibit 56).
(6) December 3rd to Tokyo-Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane
tenders departed the third (p. 22, Exhibit 56).
(7) December 3rd to Tokyo and San Francisco-Advising that a transport
had sailed for the Mainland and that a ship had arrived from San
Francisco (p. 20, Exhibit 56).
A photostatic copy of the December, 1941, bill of RCA Communications at
Honolulu, covering the Japanese Consul General's messages in November
and December, 1941, was received from the District Intelligence Office
at Honolulu (Exhibit 55). This indicates that there were four radiograms
sent on November 2nd, two on November 13th, four on December 1st, and
two on December 2nd. The testimony concerning these is to the effect
that they were not received or read prior to the attack, that they were
received later and were thought to be in more complex codes, probably
machine codes, as there were no indicators by which they could be
identified.
It further appears from Exhibit 55 that there were various other
radiograms charged to the Japanese Consul General for December 4th and
5th, and three for December 6th. The testimony concerning these
indicates that none was obtained prior to the attack.
The two messages listed on the RCA bill for December 4th, according to
Lieutenant Woodward, were among a group of messages received on the
night of December 7th (p. 4-5, Exhibit 56A). It was later learned that
one advised Tokyo that an English gunboat arrived on the third and
departed and that the sailors had come ashore and had received mail at
the British Consulate; the other advised that a light cruiser had
departed hastily on the fourth (Exhibit 57).
The five radiograms listed on the RCA bill for December 5th were
received after the attack and were actually two messages to Tokyo, the
second having been sent also to San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington,
D. C. The first message reported the arrival on the morning of the 5th
of three battleships, which had been at sea for eight days, also that
the LEXINGTON and five cruisers had left the same day, and that eight
battleships, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers were in port. The
second message has not been translated. It relates to funds of the
Consulate General (Exhibit 57).
[92] The three radiograms charged for December 6th were actually two
messages in "PA-K2" code (Exhibit 57) . The first, which was translated
after the attack, was sent to Tokyo and to Washington at 6:01 p. m. on 6
December 1941. It set forth the ships observed at anchor on the sixth
and stated:
". . .9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17
destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers
lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).
"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the
fleet air arm."
The other message of December 6th, which was filed at 12:58 p. m. that
day, was, after decryption, translated by Joseph Finnegan, now a
Captain, U. S. N., who reported for duty in the radio intelligence
Page 455
unit on the 9th or 10th of December, 1941. He translated that message
(Exhibit 57) as follows:
"From: KITA
"To: F. M. TOKYO 6 Dec. 41.
"Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123.
"1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp
Davis, N. C. on the American mainland. They considered (at that time)
the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and
Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no
locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing
moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen.
It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they
were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby
Hickam Field, EWA Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have
been dropped.
"2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the nonuse of nets for
torpedo defense of battleships and will report further."
Captain Finnegan admitted in his testimony that the last sentence of the
first paragraph of his translation was an incorrect translation. As
appears from an Army translation of that message (Exhibit 57) that
sentence, correctly translated, was as follows:
"I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity
left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."
As previously noted, among the messages turned over to the District
Intelligence Officer and to ComFOURTEEN Communication Intelligence Unit
for decryption and translation on 5 December 1941, was the [93] message
from Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 December 1941, which established a system
of signals to be used from Oahu by means of lights at beach houses, the
use of a sailboat, by wants ads on a radio station, and bonfires. This
message was in the possession of the Radio Communications Intelligence
Unit from a December to 10 December 1941, at which time it was
successfully decrypted and translated. The Japanese Consul General's
signal message of December 3rd was not only in the possession of the
Navy at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, but was also in the possession
of the Navy Department at Washington prior to the attack. A copy of that
message as contained in the Op-20-G files at the Navy Department,
indicates that it was translated on 11 December 1941, and that it had
been intercepted by any Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Va.
(Document 22, Exhibit 13). In fact however, that message was decrypted
and translated in rough form prior to 1 p. m., 6 December 1941, by Mrs.
Edgers. A translator assigned to the Op-20-G Unit, Navy Department. She
testified that she believed that it was shown that afternoon to Kramer
and that he examined it in rough form. Kramer did not recall this but
did recall going over the message thoroughly on December 5th. Evidently
further work on this message was deferred on December 6th because of the
pressure of work on the thirteen parts of the Japanese fourteen-part
reply which were being decrypted that afternoon and evening.
It should be noted that a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 2
December 1941, was intercepted by the Army radio intercept unit at Fort
Shafter, Hawaii (Document 24, Exhibit 13). This message stated that in
view of the present situation the presence of warships, airplane
carriers and cruisers was of utmost importance, that there should be
daily reports, that there should be reports whether or not there were
observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or an indications
Page 456
that they would be set up, and whether or not the warships were provided
with anti-mine nets. The message apparently was forwarded from Fort
Shafter by mail to the Army. The Army translation of the message bears a
note that the message was received on December 23rd and translated on 30
December 1941, by the Army. It has been testified by Brigadier General
Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, that no decryption was done
at Fort Shafter, but that all intercepted traffic was forwarded to
Washington for decryption and translation.
Finally, it appears that the two highly significant messages sent by the
Japanese Consul General during the afternoon of December 6th were both
intercepted by the Army intercept station at San Francisco and forwarded
to the Army in Washington by teletype (Docs. 14, 15, Exhibit 13). Both
of these were in the Japanese code known as the "PA-K2" code and are
indicated to have been translated by the Army on Monday, December 8,
1940, [sic] According to Captain Safford, the longer message, stating
that there was "considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a
surprise attack" against Pearl Harbor, and that the battleships did not
have torpedo nets, could have been decrypted in about an hour and a
half; and the shorter message, which stated in part that no air
reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm, could have been
decrypted in less than an hour.
[94] D. The "Winds Code" and the Alleged "Winds Message."
In the latter half of November, 1941, the Japanese Government by
messages to Washington and elsewhere established two codes to be used
for communication between Tokyo and elsewhere. The first has been
referred to as the "winds code." In that code certain Japanese words
were to be added in the middle and at the end of the daily Japanese
language short-wave news broadcasts and could also be used in Morse code
messages, which words would apparently be weather reports. Thus, the
Japanese words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" which meant "East wind rain," would
actually mean that Japan-United States relations were in danger. Words
were also supplied for Japan-Russian relations and for Japan-British
relations. The existence of this code was brought to the attention of
the Navy Department late in November through the interception and
decryption of Japanese messages establishing the code, and also through
information to the same effect received from other sources such as the
United States Naval Attache at Batavia. It appeared that the use of the
code words would indicate a breaking off of diplomatic relations or
possibly war between the countries designated.
The Japanese also established, late in November, 1941, a code system
which has been referred to as the "hidden word code." This code was not
discussed in previous investigations. The establishment of the code was
first learned through the interception and decryption in Washington, D.
C. of several Japanese diplomatic communications which had been sent
from Tokyo on and after 2 December 1941 (Documents 6, 8, 12, 17 and 20,
Exhibit 13). This code was intended to be used, when telegraphic
communications might be severed, as a means of informing Japanese
diplomats of the situation concerning the country in which they were
located. Thus the word "KODAMA" meant Japan, the word "KOYANATI" meant
England, the word "MINAMI" meant United States, and the word "HATTORI"
meant that relations between Japan and another country, to be identified
by a
Page 457
code word, were not in accordance with expectations. It may be noted
that the meaning of the last word, as set forth in the Navy translation
of the "hidden word code," differs from the meaning which the War
Department cryptanalyst testified should have been given to the word.
According to his testimony, the word should have been translated as
meaning that relations were on the verge of crisis or that hostilities
might commence.
Prior investigations conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the
Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry resulted in findings that prior to 7
December 1941 there had been a "winds code message" by the Japanese in
which the code words relating to the United States were used, and that
this message had been intercepted by the Navy Department prior to the
attack and communicated to the Army, but that no copy of it could be
found in the Army or Navy files. It appears that these findings were
based primarily on the testimony of Captain Safford and of Captain
Kramer of the Navy Department.
It should be noted that a Japanese message using the "winds code" words
relating to the United States, if received on 3 or 4 December, or at any
other time prior to 7 December 1941, would have conveyed no information
of importance which the Navy and War Departments did not already
possess. Such a message would have indicated either a break in
diplomatic relations or possibly war with the United States. That both
the Navy Department and the War Department, and Admiral Kimmel as well,
were already aware that a break in diplomatic relations or war with the
United States was imminent, is clearly established by the [95] November
27th "war warning" to Admiral Kimmel, and by the repetition on November
28th by the Navy of the Army's warning dispatch to General Short.
In view, however, of the findings by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the
Army Pearl Harbor Board that a "winds message" relating to the United
States was received about 3 December 1941, and that no copy of it could
be found, further investigation on this point was deemed necessary.
(1) Prior investigations.
(a) The Naval Court of Inquiry:
In the "Addendum" to its findings, the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of
Inquiry stated concerning the "Winds Code" as follows:
"From 26 November to 7 December 1941 there was much diplomatic dispatch
traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and
which was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific. A message
dated 19 November 1941, Tokyo to Washington translated on 28 November,
1941 and referred to as "The Winds Code" was as follows:
" "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
" "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)
and the cutting off of international communications the following
warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short
wave news broadcast.
" "(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. Relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.
[1]
" "(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. Relations: KOTANOKAZE KUMORI. [2]
" "(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE. [3]
" "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather
forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard
please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely
secret arrangement.
" "Forward as urgent intelligence." "
[1] East wind rain.
[2] North wind cloudy.
[3] West wind clear.
Page 458
"[96] The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November 1941 sent
to the Chief of Naval Operations information to Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and commandant 14th Naval
District substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5
December 1941 the United states Naval Attach, Batavia, sent to the Chief
of naval Operations substantially the same information. These messages
stated that at some future date information would be sent by Japan
indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war
between countries designated.
"All officers of the communication and Intelligence Divisions in the
Navy Department considering the expected information most important were
on the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4
December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was
received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject
to two interpretations either a breaking off of diplomatic relations
between Japan and the United States or war this information was not
transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet or to other
Commanders afloat.
"It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief
Pacific and Asiatic Fleets were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this
code and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy
Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl
Harbor when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor.
No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this
information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by
other Commanders afloat.
"Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it although Admiral
Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that
Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy
Department."
(b) The Army Pearl Harbor Board:
The "Top Secret" and separate portion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board's
report referred to the "Winds Message." The report stated that a winds
execute message reading "War with the United States, war with Britain,
including the Netherlands East Indies, except peace with Russia" had
been received in the Navy Department on 3 December 1941; that the Navy
admitted that that message was received prior to December 6th; and, that
the War Department files contained no copy of the message. The report
referred in this connection to testimony by Captain Safford, who stated
that such message had been received by Commander Kramer, who had been
[97] notified by Brotherhood of its receipt, and that it had been seen
by Safford at 8:00 a. m. on December 4th. Safford stated that no copy of
the message could be found in the Navy Department files.
The Army report further stated that on December 5th, Admiral Noyes
called Colonel Sadtler, at 9:30 a. m., saying: "Sadtler, the message is
in." Apparently based on Sadtler's testimony, the report also stated
that Sadtler did not know whether this meant war with the United States,
but believed it meant war with either the United States, Russia or Great
Britain; that he discussed it with his superiors and was instructed to
confer with Admiral Noyes; and that he telephoned Admiral Noyes, who
said that he was too busy and would have to confer with Sadtler later.
Sadtler then saw various officers in the War Department, all of whom did
not think that any further information should be sent to Hawaii.
It also appeared that the Army Board had received testimony on this
matter from Colonel Bratton, who said that Sadtler, acting on behalf of
Colonel Bratton, had arranged for the FCC to monitor Japanese
broadcasts. Apparently Bratton testified that no information reached him
before December 7th which indicating a break in relations with the
United States and that he did not think that any such information had
reached anyone else. He referred to an FCC intercept which was not the
message for which they had been looking.
Page 459
(2) The basis of the previous findings that there was a Winds Execute
message prior to the attack.
The basis for the Army Pearl Harbor Board finding that a "winds message"
relating to the United States had been received appears, to the extent
known by the Navy, in the above summary of the top secret portion of the
Army Board's report. That indicates that primarily the basis for the
finding was the testimony of Captain Safford. In addition to Safford's
testimony, there was apparently testimony by Sadtler of a conversation
with Admiral Noyes in which he referred to a "winds message" but not to
the contents of that message.
Captain Safford testified before Admiral Hart and before the Naval Pearl
Harbor Court of Inquiry. His testimony was the primary basis for the
Naval Court of Inquiry's findings that a "winds message" relating to the
United States had been received. In addition to his testimony, the Naval
Court of Inquiry had testimony from Captain Kramer bearing on this
subject which tended to support the finding.
In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford said:
"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning
message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets,
summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds
Message", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent.
Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral
Noyes in my [98] presence I was given the message to read after Admiral
Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on
December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked "What do you think of the
message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult to the
intelligence of the Commander in Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated "I do
not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of
things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and
I do. I think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given
this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the
front office." Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes
later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought
that this message of warning had been sent, and did not realize until
two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that
McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above
statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to
explain what is meant by the "Winds Message". The "Winds Message" was a
name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence
duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a
fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese
Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain
(including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip off from the
British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately
forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander in Chief U. S. Asiatic
Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the
American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The
Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the
State Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of
Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor
Radio Tokyo to catch the "Winds Message" when it should be sent, and
this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo
broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as
follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii
and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four
or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept
stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all
Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran
up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The "Winds
Message" was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941
(Washington Time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo
time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation
was such that the "Winds Message" was heard only on the East Coast of
the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations
that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I.
Units, not hearing the "Winds Message" themselves and not receiving any
word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed [99]
Page 460
that the "Winds Message" had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese
Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at
Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished
as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the
War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information
that the "Winds Message" had been sent by Tokyo. The "Winds Message" was
received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941,
while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch.
There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message
really meant because it came in a different form from what had been
anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came
down that evening and identified the message as the "Winds Message" we
had been looking for. The significant part of the "Winds Message" read:
"HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO
KAZE KUMORI". The literal translation of these phrases is: "EAST WIND
RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY." The meaning of
this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: "War with the
United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with
Russia." I first saw the "Winds Message" about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday,
December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my
office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and
said, "Here it is!" as he handed me the "Winds Message." As I remember
it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant "Winds"
underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom.
Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and
distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department.
As the direct result of the "Winds Message," I prepared a total of five
messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering
the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential
papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result
of the "Winds Message," McCollum drafted the long warning message,
previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but
which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval
Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the "Winds
Message" as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with
the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates
had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese
would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the
latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the
"Winds Message": Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander
F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S.
N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following
officers knew by hearsay that the "Winds Message" had been intercepted
but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N.;
Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.; Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S.
N.; Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. * * *
"[100] The "Winds Message" was last seen by myself about December 14,
1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were
assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the
Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts
Commission, according to my understanding at the time."
Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain Safford repeated in substance
his prior testimony and stated that Lieutenant Murray or possibly Kramer
brought him the message; that he couldn't determine from what Navy
intercept station the message had come; that he had a vague recollection
of a second "Winds Message", but had been unable to find any trace of it
until he testified before Admiral Hart; that since that time he learned
that the FCC had intercepted a "Winds Message" at Portland, but that he
did not recognize that message. He did not recall any of the FCC
intercepts contained in Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, none
of which indicated a break with the United States. He stated further
that despite repeated search since November, 1943, no copy of the "Winds
Message" could be found in the files; that Lieutenant Commander
Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them, but did
not care to tell Safford.
Page 461
Also Safford said that he knew what had happened to the Army copies of
that message through very "second hand and devious sources." He also
repeated his prior testimony to the effect that about the middle of the
first week in December, 1944, Commander McCollum had drafted a long
dispatch which included information about the "Winds Message," and which
dispatch had not been sent out.
Commander Kramer in his testimony before the Naval Court, said that on
December 3rd or 4th he had been shown a "Winds Message" by the watch
officer and took it immediately to Captain Safford, who took it to
Admiral Noyes. This was a plain-language message and, as shown to him,
contained the phrase translated as "East Wind Rain" which meant strained
relations or a break with the United States. The message had been on
teletype paper and indicated that it had come through an USN intercept
station.
Among the witnesses before the Naval Court of Inquiry who testified that
so far as they knew there had never been a "Winds Message" relating to
the United States were Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and Admiral
Noyes. Neither Admiral Wilkinson nor Commander McCollum, who were
alleged by Safford to have had knowledge of the "Winds Message," was a
witness before the Naval Court of Inquiry. As both were at the time
actively engaged in combat operations.
(3) Evidence Obtained in this Investigation Concerning "Winds Message."
(a) Testimony of Captain Safford:
Captain Safford testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that
there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He
realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his
memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get [101]
information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use
in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no
reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had
drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at
the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give
him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of
memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people.
Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that
Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford
about the disposition of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when
Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it
and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had
been referring to the false "Winds Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of
the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a
genuine weather broadcast.
Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the
Army's copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be
confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the Army
investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through
W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the
information was that the copies of the "Winds Message" had been
destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct
orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of
the War Department had had some question
Page 462
about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of
the original of the "Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused
to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he
said, should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army
investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of the Army knew
that the "Winds Message" had been received.
Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his
testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier
impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message" and various other
intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts
Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to
Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also
said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message"
specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's
message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in
McCollum's draft dispatch.
Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds
Message" was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington
time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were
on duty recollected only the false "Winds Message," and not the "true
"Winds Message." The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted
in the message being intercepted only on the East Coast of the United
States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that
they had to call on Corrigedor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits
because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast,
[102] West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about
fifty percent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval
station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the
station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor,
Maine. He stated that the logs of those stations and of the Navy
Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no
record had been kept.
Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander
Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he
said that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to
use the "winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine
weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to
Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not
what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that
message was received twelve hours or more after what he referred to as
the "true winds message."
Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65 as a true "winds" message
relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been
monitoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack
they had intercepted no such message.
(b) Captain Kramer's Testimony:
Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the
"winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the
light of thinking it over since that time. He said that he had had no
recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to
him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford some of the
details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall a message
some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did
recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walking with
him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it
over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that the message had
been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it
might have been one using the code words referring to the United States,
as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now that he
had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this
revision of his view was that on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp
recollection that in the latter part of the week preceding the attack
there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the
Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when he
testified during this investigation that the message referred to England
and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it
may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall.
Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese
"hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by
him as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other
messages. The message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between
Great Britain and Japan are not in accordance with expectations"
(Exhibit 20). In his [103] haste, Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI"
which was contained in the Japanese Message and which referred to the
United States. He testified that after he returned to the Navy
Department and shortly before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he discovered his
mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the
translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several
telephone calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the
officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G-
2 of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy
Department's files do not disclose any correction of the translation
(Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this that a number of copies
of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly his
correction was made on another copy which has since been discarded.
Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until
he testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of
7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a
"hidden word message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word
message", which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was
among the group of messages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December
1941, when he hastily reviewed a folder of that traffic for Mr.
Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the fact that previously
Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material.
(c) Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood's Testimony:
Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch
officers who were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the
Page 464
first week of December, 1941. He said that he had never received an
intercept or message wherein the "Winds Code" words relating to the
United States were used. He said that about December 4th, he received a
telephone message from the FCC in which the words apparently relating to
Russia were used; that he called Admiral Noyes, who commented that the
wind was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brotherhood, did
not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brotherhood
stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had
had a conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called
him about December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had
arrived. Brotherhood said he did not recall the telephone conversation
and that he believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at
that time.
(d) Lieutenant Commander Linn's Testimony:
Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's
section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the
four officers who stood that watch during the first week in December,
1941. Any intercept which had come into that section, he said, would
have had to come through one of the four watch officers. He was familiar
with the "Winds Code" and he never saw any intercept [104] prior to 7
December 1941 in which the "winds" code words relating to the United
States were used.
(e) Lieutenant Commander Pering's Testimony:
Pering testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing
watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's
section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw
any intercept using the code words relating to the United States.
(f) Lieutenant Commander Murray's Testimony:
Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a
twenty-four hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first
week in December, 1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute
relating to the United States ever came to his attention during that
week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a "winds"
message had come in on 7 December 1941.
(g) Lieutenant Freeman's Testimony:
Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI
intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his
unit worked very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every
effort was made to monitor for a " winds" message." Freeman was one of
the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony before
Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of a "winds"
message relating to the United States. He testified that he never knew
of any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States.
(h) Captain McCollum's testimony:
Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds"
code; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which
contained the words relating to the United States; that the message
which contained the words apparently relating to Russia had been
received during the first week of December, 1941, but that in his
opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further that during
the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch
Page 465
summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he
remembered no reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and,
that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941
which did not refer to a "winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know
whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been
submitted to Admiral Wilkinson.
(i) Admiral Wilkinson's Testimony:
Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds"
code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander
McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had
been received. Possibly, he said, it was the message received on the 7th
using the words relating to England. He did not recall anything about
the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted and which [105] Captain
Safford had testified Admiral Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out.
(j) Captain Mason's and Commander Fabian's Testimony:
Captain Mason who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and
Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor,
both testified that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for
any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was
received wherein the words relating to the United States were used. In
this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy
Department that the unit at Corregidor, because of its geographical
location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio
broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see
Exhibit 8).
They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British
Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been
monitoring for a "winds" message also, and that had such a message been
received by the British, they most certainly would have been advised of
its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as
to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the attack.
(k) Captain Layton's Testimony:
Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he
had been familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to
monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language
officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to
cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up
each day with Commander Rochefort and that no "winds" intercept was
received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch
from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.
(l) Captain Safford recalled:
Captain Safford was recalled and testified that he never had a
conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds"
message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he
received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood
advised of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds"
code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds"
message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He
said further, however, that until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or
knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were
used.
Page 466
(m) Mr. Friedman's Testimony:
Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to
7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds"
message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several
conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one
about a year and a half ago, and none later than six months prior to his
[106] testimony in this investigation. He said that Safford had
indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a
"winds" message but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files,
and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East
Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half
ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a
"winds" message had come in on the 4th or 5th of December: that he had
been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly
Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some
question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that
Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that
Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification
from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2
authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently
nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said
that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message
and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by
somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by
General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly
inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably
just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and
that he had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr.
Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the
existence of a "winds" message relating to the united States, apart from
his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler.
(n) Captain Rochefort's Testimony:
Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at
Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code
message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a twenty-four hour
basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made
an exhaustive search into all available Navy records and could find no
trace of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941.
[107]
E. Information Concerning the Organization of the Japanese Navy.
(1) ONI Report of 29 July 1941.
On July 29th, the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report,
which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the
organization of the Japanese Navy. This stated that, as a result of
information which had been received, it was possible to give a much more
complete picture of the organization of the Japanese Navy. It stated
that the Japanese naval forces afloat were organized into two main
commands-the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval-Forces in China. The
Combined Fleet included:
(a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
Page 467
(b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.
(c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
(d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.
(e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).
The Combined Fleet and First-Fleet, under the command of Admiral
Yamamota [sic], consisted of various BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs
and two destroyer squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA)
was included. The carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU);
CarDiv 5 (RYUJO, HOSHO) and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO).
The Second Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included
various cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and two destroyer
squadrons. CruDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier
divisions were: (CarDiv I (AKAGI and KAGA), and CarDiv 2 (SORYU and
HIRYU).)
The Third Fleet included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA MARU) and various
minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force and sub-chaser
squadrons.
The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the
Submarine Fleet and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also
given. (Exhibit 81)
(2) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45-41.
On 27 November 1941 (when the "war warning" was received), the Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin
Number 45-41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of
the Japanese Navy and with Japanese Forces and installations in the
Mandated Islands. It was a revision of the ONI bulletin above summarized
and replaced that bulletin on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This
stated:
"The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of
fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers
and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of
special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-
China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable [108] specialization
within the various commands, as shown below:
Major Fleet Commands
1. First Fleet (Battle Force) .................... 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv,
2 Desrons.
2. Second Fleet (Scouting Force) ................. 4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons,
etc.
3. Third Fleet (Blockade & Transport ............. Small Craft.
Force)
4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate Defense Force) .......... 1 Desron, 1 Subron,
and many small
units.
5. Fifth Fleet (?) ............................... (?)
6. Sixth Fleet (Submarine Fleet) ................. 6 Subrons.
7. Carrier Fleet (Aircraft Carriers) ............. 5 Cardivs.
8. Combined Air Force (Seaplane tenders, ......... 4 Airrons, & shore
etc.) based planes.
II. Japanese Naval Forces in China (Staff ........ 1 PG and 3 DD's.
Headquarters)
1. First China Exped. Fleet (Central China) ...... Gunboats.
2. Second China Exped. Fleet (South China) ....... 1 CA, 1 CL and small
craft.
3. Third China Exped. Fleet (North China) ........ Torpedo Boats, etc.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet (Saigon) ................ 1 CL, transports and
mine craft.
The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever
before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the
line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the
time. The base
Page 468
forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly
increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing."
The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin included
three BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and
HARUNA-as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during
1941 and was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a
cruiser division and two destroyer squadrons.
The Second Fleet included four CruDiv and two destroyer squadrons. One
of the CruDiv was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA).
The composition of the Third, Fourth and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was
given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated
"The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has
been reported at Maizuru."
[109] The composition of the Carrier Fleet, with the KAGA as flagship,
and consisting of ten carriers and sixteen destroyers, was listed as
follows:
CarDiv 1: AKAGI, KAGA (F) and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 2: SORYU (F) and HIRYU and a destroyer division
CarDiv 3: RYUJO (F) and HOSHO and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 4: ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU and a destroyer division.
CarDiv-: KORYU and KASUGA (MARU).
As will appear subsequently, the forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7
December 1941 included six carriers, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1), the
SORYU and HIRYU (CarDiv 2), and the ZUIKAKU and SHAKAKU [sic]. The
latter two carriers had been identified as CarDiv 4 in the Pacific Fleet
Intelligence Bulletin, as CarDiv 3 (annexed to the First Fleet) in the
earlier ONI bulletin, and as CarDiv 5, in Exhibit 3, which sets forth
the composition of the attacking force.
Also included in the attacking force were the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two
of the battleships of BatDiv 3) which had been listed in the
intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Combined Fleet and First
Fleet, and the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8) which had been listed in the
Intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Second Fleet.
[110]
F. Information Concerning the Location and Movements of Japanese
Naval Forces
The evidence indicates that there were no formal arrangements whereby
the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and
movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section
of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained
in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing
such information, and had access to radio intelligence information
available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with
them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force
received some general information concerning Japanese movements, from
the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
(1) Information available at the time of the "War Warning."
The procedure for handling radio intelligence information concerning
Japanese movements was set forth in a dispatch of 24 November 1941 from
OpNav to CincAF, information ComSIXTEEN, CincPac, ALUSNA Chungking,
ASTALUSNA Shanghai, and
Page 469
ALUSNA Tokyo (Exhibit 8). This dispatch stated that Japanese naval
movements as reported by the individual information addresses were often
conflicting because of their necessarily fragmentary nature and that
since (ComSIXTEEN intercepts were considered most reliable, it was
suggested that other reports be carefully evaluated and sent to
ComSIXTEEN for action and to OpNav for information and, that after
combining all incoming reports, ComSIXTEEN was to direct dispatches to
OpNav, info CincPac, based on all information received and indicating
the ComSIXTEEN evaluation.
The Japanese naval situation as estimated by ComFOURTEEN on 26 November
1941, was set forth in a dispatch of that date to OpNav, information
CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN. This dispatch stated that for the past
month the Commander of the Second Fleet had been organizing a task force
consisting of Second Fleet and other units and, after discussing various
other units, stated: "There is believed to be strong concentration of
submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airon [sic]
24, at least one carrier division unit, plus probably one-third of the
submarine fleet. Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be
preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts may
operate from Palao and Marshalls."
On the same day ComSIXTEEN sent a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav,
ComFOURTEEN and CincAF, discussing in considerable detail the estimate
of ComSIXTEEN concerning the location and probable movements of Japanese
Fleet units (Exhibit 8). This stated that traffic analysis for the past
few days had indicated that the Commander-In-Chief of the Second Fleet
was directing some units of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Fleets
in a loose-knit task force organization that apparently would be divided
into two sections. One section expected to operate in the South China
area, was referred to in the dispatch as the "first section." The "first
section" was estimated to consist of CruDiv 7, AirRon 6, Defense
Division 1, Desron 3, and Subron 6. The "second section" consisted of
units expected to [111] operate in the Mandates. The "second section"
was believed to include Crudiv 5, Cardiv 3, RYUJO and one MARU. It was
indicated that BatDiv 3 might be included in the "second section." But
that this could not be clarified yet. The dispatch further stated:
"Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in
the Mandates X Our best indications are that all known First and Second
Fleet carriers still in Sesebo [sic] -Kure area." The evaluation was
considered to be reliable.
During this time, the Office of Naval Intelligence was issuing
fortnightly summaries of current national situations. The summary for
December 1941 (Exhibit 9) was distributed by air mail. The statements
therein as to the Japanese naval situation, which portion was prepared
by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, were based upon information which had
been received at least three or four days prior to the date of the
document. This stated:
"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that
extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time
troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan
and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-
China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be
carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an
extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take
sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force,
Page 470
under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet appears to be
subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off
the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes
a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the
Combined Air Force destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one
division of battleships also may be assigned the major capital ship
strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the
carriers.
"The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment including
landing boats in considerable numbers. Activities in the Mandates under
naval control consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel
aircraft munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen
engineers etc."
(2) Admiral Kimmel's sources of information after the "war warning."
The ComFOURTEEN communication intelligence unit continued the practice,
which had been followed for some time past, of preparing daily
communications intelligence summaries for submission to Admiral Kimmel
via Lt. Comdr. Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Photostatic
copies of the communication intelligence summaries from 14 October to 14
December 1941, [112] constitute Exhibit 22 of this investigation.
Lieutenant Commander Layton, who presented these summaries to Admiral
Kimmel, also prepared daily intelligence reports which were distributed
to various members of CincPac's staff. The intelligence memoranda were
not given to the Admiral or Chief of Staff because they saw the basic
material upon which the reports were based. The intelligence reports by
Layton for the period 6 October to 2 December 1941 constitute Exhibit
26. None was prepared after December 2nd, according to Layton.
The daily communication intelligence summaries together with the
dispatches received by Admiral Kimmel from other organizations during
the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, constituted the only sources
of information which he had during that period concerning the location
and movements of Japanese naval forces.
(3) Information received by Admiral Kimmel after the "war warning."
The critical period commenced on 27 November 1941, when the Japanese
force, which was to attack Pearl Harbor, secretly left Tankan Bay,
Etorofu Island and, in radio silence, proceeded undetected toward Pearl
Harbor. The Japanese force, which included three of a Japan's Carrier
Divisions, CarDiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA; CarDiv 2, HIRYU, SORYU; CarDiv 5,
SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; BatDiv 3, first section, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA; CruDiv 8,
CHIKUMA; and other lighter vessels, cruised for ten days to a point 200
miles north of Oahu, where the planes were launched for the attack on
Pearl Harbor.
It will be recalled that the November 24th dispatch from CNO in part had
stated that the diplomatic situation and statements of the Japanese
Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicated
that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack
on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility. The "war warning" of the
27th had stated that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the
next few days and that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and
the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition
against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly
Borneo.
Page 471
The information which Admiral Kimmel subsequently received as to the
location and movements of Japanese naval forces was as follows:
28 November 1941:
The Naval Attache at Shanghai reported in his dispatch 270855 the
sightings by the master of a foreign vessel, which had left Hong Kong en
route to Shanghai, of many transports proceeding south singly or in
small groups.
[113] The November 27th ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary delivered
on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little
below normal, due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the
Tokvo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic
was heard, intercepted from carriers, Bako, Sama and Saigon were active
as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity
which sent five dispatches to he major commanders. The direction finder
activity was very high. Is to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there
was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area.
The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of
general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The
Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third
Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there
was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander,
it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense
forces in the Mandates, and also that there was no further information
on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander
Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area.
Concerning air forces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in
the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that
"Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initialed
by Admiral Kimmel.
It appears, therefore, that as of this time the ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN,
and Washington radio intelligence units were of the opinion that the
major portion of the Japanese carriers were in "home waters;" that
ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that a carrier unit was in the Marshalls,
and that ComSIXTEEN expected CarDiv 3 to operate in the Mandates. The
evidence disclosed that the term "home waters" was understood
differently by the Far Eastern Section of OWI, which prepared the 1
December 1941 ONI estimate, and by the Fleet Intelligence Officer,
Pacific Fleet. Captain McCollum testified that the term meant the normal
cruising grounds of the Japanese Fleet, roughly west of the 180 meridian
of longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa, and included the
Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians. Captain Layton, the Fleet
Intelligence Officer, testified that "home waters" meant to him, and was
understood by Admiral Kimmel to mean, the drill grounds of the Inland
Sea and approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay
Area; in general the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, but
not including northern Japan and the Kuriles, to a point about 60 miles
east of Japan.
Page 472
29 November 1941:
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a
dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th
(Exhibit 19, Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent
by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:
"[114] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action
unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities
cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit
the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense
X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these
measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil
population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate
message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities
in the United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the
tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit
dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
officers"
The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the
Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as
then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It
stated further:
"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X
Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply
to Japan in case hostilities occur"
On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav, information
CincAF, and stated:
"Following received by British consul from usually reliable source X
Japanese will attack Krakow [sic] Isthmus from sea on one December
without ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and
Singapore X Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main
landing to be made at Songkhola X (Singora)"
ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF, OpNav,
CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship believed to be a
light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as flagship, Southern
Expeditionary Fleet; that this ship was now in the Camranh Bay-Saigon
area.
OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPac, ComSIXTEEN,
ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State Department, from
Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that five days previously
[115] Orange troops and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking
up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops had landed and that
10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during the same period; that
the total troops in South Indo-China totaled 70,000. It observed that
there was an estimate of some 128,000, but considered that too high. It
reported that many trucks had landed and were moving troops and supplies
to the interior. It observed that this movement is of large proportions
and indicates hostilities against Thailand may begin soon. It also
forwarded information from Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated
November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particularly
railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even recently
augmented and are being transshipped south. Among recently landed
artillery are anti-tank guns; that the Japanese had
Page 473
recently purchased a considerable number of native boats along the coast
of Tongking Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500.
These boats were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated
November 25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable
information that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that
around 1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum,
Nippon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army would
advance on Thailand; that great increased troop landings and movements
were noted south; that during last few days about 4,000 men have landed.
On November 25th and 26th. 1,500 would go south by special train; that
in Tongking there were approximately 25,000 Jap troops and at Gillam
there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated November 26th Hanoi,
was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong mayor had
advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended to sequester
all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had demanded keys to
all warehouses by noon November 25th.
The ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered the
29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to
and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were very
heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence
net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed
to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this
command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet
commanders. It was said that "This activity is interpreted to indicate
that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S.
Naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet,
it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its
units. As to the Third Fleet there was little activity from its units
save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said
to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet
originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively
for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in
Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity.
This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
[116] The ComSIXTEEN communication intelligence unit sent a dispatch on
the 29th noting various recent developments from radio intelligence such
as various encrypted addresses noted in the preceding two days traffic,
that various additional units now appeared to be associated with the
"first section" (South China area), referred to in ComSIXTEEN's November
26th dispatch, that the Hiyei (which in fact was en route to Pearl
Harbor) and Kongo appeared to be associated definitely with the "first
section," but no movement from the Takao area had been noted, and, that
the Cinc Combined Fleet was to leave the Kure zone that day, the Sasebo
zone on December 1st, and enter the Bako zone on the 2nd.
30 November 1941:
On 30 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to
CincPac for information (Exhibit 76, Naval Court), which advised in
part:
"Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra by overseas
expedition . . . desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on
three days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch X . . ."
Page 474
A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77,
Naval Court) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were
no contacts and the information were all negative.
The communication intelligence summary of the 29th delivered this day
stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the
traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic
was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence
sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders both ashore and
afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long
messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally
reporting to Tokyo radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This
station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction
finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with
much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AlNav, and the
naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleets Third Fleet,
Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been
addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address
was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he
had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this
had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was
intentional in making positively known the existence of an air fleet.
Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units
were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second
Fleet, including Cardiv 3, and the Third Fleet.
Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships but their
assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the
Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication
with [117] the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The Cinc
Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area.
There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at
Chichyima [sic] the previous day, and also some traffic from the
Commander in Chief, China Fleet.
1 December 1941:
A copy of a dispatch by CNO to CincAF, 301709, was received by CincPac,
referring to the previous dispatch which had directed an air search on
the line Manila to Camranh Bay, directing that a report be made daily
even if the information were all negative (Exhibit 77, Naval Court).
A dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 December 1941, was also received
referring to a Thailand-Japanese intrigue aimed at forcing the British
to attack Thai as a counter-move to a Japanese landing in Kota Bharu,
whereupon Thai would declare war and ask Japanese help.
A dispatch of 1 December from ComSIXTEEN advised of radio intelligence
information indicating that various units under Cinc Third Fleet were in
the Takao area and that Cinc Second Fleet had shifted from Kure to
Sasebo apparently en route to South China waters.
The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on
December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the
past few days, that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing
old dates. No reason could be given for the re-transmission of these
messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had
prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches
originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard
was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs. As to the Combined
Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets
were in Kure. In the same message, the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was
not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was
at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his
usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces, but also
included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members
of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As
to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the
location of the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, which gives the strong
impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be
still in the Truk area. It was said that the continued association of
Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus his known progress from the
Empire to Chichijime [sic] to Saipan made his destination obviously the
Marshalls; also that since one of his large units arrived in the
Marshalls some time ago, that unit could not agree with ComSIXTEEN that
there was not a submarine concentration in that area. "Every evidence
points to a concentration, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines
there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the
Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane
guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the
Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication
summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War
Plans Officer.
[118] A dispatch was received from ComSIXTEEN, addressed to OpNav,
information CincAF, CincPac, and ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a
reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight.
2 December 1941:
On 2 December 1941, ComSIXTEEN reported that Cinc Second and Cinc Third
Fleets were in the Takao area, and, that broadcasts to fleet units were
being sent to Takao or Bako in addition to Tokyo. Also reported was the
fact that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok had requested permission to
destroy codes.
CincAF also reported that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on
a southerly course in the South China Sea between Camranh Bay and the
Philippines. Also that three submarines were sighted 070 from Saigon,
180 miles, heading south, and that twenty-one transports, with air
patrol overhead, were at Camranh Bay.
A report from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of the
arrival of 14,000 troops sailing from there the week ending the 22nd.
The communication intelligence summary for the previous day stated
generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly
at 0000 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a
period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November
1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month
Page 476
indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active
operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to
the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of
dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the
Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of
traffic prior to 0000 1 December indicated that an effort was made to
deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change
of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and
consequent confusion and compromise. Either that, or the large number of
old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it
appear as if nothing unusual were pending. It should be noted that the
sentence in the above summary reading "The fact that service calls
lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in
preparing for active operations on a large scale" was underscored in red
pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton
testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by
Admiral Kimmel at the time.
The summary further stated as to the First Fleet "nothing to indicate
that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to
the Second Fleet, it was stated "This fleet is believed proceeding from
the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China;"
Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic;
consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up
Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report
except that the [119] same associations of Second Third Fleets and
Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continued. As
to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to
Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a
large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area
eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it
was stated "No change." As to carriers, it was said "No change." This
summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
In accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, Layton, the Fleet
Intelligence Officer, prepared a memorandum for the Admiral dealing with
the location of the Japanese Fleet. This memorandum was prepared,
according to Layton, on the evening of 1 December and was submitted by
him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum is
Exhibit 23. The memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which,
Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to
submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, and which reflected the
later information received after preparation of the memorandum on the
night of December 1st-2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations
which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This
memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the
location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to
him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.
Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units
of the Orange (Japanese) were "*thought*" to be located as listed in the
memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of
the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six
battleships, "(?)", and other units. He listed
Page 477
the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then
corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-
Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.
In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief,
China Fleet, the Shanghai base force, and an air group.
In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons
and various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force with
numerous air groups and the KASUGA MARU (thought to be a converted
carrier with 36 planes). He estimated hat the Commander in Chief, Second
Fleet, had been en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to
indicate that he was at Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and
with "Cardiv 4-two CV and four DD; Cardiv 3-two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3
less HARUNA-3 BB (maybe 2 BB)" and, he added in red pencil, certain
cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.
In the Hainon-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the
South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In
the French Indo-China area, he located the Commander in Chief of an
Expeditionary Fleet with various ships including 21 transports and some
base forces among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an
air group [120] and task force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the
Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air
group. At Saipan, he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine
force with possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force.
In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier
"KORYU? plus plane guards", and several submarine squadrons and base
force.
Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of
Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en
route to attack Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941,
during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and
commented on the absence of information concerning Japanese Carrier
Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described the conversation on
this point as follows:
"Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you
said as best you recall it?
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You
don't now where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I
replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do
not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty
confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as
sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially
with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could
be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that
effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or
words to that effect . . .
"Mr. SONNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me,
arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye
when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion
about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or
jocular one?
"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said,
"Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but
if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area
since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be
refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and
it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you mean to
say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In
other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their
exact location.
Page 478
"Mr. SONNETT. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information
about those carriers?
"[121] Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do
not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a
statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where
they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
3 December 1941:
It will be recalled that on December 3rd dispatches were sent by CNO to
CincPac and others advising that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts
at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had
been ordered to destroy the "purple" machine and most of the codes and
ciphers.
Layton testified that at the time Admiral Kimmel asked him what the
"purple machine" was; that he did not know and made inquiry; that he
advised Admiral Kimmel that it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical
coding machine; that he did not then know whether or not the Japanese
consul at Hawaii had such a machine; and, that he subsequently learned
that the Japanese consul there did not have such a machine.
The communication intelligence summary delivered on the 3rd, covering
the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic
was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major
parts of the Japanese Fleet. There was instances where the same dispatch
was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast
and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had
previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEEN had reported Second and
Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting
traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered
at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one
indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several
instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It
was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed
that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has
left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good
communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was
further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this
office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now
in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai
radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was
originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was
pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high
precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As
to the First Fleet, it was stated that despite the lack of positive
identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that
"from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a
split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may
be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing
indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third
Fleets, and apparently in company, while another combined fleet call
appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the
Second Fleet, it was stated "No units have stood out prominently in
[122] the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new
identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large
part of
Page 479
the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said
there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the
association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.
Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete lack of
information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat
promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls
have been partially identified since the change on the first of December
and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier
traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
4 December 1941:
On 4 December 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21, Naval Court) to
NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN and
ComSIXTEEN for information stating:
"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other
classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special
intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for
essential communications with CinCAF CincPAC ComFOURTEEN ComSIXTEEN and
Opnav X be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all
classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained."
ComSIXTEEN advised, in a dispatch received on December 4th, that seven
transports had been sighted of Saigon on 15 November 1941, and on the
20th a seaplane carrier northeast of Amoy.
The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised, in a dispatch received 4
December, that several large liners had been carrying supplies and
personnel to the Carolines, that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit and
that certain islands were being specially developed.
The Naval Attach,, Tokyo, advised in a dispatch received this day that a
transport loaded with aircraft and another with naval personnel had left
Yokohama on 27 November 1941.
The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated under the
heading "General," that traffic volume was normal with receiving
conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much
detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate
calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these
units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief
of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the
Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo
intelligence originated nine [123] dispatches to the same addresses. It
was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in
Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it
was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway,
but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also
stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands
but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no
information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initialed by
Admiral Kimmel.
5 December 1941:
There were no dispatches of an intelligence nature received by CincPac.
The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated that in
general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving
Page 480
conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system using the
prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in
operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao
broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages most of these
from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated
messages to the Chiefs of Staff. China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third
Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-(China Force, and same. In all,
this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the
Combined Fleet, it was stated "The outstanding item of today's traffic
is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and
Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative
commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well
identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed
to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now
believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity
of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic
destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CincSecond Fleet is still
copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in
Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be
made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that
Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South
China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator
addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between
South China commanders. All units in that area were quiet. This summary
was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
6 December 1941:
Several dispatches dated 6 December 1941 were found in the CincPac
files, but it does not appear whether or not they were received prior to
the attack. One was an OpNav dispatch authorizing CincPac to direct the
destruction of secret and confidential documents at our outlying islands
"in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our
outlying Pacific islands." (Exhibit 22, Naval Court.) Other dispatches
dated the 6th, from the Naval Observer at Wellington, advised of
Japanese destruction of codes; from the Assistant Naval Attache,
Shanghai, advised of the departure south of Japanese troops and increase
of Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai; and, from CincAF, advised of
a [124] 25-ship convoy, a 10-ship convoy, and 3 ships, off Saigon French
Indo-China, all of which appeared to be headed in a westerly direction,
also 30 ships and a cruiser were sighted in Camranh Bay.
The radio intelligence summary for 5 December, which was delivered on
the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the
attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circuits
were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo
Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept
schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was
several days old which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in
the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence
which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits. A
plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo
to Takao, prob-
Page 481
ably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs
Bureau saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you said is
considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing,
specific orders will be issued soon."
As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor
Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still
frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts.
It was stated that "They are undoubtedly in the Takao area or farther
south since the Takao broadcasts handles nearly all the; traffic. No
traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen
either."
There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic for that
fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet addressed at
Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth
Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China where was much traffic
addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako
continued as an active originator with man dispatches to the Second and
Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with
the movement of air corps several of which were moving probably to Indo-
China.
[125] 29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire
information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese
Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese
diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington,
D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese
Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic situation of the
Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the act that
hostilities were impending and imminent.
30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at
Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to he Chief of Naval
Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department and to
the President.
31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of
Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic
negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully
informed on this subject.
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at
Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the
Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's
success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted
messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during
the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications
facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations
to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac of the important
facts learned.
33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on he
information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.
34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, during
November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early
December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the
Page 482
diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent and
that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating
interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more
specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in
the movements of ships to or from other ports.
[126] 36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised
of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages
after the November 27th "war warning," which made it further evident the
termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese
intention to wage war.
37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the
attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in
which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present
to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply
terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact
that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the
middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated
an air attack at Pearl Harbor.
38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one
sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at
Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy
Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy
Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for
translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy
Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by
a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army
until after 0900.
39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information
several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby
the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel
immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army,
Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any
message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a
message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be
furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.
40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it
necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December
and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but
that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message
that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the
naval radio system.
41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was
received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an
ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code
machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might
have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and
that the naval authorities were to be informed.
42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on
November 24th, that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction,
including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possi-
Page 483
bility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the
Japanese is expected [127] within the next few days. The number and
equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces
indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai
or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."
43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to
probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of
Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware
of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not
regard such an attack as probable.
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1911, which were
to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives
information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the
United States, and other countries. These were known as the "winds" code
and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a
break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the
United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain
Japanese words signifying wind direction.
45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States
during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any
information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.
46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was
received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom
such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy
Department. No such message was intercepted by the Radio intelligence
units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts
were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The
evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the
British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message.
Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the
Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence
Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence,
recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations. The Director
of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled
no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was
received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of
Op-20-G, a communications security section of the Navy Department, who
stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it
related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the
Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain
Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he
stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those
officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other
testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by
Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said
that he recalled that there was a message but could not recall whether
or not it related to the United States or England or
Page 484
Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this [128]
investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word"
message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds"
message.
47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code
message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of
delivering other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he
overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the
message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are
not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later
discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p. m. on December 7th,
he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of
Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.
48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code
message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect
previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message
was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.
49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition
to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of
the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the
Pacific Fleet.
50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the
FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul
General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some
months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941
because the District Intelligence Officer feared that the existence of
such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications.
No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means
of the telephone taps.
51. On 6 December 1941 the local representative of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer
a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a
person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined
by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the
conversation should be further studied by a Japanese linguist of the
District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the recording of the
conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript
furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was
interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from
Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation,
references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been
code words signifying the presence or absence of ships, and a method of
conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which
presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior
investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to
the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.
[129] 52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of
the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and
to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial
communications company, were obtained during the first week of December,
1941. This was the first time that such mes-
Page 485
sages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made
immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted
before the attack. These contained no information of particular
significance.
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the
telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese
Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl
Harbor.
54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by
the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to
the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a
message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as
the "PA-K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence
Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the
Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been
established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby
lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads
to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey
information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships
of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl
Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the
message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by
a civilian translator in Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington.
That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept
station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no
specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the
attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown
to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of
work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was
taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.
55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received
a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing
situation, the presence of the ships in port was of utmost importance,
that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise
whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and
whether or not the warships were provided with antitorpedo nets. This
message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort
Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War
Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by
the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.
56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the
likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs
of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability
there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise
attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the
battleships [130] did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported
on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that
no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These
messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to
the attack.
Page 486
They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San
Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations
of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were
translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and
translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to
the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval
forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at
Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division
of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had
access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy
Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor,
an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general
information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence
Officer.
58. The War Department had information which led that Department to
believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November,
1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to
General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special
photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order
to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location
of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special
Army planes were not made ready.
59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence bulletin was
distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command.
This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the
organization of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the
same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further
increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping
of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The
bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet
consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each
having two carriers.
60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the
location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer,
who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl
Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio
Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of
Naval Intelligence in Washington,
61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of
Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These
included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces
which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl
Harbor and at the Philippines.
[131] 62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav,
information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the
information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio
Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The
dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a
task force comprising units of
Page 487
various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a
strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls,
which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a
carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate
was that a strong force night be preparing to operate in southeastern
Asia while component parts might operate from Palao and the Marshalls.
63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in She
Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of
the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence
unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others,
commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic
analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander-in-
Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleets units in a loose-knit
task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first
section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second
section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that
the second section included "Car Div 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This
dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the
supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates,
and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still
in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was
considered to be reliable.
64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports
from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were
received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important
Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not
report the movement of carriers.
65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor
continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information
received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval
communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence
Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning.
Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries daily on and after
27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December
5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.
66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication
intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other
things, that there was no further information on the presence of a
carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still locate in
home waters." The next day, he received the November 28th summary which
indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio
intelligence net was [132] operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval
communications and "IS GETTING; RESULTS." There was no information set
forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral
Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other
things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate
command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st,
Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to
carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated
the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had
not been confirmed
Page 488
67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received stated that
all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly
at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed
after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last
changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by
Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month
indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on
a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number
of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and
Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."
68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which
Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained
Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the
location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-
Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included
four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted
carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?) plus plane guards"
in the Marshalls area.
69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier
Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was
deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information
as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a
reliable estimate of their whereabouts.
70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following
conversation:
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You
don't know there carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I
replied, "NO, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do
not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty
confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as
sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially
with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could
be rounding Diamond head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that
effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or
words to that effect. * * *
"[133] Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he
said, "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely,
but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure
area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be
refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and
it was then when he with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you mean to say
they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In other
words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact
location. * * *
"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not
say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a
statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where
they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to
Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of
identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However,
since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the
change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been
recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on
December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or
carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention
Page 489
of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No
traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen
either."
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/12/96 Updated: 12/12/96