From: U.S. CONGRESS JOINT COMMITTEE ON PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, HEARINGS:
EXHIBITS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, Pt. 16, pp. 2721-27.
EXHIBIT NO. 120
 KIMMEL EXHIBIT 5 TO REPORT OF ACTION
PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 19, 1941.
Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am
forwarding to you the following information:
1. Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of 7
Squadron In commission available Location Under Ready In air
for flight Repair at base
VP-11 12 PBY-5 12 Kaneohe 0 12 0
VP-12 12 PBY-5 11 Kaneohe 1 11 0
VP-14 12 PBY-5  10 Kaneohe 2 7  3
VP-21 12 PBY-3  11 Midway 1 4  7
VP-21 1 PBY-3 (spare) 1 Pearl Harbor 1 0 0
VP-21 1 PBY-3 12 Pearl Harbor 2 12 0
VP-22 14 PBY-3 12 Pearl Harbor 1 11 0
VP-24 6 PBY-5 5 Pearl Harbor 1 1  4
Squadron In commission available Under Ready In air
for flight Repair at base
At Kaneohe 36  33 3 30  3
At Pearl 33  28 5 24  4
At Midway 12  11 1 4  7
Total 81 72 9 58 14
 3 planes armed with two depth charges each conducting search of
assigned fleet operating areas in accordance with U. S. Pacific Fleet
Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) (Task Force NINE Operating Plan (9—1). 3
planes in condition 2 (30 minutes notice).
 5 planes conducting search of sector 120 —170 radius 450 miles;
departed Midway at 1820 GCT. 2 planes departed Midway at same time to
rendezvous with U. S. S. LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles bearing 130
from Midway to serve as escorts for Marine Scouting planes. Four planes
additional plants armed with 2—500 pound bombs each were on the alert at
Midway as a ready striking force. These four planes took off at about
2230 GCT upon receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor and
searched sector 060 to 100 radius 400 miles. One plane was under
repair in the hangar at Midway. A spare plane was under overhaul at
 Four planes conducting inter-type tactics in area C-5 with U. S.
 All planes except those under repair were armed with machine guns
and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.
 2. Material condition:
(a) Of the 81 available patrol planes 54 were new PBY-5's; 27 were PBY-
3's having over three years service. The PBY-5's were recently ferried
to Hawaii, arriving on the following dates:
Squadron Number Arrival date Squadron Number Arrival date
VP-11 12 28 Oct. 1941 VP-23 12 23 Nov. 1941
VP-24 6 28 Oct. 1941 VP-14 12 23 Nov. 1941.
VP-12 12 8 Nov. 1941
(b) The PBY-5 airplanes were experiencing the usual shake-down
difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an almost complete
absence of spare parts. In additions a program for installation of
leakproof tanks, armor, and modified
engine nose sections was in progress. They were not fully ready for war
until these installations were completed, nor were extensive continuous
operations practicable until adequate spare parts were on hand.
(c) The 12 PBY-3 airplanes at Pearl Harbor (VP-22) had returned from
Midway on 5 December after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake
since 17 October. This squadron was in relatively poor material
condition because of its extended operations at advance bases with
inadequate facilities for normal repair and upkeep. In addition 10 of
its planes were  approaching 18 months service and were due for
(d) It should be noted that the material situation of the patrol
squadrons made the maintenance of continuous extensive daily searches
impracticable. Under such conditions the PBY-5's were to be expected to
experience numerous material failures which would place airplanes out of
commission until spare parts arrived. The PBY-3's of Patrol Squadron
TWENTY-TWO at Pearl were scheduled for a week of upkeep for repair and
(e) Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive
expansion training operations and improvement of the material military
effectiveness at the same time preserving the maximum practicable
availability of aircraft for an emergency. Under the existing material
and spare parts situation, continuous and extensive patrol plane
operations by the PBY-5's was certain to result in rapid automatic
attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes immediately
available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which
there were no replacements.
(f) In this connection it should be noted that there were insufficient
patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area effectively to do the Job required.
For the commander of a search group to be able to state with  some
assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and
launch an attack without prior detection would require an effective
daily search through 360 to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming
a 16-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16 hour flight
of 84 planes. A force of not less than 209 patrol planes, adequate spare
parts and ample well trained personnel would be required for such
(Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1 Jan. 1942.
From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO
To: Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941.
Subject: Data Requested by Board.
1. In accordance with your request I am sending herewith six (6) copies
of Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941.
2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as
24 April, 1941, 20 August, 1941
12 May, 1941, 5 September, 1941
13 May, 1941, 27 September, 1941
19 June, 1941, 13 October, 1941
10 July, 1941, 27 October, 1941,
26 July, 1941, 12 November, 1941
1 August, 1941,
P. N. L. BELLINGER
REPORT OF ARMY-NAVY BOARD 31 OCTOBER 1941
 In compliance with radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, dated 2 October 1941 and a similar radiogram to the
commandants 14th Naval District, a Joint Army-Navy Board was convened to
prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating
areas for all purposes
for the entire Hawaiian Area with particular recommendations on the
jurisdiction of the Kahuku Point Area. The board met at 0900 October 7,
1941 and frequently hereafter until final recommendations were
submitted. Present were:
Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. A.
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N.
Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. A.
Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, U. S. N.
1. A general discussion was held concerning the various Army-Navy
aviation activities, the available training areas, the present
congestion of aircraft areas, the expected expansion of aircraft of both
services in the near future with the attending operational difficulties
which such expansion would produce.
2. In order that the board could intelligently approach the problem
which confronted it, it was necessary to have such information as was
available as to the total number of airplanes of both services for which
operating facilities would be made available. The following lists show
the number of airplanes which were considered.
14th Naval District Aircraft: 84 Patrol planes, 48 VSO seaplanes.
Fleet Aircraft: 750 airplanes (10 Aircraft Carrier Groups).
Cruiser and Battleship Seaplanes: 75 seaplanes (approximately),
Patrol Wings One and Two: 98 Patrol planes.
 Marine Aircraft Groups: 162 airplanes
Utility Aircraft: 88 Airplanes (various types)
54 Group program:
B-17 ............................................................ 170
A-20-A .......................................................... 27
P-40 ............................................................ 163
P-38 ............................................................ 163
C-47 ............................................................ 20
B-17 ............................................................ 12
A-20-A .......................................................... 104
P-40 ............................................................ 12
C-47 ............................................................ 13
B-18 ............................................................ 30
B-36 ............................................................ 50
P-26 ............................................................ 17
Total ........................................................... 781
Air Fields Available:
Army: Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field.
Navy: Ford Island, Ewa, Kaneohe.
Air Fields Proposed: Kahuku, John Rodgers, (Commercial), Barbers Point,
Keehi Lagoon (commercial—under construction).
 Outlying Islands-Hawaiian Archipelago
Army: Barking Sands, Kauai, Burns Field, Kauai (Commercial—too small
for bombardment airplanes) Morse Field, Hawaii; Hilo, Hawaii (Municipal
Airport); Lanai (Under construction); Homestead Field, Mologai (Used
jointly Army-Navy and commercial).
Navy: Maui (Navy and Commercial; Hilo (Temporary facilities patrol
3. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Naval aviation
was summed up by the Naval representatives as follows:
a. The Navy requires shore air bases for the use of carrier aircraft in
order to maintain them in a proper state of training for war readiness.
With the imminent increase in numbers of Army and Navy aircraft
operating from Oahu, the congestion of air space for training and the
shortage of suitable sites for ail bases on Oahu must be recognized as
becoming serious problems. Lack of suitable harbor and dock facilities
in islands of the Hawaiian group other than Oahu precludes the
development of these islands as bases for carrier-based aircraft, since
it is essential that carrier planes be readily accessible to their
parent vessels. For this reason Oahu is the only logical island for the
development of additional facilities for shore basing of carrier air
groups. Carrier aircraft when based on shore, must, on account of the
nature of their functions, be considered in a mobile state of readiness
and not definitely fixed or attached to any shore base. Nevertheless,
there must be provided on shore suitable and adequate facilities for the
basing and operating of such aircraft just as definitely and
specifically as if they were intended to be shore based permanently. It
is estimated that approximately ten carrier air groups will be shore
based in the Hawaiian Area at any one time. It is essential that shore
bases be available for these air groups in order that a proper state of
training may be maintained, These shore bases must necessarily be
located on the island of Oahu where transportation facilities are
available between bases and berths of parent vessels both for
transferring personnel and equipment, and for reasons of readiness. In
addition, in order to provide air space and fields for the conduct of
daily training of these air groups, adequate aviation facilities must be
available not only on Oahu but on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.
b. The Navy has under lease approximately 70 acres of land on Kahuku
Point. There is a landing strip and a dive bombing target on this area
that is continually in use by shore-based carrier aircraft in connection
with training operations. If this area is given over to the Army for
construction of an air base, its loss will be strongly felt even now,
when congestion on Oahu is but a portion of  that of the future, and
adjustments must be made not only for loss of the existing landing strip
and target area, but also for the reduction of the Navy air space
involved. With the arrival of each additional carrier group in Oahu,
further adjustments will be required to permit the necessary training to
c. The principal joint task assigned to Army and Navy forces permanently
based in the Hawaiian Islands is "to hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval
base." The importance of Oahu in the Hawaiian Group is due entirely to
the existence of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and its attending
activities. The existence of Army Forces and Navy District Forces in
great numbers in the Hawaiian Islands is solely for the purpose of
maintaining the usefulness of Pearl Harbor as a base for the various
units of the Fleet. The value of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the
Fleet is in providing means for Fleet units to be maintained and
continued in effecting operating readiness at a point well advanced to
the westward. It therefore appears that any military or Naval air units
on Oahu which unnecessarily interfere with the maintenance of proper
readiness of Fleet units and which are not required on Oahu for the
security of Oahu, but are required in the Hawaiian Area, should be based
on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.
d. It appears necessary, to develop to maximum practicable capacity all
sites on Oahu considered suitable for air bases; to construct auxiliary
fields where practicable; and, at the same time, to avoid creating an
undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu that will
defeat operating effectiveness. In planning the above developments, due
consideration should be given to providing adequate dispersion.
e. To provide for future requirements of Army and Navy air forces in the
Hawaiian Islands, it appears necessary to develop all suitable air base
sites on islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, to their
maximum practicable capacities. In order to carry out estimated
requirements, these developments should precede or at least proceed with
any further developments on Oahu. This may not be entirely practicable
of accomplishment, but every effort should be made to do so. A far-
sighted policy in which currently foreseen needs are subordinated to and
coordinated with a general plan of ultimate development should be
adopted now. Otherwise, inevitable future expansion will cause a more
difficult problem to arise at a later date.
f. There is every desire of the Navy to cooperate with the Army to the
fullest extent, but in the case under consideration there is
insufficient space on the island of Oahu for the numbers of aircraft
involved, even in current plans, to base thereon at the same time. As
both services are basing their requirements on the part they are
expected to play in national defense, it follows that final decision as
to the action to be taken should be based on the effect of the various
alternatives on over-all national defense.
 4. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Army aviation
was summed up by the Army representatives as follows:
1. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval
Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the
Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is:
(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of
action by bombardment aviation.
(2) To detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of
Oahu by pursuit aviation.
b. Due to the limited range of pursuit aviation and the uncertainty of
ascertaining the direction of approach of enemy aircraft making an
attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, it is mandatory that the air
fields from which pursuit aviation operates, in the performance of this
mission, be situated on the Island of Oahu. Under no other condition
could there be assurance that enemy aircraft could be intercepted before
they reached their bomb release line. The minimum requirements of
pursuit aviation for its mission is two groups. The number of airplanes
at present allocated to a pursuit group, which is 163, necessitates two
air fields be available on this island. One of these groups is now
permanently located at Wheeler Field where atmospheric conditions at
times offer an obstacle to their continuous operation. To insure that at
least one group of pursuit aviation may operate without being hampered
by weather conditions, it should be located at approximately sea level
elevation. The Kahuku Point area has been selected as having the
necessary level ground and weather prevailing to satisfy these
conditions. Furthermore, by having all Army pursuit aviation located at
Wheeler Field and Kahuku Point, it makes it possible to carry out the
pursuit mission and training therefor on the north side of Oahu,
removing all pursuit aircraft from the air congestion which prevails
over the Pearl Harbor area. The Kahuku Point area also lends itself to
the establishment of grounds targets, in its immediate vicinity, which
are so essential to proper progress in pursuit training. This still
leaves one group at Wheeler Field without proper ground gunnery
facilities which cannot be obtained on the Island of Oahu. The nearest
point where these facilities can be made available is on the Island of
Molokai where one gunnery range has been established.
c. There is allocated to the Hawaiian Air Force 39 A-20-A airplanes
which form the support command to assist the ground forces of the
Hawaiian Department in their mission of defending the Pearl Harbor Naval
Base. These airplanes must, of necessity, be closely associated with the
ground troops which they serve, both for training and to facilitate
their employment in time of war. The home for the support command is
established at Bellows Field.
 d. The bombardment command of the Hawaiian Air Force consists of 182
heavy bombers. To relieve congestion, all of the training for heavy
bombardment is conducted over water or land areas removed from the
Island of Oahu. This number of heavy bombers over-taxes the capacity of
Hickam Field, their home station, to such an extent that provisions must
be made for the training of approximately one-half of this force from
outlying fields on other islands of the Hawaiian Archipelago.
e. To establish permanent stations for air organizations on other
islands in this group entails changing the defense plans for these
islands that security for these bases may be established. This would
require a decided increase in the number of ground troops or such a
dispersion of available forces as to destroy their effectiveness. This
cannot be done except at enormous expense of time and money. For this
reason the home base for bombardment aviation and the large quantities
of bombs and other supplies necessary for continued operations must be
placed under the protection of the ground defense installations on Oahu.
Operations may be conducted from outlying fields in the Hawaiian group
in the beginning of the attack but as the attack is pressed home these
bombers will be forced to fall back upon their protected home bases.
While the training of bombardment units is normally conducted in areas
distant from the Pearl Harbor area, it would be practically impossible
to control this force in
time of actual hostilities if they were stationed on outlying islands.
Radio is the sole means of communication and is too susceptible to
interference to furnish a positive medium of control. A positive means
of communication is a prime requisite for successful air operations. It
must be in being and constantly used prior to the beginning of
hostilities. Further, it must be pointed out that bombardment aviation
must be protected by every available means of ground and anti-aircraft
defense, i. e., pursuit aviation antiaircraft artillery and aircraft
warning service. Duplication of these defenses on outlying islands is
manifestly prohibitive. Therefore, as pursuit concentrations for the
defense of Oahu must be located on Oahu, it is imperative that
bombardment aviation must be based on Oahu under the protection of the
f. The 20 transports must of necessity operate from Hickam Field as that
is the base at which technical supplies are concentrated for which the
transports furnish transportation to outlying fields where training is
being conducted. Supply and maintenance facilities also require the same
protection from the ground and air as is required for grounded
g. In the case of actual war, the majority of the Fleet units, with
their carriers attached, would be at sea, leaving ample air field
facilities for such naval aviation as might be left behind and for all
Army aviation participating in the defense of these islands. Therefore,
the problem which confronts this board is to find a solution which will
permit the maximum use of existing air fields for aviation training for
both the Army and the Navy and to suggest such sites as might be
developed to increase these facilities.
 h. A careful survey has been made of the entire Island of Oahu for
sites on which landing fields can be constructed. On this island, with
the exception of the Kipapa Gulch area, all level ground that might be
available for air fields is either so occupied, projects are underway
for preparation of air fields, or the turbulence in the air created by
the close proximity of mountain ranges precludes such development. The
site commonly referred to as the Kipapa Gulch area will accommodate two
5,000-foot runways free from obstructions. The greatest handicap to the
use of this area is that it is about two-thirds of the distance between
Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field which would further increase the
congestion of the air over this part of the island, It would also remove
from cultivation a highly productive tract of land. The Kipapa Gulch
area is the only site remaining where an air field could be constructed.
The principal objection to the use of this site, which is congestion of
the air over the Pearl Harbor area, is much less of a handicap should
this site be used for the training of carrier groups than it would be as
a station for Army pursuit aviation. The use of this site by the Navy
would permit the concentration of carrier-group training for Naval
aviation on the south side of the island of Oahu, at Barber's Point,
Kipapa Gulch, and Ford Island. As the training from these stations would
be entirely under Naval control it lends itself to aerial traffic
regulations which would be difficult to attain if large numbers of
airplanes of the two services were intermingled. The Kipapa Gulch area
is advantageously located for occupancy of carrier-group aviation in
that the site is readily accessible to the parent vessels of the carrier
groups. It would permit facility in the transfer of personnel and
supplies to and from the parent vessel in Pearl Harbor. It would be
advantageous in making for ease of supervision of the training of all
carrier-based Naval aviation.
i. The Army is cognizant of the fact that with the increase in carrier-
based aircraft contemplated for this area, serious problems arise as to
sufficient air and ground space on Oahu. It is also cognizant of the
fact that air units in Hawaii will, within the next few months, be
reinforced with pursuit and bombardment aircraft for which bases must be
available now, while the additional carriers anticipated for this area
will not be available for an elapsed time of from one to three years.
j. That far-sighted and long-range planning must be done there can be no
doubt. But, provisions for aircraft which may be available within three
years should not be allowed to disrupt the plans, training and
employment of the Army Air Force units in this area at a time when they
may be required for immediate use against a hostile threat.
k. This problem can be solved by restricting the number of carrier
groups to that which can be adequately accommodated on existing Navy
facilities and those Navy projects which are now under development.
 5. Conclusions:
That the board concludes that it has been presented with a problem for
which a satisfactory solution to all concerned cannot be obtained due to
the fact that-
a. The Army estimates its requirements from directives emanating from
the War Department.
b. The Navy estimates its requirements from directives emanating from
the Navy Department
c. There is insufficient space on the Island of Oahu to provide for the
estimated future requirements of both the Army and the Navy.
6. Joint recommendations:
a. That it be agreed that in order not to delay starting the development
of an important strategical base, the board recommends:
(1) That the Kahuku Point area be developed immediately by the Army as
an air base.
(2) That as the Army representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base
should be available for Army air units solely and the Navy
representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base should be available
for temporary use by the Navy when circumstances so require, the extent
of availability of this base to the Navy as well as the extent of the
availability to the Navy of all other Army air leases on the Island of
Oahu, be left to the determination of higher authority as the solution
of this problem transcends the prerogatives of this board.
b. That progress be continued on the development of air bases on islands
of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, which are now under
c. That in order to reduce air congestion on Oahu, all existing and new
sites of strategical importance on islands of the Hawaiian Group other
than Oahu, suitable for air bases and auxiliary operating fields be
expanded or developed to maximum practicable capacities and that such
developments have the same high priority as any development proposed for
the Island of Oahu.
d. That all sites on the island of Oahu suitable for air bases and
auxiliary operating fields be developed to maximum practicable
capacities at the same time avoiding the creation of an undesirable
degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu.
e. That the existing revised Joint Army-Navy agreement relating to
operating areas be placed in force—adjustments which may become
necessary, from time to time, to be accomplished by conference between
P. N. L. BELLINGER
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,
Senior Naval Member.
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. A,
Senior Army Member.
WASHN, D. C., 210P Oct. 2, 1941
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
One eight six second September twenty-three reurad Navy Department
instructed Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in radio September
twenty six to confer with you and submit recommendations covering
allocation aircraft operating areas for all purposes for entire Hawaiian
area stop This has War Department approval stop Navy stated further
joint recommendations on Kahuku Point desired stop You are authorized to
confer on this latter matter but will be guided by instructions to you
in General Marshall's letter of August nineteen.
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