TOP‑SECRET
NARRATIVE
STATEMENT OF RECORD OF NAVAL PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY
[The
digest of testimony from the Hart Inquiry will be found set forth in bold face
type at the pertinent point. The digest of testimony from the Hewitt
inquiry will be found similarly indicated in italic type]
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET AND PACIFIC FLEET
At
the time of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN
(page 273). Admiral Kimmel's predecessor was Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN. He
had occupied that post from January 1940, when he had relieved Admiral Bloch,
until February 1, 1941 (page 1053).
B.
BASING OF FLEET AT HAWAII
According
to Admiral Richardson, in May 1940, while the Fleet was in Hawaii as part of
the Fleet exercises, he received directions to announce to the press that
"at his request" the Fleet would stay in Hawaii to carry out further
exercises. He did not think that Hawaii was a proper base for the Fleet and so
advised the Chief of Naval Operations (page 1057). The reason for basing the
Fleet at Hawaii, as he understood it, was so that it would act as a restraining
influence on the Japanese (page 1058). (See also Exhibits 26 and 27.)
Admiral
Stark testified that the Fleet, which was normally based on the Pacific Coast,
was kept at Pearl Harbor in 1941 as a deterrent to Japan, and for training for
its task, which included the security of the Fleet when at anchor; Admiral
Richardson had advised basing the Fleet on the Pacific Coast and did not agree
that the Fleet should be based at Pearl Harbor (pages 21, 22, 91). The
President he said, made the decision as to the base of the Fleet (page 91). The
ships, however, were allocated or based, prior to December 7, 1941, in
accordance with Admiral Stark's views and recommendations (page 189).
Admiral
Turner said that CincPac recommended several times that the Fleet be returned
to the West Coast; Admiral Stark discussed this with the President, but made no
recommendation to the President, who would not approve the change (page 1020).
Admiral Turner said that the matter of withdrawing the Fleet
from Pearl Harbor lead been discussed a number of times and each time the
decision was reached to leave the Fleet there (p. 261).
It
appears that there were some differences of opinion on the part of various
other Naval witnesses as to the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl
Harbor. Admiral McMorris, for example, said that he personally felt that Hawaii
was a proper base for the Pacific Fleet (page 896).
Admiral McMorris said that he had always held the view that
he would have based the Fleet at Pearl Harbor rather than on the Pacific coast,
although, he said, there was considerable difference of opinion about that (p.
248).
Admiral Pye said that
he had expressed the opinion that it was unwise to base the battleships there
(page 439).
Concerning
the basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said that there were
several reactions, first, that it might incite Japan and second, that it was a
poor time to make such a move because we were not prepared
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INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to
move to the westward in time of war due to poor logistics support. There was,
however, one great advantage which was that the expenditure of money on the
ships for repair and overhaul in Pearl Harbor permitted expansion of the Navy
Yard at a greater rate (p. 151).
And Admiral DeLany
testified that he personally saw no reason for keeping the Fleet at Pearl
Harbor (page 496).
Admiral DeLany thought that it was inconsistent to place the
Fleet at Pearl Harbor with the idea of having it as a threat to Japan and at
the same time being advised whenever they asked for material that the war was
in the Atlantic and also to get units of the Pacific Fleet moved to the
Atlantic. He thought that Admiral Kimmel discussed this very thing during his
trip to Washington in the summer of 1941. He thought that there was some effect
on morale because of the indecisiveness about whether the Fleet was going to
stay at Pearl Harbor or be returned to the West Coast but there was no effect
on the material condition of the Fleet. The fact that the Fleet was based there
resulted in the development of a number of wartime practices which were
beneficial to the Fleet when war came (p. 82).
Admiral Smith
testified that during 1940 the Fleet was told to remain at Pearl Harbor and
everyone thought this meant a probability of war in the Pacific, but he knew of
no military reason for keeping the Fleet there. In his opinion neither the
development of the Navy Yard nor fleet logistics was a sufficient reason for
keeping the Fleet at Pearl Harbor (page 528). The objections in 1940 were: (1)
no protected anchorage, (2) no air cover, (3) single channel entrance to Pearl
Harbor.
Admiral Smith said that the lack of premonition as to a
carrier raid was not due to administrative difficulties facing the Fleet which
resulted from the fact that the Fleet had been based at Pearl Harbor for a long
time (p. 64).
Admiral Smith said that the fact that the Fleet was based at
Pearl Harbor rather than on the mainland did not affect the materiel conditions
or readiness of the Fleet for war; he said that Admiral Kimmel often discussed
the question of the conditions of the Fleet and that they felt that it was
better out there than when it had been based on San Pedro; he said there might
have been a question in the minds of some of the officers as to why the Fleet
was being kept out there; a great many felt that the Administration was keeping
them out there unnecessarily since there was no danger of war in the Pacific;
the movement of a part of the Fleet undoubtedly had some effect upon the minds
of the personnel of the Fleet (p. 39).
Admiral Smith said that to his absolute knowledge, Admiral
Kimmel never made a recommendation during 1941 that the Fleet should be returned
to the California coast either by letter or dispatch. Admiral Smith never heard
him say that the Fleet should return to the coast although Admiral Kimmel knew
that his predecessor had recommended it. Admiral Smith said that if Admiral
Kimmel ever made any such recommendation it might have been in July 1941 when
he made a trip to Washington accompanied only by Captain McMorris, but that Admiral
Smith thought he would have heard about it (p. 40).
Admiral Smith said that the transfer of certain units to the
Atlantic affected the mental attitude of some officers in that the danger of
immediate outbreak of war might have been more evident to them if the units had
not been transferred (p. 40).
Admiral Smith said that in his opinion the general
warmindedness of the personnel of the Fleet was improved by its retention in
Hawaii (p. 40).
Captain Murphy indicated that previously he had been War
Plans Officer for Admiral Richardson; that at that time he had advocated basing
the Fleet on the Pacific coast instead of Pearl Harbor.
Captain Glover's view was that the Fleet was kept in
Hawaiian waters for the purpose of assisting in the protection of the United
States east of the 180th Meridian and also to be in a position from which
raiding operations could be projected (p. 176).
Admiral Halsey said that he thought that the closer the
Fleet was to the Japanese, the better off they were and therefore, he thought
that Manila was the first best base, then Pearl Harbor the second. (p. 295)
It
may be noted that according to Mr. Grew no official representations were made
to him by Japan with respect to the United States keeping the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor (page 1065).
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HEWITT INQUIRY 367
Admiral Schuirmann said that so far as he knew, there was no
open disagreement between the State and Navy Departments as to the disposition
of the Fleet. He said that the State Department generally favored the retention
in the Pacific of the greater portion of the United States Fleet (p. 407).
Admiral Ingersoll said that he recalled during the winter
1940‑1941 that the question was raised about continuing to base the Fleet
at Hawaii and that it was considered that that was the most advantageous point
and that the Fleet should be kept there. He recalled no discussion of the
particular point of the Fleet's security at Hawaii in that connection and
recalled no protest by Admiral Kimmel and no pressure by the State Department
to keep the Fleet there (p. 418).
C.
AIR PATROL FROM HAWAII IN 1940
Admiral
Bloch testified that in June, 1940, General Herron, then Commanding General of
the Hawaiian Department, came to Admiral Bloch and stated that he had received
a dispatch from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to the effect that he must be
on the alert against a raid from the west by a hostile nation (page 1139).
Bloch told him that he had no patrol planes for the purpose and suggested that
they go to the Senior Officer Present, who was Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews,
then Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment. They did so and Admiral Andrews
instituted a dawn‑to‑dusk patrol, informing the Commander‑in‑Chief,
Admiral Richardson, who was then at sea. Admiral Richardson flew in to discuss
the matter, and finally sent a dispatch to the Navy Department, asking for
information about the situation, to Which the Navy Department never replied.
Admiral Bloch did not recall for how long they continued that reconnaissance.
To the best of Admiral Bloch's recollection, the long distance reconnaissance
established by Admiral Andrews in 1940 was for three days and then was
discontinued by Admiral Richardson (page 1149).
Admiral Bloch said: "Sometime in the summer of 1940,
the date I cannot recall, General Herron, the Commanding General, came to my
office and stated that he had just received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff
of the Army to the effect that an overseas raid was impending and that he was
to go on the full alert at once. He told me that he had received this dispatch,
that it was a bolt from the blue, that he knew nothing about it, but he had
gone on the alert and came down to see me and wanted to know if I had received
a similar dispatch. I told him, no; I knew nothing about it. He then said that
he was very much disturbed about this, he didn't know the nature of the raid,
didn't know when it was going to be, what it was about, but he wanted my
advice. And I said, 'Well, I'm not the senior officer present in the Fleet.
While I am an officer of the Fleet, there is a superior officer here, Vice
Admiral Andrews, and I think you had better show him the dispatch.' We went
aboard the Flagship and told Admiral Andrews about this, and after conference,
it was decided by Admiral Andrews that we would have morning and dusk
reconnaissance patrols, and patrols were then ordered to be sent out. The
Commander‑in‑Chief was Admiral Richardson, but he was not present.
Admiral Andrews sent him a dispatch telling him of the condition. Admiral Richardson
flew in and as he had never heard of the warning he sent a dispatch to the
Chief of Operations and it was my recollection that he never received a reply
to it. Now this alert continued for some two or three weeks. When the Army had
this alert, had been warned of an overseas raid, they were not told it was an
exercise or drill, they were told it was an overseas raid that was expected.
The Navy was in a position of knowing nothing about it. I think, subsequently,
the Commander‑in‑Chief got information about it here in Washington,
but so far as I know, we got nothing there." (p. 13‑4)
Admiral
Richardson said that in June, 1940, be received a warning from the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department to the effect that there was a possibility
of war, and as a result of this he increased the air patrols which he had
established. He reported, be said, this warning to the Navy Department and
asked for information, but received no reply (page 1056). He asked the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether this was a real warning,
but was informed that the Commanding General had no idea, and be acted as
though it were such a warning It appears that in personal letters he had also
received warnings of the possibility of war which, he said, were not definite
or clear cut (page 1055). In view of these warnings, and his belief that when
war came it would come as a surprise, which was based op 20 years' study of the
368 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese, he felt that
he had to maintain as adequate a patrol as he could with the available means
(pages 1053, 1060).
The
air patrol directed by Admiral Richardson during 1940 was a patrol of
particular sectors which was daily rotated. As Admiral Richardson recalled it,
this patrol covered 170° to 350° to a distance of 300 miles. A dawn and dusk
patrol was also established. He regarded the Southwest sector as the sector
from which an attack most probably would come (pages 1053, 1055).
Admiral
Richardson did not recall the number of patrol planes which were available to
him. He stated that toward the end of his command it was planned to restrict
the air patrol to adequate searches of operating areas, and that it was Admiral
Kimmel's intention to continue this same patrol in effect when he assumed
command (pages 1055, 1053).
Admiral
Bellinger's recollection was that under special conditions and orders there had
been a dawn patrol of 6 to 12 planes flying to 300 miles (page 682). This
patrol was discontinued after the time that Admiral Kimmel took command as
CincPac. It had covered a constantly changing sector (page 683).
D.
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION; LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK AND THE STATUS OF DEFENSES PRIOR TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S
COMMAND
Shortly
before Admiral Kimmel assumed command, as appears from a dispatch of January
21, 1941 (Exhibit 76) from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincUS. and others,
it was thought that the international situation was continuing to deteriorate
and that the Pacific Fleet should be in a waiting attitude or execute the tasks
assigned to it in the area eastward of 160°, depending on the action which
might be taken by the Japanese.
At
this time Admiral Bloch, as ComFOURTEEN, complained of inadequate local defense
forces and pointed out that he had no planes for distant reconnaissance and
that for such reconnaissance requisition would have to be made on the forces
afloat. This was set forth in a letter of December 30, 1940, by Admiral Bloch.
According to Admiral Bloch, in the fall of 1940, he became
convinced that the Army's defenses against aircraft attack were insufficient.
He discussed this matter with the then Commander‑in‑Chief, Admiral
Richardson. As a result of that conversation, Admiral Richardson asked the then
Commanding General, General Herron, to go around with him and to interview
first hand the officers and find out what equipment the Army had. At the
conclusion of this tour around the Army posts, Admiral Richardson gave Admiral
Bloch a memorandum informing him of the numbers of aircraft, guns and planes
which were at Oahu. As the result of this information and of his conversation
with Admiral Richardson, Admiral Bloch wrote a letter to the Navy Department
concerning the inadequacy of the defenses. This letter was forwarded with a
strong endorsement by Admiral Richardson. (The letter is Exhibit 23.) That
correspondence was the basis of the letter written by the Secretary of the Navy
to the Secretary of War dated January 4, 1941 (p 3). (That letter and the reply
of the Secretary of the Navy constitute Exhibit 40.)
Admiral Richardson's
endorsement on this letter (January 7, 1941, Exhibit 28) stated that the Army's
equipment was inadequate to meet a surprise attack; that the defense of Fleet
units in Pearl Harbor would have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet
in Pearl Harbor; that plans for cooperation with local defense forces were
being made; that constant readiness of fighter squadrons was not contemplated;
that there did not appear to be any practical way of placing torpedo baffles or
nets within the harbor; and considering this and the improbability of such an
attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of the enemy being able to
advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of fleet operations,
it was not regarded as necessary to lay such nets. This endorsement urgently
recommended that local defense forces be provided ComFOURTEEN.
On
January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of War
(Exhibit 9) and discussed in some detail the security of the Fleet at Pearl
Harbor and the adequacy of the local defense forces. The Secretary of the
Navy's letter stated that the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl
Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, had been reexamined because of the
increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and because of
reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships
while in bases. The letter stated:
"If
war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at
Pearl a
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 369
Harbor * * *. The
dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probabilities are considered
to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4)
submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."
The
letter continued that defense against all but the first two of the dangers
appeared to have been provided for satisfactorily. As to an air bombing attack
or an air torpedo plane attack, it was stated that both types were possible and
might be carried out successfully simultaneously or in combination with any of
the other possible operations. Attacks, it was said, would be launched from a
striking force of carriers and other supporting vessels. The counter‑measures
to be considered were the location and engagement of enemy carriers before the
attack could be launched: the location and engagement of enemy aircraft before
they reached their objectives; the repulse of enemy aircraft by anti‑aircraft
fire, the concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; and the
protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. The letter pointed out
that the location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels
before an air attack could be launched were largely functions of the fleet, but
quite possibly might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated
without warning and prior to a declaration of war; and, then discussed the
status of the Army's preparations, such as pursuit aircraft, anti‑aircraft
information service, and anti‑aircraft batteries.
Various
proposals were made in this letter, including proposals that the Army assign
the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft, anti‑aircraft
artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii, and that
local joint plans be drawn for effective coordination of naval and military
aircraft operations and ship and shore anti‑aircraft gunfire, against
surprise aircraft raids; that the Army and Navy forces agree on appropriate
degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise
aircraft raids on Pearl Harbor; and, that joint exercises designed to prepare
Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids be
held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continued to
exist*
E.
JOINT ESTIMATE OF RICHARDSON AND KIMMEL AS TO SITUATION AND DEFENSES
The
views of both Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel, at that time, were set forth
in a letter which they prepared and sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on
January 25, 1941 (Exhibit 70). This stated that if Japan entered the war or
committed an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our
attitude in the Pacific would be primarily defensive. Certain assumptions were
then outlined, upon which the action of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated.
These included:
(a)
United States is at war with Germany and Italy,
(b)
War with Japan is imminent,
(c)
Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to
attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines,
under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.
(f)
Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying positions or naval
units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are
possible.
Their
letter continued, that the tasks to be undertaken by the Fleet in connection
with such assumptions included the taking of full security measures for the
protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port. The letter pointed out that the
Fleet was handicapped by deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and
stated that, among other things, it would be necessary to expand patrol plane
search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing
One; that it would be necessary to establish an inner air patrol; to arrange
for alertness of a striking force of planes; and to augment Army anti‑aircraft
defenses with batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor; also that it would be
necessary to assist in local defenses of the Fourteenth Naval District, which
task would require the increase of district forces by the assignment of Fleet
units until suitable vessels would become available to the Commandant. Various
other measures were discussed, including those to be taken if Japan entered the
war, among which was reconnaissance of the Marshalls.
The
letter then discussed in some detail the existing deficiencies in the defenses
of Oahu among which were the inadequacy of anti‑aircraft guns, the small
number and condition of land‑based aircraft, necessitating constant
readiness of striking
* The Secretary of
War's reply to this will be found at page 402.
370 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
groups of Fleet planes
and the use of Fleet planes for local patrols, the lack of patrol vessels for
ComFOURTEEN, and the lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. It stated that
it was considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct
the critical deficiencies.
Admiral Smith said that about a week before Admiral Kimmel
assumed command, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, and
Admiral Smith were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in a conference with Commander
McCrea, who was returning from a mission to CincAF. At that time, Comdr. McCrea
furnished Admiral Hart's estimate of each one of the Japanese naval leaders,
which was the best estimate that had ever been received; this included information
concerning the Japanese Admiral Yamamoto to the effect that he was efficient
and bold, a poker player, and dangerous; Comdr. McCrea's information was copied
down and put in the secret file (p. 45‑46).
F.
THE GREW REPORT OF RUMORED JAPANESE ATTACK AND ONI EVALUATION
On
the day when Admiral Kimmel assumed command, Naval Intelligence wrote to him
concerning the rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (See letter of February
1, 1941, Exhibit 67) The letter referred to the report from Ambassador Grew, based
on information from the Peruvian Minister, that in the event that trouble broke
out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese would make a surprise
attack against Pearl Harbor. This information the Peruvian Minister had
transmitted, although he considered it fantastic. The letter of Naval
Intelligence stated that no credence was placed in these rumors and that based
on known data regarding the disposition and employment of Japanese forces, no
move against Pearl Harbor appeared imminent or planned for in the foreseeable
future.
Admiral Schuirmann said that a low evaluation had been given
to Ambassador Grew's report (referring to page 113 "PEACE AND WAR")
that in case of trouble the Japanese planned a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.
He recalled no discussion of that report with the State Department. He said
that he did not think that a particularly high evaluation had been placed upon
that information by the Ambassador or his staff and could not explain the
prominence given to this report in "PEACE AND WAR" (p. 411).
Ambassador
Grew said that the information of Japanese intention to open war by a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor that he transmitted to the State Department on January
27, 1941, was a rumor from reliable sources (the Peruvian Minister (page 1066).
This was only such report of this rumor (page 1062). He also said that in
making his later reports during 1941, including a report of November 3rd, he
advised that the Japanese might strike with dramatic suddenness.
Admiral
Turner said that he usually attended the State Department conferences. He never
heard of Ambassador Grew's statement that Hawaii might be attacked suddenly,
until it came out in the newspapers (page 1019).
Captain
Smith‑Hutton, Naval Attaché at Tokyo, said that since there was so much
secrecy of Japanese movements, it was highly improbable that the plan, if real,
would have been known in diplomatic circles (page 1080).