Page [1]
 1. Memorandum dated 17 May 1945 for Lieut. Commander John F.         
    Sonnett, U. S. N. R. regarding Evaluation of Messages of 
    November 26, 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        1
 2. Memorandum dated 19 May 1945 for Lieut. Commander John F. 
    Sonnett, U. S. N. R. regarding Evaluation of "UTU" Broad-
    casts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        7
 3. Memorandum dated 21 May 1945 for Lieut. Commander John F. 
    Sonnett, U. S. N. R. regarding Information concerning the 
    Japanese passenger ship TATUTA MARU and American passenger 
    ship PRESIDENT MADISON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       15
 4. Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the 
    State Department on Wednesday, 30 May 1945 . . . . . . . .       17
 5. Memorandum dated 22 June 1945 for Admiral Hewitt regarding 
    Pearl Harbor Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       19
 6. Memorandum dated 14 July 1945 of Conversations in connection 
    with Admiral Hewitt's Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
    Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       20 

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1] Secret

17 MAY 1945.

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R. 
Sub;: Evaluation of Messages of 26 November 1941.
   (a) Opnav-242239 (Nov. 1941).
   (b) Com 14-260110 (Nov. 1941).
   (c) Com 16-261331 (Nov. 1941).
   (d) Com 14 Communication Intelligence Bulletins (1 Nov. - Dec. 1941).
   (e) Station "H" Chronology (1 Dec-6 Dec. 1941).
   (f) Roberts Report (Senate Document 159) dated 23 Jan. 1942.
   (g) CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence" Vol 1, No. 22, 8 Dec. 1944-P. O. W.
       Account of Raid on Pearl Harbor.
   (h) Op-16-F2 Weekly Memorandum dated 1 Dec. 1941.
   (i) Jane's Fighting Ships-1941 edition.
   (A) Op-20-3 GL Memo dated 14 May 1945.
   (B) "Japanese Naval Vessels" (ONI-December 1942).

1. Reference (a) advised that Com 16 intercepts were considered most reliable and requested Com 16 to evaluate reports on Japanese naval movements and send despatch to Opnav, info Cincpac. Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's, not only because of better radio interception, but because Com 16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet Cryptographic System ("5-number code" or "JN25") and was exchanging technical information and translations with the British C. I. Unit at Singapore. McCollum knew this and gave it due consideration when he drafted reference (a).

2. Reference (b) summarized Japanese naval activities for the current month and advised that some large scale movement involving most if not all of the Japanese Navy was about to take place. The message itself was summarized in its last sentence, as follows:

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

This information was reliable, timely, and accurate on the whole. It must be realized, moreover, that this estimate was based entirely on "radio intelligence," the Com 14 C. I. Unit being unable to read anything except the Weather Ciphers and other minor systems of the Japanese Navy at that particular time. This fact was known in the Navy Department, and the Director of Naval Com­munications and the Director of Naval Intelligence were so informed by me.

[2] 3. The major project of the 14th District C. I. Unit in November 1941 was, attack on the Japanese Flag Officers Cryptographic System (Transposition Cipher superposed on a "4‑character code"‑think we called it "AD")‑in which they were being backed up by similar attack in the Navy Department. This system (its earlier editions) had been our main source of information on the Japanese Navy from 1926 or 1927 up until about November, 1940. It was the most difficult as well as most important system the Japanese Navy was using and our most skilled and most experienced officers and men were attempting its solution. If we could have solved the Flag Officers System, Admiral Kimmel


would probably have known of the Japanese plans and the Pacific Fleet would not have been surprised on December 7, 1941. Unfortunately, neither the U. S. Navy nor the British cryptanalysts ever succeeded in cracking this system. The "5‑numeral" system yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of the Pearl Harbor Raid, either before the attack or afterwards. The Japanese abandoned the "AD (?)" system in 1942 or 1943, apparently because of excessive delays and unreadable messages. As regards the "JN25" or "5‑numeral" sys­tem, the current code (JN25B) had been in effect since 1 December 1940, remained in effect until 27‑31 May, 1942, and was partially readable in November 1941. A new system of keys was introduced on 4 December 1941 and reported by Com 16‑041502, but the carry over of the old code made their solution quite simple, and we were reading messages again by Christmas, Corregidor getting the "initial break" on 8 December 1941. The Hawaiian C. I. Unit did not commence work on the Japanese Navy's "5‑number" system until 10 December 1941, at which date it discontinued attack on the "Flag Officers System." (The Navy Department continued its attack on the "Flag Officers System" as long as it remained in use.)

4. Reference (c) contained Com 16's evaluation of reference (b) plus ex­tensive observations and comments of his own, and in general agreed with Com­14's estimate. Com 16 had the benefit of his own translations plus "tips" from Singapore. Com 16 also had much better direction finder service as distances were much less, differences of longitude much less, and the bearings lines gen­erally cut at more favorable angles for reliable plotting. This advantage was lost with the capture of Guam a few days after the Pearl Harbor Raid.

5. The discrepancies between references (b) and (c) are mostly artificial, the only important difference being in the following sentences, which are quoted below:

Ref. (b), Com 14‑260110:

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air group in the Marshalls which comprise airron twenty four at least one carrier divi­sion unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

[3]        Ref. (c), Com 16‑261331:

"Second section (expected to operate in mandates) crudiv five X Cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru____."

"Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X. Our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo‑Kure area X____.

It is apparent that everyone has jumped to the conclusion that "carrier division unit" meant "carrier division," but such was not the case. Commander Williams used the term "unit" rather loosely: in this instance it was later identified, on November 30, 1941, as "a unit of plane guard destroyers" (i. e., two or more de­stroyers attached to CarDiv 5). Another source of confusion was in the loose use of the term "Mandates." To Com 14 it meant Jaluit, Marshalls, and Eastern Japanese Mandated Islands, but to Com 16 it meant Palao or Halmahera. The Japanese Mandated Islands stretched over an East‑West belt 2,100 miles long, so the distinction is important.

6. A study of reference (d) reveals the following:

(a) Call "SI TI 4" (previously identified as Cardiv 4) was located at Jaluit on November 19, but on November 21 was identified as a Submarine Squadron.

(b) The November 25th statement, "One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates," was retracted on November 27 by the statements:

"No further information of Carrier Division Five in Mandates."

"Carriers are still located in home waters."

(NOTE: According to reference (j) the Pearl Harbor Attack Force sailed from the Kurile Islands on 27 November 1941. )

(c) On November 30, the above discrepancies were reconciled by the statement:

"The presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed."

(d) Another interesting bit of information appeared on November 30:

"The only tactical circuit heard today was one with Akagi and several Marus."

[4]        (e) The December 2nd Summary comes clean:

"Almost a complete blank of information on carriers today. Lack of iden­tification has somewhat prompted this lack of information."

(f) The last specific mention of carriers was on December 3rd:

"No information on submarines or carriers."

(g) The record as to carriers is closed with the December 5th entry:

"No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

(b) The earlier estimate of submarine concentration in the Marshalls is re­affirmed on November 30 as follows:

"This unit cannot agree with Coin 16 that there is not a submarine con­centration in that area (the Marshalls). Every evidence points to a concen­tration of not only the small (RO‑class) Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force."

(Note: See enclosure (A) and reference (‑g).

7. In view of the foregoing, and after consideration of all other information available to me at this time, I evaluate Com 16's statement "All known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo‑Kure Area," to refer specifically to the fol­lowing carriers:

CarDiv 1

CarDiv 2

CarDiv 5

Kaga (F)

Soryu (F)






These carriers were in the vicinity of the Japanese main islands on. that date, and participated in the Pearl Harbor Raid on 7 December 1941.

CarDiv 3, Ryujo and (Kasuga) Maru, were stated by reference (c) as ear­marked for operations under CinC Second Fleet in the forthcoming offensive in Southeastern Asia and were not specifically located, although it was implied that they were at Palao. They did not represent an offensive threat against U. S. possessions other than Guam and the Philippines. Reference (h) and enclosure (A) list the Kasuga (Maru) ; reference (i) and enclosure (B) do not; she might have been the Shoho.

CarDiv 4 (Hosho and Zuiho), second line and escort carriers used for training pilots in flight deck operations, may have been assigned to the Fifth Fleet, or to the First Fleet (see enclosure (A) ), or directly under the CinC Combined Fleet. These ships did not represent an offensive threat against U. S. possessions at that time.

[5] The Koryu was listed in reference (h) as being in the Sasebo‑Kure Area. Reference (i) describes the Koryu as a sister ship of the Soryu and Hiryu. En­closure (B) and later information indicate the Koryu was nonexistent. She was undoubtedly confused with one of the four auxiliary carriers.

8 Reference (e), prepared by the Chief Radioman in Charge of Radio Heeia, supports and amplifies reference (d), but introduces one element of confusion. Extracts are quoted below.

1 December 1941

(Nothing of particular interest.)

2 December 1941


"CinC Second Fleet has shifted to Sasebo and is probably going to South China to        direct operations of units sent to this area from the Empire."

"No signs of movement of the Third Fleet or Carriers were given in today's traffic. It is believed that they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu. CarDiv 4 is believed to still be at Sasebo. CarDiv 3 has not shown any activity during the last few days, and it is possible that this unit has gone South."


3 December 1941

"It is believed that the Carriers are still based at or near Sasebo."

4 December 1941

"Very little activity was observed. in the Sasebo or Kure areas. The Carriers are believed to have remained in the vicinity of Kyushu."

"The large number of high precedence messages and general distribution might indicate that the entire Navy is being instructed to be prepared for drastic action."

5 December 1941

"No indication as to locations of the Carriers was noted in today's traffic, although it is believed they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu."

6 December 1941

"At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 kcs, dual with 12330 kcs for UTU broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 kcs (M) was imme­diately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast was in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcasted traffic on 6665 kcs (A) during the evening."

"Saipan, Takao and Ominato were also heard broadcasting traffic to units in their vicinities. The use of this method of delivering messages tends to keep unknown the positions of vessels afloat, and is probably one of the first steps toward placing the operation of the Navy on a wartime basis."

9. Reference (f) states on page 9:

"The Naval Intelligence Service in Hawaii, due to lack of information indi­cating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, concluded they were in home ports."

The Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer (Lt Comdr. E. T. Layton U S N) and the Hawaiian Communication Intelligence Officer (Comdr. J. J. Rochefort, U.S.N.) deny even making such a statement to the Roberts Commission. This information must have come from the District Intelligence Officer (Capt. I. H. Mayfield, U.S.N.) or one of the members of Admiral Kimmel's staff, who were completely outside of the picture as regards Communication Intelligence or locations and movements of Japanese Naval Forces. The statement can and some support in reference (e) but none in reference (d), which was the last word in this matter.

10. Reference (d) was examined by a member of the Roberts Commission—­but was not submitted as evidence. Reference (d) was not available to Admiral Hart because it was not submitted to him at Pearl Harbor and could not be located at the Navy Department. Reference (e) was not located until the day before I gave my "on‑the‑record" testimony to Admiral Hart. It did not quite fit the description of Com 14's Daily C. I. Summaries that Rochefort had told me about in the spring of 1943, but I figured my memory or his had been at fault. So reference (e) was submitted to the "Hart Investigation" to substantiate my testi­mony as well as refresh my memory. It is apparent that reference (e) has been the source of confusion and misleading evidence in the two earliest investigations of the Pearl Harbor Disaster.


Captain, U.S. Navy.



[7]        Secret

19 May 1945.

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R.
Sub: Evaluation of "UTU" Broadcasts.
(a) Corn 14‑Routine 052200 (Dec. 1941) .
(b) Com 14 Communication Intelligence Bulletins (1 Nov.‑6 Dec. 1941).
(c) Station "H" Chronology (1 Dec.‑6 Dec. 1941).
(d) CinCAF‑Priority 020345 (Dec. 1941).
(e) CinCAF‑Priority 020730 (Dec. 1941).
(f) CinCAF‑Routine 021636 (Dec. 1941).
(g) CinCAF‑Priority 061255 (Dec. 1941).
Encl: (A) Copies of references (d), (e), (f) and (g).

1. Reference (a) reported to Com. 16 and to Chief of Naval Operations:

"UTU's are being sent by HA FU 6 (Tokyo Radio) on 32 kilocycles instead of 39 kcs as before."

This message was sent with ROUTINE precedence was handled by the Navy Department Code Room, and was delivered to Op‑20‑G at 1943 GCT on 6 Decem­ber 1941 according to notation on the message.

2. Reference (a) is, to a large extent, evaluated by references (b) and (c), relevant portions of which are quoted below:

2 December 1941 (Ref. (b) )

"The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast, and also where Takao Radio received the same dis­patch that it previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao was broadcasting traffic to those fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several in­stances, Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it, is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao."


3 December 1.941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good."

"It is the impression that both Second and Third Fleets are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means."

3 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao, using call NUKU, was heard broadcasting traffic on 7155A kcs (night) and 14310A kcs (day). This broadcast was similar to the Tokyo UTU broad­cast. Traffic was broadcast to CinC's combined, Second and Third Fleets, Comdr. Combined Air Force, Comdr. Indo‑China Force and several unidentified afloat calls."

4 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio (in Formosa) today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation."

"It is now believed that CinC Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broad­cast which CinC Second Fleet is still copying."


4 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao continued to broadcast traffic on 7155A kcs (night) and 14310A kcs (day) to ships in that vicinity. A regular series of UTU numbers are being used by Takao and the broadcast is similar to Tokyo's. Takao uses the call NUKU, and calls RIKU (All ships in my vicinity?)."

5 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo‑Mandates circuit is duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. Ominat Radio working Sawa and Bako sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleets while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast several days old WHICH INDICATES THE UNCERTAINTY OF DELIVERY EXISTING IN THE RADIO ORGANIZATION."

[9] "Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther South since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic."

5 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao continues the use of the UTU broadcast on 7155 kcs to units in that area. From all indications, CinC's Second and Third Fleets are in the Takao area or have moved even farther South from Takao."

"Saipan, Ominato and Takao were, heard broadcasting traffic to vessels in their vicinity. Tokyo broadcasted traffic on 12330 kcs in addition to his regular UTU broadcast. At 0430/6th Tokyo was observed using 32 kcs for an UTU broadcast. This frequency was used dual with 12330 kcs. Signals were very strong during the day. The use of this low frequency indicates traffic sent on this broadcast is for ships at a great distance from Tokyo."

6 December 1941 (Ref: (b))

"Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level, but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are: Tokyo (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), Saipan, Ominato, and Takao."

"Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the Takao and Tokyo broadcasts."

"Fifth Fleet appears dispersed about the Japan Sea with Ominato broadcasting traffic for this unit."

6 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao continues to broadcast traffic for ships in that vicinity on 7155 kcs (A) (night) and on 14310 kcs (A) (day)."

"At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 kcs, dual with 12330 kcs, for UTU broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 kcs (M) was im­mediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast was used in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcast traffic on 6665 kcs (A) during the evening"

[10] 3. It was a matter of official record in Op‑20‑G, and common knowl­edge among our intercept operators, that the Naval Radio Station Tokyo had, on several occasions during the period 1936‑1941, keyed other transmitters for test or during Grand Maneuvers of the Combined Fleet. The transmitters that are specifically remembered are:

Haranomachi (250 miles north of Tokyo) (Commercial)

19.6 kcs

400 kw


Fukuoka (near Sasebo) (Commercial)

32 kcs

100 kw


Kure (Navy)

57 kcs

50 kw


Yokosuka (Navy)

63 kcs

50 kw




By way of comparison, corresponding characteristics are listed for the trans­mitter used for regular Tokyo UTU broadcasts:

Tokyo (Navy)

39 kcs

100 kw


It was also a matter of general knowledge and official record that Tokyo Radio normally operated at reduced power but did not hesitate to go to full power when anything important occurred. Broadcasts on 19.6 kcs from Haranomachi (JAA), the most powerful station in Japan, would have implied submerged re­ception by submarines or transmission to a far‑distant surface force.

4. References (d), (e), (f) and (g) report actual sighting of the Japanese Naval Forces referred to in paragraph 2 above. Reference (g), reporting the Japanese Amphibious Force which landed at Iota Bharu a day or two later, was deciphered in the Navy Department Code Room at 1557 GCT on 6 December 1941. This was approximately two hours before reference (a) was received by Op‑20-g. In view of the actual sighting of the Japanese Invasion Force heading for the Kra Peninsula, reference (a) came as an anticlimax.


Captain, U. S. Navy.


Enclosure (A)

For Action: OPNAV PP
Date: Dec 2, 1941
Information: CINCPAC PP
Decoded by: Laresen
Paraphrased by: Purdy
020345. CR0759

Patrol plane sighted 9 submarines speed lit course south at 0230 GMT LAT 13‑10 north long 110 degrees.

Shown DOO 0900
Shown OPDO 0850
Shown 38W 0850

Dist: 38W Action
20 OP
Record Copies
Navaide           JRB


For Action: OPNAV PPPP
Date: 2 Dec 1941
Information: CINCPAC PPPP
Tor Code Room 1048
Decoded by: Weinstock
Paraphrased by: Purdy
020730            CR0778

Bear 070 from Saigon distant 180 M miles 3 type I‑61 submarines in cruising formation headed south 15 knots. 21 transports anchored Camranah Bay with six planes patrolling overhead.

38W Action.
Record Copy:
Shown OPDO by W. Bell 021120
GBM : No action copy requested
NavAide JRB H

[13] Todays reconnaissance no results of significance other than as pre­viously reported X the nine submarines were line abreast five mile spacing X ships in Camranh are mostly large several probably cargo only X our planes having been sighted on Indo China coast three successive days have discontinued search that locality for the present XX action addees are C X M and cinc csina via numeral cypher XX goodnight.


Record copy
20 Op



Refer: 021636
Tox : 2017
Indicator: GUPID
Date: Dec. 2 1940

Exact Translation NAVCOM‑14


[14] Cinc China reports quote two five ship convoy with escort six cruisers and ten destroyers lat eight north one zero six east at zero three one six Greenwich today X convoy ten ships with two cruisers and ten destroyers seven dash forty north one zero six dash twenty east two hours later X all on course west X three additional ships seven dash five one north one zero five east at zero four four two course three ten X this indicates all forces will make for Kohtron repeat Kohtron unquote X my scouting force sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser anchored Camranh Bay.

Priority Secret

Refer: 061255 CR 0151
Tox : 1557
Indicator: CETYH
Date: 6 Dec 41

Exact Translation



21 MAY 1945.

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett U. S. N. R.

Subj : Information concerning the Japanese passenger ship TATUTA MARU and American passenger ship PRESIDENT MADISON.


(a) CinCAF 010300 (Dec. 1941).
(b) OpNav 071722 (Dec. 1941) .
(c) "Where Away" (1944) by Perry & Leighton.
(d) AmCon Batavia, #263 dated Dec. 31, 1941.
(e) AmCon Singapore #391 dated Dec. 29. 1941.
(f) Minister Vichy #1191 dated Aug. 14, 1942.

1. Reference (a) requested authority for CinCAF to use the PRESIDENT MADISON for evacuation of American Marines plus about 615 American Nationals in North China area, and advised that the MADISON could arrive at Chingwangtao (seaport for Peiping) on 10 December 1941.

2. Reference (b) advised CinCAF six days later that the State Department was informing the Japanese Government of the MADISON'S movements and request­ing that she be allowed to proceed "freely and without hindrance" in return for similar arrangements "made for TATUTA MARU now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate Japanese Citizens." It is apparent from the tone of reference (b) that war in Eastern Asia is anticipated but that this war does not include the United States. Reference (b) was prepared by the Central Division of Naval Operations (Op‑13) and the records of that Division may contain additional information on this subject.

3. Reference (c) states on pages 39‑48 that the USS MARBLEHEAD joined the PRESIDENT MADISON on 9 December 1941 in Balikpapan (Borneo) and escorted her to Surabaja (Java). It mentions the "frightened passengers" on the MADISON.  References (d) and (e) report the departure of the MADISON (with evacuees) for Colombo on 29 December 1941.

4. Reference (f) is the State Department's only readily available reference to the TATUTA MARU. It reports that the TATUTA MARU will be used as an "exchange ship" for civilian internees. However, it is believed that additional information could be located in the files of the State Department, of Op‑13, and of Op‑20‑G.

5. An interesting story appeared in reference (c) on page 28, as follows:

"Back in the States it was still December 6th. A minute or two after three that morning a plain‑language message came over the radio. * * * By 3:15 the general alarm began hammering the MARBLEHEAD's people into wakefulness. * * *  Over the loudspeaker system were coming the


relentless words: 'Man your battle stations.' When all stations had been manned, an announcement was made over the public address system 'We have just received an official plain‑language message which says. "The Japanese have commenced hostilities. Act accordingly." ' "

Captain, U. S. Navy.

NOTE: The Memorandum bear the following handwritten notes:

"The authors were a bit ambiguous at this point."

"Dick Lern, Navigator of the MARBLEHEAD says this was just after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Monday Dec. 8th, Tarapan Time. A check with the book shows that 'still Dec. 6th referred to the quiet evening' the day before 0300/ 8th (Tarapan Time)=2100/7th GCT=1030/7th (Pearl Harbor Time)"

"This could have been based on CincPac 071542 or NSS 071930 ([illegible] 142) .



[Handwritten note:] Note: Not given to Adm. Hewitt or Lt. Cdr. Sonnett. Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the State Department on Wednesday, 30 May 1945.

1. Mr. Walter Foote was the American Consul General at Batavia, Java, from 1927 until the capture of Java by the Japanese in 1942, except for a short tour of duty in Australia. At the present time he is attached to the State Department and is standing‑by to return to Java as diplomatic representative of the United States Government. Mr. Foote knew all the NEI officials intimately and was taken into their confidence in all official matters in their relations with Japan. Mr. Foote may be reached on Branch 420 at the State Department, in care of Miss Jane Wilson.

2. Mr. Foote got his information about the Winds "Set‑Up" message from "Tony" Lovink, Advisor to the Governor General for East Asiatic Affairs. Mr. Lovink is now Netherlands Ambassador at Chungking, being one of the few high Dutch officials to escape from Java. Mr. Lovink was head of the NEI Intelligence Service and was well informed as to Japanese plans and inten­tions. As early as July, 1941, Mr. Lovink Informed the Governor General that Japan was planning the conquest of East Asia and the only thing in doubt was just when the Japanese would commence their advance. Mr. Lovink said the Winds "Set‑Up" was the first tangible thing that he had to show his Govern­ment to prove his predictions. As he expressed it, "It was the first thing I could sink my teeth into." Mr. Lovink kept warning the NEI Government as to the Japanese plans and preparations for war, and was regarded as an alarmist. Subsequent events proved him 100% correct throughout.

3. Mr. Lovink informed Mr. Foote of the Winds "Set‑Up", and Mr. Foote sent Batavia confidential message #220, dated 4 December 1941, addressed to the State Department, after thinking the matter over for about two hours. This message was largely at Mr. Lovink's behest. Lieut. Colonel Thorpe, USA, and Lieut. Commander Slawson, USNR, got, their translations of the Winds "Set-­Up" directly from the NEI War Department at Bandoeng. (Lt. Comdr. Slawson was killed in action off the coast of New Guinea.) (Lt. Col. Thorpe is believed to be still alive.)

4. The Dutch listened for the Winds "Execute" message but did not hear it. Mr. Foote is positive that he would have been notified if any Winds "Execute" had been heard in Java. The Dutch were convinced that Japan was going to make war on them on December 6, 1941, when the big convoy of 35 transports (Mr. Foote's recollection), guarded by about six cruisers and several destroyers, was sighted heading straight for Kota Bharu (Malaya). The Dutch did not think that Japan was going to attack the United States and Pearl Harbor came as a complete surprise to them.

5. Vice Admiral Helfrich, NEI Commander in Chief, ordered his subs to sea on December 6, possibly earlier, and stationed them to defend the Netherlands East Indies. Submarines had orders not to commence hostilities [18] without positive orders. When the news of the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor reached Java, the Governor immediately broadcast the following message to all NEI armed forces:

"We are now at war with Japan which has just attacked Pearl Harbor,"

or words to that effect. The Dutch Navy commenced hostilities immediately after this broadcast but took no hostile action before. (Vice Admiral Hel‑


frich attended the San Francisco Conference in 1945 as one of the Dutch dele gates.) The story that NEI Fleet put to sea on December 6, 1941, with orders to sink anything flying the Japanese flag seems to be a somewhat garbled version of what actually happened.

6. The NEI Intelligence were very alert. They had all the leading Japanese under constant surveillance throughout November and December, 1941, and had most of them under arrest within fifteen minutes of the time the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor was broadcast by the Governor General. Mr. Foote personally saw one whole block of Japanese run down the street in their under­clothes in the custody of NEI policemen.

7. Mr. Foote lived next door to the Japanese Consul General and saw his arrest a few minutes after the previously‑mentioned incident. Mr. Foote saw the Japanese Consul General burn his codes and secret papers in his back yard a day or so before Pearl Harbor. He could see servants bringing papers from the consulate and could see the smoke flame up each time a new batch was thrown on. (Mr. Foote was burning his own secret papers at the same time in his own back yard.)

8. When Mr. Foote came to Washington about a year ago, prior to going to duty at Curacao, NWI, he looked up all his telegrams and reports on file in the State Department to refresh his memory. Mr. Foote recalled the #220 as soon as he saw it. He stated that there was no record in the State Depart­ment of any further reference to the Winds Message or anything in the nature of a war warning, and that he did not recall ever having sent one. He is thoroughly convinced that the Dutch did not hear the Winds "Execute" message but that they would have believed it if they had heard it. Mr. Foote was one of the very last white men to leave Java. He escaped on a small steamer from a small port down the coast with nothing but the clothes on his back. He received the warning to get out from Captain J, M. Creighton, U. S. Navy, who escaped through some other route, believed by plane.

9. "Tony" Lovink was thoroughly convinced that the Winds "Execute" message would contain the Japanese Government's decision as to peace or war with Russia, the United States, and England (including NEI), respectively, and impressed this fact on Mr. Foote.

10. The above memorandum is prepared from notes made at the time and is a reasonably accurate summary of Mr. Foote's statements.

22 JUNE 1945.



Memorandum for Admiral Hewitt.
Subj : Pearl Harbor Investigation.
Ref : (a) My Testimony given this date.

1. I now recall that Lieut. Commander Brotherhood told me that he did not receive a written copy of the "False" Winds Message from the F. C. C., but merely received the information by telephone. The only written version of the "False" Winds Message we ever had prior to 1944 was a memorandum of the phone call in Brotherhood's handwriting. Only one significant word (North) appeared and it was in English. It was this memorandum that Kramer threw in the burn bag after telling Brotherhood that this was not what we were looking for.

2. The Winds "Execute" Message which passed through my hands on the morn­ing of 4 December 1941 was a teletype copy (typed on yellow teletype paper) of the entire Japanese broadcast about 200 or 300 words long. Three significant words (Kits, Higashi, and Nishi) appeared and they were in Japanese. Kramer's translation appeared in pencil, or colored crayon, at the bottom of the sheet. There was very little chance of confusion.

3. I would like to make one correction in the testimony I gave today:

"Mr. Phillip Cate, Japanese translator, employed by the Navy Department is still alive. It was his brother, employed as a Japanese translator by the War Department, who died a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor."


Captain., U. S. Navy.





14 JULY 1945.


1. This memorandum is prepared, while events are still fresh in my mind, for possible use in connection with future Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Disaster or Court‑martials in connection with Pearl Harbor. It includes certain acts which strike me as irregular or unusual and probably illegal.

2. On or about Friday, 11 May 1945, I was called to an unofficial conference (or meeting) conducted by Lieut. Comdr. John Sonnett, USNR, in Room 1083A, Navy Building. He was in civilian clothes, as he has been on every occasion on which I have seen him. Sonnett told me that he had been assigned as a legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt in an investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor Disaster, that he was also a special representative for Secretary Forrestal in this investigation, and that he was authorized to handle Top‑Secret and Secret information and documents. He showed me papers signed by Secretary Forrestal and Fleet Admiral King verifying these statements. At my request, he let me read the Precept which directed Admiral Hewitt to conduct the investigation. It was my understanding that Admiral Hewitt had not yet returned to Washington and that Sonnett was getting things lined up to expedite matters after the Admiral's arrival.

3. I answered many questions pertaining to my testimony before previous Inves­tigations and discussed discrepancies between my testimony and the testimony of other witnesses. Sonnett requested that I give him, by the end of the next week, written memoranda to be used as a basis of study and examination (under oath) on the subjects listed below. This was done, and the memoranda submitted as follows:



Date submitted


"Winds Message" (6 pages)

15 May 1945

Withdrawn on 18 May 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Cdr. Sonnett. Original retained for pos­sible future use.

Evaluation of Messages of 28 November 1941 (6 pages).

17 May 1945

Also lists the 6 carriers described by Com 18 as "all known First and Second Fleet Carriers."

Evaluation of "UTU" Broadcasts (8 pages)

19 May 1945

No action was taken because Jap invasion fleet had been sighted by RAF planes off Kota Bharu.

Tatuta Maru and the President Madison (1 page).

 21 May 1945

Indicates that on 7 Dec. 1941 the CNO refused to believe that the U. S. would be involved in the war that was imminent in East Asia.

[21] On Sonnett's request, I prepared and furnished him copies of certain U. S. Naval messages, the Station "H". Chronology for 1‑6 Dec. 1941, and Com 14 Daily CI Summaries for 1 Nov.‑6 Dec. 1941.

4. It was apparent to me on my very first meeting with Lieut. Comdr. Sonnett that he was acting as a "counsel for the defense" for the late Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to the investigating officer. His purpose seemed to be to refute testimony (before earlier investigations) that was unfavorable to anyone in Washington, to beguile "hostile witnesses into changing their stories, and to introduce an element of doubt where he could not effect a reversal of testimony. Above all, he attempted to make me reverse my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and to make me believe I was suffering from hallucinations.

5. I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May 1945, and the third time a day or two later. On these latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to per­suade me that there had been no "Winds Execute" Message, that my memory had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the "False Winds Message" with what I had been expecting, and that I ought to change my testimony to permit reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair. In some cases the idea was stated outright, in some cases it was implied, and in other cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view.



6. I distinctly recall Lieut. Comdr. John Sonnett, .USNR, making the following statements to me during the course of the above‑mentioned conferences:

"You are the only one who seems to have ever seen the `Winds Execute' Message."

"How could the `Winds Execute' be heard on the East Coast of the U. S. and not at any of the places nearer Japan?"

"It is very doubtful that there ever was a `Winds Execute' Message."

"It is no reflection on your veracity to change your testimony."

"It is no reflection on your mentality to have your memory play you tricks ­after such a long period."

"Numerous witnesses that you have named have denied all knowledge of a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"You do not have to carry the torch for Admiral Kimmel."



7. I testified before Admiral Hewitt the first time on or about 24 May 1945, before he went to Pearl Harbor. I testified before Admiral Hewitt a second time on 22 June 1945, after his return from examining witnesses at Pearl Harbor. Upon completion of my testimony (in which the "Winds Execute" Message had figured), I asked him, "off‑the‑record," if there was still any doubts in his mind as to the "Winds Message" having been sent by Japan and disseminated in the War and Navy Departments. The Admiral looked startled, and before he could reply Sonnett said:

"Of course, I am not conducting the case and I do not know what Admiral Hewitt has decided, but to me it is very doubtful that the so‑called 'Winds Execute' Message was ever sent."

Admiral Hewitt thought a minute or two more and then said:

"You are not entitled to my opinion, but I will answer your question. There is no evidence of a `Winds Execute' Message beyond your unsupported testimony. I do not doubt your sincerity, but I believe that you have confused one of the other messages containing the name of a wind with the message you were expect­ing to receive."

8. For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity, but I do believe that Sonnett has succeeded in pulling the wool over his eyes.

9. I also believe that Sonnett employed similar tactics on other witnesses whose testimony had favored Admiral Kimmel, particularly Rochefort and Kramer.

10. Copies of the memoranda described in paragraph 3 are appended hereto. Also appended is a memorandum to Admiral Hewitt, dated 22 June 1945, clarifying my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and indicating that Sonnett had attempted to trick me into stating the opposite of what I intended to say.

/s/ L. F. Safford,

/t/ L. F. SAFFORD,

Captain, U. S. N.


[Following Memorandum bears this handwritten note:]

18 May 1945.

Delivered to Lt. Cdr. Sonnett by Lt. Cdr. Linn about 1000 on 15 May 1945.

Withdrawn on May 18, 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Cdr. Sonnett.

Retained for possible use at the Next (?) investigation of Pearl Harbor.





14 MAY 1945.

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett? U. S. N. R.
Subj : Winds Message.

1. To the best of my knowledge and belief the following officers knew, in December 1941, that the Winds "Execute" message had been broadcast from Tokyo on (or about) 4 December 1941 (and prior to 7 December 1941) , although some of them did not learn about it until after the attack on Pearl Harbor:



Present rank

Station and duty on 7 December 1941

George C. Marshall

General of the Army

Chief of Staff. U. S. Army.

Leonard T. Gerow

Lt. Gen. U. S. A

Director, War Plans Division.

Dawson Olmstead

Maj. Gen. U. S. A. (Ret.).

Chief Signal Officer.

Sherman Miles

Maj. Gen. U. S. A

Director of Military Intelligence. War Plans (Handwritten note) Military intelligence Division (WDGS) [1] (Corrected after return. LFS).

Clayton Bissell

Maj. Gen. U. S. A

[Not in text. LWJ]

Otis K. Sadtler

Col. U. S. A.

Army Communications, Office of Chief Signal Officer.

Rufus S. Bratton

Brig. Gen., U. S. A

In charge, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelli­gence.

Rex W. Minckler

Col., U. S. A.

Chief of Signal Intelligence Service, Office of Chief Signal Officer.

Harold Doud

Col., U. S. A.

In charge, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.




Robert E. Schukraft

Col., U. S. A.

In charge, Intercept Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.

Frank B. Rowlett

Lt. Col. (Signal Corps Reserve), U. S. Army.

Principal Cryptanalyst Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.




H. R. Stark

Admiral, U. S. Navy

Chief of Naval Operations.

R. E. Ingersoll

Admiral, U. S. Navy

Asst., Chief of Naval Operations.

R. K. Turner

Vice Adm., U. S. N.

Director, War Plans Division.

T. S. Wilkinson

Vice Adm., U. S. N.

Director of Naval Intelligence.

Leigh Noyes

Rear Adm., U. S. N.

Director of Naval Communications.

J. R. Beardall

Rear Adm., U. S. N.

Naval Aide to the President.

J. R. Redman

Rear Adm., U. S. N.

Asst. Director of Naval Communications.

F. E. Beatty

Rear Adm., U. S. N.

Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.

L. F. Safford

Capt., U. S. N.

Op‑20‑G. In charge, Security Section, Naval Communications.

A. H. McCollum

Capt., U. S. N.

Op‑16‑F2. In charge, Far Eastern Sect., Naval Intelligence.

G. W. Welker

Capt., U. S. N,

Op‑20‑GX. In charge, Intercept and Direction Finding Section.




A. D. Kramer

Capt., U. S. N.

Op‑20‑GZ. In charge, Translation and Dissem­ination section. (Actually attached to Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.)

L. W. Parke

Comdr., U. S. N.

Op‑20‑GY. In charge Cryptanalytical Section.

A. A. Murray

Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.

Watch Officer in Op‑20‑GY.

H. L. Bryant

Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. N.

Confidential Yeoman in Op‑20‑GZ.

[1] [Handwritten note:] Corrected after return. LFS.

[26] 2. An element of confusion was caused by the Tokyo Weather Fore­cast or "False" Winds Message intercepted by the F. C. C. at 2200 GCT, 4 December 1941, and phoned to Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood during the evening of 4 December 1941. It is believed that certain officers attached to Op‑20-G in December 1941 had in mind the "False" Winds Message when they informed me that they knew of the "Winds Message." Their names are as follows:

Lt. Comdr. G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.
Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R.
Lt. Comdr. A. V. Pering, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. F. L. Freeman, U. S. N.
Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N.

The F. C. C. interception of another Winds Execute Message between 0002 and 0035 (GCT), 8 December 1941, proves that the Japanese Government did use this system for broadcasting war warnings.


3. There never has been any doubt in my mind that the Winds "Execute" Message was broadcast from Tokyo two or three days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and forwarded to the Navy Department. The points in doubt, which I sought to clarify by sighting the incoming Japanese message (or its translation), were:

(a) Exact date [i.e. December 4 (Thursday) or December 5 (Friday) 1941].
(b) Exact wording of the original Japanese broadcast.
(c) Station call, time and frequency of the Japanese Radio Station which broadcast it. (This would reconcile "skip" phenomena.)
(d) Whether received in voice or Morse code.
(e) Station which intercepted the message.

4. After receiving the Winds "Execute" Message I discussed with Lt. Comdr. Welker (Op‑20‑GX) the advisability of discontinuing the special intercept watches being maintained to pick up the Winds "Execute." However, only two days previously we had translated Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD #6985) dated 27 November 1941—setting up a system for sending out "Hidden Word Messages" (INGO DENPO) in event of strained relations. Although we expected these would come over regular commercial circuits (as proved the case on the morning of 7 December 1941), we could not be sure, and it seemed advisable to continue the existing set‑up which covered all possibilities (even though it meant the operators continuing their doubled‑up watches), and required no further orders and no possibility of misunderstanding and confusion. It is my impression that Welker discussed the matter with Capt. Schukraft, and the Army made a similar decision. I have not discussed this with Welker since September 1942 and I have no idea how well he remembers this incident.

[27] 5. Somebody must have notified the War Department about the Winds "Execute" Message because Colonel Bratton telephoned to Admiral Noyes and requested a copy of the original Japanese broadcast so that he could verify the translation. (This was customary in highly important intercepts.) Admiral Noyes Got quite indignant and told Colonel Bratton that the Navy's translation was correct and that the War Department would not be furnished a copy of the original message. The foregoing incident, if verified by Colonel Bratton will prove that the Winds "Execute" got as far as Rear Admiral Noyes and G‑2.

6. There is one possible source of information on the Winds Message which has not been checked, namely—the Australian C. I. Organization. The Australi­ans had a small C. I. Organization and in December 1941 they were intercepting Japanese Diplomatic radio traffic and reading messages in the J‑l9 system. (The Dutch in Java were also reading J‑19, as well as the British in Singapore and London and the U. S. Army and Navy in Corregidor and Washington.) The Australian C. I. Unit had liaison with the Singapore, C. I. Unit, including ex­change of translations and keys, except for the Purple and Red machines. The Winds "Set‑up" message (Tokyo Circulars #2353 (JD #6875) and #2354 (JD #6850), dated 19 November 1941) were in J‑19. Singapore sent translations to Corregidor (CinCAF 281430 (COPEK) to OpNav) and undoubtedly sent these same translations to Australia. The Australians may have intercepted the Winds "Execute" Message on 4 December 1941. If so, this was the basis of Senator Ferguson's "Australian War Warning" which received much publicity in Decem­ber 1943. This hypothesis could be easily proved or disproved. The following secret message to the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne, is suggested:


"From: SECNAV.

"Referring CINCAF twentyeight fourteen thirty November nineteen fortyone and Tokyo circulars twentythree fiftythree and twentythree flftyfour dated nineteen November same year in jig nineteen did Australians intercept or know of such a warning broadcast from Tokyo on or about four December nineteen fortyone X If affirmative forward by airmail certified. Transcript of broadcast as received with notation as to date X time X frequency X voice or Morse X call letters of transmitting station X location of intercepting station and other relevant data."

[Handwritten note:. Australia knew of the Winds "execute" but did not inter­cept this message locally.
[NOTE: This message was never sent. LFS]


[28] 7. Lieut. Colonel Rowlett heard of the Winds "Execute" by office gossip a day or two before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A few days after the attack Colonel Sadtler came to him and said, "I would like to see the Winds Message," or words to that, effect. Rowlett referred him to MaJor Doud, in charge of the section, who in turn referred him to Colonel Minckler, the Chief of S. I. S. The rest of the story belongs to the Army Investigation rather than the Navy Investigation except for the fact that it furnishes further proof of the authenticity of the Winds "Execute" Message and that some written record of it did exist in the War Department in December 1941.

8. A complete exposition of Radio Wave Propagation would be very lengthy and out of place. It is sufficient to say that the radio frequencies used between Japan and the United States were quite erratic in performance, and that long distance radio communications in an East‑West direction are more difficult and less reliable than those in a North‑South direction. A few pertinent examples can be given namely:

(a) The long fourteen (14) part Tokyo Serial #902 (JD‑1 #7143) was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. Part Two (of Tokyo Serial #902) and Tokyo Serial .#904 (JD‑1 #'7144) were also copied at Cheltenham, Maryland, and forwarded to the Navy Department and used for the actual decryption. (This is verified in the GY Log for 6 December 1941.) The rest of Tokyo Serial #902 was "uncopyable" at Cheltenham.

(b) Part Two of she very important three‑part Tokyo to Berlin #985 (JD‑1 #6943) was missed but the first and third parts were copied solid.

(c) We finally had to call on Corregidor to cover the Berlin‑Tokyo circuits as the combined efforts of Intercept Stations in the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than fifty (50) percent coverage. During the period 1 December‑7 December 1941, the Navy Department received seventy (70) Japanese Diplomatic intercepts from Corregidor as compared with Seventy‑three (73) from Bainbridge Island, Twenty (20) for all other U. S. Navy Stations, and ninety‑three (93) for all U. S. Army Stations. The Japanese were trying to reach Rio and Buenos Aires as well as San Francisco, Medico City, and Washington. (See distribution of Tokyo Serial #2354.) It is not at all sur­prising that the frequency used to reach Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires skipped over the West Coast and Hawaii. There is a possibility that this frequency was heard in Australia even though it skipped over Manila, Singapore, and Java.

9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the Winds "Execute" Message may exist‑the Record of Proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the Winds "Execute" did not slip into the record. First they said I didn't know what was going on around me; now they claim I am suffering from hallucina­tions. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity, as well as my Intelligence and my veracity.

[Handwritten note:] See testimony of Col. Fielder and Col. Bicknell—Dec. 24, 1941.

[29] 10. In conclusion the following quotation from my secret memoran­dum to Colonel West, dated 2 October 1944, is submitted for consideration:

"The reason for my stressing the 'Winds Message' so much in my testimony (in all three cases) is because we could afford to talk about it, even print it in the newspaper, without detriment to the war effort. Even the Dutch know of the Code and the FCC listened for the message. We had the same information—at the same time—from more secret but less dramatic sources. Also the `Winds set‑up' was the nearest thing to a warning CINCPAC ever got. If the `Winds Execute' had been heard at Pearl Harbor, the fleet would not have been sur­prised. And because CINCPAC was given no information that the `Winds Exe­cute' had been sent, everybody at Pearl Harbor believed it had not been sent and that the Japs were still making up their minds as to the next step."

/s/ L. F. Safford,
L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. S. Navy.


[ 30 ]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
Circular .#2354

When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "Higashi"
(2) Japan Russia relations "Kita"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) "Nishi"

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.

[Handwritten note] J‑19 Key for this message passed td Washington (Navy Dept) by London (Admiralty) on Nov. 24, 1941.

JD‑1:8850 Secret Navy Trans. 11‑26‑41. S(TT)Intercepted Nov. 19, 1941.


Dated December 4, 1941
Rec'd 9:19 a. m.

220, December 4, 10 a. m.

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: One east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers."

Same re Following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:

"When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita north Russia, three Nishi west British with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies."

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.





From: Alusna Batavia
Date: 5 Dec. 1941
Decoded by: Kalaidjian
Paraphrased by: Purdy
031030            CR0222

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code Intercept: Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States: north wind cloudy Russia: west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.


War Dept. Action
Files: CNO
Record Copy: 20G


[33 ]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan‑U. S. relations in danger:

(2) Japan‑U. S. S. R. relations:

(3) Japan‑British relations:

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

[Handwritten note:] J‑19 Key for this message passed to Washington (Navy Dept) by London (Admiralty) on Nov. 24, 1941.

JD‑1: 6875 (Y) Navy Trans 11‑28‑ 11 S (TT) Intercepted Nov 19, 1941.


For Action: OPNAV
Date: 28 NOVEMBER 1941
Decoded by: P R White


[Handwritten:] COPEK.


Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X if diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no kaze kumori XX England X Nishi no kase hare X unquote X British and comsixteen monitoring above broadcasts.