From: U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Pearl Harbor Attack; Hearings, 
Part 24, pp. 1749-56.

Page 1749





The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th was a 
complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its initial success, 
which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state 
of readiness against such an air attack, by both branches of the 
service. This statement was made by me to both General Short and Admiral 
Kimmel, and both agreed that it was entirely true. Neither Army or Navy 
Commandants in Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely, because of 
the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of 
the preponderance of the American Naval strength in Hawaiian waters. 
While the likelihood of an attack without warning by Japan was in the 
minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that 
such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, that 
is, in the Far East. Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the 
attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise 
move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese 
instructions to Nomura, in

Page 1750

which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the 
insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one 
o'clock on Sunday. 

A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on 
November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message 
of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, 
before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after 
the attack had been made. 

Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared careful  [2] 
estimates covering their idea of the most likely and most imminent 
danger. General Short repeated to me several times that he felt the most 
imminent danger to the Army was the danger of sabotage, because of the 
known presence of large numbers of alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on 
this assumption, he took every possible measure to protect against this 
danger. This included, unfortunately, bunching the planes on the various 
fields on the Island, close together, so that they might be carefully 
guarded against possible subversive Action by Japanese agents. This 
condition, known as "Sabotage Alert" had been assumed because sabotage 
was considered as the most imminent danger to be guarded against. This 
bunching of planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more 
effective. There was, to a lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of 
planes on Navy stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was 
not given the same prominence in Naval minds, both arms of the service 
lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial attack by the 
enemy. There were no Army planes in the air at the time of the attack 
and no planes were warmed up in readiness to take the air. 

The Navy regarded the principal danger from a Japanese stroke without 
warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary 
provisions to cope with such an attack. As a matter of fact, a submarine 
attack did accompany the air attack and at least two Japanese submarines 
were sunk and a third one ran ashore and was captured. No losses were 
incurred by the Fleet from submarine attack. One small two man submarine 
penetrated into the harbor, having followed a vessel through the net, 
but because it broached in the shallow water it was immediately 
discovered by the Curtis and was attacked and destroyed through the 
efforts of [3] that vessel and those of the Destroyer Monaghan. This 
submarine fired her torpedoes which hit a shoal to the west of Ford 

The Navy took no specific measures of protection against an air attack, 
save only that the ships in the harbor were so dispersed as to provide a 
field of fire covering every approach from the air. The Navy morning 
patrol was sent out at dawn to the southward, where the Commander-in-
Chief had reason to suspect an attack might come. This patrol consisted 
of ten patrol bombers who made no contacts with enemy craft. At least 
90% of Officers and enlisted personnel were aboard ship when the attack 
came. The condition of readiness aboard ship was described as "Condition 
Three", which meant that about one-half of the broadside and anti-
aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft guns were 
supplied with ammunition and were in readiness. 

The first intimation of enemy action came to the Navy shortly after 
seven a. m., when a Destroyer in the harbor entrance radioed that she 
had contacted a submarine and had (they believed) successfully depth 
charged it. Thus an attempted attack by submarine preceded the air 
attack by approximately a half hour. Quite a number of similar 
incidents, involving reports of submarine contact, had occurred in the 
recent past and too great credit was not given the Destroyer Commander's 
report. Subsequent investigation proved the report to be correct. 
Admiral Bloch received the report and weighed in his mind the 
possibility that it might be the start of action, but in view of 
submarine contacts in the past dismissed the thought.

The Army carried out no dawn patrol on Sunday, December 7th, the only 
air patrol being that sent to the southward by the Navy. 

The Radar equipment installed on shipboard, is practically useless [4] 
when the ships are in Pearl Harbor because of the surrounding mountains. 
Reliance therefore of both branches of the services is chiefly upon 
three Army detector stations on the Island of Oahu. Until 7 December, it 
had been customary to operate three Radars for a large portion of the 
day. However, on 6 December, permission was requested and obtained from 
the Control Officer to, on 7 December, operate only from 4:00 a. m. to 
7:00 a. m. Accordingly, on 7 December, the stations were manned from 
before dawn until seven a. m., when they were closed officially. 
However, by pure chance one Army non-com officer remained at his post to 
practice on such planes as might take the air, and probably with no 

Page 1751

thought of enemy approach. At least a half hour before the attack was 
made this officer's Radar indicator showed a concentration of planes to 
the northward, out 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air Craft 
Warning Information Center, which was the place from which it should 
have been reported to Headquarters. The Officer there, a Second 
Lieutenant, took it upon his shoulders to pass it up, explaining that he 
had been told the Enterprise was at sea, and that the planes he had 
located were probably from that carrier. No report of this discovery of 
an enemy air force approaching from the north reached either the Army or 
the Navy Commander. If this information had been properly handled, it 
would have given both Army and Navy sufficient warning to have been in a 
state of readiness, which at least would have prevented the major part 
of the damage done, and might easily have converted this successful air 
attack into a Japanese disaster.

The Officer at the Radar station, I was advised, showed this air force 
on his instrument as they came in and plotted their approach. [5] I have 
seen the radar plot, which also included a plot of the enemy air forces 
returning to the carriers from which they had come to make the attack. 
This latter information did not reach the Navy until Tuesday, two days 
after the attack occurred, although many and varied reports as to 
various locations of radio bearings on the Japanese carriers did come to 
the Navy Commander-in-Chief. 

The Activities of Japanese fifth columnists immediately following the 
attack, took the form of spreading on the air by radio dozens of 
confusing and contradictory rumors concerning the direction in which the 
attacking planes had departed, as well as the presence in every 
direction of enemy ships. The Navy regarded the reports of concentration 
of enemy ships to the southward as most dependable and scouted at once 
in that direction. It is now believed that another unit of the Japanese 
force, using the call letters of their carriers, took station to the 
southward of Oahu and transmitted. Radio Direction Finder bearings on 
these transmittals aided in the false assumption that the enemy was to 
the southward. A force from the westward moved over from there in an 
attempt to intercept a Japanese force supposedly moving westward from a 
position south of Oahu. Subsequent information, based upon a chart 
recovered from Japanese plane which was shot down, indicated that the 
Japanese forces actually retired to the northward. In any event, they 
were not contacted by either of the task forces, one of which was too 
far to the westward to have established contact on 7 December. 

The Army anti-aircraft batteries were not manned when the attack was 
made and the mobile units were not in position. All Army personnel were 
in their quarters and the guns were not manned or in position [6] for 
firing, save only those in fixed positions. Early anti-aircraft fire 
consisted almost exclusively of fire from 50 caliber machine guns. 

The enemy attacked simultaneously on three Army fields, one Navy field 
and at Pearl Harbor. This attack was substantially unopposed except by 
very light and ineffective machine gun fire at the fields and stations. 
Generally speaking, the bombing attacks initially were directed at the 
air fields and the torpedo attacks at the ships in the harbor. The first 
return fire from the guns of the fleet began, it is estimated, about 
four minutes after the first torpedo was fired, and this fire grew 
rapidly in intensity. 

Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the 
assault. As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. The 
torpedo planes, flying low, appeared first over the hills surrounding 
the harbor, and in probably not more than sixty seconds were in a 
position to discharge their torpedoes. The second wave over the harbor 
was resisted with far greater fire power and a number of enemy planes 
were shot down. The third attack over the harbor was met by so intensive 
a barrage from the ships that it was driven off without getting he 
attack home, no effective hits being made in the harbor by this last 

The Army succeeded in getting ten fighter planes in the air before the 
enemy made the third and final sweep. And in the combat that ensued they 
estimate eleven enemy craft were shot down by plane or anti-aircraft 
fire. The Navy claims twelve more were destroyed by gunfire from the 
ships, making a total enemy loss of twenty-three. To these twenty-three, 
eighteen more may be added with reasonable assurances, these eighteen 
being Japanese planes which found themselves without [7] sufficient fuel 
to return to their carriers and who plunged into the sea. Conversation 
between the planes and the Japanese fleet, in plain language, received 
in Oahu is the basis for this assumption. If true, it makes a total of 
forty-one planes lost by the Japanese. 

Page 1752

The estimate of the number of planes attacking varies. This variance 
lies between a minimum of three carriers, carrying about fifty planes 
each, and a maximum of six carriers. This would indicate an attacking 
force somewhere between one hundred fifty and three hundred planes. 

From the crashed Japanese planes considerable information was obtained 
concerning their general character. Papers discovered on a Japanese 
plane which crashed indicate a striking force of six carriers, three 
heavy cruisers and numerous auxiliary craft including destroyers and 
other vessels. It is interesting to note that the Japanese fighter 
planes were Model O-1, equipped with radial engines and built in early 
1941. None of the planes shot down and so far examined, was fitted with 
any armored protection for the pilot nor were any self sealing gasoline 
tanks found in any plane. American radio and other American built 
equipment was recovered from the wreckage. One plane was armed with a 
Lewis gun of the 1920 vintage. Some observers believed that the planes 
carried an unusual number of rounds of ammunition and the use of 
explosive and incendiary 20 millimeter ammunition was a material factor 
in damaging planes and other objectives on the ground. The torpedo 
bombers were of an old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about 
1906, equipped with large vanes on the stern to prevent the initial deep 
dive customary of torpedoes dropped by planes. It is pleasing to note 
that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent weapons. With this 
in mind, it was found that the Armor [8] piercing bombs employed were 15 
[sic] inch A. P. projectiles, fitted with tail vanes.

In Actual combat when American planes were able to take the air, 
American fliers appear to have proved themselves considerably superior. 
One Army pilot alone is credited with shooting down four Japanese 
planes. All of the pilots who got in the air returned to the ground 
confident of their ability to handle Japanese air forces successfully in 
the future.

At neither Army or Navy air fields were planes dispersed. At Kaneohe 
some VP planes were, however, moored in the water. They, too, were 
destroyed by machine gun fire, using incendiary bullets. Consequently, 
most of them were put out of action by the enemy in the initial sweep. 
Hangars on all of the fields' were heavily bombed and many of them 
completely wrecked. At Hickam Field a very large barracks building was 
burned with heavy loss of life. The heaviest casualties in the Navy were 
incurred aboard ships subjected to torpedo attack. The bulk of the 
damage done to the fleet was done by torpedoes and not by bombs, some 
ships being hit by four or more torpedoes. With the sole exception of 
the Arizona, bombs proved ineffectual in causing serious damage. 

Many of the officers and men of the crews when their ships were set 
afire were compelled to take to the water. A very considerable number 
were trapped below decks aboard the Oklahoma and the Utah, both of which 
capsized. By cutting through the bottom of these two vessels, while the 
attack was in progress, twenty six additional men were rescued alive. 
Throughout the action, small boats from other ships and from the harbor 
swarmed over the harbor engaged in the rescue of men who were driven 
overboard from their ships. The rescue of men from drowning and the 
recovery and swift treatment of the wounded was carried on throughout 
the engagement [9] by both service people and civilians with the 
greatest gallantry. Temporary hospital quarters were provided in half a 
dozen different places and the wounded were cared for promptly. Because 
of the huge number of unidentified dead, many being burned beyond 
recognition and a large number having been picked up in the harbor 
unrecognizable after several days in the water, several hundred were 
buried in a common grave on Government land adjoining the Navy Yard. 
While I was still there bodies were being recovered from the water, but 
all were in a condition which prevented identification. Dispositions 
made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Block [sic]) 
were adequate and were efficiently carried out. 

Of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbor when the attack was made on 7 
December, three escaped serious damage and can put to sea in a matter of 
a few days. These are the Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Tennessee. The 
Nevada can be raised in a month, and will then require a complete 
overhaul. The California can be raised in two and one-half months, and 
then must be given temporary repairs in order to send her to the Pacific 
coast for a year's overhaul. The West Virginia can be raised in three 
months, and will require a year and a half to two years for overhaul. 
The Oklahoma, which was overturned, it is estimated, can be raised in 
four months. Whether she will be worth overhaul cannot be determined 
now. The Arizona is a total wreck, her forward magazine having exploded 
after she had been damaged by both torpedoes and bombs. The Colorado was 
on the Pacific coast for overhaul.

Page 1753

There were six cruisers in the harbor at the time of the attack. The 
Detroit put to sea at once and is uninjured. The New Orleans and the San 
Francisco are now ready to go to sea. The Honolulu will be ready on 
December 20th. The Helena was badly damaged and may require a new 
engine. [l0] She will be ready to go to the Pacific coast for overhaul 
December 31st. The Raleigh was flooded throughout her machinery spaces 
and seriously injured in other respects. It is estimated she will be 
ready for the trip to the Pacific coast for overhaul on January 15th. 

There were ten destroyers in the harbor at the time of the attack. Seven 
of these put to sea at once and were uninjured. The Cassin and the 
Downes were in the same dry-dock with the Pennsylvania. Bombs designed 
for the Pennsylvania hit the two destroyers and totally wrecked both of 
them. Although both destroyers were badly burned prompt fire fighting 
work saved the Pennsylvania from any damage. The destroyer Shaw was in 
the floating dry-dock at the time of the attack. All of this ship 
forward of No. 1 stack was seriously damaged or blown off. The after-
part of the ship is still intact and can be salvaged and a new section 
can be built to replace that part of the ship now destroyed. 

The mine layer Oglala was lying moored outside the Helena, and received 
the impact of the torpedo attack designed for the cruiser. She is a 
total loss. The airplane tender Curtis which was bombed and injured by 
fire started when a torpedo plane plunged into her crane will be ready 
for service on December 17th. The Vestal, one of the ships of the train 
which was damaged, will be ready to go to the Pacific coast on December 
17th for overhaul. The old battleship Utah, which had been converted 
into a training ship for anti-aircraft instruction, is a total loss. 


There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General Short to alibi 
the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted [11]  
they did not expect it and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if 
it came. Both Kimmel and Short evidently regarded an air attack as 
extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs would 
have to travel to make the attack and the consequent exposure of such a 
task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet. Neither the 
Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the 
Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both 
felt that if any surprise attack was attempted it would be made in the 
Far East. 

Of course the best means of defense against air attack consists of 
fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft 
available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the 
diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, 
the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians. 

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well disposed 
antiaircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this 
type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who 
has pressed consistently for these guns. 

There was evident in both Army and Navy only a very slight feeling of 
apprehension of any attack at all and neither Army nor Navy were in a 
position of readiness because of this feeling. 

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there was available to the 
enemy in Oahu probably the most efficient fifth column to be found 
anywhere in the American possessions, due to the presence of very large 
numbers of alien Japanese. The intelligence work done by this fifth 
column before the attack provided the Japanese Navy with exact knowledge 
of all necessary details to plan the attack. This included exact charts 
showing customary position of ships when in Pearl Harbor, exact location 
of all defenses, gun [12] power and numerous other details. Papers 
captured from the Japanese submarine that ran ashore indicated that the 
exact position of nearly every ship in the harbor was known and charted 
and all the necessary data to facilitate a submarine attack was in 
Japanese possession. It is an interesting fact that the Utah at the time 
of the attack occupied a berth normally used by an aircraft carrier and 
she was sunk and is a total loss. The work of the fifth column artists 
in Hawaii has only been approached in this war by the success of a 
similar group in Norway.

The fighting spirit of the crews aboard ship and ashore was superb. Gun 
crews remained at their station with their guns in action until they 
slid into the water from the Oklahoma's deck or were driven overboard by 
fires on other ships. Men ashore manned every available small boat and 
carried on rescue work saving the lives of the men who were driven 
overboard while the heaviest 

Page 1754

fighting was going on. Some of the crew of the Utah, swept from the deck 
of the ship as she capsized, were rescued by destroyers leaving the 
harbor to engage in an attack on the enemy forces. Although clad only in 
their underclothes, they insisted on joining the crews of the destroyers 
which rescued them and went to sea. 

The evacuation of the wounded and the rescue of men from drowning was 
carried on with such superb courage and efficiency as to excite 
universal admiration, and additional hospital accommodations were 
quickly provided so that the wounded could be cared for as rapidly as 
they were brought ashore. 

The removal of the convalescent wounded to the mainland promptly is 
imperative. I recommend that the Solace should be loaded with these 
convalescent wounded at once and brought to the coast with or without 

[13] The reported attempted landing on the west coast of Oahu, near 
Lualualei was an effort on the part of the Japanese fifth columnists to 
direct the efforts of the U. S. task forces at sea and to lure these 
forces into a submarine trap. Fortunately, this fact was realized before 
certain light forces under Rear Admiral Draemel reached the vicinity of 
the reported landings. His ships were turned away just prior to the 
launching of a number of torpedoes by waiting submarines, which 
torpedoes were sighted by the vessels in Admiral Draemel's force. 

[14] The same quality of courage and resourcefulness was displayed by 
the Naval forces ashore as by the men aboard ship. This was likewise 
true of hundreds of civilian employees in the yard, who participated in 
the fire fighting and rescue work from the beginning of the attack. 

It is of significance to note that throughout the entire engagement on 7 
December, no enemy air plane dropped any bombs on the oil storage tanks 
in which huge quantities of oil are stores [sic]. This was one of many 
indications that appear to foreshadow a renewal of the Japanese attack, 
probably with landing forces, in the near future. Every effort to 
strengthen our air defenses, particularly in pursuit planes and anti-
aircraft artillery is clearly indicated. This anticipation of a renewal 
of the attack is shared by both Army and Navy Officers in Hawaii. As a 
matter of fact, in the ranks of the men in both services it is hoped 
for. Both are grimly determined to avenge the treachery which cost the 
lives of so many of their comrades. Instead of dampening their spirits, 
the Japanese attack has awakened in them a stern spirit of revenge that 
would be an important factor in the successful resistance of any new 
enemy approach. 


The salvage operation involved in raising the sunken battleships is one 
of the most important pieces of defense work now under way. Its 
magnitude warrants that it should receive maximum attention and all 
facilities in man power and materiel that will further its expeditious 
progress, including top priorities for material and high speed 
transportation facilities to and from the mainland and Hawaii. 

The Navy is fortunate that Lieut. Comdr. Lemuel Curtis, who is an 
officer in the Naval Reserve, and who is one of the most expert salvage 
men in [15] the United States was in Pearl Harbor at the time of the 
attack. He is in full charge of the salvage operations under Commander 
J. M. Steels, USN, the representative of the Base Force Command. With 
personnel already available and with certain additions to be immediately 
provided, adequate organization to carry on this work with maximum speed 
has been assembled. 

I am proposing to send to Pearl Harbor a large force of partially 
trained men from San Diego to assist in the salvage operations, and to 
be trained to form part of the crews of the new salvage ships due to the 
completed next autumn. The most rapid delivery to the job of materiel 
and men to expedite this salvage work is essential, and I am proposing 
to arrange for the purchase or charter of the S. S. Lurline of the 
Matson line, or of some other suitable high speed vessel to be utilized 
primarily for this purpose. Such a ship would also be available for 
returning to the United States the families of Officers and men who 
should be evacuated because of the dangers inherent in the Hawaiian 
situation. In addition, any available cargo space in this vessel not 
needed for the transfer of material for the salvage operation can be 
used to assist in the transportation of food to Hawaii. 

Lieut. Cmdr. Curtis is the authority for the estimates of time required 
for the salvage operations on the Nevada, California, West Virginia, and 

Page 1755


The possibility of advancing the repairs on salvaged vessels was 
discussed with the Commandant and with the manager of the Yard at Pearl 
Harbor. A suggestion that help might be rendered direct to the Navy Yard 
by Continental Repair Yards did not meet with their approval for the 
reason that were compelling, but the desirability of dispersing part of 
the Naval work on this Station [16] resulted in the suggestion that the 
Navy take over, by purchase or lease, three small ship repair plants 
located in Honolulu and that these be operated under a management 
contract, with personnel to be furnished by private ship repair yards on 
the west coast. These three plants are the Honolulu Iron Works, the 
Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company and the Tuna Packers, Inc. Only so 
much of these plants as are useful in ship repairs would be taken over, 
and the Navy Yard would assign work to them on destroyers, small vessels 
and yard craft, thus relieving congestion and scattering the risk in 
case of further possible attack. I am studying this proposal with the 
various interested parties. With these added facilities, the Navy Yard 
can adequately handle the work load presently to be imposed upon it. 


Upon arrival in San Diego, I was met by the Commandants of the 11th 
Naval District and Navy Yard, Mare Island, and gave them the necessary 
information and instructions to post them on the Pearl Harbor attack to 
permit them to safeguard their commands so far as possible. This 
included all available information about the two men submarines which 
might provide a serious menace to the west coast. The Commandant of the 
Navy Yard, Mare Island, undertook to pass on all of this information to 
the Commandant of the 12th and 13th Naval District who could not attend 
this meeting.


In conclusion may I invite particular attention to the following points 
in my report and draw certain conclusions therefrom:

(1) Neither the Army or the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air 
attack on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely.        

[l7] (2) The Army and Naval Commands had received a general war warning 
on November 27th, but a special war warning sent out by the War 
Department at midnight December 7th to the Army was not received until 
some hours after the attack on that date.

(3) Army preparations were primarily based on fear of sabotage while the 
Navy's were based on fear of submarine attack. Therefore, no adequate 
measures were taken by either service to guard against a surprise air 

(4) Radar equipment manned by the Army and usually operated for a longer 
period, was only operated from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m., on December 
7th. This change was authorized by the Control Officer. Accurate 
information of the approach of a concentration of planes 130 miles to 
the northward relayed to the Aircraft Warning information Center by an 
unofficial observer was not relayed beyond that office. Nor was other 
information from Army Radar showing the retirement of enemy aircraft to 
their bases received as such by the Navy until two days after the 

(5) The first surprise attack, simultaneously on five principal 
objectives, caught them all completely unprepared. It was about four 
minutes before the first anti-aircraft fire by the Navy began, and as 
the Army aircraft batteries were not manned nor their mobile units in 
position it was some time before their anti-aircraft fire became 

(6) Most of the damage to Army fields and Navy stations occurred during 
the first attack, which concentrated on planes, airfields and capital 

(7) As anti-aircraft fire increased the second and third attacks 
resulted in successively less damage. 

[18] (8) The final results of the three attacks left the Army air fields 
and the Naval station *very* badly damaged and resulted in the practical 
immobilization of the majority of the Navy's battle fleet in the Pacific 
for months to come, the loss of 75% of the Army's air forces on the 
Islands, and the loss of an even larger percentage of the Navy's air 
force on Oahu. 

Page 1756

(9) Once action was joined the courage, determination and  
resourcefulness of the armed services and of the civilian employees left 
nothing to be desired. Individually and collectively the bravery of the 
defense was superb. In single unit combat the American pursuit planes 
proved themselves superior to the Japanese and the American personnel in 
the air demonstrated distinct superiority over the Japanese. 

(10) While the bulk of the damage done to Naval ships was the result of 
aerial torpedoes, the only battleship that was completely destroyed was 
hit by bombs and not by torpedoes. Hangars of the type used on all four 
stations are a serious menace and should be abandoned for use for 
storage purposes in possible attack areas. 

(11) The loss of life and the number of wounded in this attack is a 
shocking result of unpreparedness. The handling of the dead and wounded 
has been prompt and efficient. The wounded should be evacuated to the 
mainland as soon as possible.

(12) The families of combatant forces should be evacuated to the 
mainland as soon as possible. Orders to this end are already in 

(13) Salvage facilities and personnel are excellent and, as presently to 
be augmented, will be ample to meet the Station's needs and [19] will 
place the damaged vessels in repair berths in the shortest possible 

(14) Repair facilities are adequate to promptly carry out such repairs 
as are to be made on this Naval Station. Auxiliary repair facilities are 
under consideration to relieve the yard from small craft and to lessen 
the concentration of vessels at one harbor. 

(15) In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, the 
usefulness and availability of the Naval station must be restudied. Its 
air defenses must be strengthened immediately by the despatch of as many 
fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns as can be assigned to it. Special 
defenses against aerial torpedoes, such as balloon barrages and deep 
floats to be moored alongside important combatant units must be 
developed. Pending these studies and the addition of satisfactory 
safeguards, no large concentration of Naval vessels can be permitted at 
Pearl Harbor. 

(16) This attack has emphasized the completeness of the Naval and 
military information in the hands of the Japanese, the meticulous detail 
of their plans of attack, and their courage, ability and resourcefulness 
in executing and pressing home their operation. It should serve as a 
mighty incentive to our defense forces to spare no effort to achieve a 
final victory. 

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