EXHIBIT NO. 120


                                            PATROL WING TWO
                                        U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
                                 Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 19, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am
forwarding to you the following information:

1. Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of 7 
December, 1941:
Squadron  In commission   available  Location   Under  Ready   In air
                          for flight            Repair at base
VP-11     12 PBY-5            12     Kaneohe      0      12         0
VP-12     12 PBY-5            11     Kaneohe      1      11         0
VP-14     12 PBY-5        [1] 10     Kaneohe      2       7     [1] 3
VP-21     12 PBY-3        [2] 11     Midway       1       4     [2] 7
VP-21      1 PBY-3 (spare)     1     Pearl Harbor 1       0         0
VP-21      1 PBY-3            12     Pearl Harbor 2      12         0
VP-22     14 PBY-3            12     Pearl Harbor 1      11         0
VP-24      6 PBY-5             5     Pearl Harbor 1       1     [3] 4


Squadron  In commission   available  Under  Ready   In air
                          for flight Repair at base

At Kaneohe     36          [1] 33       3       30     [1] 3
At Pearl       33          [3] 28       5       24     [3] 4
At Midway      12          [2] 11       1        4     [2] 7 
   Total       81              72       9       58        14

[2]                               NOTES

[1] 3 planes armed with two depth charges each conducting search of 
assigned fleet operating areas in accordance with U. S. Pacific Fleet 
Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) (Task Force NINE Operating Plan (9—1). 3 
planes in condition 2 (30 minutes notice).

[2] 5 planes conducting search of sector 120 —170  radius 450 miles; 
departed Midway at 1820 GCT. 2 planes departed Midway at same time to 
rendezvous with U. S. S. LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles bearing 130  
from Midway to serve as escorts for Marine Scouting planes. Four planes 
additional plants armed with 2—500 pound bombs each were on the alert at 
Midway as a ready striking force. These four planes took off at about
2230 GCT upon receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor and 
searched sector 060  to 100  radius 400 miles. One plane was under 
repair in the hangar at Midway. A spare plane was under overhaul at 
Pearl Harbor.

[3] Four planes conducting inter-type tactics in area C-5 with U. S. 

[4] All planes except those under repair were armed with machine guns 
and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.

[3]  2. Material condition:

(a) Of the 81 available patrol planes 54 were new PBY-5's; 27 were PBY-
3's having over three years service. The PBY-5's were recently ferried 
to Hawaii, arriving on the following dates:

Squadron Number Arrival date   Squadron Number Arrival date
         Planes                         Planes
VP-11      12   28 Oct. 1941    VP-23     12    23 Nov. 1941
VP-24       6   28 Oct. 1941    VP-14     12    23 Nov. 1941.
VP-12      12    8 Nov. 1941

(b) The PBY-5 airplanes were experiencing the usual shake-down 
difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an almost complete 
absence of spare parts. In additions a program for installation of 
leakproof tanks, armor, and modified

Page 2722

engine nose sections was in progress. They were not fully ready for war 
until these installations were completed, nor were extensive continuous 
operations practicable until adequate spare parts were on hand.

(c) The 12 PBY-3 airplanes at Pearl Harbor (VP-22) had returned from
Midway on 5 December after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake 
since 17 October. This squadron was in relatively poor material 
condition because of its extended operations at advance bases with 
inadequate facilities for normal repair and upkeep. In addition 10 of 
its planes were [4] approaching 18 months service and were due for 

(d) It should be noted that the material situation of the patrol 
squadrons made the maintenance of continuous extensive daily searches 
impracticable. Under such conditions the PBY-5's were to be expected to 
experience numerous material failures which would place airplanes out of 
commission until spare parts arrived. The PBY-3's of Patrol Squadron 
TWENTY-TWO at Pearl were scheduled for a week of upkeep for repair and 

(e) Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive 
expansion training operations and improvement of the material military 
effectiveness at the same time preserving the maximum practicable 
availability of aircraft for an emergency. Under the existing material 
and spare parts situation, continuous and extensive patrol plane 
operations by the PBY-5's was certain to result in rapid automatic 
attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes immediately 
available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which 
there were no replacements.

(f) In this connection it should be noted that there were insufficient 
patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area effectively to do the Job required. 
For the commander of a search group to be able to state with  [5]  some 
assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and 
launch an attack without prior detection would require an effective 
daily search through 360  to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming 
a 16-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16 hour flight 
of 84 planes. A force of not less than 209 patrol planes, adequate spare 
parts and ample well trained personnel would be required for such 

                                             (Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER
                                             Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
                                             Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

                                   PATROL WING TWO
                                  U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
                               Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1 Jan. 1942.

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO
To: Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941.
Subject: Data Requested by Board.

1. In accordance with your request I am sending herewith six (6) copies 
of Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941.

2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as 

24 April, 1941,              20 August, 1941
12 May, 1941,                5 September, 1941
13 May, 1941,                27 September, 1941
19 June, 1941,               13 October, 1941
10 July, 1941,               27 October, 1941,
26 July, 1941,               12 November, 1941
1 August, 1941,
                                                      P. N. L. BELLINGER


                 REPORT OF ARMY-NAVY BOARD 31 OCTOBER 1941

[1] In compliance with radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, dated 2 October 1941 and a similar radiogram to the 
commandants 14th Naval District, a Joint Army-Navy Board was convened to 
prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating 
areas for all purposes

Page 2723

for the entire Hawaiian Area with particular recommendations on the 
jurisdiction of the Kahuku Point Area. The board met at 0900 October 7, 
1941 and frequently hereafter until final recommendations were 
submitted. Present were:

Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. A.
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N.
Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. A.
Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, U. S. N.

1. A general discussion was held concerning the various Army-Navy 
aviation activities, the available training areas, the present 
congestion of aircraft areas, the expected expansion of aircraft of both 
services in the near future with the attending operational difficulties 
which such expansion would produce.

2. In order that the board could intelligently approach the problem 
which confronted it, it was necessary to have such information as was 
available as to the total number of airplanes of both services for which 
operating facilities would be made available. The following lists show 
the number of airplanes which were considered.


14th Naval District Aircraft: 84 Patrol planes, 48 VSO seaplanes.
Fleet Aircraft: 750 airplanes (10 Aircraft Carrier Groups).
Cruiser and Battleship Seaplanes: 75 seaplanes (approximately),
Patrol Wings One and Two: 98 Patrol planes.
[2]  Marine Aircraft Groups: 162 airplanes
Utility Aircraft: 88 Airplanes (various types)
Total, 1305.


54 Group program:

                            Combat Airplanes

B-17 ............................................................ 170
A-20-A ..........................................................  27
P-40 ............................................................ 163
P-38 ............................................................ 163
C-47 ............................................................  20

Present Assignment:

                           Combat Airplanes

B-17 ............................................................  12
A-20-A .......................................................... 104
P-40 ............................................................  12
C-47 ............................................................  13

Obsolescent Airplanes

B-18 ............................................................  30
B-36 ............................................................  50
P-26 ............................................................  17

Total ........................................................... 781

Air Fields Available:

Army: Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field.
Navy: Ford Island, Ewa, Kaneohe.
Air Fields Proposed: Kahuku, John Rodgers, (Commercial), Barbers Point,
Keehi Lagoon (commercial—under construction).

[3]         Outlying Islands-Hawaiian Archipelago

Army: Barking Sands, Kauai, Burns Field, Kauai (Commercial—too small
for bombardment airplanes) Morse Field, Hawaii; Hilo, Hawaii (Municipal
Airport); Lanai (Under construction); Homestead Field, Mologai (Used 
jointly Army-Navy and commercial).

Page 2724

Navy: Maui (Navy and Commercial; Hilo (Temporary facilities patrol 

3. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Naval aviation 
was summed up by the Naval representatives as follows:

a. The Navy requires shore air bases for the use of carrier aircraft in 
order to maintain them in a proper state of training for war readiness. 
With the imminent increase in numbers of Army and Navy aircraft 
operating from Oahu, the congestion of air space for training and the 
shortage of suitable sites for ail bases on Oahu must be recognized as 
becoming serious problems. Lack of suitable harbor and dock facilities 
in islands of the Hawaiian group other than Oahu precludes the 
development of these islands as bases for carrier-based aircraft, since 
it is essential that carrier planes be readily accessible to their 
parent vessels. For this reason Oahu is the only logical island for the 
development of additional facilities for shore basing of carrier air 
groups. Carrier aircraft when based on shore, must, on account of the 
nature of their functions, be considered in a mobile state of readiness 
and not definitely fixed or attached to any shore base. Nevertheless, 
there must be provided on shore suitable and adequate facilities for the 
basing and operating of such aircraft just as definitely and 
specifically as if they were intended to be shore based permanently. It 
is estimated that approximately ten carrier air groups will be shore 
based in the Hawaiian Area at any one time. It is essential that shore 
bases be available for these air groups in order that a proper state of 
training may be maintained, These shore bases must necessarily be 
located on the island of Oahu where transportation facilities are 
available between bases and berths of parent vessels both for 
transferring personnel and equipment, and for reasons of readiness. In 
addition, in order to provide air space and fields for the conduct of 
daily training of these air groups, adequate aviation facilities must be 
available not only on Oahu but on other islands of the Hawaiian Group. 

b. The Navy has under lease approximately 70 acres of land on Kahuku 
Point. There is a landing strip and a dive bombing target on this area 
that is continually in use by shore-based carrier aircraft in connection 
with training operations. If this area is given over to the Army for 
construction of an air base, its loss will be strongly felt even now, 
when congestion on Oahu is but a portion of [4] that of the future, and 
adjustments must be made not only for loss of the existing landing strip 
and target area, but also for the reduction of the Navy air space 
involved. With the arrival of each additional carrier group in Oahu, 
further adjustments will be required to permit the necessary training to 

c. The principal joint task assigned to Army and Navy forces permanently 
based in the Hawaiian Islands is "to hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval 
base." The importance of Oahu in the Hawaiian Group is due entirely to 
the existence of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and its attending 
activities. The existence of Army Forces and Navy District Forces in 
great numbers in the Hawaiian Islands is solely for the purpose of 
maintaining the usefulness of Pearl Harbor as a base for the various 
units of the Fleet. The value of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the 
Fleet is in providing means for Fleet units to be maintained and 
continued in effecting operating readiness at a point well advanced to 
the westward. It therefore appears that any military or Naval air units 
on Oahu which unnecessarily interfere with the maintenance of proper 
readiness of Fleet units and which are not required on Oahu for the 
security of Oahu, but are required in the Hawaiian Area, should be based 
on other islands of the Hawaiian Group. 

d. It appears necessary, to develop to maximum practicable capacity all 
sites on Oahu considered suitable for air bases; to construct auxiliary 
fields where practicable; and, at the same time, to avoid creating an 
undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu that will 
defeat operating effectiveness. In planning the above developments, due 
consideration should be given to providing adequate dispersion. 

e. To provide for future requirements of Army and Navy air forces in the 
Hawaiian Islands, it appears necessary to develop all suitable air base 
sites on islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, to their 
maximum practicable capacities. In order to carry out estimated 
requirements, these developments should precede or at least proceed with 
any further developments on Oahu. This may not be entirely practicable 
of accomplishment, but every effort should be made to do so. A far-
sighted policy in which currently foreseen needs are subordinated to and 
coordinated with a general plan of ultimate development should be 
adopted now. Otherwise, inevitable future expansion will cause a more 
difficult problem to arise at a later date.

Page 2725

f. There is every desire of the Navy to cooperate with the Army to the 
fullest extent, but in the case under consideration there is 
insufficient space on the island of Oahu for the numbers of aircraft 
involved, even in current plans, to base thereon at the same time. As 
both services are basing their requirements on the part they are 
expected to play in national defense, it follows that final decision as 
to the action to be taken should be based on the effect of the various 
alternatives on over-all national defense. 

[5] 4. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Army aviation 
was summed up by the Army representatives as follows: 

1. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval 
Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the 
Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is: 

(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of 
action by bombardment aviation. 

(2) To detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of 
Oahu by pursuit aviation.

b. Due to the limited range of pursuit aviation and the uncertainty of 
ascertaining the direction of approach of enemy aircraft making an 
attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, it is mandatory that the air 
fields from which pursuit aviation operates, in the performance of this 
mission, be situated on the Island of Oahu. Under no other condition 
could there be assurance that enemy aircraft could be intercepted before 
they reached their bomb release line. The minimum requirements of 
pursuit aviation for its mission is two groups. The number of airplanes 
at present allocated to a pursuit group, which is 163, necessitates two 
air fields be available on this island. One of these groups is now 
permanently located at Wheeler Field where atmospheric conditions at 
times offer an obstacle to their continuous operation. To insure that at 
least one group of pursuit aviation may operate without being hampered 
by weather conditions, it should be located at approximately sea level 
elevation. The Kahuku Point area has been selected as having the 
necessary level ground and weather prevailing to satisfy these 
conditions. Furthermore, by having all Army pursuit aviation located at 
Wheeler Field and Kahuku Point, it makes it possible to carry out the 
pursuit mission and training therefor on the north side of Oahu, 
removing all pursuit aircraft from the air congestion which prevails 
over the Pearl Harbor area. The Kahuku Point area also lends itself to 
the establishment of grounds targets, in its immediate vicinity, which 
are so essential to proper progress in pursuit training. This still 
leaves one group at Wheeler Field without proper ground gunnery 
facilities which cannot be obtained on the Island of Oahu. The nearest 
point where these facilities can be made available is on the Island of 
Molokai where one gunnery range has been established. 

c. There is allocated to the Hawaiian Air Force 39 A-20-A airplanes 
which form the support command to assist the ground forces of the 
Hawaiian Department in their mission of defending the Pearl Harbor Naval 
Base. These airplanes must, of necessity, be closely associated with the 
ground troops which they serve, both for training and to facilitate 
their employment in time of war. The home for the support command is 
established at Bellows Field. 

[6] d. The bombardment command of the Hawaiian Air Force consists of 182 
heavy bombers. To relieve congestion, all of the training for heavy 
bombardment is conducted over water or land areas removed from the 
Island of Oahu. This number of heavy bombers over-taxes the capacity of 
Hickam Field, their home station, to such an extent that provisions must 
be made for the training of approximately one-half of this force from 
outlying fields on other islands of the Hawaiian Archipelago. 

e. To establish permanent stations for air organizations on other 
islands in this group entails changing the defense plans for these 
islands that security for these bases may be established. This would 
require a decided increase in the number of ground troops or such a 
dispersion of available forces as to destroy their effectiveness. This 
cannot be done except at enormous expense of time and money. For this 
reason the home base for bombardment aviation and the large quantities 
of bombs and other supplies necessary for continued operations must be 
placed under the protection of the ground defense installations on Oahu. 
Operations may be conducted from outlying fields in the Hawaiian group 
in the beginning of the attack but as the attack is pressed home these 
bombers will be forced to fall back upon their protected home bases. 
While the training of bombardment units is normally conducted in areas 
distant from the Pearl Harbor area, it would be practically impossible 
to control this force in 

Page 2726

time of actual hostilities if they were stationed on outlying islands. 
Radio is the sole means of communication and is too susceptible to 
interference to furnish a positive medium of control. A positive means 
of communication is a prime requisite for successful air operations. It 
must be in being and constantly used prior to the beginning of 
hostilities. Further, it must be pointed out that bombardment aviation 
must be protected by every available means of ground and anti-aircraft 
defense, i. e., pursuit aviation antiaircraft artillery and aircraft 
warning service. Duplication of these defenses on outlying islands is 
manifestly prohibitive. Therefore, as pursuit concentrations for the 
defense of Oahu must be located on Oahu, it is imperative that 
bombardment aviation must be based on Oahu under the protection of the 
Interceptor Command.

f. The 20 transports must of necessity operate from Hickam Field as that 
is the base at which technical supplies are concentrated for which the 
transports furnish transportation to outlying fields where training is 
being conducted. Supply and maintenance facilities also require the same 
protection from the ground and air as is required for grounded 
bombardment aviation.

g. In the case of actual war, the majority of the Fleet units, with 
their carriers attached, would be at sea, leaving ample air field 
facilities for such naval aviation as might be left behind and for all 
Army aviation participating in the defense of these islands. Therefore, 
the problem which confronts this board is to find a solution which will 
permit the maximum use of existing air fields for aviation training for 
both the Army and the Navy and to suggest such sites as might be 
developed to increase these facilities.

[7] h. A careful survey has been made of the entire Island of Oahu for 
sites on which landing fields can be constructed. On this island, with 
the exception of the Kipapa Gulch area, all level ground that might be 
available for air fields is either so occupied, projects are underway 
for preparation of air fields, or the turbulence in the air created by 
the close proximity of mountain ranges precludes such development. The 
site commonly referred to as the Kipapa Gulch area will accommodate two 
5,000-foot runways free from obstructions. The greatest handicap to the 
use of this area is that it is about two-thirds of the distance between 
Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field which would further increase the 
congestion of the air over this part of the island, It would also remove 
from cultivation a highly productive tract of land. The Kipapa Gulch 
area is the only site remaining where an air field could be constructed. 
The principal objection to the use of this site, which is congestion of 
the air over the Pearl Harbor area, is much less of a handicap should 
this site be used for the training of carrier groups than it would be as 
a station for Army pursuit aviation. The use of this site by the Navy 
would permit the concentration of carrier-group training for Naval 
aviation on the south side of the island of Oahu, at Barber's Point, 
Kipapa Gulch, and Ford Island. As the training from these stations would 
be entirely under Naval control it lends itself to aerial traffic 
regulations which would be difficult to attain if large numbers of 
airplanes of the two services were intermingled. The Kipapa Gulch area 
is advantageously located for occupancy of carrier-group aviation in 
that the site is readily accessible to the parent vessels of the carrier 
groups. It would permit facility in the transfer of personnel and 
supplies to and from the parent vessel in Pearl Harbor. It would be 
advantageous in making for ease of supervision of the training of all 
carrier-based Naval aviation.

i. The Army is cognizant of the fact that with the increase in carrier-
based aircraft contemplated for this area, serious problems arise as to 
sufficient air and ground space on Oahu. It is also cognizant of the 
fact that air units in Hawaii will, within the next few months, be 
reinforced with pursuit and bombardment aircraft for which bases must be 
available now, while the additional carriers anticipated for this area 
will not be available for an elapsed time of from one to three years.

j. That far-sighted and long-range planning must be done there can be no 
doubt. But, provisions for aircraft which may be available within three 
years should not be allowed to disrupt the plans, training and 
employment of the Army Air Force units in this area at a time when they 
may be required for immediate use against a hostile threat.

k. This problem can be solved by restricting the number of carrier 
groups to that which can be adequately accommodated on existing Navy 
facilities and those Navy projects which are now under development.

[8] 5. Conclusions:

That the board concludes that it has been presented with a problem for 
which a satisfactory solution to all concerned cannot be obtained due to 
the fact that-

Page 2727

a. The Army estimates its requirements from directives emanating from 
the War Department.

b. The Navy estimates its requirements from directives emanating from 
the Navy Department 

c. There is insufficient space on the Island of Oahu to provide for the 
estimated future requirements of both the Army and the Navy. 

6. Joint recommendations: 

a. That it be agreed that in order not to delay starting the development 
of an important strategical base, the board recommends: 

(1) That the Kahuku Point area be developed immediately by the Army as 
an air base.

(2) That as the Army representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base 
should be available for Army air units solely and the Navy 
representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base should be available 
for temporary use by the Navy when circumstances so require, the extent 
of availability of this base to the Navy as well as the extent of the 
availability to the Navy of all other Army air leases on the Island of 
Oahu, be left to the determination of higher authority as the solution 
of this problem transcends the prerogatives of this board. 

b. That progress be continued on the development of air bases on islands 
of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, which are now under 

c. That in order to reduce air congestion on Oahu, all existing and new 
sites of strategical importance on islands of the Hawaiian Group other 
than Oahu, suitable for air bases and auxiliary operating fields be 
expanded or developed to maximum practicable capacities and that such 
developments have the same high priority as any development proposed for 
the Island of Oahu. 

d. That all sites on the island of Oahu suitable for air bases and 
auxiliary operating fields be developed to maximum practicable 
capacities at the same time avoiding the creation of an undesirable 
degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu. 

e. That the existing revised Joint Army-Navy agreement relating to 
operating areas be placed in force—adjustments which may become 
necessary, from time to time, to be accomplished by conference between 
local representatives. 

                                        P. N. L. BELLINGER
                                           Rear Admiral, U. S. N., 
                                              Senior Naval Member.
                                        F. L. MARTIN,
                                           Major General, U. S. A,
                                              Senior Army Member. 

17 WAR
  WASHN, D. C., 210P  Oct. 2, 1941
   Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
One eight six second September twenty-three reurad Navy Department 
instructed Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in radio September 
twenty six to confer with you and submit recommendations covering 
allocation aircraft operating areas for all purposes for entire Hawaiian 
area stop This has War Department approval stop Navy stated further 
joint recommendations on Kahuku Point desired stop You are authorized to 
confer on this latter matter but will be guided by instructions to you 
in General Marshall's letter of August nineteen.

Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, Created: 12/13/96 Updated: 12/18/96