Section V. THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR 
 
A. Prelude: Japanese Submarines on 7 December 1941.  
 
At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a  
submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in  
a defensive sea area where American submarines had been restricted from  
operating submerged. When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward  
the entrance buoys. It was about 100 feet from and on a collision course  
with the CONDOR, but turned sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously  
turned to starboard.  
 
The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD between 0350  
and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in  
patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued on  
its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:  
 
"Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots." 
 
Page 497 
 
After receiving this visual signal, the WARD made a sonar search or  
about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio  
with the CONDOR, asking:  
 
"What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you  
sighted?" 
 
At 0520 the CONDOR replied:  
 
"The course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and  
about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance." 
 
In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536,  
the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted he submarine  
was about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On  
receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020  
magnetic, the captain of the WARD realized that his search had been in  
the wrong direction. He then continued searching, but again without  
result. 
 
The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. She  
captain considered that the identification at that time was not positive  
enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat.  
The Senior Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who  
commanded the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of  
the WARD thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding  
that it had seen submarine.  
 
The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was overheard and  
transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a  
radio station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore  
Patrol, 14th N. D. (Ex. 18). Since the conversation was solely [144]  
between the ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no  
request was made that it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station  
did not relay or report it to higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on  
the same frequency, which was maintained in the Communications Office,  
14th N. D., did not overhear or intercept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.  
 
At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate-vessel  
charged with opening and closing the net at the entrance. This anti- 
torpedo net was, according to Admiral Bloch's previous testimony, 45  
feet in depth. The deepest part of the channel was 72 feet. A Japanese  
submarine subsequently recovered was about 20 feet from keel to conning  
tower.  
 
The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be  
kept closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders from him,  
from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer  
who could be reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the  
gate-vessel indicates that the net was opened and closed a number of  
times during the night of December 6-7. At 0458 on the 7th, the gate was  
opened and the CROSSBILL and the CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846  
that the gate was closed. The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR testified  
that at O532, when the CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were  
very good and were "approaching daylight conditions."  
 
The log of the signal tower-for December 6-7, 1941 records the losing of  
the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by  
 
 
 
Page 498 
 
an entry at 0600 that the ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Exhibit  
46).  
 
The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pearl  
Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls  
with the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which  
appeared to be a small submarine, about 1,500 yards on its starboard  
quarter. The ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and  
several minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane  
circle and drop two smoke pots near the object. (Exhibit 73.)  
 
The WARD complied and at 0640 sighted an unidentified submarine one  
point off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES into Pearl  
Harbor. General Quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full  
ahead, increasing the WARD's speed from five to twenty-five knots. At  
0645 she opened fire with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun.  
The attack lasted only one or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of  
approximately 100 yards passed directly over the conning tower; the  
second, from No. 3 gun, at fifty yards or less, hit the submarine at the  
waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. At about this time,  
the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also noted that the Navy  
patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the submarine.  
The submarine heeled over to the starboard and started to sink. The WARD  
ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large amount of oil  
appeared on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water.  
(Exhibit 74.) 
 
[145] At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant,  
FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18): 
 
"We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea  
area." 
 
The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be  
interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the  
following supplementary message:  
 
We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine  
operating in defensive sea area.  
 
This message was received by the Bishop's Point radio station, relayed  
to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and  
delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval  
District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the  
ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the  
Duty Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.  
 
The ComFOURTEEN Chief of staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of  
numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that  
the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake  
the WARD and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was  
dispatched, could take care of the situation, while the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom they had referred the information, had the  
power to take any other action which might be desired.  
 
The CincPac Staff Duty Officer was given the report at about 0720 by the  
Assistant Duty Officer. After several attempted phone calls to ascertain  
whether Admiral Bloch knew of the report, the Staff Duty  
 
Page 499 
 
Officer received a phone message at 0740 from the duty officer of  
PatWing 2 that a patrol plane had reported that a submarine had been  
sunk in the defensive sea area; simultaneously, another phone call from  
FOURTEENTH Naval District advised the CincPac Staff Duty Officer that  
Admiral Bloch had been informed of the sinking and had ordered the ready  
duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and the standby destroyer to get  
up steam. The Staff Duty Officer then phoned Admiral Kimmel and gave him  
both messages and the information as to the action taken by Admiral  
Bloch. About this time, Captain Ramsey, of PatWing 2, phoned again and  
the Staff Duty Officer suggested he make his search planes available in  
case the Admiral wanted them. 
 
Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that between 0730 and  
0740 he received a report that a submarine had been attacked off Pearl  
Harbor. He said that he was waiting for an amplification of this report  
when the air attack commenced. He also stated that the officer who  
reported the sinking of the submarine should have broadcast in plain  
language, but that he had reported in code, which caused delay. Admiral  
Kimmel also testified that after 27 November 1941, there had been about  
a half-dozen of such reports, and hence amplification of the report was  
necessary. 
 
[146] The evidence indicates that the reports by the WARD were in plain  
language but that a request for verification by the WARD was later sent  
in code by the ComFOURTEEN Communication Officer at the direction of the  
ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The WARD's reply to that request was also in  
code and was deciphered at about the time when the air attack commenced.  
 
A Japanese midget submarine entered Pearl Harbor and, after the air  
attack had commenced, fired both of its torpedoes, one of which exploded  
on the beach of Ford Island, passing between the RALEIGH and the  
CURTISS, and the other buried itself, it was believed, in the mud near  
the berth of the UTAH. This submarine was sunk by the CURTISS and  
recovered from the harbor some weeks after the attack. It had been so  
thoroughly destroyed that nothing of intelligence value could be  
obtained from it. Whether or not this was the submarine which had been  
sighted by the CONDOR could not be determined. No other submarine was  
detected in the harbor.  
 
Another Japanese midget submarine was beached off Bellows Field, Oahu,  
and captured on the next day, along with its commanding officer. Various  
documents were recovered from this submarine including a chart of Pearl  
Harbor, on which was laid out a course into the harbor, around Pearl  
Harbor, and out of the harbor (Exhibits 32A, 33A). On this chart (Ex.  
33A) were indicated the positions of various ships in the harbor. The  
charted positions differed substantially from the actual berthing  
arrangements on December 7th. This fact led the Army Pearl Harbor Board  
to conclude that the submarine had been in the harbor for reconnaissance  
prior to December 7th.  
 
The conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board that the Japanese midget  
submarines "must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack  
and evidently were moving into and out of the harbor at will" (Report,  
Army Pearl Harbor Board, page 155) is  
 
Page 500 
 
based wholly on the legends appearing on the Japanese maps (Exhibits 32,  
32A, 33, 33A) captured in the midget submarine that was sunk off Bellows  
Field, and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge at  
Honolulu on 7 December 1941, which, in turn, is likewise based solely on  
the legends appearing on the same maps (Rep. APHB, page 155). At the  
present time, Mr. Shivers is Collector of the Port at Honolulu, and is  
in a precarious physical condition due to a serious heart ailment. Mr.  
Shivers was interviewed in Honolulu during the first week of June, 1945,  
and he stated, as also appears in the Army Pearl Harbor Board report  
(page 155), that his conclusion that Japanese submarines had been in  
Pearl Harbor prior to the attack was based on an examination of the maps  
in question, and that he had no other information to sustain his  
conclusion. Mr. Shivers likewise had no further information to supply in  
respect of the intelligence situation or the intelligence information  
that was available in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, except to say  
that he was mystified that the ONI tap of the telephone line of the  
Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was lifted on 2 December 1941, pursuant  
to an order issued by Captain (now Rear Admiral) Mayfield, the DIO.  
Since Mr. Shiver's statements were no different from those given by him  
in his testimony of record before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and since  
the basis of his, and the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, are  
shown to be erroneous by a careful study of the legends on the maps in  
question, on which those conclusions were based, and since his health  
was so precarious, it was deemed not necessary to call him as a witness.  
 
[147] For the following reasons, it appears that the Japanese midget  
submarine from which was obtained the chart of Pearl Harbor was not in  
the harbor on that day, and probably had not been there on any prior  
occasion: 
 
(a) The following facts lead to the conclusion that the recovered chart  
was an attack *plan* rather than an actual track and log of events:  
 
(1) The characters marking certain points on the chart (Exhibits 33 and  
33A) were in Chinese ideographs which give no indication of tense. For  
instance, the notation which has been variously translated as "enemy  
ship sunk" and "Attack and sink enemy ships" could have been the future  
meaning. Similarly the notation translated as "Fixed position," could  
mean "Position to be fixed," a natural course of action before entering  
the channel.  
 
(2) The times marked on the chart were unquestionably Tokyo time (-9).  
This is confirmed by the computation, on the back of the chart, of the  
time of dawn and sunrise at Pearl Harbor on December 8 (Tokyo time).  
 
(3) Based on (2), times along the track were all in daylight,   
commencing at the channel entrance at dawn. 
 
(4) The northwesterly portion of the track, to the northward of Ford  
Island, passed through an area which was, and had been, occupied by a  
number of ships moored to buoys, and could not have been followed by a  
submarine. 
 
(5) The courses and notations were much more neat and meticulous than  
any that could have been made during the passage of narrow and crowded  
waters by the navigator of a two-man submarine. 
 
(6) The major Japanese operation plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, as  
reconstructed by a captured Japanese yeoman, and confirmed generally by  
captured documents, provided that the midget submarines were to enter  
the harbor and after the initiation of the air attack were to attack  
with torpedoes. The times on the chart were in conformity with this,  
since, converted into Honolulu time, there was a waiting period inside  
the harbor entrance from 0545 to 0840 and the turning point south of  
Ford Island was timed 0900.  
 
(b) The submarine had its full allowance of two torpedoes when  
recovered.  
 
(c) The submarine commander, on interrogation, stated that he had failed  
in his mission (Exhibit 68).  
 
(d) The information on the chart was of a nature that could more readily  
be obtained by civilian observers from the area surrounding Pearl Harbor  
than by dangerous submarine reconnaissance. As has appeared earlier, the  
Japanese Consul General had been communicating just such intelligence to  
Tokyo.  
 
(e) Notations on the chart indicate that the submarine commander  
received intelligence reports as late as December 5th.  
 
[148] Intelligence information recently received indicates that the  
midget submarines were carried by and launched from mother submarines  
(Exhibit 69.). They were carried on the main deck abaft the conning  
tower and secured to the pressure hull by means of heavy clamps. The  
midgets used in the Pearl Harbor attack were 41 feet in length, had a  
reported cruising range of 175 to 180 miles at their most economical  
speed of 4 to 6 knots, did not have a radio transmitter, and carried a  
crew of two men. They were armed with two torpedoes and apparently  
carried the same designation number as their mother subs. The exact  
number with the Japanese task force is not definitely known, but there  
is substantial proof that there were at least five.  
 
The midget submarine beached off Bellows Field from which the chart was  
recovered bore the designation of "I-18," apparently that of its  
"mother." In the recovered chart, at various points along the sides of  
the entrance channel from Hammer Point to Hospital Point, are notations  
in faint pencil, "IZ16," "I-20," "22," "I-18," "I-24." From information  
received, it is now known that these are the designations of the  
submarines which carried the five midgets known to have been present.  
The times on the recovered chart indicate a waiting period in the narrow  
harbor entrance area from 0115 to 0410 (0445 to 0840, Hawaiian time). It  
therefore appears to be a logical assumption that the five midget  
submarines were to lie in wait in the narrow entrance channel,  
approximately in the positions indicated, with the object of torpedoing  
ships attempting to sortie, thus blocking the channel; and that after  
the initial air attack had been completed, they were to proceed around  
Ford Island and complete the destruction. The midget submarine which was  
sunk west of Ford Island apparently followed just such a plan.  
Confirmation of this assumption is found in a captured copy of the  
Japanese Plan for this operation, wherein the following initial task is  
assigned to the Sixth Fleet Submarine Force): "Will observe and attack  
American Fleet in HAWAII area. Will make a surprise attack on the  
channel leading into PEARL HARBOR and attempt to close it. If the enemy  
moves out to fight he will be pursued and attacked."  
  
Page 502 
 
B. Suspicious Submarine Contacts Prior to 7 December 1941.  
 
It was suspected in Washington for some time prior to December 7th that  
our Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was being kept under observation by  
Japanese submarines, there having been, over a period of six months,  
reports by our destroyers of such contacts. The Fleet also received  
reports that Japanese submarines were reconnoitering the approaches to  
Pearl Harbor. The number of such reports at Pearl Harbor prior to the  
attack was placed by one witness at from ten to fifteen, several of  
which occurred in the immediate vicinity of the entrance to Pearl  
Harbor. The contacts were on underwater sound contacts, which were not  
confirmed by sightings. 
 
A search of the files of CincPac has resulted in locating dispatches  
that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding  
Pearl Harbor:  
 
(1) On 3 November 1941, an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude  
157-41 was observed by a patrol plane, and crossed by Task Force One; an  
air search of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of  
an unspecified area by the USS WORDEN and an investigation by [149] the  
USS DALE produced negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920,  
032035, 032133, 032300, 040042).  
 
(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,  
had issued an order requiring extreme vigilance against possible hostile  
submarines, restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas,  
and providing that all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be  
hostile were to be depth bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar  
operator, without knowledge of the CincPac alert, was positive that a  
submarine was in a restricted area (Exhibit 48; dispatch 280835). A  
search by a task group with three destroyers, of the western border and  
the northern half of that area, pursued from 281050 to 281845, when  
abandoned by 290900, produced no contacts (Exhibit 48; dispatches  
281050, 281133, 281704. 281845).  
 
(3) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a clear  
metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23, which was lost in a  
change of range, that was evaluated to have been too rapid to indicate  
the presence of a submarine (Exhibit 48; dispatch 022336). An  
investigation, order to be made by Desron 4 (Exhibit 48; dispatch  
030040), apparently was negative.  
 
C. Detection of Aircraft by the Army Radar System.  
 
It appears from the prior investigations that about 0702 on the morning  
of 7 December 1941, two Army privates on duty at a mobile radar unit on  
the northern part of Oahu discovered an unusually large response on the  
radar in a northerly direction and from about 136 miles. This  
information they reported, at about 0715, to an Army officer on duty at  
the Army Information Center. The Army officer stated that he had some  
information to the effect that a flight of Army B-17's was due in that  
morning, and he thought that the planes detected by the radar were those  
Army planes. He did not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to  
report to his superior.  
 
The evidence indicates that neither this information nor any other  
information as to the direction from which the planes approached or on  
which they departed was transmitted to the Naval authorities on the day  
of the attack. 
 
Page 503 
 
D. The Air Attack.  
 
The Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, according to most observers,  
started at 0755. It began with dive bombing and strafing of the Naval  
Air Station at Ford Island, and at the Army's Hickam Field. This was  
followed at Pearl Harbor by attacks on major units of the Fleet,  
launched by torpedo planes and dive bombers, and was accompanied by  
strafing. Next there occurred two distinct horizontal bombing attacks  
from high altitudes, the last immediately preceding a final intensive  
dive bomb attack. Almost simultaneously with the raid on Pearl Harbor,  
the Japanese attacked [150] the Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Ewa  
Field at Barber's Point was strafed. Approximately 150 planes took part  
in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The raid is reported variously to have  
ended at from 0940 to 1130 and some Japanese planes are known to have  
been over Oahu after 1200. 
 
The CincPac Staff Duty Officer learned of the inception of the air raid  
during his second telephone conversation of the morning with Admiral  
Kimmel. When he was advising of a report by the WARD, after its  
submarine reports, that it had detained a sampan. He immediately told  
the Admiral of his receipt from the signal tower of this message:  
 
"Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor X this is no drill." 
 
[151]

E. Location of Pacific Fleet Units.  
 
At the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were,  
according to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port and  
partly at sea as follows:  
 
(1) In Pearl Harbor:  
 
(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship,  
one light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four  
light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine  
layers.  
 
(b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was at  
sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force- Task Force  
Eight) comprising three battleships, eight destroyers, one light  
cruiser, and four mine layers.  
 
(c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Admiral  
Brown at sea, and less a separate task force-Task Force Twelve-which was  
at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy  
cruisers, and four mine layers which were under overhaul.  
 
(d) Five submarines and the submarines tender PELIAS of Task Force  
Seven.  
 
(e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTIS, and THORNTON, and Patrol Squadrons VP  
11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24 (a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force  
Nine.  
 
(f) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty planes)  
at Ewa, Oahu.  
 
(g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the   
ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base Force  
Aircraft Squadrons VJ-1, VJ-2, and VJ-3 as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, 2  
PBY-1, 1 J2V. 
  
Page 504 
 
(2) At sea:  
 
(a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one  
aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers,  
located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was  
returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake  
Island.  
 
(b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in  
port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less  
two of its divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston  
Island.  
 
[152] (c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinarily  
a component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier  
(LEXINGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about  
425 miles southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to  
land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island.  
 
(d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of  
Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest  
of Oahu. 
 
(e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to  
Pearl Harbor.  
 
(3) At other places:                              5  
 
(a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and 3 Patrol  
Squadron VP-21 (consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force Twelve. 
 
(b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air  
Squadron.  
 
(c) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing  
exercise), two Base Force PBY-1 planes.  
 
(d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.  
 
(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.  
 
To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy  
cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser  
mine layer, eight destroyers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two  
destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft tenders, various  
auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of various types, of which  
nine were under overhaul. At sea, there were two aircraft carriers,  
eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines and one mine  
layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were thirteen  
submarines, fourteen Navy Patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron.  
 
Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special  
missions to reinforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of  
Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously  
worked out fleet employment schedule. 
 
[153]

F. Condition of Readiness. 
 
(1) The ships in port:  
 
The testimony in previous investigations showed some confusion as to the  
condition of readiness which was in effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet  
in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. It appears, however, that  
whether or not Condition III, as prescribed in the Pacific Fleet Letter  
on security of the Fleet, was in effect, the condition aboard the  
battleships was in excess of that condition. Each of the battleships had  
two 5-inch anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned. While  
the Fleet letter on security fixed responsibility on the senior officer  
present in each air defense sector for fire control in his sector, no  
particular damage control organization was prescribed in that letter or  
functioning on the ships in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The  
evidence in prior investigations indicates that the anti-aircraft  
batteries of the ships were quickly manned and, considering the  
circumstances, were effectively used against the Japanese attackers.  
 
(2) The aircraft of the Pacific Fleet:  
 
The condition of readiness in force as to the Fleet aircraft was Baker 5  
(50 per cent of the assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours notice)  
with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not undergoing  
maintenance work. Three squadrons (one at Midway, one at Pearl Harbor,  
and one at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5 (100 per cent assigned  
aircraft to be ready on four hours notice). This was augmented on  
December 7th by specific duty assignments which required six planes from  
Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN and from Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR (at  
Kaneohe) and from Patrol Squadron TWELVE (at Pearl Harbor) to be ready  
for flight on 30 minutes notice. On the morning of December 7th, three  
patrol planes of a squadron based at Kaneohe were in the air on morning  
security patrol armed with depth charges, three were ready for flight on  
30 minutes notice, and four on four hours notice; and four planes of a  
squadron at Pearl Harbor were in the air conducting tactics with  
submarines and one plane was ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.  
 
G. Reaction to the Attack.  
 
The hostile character of the attacking planes was not recognized until  
the bombs fell, but there followed an immediate and general realization  
of that fact, and a prompt application of such defensive measures as  
were then capable of being carried out. General Quarters was sounded in  
all units ashore and afloat and, as has been pointed out above, anti- 
aircraft batteries were manned and, considering the damaged condition of  
the ships, employed to the fullest possible effect. There was, however,  
an unfortunate lapse of time before damage control measures on the ships  
in Pearl Harbor could be carried forward, resulting in the suffering of  
much damage that might otherwise have been prevented or minimized. The  
damages so quickly suffered included a partial breakdown of the  
communication system, preventing an accurate interchange of necessary  
information, including radio direction bearings of the attacking force.  
The futility of the attempted counter-measures in locating and attacking  
the Japanese striking force was due, in [154] large part, to a flood of  
wild and conflicting reports as to the location and strength, and  
probable intentions, of units of the Japanese force.  
 
The evidence obtained in the previous investigations demonstrates  
clearly that the officers and men of the Pacific Fleet met the attack,  
individually and jointly, with great heroism.  
 
 
 
Page 506 
 
[155]

H. Composition and Movements of the Attacking Force.  
 
The chief source of information concerning the Japanese force which  
attacked Pearl Harbor is a Japanese prisoner of war who was captured on  
Saipan during the Marianas Campaign. The POW was a chief yeoman in the  
Japanese Navy, attached to the staff of the Commander in Chief, Combined  
Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto. The reconstruction by the POW of the events  
preceding and leading up to Pearl Harbor has been substantiated and  
verified by other information, including that contained in a copy of  
Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1, recovered from the  
Japanese cruiser NACHI that was sunk in Manila Bay. The prisoner's  
reconstruction of the orders to the striking force is contained in  
Exhibit 3.  
 
The movements of the striking force were provided for in the Japanese  
Secret Operation Order No. 1, dated 1 November 1941, which stated that  
war would be declared on the United States on X-Day, expected to be in  
the early or middle part of December, and that on or about X-16 Day the  
carrier task force would depart its base and proceed by way of Tankan  
Bay (Hotokappu Bay), Etorofu Island and the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor,  
where it would deliver a surprise attack. Japanese Combined Fleet Secret  
Operation Order No. 3, dated 10 November 1941, fixed as X-Day, 8  
December 1941, E. L. T. (Exhibit 3).  
 
The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the Bongo  
Channel some time between November 20 and November 22, 1941, East  
Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island. At the  
latter place it assembled and fueled, and departed on or about 28  
November 1941, E. L. T., and headed eastward under heavy front. The  
force proceeded in an easterly direction heading on course about 085 ,  
to a point in longitude about 170  W; then turned southeast on course  
about 135 degrees, and proceeded to a point northwest to due north of,  
and approximately 200 miles from, the island of Oahu where it arrived  
early in the morning of 8 December 1941, E. L. T. From that position the  
Pearl Harbor attack was launched. Following the attack, the striking  
force retired initially to the northwest, on a heading of about 300 , to  
a point about longitude 170  E, thence to the southwest, irregularly on  
varying headings to a point near 140  E, and thence northwest to Kyushu  
(Exhibit 3, page 16).  
 
The striking force consisted of three of Japan's five carrier divisions,  
the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1); HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOKAKU and  
ZUIKAKU sometimes referred to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and  
sometimes as CarDiv 5); the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships  
of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), and of various destroyers  
and submarines.  
 
Cooperating with the foregoing striking force was a large part of the  
Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet. That fleet left the Japanese Inland  
Sea about 18 November 1941, E. L. T. At the time of the attack, many  
Japanese submarines were concentrated at the mouth of Pearl Harbor for  
the purpose of making torpedo attacks on any United States ships that  
attempted to escape from the air attack in the harbor. As previously  
pointed out, the evidence indicates that only one midget submarine  
succeeded in entering the harbor. 
 
Page 507 
 
[156]

I. The Casualties and Damage.  
 
The facts as to the casualties and damage appear fully in the record of  
the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry:  
 
(1) All examination of reports in the Bureau of Personnel showed that  
there were 3,963 casualties as a result of the Japanese Pearl Harbor  
attack, of which 896 were wounded and 3,067 were either killed, dead of  
wounds, or are missing and declared dead. 
 
(2) The damage to fleet units in Pearl Harbor was extensive. The  
Battleships ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, and WEST VIRGINIA were sunk  
and the NEVADA beached to prevent its sinking. The auxiliary vessels  
UTAH and OGLALA were also sunk. All other battleships in the harbor,  
PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND, and TENNESSEE, the Cruisers HELENA, HONOLULU,  
and RALEIGH, the destroyers SHAW, CASSIN, and DOWNES, and the  
auxiliaries CURTIS and VESTAL, were seriously damaged. 
 
(3) The damage to airplanes was as follows:  
                                         Number   Number      Number 
                                         present  on hand     usable 
Type                                     Dec. 7   after raid  after raid                            
Patrol .................................   69       45          11 
Fighters ...............................   24       15           0       
Scout bombers ..........................   60       29          14 
Torpedo bombers ........................    2        2           0  
Battleship and cruiser planes ..........   92       82          11 
Utility and transport planes ...........   54       48          16 
Totals .................................  301      221          52 
 
[157]

FINDINGS 
 
92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on  
Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile  
submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge  
attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible  
officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with  
submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by  
ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with  
the provisions of the Fleet security letter. 
 
93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not  
received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.  
 
94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese  
submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget  
submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December  
7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack. 
 
95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the  
northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation  
for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to  
responsible Army commanders.  
 
96. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no  
previous warning of the air attack, which was initialed by the enemy at  
0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses  
of life and damage. 
 
 
 
Page 508 
 
97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two  
machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of  
condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet  
aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security  
patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with  
submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forty- 
four on four hours notice.  
 
98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in  
September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were  
all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate  
coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they  
were uninjured.  
 
99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task  
force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo  
Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time,  
and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force  
then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941,  
East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about  
170  West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from  
Oahu.  
 
100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among  
which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the  
Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not  
reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.  
 
[158] 101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position  
200 miles due north of Oahu.  
 



Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/13/96 Updated: 12/13/96