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From: Tokyo To: Berlin July 2, 1941 Purple (CA) (K9) Circular #1390 (Part 1 of 2.)
At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation" were decided. This Policy consists of the following two parts. The first part "The Policy" and the second part "The Principal Points" (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.
The Policy.
1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.
2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.
Army 20701 Secret Trans. 8/8/41 (NR)
From: Tokyo (Matsuoka) To: Washington July 2, 1941 Purple (CA) (K9) Circular #1390 (Part 2 of 2.)
For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reenforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand
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shall be executed. As regards the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will employed.
Addresses to which this message is sent: U. S., Germany and Soviet Russia. From Germany transmit to Italy.
Army 20702 Trans. 8/8/41 (S)
From: Canton To: Tokyo July 14, 1941. Purple #255.
To be kept secret within the Department.
Re my #253[a].
Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attache is as follows:
1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary force and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.
2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-Chin will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two. In the main, through the activities of our air arm (in your city, the Spratley Islands, Parao, Thaiese Singora, Portuguese Timor and French Indo-China) and our submarine fleet (in the South Seas mandate islands, Hainan Island and French Indo-China) we will once and for all crush Anglo-American military power and their ability to assist, in any schemes against us.
3. The troops soon to occupy French Indo-China will be reorganized as the 25th Army Corps (one Army Corps consists of four divisions) and also the 30th Army Corps, consisting of the South China forces, which will be assigned to special duty with airplanes, tanks,
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and howitzers. General IIDA (the IIDA Army mentioned in preceding telegrams has been changed to the Nishimura detachment) will be placed in command and general military headquarters will be set up in Saigon. All preparations have been made. The ship fees have been paid and the expedition will soon proceed from here.
Army 19731 Trans. 7-19-41 (5) [a] Not available.
From: Tokyo. To: Berlin. 19 July 1941 (Purple) #669
The Cabinet shake up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact.
Relayed to Rome, Nanking.
19842 JD-1: 3838 (A) Navy Trans. 7-21-41 (C-NR)
From: Washington. To: Tokyo. 21 July 1941 (Purple—CA) #545
At the request of Acting Secretary of State Welles, Wakasugi called on him on the 21st. (The Ambassador is expected back in Washington tomorrow morning.) Welles said that he has been giving careful study to recent world conditions. He had asked Wakasugi to come to his office, he said, so that he could express the opinions reached by Secretary Hull and himself, in the light of recent world developments, regarding the unofficial discussions which have been taking place for the past several months between the Ambassador and Secretary Hull.
After thus prefacing his remarks, the Undersecretary said that the real objectives, set up by the Ambassador, Wakasugi, et al., of the Japanese-U. S. conversations, were identical to those towards which the Secretary was striving.
According to information received from various sources in various areas, he continued, there are definite indications that Japan is planning to take some steps very shortly which would upset the peaceful status of certain areas. If these reports are based on fact, he said, there would be a conflict between Japanese acts and the gist of the Ambassador's intentions expressed during the conversations.
Recently when the Ambassador met with him, Welles said, Japan's position was discussed. In the course of those conversations, the Ambassador claimed that Britain, the United States and other nations were applying the pressure on Japan, and described this as an "encirclement", of Japan. This expression is identical to that employed earlier by Germany, he pointed out.
As a matter of fact, the Undersecretary continued, the above was clearly a misunderstanding on the part of Japan, because the United
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States has no such intentions as those Japan apparently feels. It is because the United States wishes to maintain peace between the two countries that she has been continuing the talks.
He went on by saying that the advices received were to the effect that Japan would take the southern portion of French Indo-China by force within the next few days. Such an act would definitely be in violation with the spirit of the Japanese-U. S. conversations which are being conducted in behalf of maintaining peace on the Pacific.
That is the American viewpoint, he said, but would appreciate being advised of the Japanese viewpoint.
Wakasugi, therefore, replied that he was well aware of the fact that the Ambassador and the Secretary were conducting negotiations aimed at improving U. S.-Japanese relations, and that he, himself, prays that they will succeed. By "a reliable source of information", Wakasugi asked, did the Undersecretary mean the U. S. Embassy in Japan? To this, avoiding a clear answer, Welles merely replied that the report was an accurate one.
Wakasugi then said that he would relay the information contained in the report referred to to the Ambassador. In the meantime, he said, he would like to make an inquiry, as one emanating purely from himself and one which in no way should be considered an official one. Assuming, Wakasugi said, that Japan is planning to make a move in the manner described by the Undersecretary in some direction what effect would that have on the U. S.-Japanese discussions which were being conducted?
Welles replied that such an act on the part of Japan would be in direct conflict with the spirit of the discussions. So saying, he implied that further discussion would be in vain. On the other hand, he continued, he had been lead to understand that the new Foreign Minister of Japan was a close friend of Ambassador Nomura. Moreover, in new of the fact that very little time has elapsed since the new Cabinet was installed, probably it had not decided upon any definite policy as yet. In view of this fact the United States would patiently await developments before taking any steps to halt the discussions.
Wakasugi told Welles that he would report this conversation to the Ambassador in detail, and withdrew.
20026 JD-1:3937(D) Navy Trans. 7-25-41 (X)
From: Tokyo. To: Washington. 23 July 1941 (Purple—CA) #397
Regarding your message #545*. 1. You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined upon a definite policy because of the fact that I have not been in office very long.
As was pointed out in my message #368**, our occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable. This step had been decided upon by the Cabinet even before I assumed office. It is to be carried out peacefully for the purpose of jointly defending French Indo-China.
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It is my intention to continue to make an effort. to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U. S.
Should the U. S., however take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as closing of _____ for all practical purposes and the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.
2. Please carefully reread messages Nos. 368** and 396***, and make an effort to improve the situation.
3. With regard to your message #536**** _____ (last 13 groups garbled).
*JD-1: 3937. Wakasugi reports conversation with Undersecretary Welles. **JD-1: 3680. (S.I.S. #19501). Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France for establishment of Jap naval and air bases in French Indo-China. ***JD-1: 3953 (S.I.S. #20029). *****JD-1: 3974 (S.I.S. #20087). 20091 JD-1: 3986 (D) Navy Trans. 7-25-41 (S-TT)
From: Washington. To: Tokyo. 23 July 1941 (Purple--CA) #555 (In 2 parts, complete).
Since Wakasugi had called on the Acting Secretary of State, as reported in my message #545*, I called on Welles myself this afternoon. I explained to him that our southern occupation was absolutely essential from the standpoint of national security and economic safety. I further pointed out the impossibility of Japan to pursue a "do nothing" policy in the face of the embargoes being clamped down against her by various countries, for such a policy would lead to national suicide.
After carefully explaining the above situation, I said that according to press report the French Indo-China affair was apparently being carried out peacefully with the full approval of the Vichy government. I added that in view of those circumstances, it was my hope that the government of the United States would restrain itself from jumping to hasty conclusions, and instead would watch the trend of further developments for a little while yet.
I told him that I feared considerable repercussions among the general public, if measures such as an export embargo on oil is put into effect at a time such as this.
The new Cabinet in Japan, I advise the Undersecretary, is as anxious to bring the U. S.-Japanese "Understanding Pact" to a successful conclusion, as was the previous cabinet.
To the above, the Undersecretary replied that he would not reiterate his statements to Wakasugi. He would not, he said, reconcile the Japanese policy with regard to French Indo-China with the basic principles of the plans being discussed by Secretary Hull and myself. Neither Great Britain nor the United States had any intention of attacking French Indo-China, he said. The consensus here is, he said, that Vichy's submission came as a result of pressure from Hitler and that Japan intends to use French Indo-China as a base from which to make further southward moves.
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The U. S. Government, he continued, has not for the past many years made any hasty conclusions. Her actions are governed by Japan's policies.
Although he did not mention what steps the United States is planning to take in the future, he did say, as I was about to depart that Secretary Hull was expected back at his desk very shortly and that he would no doubt welcome an opportunity to discuss matters with me.
In reply to my inquiry, the Undersecretary said that traffic through the Canal has been indefinitely suspended while it is undergoing repairs. He asserted that no particular nations was suffering discriminatory action.
(Time at present: 2130). *JD-1: 3937 (S.I.S. 20026). Acting Secretary Welles, in a requested interview with Jap Minister Wakasugi, states that the reported aggressive move by Japan toward F.I-C. would violate the basis of proposed understanding with Japan. Requests Japanese statement of intentions. Wakasugi asks for source of Welles information and is told that "it is accurate". 20186 JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (2)
From: Tokyo To: Washington July 24, 1941 Purple (CA) #406
Secret outside the Department.
Re my #397[a].
That the leaders of the United States Government will at this time display a high degree of statesmanship is what I am secretly hoping for the sake of maintaining peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Government would do likewise and would like to reciprocate. However according to information received by us lately, especially according to newspaper reports, there is the possibility of the United State freezing Japanese funds or of instituting a general embargo on petroleum, thus strongly stimulating public opinion in Japan. Should this plan of freezing Japanese funds be put into effect, it would have an adverse effect on many aspects of our domestic life and might compel us to resort to diverse retaliatory measures. This would lead to a breakdown of Japanese-American economic relations an we cannot be certain that it would not in turn hasten the development of the worst situation. Will you please get in touch with Finance Official NISHIYAMA and, in accordance with the contents of the caption telegram, request the United States Government favorably treat this question.
Army 20034 Trans. 7/25/41 (5) [a] Not available.
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From: Tokyo To: Net July 26, 1941 Red Circular #1616
Depending upon how Japanese relations with England and the United States turn out, we may have to consider divesting England and the United States of all their interests in China. If and when things come to the worst, I want all areas concerned to cooperate in either destroying or seizing the considerable mining and other industrial equipment and ships of these countries. Be particularly sure let nothing be taken away. I want you all to be ready at any moment to take this precautionary step of transferring the property of these two nations to our control.
Army 20144 Trans 7-28-41 (5)
From: Tokyo To: Washington 27 July 1941 (Purple) Circular #1622
In retaliation for the steps taken by the British and United States by which our assets were frozen, the rules restricting foreign business transactions in Japan which are included in the rules governing foreign exchange, shall be put into effect on the 28th by order of the Finance Ministry. Manchukuo will also take similar steps while in China proclamations by the Consulates will be made subsequently. As an emergency measure, the above regulations will be announced by the Consulates as a bulletin and will be made effective for all practical purposes. (All transactions involving Britain and America will be placed on a license basis). At the same time, the Chinese will receive instructions to put similar measures in effect.
With regard to the Customs, all exports to countries which have frozen our assets, shall have to receive licenses in accordance with orders issued by the Financial Bureau. Guidance will be given to settle all complications which accompany the materialization of these regulations.
Ample study has been made so as to make these measures counter whatever measures the opposition should choose to actually take.
This message addressed to London and Washington.
20267 JD-1:4111 (D)Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (S-TT)
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From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo July 30, 1941 Purple #609.Re my #608[a].
Today I knew from the hard looks on their faces that they meant business and I could see that if we do not answer to suit them that they are going to take some drastic steps.
During my first conversation with Roosevelt after I took office the President, referring to the Panay incident, said that at the time he cooperated with the Secretary of State and succeeded in restraining popular opinion but that in case such a thing happened a second time, it would probably be quite impossible to again calm the storm. The latest incident brought all this back to me and I can see just how gravely they are regarding it. Think of it! Popular demand for the freezing of Japanese funds was subsiding and now this had to happen. I must tell you it certainly occurred at an inopportune moment.
Things being as they are, need I point out to you gentlemen that in my opinion it is necessary to take without one moment's hesitation some appeasement measures. Please wire me back at the earliest possible moment.
[a] See S.I.S. #20331 (J. D.-1: 4149): Welles summons Nomura and demands explanation of Tutuila bombing immediately. Army 20423 Trans. 8/2/41 (2)
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) To: Washington July 31, 1941 Purple (CA) K9 #433 (Part 1 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)
From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.
1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular #1390 [a]. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.
2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of it energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.
[a] Not available. Army 20461 Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)
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From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) To: Washington July 31, 1941 Purple (CA) #433 (Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)
It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.
3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.
That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.
Army 20462 Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) To: Washington July 31, 1941 Purple (CA) #433 (Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)
Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.
5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.
It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not
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Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.
Army 20463 Trans. 814/41 (NR)
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) To: Washington July 31, 1941 Purple (CA) #433 (Part 4 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)
We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.
6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving tower one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bound of good judgment.
Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.
Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.
Army 20464 Trans. Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)
From: Tokyo. To: Washington. 5 August 1941. (Purple) (CA) #447 (In 2 parts, complete).
1. The Imperial Government is trying to give its attention to the all important matter of Japanese-U. S. relations. This is not an easy task, for there are numerous obstacles involving domestic politics.
According to the various reports you have submitted on the subject the President and the Secretary of State are displaying considerable understanding in their attitudes towards Japan. You imply that they view the situation cool headedly, regardless of the trend of general public opinion.
On our side, however, there are quite a few persons who vigorously insist that the U. S. economic pressure on Japan is being daily in creased in intensity. For example, the newspaper Yomiuri carried dispatch from ------ on the 2nd, in which it was reported that the President of the United States had either ordered the complete suspension of, or curtail to the extreme, all exports of petroleum products. As a result of this order, the dispatch continued, even those
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exports for which permits had already been issued, had to be cancelled.
Regardless of whether there was any truth in the report or not and regardless of the extent of the alleged curtailment, such reports give the antagonists a strong talking point. This is a situation which causes us no end of anxiety
2. If it is believed by any that our people and country can be threatened into submission by the so-called strengthened encirclement policy or by the application of economic pressure, it is a mistaken notion. As a matter of fact it is erroneous to the extreme as should be obvious to any who understands our national characteristics.
If such a policy as the above is adopted, we cannot guarantee that the trend will not be in directly the opposite direction from our goal of an improved U. S.-Japanese relationship. One should be able to see this clearly from the example set forth above.
3. We are convinced that we have reached the most important, and at the same time the most critical, moment of Japanese-U. S. relations. It was at a time like this that the Imperial Government voluntarily agreed to temporarily cease the bombing of Chungking and its suburban area. This should clearly indicate Japan's sincerity, considerateness, and restraint toward the United States.
If an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan, as two equal powers on the Pacific, is sincerely desired, the points which will most effectively bring about such improvements must be given unbiased and cool consideration.
For the purpose of preventing the possibility of letting anyone, either within or out of the country, be under the impression that the negotiations were conducted under the threat of economic pressure, all measures which may be construed as being economic pressure should be abandoned at once. That we shall reciprocate in kind was made clear in the recent statement issued by the Minister of Finance.
4. Based on the general plan outlined by the last Cabinet, the Imperial Government proposes a plan, set forth in my separate message #448*, to improve Japanese-U. S. relations. This last plan was drawn up as a reply to the plan suggested by the President on the 24th, and is being submitted only after the respective positions of the United States and Japan as they affect the other, were given thorough consideration.
Will Your Excellency make an effort to clearly impress this point on the President and the Secretary of State and at the same time draw their attention to the graveness of this matter.
5. In form, the proposal which is being forwarded herewith, is a reply to the President's plan of the 24th. Our real motive, however, is to incorporate its provisions into the final agreement. With this instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-U. S. negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised proposals of 14 July and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime. Since that is our intention, please relay the matter contained in my separate message #448* without delay.
*JD-1: 4326. 20615 JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-6-41 (S-TT)
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From: Tokyo. To: Washington. 7 August, 1941 (Purple—CA) #452
Through my previous messages on the subject, you are perfectly well aware of the fact that the Konoye Cabinets have been sincerely interested in the betterment of Japanese-U. S. relations. Through misunderstandings and manipulations by third countries, and in spite of our above described desires, Japanese-U. S. relations are, today, critically tense. We feel that a policy of laissez faire should no longer be pursued.
We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to determine a way out of the present situation.
2. In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt.
Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific. Please sound out their attitude on this proposal.
3. If, however, they show any signs of hesitation (from the contents of your message #649* this possibility cannot be discounted entirely) on the grounds of our occupation of French Indo-China and the reports that we have increased our military strength in the north, put up the following arguments:
(a) That we recognize the exceedingly criticalness of the situation and for that reason, the Prime Minister made up his mind to break all precedent to represent his country himself.
(b) That unless every possible effort is made to maintain peace on the Pacific, we would be failing to fulfill our duties to our people.
4. If they are agreeable to holding such a conference, make inquiries as to the time which would best meet the President's convenience. In view of the times and conditions, we are of the opinion that the sooner that such a meeting took place, the better.
The subjects which will be discussed, undoubtedly will depend greatly on the time it is held. In general, however, the discussion will be conducted along the lines of the negotiations which were being conducted in an attempt to bring about better relations between Japan and the United States. In view of the fact that both the Prime Minister and the President have many uses for their time, arrangements should be made so that the discussions between them will last no longer than a few days. With a view to practicalness it is our hope that the delegations representing Japan and the United States will consist of the minimum number of persons.
5. In view of the extremely important nature of this subject, it is essential that strict secrecy be observed until the holding of the discussions are definitely agreed upon. Therefore, Your Excellency will convey this proposal in person to the President or to the Secretary of State. As soon as you come to an agreement and if the President
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as no objections, it shall be publicly announced. Therefore, will you confer as to the opportune time, etc. and come to an agreement those points as well.
For the purpose of security, we are not advising the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this subject for the time being. This is for our information.
*JD-1: 4345 S.I.S. #20649. Amb. Nomura discusses various angles of Jap- U.S. relations with a U. S. cabinet member (identity not given); suggests conclusion of an agreement upholding the integrity of territories adjacent to F. I. C. to facilitate supplies of materials. 20699 JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-8-41 (S-TT)
From: Washington. To: Tokyo. 7 August 1941 (Purple—CA) #663 (In 2 parts, complete).
U. S.-Japanese relations have now reached an extremely critical stage. However, this does not come unexpectedly; undoubtedly it as unavoidable and is the by-product of our government's pursuing their essential policies.
I now wish to describe the recent general outlook in the United States. I realize, of course, that I may be too presumptuous, but do so only because I believe it might be of some interest to one whose time in office has been as short as yours.
1. Fundamentally speaking, the United States is under the impression that the ties between the Axis partners are closer than appear on paper. It is convinced that the East is working in close cooperation with the West, and vice versa. It assumes that the aims of Germany and Italy in the West and Japan in the East are to conquer the world. Talking with ones who harbor such policies, the United States says, is out of the question.
We, therefore, carefully explained that Japan is guided solely by the principles of HAKKO ITIU (brotherhood of mankind) and that the Axis Pact, like the earlier Anglo-Japanese Pact, is merely an agreement within limitations. This explanation lead eventually to beginning the unofficial discussions.
Then, while the Secretary of State was on leave due to illness, the occupation of French Indo-China took place. The United States, refusing to accept our explanation that that was a peaceful occupation, discontinued the unofficial discussions then and there. Moreover, the United States returned to its original opinion with regard to Japan. Acting Secretary of State Welles made this clear in his statement and it was later confirmed by Secretary Hull himself. Last night, the Secretary expressed his deep disappointment to me. According to the Postmaster General, this disappointment on the part of the Secretary was all the deeper because he had been so very interested in bettering the relations between Japan and the United States I have already reported that Secretary Hull and his very good friend Walker were put in an exceedingly embarrassing spot in their relations with their Cabinet colleagues.
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2. The United States policy toward Japan cannot be termed as one of definite unfriendliness to Japan herself, they explain. The United States has to take some measures, they say, to counteract certain steps taken by Japan. The United States is only taking measures which will counter Japanese southward or northward expansion attempts.
When Japan occupied French Indo-China, the United States retaliated with the "freezing" order and the export embargo, a joint warning by Hull and Eden was issued with regard to any ambitions in the direction of Thailand. There is no doubt whatsoever that the United States is prepared to take drastic action depending on the way Japan moves, and thus closing the door on any possibility of settling the situation.
With regard to a northward move by us, it must be remembered that the United States has suddenly established very close relations with the Soviet Union. In view of this fact, it is highly doubtful that the United States would merely watch from the sidelines if we should make any moves to the north.
It is reported that the President accompanied by high army and nay, officials is meeting with Churchill. This indicates that careful preparations are being made to counter our every move without falling back a single time.
3. It must be noted that the government of Germany is exercising the utmost precaution and perseverance in dealing with the United States. It has even gone so far as to issue peace terms in an attempt to ease U. S. public opinion. Therefore, the Pacific, of late, has become the center of public attention and there is a good possibility that, depending on developments in Europe, this trend will be considerably invigorated in the near future.
I have submitted my humble opinions before and they are unchanged today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the sake of the future of our country.
21045 JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-15-41 (X)
From: Washington. To: Tokyo. 9 August 1941 (Purple) #674 (In 2 parts, complete).
Re your #465*
Upon the President's return to Washington (when this will be is unknown) I shall make arrangements to call on him and explain to him the subject contained in your message referred to above. I shall do everything in my power to make a favorable impression on the President on that occasion.
As I have pointed out in my various reports on this subject, I am convinced that as long as we proceed along the lines of our present policy, the United States, too, will undoubtedly undeviatingly follow the course whose trend has already been established. The United States assumes that our occupation of South French Indo-China
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indicates that Japan has definitely set her course. On this point the President and the Secretary of State are in complete agreement and it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes. I was made acutely aware of the firm attitude of the United States during my conversations of the 6th and the 8th.
In view of this situation, I greatly fear that even the offer of the Prime Minister to personally come here, would not move the United States to any perceptible degree. For this reason, I regret to have to say that I do not expect too much from the interview I plan to have with the President.
Unless we can draw up some plan by which we can persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan, I can only feel pessimism for any attempts to break up the present critical situation.
Though I regret that I can report only dark clouds over the world from my distant vantage point, I submit these humble opinions to you for whatever value they may be.
*JD-1: 4429. Immediately upon Roosevelt's return to Washington call upon him and do your utmost to bring about a materialization of these conversations (re Jap-American understanding). 20868 JD-1: 4465 (D) Navy Trans. 8-12-41 (2)
From: Tokyo. To: Berlin. 15 August 1941 (Purple) #739 (Separate message)
At the time of my conversation with Ambassador Smetanin the other day, I mentioned our desires in regard to the full realization of our rights and interests in Northern Saghalien and also the removal of danger zones in the waters of the Far East. Since then, we have been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the German-Russian war; to which we have replied that there has been no change in our intentions of continuing friendly relations between Japan and Russia, that thus far we have maintained an attitude of observing the neutrality pact, and that it is still our desire to continue this in the future, but, that whether or not we can continue thus is a question that depends on the way in which the Soviet Union responds to this. For instance if (a) any of the Soviet Union's territory in East Asia should be ceded, sold, or leased to a third power, or offered as military bases, (b) the Soviet Union should take any steps that would cause the sphere of any third power's military movements to be extended into East Asia, or should conclude with a third power an alliance that might have the Empire as its object, we certainly could not overlook the threat that this would be to our nation.
To this the Soviet Ambassador replied, that the Soviet government is rigidly observing the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and that as far as the above mentioned two points are concerned he could give assurance that there has been nothing of the kind and that there will be none in the future.
I furthermore took this opportunity to call the attention of the Soviet to the fact that of late it is persistently rumored that the United States will be shipping munitions to the Soviet via Vladivostok, and
Page 16
that if this should be true, Japan would have to take a serious view of it, as it would involve the three power pact relations.
In regard to the Japanese Government's attitude to the German- Russian war, I reiterated that there has been no change in our foreign policy, which has as its keynote the spirit and the objectives of the three power pact, even as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had communicated to the Soviet Government 2 July, and that this point is well understood by the Soviet.
21175 JD-1: 4637 (F) Navy Trans. 8-19-41 (C-N R)
From: Tokyo To: Berlin 15 August 1941 (Purple) #740
On the 15th I told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo confidentially, of my recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassador along the lines of my separate message #739*. Ambassador Ott expressing a desire to understand the basic problem, said that according to the notice sent to the German Government on 2 July, he understood that the possibility of Japan's participating in the German-Russian war was not precluded but asked if, now since the Soviet have given assurances regarding the two points which Japan considers vital, to the effect that there has been nothing of the kind and will not be in the future, the Soviets do not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war. To this I replied that, in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-mentioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet which will be undertaken together with the German Government, that this is entirely in harmony with the spirit and objectives of the Tripartite Treaty, and that I hoped that the German Government would fully understand this point. Ambassador Ott thereupon asked if it is proper to understand that this present arrangement is the first step toward future measures that are to be taken against Russia, that this is merely a temporary arrangement, in other words that it partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed. To this I replied in the affirmative.
Please relay to Rome together with the separate message.
JD-1: 4637 S.I.S. #21175. Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality Pact is being strictly observed, Japan warns against third power's acquiring Russian territory in East Asia; extension of third power's military movements to East Asia, and shipment of U. S. munitions to Vladivostok. 21219 JD-1: 4656 (F) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (C-NR)
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From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo August 16, 1941 Purple (CA) #703 (Part 1 of 4)
Re your #480[a].
(1) As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today reached a stage in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you, the United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with regard to participation in the European war, and the President himself is hesitant. However, the people are unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. According to those well versed in political affairs, this is what Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire.
[a] Not available. Army 21150 Trans. 8/19/41 (2)
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo August 16, 1941 Purple (CA) #703 (Part 2 of 4)
I hardly think the President will go to the extreme, inasmuch as he and the naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific war would be. I understand that the British believe that if they could only have a Japanese-American war started at the back door, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war. The people here believe that though Germany might eventually defeat Soviet Russia, the war has already passed the stage of being a short, decisive one and has entered the stage of being one of attrition; that inasmuch as the submarine war in the Atlantic is turning in favor of Britain and the United States, these countries will be able in time to attain their original objective; and that the situation resembles closely that which existed in 1917. I understand that confidence in ultimate victory is gaining.
Army 21151 Trans. 8/19/41 (7)
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo August 16, 1941 Purple (CA) #703 (Part 3 of 4)
(2) Since such is the state of affairs in this country, I could not have helped but refer to the State Department the proposal for a conference which you made in your telegram, but as you already know, the Secretary of State gave a negative reply to the proposal.
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I, therefore, subsequently tried to interest a member of the cabinet who was intimately associated with the Secretary of State, but he also showed little interest in the subject. Besides, it is customary the Secretary to be present at such conversations. I understand the President at one time had thought of arranging for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, but since Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, he has come to believe that Japan does not want a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations but that she is carrying on an appeasement policy toward the United States. I hear that they are beginning to think that I have been fooled by my country and that his having conferred with me was exceptional thing.
Army 21152 Trans. 8/19/41 (2)
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo August 16, 1941 Purple (CA) #703 (Part 4 of 4)
In the meantime, Japanese newspapers have printed scorching criticism of the statement issued by the American Government. Thus the atmosphere is getting worse. Unless something is do now to eliminate this misunderstanding, I shall not be able to accomplish our object. Furthermore, viewing the problem from the politic standpoint, so long as the head of the country remains unfavorable to the proposal, we cannot expect him to do anything about it. I believe the United States is wishing that we would give, at least, some sort of a pledge regarding those three critical points taken up during the past conversations; namely, the question of self-defense, withdrawal of troops from China, and nondiscrimination in trade. Today, when the Secretary of State has already rejected our proposal, I cannot help but feel keenly the necessity of careful consideration and a great deal of smoothing out if we are to bring about what you have instructed me in your telegram. I am told that the Preside will be returning in a few days, so will you please consider the point I have given above, and if you have any further instructions, wire them at once.
Army 21153 Trans. 8/19/41 (2)
From: Tokyo To: Washington August 20, 1941 Purple CA #487 (Part 1 of 2)
Re the last part of your #705 [a].
We cannot, of course, predict what the outcome of the Russo-German war will be, but this does not preclude our anticipating the fact that in case Soviet Russia loses and as a result the Stalin Regime disintegrates, Far Eastern Russia will be thrown into political confusion. It is a self-evident fact that Japan is pressed with the necessity of taking precautionary measures for the sake of maintaining peace in the Far East as well as for the sake of Japan's national defense
Page 19
and security, in view of the actuality that that part of Soviet Russia is adjacent to Japan and Manchukuo. Furthermore, since, due to the Russo-German war, there is a possibility of the influence of a third power being implanted in Far Eastern Soviet Russia, as for instance of Soviet Russia resorting to such unfriendly act as to allow the establishment of —----- and military bases in the Maritime province of Siberia or in Kamchataka, and consequently of the security of both Japan and Manchukuo being threatened, we need to prevent such a thing from happening.
The Japanese Government has decided to increase the Japanese forces in Manchukuo to the minimum number necessary to cope with such a possibility. On the other hand negotiations are being carried on in Tokyo with Soviet officials in order to arrive at a friendly solution of various matters having to do with this area. I understand that the Soviet officials have been instructed by the party leaders to be cautious in their attitude toward the forces stationed in Manchukuo. This is solely for your information.
Army 21234 Trans. 8/19/41 (S) [a] S.I.S. #21165. NOMURA asks to be informed for his own information what the Japanese government intends to do with regard to her northern policy.
From: Tokyo To: Washington August 20, 1941 Purple (CA) #487 (Part 2 of 2)
If the United States Government asks you questions concerning the increase of Japanese troops in the North, will you explain to them suitably as your own view of the matter what I have pointed out above. Impress upon their minds that the movement of the troops has for its objective purely preventive precautions against unforeseen emergency and that by it we will be able to forestall any possibility of peace in the Far East being disturbed.
Recently when the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo inquired about this matter, I replied that so long as the Russian Government lives up to the treaty Japan also will be faithful to it. The Ambassador was very much pleased to hear this, saying that my statement had clarified the matter. This is solely for your information.
If it becomes definitely known that the United States is shipping iron, airplanes and other materials by way of Japanese coastal waters to assist Soviet Russia, this fact would unnecessarily provoke the feelings of the Japanese people, and it cannot be said that it will not have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting Japanese-American relations—a question which is at the present stage a very delicate one. We would like, therefore, to see the United States refrain from such action. Will you take a good opportunity and tactfully call the attention of the United States authorities to this fact. Today I personally called the attention of the American Ambassador to it.
Army 21235 Trans. 8/20/41 (S)
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From: Tokyo. To: Washington. 23 August 1941 (Purple) #497
From Financial Attache Nishiyama (#70).
1. American inspection of Japanese firms and banks comes closer to being a search for "subversive acts" rather than an inspection connected with the freezing order. There was a marked difference in the Japanese inspection of American banks. Influential persons in the Specie Bank are much concerned and desire an investigation to ascertain just what the real purpose of the American officials is. Furthermore the National City Bank is arranging for the Kobe and Yokohama branches to unite with the Tokyo office and is closing out the Dairen office. According to Curtis's explanation the above move is dictated by economic policy as was the case in the Osaka amalgamation and that there is no other reason for the move. Two or three young Americans will be left in the Tokyo office and the others will be returned home.
2. A proposal has been received from the British-Dutch Bank to exchange commodities for commodities in order to liquidate the bank's accounts and this matter is being pressed by the head of the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank. However officials in the foreign office do not look with favor upon pushing negotiations to the solution of this one problem when there are so many other questions pending between Japan and Britain. Also the immediate conclusion of such an agreement would exert an unfortunate influence upon the leadership of public opinion hence orders have been issued not to ratify such an agreement.
(This item is for your information only).
21644 JD-1: 4860 (H) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)
From: Tokyo To: Washington August 26, 1941 Purple CA (Very Urgent) #504
Re my #503.
That message contains the maximum concessions that we can make to the proposal of the President of the United States; however, whether or not you can convince the Americans of this is naturally another matter. Now the international situation as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hopes on an interview between the Premier and the President.
Please try to convince ROOSEVELT and HULL to this effect and please bear in mind that I do not consider that the interview need necessarily be bound strictly by what is set forth in my caption message.
Army 21481 Trans. 8/26/41 (S)
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From: Tokyo To: Washington August 26, 1941 Purple #505
Notwithstanding representations made by us on successive occasions the United States is treading a course which seems to be bent on exciting public opinion within our country. Beginning the first day of September they are exercising stringent limitations on gasoline shipments essential to our civilian population. At this time they are planning to pass through waters adjacent to our shores with cargoes of petroleum products which should be coming to us. The fact that they are transporting these petroleum products to Vladivostock has dealt a severe blow to the sensibilities of our government and people. At the same time that this brings about grave effects upon Japan and American relations, a terrific blow is being dealt by those in Washington to the whole country far more than you can realize.
This being the case, we are forced to cry out our disapproval of the realization of such measures and the Ministry of Interior as well as the War Ministry are very apprehensive. Therefore, because such measures are not in keeping with the neutrality treaty between Japan and Soviet Russia nor in accord with the interpretation of international law, I would like to have you make representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general viewpoint of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations. Wire me back as soon as you have filed these representations.
In the event the United States assumes the position that it is impossible to cut off shipments of petroleum products to the Soviet, then as it seems advisable to your Excellency make suggestions that they change the transportation route. However, should they not comply with this request, either, I think it would be wise to try to persuade the American authorities that they revive shipments of petroleum products to Japan immediately.
Furthermore, additional representations have been filed with the Soviet too, as of the 26th.
Army 21482. Trans 8/26/41 (S)
From: Washington. To: Tokyo. 29 August 1941 (Purple-CA) #756 (4 part message, complete except for Part 4)
Regarding my #732 (?)*
The following is the gist of my discussion with Hull, last evening, (28th), regarding the proposed conference, etc.
(A) As the result might be quite unfortunate should either one of the conferring heads of the two governments assume an uncompromising attitude on certain points, it is the expressed desire of Hull to
Page 22
hold preliminary conversations for tile purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the meeting of the two heads, and also to make the decisions of the two principals as final. (Hull used the expression "certification"). (Regarding this point please refer to my #703 (?)**)
(B) While it is necessary to bring up to date the various points of past conversations, the United States maintains that the adjustment of Japanese-American relations can be achieved without-considering the question of China, which is vital to her.
(C) Despite Japan's insistence that she cannot alter her policy towards China, the United States government is unwilling to seek adjustments in Japanese-American relations at the expense of existing American-Chinese relations. Neither is the United States Government willing to give cause to "explosion" in China by its action. Furthermore, the task of placating China by the United States Government for accepting the basis of Chinese-Japanese negotiations will involve the tremendous effort of winning the approval of Britain and the U. S. S. R. and for this reason it is deemed unfeasible.
(D) Regarding the question of withdrawal of our troops from China and the right of protection, I informed the Secretary that I had nothing to state except what has already been stated on previous occasions. However when I explained that so long as Prince Konoe remains in the saddle, I am confident that he will make every effort to settle these questions satisfactorily, Hull replied that he hoped that the Imperial Government will see fit to take definite steps towards this end.
Please check over my #540*** regarding these questions and let me know the government's opinion regarding them. Also please obtain details regarding same from Colonel Iwakuro upon his return.
(E) I wish to make the following suggestions in the event that it has been decided to hold the "Leaders' Conference".
(1) While it is the desire of the Japanese Government to designate Hawaii as the meeting place, we should consent to accept Juneau, if for reasons of constitutional requirements or personal safety, Hawaii is unsatisfactory to the President.
(2) The conference date should be from September 21st (?) to ----.
(3) Five persons each from the Foreign Office, the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and Consulate, that is a total of 20 persons or less, should be present at the conference.
(Part 4 not yet available).
*#732 available, not translated. Dated 23 August. Corrects the word "insisted" in a previous message to "instituted". **JD-1: 4642 (S.I.S. #21150 to 53). Amb. Nomura brings up to date the seriousness of Japanese-American relations; reports that since Secy. Hull has already rejected Japan's proposal (for continued negotiations) and the President is returning shortly, Tokyo should consider giving the U. S. some sort of pledge regarding the three critical points: self- defense, withdrawal of troops, and nondiscrimination in trade. ***JD-1: 3842 (S.I.S. #19911). Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that, based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunder- standing. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each. 21732 JD-1: (A) Navy Trans. 9-3-41 (7)
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From: Batavia (Isizawa) To: Tokyo September 2, 1941 Purple #902
Re the first part of Circular #261 [a ]from Ambassador HONDA.
1. Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indo-China, it is a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude of aid to China. This is evidenced by the unconvincing control exercised by the authorities here over the anti-Japanese editorials of the Chinese press, the solicitation of funds for the construction of military airplanes for Chungking among Chinese resident here, and their demand for suspension of publication of the Japanese-operated East India Daily News Chinese character edition, as well as the Malayan language magazine Sinarusuratan. However, on the other hand, in order that we may give a sufficiently clear picture of the situation, there is a small group of Chinese resident here whose anti-Japanese tendencies have slightly improved as a result of the activities of the government here. However, no sooner than they got the impression that these Chinese were coming slightly closer to us in feeling, it could be seen that they began to exercise their old tendencies on a still greater scale. Japanese who had good contacts with Chinese here were unmercifully exiled, and these Chinese friends were hauled unceremoniously to the police stations for questioning or possibly taken before the person in charge of Chinese affairs here. It has been anonymously reported that a statement has been made that they are in danger of their lives. Thus they have begun to hinder our schemes with regard to the Chinese with more and more determination.
2. Therefore, when an excellent opportunity presented itself, I deliberately took the occasion to exchange arguments on the Sino-Japanese incident with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, RO [b], who is chiefly in charge, within the government circles, of the handling of the Chinese question. At that time, the fundamental points of his argument relating to the Chinese question here, I am giving below for your information.
(a) "I have lived in China many, many years. In addition, since my return to the Netherlands East Indies ten years ago, I have gradually come into repute in my handling of the Chinese question. I think I am pretty well aware of matters having to do with the Chinese, but the fact that Japan has set up the Nanking regime and is very anxious to overthrow the regime of CHIANG KAI-SHEK is I think, extremely foolhardy and has slight chance of success. I personally cannot condone Japan's effort to beguile the Chinese masses from CHIANG KAI-SHEK through the establishment of the Nanking Government made up of second-rate or worse individuals. There is no more logical course for Japan to follow in the settlement of the China incident than to reach a compromise with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. This is my firm belief.
(b) "Though it is said that there are practically no Chinese living here in the Netherlands East Indies who support the Nanking Government, this is actually no exaggeration. All Chinese here give their support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Furthermore, the Dutch Government recognizes the CHIANG regime, and because she does not
Page 24
recognize the Nanking regime, it can be clearly seen that the Netherlands Government entertains the same convictions.
(c) "WANG CHING-WEI, who heads the Nanking Government is sold on the Asia doctrine. He advocates Sino-Japanese peace. His fundamental policy is the expulsion of the white man from East Asia. It is but natural that the Netherlands East Indies Government should oppose this theory. Therefore the consequent reaction here is the decision to follow a course of seeing to it that the Chinese on these islands are not swept off their feet.
(d) "At the present time, martial law has been put into effect on these islands, and everything is on a wartime footing. The people are united, and in order that the Netherlands home government might be restored, they are ready to fight. The 1,500,000 Chinese resident here on these islands are an important and integral part of the society of the Netherlands Indies. Their well-being greatly affects the peace, order, and economic livelihood of all living on these islands. Therefore, the Netherlands Indies authorities have definitely decided to follow a policy of unequivocally crushing out political schemes from abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here."
3. Having said all this, I endeavored to refute him with all the strength that I could command. RO, however, would not be convinced and adamantly stuck to his statements. Not only is the situation like this, but recently the fact that the police strength on these islands has been greatly augmented has made it extremely difficult for us to carry on our schemes toward the Chinese resident here. As a consequence, the situation practically means that we can do nothing directly. Therefore, I would like to have our organs here for the manipulation of public opinion as well as those who work in the development of our schemes remain passive for a little while. For the time being, we are concentrating our efforts in the collection of intelligences having to do with the activities of Chinese here as we as other things.
4. Therefore, in the meantime, until we have securely brought French Indo-China and Thai within our sphere of influence, I think that it would be most propitious for us to strengthen our schemes with regard to the Chinese here. For this purpose I would like to have sent to these islands influential persons in whom the Nanking Government has much confidence, who can command large numbers of followers among the Chinese here, who will have for their main objective the preaching of the doctrine that the Chinese and the Japanese are one, as well as set up organizations to influence Chinese opinion. These men would have absolutely no relations with either this office or with Japanese persons but would meet in large and small group and talk with influential Chinese as well as substantial individuals of that group here.
Please transmit this message to Ambassador HONDA in China an to other competent diplomatic officials to whom this information, in your good judgment, might be usable.
Army 21816 Trans. 9/4/41 (7) [a] Not available. [b] ROFINCK.
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From: Tokyo. To: Washington. 3 September 1941 (Purple-CA) #524
Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner.
In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher's story in the Herald-Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well imagine.
The government is not afraid of the above mentioned confusion; nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this case.
Because of the circumstances being what they are, we would like to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our approval).
Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of this plan.
21792 JD-1: 4923 (D) Navy Trans. 9-5-41 (S-TT)
From: Tokyo To: Washington September 4, 1941 Purple (CA) #528 (Part 1 of 2.)
Re your #556 [a].
1. What the United States Government proposed as a preliminary to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries were the questions of self-defense, occupation of China by the Japanese Army and equal treatment in trade, discussed during the informal negotiations in the past. The fact is that the recent situation in Japan, especially since the leakage of Premier KONOYE's message, has made it urgent to hold the conference as soon as possible and thereby adjust Japanese-American relations. However, if we continue to argue merely the legal angle of the aforementioned three pending questions as we have been doing, we believe that it would be impossible to be ready, as you have suggested, by the latter part of September. Furthermore, regarding what was communicated to us by the United States Government on July 24th and (August ?) 17th, we have already expressed our views, in addition to our sending the Premier's message. Since
Page 26
we have nothing more to say on the subject, we have decided to press first of all our viewpoint given in #529 [b], and, after finding out on what points the leaders of the two countries preliminarily and principally can agree, to hold a conference for the discussion of those points and then issue a joint statement at the end (I will wire you our text as soon as it is ready,) and thus help create a more wholesome atmosphere between the two countries.
Army 21790 Trans. 9/4/41 (S) [a] Not available. [b] See S.I.S. #21786, #21787 and 21788.
From: Tokyo To: Washington September 4, 1941 Purple (CA) #528 (Part 2 of 2.)
And so at 4:30 P. M. on the 4th I asked Ambassador GREW to come to see me and, upon his arrival, I communicated to him what is in the separate telegram. Bearing this in mind, will you also communicate the same to the Secretary of State.
2. The points in the separate telegram which require special explanation are as follows: (This was promised by the leaders of the two countries today during their conference. Whether it should take the form of a secret agreement or an ordinary agreement will be left to the discretion of the conferees.)
(1) We expect each of the matters upon which Japan has made her pledge, especially Japan's stand with regard to the Three-Power Alliance, will win the approval of the United States Government
(2) As to the withdrawal of the orders for freezing of assets by both countries, you should avoid giving the impression that this freezing measure taken by the United States had proven to be damaging to Japan.
(a) Explain the fact that if the ---- of this measure is technical and complicated and, furthermore, a halfway step, it will not be understood by the people at large.
(b) Explain the fact that this step which the United States has taken has given the impression to the Japanese people that it was meant to be a punishment for Japan's occupation of French Indo-China.
(c) Consider its spectacular aspect as secondary and emphatically propose that in view of the importance of the pledges made at this time by Japan, the United States must reciprocate Japan's decision even by overcoming a possible strong opposition within the American Government. By the word "immediately" with reference to the time when these orders are to be withdrawn, the time when an agreement regarding the matter included in the aforementioned (1) has been reached by the leading conferees, is meant.
(3) By ceasing to take military measures we mean, for example, to cease dispatching more submarines and airplanes to the Philippines and cease acquiring military bases in the southwestern Pacific area, in China and in Far Eastern Russia.
Army 21791 Trans. 9/4/41 (S)
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From: Washington To: Tokyo 15 September 1941 (Purple) #819 (In 3 parts, complete).
Re your 561 to 563*.
Points that have occurred to us here:
(1) Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as "two in one".
(2) The expression "Communistic and other subversive activity" would arouse their caution, and the words "common defense in China" would give rise to questions, while "agreement" would still leave a doubt as to just what it does mean in concrete terms.
(3) The United States has intimated that it wants to be advised of the peace terms between Japan and China and has further indicated that she would refuse to act as intermediary in the peace negotiations unless the terms were fair and just. Under such circumstances, I feel certain that the United States will not agree to promoting the peace conference if we now avoid outlining our terms.
(4) In view of the national characteristics of the United States and of the President's position, it will be next to impossible to leave the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact up to the "leaders" at the conference, for them to settle from a political viewpoint. In other words, if opinions of both sides do not coincide at the preliminary conferences, there will be no "leaders' conference".
(5) The United States has absolutely no objections to making these talks a Japanese-U. S. affair. Moreover, she has never even suggested the addition of a third power to it. The only thing they want to do to is arrange matters with Britain, China, Netherlands, etc. in advance, so that they will not get the impression that the United States is trading them off. However, I shall, of course convey the gist of your instructions to Hull.
(6) I have been doing everything in my power, however insignificant my efforts may seem, to carry out your various instructions and suggestions concerning the proposed negotiations. I fear, however, that if I were to go ahead and make some disposition of the various points you are discussing in Tokyo, I may find myself going off at a tangent. I should like, therefore, to leave these points alone for the time being and watch developments.
22427 JD-1: (FD) Navy Trans. 9-18-41 (1) *#561-JD-1 5159. (S.I.S. #22247) #562-JD-I 5160. (S.I.S. #22248) #563-JD-I 5161. (S.I.S. #22249)
Page 28
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 17 September, 1941 (Purple-CA) #823 (Parts 1 and 2 of 3) [a]
(1) On 6 August, I said at the White House that of the three main points, both parties were in agreement in principle on two. As for the matter pertaining to our evacuating our troops, I expressed my opinion that it was only because he was confident that an agreement could be reached that the Premier is prepared to attend the meeting. At that time, the Secretary of State said that there were two or three other points that had to be clarified and "brought up to date." When he said that, he was referring to our proposal of 24 June.
Although we are aware of your instructions contained in your message #397 of 24 July,* since the negotiations broke down at about that time, we could do nothing about your instructions of 15 July. The breakdown continued, and the talks were resumed only after the recent message was sent.
(2) The "understanding" which was put into words and submitted as a proposal on 24 June, was the culmination of over a dozen conferences between the Secretary of State and myself, in accordance with your instructions of 11 May. The Secretary and I conferred almost up to the moment he departed on his trip in behalf of his health. It is natural that the Secretary feels considerable attached to the proposal, since he had worked on it so hard for so many months.
It is my opinion that the U. S will be more likely to come to terms at the preliminary negotiations if the general lines contained in the proposal were followed.
Hull (insists ?) that the negotiations be held here.
*JD-1: 3986 (S.I.S. #20091)-(You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined on a definite policy because of the fact that I have not as yet been in office very long. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U. S. Should the U. S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the U. S. of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation. [a] For Part 3; see S.I.S. #22477. 22506 JD-1: 5301 Navy trans. 9-19-41 (7)
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 17 September, 1941 (Purple-CA) #823 (Part 3 of 3). [a]
In view of the above facts, I believe that it is doubtful whether the preliminary negotiations can be arranged in accordance with only our proposal of 4 September. In any event, our first task is to find terms which are acceptable to both sides concerned, regarding the three points-particularly regarding the matter of garrisoning troops.
According to information from that usual source, the atmosphere of the Cabinet meeting held here last Friday showed considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. conference. There is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made.
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Nishiyama (Financial Attache) says that a very good friend of his told him that Hull said to him (the friend) that the President "went too far" during the talks with this Ambassador.
[a] Parts 1 & 2 not available. 22477 JD-1: 5301 Navy Trans. 9-19-41 (7)
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo September 22, 1941 J-19 #839 (Part 1 of 4)
Currently the feeling here is, as ever, to aid the various countries on the side of the United States in carrying out the ultimate destruction of Germany. Though the Soviet, far more than was expected, has been able to put up a remarkable fight, there are many who sense an early defeat. England and the United States render such assistance as is possible in order to make impossible a separate peace or surrender. They are hopeful of being able to maintain her fighting strength in the spring provided she can weather the winter. Opinion has developed to this point. The United States is putting up an estimated $-0,000,000 worth of assistance. As a result of this, they plan to encourage the Britons' will to fight.
With regard to submarines, their utter annihilation is recognized to be virtually impossible. But then the American Navy could move directly into the Atlantic in order to protect Atlantic shipping. Furthermore, after the anticipated 6,000,000 "dead-weight" tons of increased construction have been completed by the United States alone during the twelve months of next year, a crisis will arise in the Atlantic. No one is unduly alarmed about submarines.
Army 23011 Trans. 10/3/41 (2)
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo September 22, 1941 J-19 #839 (Part 2 of 4)
With regard to the question of the policy toward ______, the people, as a general rule, are extremely happy-go-lucky. Should a war develop between Japan and the United States, "why worry, it's inevitable," is their attitude. There is still a great deal of talk on the comparative merits of the navies of both countries, the gist of which can be summed up as follows: A war between Japan and the United States will be one within the scope of the navy alone; Japan's economic strength cannot stand a long war; the United States excels greatly in its ability to replace warships lost in battle; saying these things, they boast of their ability to win out in a short while. There are only a few who are at all conscious of the danger of a war with Japan. In the field of international diplomacy, they still maintain their age-old policy
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toward ______. There are many who argue that to reach a compromise with Japan at the expense of China is fundamentally wrong. For example, according to the Hyde Park correspondent writing in the New York Times, Sunday edition, at the present time attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States are deadlocked. Because Japan's demands for the continued occupation of territory held by them in China is not in agreement with HULL's categorical denial of the possibility of such continued occupation, Premier KONOYE has requested a direct conference with the President.
Army 23012 Trans. 10/3/41 (2)
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo September 22, 1941 J-19 #839 (Part 3 of 4)
Nevertheless, notwithstanding all that, since the German people's will to fight is stronger than ever before, there are a greater number of people who feel that such a non-aggressive policy as outlined above cannot bring about a successful conclusion.
Many feel that as a result of the discontent of people in occupied lands, Italy will withdraw herself from the line of battle. In addition, many feel that the unrest of people in occupied areas will continue to increase. There are others, too, who pin unfounded hopes that the power of endurance of the German people will crumble within a short space of time.
If the war is to be a short one, one or two years will be required. If it is a long one, it will be protracted from five to ten years. the people generally here are maintaining an extremely happy-go-lucky frame of mind. There are practically none at all who think that as a result of this war the United States will be destroyed. With regard to their will to enter into the war, they feel that naval participation is sufficient. And, aside from the preparations being undertaken by military authorities, there are practically none who anticipate the dispatch of expeditionary forces on a large scale.
However, most recently there has been a sharp decline in the isolationist opinion expressed in the houses of Congress. One group is already going over to the majority group who back up the Government's foreign policy.
Army 23013 Trans. 10/3/41 (7)
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo September 22, 1941 J-19 #839 (Part 4 of 4)
Nevertheless, the President is a person who unceasingly confers with HULL. Today the greater portion of the American Navy being is kept in the Pacific. Japan, in the event of the Russian do, fall, might move either to the south or to the north. In such a case
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there is some fear that a frontal clash might occur at the same time in the Atlantic and the Pacific as well. The President is giving the utmost consideration to this matter.
As for Japan's peace terms, rumors are being circulated that in addition to Japan demanding the treaty ports and the four southern provinces in China, she might go so far as to demand other points of military importance.
Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render economic assistance to Japan.
The above are the critical observations concerning the trend of opinion in the United States made by KURATUKUHOON, [a] and I think he hit the nail on the head.
[a] Kana spelling. Army 23014 Trans. 10/3/41 (2)
From: Washington To: Tokyo 23 September, 1941 (Purple-CA) #842 (3 Parts-complete)
On the morning of the 23rd. I called on Hull and handed to him the English texts of your messages #562* and #564**, and our terms of peace between Japan and China as contained in your message #590***.
I took this opportunity to point out the following points: That with these notes, together with the various other statements made by us, we have said all that we can say; that we have nothing further to say to Ambassador Grew, either; that we shall leave all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact, other than the points which have already been brought up and explained, to be decided upon at the meeting of the leaders of the two countries; that the proposals which we now make are not intended to show down the original proposals made by the U. S., but rather are intended to enlarge their scope.
I continued by describing the situation and conditions in Japan in accordance with the contents of your message #589****. I added that our government was sincerely interested in having the "Leaders' Conference" materialize at the earliest possible opportunity.
In reply to this, Hull said that he was spending much time in promoting the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference". He then said that he had previously expressed his hope that we would guide public opinion to a more favorable one, and inquired if we had been successful in this.
I replied that as I had pointed out on several previous occasions, the government has faced this problem with sincerity, and that it is gradually being improved.
Hull then asked for my own personal opinions on the matter, so I replied that it is the government's opinion that the Tripartite Pact
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and the improvement of U. S.-Japanese relations can be made parallel each other. I also said that I was firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen peace the of the Pacific.
Hull then advised me that he has received Grew's report of the Minister Toyoda-Grew meeting of the 22nd, and that he is giving it his careful study at the present time. He said that he is anxious to reply to it at the earliest possible moment. I then tried to have him commit himself to be in favor of the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference", even if in principle only, but I was unable to make say anything definite.
Hull then went on to say that in view of world conditions, it is not too early even now, for the U. S. and Japan to consider the reconstruction of a peaceful world. He, himself, thinks that Japan and the U. S. are ideally situated right now to lend leadership to the world. At the same time, however, he is not sure whether the caliber of statesmanship of the two countries is capable of coping with such an undertaking.
I, therefore, said that even from this standpoint, it was essential that the "Leaders' Conference" takes place.
With this, our meeting was brought to an end.
*JD-1: 5160 (S.I.S. #22248)-Detailed reply of Foreign Minister to Grew's request for interpretation of various phrases and paragraphs in Japan's notes and statements of intentions in the current U. S. negotiations. **JD-1: 5162 (S.I.S. #22250)-"Equitable basis" is not to be judged solely by Japan. (Refers to open door & commerce in China.) ***JD-1: 5360 (S.I.S. #2250-51)-Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China . ****JD-1: 5359 (S.I.S. #22547-49)-Grew-Toyoda talk in which Japs again emphasize that all U. S questions have now been answered and they therefore expect a U. S. reply on the leaders' conference question. The situation during past month has steadily become more critical and will become more so, due to pro-Axis elements in Japan, if a decision is not reached prior to the 1st anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the 28th of this month. Tell the Secretary this and wire his reactions. 22749 JD-1: Navy Trans. 9-26-41 (1)
From: Tokyo To: Washington September 26, 1941 Purple (CA) #597
In solving so difficult a problem as Japanese-American relations, your Honor's troubles and anxieties have always been deeply appreciated by me. I can easily see that, concerning the negotiations, Your Honor's views are not infrequently at variance with mine; but as I told you in my #554 [a], this is a very serious matter and I am proceeding cautiously and deliberately. Therefore, I wish to caution you again not to add or detract a jot or tittle on your own without first getting in contact with me. In this connection, please wire me back concerning the following points:
1. Have you communicated to them the contents of my #590 [b]?
1. In your conversation with the President, did he not mention a promise on our part that we would avoid and cease any further increase in our troops stationed in French Indo-China for the sake of success in the Japanese-American negotiations? When the President stated with smiling cynicism that he expected we might occupy Thailand
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while the Premier and he were talking, just as we did French Indo-China while you and the Secretary of State were conferring (see your #752 [c]), did he not also refer to such a promise? I think he probably did. In view of the seriousness of matters as they stand, although I know the hour is all ready late, because of the necessity of keeping records, I want you please to go and question them again. Now when Germany (?) is becoming so aroused, we have no intention of rehashing things which have been gone over in the past. Please, also, (tell this to them?). Needless to say, there will be no changes in my #595 [d] of today, so will you please communicate it to them.
[a] See S.I.S. #22191 in which Tokyo tells Ambassador NOMURA that the texts of certain notes are decided upon after very careful study by all of the various ministries involved. If, however, he notes any points in such messages, he should make inquiries and suggestions by cable before delivering them to the addressees. [b] See S.I.S. #22550-51 in which Tokyo sends Washington the text of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China . [c] See S.I.S. #21651 and #21615 in which Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo of his conference with the President with regard to the meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President. [d] See S.I.S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States. Army 22753. Trans. 9/26/41 (S)
From: Tokyo To: Washington 27 September 1941 (Purple-CA) #604
On this the 27th, at 1630, after completing the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me. Off the record, I talked to him along the lines contained in my separate message #605*. I urged him to strongly recommend to his home government to have the "leaders' meeting" materialize immediately. Will you too, therefore, carefully read the contents of my separate wire and secretly do everything in your power to prevail upon the President to have this meeting materialize.
The above is not to be construed as being the absolutely final proposal on our part, nor is it absolutely essential that a time limit be put in force. However, in view of internal and external circumstances of our country, we cannot keep postponing matters forever. Please, therefore, put primary emphasis on the importance of holding the meeting immediately. (I mentioned this point to the U. S. Ambassador, too.)
*JD-1: 5503. 22863 JD-1: 5502 (D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT)
From: Tokyo To: Washington 27 September 1941 (Purple CA) #605 (In 4 parts, complete).
(Translator's Note. This is the gist of the off-the-record statement made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew-see Tokyo to Washington #604*-and is written in the first person, Toyoda speaking.)
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1. Europe has now fallen into a chaotic condition The flames of war have spread to the Atlantic and they are enveloping the various powers of the world. Fortunately, however, no war has, as yet broken out in the Pacific. The United States and Japan, alone, hold the key to continued peace or war in the Pacific.
Should the United States and Japan come to blows, the Pacific, too, would be immediately thrown into the chaos that is war. World civilization would then come crashing down. No greater misfortune could befall mankind.
In recent times, there have been numerous and various incidents between Japan and the United States. Relations are at an exceedingly sensitive point, and even the slightest thing must be treated with the utmost precaution.
If, at this time, Japanese-U. S. relations were to be adjusted so as to promote friendship between them, the effects would be felt not only by the United States and Japan, but would indeed contribute greatly to a world peace. The Imperial Government desires the adjustment of Japanese-U. S. relations not only for the sake of Japan and the United States, but hopes that at the same time, such a step would become the opening wedge to bringing about peace throughout the world.
2. Since assuming my post two months ago, I have been working on the matter of readjusting Japanese-U. S. relations even to the extent of almost forgetting to eat and sleep. It is with the same objective that Premier Konoye has expressed his willingness to act as a leader in a conference with President Roosevelt.
3. Japan is connected to Germany and Italy by an alliance. The fact that the Premier of Japan had volunteered to meet the President, in itself has given rise to much misunderstanding regarding her relations with Germany and Italy. Thus, there is proof that Japan is making a supreme sacrifice. Moreover, the history of Japan has no precedence of an instance where the Premier himself has gone abroad in behalf of diplomacy. This fact in itself should clearly show the sincerity of the government of Japan in its expressed desire of adjusting the relationship between Japan and the United States, and through that, of maintaining peace on the Pacific, and, indeed, for the world.
4. Maintenance of peace is Japan's sole motivating power. Should there be those who believe that Japan was forced to her knees by U. S. pressure, it would indeed be a sad misconception on their part. Japan desires peace; she is not succumbing to outside pressure. Moreover, Japan is not one to yearn for peace at any price.
The Japanese people have a peculiar characteristic of repelling all outside pressures. We have pointed this fact out previously but I view of the general tone of U. S. newspapers in the past, (it is admitted that this has been considerably toned down of late), I feel that it is necessary to repeat this.
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5. Japanese-U. S. relations are exceedingly complicated. Hence, it is quite possible that the entire matter cannot be settled in a day and a night. It is quite possible that not all of the difficult problems can be ironed out by a single meeting between the leaders of the two countries However, the political aspect of such a meeting would have exceedingly far reaching effects. Moreover, those items which have as yet remained unsettled (we do not believe that any of these exist any longer, but assuming that some do) after all of the goings and comings of cables, they could undoubtedly be settled at the conference. It should be unnecessary to point out the turn for the better in U. S.-Japanese relations that this would have.
We are under the impression that in theory, your side is not opposed to the holding of the "leaders' conference". Should, however, in spite of this, the meeting does not materialize for some reason, we doubt if another opportunity such as the present would appear for some time to come. Moreover, it is quite possible that here may be some fearsome reactions from such a failure.
6. Japan has already announced the proposals she will make at the meeting. We have moreover already submitted for your convenience a complete resume in accordance with the lines contained in the United States' proposal of 21 June. I feel certain, therefore, that the United States is fully aware of the Japanese viewpoint by this time.
7. We have, of course, already decided upon the vessel which will transport the Premier and his party; the personnel of his party, including the generals and admirals, have also been decided upon. We are in a position to start at any moment now.
8. Since the situation is as described above, the Imperial Government awaits with expectations the United States' reply at the earliest possible moment. Any further delays would place the government in an exceedingly difficult position from the viewpoint of the Tripartite Pact. Your Excellency is certainly fully aware that there is every possibility of commemorating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, to strengthen the ties of the three powers.
From the viewpoint of the weather there is considerable danger that it will become unfavorable in the North Pacific and in the Alaska area.
9. From both domestic and external circumstances, time is of paramount importance, as I have pointed out previously. It is essential that the meeting be decided upon at all possible speed and it is with this thought uppermost in my mind that I so strongly insist upon this matter at this time. I would consider it to be of greatest fortune if we were to receive a definite reply at the earliest moment.
From our standpoint if the meeting were scheduled from 10 to 15 October, it would meet with our best convenience.
In conclusion, I would like to say that in a negotiation of this type, it is of the utmost importance that each respect the other's reliability
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and sincerity. Your Excellency is fully cognizant of Premier Konoye, character and his political position. I hardly feel that I can add anything in this respect at this time. However, as I said before, I doubt if another opportunity to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations will present itself because, at present, the Premier and the entire Cabinet are behind the move. At the same time, it is essential, even under present circumstances, that the leaders meet and confer directly and at the earliest possible time. I repeat this last point over and over again.
*JD-1: 5502. JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT) 22864
From: Washington To: Tokyo 27 September 1941 (Purple-CA) #865 (In 10 parts, complete)
On this, the 27th, I had Matudaira call on Ballantine and had him relay the contents of your message and at the same time deliver the English texts contained in your messages 591* and 595**. He requested that they be delivered to Hull.
I am taking this opportunity to express my humble opinion on various points which happen to draw my attention in regard to your message #595**. I pass them on to you for whatever value they may have.
1. As I have pointed out on several previous occasions while reporting on matters pertaining to this issue, the United States insists that it would be inappropriate to hold the "leaders' conference" until the two nations have come to a complete agreement on all the points involved. At present the United States is allegedly investigating our attitude with regard to said various points. Since, as you said, we have already said all that is to be said, we are now committed to await expression of intentions by the United States.
If we submit further papers to them in advance of receiving some reply from them, there is a danger that matters would become further complicated and less clear. I am of the opinion that this would tend to hamper the progress of the negotiations.
If, by some chance, some apparent inconsistencies appear in our various papers, it may lead to their becoming suspicious of our sincerity.
Fundamentally speaking, the United States wishes to proceed along the lines she express in the U. S. proposals of 21 June. Judging from developments to date we do not feel that the premises outlined in those proposals are too far afield. Moreover, from the viewpoint of
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practicability we feel that they are the most concrete. I, therefore, hope that you will accept the reasonings embodied therein.
2. The deletion of the item reading "no northward advance shall be made without justification" will no doubt be the point which will invite the most suspicion.
3. The respective attitudes of the two nations to the war in Europe: As I have pointed out in messages pertaining to this phase, (see particularly my message #540***), it would be exceedingly difficult from the United States' viewpoint to retain paragraph 1 proposing joint mediation. Recent developments (particularly in view of the President's statement subsequent to the sinking of the U. S. vessel) have further stiffened the U. S. attitude. Therefore, it is my opinion that considerable difficulty will be encountered in securing U. S. agreement to this point.
(Part 5)
Concerning the matter of self defense as contained in paragraph two: Again, as I have previously reported, all U. S. moves pertaining to the European war are allegedly being made from the basic national policy of self defense as the starting point. Even if the United States does become actively involved in the war, she will do so in behalf of self defense and will not, supposedly, be in any sense an aggressive attack, even though she may have had ample provocation to make it so. In this way, they intend to obviate the necessity of our invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the United States is very anxious to have the term "right to self defense" as elastic as possible. (Read Secretary Hull's speech, contained in my message #381****). For this reason, they may not be tempted to accept the wording of our proposal on this point. The fact that we outline our needs for self defense may unduly arouse their suspicion.
Regarding the matter pertaining to the settlement of the Chinese Incident: As I pointed out in my message #540***, the United States has, fundamentally speaking, insisted that we outline the peace terms we shall propose to China. She maintains that she will enter into the real negotiations only after a complete agreement as to the contents of the "annex." Therefore, we shall undoubtedly be confronted with the difficult task of coming to an agreement on the matters of garrisoning troops and non-discriminatory treatment. I am of the opinion that in the final analysis, we shall have to agree to the terms offered by the United States in so far as they do not conflict with the terms of the Nanking Agreement. We should word our explanations and counter proposals with this in mind.
Before we are able to have the United States yield, we shall undoubtedly have to conduct several negotiations even after this. The danger of the negotiations breaking down completely as a result of the matter of our stationing troops, is constantly on the increase.
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The "non-discrimination" phase is not quite as tickling a problem as the former. In our proposal we state that non-discrimination will apply to the conducting of business between China and Japan only.
We add that as long as any third nation conducts her economic enterprises on a fair and even basis, she will in no way be discriminated against. I am not at all sure that the United States will be satisfied with these conditions.
Furthermore, we will probably encounter considerable difficulty in making the United States swallow, from the standpoint of policy, the new "principle of especially close relations".
Aside from these points, paragraph one is so worded as to imply that the United States and Japan were jointly responsible to settle the China Incident. I am not at all confident that we shall be able to succeed in this because it may not give a favorable impression at the time this "understanding" is published. (As I have reported in previous messages, the United States is not in favor of keeping this "understanding" a secret).
______________ with regard to the contents of paragraph two referring to having the United States use her good offices ______________ and the point making the demands, shall necessitate the making of new demands if we are to pursue the lines laid down heretofore, as well as those contained in your instruction of 11 April.
I also believe that considerable difficulty will be encountered in having them agree to the new matter. In that part referring to peace terms, the following words appear: "Konoye statement and those agreements between Japan and China". I feel that here, too, we shall encounter difficulty in getting their approval. Since President Roosevelt is very interested in taking the mediation actions himself it might be well to insert the word "President" in the sentence.
5. We have your instructions of 15 July with regard to the matter of trade between the two countries. We would appreciate your basing your proposal on the U. S. proposal of 21 June.
6. With regard to the matter pertaining to the political stabilization of the Pacific, it is said that that part of the U. S. proposal of 21 June referring to it was written by Secretary Hull himself. Since the United States looks upon this phase with the most importance, we would appreciate your allowing that part of their proposal to stand as is. We would particularly appreciate your deleting from the new proposals that part which states that we agree to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China only at the termination of the China Incident. We feel that it would be more acceptable to the United States if we were to retain only that part which refers to the condition of a large scale peace on the Pacific.
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In other words, we hope to wind up all arrangements of the preliminary conference,
*JD-1: 5415 (S.I.S. #22709). Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored. **JD-1: 5438 (S.I.S. #22748). Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U. S. to agree to a "leaders' conference." ***JD-1: 3842 (S.I.S. #19911) Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that based on the thought and discussion given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the Countries' and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each. *****Not available. 22961 JD-1: 5534 (D) Navy Trans. 10-1-41 (2)
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) To: Washington September 28, 1941 Purple (CA) #606 (Part 1 of 2)
In connection with my off-the-record communication to the American Ambassador in Tokyo last night, in case you have an interview with the President, the following is for your information:
1. As the last paragraph of that communication makes clear, we do not mean at all that all questions and answers are now useless. However, I wished again to emphasize that the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance is the turning point and that this occasion is all the more grave. If they have any questions, of course, we will be glad cordially to respond (but as a matter of fact, they have not asked us a single thing since the 10th, and I find this very mysterious).
2. The meaning of the statement that yesterday was the turning point and that the occasion is an important factor is that for the last few days a movement to strengthen the Axis has been afoot, and the popular psychology is being adverted toward this trend. Consequently, the tendency to oppose an adjustment with the United States is naturally increasing. Hence, now is the time, if ever, to concentrate on this accord. This does not mean at all that the power of the present government has dwindled or that the advocates of anti-Americanism have strengthened their position.
Army 22819 Trans. 9/29/41 (S)
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) To: Washington September 28, 1941 Purple (CA) #606 (Part 2 of 2)
It is true, we shall have to get quicker and better results than ever before from our endeavors for an understanding. It may even be necessary for us to publish them. Nevertheless, once the negotiations are decided upon or once the date of an interview is set, the government of this country is sure that the people will stand united and that the opposition's voice will be quickly drowned in a chorus of approval. Of this we have always been sure, nor has our conviction waned for a moment lately. Notwithstanding, the Premier sent his message more than a month ago. Nothing has happened; it
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seems as though it were pigeon-holed. The government is very much worried over this, needless to say.
3. It is true that one influential admiral and one general were included in the Premier's entourage. This made the United States suspect that a hostile military was holding the whip hand over us. I took this action, therefore, to dispel any such fear on their part (I seem to recall that HULL asked Your Honor something about this once.)
4. I talked with the British Ambassador the other day and he said, "To speak frankly, the trouble is that the United States is uneasy and lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of Japan." Well, the integrity of Premier KONOYE and of the present government ought to be a hundred per cent reliable, and the American Ambassador must have sufficiently advised his government on the trustworthiness of Prince KONOYE.
Army 22820 Trans. 9/29/41 (S)
From: Washington To: Tokyo 29 September 1941 (Purple) (CA) #867
During the morning of this, the 29th, (Monday), I called on the Secretary of State, and, in accordance with the instructions contained in your messages from 604 to 606*, I asked that I be granted a secret interview with the President. The Secretary said that because of death in his family, the President had been in Hyde Park since Thursday. Upon his return to Washington, however, he would see the President, he said and would hand me a memo of the U. S. Government within the next couple of days. He added that he read Ambassador Grew's report yesterday and thus gave evidence of being thoroughly familiar with the situation.
Hull gave indications that he too felt that immediate action was essential. At the same time, however, he seemed to think that it was of primary importance to get public opinion in Japan thoroughly unified in favor of it.
I, therefore, pointed out that though the government, the army, and the navy, were in full accord with the proposals being discussed, considerable time would have to elapse before the entire public could be made to understand them. There are those, for example, who cannot understand why the United States should meddle so deeply in Asiatic affairs when she herself constantly refers to the Monroe Doctrine and who, in actual practice, has seized the leadership of the American continents. Japanese public opinion cannot be made to conform with the every whim of the United States. To await its doing so would be like watchfully waiting for the century plant to bloom, I said.
23033 JD-1: 5592 (D) Navy Trans. 10-3-41 (7) *604-JD-1: 5502 (S.I.S. #22863). Toyoda-Grew talk held 1630 Sept. 27. Japs again strongly urge early action on the "leaders' conference", and directs Nomura to do everything possible to avoid further postponement. *605-JD-1: 5503 (S.I.S. #22864). Gist of remarks made by Toyoda to Grew. *606-JD-1: 5504 (S.I.S. #22819-20). Toyoda elucidates for Nomura's information various points of his talk with Grew.
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From: Washington. To: Tokyo. 29 September 1941 (Purple) #870 (In 4 parts, complete)
To Chief of Bureau Terasaki from Iguti.
I realize, of course, that I am being presumptuous, but the following are my opinions of the negotiations to adjust U. S.-Japanese relations:
(1) In view of such incidents as were described in our message #866*, we believe that it would be well if we did not deliver those papers here which have already been delivered in Tokyo to Ambassador Grew. Duplications in this manner are apt to create misunderstandings through transmission errors and through differences in translations. This is particularly true of some vague passage which cannot be made clear without lengthy explanations. (Please see our message #865**, and others for points which are in doubt). Under these circumstances, we are unable to make explanations when we are requested to do so by the United States. The Ambassador himself is placed in an exceedingly awkward position. We, therefore would prefer to put most of our efforts in trying to sound the U. S. attitude.
(2) We have already said that we have said all that is to be said. To keep submitting notes after notes, thereafter, which do not always run in sequence with the previous note, is not good, for it causes confusion and further delays.
As a matter of fact DESUBANIN * * * told us in confidence that the United States is of the opinion that the scene of the negotiations was shifted to Tokyo by us so as to bring about delays. They think that we are watching developments of the German-Soviet war, and that we shall launch a northward move if indications seem to favor it.
(3) Father Drught advises us that a friend of his in Tokyo (probably Walsh) reports that Japanese governmental circles feel that there is absolutely no reason why the United States should not accept the most recent proposals. The fact that she has not done so, must be due to interference from some Washington source, Walsh cables.
For the past six months, we have been holding talks here during which the attitude and stand of the United States has been set down clearly. We feel confident that you are aware, through our various reports on the subject, that it is exceedingly unlikely that the United States has any intention of backing down from those established stands.
We feel that there must be a tendency in Tokyo to view the United States statements too optimistically. It is imaginable to us that there are those who approach the Premier with a little too much "wishful thinking".
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(4) It is admittedly true that impatience in this matter must be avoided. We realize, of course, that circumstances have made it unavoidable to a certain extent, but even so, it seems to us that we have been urging the United States to reply quite frequently of late. This apparently is giving the impression to the United States that we are overly anxious.
On the other hand, the United States applied the "freezing" order on us, effecting our entire economic structure. Since then, they have been sitting tight, awaiting and watching subsequent developments. The United States does not suffer greatly from that measure; hence they are in no rush.
Under such circumstances, we do not feel that it is to our advantage to show signs of over-anxiety all by ourselves.
23110 JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (1) *JD-1: 5560 (S.I.S. #22877). Grew's report of our terms of peace with China differs from what you sent me. Please check. **JD-1: 5534 (S.I.S. #22961). Long report from Nomura giving his views of current state of U. S.-Jap negotiations. ***R. E. Desvernine, President American Crucible Steel Co.
From: Tokyo To: Washington September 30, 1941 Purple (CA) #614 (Part 1 of 3.) Re your #865 [a].
1. As you say, so long as they do not send us any reply we should presenting them with various written suggestions . I am entirely in agreement with you.
2. I, too, in the beginning was in a hurry to draw up a plan and hurry along the negotiations, that is why on the 14th of July I sent you some instructions, but since you never presented the American officials with them, and in the light of subsequent events, in order to finally evolve a comprehensive settlement, on September 4 I brought forth a proposal. I incorporated this proposal in my #595 [b] and did my best to harmonize it with the American proposal. There are no changes to be made in the substance of it and if the Americans so desire I think we might negotiate on the basis thereof.
3. My views on certain points which you mention in your message as follows. In case they question you please answer accordingly:
1. The reason why I left out the expression, "As there is no real objection we will make no northward invasion", in part 2 of your message is that if we were to insert this into the body of the text it might only give them the suspicion that we have direct designs against the Soviet. This whole matter, after all, concerns the China incident and the South Seas question. There is no particular problem in the north. In the preface to the clause concerning the stability of the Pacific area this matter is fully included so I am willing to leave it up to the leaders on both sides and if necessary to clarify this in the
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minutes. In my proposal of the 4th I made it plain that there was no objection to this statement.
Army 22870 Trans. 9/30/41 (S) [a] Not available. [b] See S. I. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.
From: Tokyo To: Washington September 30, 1941 Purple (CA) #614 (Part 2 of 3)
2. The first clause relating to the attitude of both Governments toward the European war is all right as it stands so far as I am concerned. Since we say "when the proper time comes" I am sure that this will cover their misgivings.
3. Concerning the second clause of the same article, as you say, they may have something more to say. We will merely wait for them to broach the subject and if necessary not be loathe to consider it again.
4. The part concerning the adjustment of the China incident.
a. We do not mean by the first clause that this is the joint responsibility of the Japanese and the American Governments. All along the United States has insisted that a settlement of the China trouble has a great bearing on the stability of the Pacific. That is why we went so far as to say that both Governments "will endeavor to bring about etc." We do not mean to discuss this in detail but if they oppose it as it stands we are ready to change it or leave it out.
b. We have been looking forward with expectancy from the beginning to American mediation and so we are not making any new requests such as you mentioned.
c. The insertion of the phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" is merely in accordance with the three principles laid down by KONOYE and there is no special meaning to it. Please explain this to them.
d. There is no objection to requesting that President ROOSEVELT mediate.
Army 22871 Trans. 9/30/41 (S)
From: Tokyo To: Washington September 30, 1941 Purple (CA) #614 (Part 3 of 3.)
e. When we come to the question of non-discrimination in economic activities in China, I want you to make it clear to them so that they will not entertain any misgivings that this principle should not apply merely between Japan and China but also to third countries. Advise them, furthermore, that the principle that neighbors naturally have intimate relations is practiced throughout the whole world and is by no means a new theory.
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5. The clause concerning commerce between the two countries in my #595 [a] coincides in meaning with the American proposal. Only in the meantime the freezing order has taken place and subsequent developments have modified the situation. We only hope that conditions will soon be ameliorated. Once they eliminate this order we will have no objection to their proposal on this subject.
6. a. Concerning the stipulations about the political stability of the Pacific, the stipulations in the American proposal are pet principles of Secretary HULL and the United States sets great store by them. They are merely general stipulations, therefore, we will not be loathe to reconsider them.
b. I transferred the matters concerning the military evacuation of French Indo-China and the settlement of the Chinese incident to the clause concerning the establishment of peace in the Pacific. This will make the clause more harmonious and expand its significance. That is all I meant by this action. If they don't like it, however, we will put it back like it was.
If the Americans present you with an aide memoire today, without any delay, wire it on to me. I am ready and eager to make a translation of it. If possible, before you send it, send me a brief summary.
Army 22872 Trans. 9/30/41 (S) [a] See S.I.S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.
From: Rome To: Tokyo September 30, 1941 Purple #627
Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the newspapers have been growing more critical in tone where we Japanese are concerned. Official comment, too, has been none too complimentary. As for Italy's attitude toward the recent celebration of the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian people. I mean to say:
1. The Propaganda Department told the press to confine itself to a mere mention of the present anniversary and to turn its attention mainly to other things, refraining from discussion of the bearing of this alliance upon the present international situation.
2. The ceremonies attendant upon this anniversary were carried out half-heartedly or even less by the Italians. It would even seem that this was done to spite Japan and Germany. At Villa Madama there was a reception held for CIANO, but certainly no festivities worth mentioning took place. At a reception held for the press, at first the German and Italian flags only were hanging in the hall. A Japanese reporter mentioned this, and then they pulled them all down.
3. When asked about felicitations and ceremonies, the Propaganda Department always replied that this was not a good time to be ostentatious.
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Furthermore, the other day PRUNAS told ANDO that word had been received from Ambassador INDELLI that when he inquired of the Japanese Foreign Office officials concerning the negotiations between Japan and the United States, they were very reserved and uncommunicative, showing that their erstwhile fervor for the Axis was not as glowing as in days gone by.
All this shows how dissatisfied the Italian people are. All I can say is that the exercises held in Tokyo on the and the Minister's speech, together with the messages from the Premier and Minister, saved the situation perhaps to some extent.
Army 22946. Trans. 10/2/41 (G)
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo September 30, 1941 Purple (CA) #881 Part 1 of 2 [a]
Last Monday after a long time I went to call on Admiral STARK. In the middle of our conversation Rear Admiral TURNER joined us. The Admiral said that after all the question of troops stationed in China would do most damage to the negotiations and that unless the China Incident is settled an understanding between Tokyo and Washington will be impossible. TURNER said that he doubted if we would agree to evacuate China, but if no agreement were reached in the preparatory talks any conversations between the leaders of the two countries might