[134]
Section IV. RECONNAISSANCE
A. The Responsibility for long Distance Reconnaissance.
1. The Navy's obligation. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
(Exhibit 80), which was in effect prior to the attack, the Navy was
responsible for long distance reconnaissance.
Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan made
provision for joint air action by the Army and Navy for defense against
hostile raids or air attacks prior to a declaration of war. Under this
agreement, if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance
patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the
Army aircraft were to be used by the Navy. This plan was implemented by
the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, under which Admiral Bellinger
would command the Navy and Army patrol planes. Annex VII, Section VI, to
the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense plan and the Naval Base Defense Air
Force Plan were not operative prior to the attack. An agreement between
the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack
was imminent was a prerequisite to the operation of Annex VII, Section
VI. No such agreement was made prior to the attack.
2. Control of the Pacific Fleet patrol planes. The Pacific Fleet patrol
planes were actually under the control and operating in accordance with
the orders of Admiral Kimmel. Thus, on November 22nd he approved the
schedules for the employment of those planes, which remained in effect
up to the time of the attack. His responsibility for the operations of
the patrol planes, which were under the command of Commander, Task Force
Nine, of the Pacific Fleet, is further indicated by the fact that he
directed search operations by those planes at Midway and Wake.
Admiral Bellinger, who commanded Task Force Nine, which consisted of
Patrol Wings One and Two of the Fleet, was under the command of
ComFOURTEEN only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was
activated for the purpose of drills.
The responsibility for the employment of the fleet patrol planes was, as
Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, his responsibility and
was accepted by him. He testified further that Admiral Bloch had asked
for the dispatch of patrol planes for a search if he had felt that it
was necessary. In this connection it should be noted that on October 17,
1941, Admiral Bloch had asked for certain Fleet utility planes to be
used for inshore patrol and that they were not made available to him
(Exhibit 46, Naval Court). It should be noted that ComFOURTEEN had no
planes assigned to him.
Admiral Bellinger testified that he was responsible for the operation of
the Fleet planes in accordance with the orders of Admiral [136] Kimmel.
He said, however, that it was not his responsibility to decide whether
or not long range reconnaissance should be conducted. Rear Admiral A. C.
Davis, who was the Fleet Air Officer on CincPac's staff in 1941,
testified before Admiral Hart that his
Page 490
duties were primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical
training and logistic matters.
3. Conferences after 27 November 1941 concerning reconnaissance.
There is no evidence that on or after 27 November 1941 the necessity or
advisability of long distance reconnaissance was specifically discussed
between Admiral Kimmel and any member of his Staff or Task Force
Commanders. Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer, testified that he
thought the subject was discussed, but that he could recall no specific
conference dealing with this subject. Admiral Bellinger testified that
there was no such conference in which he participated. Admiral Kimmel's
testimony before the Naval Court was to the effect that on November 27th
he decided not to conduct long range reconnaissance. It is significant
that Captain Layton, who was the Fleet Intelligence Officer, stated that
he did not tell Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7th that aerial
reconnaissance from Oahu would be advisable in view of the available
intelligence because he knew that reconnaissance was being conducted by
the Fleet patrol planes. He said that he was not familiar with the
extent of the reconnaissance, but definitely believed that
reconnaissance was being conducted. Neither the Chief of Staff nor the
Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer could recall any
discussion of the advisability or necessity for long range
reconnaissance from Oahu between November 27th and December 7th.
B. Reconnaissance Conducted from Oahu.
Although the schedules for the Fleet patrol planes (Exhibit 37) did not
provide for any reconnaissance from Oahu, the Fleet Security Letter
(Exhibit 8, NC) directed that there be a patrol of the Fleet operating
areas. The Fleet operating areas were thirty miles to the south of Oahu.
During the period 30 November to 7 December 1941, certain searches were
flown from Wake and Midway. The extent of these searches appears in
Exhibit 50A of this investigation. One squadron had been sent to Midway
on the 30th of November and searched en route; another squadron had been
sent from Midway to Wake on the 1st of December and returned to Pearl
Harbor prior to the attack, searching en route (Exhibit 50, 50A).
Prior to 7 December 1941 the last daily long distance reconnaissance
flown from Oahu was in the summer of 1941. According to Admiral Bloch's
previous testimony, some time during the summer of 1941, on the basis of
some intelligence or information which he could not recall, he asked
Admiral Kimmel to direct reconnaissance on a sector towards Jaluit and
this was done for several days. Admiral Kimmel recalled that such
reconnaissance had been flown for a few days on the line from Jaluit to
Pearl Harbor and stated that they had in mind that they might catch a
submarine on the surface out there and perhaps any other vessel there.
Despite thorough examination of the available records of Patwing Two, of
the CincPac operation files, of the ComFOURTEEN files, of the CincPac
secret dispatches for 1941 and confidential and restricted dispatches
for June, July, and August, 1941, no record of this reconnaissance could
be found. None of the witnesses examined recalled the reconnaissance or
the reasons for it.
Page 491
[136]
C. Proposed Army Reconnaissance to Jaluit.
In the Army report it was stated that on November 26th the Army directed
General Short to send two B-24's to Jaluit on a reconnaissance mission
to look for various things, including ships. However, the Army report
does not state whether this reconnaissance actually took place.
Before the Roberts' Committee, General Gerow said that reports had been
received of Japanese concentrations in the Mandated Islands and they
assumed that every effort was being made to identify any Japanese
movements in that direction. He stated that those two B-24's were sent
out with an idea of trying to confirm information that had been received
from other sources. If no reconnaissance at all were done after the
Army's message to General Short which directed such reconnaissance as he
deemed necessary, General Gerow said that would have been considered a
failure to obey orders.
The status of this reconnaissance has been quite definitely confirmed
Captain Layton's testimony in this investigation. In the latter part of
November, 1941, Captain Layton stated, either Admiral Kimmel directed
him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this
reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to him
with the information of the pending reconnaissance and requested his
assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives and to furnish
the pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing. He was
also requested to assist in the projected reconnaissance. The
reconnaissance unfortunately never materialized, he stated, because only
one plane arrived and there were delays due to uncompleted camera
installations. He was never informed that one plane had arrived, but
later learned that it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The
Navy was extremely anxious that the reconnaissance be made at the
earliest possible date, and Admiral Kimmel, upon receipt of Captain
Layton's memorandum concerning information he had obtained at the
conference, asked him how soon the reconnaissance might be expected.
Captain Layton relayed Colonel Raley's answer to the Admiral to the
effect that the delay was due to non-installation or non-completion of
installation of cameras and the time was still not definitely fixed. A
photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28th from Captain Layton to
Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance appears in the record as
Exhibit 28. Furthermore, Captain Layton was questioned as to his
knowledge of any discussion concerning the possibility of the use of
Navy planes for this reconnaissance. Captain Layton replied that it was
not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY "Catalinas" could not be
used because their appearance over the Marshalls would have been an
overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand, would have been
flying ostensibly from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the Philippines.
Captain Layton was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be
carried out to check on his information as to the presence or absence of
air strength and carriers and submarines and naval concentrations in the
Marshalls area, including Truk. This was an ideal opportunity to
establish the reliability of existing intelligence on Japanese naval
dispositions and developments in the Mandated Islands.
Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army
reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands.
Page 492
[137]
D. The Direction to Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment.
Among the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the Basic Navy War Plan
was to protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific
area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air
forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that
hemisphere. It will be recalled that the Pacific Fleet War Plan, which
was designed to implement the Navy Basic War Plan, provided, among other
things, that in the event of war with the Axis Powers, including or
excluding Japan, the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet were to conduct
the maximum reconnaissance possible of the approaches to Oahu. The
Pacific Fleet Plan was not ordered to be executed prior to the attack.
On the 27th of November, however, in the war warning, which advised that
an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of
Naval Operations had directed Admiral Kimmel to "Execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
WPL-46."
On the following day, the Chief of Naval Operations, in his dispatch
which repeated the Army dispatch advising that hostilities were possible
at any moment, had directed that Admiral Kimmel was to "Be prepared to
carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."
Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that as the result of
the "war warning," he continued the security measures already in effect
(supra, page 64); carried out the planned movements of carriers to Wake
and Midway, with reconnaissance en route; carried out reconnaissance at
Midway and Wake; increased security measures in fleet operating areas
southward of Oahu; and, on November 28th, issued an order directing
extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas and depth
bombing of all contacts, suspected to be hostile, in certain of the
operating areas (page 5, Exhibit 70). There is no evidence of any other
specific action taken by Admiral Kimmel after 27 November 1841, in order
to carry out the direction contained in the war warning or the direction
in the message of November 28th. It does appear that so far as the Fleet
patrol planes at Oahu were concerned, their training continued along the
same lines which had been followed prior to the "war warning."
The testimony by Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer, and others in
this investigation, is to the effect that the establishment of long
distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "Appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
WPL-46."
It is interesting to note that the memoranda prepared by the War Plans
Officer on November 30th and 5 December 1941, setting forth the action
to be taken if war developed with Japan in twenty-four or forty-eight
hours, contained no provision for the establishment of reconnaissance
from Oahu (Exhibit 69A and 69B, Naval Court). As Vice Admiral Smith,
Chief of Staff, testified, what they were thinking about in the Pacific
was not the defense of Pearl Harbor. They were thinking about the Fleet
and the readiness of the Fleet.
E. The Reconnaissance that Could Have Been Flown.
A review of past reconnaissance during Admiral Kimmel's tour of duty
sheds no light on this problem because he testified that he
page 493
had never attempted to cover any large sector by long range
reconnaissance and that a patrol out to 300 miles was almost useless
unless as a guard against an air raid, although any patrol has some
value as far as surface ships are concerned. However, his predecessor,
Admiral Richardson, had established a distant patrol, "in view of the
fact that constant and repeated warnings were received of the possible
outbreak of the war in the immediate future" (p. 1053, Naval Court).
This patrol, he said, was designed to cover [138] a given sector
adequately and was rotated daily. The sector which was primarily covered
more adequately and frequently than any other was from 170 to the
westward to about 350 . That to the eastward was not covered.
Admiral Richardson also testified that this patrol would not have been
adequate to positively detect an approaching combat force having as its
intention the delivery of an attack early in the morning, but that it
certainly would have made the attack more difficult. These patrols were
discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel believed Admiral
Richardson.
Admiral Bellinger's testimony on the reconnaissance that could have been
flown during the critical period is obviously the most valuable on the
subject. He stated that after October 28th, while there were 107 VP
assigned to all units of Aircraft Scouting Force only eighty-one were
available. Of these, fifty-four had just arrived and were the PBY-5
type, with limited available spare parts. The number of plane crews did
not quite equal the number of planes available. If one could consider
eighty-one planes available, and assuming that there would have been
none lost because of breakdowns requiring spare parts, it would have
been practicable to use one-third, about twenty-seven planes, for daily
patrol. Each plane could cover a sector of eight degrees with a radius
of 700 miles, totaling approximately 216 degrees daily. This, however,
would have been the absolute maximum because of the lack of sufficient
crews and spare parts. 144 degrees could have been covered daily based
on the use of eighteen planes daily of the fifty-four new PBY-5's.
Actually, on 7 December 1941 there were in all only sixty-one planes
available at Oahu, one squadron of which had just returned from Midway
and Wake and required overhaul. This left forty-nine planes actually
available, one-third of which would have been able to cover 128 degrees.
Admiral Bellinger testified that if he had received a directive from
Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct 360
degrees reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, it would lave
been possible to maintain such reconnaissance for not more than four or
five days. His estimate of the duration of the daily 128-degree search
was that it could have been flown until the failure of planes and the
lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such an extent that further
reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such reconnaissance could
have been carried on for an indefinite period and Admiral Bellinger's
"vague" estimate was that it could have been carried on for several
weeks.
Admiral Davis testified before Admiral Hart that: "There were not enough
planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long range, 360 degree
search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There were,
however, enough to approximate this by using relatively
Page 494
short range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining some
assistance by available Army aircraft, so that I think it could have
been undertaken, had it been considered essential, on the basis that
reinforcements could have arrived before personnel and materiel fatigue
set in. Unless reinforcements arrived, it could not have been
maintained."
[139]
F. The Sectors Which Would Have Been Covered.
Had partial reconnaissance been flown from Oahu during the first week of
December, 1941, it appears that the northern sectors would have been
covered. Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered the northern
sectors as the most dangerous sectors primarily because of the
prevailing winds which would facilitate carrier-based plane operations
in that sector. He stated that had the normal plan been carried out
after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have searched the
northern sector, and that some few planes did search that sector. But
there had been searches made to the south because of information
received from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing indicated that
the attacking force was to the south.
[140]
FINDINGS
73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other
sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, could have obtained information as to the location or
movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941
was by long distance air reconnaissance.
74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the
obligation, through Com 14, to conduct distance reconnaissance, and
under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
naval forces were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the
naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search
operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was not in
operation because an agreement between the Commanding General and Com 14
that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no
such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense
Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air
action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.
75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only
Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific
Fleet patrol planes.
76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral
Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were
operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by
him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The
schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant
reconnaissance from Oahu.
77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he
decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral
Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war
warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range recon-
Page 495
naissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must
have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The
Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any
of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had
no such discussion with him.
79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol
Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was
prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the
most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be
launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate
stated that the action open as a countermeasure included daily patrols
as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce
the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that
such [141] patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel
and materiel available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period
and that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence
indicated that a surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time.
According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible
officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was
always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the
available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.
80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu
was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the
provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base
and in operating areas.
81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical
period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant
reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days
during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance
had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.
82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance
flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by
providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the
Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.
83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of
protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in
denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under
the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that
plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain
maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to
the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and
repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.
84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations
with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected
within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral
Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."
Page 496
85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch which, among
other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was
unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The
Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive
action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be
prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to
Japan in case hostilities occur."
86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu
would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."
[142] 87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week
preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree
reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to
the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to
the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during
October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the
prompt arrival of reinforcements after December 7th, could have been
made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in
other areas. The Navy Department presumably knew that the number of
planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree
reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior
investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers
in the Navy Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted
from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.
89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact
available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown,
for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees
to a distance of about 700 miles.
90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the
most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the
Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27
November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors
probably would have been searched.
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/13/96 Updated: 12/13/96