VI.
THE WAR PLANS RELATING TO HAWAII AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE PACIFIC FLEET
A.
THE PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF HAWAII
In the Hewitt
investigation, the war plans were fully examined. They were:
1. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan
Rainbow Five:
On 26 July 1941, U. S.
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 86) was distributed to the
Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy
basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific
Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval
Operations (Exhibit 86).
According to this
plan. the day of execution was to be designated as W‑Day, and the day
upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J‑Day, which might or
might not coincide with W‑Day. The plan (Exhibit 35) provided in part:
"INTRODUCTION
"CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION
"0101. At the
date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized,
and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base.
It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for
active service within four days of
an order for general mobilization. To
provide for the contingency of M‑day being set prior to the date on which
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of thus Plan is designated
throughout the Plan as W‑day. The day that hostilities open with Japan
will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day."
(Exhibit 85)
*In connection with the relations between Admiral
Kimmel and General Short, it will appear subsequently that there may be
questions raised concerning the extent of their knowledge of action taken by
one another, particularly after November 27, 1941 their exchange of
information, and the degree of cooperation which existed in connection with the
Army radar system at Oahu.
382 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS
"1211. The
general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:
a. That the Associated
Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less
Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the
'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:
"1. Germany,
Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
"2. Germany,
Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand..
"Note:—.
As of
22 June war exists between the European
Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally
against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." . . .
(Ex. 35)
"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION
"131. The concept
of the war in the Pacific, as set forth do ABC‑1 is as follows:
"Even if Japan
were not initially to enter the war on the side of the
Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy
their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does
enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The
United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the
Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the
manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the
defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia.
The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to
release the necessary forces for the Far East." (Exhibit 36)
"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION
SECTION 3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY ACTION
"1331. It is
believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to
commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket
battleship or heavy cruiser.
"1332. It is
conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:
"a. The principal
offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
"b. The secondary
offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian
Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of
Guam and other outlying positions.
"c. The offensive
against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
"d. The principal
defensive efforts to be:
"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
"2. Holding
positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western
Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.
"3. Protecting
national and captured territory and approaches.
"1333. To
accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be
toward:
"a. Capture of Guam.
"b. Establishment
of
control over the South China Sea,
Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the
establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of
United States and allied air and naval
forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
"d. Denial to the
United States of the use of the Marshall‑Caroline‑Marianas area by
the use of
fixed defenses, and, by the operation of
air forces and light naval forces to
reduce the strength of the United
States Fleet.
"e. Reenforcement
of the Mandate Islands
by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.
"f. Possibly
raids on stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States
positions.
"1334. The
initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
"a. Troops and
aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan,
fairly strong defenses in the
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HEWITT INQUIRY 383
Carolines, and comparatively weak but
constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
"b. Main fleet
concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly
Pescadores) after the capture of
Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
"c. A strong
fleet detachment in the Mindanoa‑Celebes area (probably main base in
Halmahera).
"d. Sufficient
units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.
"e. Strong
concentration of submarines
and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air
attack units as can be supported there.
"f. Raiding
and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the
Hawaiian area." . . . (Exhibit 36)
"PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS
CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED By NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION
" 2101. The Navy
Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific
Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:
"a. Support the
forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength
away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the
Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
"b. Prepare to
capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and
to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
"c. Destroy Axis
sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or
indirectly with the enemy;
"d. Support
British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as Longitude
155° East;
"e. Defend .Samoa
in category 'D';
"f. Defend
Guam in category 'F';
"g. Protect the
sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and
patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding
forces;
"h. Protect the
territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the
extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying
hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy
the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" . . . (Ex. 35)
"CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE
ASSIGNED MISSIONS
"2201. It will be
noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption
a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander‑in‑Chief
has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by
the Pacific Fleet unto phases, as follows:
"a. PHASE I‑Initial
tasks‑Japan not in the war.
"b. PHASE IA‑Initial
tasks‑Japan in the war.
"c. PHASE II,
etc., Succeeding tasks.
"2202. Phase I
tasks are as follows:
"a. Complete
mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types
in constant readiness for distant service.
"b. Maintain
fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
"c. Transfer the
Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
"d. Transfer the
Southeast Pacific Force, if
ordered.
"e. Assign twelve
patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M‑Day.
"f. Assign
two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval
Coastal Frontier on M‑Day.
"g. Protect the
communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension
of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light
forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In
so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as
longitude 165° East.
"h. Establish
defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
384 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"i. Observe, with
submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the
Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
" j. Prosecute the establishment and
defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra,
Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
"k. Continue
training operation. as practicable.
"l. Move the
maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in
landing operations.
"m. Guard against
surprise attack by Japan." (Exhibit 36)
"PHASE
IA
"2203. Phase IA
tasks areas follows:
"a. Continue
tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
"b. Accomplish
such of the tasks in 2202 e, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
"c. Make an
initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the
Northern Pacific.
"d. Continue the
protection of
the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, and of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, chiefly by covering operations.
"e. 1. Make
reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
"2. If available
cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese
shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
"f: Establish and
maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and
communications near the Japanese homeland.
"g. Maintain air
patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
"h. Escort
important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian area and
the West Coast.
"i. Route
shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
"j. Augment the
local defense forces of
the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as
necessary.
"k. Move from San
Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of
the Second Marine Division.
"1. Prepare to
capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area." (Exhibit 35)
"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT
CHAPTER I. PHASE I
"SECTION 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)
" 3141. Task
Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.
" 3142. On W‑Day
transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern
and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these
forces and rotate detail at discretion.
"3143. Perform
tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex 1) ," . . . (Exhibit
36)
"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS‑PHASES I AND IA
SECTION 1. PHASE I
United States Pacific
Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Flagship
Place
Date
"Operation
Plan
"No. 1‑R5"
"1. Information,
Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O‑1, Rainbow Five.
"2. This Fleet
will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the
Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 385
of the equator as far west as Longitude
155° East; while continuing training and guarding against attack by
Japan." . . . (Exhibit 35)
"ANNEX I
United States Pacific
Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Flagship
Place
Date
"Patrol and
Sweeping Plan." . . .
"1. Information
and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O‑1,
Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions,
and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander‑in‑Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.
"2. Phase I.
"This Fleet will,
in the Pacific area, protect the territory and sea communications of the
Associated Powers by:
"(a) Patrolling
against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and
on shipping lanes (1) West Coast‑Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of
Midway, and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
"(b) Escorting as
conditions require and forces available permit.
"(c) Covering.
"(d) Employing
striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
"(e) Routing shipping." (Ex. 36)
"3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
"(1) Having due
regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of
personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the
approaches to the Hawaiian area.
"(2) Initially
base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase
the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two
squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the
situation at the time makes. practicable.
"(3) Be prepared,
on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one patrol squadron and
tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.
"(4) Be
particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
"(5) In
transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.
"(6) Planes
engaged to training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal
Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
"(7) Effect
closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during
initial sweep of Phase IA.
"(8) Modify
patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding
and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O‑1).". . . (Exhibit
36)
2. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater,
Orange 14ND‑JCD‑42.
The Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and
FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND‑JCD‑42), was signed and placed in
effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by
the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Ex. 80). The plan was based on the
joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which
all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization
plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual
cooperation which was co apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy
would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were
invoked. (Ex. 80)
It will be seen that
under this Plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land,
and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval
forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and
protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy
was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.
The tasks assigned
were as follows:
"14. Tasks.
"a. JOINT TASK.
To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping
in the Coastal Zone.
"b. ARMY TASK. To
hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile
sympathizers; to support the naval forces.
386 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"c. NAVY TASK. To
patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support
the Army forces." (Ex. 80)
The Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the
waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and
sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu). (Ex. 80)
"17. ARMY. The
Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:
"a. The beach and
land, seacoast and anti‑aircraft defense of OAHU with particular
attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat,
HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS‑WHEELER
FIELD‑LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is
recognized.
"b. An
antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.
"c. Protection of
landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with
available forces.
"d. Defense of
installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community
for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within
naval establishments.
"e. Defense
against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore
establishments.
"f. Establishment
of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation
with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an aerial observation
system an outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
"g. Support of
naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within
range of Army bombers.
"h. Provide
personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided
for in paragraph 18.e.
"i. In
conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by
means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint
instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence.:
Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint
Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.
"j. An
intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather,
evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of
activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"k. Counter‑espionage
within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"l. Control of
dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"m. Any measures
to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication
systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1936,
Chapter IX.
"n. Supply of all
Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"o.
Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"p. Reception and
distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the
civil population.
"18. NAVY. The
Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, shall provide for:
"a. An inshore
patrol.
"b. An offshore
patrol.
"c. An escort
force.
"d. An attack
force.
"e. Provide and
maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.
"f. Installation
and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro‑acoustic
posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of
the Army.)
"g. Support of
Army forces in the OAHU‑D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine
fields in the defense of the OAHU‑D. C. A, as may be deemed necessary and
practicable.
"h. Sweeping
channels and mine fields.
"i. Distant
reconnaissance.
"j. Attacking
enemy naval forces.
"k. Maintenance
of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore
establishments.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 387
"l. In
conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local
communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.
"m.. Navy
measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over
communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
"n. Operation of
a Naval intelligence system, including counter‑espionage, for the
collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.
"o. Supply and
hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.
"p. Operation or
supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining
thereto." (Exhibit 80)
3. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan.
Annex VII, Section VI
to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth
Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General
Short 2 April 1941 (Exhibit 47) dealt with joint security measures and
protection oaf the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base.
This provided for
joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks
delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for
the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces
were insufficient), and was to become effective when the Commanding General and
ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently
imminent to. warrant such action.
It stated that in
order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and
for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization
for war, there were adopted the following agreements:
Paragraph II, in
respect of joint air operations, provide that when the Commanding General and
ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently
imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary
steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander
such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in
order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following
plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under
the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the
immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the
Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distant patrol and
search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would
be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search
operations. (Ex. 47)
Paragraph III provided
for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the
presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through
Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti‑Aircraft
Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently,
when; the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be
made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and
friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available
for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own
evaluation of the available information and transmit is to their respective
organizations. (Ex. 47)
Paragraph IV related
to joint anti‑aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for
aircraft, baboon barrages, Marine Corps anti‑aircraft artillery, and Army
Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be
expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and "during the
period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use
of Radar and other appropriate means; will endeavor to give such warning of
hostile attacks as may be practicable." (Ex. 47)
4. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the
Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu.
On 31 March 1941, Rear
Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol
Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force,
prepared a joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event
of sudden hostile action against Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph 1 of the
estimate included a "Summary of the Situations" which indicated that
relations between. the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and
varying, that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by
388 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a declaration of war; that a successful
sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent
effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long
period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating
areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines
and/or Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior
warning from our Intelligence Service (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph II of the
estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," indicating, among
other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more
submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported
by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when
several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their
actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain
for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure
that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a
complete surprise (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy
Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a
surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on
Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of
these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on
Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from one or more carriers
which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out
that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to
attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust;
that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier;" and that in a dawn air
attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete
surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using. (Exhibit
49).
Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to
Us." It was stated that at would be desirable to run daily patrols as far
as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively
maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as
a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other
intelligence indicated that a surface
raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was
made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack
on ships in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of
action could be initiated by our forces
until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred. (Exhibit 49)
Paragraph V contained
"Decisions." The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air
Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or
fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a
surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory
measures. A number of
subsidiary decisions were made, including
decisions for the establishment of
a search and attack group, an air combat
group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions
of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval
Base Defense Air Force‑Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with
current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment
and reconnaissance squadrons. (Exhibit 49)
5. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security, of
the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 14CL‑41,
from the Commander in Chief; Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning
the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in
February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.
This order provided
that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:
(a) That no
responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions
by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals
of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from
small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an
obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the
approaches to Pearl Harbor;
(b) That a declaration
of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine
attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.
PROCEEDINGS OF
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Security measures were
prescribed covering:
A. Continuous patrols,
inshore, boom and harbor.
B. Intermittent
patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The
destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance,
(b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or
Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other
than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice.
The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed
by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie
of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship
at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored
mines.
C. Sortie and entry.
D. Operating areas.
E. Ships at sea.
F. Ships in port.
The, security
provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army
anti‑aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine
defense battalions would, assist the Army in manning them; and provided that
in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all
Fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it
prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further
provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure
berthing so as to develop the maximum anti‑aircraft gunfire; and that
ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army,
joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other
action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging
through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air
effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti‑aircraft
fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive
of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills,
etc.
Three conditions of
naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:
"Anti‑aircraft
battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each
sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.)
Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."
The procedure to be
followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth:
The Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending
destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for
sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.;
and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an
attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of
the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships,
and arm and prepare all bombing units available.
The action to be taken
if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided
that the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language
dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by
other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for
offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and
to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of
attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The
shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack
area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions
issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further
provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not
indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that
"(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may
indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast
ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore,
assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions
warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be
located by air search or other means." (Exhibit 8, Naval Court of
Inquiry).
The
war and defense plans relating to Hawaii were contained in Navy Basic War Plan
Rainbow No. 5, U. S. Navy WPL‑46 (Exhibit 4); in United States Pacific
Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5, WP‑PAC‑46 (Exhibit 5); in
"Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935" (Exhibit 6); and, particularly,
in Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Theatre, Orange 14ND‑JCD‑42
(Exhibit 7); and in Operation Plan No. 1‑41, issued by Admiral Bloch as
Naval Base Defense Officer (Exhibit 53).
390 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In accordance with the Basic War Plans, United States
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 was approved by Admiral Kimmel and
issued about July 1, 1941. It was offered in evidence as Exhibit 16. Admiral
Smith said that these plans contemplated that the Pacific Fleet was to deny to
the enemy the Marshalls and Carolines, and to capture a fleet base in Truk.
With the available equipment and personnel, he said, the Marshalls could have
been raided, but could not have possibly been captured.
Admiral Pye said that in his opinion, war plan Rainbow 5 was
not yet up to date and that he considered that the whole basic war plans had
really not been operations plans but development plans and had been used as a
lever to get more men, ships and naval shore establishment development. (p.
160)
Admiral Pye said that under the provisions of the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance
off Hawaii was apparently the Navy's under the direction of the Commandant of
the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 163)
The
record submitted by the Naval Court refers to, but does not include, copies of
Exhibits 4 to 7, inclusive. There was, however, considerable testimony
concerning the local plans for the Hawaiian area.
Annex
VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department
and Fourteenth Naval District, dated March 28, 1941 (Exhibit 23) dealt with
joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It
stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of
the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids
or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general
mobilization for war, the following agreements were adopted.
Paragraph
II provided for joint air operations. It stated that when the Commanding
General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was
sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such
preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the
other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as
circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in
accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface
vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive
air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under
the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for
long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made
available these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval
commander, directing the search operations.
Paragraph
III provided for joint communications and, among other things, stated that all
information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu
which was secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the
Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti‑Aircraft. Brigade. It also
stated that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was
established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the
location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and that special wire or
radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so
that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and
transmit it to their respective organizations. Information relating to the
presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore which would be secured
through Navy channels was to be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft
Warning Service Information Center.
Paragraph
IV related to joint anti‑aircraft measures, dealt with arrival and
departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, and Marine Corps anti‑aircraft
artillery, and the Army Aircraft Warning Service. This stated that that service
was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army an
"during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the
Nay, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give
such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."
Admiral Brown said that he would have expected the Army to
depend on Navy planes to discover the approach of the enemy. (p 144)
Admiral Bellinger said that the Commanding General of the
Army's Air Force at Hawaii apparently expected the Navy would have early
information and seemed surprised when Admiral Bellinger told him that they
should not expect such information. (p. 131)
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 391
ADMIRAL
HEWITT'S EXAMINATION
Captain John B. Earle,
USN, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District in December, 1941, was shown
Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, dated 28 March 1941 (Exhibit 47), which deals with point Army and Navy
measures for the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet. Regarding joint anti‑aircraft
exercises and drills in the months preceding December, 1941, Captain Earle
stated that definite problems were developed for training purposes, which would
serve to develop the control features of anti‑aircraft defense and also
develop the necessary coordination between Army and Navy operations. In
addition, about once in every ten days a drill was held in which planes flew
over Pearl Harbor during ether day or night and ships in the harbor simulated
anti‑aircraft fore. The Pearl Harbor area was divided into sectors, with
a naval sector commander aboard ship responsible for controlling the fire from
that sector and making required reports (p. 457‑458).
Captain Earle stated
that about once a month a drill was held which entailed locating an aircraft
target at a certain bearing from Pearl Harbor, with warnings being sent to both
Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier or unit was located at a certain
distance and bearing. Fighters planes would then be sent up and bombers dispatched to attack the simulated target.
Captain Earle believed that at least three of these drills were held prior to 7
December 1941, but could not recall the date of the last drill or whether any
was held between 27 November and 7 December (p. 168).
Questioned regarding
the command set‑up for the joint exercises, Captain Earle said (p. 458‑459):
"My recollection
is colored from operations that took place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my
belief that the entire problem of this aircraft coordination was handled
through the fleet and the Army. In other words, after the word came through
that an enemy had been signed on a certain bearing, this word was given to the
fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made between the
commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate their operations,
including order as to detailed directions as to direction, speed, and number of
planes to be used, and so forth.
"To amplify the
above statement, there was no joint command post or operations center actually
set up for these drills before the war. The Operations Office in the
Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary
communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle these drills
from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the exact time, but either
somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just after, a coast artillery liaison
officer was placed in this Operations Office. Plans had been made for a joint
command post, but no definite steps had been taken as to location or details
prior to the start of the war. It is my recollection that plans had been made
for a joint command post, but this had not gone beyond the planning
stage."
Exhibit 47 provided in
part that pending completion by the Army of an aircraft warning service, the
Navy would by radar and other appropriate means attempt to give such warnings
of hostile attacks as might be practicable. Captain Earle said that to
implement this agreement, the Navy had established communications with the Army
over radio nets and the teletype system, so that any information received could
be promptly disseminated; had ordered the communications activities to make
prompt report of enemy movements; had directed the few destroyers assigned to
the Fourteenth Naval District to promptly report contacts; and since there were
no planes attached to the District, had instructed fleet planes to forward
immediately to the Army any pertinent information (p. 460).
Captain Earle said
that prior to 7 December 1941 the Fourteenth Naval District assigned a liaison
officer to General Short's headquarters for general liaison duties (p. 160).
Captain Earle stated further that there had been a naval officer engaged in
assisting the Army to get their aircraft warning system installed and that at
one time this officer came to ham and asked for assistance. This officer also
stated that several naval liaison officers would be required at the warning
center. Captain Earle told him that the District Communications Officer would
be glad to give him all possible assistance, but that there were no spare
personnel an the District who could be used for naval liaison officers at the
center (p. 461).
392 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The
above agreement was approved April 2, 1941, by Admiral Bloch and General Short.
Exhibit 22 is a letter forwarding the joint agreement
between General Short and Admiral Bloch and the Joint Estimate, which was sent
to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 1, 1941. (p. 86)
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that the
Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District would be a member of the Joint
Planning Committee established by that plan. Captain Earle, however, did not
act formally as a member of that Committee, but said that the Chiefs of Staff
acted informally with sub‑committees appointed for the majority of the
detailed work. (p. 368)
Captain Earle said that when he first had his assignment as
Chief of Staff it took some time to get the plans approved by the Army, but as
time went on and various warnings were received, it became easier to accomplish
joint action. (p. 369)
Captain Earle said that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan was not effective during the period preceding the attack, except as to the
portion relating to planning. (p. 369)
Concerning annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan, which required the Army to expedite the warning service and the
Navy to endeavor to give warning of hostile attack until such time as the Army
system was in operation, Captain Earle had no recollection of discussion of
this requirement. Neither did he have any definite recollection of the
provision for liaison officers in connection with the dissemination of information,
but vaguely recalled some talk with a fleet radar officer on the question of
assignment of Navy personnel, and recalled that he told the fleet radar officer
that as soon as they could get somebody who was qualified they would be glad to
turn him over to the Army. (p. 369)
Captain Earle's recollection was vague as to other
provisions of the Joint Plan such as procedure for recognition of aircraft and
the use of barrage balloons, etc. (p. 370) Captain Earle could recall no plan
for the coordination of Fleet anti‑aircraft fire with Army anti‑aircraft
fire in the Pearl Harbor area. Captain Earle discussed generally his
recollection of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 372‑3)
To
the agreement was annexed Addendum One, dated March 31, 1941. Addendum One was
a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy action in the event of sudden
hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.
Concerning the estimate in Admiral Bellinger's air plan that
the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack, Admiral
Pye said that the estimate did not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that
than to do something else. (p. 160)
In
paragraph I of the addendum there was a "Summary of the Situation."
The summary indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were
strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange bad never preceded
hostile action by a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against
our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive
action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong
part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to
take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which
Initiated hostile action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines
and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with nor
prior warning from our Intelligence service.
Paragraph
II of the addendum was a "Survey of Opposing Strengths." This
indicated, among other things, that Orange might send into the are one or more,
submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported
by fast cruisers. Also that the most difficult situation for us to meet would
be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated
their actions. The aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for
any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure,
that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a
complete surprise.
Paragraph
III of the addendum dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." This stated
that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on
ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and
installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two. Further, that it
appeared that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 393
an air attack, which
would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably
approach inside of 300 miles. That a single attack might or might not indicate
the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after
defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. It was also
stated that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence
of considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied
by a carrier." It was further stated that in a dawn air attack there was a
high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of
any patrol that we might be using.
Paragraph
IV of the addendum dealt with "Action Open to Us." This stated that
it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward
through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present
personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure
could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a
surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. It contained
other types of action open in the event of .a surprise attack on ships in the
operating area or on the Island, and stated that none of the outlined courses
of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be
imminent or had occurred.
Paragraph
V contained the "Decisions." The primary decision was that this force
would locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet
units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise
attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory
measures. There were a number of subsidiary decisions, including decisions for
the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, assignment
of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The
search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air
Force‑Commander Patrol Wing Two, and was to include various units in
accordance with current conditions of readiness. These units included patrol
squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons, among others.
Admiral
Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 1‑41,
on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit ‑53): The Task Organization prescribed was
(a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol), consisting of two destroyers,
a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, an A/B boom and minesweepers, (b) Base Defense
Air Force, (Commander Patrol Wing Two). In conjunction with the Army, (c)
Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the Army,
(d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with the
Army. This plan directed attention to, among other things, the Hawaiian Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and stated:
"By
cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established
as, necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to
safeguard the Fleet.
"In
conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base
Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to
coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required
drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear", signals.
"ASSUMPTIONS
"(a)
That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions,
by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nations
of such powers may attempt:
"(1)
Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.
"(2)
Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the
channel.
"(3)
Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.
"(b)
That a declaration of war might be preceded by:
"(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base
area—probable.
"(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.
"(3) A combination of these two—possible."
A
detailed Inshore Patrol Plan was Annex "A" to Operation Plan 1‑41,
a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was Annex "Baker," a
detailed Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan was Annex "C", a detailed Harbor
Control Post Plan was Annex "D", and a detailed Communications Plan
was Annex "Easy."
Annex
"Baker", the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, was dated
April 9, 1941, prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch.
According to Admiral Bloch, after Admiral Kimmel assumed
command and before information was received about the correspondence between
the
394 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary
of the Navy and the Secretary of War dealing with the Pearl Harbor defenses,
Admiral Kimmel reviewed certain information that had been left by Admiral
Richardson and decided that since the ships had antiaircraft batteries, they
should be used to the fullest extent to increase the volume of fire and
protection that the Fleet would have in the harbor. He also decided that since
the Navy also had a number of planes on shore many of which were carrier planes
that had been sent ashore while the carriers were alongside, they also should
be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned Admiral Halsey and Admiral Ballinger to Admiral
Bloch to talk over with the Army the coordination of action of the airplanes.
Conferences were held with the Army authorities and an agreement reached with
the Army under which all fighter planes, including Navy fighter planes on shore
at the time of an attack, would be placed under the Army's command and that all
bombers would be turned over to the Navy. (p. 4)
Admiral Bloch said that generally speaking, he took no
exception to the Air Defense Plan which had been worked out by Admiral
Ballinger and General Martin. (p. 89)
Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel had a copy of the
Joint Air Operating Plan; that it was fair to assume that he must have known
about the plan; and that General Short also must have known about the plan. (p.
89)
Admiral Smith said that the Commander‑in‑Chief
was apprised of all of the plans made by the Army and by Admiral Bloch.
However, Admiral Smith did not recall the Joint Defense Plan, Exhibit 5. (p.
37)
It
divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting of
patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons, and
(b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with, among, other
things, the Joint Estimate, dated March 31, 1941, which is digested above. The
Naval Base Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to locate and destroy
hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas. The
plan was effective upon receipt and would become operative without signal in
the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by despatch.
In the meantime, conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum Two to this
plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department
for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (ComFOURTEEN) for Navy
units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a letter,
such as "E", signifying that all aircraft were conducting routine
operations and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and the condition
of operational readiness by a number, such as "5", signifying that
all types of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was also
required that a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each
unit assigned to a task group by this plan stating the number of planes and
readiness.
General
Short testified that the local joint defense plan was in effect prior to the
attack, but was not in operation because, he said, it was predicated on the
Rainbow Plan which had not been executed, and, therefore, the action taken
under it prior to the attack was only drills (pages 259‑260).
Admiral
Bellinger testified that about March 1, 1941, CincPac directed him to report to
ComFOURTEEN to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Force. He did so and worked with Major General Martin,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. The operations plan for the Naval Base
Defense Force included several subsidiary plans, the most important of which
was the plan for the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which outlined the proposed
employment of all units made available to that force (page 661):
Army
and Navy orders he said, were based on the estimate of the situation dated
March 31, 1941. He believed this estimate was sound, but that unity of command
was missing (page 662). The plan was to function through mutual cooperation of
the Army and Navy, and the Naval Base Defense Air Force could. function only in
an emergency or when proper authority directed. The composition varied with the
planes made available by the various Army and Navy commanders; the determining
factor of availability was the daily employment schedule of planes belonging to
various units. Available planes were subject to operational control only when
the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning status.
The
normal procedure for vitalizing this organization for drill was an "air
raid" dispatch from ComFourteen, as Base Defense Force Commander; then
Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Commander, would send a dispatch to all units
which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuits,
ordering them to
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 395
place all available
planes in highest readiness; searches would immediately be started then, and an
attack on enemy surface forces when located (page 662).
The
authority of "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Officer" was nonexistent
until an emergency was apparent or appropriate authority placed that force in a
functioning status, and when called into existence covered not pursuit, but
only the search and attack groups of that force (page 663). The planes actually
present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on naval base
defense (page 663) .
Admiral
Kimmel, he said, made final approval for naval aircraft operation. He or
ComFourteen could vitalize the NBDA Force. ComFourteen worked under CincPac.
NBDA Force was not composed of all aircraft but only of aircraft reported
available (page 665).
Their
estimate, he said, that "it appears possible that Orange submarines and/or
an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior
warning from our Intelligence service" was an estimate of hostile action
and not of Japanese war plans (page 666).
In
summary, the NBDA Force would come into being in the event of: (a) a drill, (b)
an actual emergency, (c) orders from higher authority based on information as
to the imminence of attack (page 678).
Admiral Bloch said that the agreement with the Army
concerning the use of aircraft was effective from the date of signature and
would be put in execution in the same manner as the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan. (P. 7)
B.
TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE WAR PLANS IN GENERAL
Admiral Bellinger
stated that unity of command is essential to the preparation for meeting such
an air attack as that on Pearl Harbor; the organization, operating twenty‑four
hours a day, must be fully manned and functioning. Reconnaissance, radar nets,
complete information regarding shipping, and control of all aircraft in. the
zone of operations are essential. Such an organization must be in effect and
functioning smoothly before the attack. Not much can be expected from a mutual
cooperative organization existing only on paper, developed only through intermittent
drills (p. 510).
It
appears from the testimony of various of the witnesses that (1) the decisive
theater, as laid down in the war plans, was the Atlantic, and that the military
strategy in the Pacific was to be defensive; (2) that the primary
responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's, and that the
Navy was to assist the Army in that task; (3) that the method of command at
Pearl Harbor was one of joint cooperation between the Army and Navy and not
unity of command; (4) that the principal mission which had been assigned to the
Pacific Fleet was to train for war with Japan; and (5) that the war plans were
not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the fleet technically
mobilized.
(1) The decisive
theatre the Atlantic; defensive strategy in the Pacific.
Admiral Bloch said that "Rainbow I" contemplated
the United States at war with the Axis Powers, including Japan, without any
assistance except perhaps some of the South American Republics; JCD was based
on that plan; "Rainbow 3" was based on the assumption that the United
States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the
Axis nations, including Japan; he believed that the provisions of "Rainbow
5" were about the same as in the earlier plans insofar as they related to
the Fourteenth Naval District. No. 1 was a purely defensive plan. No. 3 had
certain offensive tasks in it, and he did not recall the tasks assigned by
"Rainbow 5." (P 23)
Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, on December 7, 1941, was
assistant War Plans Officer to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific
Fleet, and was under then Captain McMorris. He was responsible for the
preparation of the written war plans for the Pacific Fleet which were required
to implement the basic Navy war plans then in effect. He had reported for that
duty on February 1, 1941. (p 66)
Admiral McCormick said that the commitments of the Pacific
Fleet for the first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 Plan,
in general were to defend the United States and its possessions, some of which
were in special categories such as Guam, which was regarded as more or less indefensible;
to divert the Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier by
396 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
raids,
and the capture of positions in the Marshall Islands; to protect our sea
communications; and to raid or interrupt Japanese communications east of
longitude 180. This provided, therefore, for the use of task forces composed of
combatant ships for offensive operations consisting of raids, and if the use of
a covering force were taken into account it might be said that the whole of the
Fleet would thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first phase.
(p. 66‑7) In his opinion, had the three carriers which were attached to
the Fleet been available, they could have raided an island in the fringes of
the Marshalls without undue risk. There were only two carriers available around
December 7th, but it is Admiral McCormick's belief that Admiral Kimmel intended
to carry out the plan even with the two carriers which were then available. The
operating schedules were more or less built around the war plans insofar as the
operations of the task forces were concerned. (p. 67)
Captain Glover worked on portions of Rainbow 5, which was
completed in May. The plan contemplated, he said, the dispatch of certain
forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. (p. 161) According to Captain Glover,
the plan gave the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, an offensive
task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. Also, to
divert the enemy strength from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications
and positions. Captain Glover's concept of the plan was that initially, the
attitude of the Pacific Fleet was to be defensive and that it did not have the
means available to assume an outright offensive. The movements which he had
mentioned were to be classed as raids rather than movement of total force and
he considered that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was
sufficient for such raids. (p. 173)
Captain Glover said that he thought that WPL‑46
represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time and
a calculated risk in the Pacific and that the plan was elastic.
Captain Glover referred to a memo, dated August 21, 3941, to
the Plans Section of the War Plans Division re: "Cognizance of Navy Basic
War Plan Rainbow No. 5." This indicated that the Plans Section was charged
with preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in
effect and continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice
might be given in regard to matters relating to the execution of the plan.
No change was made in Rainbow 5 prior to December, according
to Captain Glover. (p.174)
Admiral Turner discussed the background and form of WPL-46,
known as Rainbow 5. (p. 251‑2) Admiral Turner said that the contributory
plan of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, was approved by the
Navy Department in about September, 1941. Concerning the offensive tasks of
the war plan, Admiral Turner said, "So far as Admiral Kimmel was
concerned, his part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited
offensive through the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral
Kimmel did not have at hand all the material and men and organizations to
proceed immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls.
The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and
organizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a comparatively
short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether in writing
or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the forces
suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There was no
disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of
the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that some
time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory. But it would
be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific
was to be purely defensive. Far from it. While the Navy Department believed
that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be
against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we
were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the
Pacific." (p. 252)
Captain Wellborn said that his recollection was that generally
the officers concerned with the preparation of the war plans were of the view
that the initial major effort must be in the Atlantic. (p 383‑4)
Concerning the concept that Germany was the principal enemy
to be first disposed of, Admiral Ingersoll said: "Naturally, there was a
discussion of the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized
that if Japan
PROCEEDINGS
OF HEWITT INQUIRY 397
entered
the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Nevertheless, the
United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive warfare in
both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major effort would be made
in ode ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy to
be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member, Italy, and that
after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could concentrate on Japan.
I do not recall that there was any formal representation made to the Chief of
Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At some time during 1941, the
general features of WPL‑46 were explained at a conference in the Navy
Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary Hull, and I believe the
Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were present. I'm
quite sure that the general consensus of opinion was that Germany should be
eliminated first, after Italy, and then Japan." (p. 422)
Admiral
Stark testified that the over‑all military strategy which regarded the
Atlantic as the decisive theatre had been established by the President, the
Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy (pages 80-1). Despite this,
however, he said, the Atlantic did not have exactly priority over the Pacific,
and he did not believe that men had been transferred from the Pacific to the
Atlantic (page 794).
Admiral
Smith testified that he thought the CNO considered the Atlantic more important
than the Pacific since in May, 1941, the best BB's, four CL's, and two
squadrons of DD's were secretly transferred to the Atlantic (pages 529‑30).
Admiral Smith said that in May, 1941, the YORKTOWN,
Battleship Division Three, Cruiser Division Eight, and two squadrons of
destroyers were detached and sent to the Atlantic; these he said were equipped
with all of the modern devices that they had tried to get for them while they
were attached to the Pacific Fleet. (p. 38)
(2) Testimony
concerning the primary responsibility for defense.
Both
Admiral Stark (page 193) and Admiral Kimmel (page 294) testified that the basic
responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's. The Army,
Admiral Kimmel said, had the duty of locating and engaging enemy aircraft
before they reached their objectives; the Navy was to support the Army. The
Army had the duty of repulsing air attack by artillery, the Navy to assist. Under
the joint plan, the Army operated ail pursuit planes and the Navy all bombers
and patrol planes (page 295).
Admiral
Pye stated that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor,
assisted by the Navy in such manner as possible (page 438).
Admiral
Bloch stated that the method of command was joint cooperation and that the
Army's task under JCD‑42 was to hold Oahu against attack and support the
naval forces (page 385, Exhibit 7); the Navy's task was to patrol and control
the coastal zone and to support the Army (page 386).
Admiral Bloch said that it might be stated that the Navy had
no responsibility because there was nothing said in the Joint Coastal Defense
Plan to the effect that the Navy had any responsibility for protecting Pearl
Harbor against air attack, but yet, by 2CL the Commander‑in‑Chief
felt the necessity to help out on account of the fact that he had means that he
could use. (p. 11)
Admirals
Ingersoll, Delaney, and Smith testified that under JCD‑42 the Army was
responsible for the defense of Hawaii (pages 848, 505, 551).
Admiral
Kitts testified that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor
(page 521). The Navy's function was to support the Army. When ships wire in
port, the guns of the Fleet were made available to Army command through the
Base Defense Officer (page 521).
Admiral
McMorris said that the Fleet was not charged with its own defense while in
Pearl Harbor.
Vice Admiral McMorris
testified that the phrase "territory of the
associated powers in the Pacific area," as used in sub‑paragraph (h)
page 24, of the "Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, (WPPac‑46)",
(Exhibit 36), included Hawaii, and that the duty prescribed in sub‑paragraph
(m) of Phase I of the Initial Tasks which was to "guard against a surprise attack by Japan," contemplated
that it was a task of the Pacific Fleet to guard Hawaii against the surprise
attack by Japan. (Page 295‑296).
398 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral McMorris
further testified, with reference to the statements in the "Summary of
the Situation" appearing in Addendum
I to the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A‑1‑41
dated March 31, 1941, to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded
by "a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor," that he agreed with the thought there expressed but had
considered such an attack much more probable in the approaches to Pearl Harbor
than in Pearl Harbor itself. (Page 299‑301).
Vice Admiral McMorris
also testified that at or about the time of the issuance of the Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number
2CL‑41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, he agreed with the assumption
therein stated that a declaration of
war might be preceded by either a
surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, or a surprise submarine attack on
ships in the operating area, or by a combination of both of those two forms of
attack. (Page 301‑302).
Vice Admiral McMorris
testified that he had no specific recollection yet he entertained no doubt that
he had reviewed, Annex VIII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier or
Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and also that he had reviewed Addendum I of
Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A‑1‑41, dated
March 31, 1941. (Page 297‑298).
but CinCPac was
concerned over the safety of the Fleet and felt a responsibility for urging the
strengthening of the defenses (page 899).
Admiral McMorris said that Admiral Kimmel had felt an
overall responsibility for safeguarding the Fleet, although he did look to
ComFOURTEEN and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to protect Hawaii.
(p. 239)
General
Marshall said that the Army was responsible for protecting Pearl Harbor against
air attack; the Navy was to do long distance patrol and to search for and to
attack hostile surface ships (page 855). The mission of the Hawaiian Air Force
was to defend Oahu against air attack in cooperation with fleet aircraft and to
attack hostile vessels (page 863).
Colonel
Phillips testified that the Army's mission was the defense of the island, but
that the Navy was jointly responsible (page 479).
(3) Command by joint
cooperation, not unity of command.
Admiral Bellinger said that one of the main impediments of
the air agreement and of the air organizations was the provision requiring
agreement between the Commanding General and the Navy Base Defense Officer that
a hostile raid was sufficiently imminent to warrant action; the set‑up
that existed was a paper organization which could not really function to prevent
or take action in an air attack; it was not the primary objective of either the
Army of the Navy; there was no unity of command or control. (p. 119‑120)
He said that if the Commanding General or he had seen an
emergency situation, he felt that the Commanding General would have cooperated
in any specific instance. Drills had been arranged previously by special
arrangement with the Army. (p. 120)
Admiral Bellinger said that he did not talk over with
Admiral Kimmel the possibility of a carrier raid by the Japanese nor was the
wording of his estimate discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and that Admiral Kimmel
knew, of course, that Admiral Bellinger was not satisfied with the
organization's setup because it was based on too much cooperation and on the
assumption that it would go into effect when an emergency arose, and that no
such organization is any good unless it functions on a 24‑hour basis.
There were, he said, insufficient personnel to have an organization functioning
on that basis. (p. 122‑3)
Admiral Bellinger said that when the situation in the
Pacific grew more tense, those portions of his estimate dealing with a carrier
raid came back to his mind; he remembered discussing the subject matter with a
high Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he complimented
Admiral Bellinger on the organization that had been set up, and Admiral
Bellinger told him that that was all right but it would not work in case of war
and indicated that there must be unity of command to make it work and also additional
facilities and equipment. (p. 123)
Admiral Bellinger said that he did not think that any joint
plan based on cooperation alone would or could function properly in an
emergency and he mentioned his more or less dissatisfaction with the general
set‑up of this air defense, both personally in conversation with Admiral
Kimmel and also at one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of the Navy.
(p. 124)
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY
399
Admiral Bellinger ended his testimony with a statement which
in part was as follows:
"Although it was realized that facilities, personnel,
and equipment were inadequate for proper and continuous air defense, the main
idea was to evolve a plan and organization that would make the most of the
tools that were available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to
think that such a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of
cooperation by the Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by
special orders or by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non‑existent
except during periodic drills, could go into action and function effectively at
the occurrence of an actual emergency. An organization of this nature to be
effective must function twenty‑four hours every day, and prior to an air
raid not subsequent thereto. However, considering shortages, and deficiencies,
other necessary employment of forces, such as expansion training and
development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little, if any more,
in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel
saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the
circumstances, could have done more. I know this, that the existing
deficiencies, the varied duties and schedules of employment, the lack of
authority due to lack of unity of command, placed the Commander Naval Base
Defense Air Force in a very embarrassing position." (p. 134)
Captain Glover said that unity of command for Hawaii had
been discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action.
Admiral Pye said that for at least ten years before the
attack, he felt that there was need for unity of command at Pearl Harbor; for
more than a year before the attack, he had advised several Commanders‑in‑Chief
that coordination was not adequate and that they should get some Army officers
on their staff so that it would be better arranged at least. (p. 168)
Concerning
the absence of unity of command, Admiral Stark testified that thought had been
given to unity of command for the whole area, but that no satisfactory solution
had been reached (page 29). He said that the President or Secretary of the Navy
and the Secretary of War could have put unity of command in effect. Admiral
Stark and General Marshall could have, subject to approval, he said, of the
Secretaries. Local Army and Navy commanders could have done so by agreement.
Admiral Bloch probably could not have acted independently of Admiral Kimmel
(page 39). He occupied, under directive, a dual status when directed by OPNAV
or on "M" day (page 41).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that he did not discuss with the Army the desirability of
invoking unity of command. Unity of command would have made operations easier.
ComFOURTEEN could not, he said, have invoked unity of command without reference
to him, and he would have referred the matter to the Navy Department (page
296).
Admiral
Ingersoll said that unity of command at Hawaii was not discussed at the
Secretary's and CNO's conferences when he was present (page 848).
Admiral
Turner and General Marshall both said that there had been discussion of unity
of command, but that no decision had been reached (pages 858, 1009).
Admiral Turner said, "That had been discussed at great
length with the Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could
find, and there has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command
applicable to all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain
cases in WPL‑46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command
between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never
been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on
shore." (p.271)
(4) The principal
mission which had been assigned was training for war.
Admiral
Ingersoll said that he was familiar with the problems of the Pacific Fleet in
1941. The Pacific Fleet was assigned its missions in the War Plans, and until
war broke out its major mission was to prepare for war (page 820).
Admiral
Smith testified that the principal mission of the Pacific Fleet during 1941 was
training for war with Japan (page 529). And this was not changed prior to
December 7th (page 539).
(5) The plans were not
technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the Fleet technically
mobilized.
Admiral
Stark admittedly sent out no order to mobilize under WPL‑46 (page 102) .
Admiral
Pye discussed the various phases of mobilization at page 440.
400 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral
Smith's testimony concerning WPL‑46 and the assigned tasks of the Pacific
Fleet appears at pages 541‑2. He said that the War Plan was not executed
by the Navy Department before the attack (page 561).
Admiral
Delaney said that no "M" day was set prior to December 7, 1941 (page
505). He did not consider the Fleet mobilized because of deficiencies in men
and material.
Admiral
McMorris said that the War Plans, which were not executed provided that the
greater part of the patrol planes of the Fleet were to be advanced to Midway
and Wake and a minimum number to be left under control of the sea frontier,
based on Pearl Harbor (pages 901‑2).
Admiral
Bloch also said that no parts of JCD‑42 (Exhibit 7) were executed prior
to December 7th; parts of appendix VII thereof were in effect in regard to
agreements for tactical control of aircraft in case of attack (page 386).
Admiral
Turner, on page 1011, discussed the Rainbow War Plans and their development;
WPL‑46 was a realistic plan. Mobilization without war, he said, is not
practical in a democracy as the authority of Congress to mobilize is tantamount
to a declaration of war. The Fleet was, however, so mobilized that the only
thing left to be done by mobilization was the taking over of merchant shipping
which can only be taken after war is declared. Execution of a part of WPL‑46
would have been an act of war. Provision for the execution of a part of the
plan was put in to provide for war with Germany without war with Japan (page
1012).
Admiral
Ingersoll (page 844), read Articles 3721 and 3722 of WPL‑46 (Exhibit 4).
Mobilization of the Fleet, he said, was not ordered because the Fleet was in
effect already mobilized. In this connection, the Government did not want to
take any action that could be considered an overt act, and mobilization is
always an act preliminary to war (page 845).
Admiral
McMorris said that no technical execution of WPL‑46 was necessary, he
thought, to put the Fleet on a war footing; it was on a war footing (page 895).
It
may be noted that Admiral Kimmel was aware, at the end of November and early in
December, that WPL‑46 was not yet in effect and that one of the first
steps which his War Plans Officer recommended be taken in the event of
American-Japanese war, was to send dispatches to Task Force Commanders advising
that WPL‑46 was effective (Exhibits 69A and 69B).
C.
ADEQUACY OF FLEET GENERALLY TO CARRY OUT ITS TASKS
Admiral
Stark testified that certain, units were detached from the Pacific Fleet during
1941 for an amphibious operation in the Atlantic. The units transferred in June
were three BB's, four CA's, one CV, and, one DesRon, which amounted to about 25
per cent of the Pacific Fleet (pages 100‑101).
He
stated that from October to December, 1941, the Pacific Fleet was considered
adequate to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL‑46 (pages 23, 25); and later
testified that in 1941 the United States did not have sufficient men and
material to meet an attack on one ocean, much less in both (page 800).
Admiral Ingersoll said that the Pacific Fleet was regarded
as adequate to carry out the initial tasks prescribed for it in the War Plans,
which were primarily defensive with the exception of diversionary raids against
the Carolines and the Marshalls. (p 421‑2) Admiral Ingersoll discussed
the transfer of ships of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic which he said was in
accordance with the basic concept of the War Plans which indicated that Germany
was the predominant member of the Axis powers. These contemplated that the
British would release certain forces for the Far East but Admiral Ingersoll did
not know why it took until November, 1941, for a small detachment of British
capital ships to arrive in the Indian Ocean. (p. 419)
Admiral
Turner considered that the Pacific Fleet was fully prepared on November 26th to
carry out missions assigned to it in the War Plans. These missions were
defensive, except for possible raids (page 1017).
Admiral Turner said that forces were withdrawn from the
Pacific Fleet to support an occupation of the Azores but that project was
abandoned and the occupation of Iceland was substituted and some of the forces
which lead been withdrawn were then returned to the Pacific.
Admiral Turner said that he did not recall any official
protest by Admiral Kimmel concerning the detachment of units to the Pacific
Fleet, but that Admiral Kimmel did not approve the matter. (p. 253)
Admiral Turner discussed the Rainbow Plan No. 3, the
practice of keeping the war plans up to date and the movement of forces in
accordance with the commitments of the war plans. Concerning the adequacy of
the Fleet,
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 401
Admiral
Turner said, "We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover that
was being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up defenses in
outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston Island, and Samoa.
These places were all strengthened, air fields were built or in process of
building, and we were distributing forces to those positions. The principal
reason for building the defenses there was to detect and ward off enemy attacks
against Hawaii, and to afford defensive cover for the sea operations of our
Fleet. It was not possible, of course, to provide such a cover to the
northward, and that was always recognized as a weak spot in our defense. I may
say that I, personally, was not in favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was
too far removed for proper support, and was certain to fall at an early date
after the war broke out unless we could have an early successful engagement
with the Japanese Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other positions were
considered of great value and work was pushed on all of them to the limit of
our available resources. As regards the strength of the Pacific Fleet, we felt
that it was adequate for the tasks assigned to it, although we would have been
happy to have had greater strength." (p. 256)
Admiral Turner said that the Fleet logistics were believed
to be adequate for initial Fleet operations. (p. 257) .
According
to Admiral McMorris, while there were deficiencies in the Pacific Fleet, he
felt that it would be effective to carry out the missions of WPL‑46. WPL‑46
was based on the Japanese starting war (page 893). The Fleet would have been
alerted by dispatch and was advised for sometime that the situation was tense
(page 894).
Admiral McMorris was of the View that the Pacific Fleet was
adequate to carry out the missions assigned to it in the War Plans, although
there were many marked deficiencies in the Fleet, particularly in anti‑submarine
craft. He said that he thought that Admiral Kimmel considered that the Pacific
Fleet did consist of strong naval forces which could be effectively employed
notwithstanding some handicaps. (p. 234)
Admiral McMorris said that he was not happy over the
logistics situation, but certainly not discouraged over it. (p. 235)
Admiral McMorris thought the intention of Admiral Kimmel
with respect to the carrying out of the War Plans in the event of war was to
sweep for Japanese merchant ships, to make immediate reconnaissance of the
Marshalls, to carry out as expeditiously as possible operations to establish
our forces in the Marshalls, and to inaugurate patrol plane searches in the
approaches to Hawaii. (p. 235)
Admiral
Pye testified that the Pacific Fleet could have operated as far as the Marshall
Islands, but no farther (page 431). It would have been difficult to operate
long there because of the scarcity of tankers. Fuel was also short (page 432),
but there was sufficient to operate up to 7 December. The fleet would have been
more effective if the detachment had not been sent to the Atlantic (page 432).
Concerning the detachment of three battleships, four
cruisers and a squadron of destroyers in June of 1941, Admiral Pye said that
this materially reduced the power of the Pacific Fleet, but that it did not
make much difference in what the Pacific Fleet could have accomplished because
the situation with regard to logistics was such that the Fleet could not have
operated more than 2,500 miles from Honolulu no matter what its strength.
Admiral Pye said that the greatest deficiency was in tankers. Another
deficiency was the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. He said that he
thought all of the officers agreed that the Fleet could not operate to the
westward of the Marshall Islands and that even with plenty of tankers, he
doubted that the Fleet could have operated much farther west than that because
of the lack of adequate repair facilities or bases. (p 151) Admiral Pye said
that during the training periods previous to December 7, fuel was being used at
a greater rate than the rate at which fuel was being delivered so that the
reserve was being reduced. (p. 152)
Admiral
Delaney testified that he was familiar with the naval war plans in 1941 (page
500). He stated that WPL‑46 could not have been executed with the forces
then available to CincPac, but some of the tasks might have been carried out
(page 501).
Admiral
Calhoun was familiar with WPL‑46 and the preparation for carrying out the
tasks of the Pacific Fleet (page 931) He said that their tankers were adequate
to maintain the fuel supply at Pearl Harbor (the fuel tanks there were
402 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
filled to capacity on
December 7, 1941), but not sufficient to do this and also to supply the fleet
while operating any considerable distance to the westward of Pearl Harbor and
at high speeds (pages 932‑3). The number of provision ships was
hopelessly inadequate to supply fresh provisions to the fleet if operating to
the westward (page 933). The logistic support of the fleet, however, was
adequate to carry out the initial tasks of WPL‑46, which were of a
limited nature (page 938). There were, he said, personnel shortages in the
Pacific Fleet in 1941 (page 943).
Admiral
C. W. Nimitz testified that he was Chief of BuNav during 1941 (page 947).
Because of the expansion of the fleets and new construction, it was necessary
to draw on the fleets for trained personnel to man new ships. About December,
1941, the ships were fully manned as to officers and about 90 per cent manned
as to men. There was a large proportion of Reserve officers, and a large proportion
of the men were untrained (page 948).