[159]
VI
A. FINDINGS
1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United
States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either
including or excluding Japan.
2. The Wavy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive
tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the
Marshalls and raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and
various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory
of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the
extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by
destroying hostile expeditions.
3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet
various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at
the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the
communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with
light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine
patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by
Japan.
4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included
among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the
maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the
approaches to the Hawaiian area.
Page 509
5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day,
which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that
hostilities opened with Japan. W-Day was not fixed prior to the attack.
6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based
on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of
subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and
mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be
by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.
7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to
hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against
hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task
was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent
land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to
patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.
8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval
District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.
9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11
April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the
Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.
[160] 10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District,
and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive
measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval
Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a
declaration of war.
11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that
when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search
operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be
under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search
operations.
12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its
aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that
service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate means,
would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be
practicable.
13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that
the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to
warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available
to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint
operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.
14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agreement
prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was
sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in
operation.
15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other
things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with
Page 510
the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a
declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships
in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise
submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of
both forms of attack was possible.
16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated,
among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on
Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from
carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.
The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate
the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably
composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to
the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.
17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral
Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated
Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made
specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The
plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without
signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by
dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness for aircraft were to
be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army
units, and by [161] ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy
units.
18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in
operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on
14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on
several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be
preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise
submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of
the two. This letter also stated that a single submarine attack might
indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed
of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures,
including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among
other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should
exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense
against air attack and that he should take other action, including
supervisory control over naval short-based aircraft, and arrange through
the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air
effort by the Army and the Navy.
20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were
to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore
patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search
of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one
covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during
the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the
attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and
the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol
from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during
entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or
departure of a heavy ship at other times.
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22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the
Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese)
action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be
"destruction of *threatening* naval forces"; that initial action would
include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and *other
outlying* United States *positions*"; and that the initial Japanese
deployment would include raiding and observation forces *widely
distributed in the Pacific*, and that *submarines* in the *Hawaiian
area* . . ." [Italics supplied.] The possibility of an attack on Hawaii
was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.
23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command
of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a
*possibility*. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to
have considered it as a serious *probability*.
24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of
"mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders
were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack,
any permanent operating setup which could insure the constant and timely
exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so
essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in
an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint
Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the
responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.
[162] 25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the
defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement
between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the
Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would
naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his
immediate superior, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question
of unity of command for outlying islands was discussed between Admiral
Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reinforcement
of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short's position was that if
Army forces were involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel
maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy.
The islands were reinforced with Marine planes.
26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly
during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in
the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great importance
concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and
defense preparations.
27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial
communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack
indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the
Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the
likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army
and Navy radio intercept Stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C.
prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu by
Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a few
unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted there
before December 7th and, that three messages intercepted by
Page 512
Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which
indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War
Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to
the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United
States intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and
translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Japanese
Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1911, the
information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.
29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information
from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its
representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic
messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, D. C.,
prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese Government's
actual views concerning the diplomatic situation, of the Japanese
Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities
were impending and imminent.
30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at
Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval
Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to
the President.
[163] 31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the
Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the
diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept
fully informed on this subject.
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at
Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the
Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's
success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted
messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during
the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications
facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations
to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac of the important
facts learned.
33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the
information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.
34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during
November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early
December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic
negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent, and that
Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating
interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more
specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in
the movements of ships to or from other ports.
36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of
certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages
after the November 27th "war warning," which made further evidence the
termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese
intention to wage war.
Page 513
37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the
attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in
which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present
to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply
terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact
that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the
middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated
an air attack at Pearl Harbor
38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one
sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at
Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy
Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy
Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for
translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy
Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by
a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army
until after 0900.
[164] 39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant
information several hours before the attack, and there were available
means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral
Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the
Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any
message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a
message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be
furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.
40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it
necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December
and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but
that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message
that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the
naval radio system.
41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was
received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an
ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code
machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might
have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and
that the naval authorities were to be informed.
42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on
November 24th, that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction,
including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on
November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected
within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops
and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition
against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly
Borneo."
43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to
probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of
Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Page 514
Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were
to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives
information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the
United States, and other countries. These were known as the "winds" code
and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a
break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the
United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain
Japanese words signifying wind directions.
45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States
during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any
information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.
[165] 46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States
was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom
such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy
Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence
units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts
were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The
evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the
British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message.
Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the
Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence
Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence,
recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director
of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled
no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was
received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of
Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who
stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it
related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the
Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain
Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he
stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of these
officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other
testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by
Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to OP-20-G, who said
that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall
whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It
may be noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain
Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on
the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.
47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code
message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of
delivering other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he
overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the
message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are
not in accordance with expectations. He testified that he later
discovered the error and a few
Page 515
minutes before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to
his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an
officer of Army Military Intelligence.
48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code
message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect
previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message was
to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.
49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition
to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of
the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the
Pacific Fleet.
[166] 50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of
the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese
Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for
some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December
1941 because the District Intelligence Officer feared that the existence
of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable
complications. No information of military or naval significance was
obtained by means of the telephone taps.
51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence
Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation
between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This
was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that
the conversation should be further studied by a Japanese linguist of the
District Intelligence Office who was to listen to the recording of the
conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript
furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was
interested, among other things in the daily flights of airplanes from
Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation,
references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been
code words signifying the presence or absence of ships and a method of
conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which
presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior
investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to
the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.
52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the
FOURTEENTH Naval District. Copies of various cable messages from and to
the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications
company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was
the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were
in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them.
Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no
information of particular significance.
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the
telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese
Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl
Harbor.
54 One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by
the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5
Page 516
December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and
translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in
Japanese code known as the "PA-K2." It was decrypted and translated by
the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The
message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change
in a method which had been established for communication by visual
signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a
sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station,
and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of
various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio
Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message
prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough
form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op-20-G of the Navy
Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an
Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer
testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this
translation prior to the [167] attack, but the evidence indicates that
the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th
and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese
diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8
December 1941.
55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received
a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing
situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that
daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise
whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and
whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This
message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort
Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War
Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by
the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.
56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the
likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs
of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability
there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise
attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the
battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on
the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no
air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These
messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to
the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept
station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The
translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they
were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and
translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to
the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval
forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at
Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division
of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing
Page 517
such information, and had access to radio intelligence information
available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with
them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force
received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the
Fleet Intelligence Officer.
58. The War Department had information which led that Department to
believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November,
1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to
General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special
photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order
to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location
of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special
Army planes were not made ready.
59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was
distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command.
[168] This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the
composition of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the
same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further
increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping
of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The
bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet
consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each
having two carriers.
60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the
location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer,
who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl
Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio
Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of
Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.
61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of
Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These
included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces
which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl
Harbor and at the Philippines.
62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, information
to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as
to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at
Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the
Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units
of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a
strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls,
which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a
carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate
was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern
Asia while component parts might operate from Paleo and the Marshalls.
63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the
Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of
the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence
unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others,
commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic
analysis for the past few days had indicated that
Page 518
the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet, was directing the various fleet
units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into
two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South
China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates.
It was estimated that the second section included "CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and
one MARU." This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not
confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in
the Mandates, and that their best indications were that all known
carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this
evaluation was considered to be reliable.
64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports
from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were
received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important
Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not
report the movement of carriers.
[169] 65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl
Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the
information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval
communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence
Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning.
Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries daily on and after
27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December
5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.
66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication
intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other
things, that there was no further information on the presence of a
carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located
in home waters." The next day, he received the November 28th summary
which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio
intelligence net was operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval
communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was no information set
forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral
Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other
things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate
command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st,
Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to
carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated
the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had
not been confirmed.
67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, stated that
all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had charged promptly
at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed
after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last
changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by
Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month
indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on
a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number
of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and
Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."
68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which
Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request.
Page 519
This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available
information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate
placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3,
which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have
been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?)
plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.
69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese carrier
Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was
deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information
as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a
reliable estimate of their whereabouts.
70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following
conversation:
"[170] Captain LAYTON. AS best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What!
You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and
I replied, "No. Sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do
not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty
confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as
sometimes he would, with some what a stern countenance and yet partially
with a twinkle in his eye and said "Do you mean to say that they could
be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldtn't know it?" or words to that
effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now" or
words to that effect." . . .
"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious. But when said,
"Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but
if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area
since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be
refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and
it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you mean to
say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In
other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their
exact location....
"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not
say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a
statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where
they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to
Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of
identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However,
since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the
change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been
recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on
December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or
carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of
carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No
traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen
either."
73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other
sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander-in-Chief.
Pacific Fleet, could have obtained information as to the location or
movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941
was by long distance air reconnaissance.
[171] 74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had
the obligation, through ComFOURTEEN, to conduct distant reconnaissance,
and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, naval forces were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if
the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search
operations. As previously pointed
out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between t
the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack
was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made
prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which
implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was
not operative prior to the attack.
75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only
Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific
Fleet patrol planes.
76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral
Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were
operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by
him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The
schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant
reconnaissance from Oahu.
77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he
decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral
Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war
warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range
reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject
must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The
Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any
of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had
no such discussion with him.
79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol
Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was
prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the
most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be
launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate
stated that the action open as a counter-measure included daily patrols
as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce
the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that
such patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and
materiel available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and
that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence
indicated that surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time.
According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible
officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was
always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the
available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.
[172] 80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward
of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with
the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at
base and in operating areas.
81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical
period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant
reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days
during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance
had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.
82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance
flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by
providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the
Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.
83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of
protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in
denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under
the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that
plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain
maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to
the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and
repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.
84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations
with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected
within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral
Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."
85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which,
among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action
was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment.
The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel as to undertake no
offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was
to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they
apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."
86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu
would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46."
87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the
attack sere not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance
daily for more than a few days.
88. Prior to the attack. Requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet the
Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the
Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during
October and November, 1941. Additional planes, evidenced by the prompt
arrival of reinforcements after December 7th, could have been made
available by the Navy Department, but the expense of defenses in other
areas. The [173] Navy Department presumably knew that the number of
planes available Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree
reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior
investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers
in the Navy Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted
from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.
89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact
available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown,
for least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to
distance of about 700 miles.
90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the
most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the
Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
Page 522
91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27
November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors
probably would have been searched.
92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on
Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile
submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge
attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible
officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with
submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN
in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the
provisions of the Fleet's security letter.
93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not
received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.
94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese
submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The only midget
submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December
7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.
95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the
northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation
for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to
responsible Army commanders.
96. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no
previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at
0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses
of life and damage.
97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two
machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of
Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet
aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security
patrol armed with depth charged [sic] and 4 engaged in tactics with
submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice: and the balance of forty-
four on four hours notice.
[174] 98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been
issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one
exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the
fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at
sea, they were uninjured.
99. It has been learned since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task
force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo
Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time
and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force
then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941,
East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about
170 West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from
Oahu.
100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among
which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the
Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not
reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.
101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200
miles due north of Oahu.
Page 523
[175]
CONCLUSIONS
1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were
designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack,
including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war
plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet
that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a
state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between
the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was
the case prior to the attack.
2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of
mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the
local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of
attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information
concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise
of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information
between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no
organized system to ensure such exchange.
4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese
as to the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the
preparations being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor
contributed to the success of their attack.
5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United
States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington,
concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic
negotiations and its intentions to wage war, by means of interception,
decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.
6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy
Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The
information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese
naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War
Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led
that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the
Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch
of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel,
concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk
and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to
the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not
down because the special Army planes were not made ready.
7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic
messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio
broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to
the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message
was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating
to the United States.
[176] 8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from
intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated
within the Navy Department.
9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that
that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and
as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Op-
Page 524
erations did not communicate to him important information which would
have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the
situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department
message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious
means, information of the "1. p. m." message and its possible import,
were unfortunate.
10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his
possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and
that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were
imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important
messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the
"war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important
subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus
Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton,
who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this
and other important messages.
12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the
Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his
cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained
prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese
attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable
messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the
Hawaiian area.
13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of
ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of
the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information
was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain
other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December
1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not
decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack,
apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such
work.
14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have
secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the
approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service,
traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air
reconnaissance from Oahu.
[177] 15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army
during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and,
although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of
the approach of Japanese aircraft.
16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval
forces was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis
of Japanese naval communications.
17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for
the following reasons:
(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and
destruction of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.
Page 525
(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction,
anywhere in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were not
available, and could not have been expected to be available.
(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the
probability of its successful interception and destruction prior to the
following dawn would have been small.
18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half
hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the
attack, for the following reasons:
(a) Ships' anti-aircraft batteries would have been fully manned and
ready. It is to be noted that the anti-aircraft fire was more effective
against the subsequent attacks than the initial air attack.
(b) Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been
immediately appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.
(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been
set, thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.
(d) Many planes could have been in the air, in readiness.
(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.
19. The only adequate means of assuring detection of an approaching
carrier attack was by 360 degree distant air search from Oahu.
Sufficient planes were not available to carry out an all-around distant
air reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
[178] 20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the
available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor
might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of
additional patrol planes to the Pacific Fleet. Although the additional
planes, if assigned, would not have been sufficient for a 360 degree
daily search, they would have increased the area which could have been
effectively covered and might have acted as an inducement to such
employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane assignments, it was
necessary for the Chief of Naval Operations to weigh the prospective
needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostilities with Axis
submarines were already in progress.
21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees,
could have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of
time with the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel and could
have been designed to cover the most probable approach bearings from
which an attack might have been expected. Such reconnaissance would have
had a reasonable chance of success.
22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, nor the key members of the latter's staff, seem to have
given serious consideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or
probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.
23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of
forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the
probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The
information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week
of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an
unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all
information up to December 2nd, no
Page 256
reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's
ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the
carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the
location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was
possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of
the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air
attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable
precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures
which reasonably were open to him were:
(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most
probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably
permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at
least during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by
ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in
port.
[179] (e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to
intercept possible attack forces.
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry
into port at irregular intervals.
(g Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and
aircraft warning installations.
24. Admiral Kimmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack
in the Hawaiian area was justified by subsequent events.
25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive
in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action
which he could have taken, it should be noted that:
(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have meant
the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the
naval expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on
planes and crews which would have reduced their later effectiveness.
(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest
and relaxation desirable in port for the maintenance of personnel
efficiency.
(c) Failure to install anti-torpedo nets was influenced (i) by
information from CNO which made it appear that effective drops of
aircraft torpedoes with the depths of water and length of run available
in Pearl Harbor were not probable; (ii) the interference such nets would
have caused in harbor operations due to crowded conditions.
(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on
necessary ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some
reconnaissance.
(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of
antiaircraft batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in
port or at sea.
26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack
off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in
plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready
destroyer. This information was of no immediate
Page 527
interest to the Army unless it is [sic] fact indicated imminency of an
air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any
event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.
[180] 27. More effective action would have been taken both before and
after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the
Hawaiian area a suitable operating agency for the adequate exercise of
joint command functions. This omission was the fault of no one person,
but of the existing system.
28. War experience has shown that:
(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one
person; that is, there must be "unity of command."
(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders
of the different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal
members of their staffs, must be in close physical touch, and not
entirely dependent on telephonic, radio, or similar communications. In
no other way can a full exchange of information and ideas be assured nor
the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.
(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in an
emergency must be in active operation prior to such emergency.
29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such
as Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle
of "Unity of Command." The commander exercising such joint command
should be assisted by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the
functions of both services concerned
EOF
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/13/96 Updated: 12/13/96