VI. THE WAR PLANS RELATING TO HAWAII AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

 

A. THE PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF HAWAII

 

In the Hewitt investigation, the war plans were fully examined. They were:

1. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five:

On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 86) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 86).

According to this plan. the day of execution was to be designated as W‑Day, and the day upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J‑Day, which might or might not coincide with W‑Day. The plan (Exhibit 35) provided in part:

 

"INTRODUCTION

 

"CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

 

"0101. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M‑day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of thus Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W‑day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day." (Exhibit 85)


*In connection with the relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, it will appear subsequently that there may be questions raised concerning the extent of their knowledge of action taken by one another, particularly after November 27, 1941 their exchange of information, and the degree of cooperation which existed in connection with the Army radar system at Oahu.

 

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"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

 

"1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, com­prising either:

"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand..

"Note:—. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." . . . (Ex. 35)

 

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

 

"131. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth do ABC‑1 is as follows:

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East." (Exhibit 36)

 

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

 

SECTION 3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY ACTION

 

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

"d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

"2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

"3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

"a. Capture of Guam.

"b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of ad­vanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

"d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall‑Caroline‑Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

"e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

"f. Possibly raids on stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

"a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the

 

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Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

"b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.

"c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanoa‑Celebes area (probably main base in Halmahera).

"d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

"e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

"f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area." . . . (Exhibit 36)

 

"PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

 

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED By NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

 

" 2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

"a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

"b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

"c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

"d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155° East;

"e. Defend .Samoa in category 'D';

"f. Defend Guam in category 'F';

"g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

"h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and pre­vent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" . . . (Ex. 35)

 

"CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

 

"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formu­lating tasks the Commander‑in‑Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet unto phases, as follows:

"a. PHASE I‑Initial tasks‑Japan not in the war.

"b. PHASE IA‑Initial tasks‑Japan in the war.

"c. PHASE II, etc., Succeeding tasks.

"2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

"a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.

"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.

"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.

"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M‑Day.

"f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M‑Day.

"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as longitude 165° East.

"h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

 

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"i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Depart­ment.

 " j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,

Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.

"k. Continue training operation. as practicable.

"l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.

"m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan." (Exhibit 36)

 

"PHASE IA

 

"2203. Phase IA tasks areas follows:

"a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.

"b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 e, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.

"c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the Northern Pacific.

"d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Asso­ciated Powers, and of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, chiefly by covering operations.

"e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.

"2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.

"f: Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.

"g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.

"h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian area and the West Coast.

"i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.

"j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.

"k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.

"1. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area." (Exhibit 35)

 

"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

 

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

 

"SECTION 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)

 

" 3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

" 3142. On W‑Day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex 1) ," . . . (Exhibit 36)

 

"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

 

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS‑PHASES I AND IA

 

SECTION 1. PHASE I

 

United States Pacific Fleet

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Place

Date

"Operation Plan

"No. 1‑R5"

"1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O‑1, Rainbow Five.

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communi­cations of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south

 

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of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East; while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan." . . . (Exhibit 35)

 

"ANNEX I

 

United States Pacific Fleet

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Place

Date

"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." . . .

 

"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O‑1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dis­positions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be fur­nished by the Commander‑in‑Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

"2. Phase I.

"This Fleet will, in the Pacific area, protect the territory and sea communi­cations of the Associated Powers by:

"(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast‑Hawaii, (2) Trans-­Pacific westward of Midway, and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

"(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

"(c) Covering.

"(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

 "(e) Routing shipping."  (Ex. 36)

"3.  (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).

"(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

"(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes. practicable.

"(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

"(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

"(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

"(6) Planes engaged to training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

"(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

"(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O‑1).". . . (Exhibit 36)

 

2. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange 14ND‑JCD‑42.

 

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND‑JCD‑42), was signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval Dis­trict (Ex. 80). The plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation which was co apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked. (Ex. 80)

It will be seen that under this Plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.

The tasks assigned were as follows:

"14. Tasks.

"a. JOINT TASK. To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

"b. ARMY TASK. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

 

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"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces." (Ex. 80)

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu). (Ex. 80)

"17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

"a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti‑aircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS‑WHEELER FIELD‑LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

"b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an aerial observation system an outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea con­ducted within range of Army bombers.

"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18.e.

"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coor­dinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intel­ligence.: Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.

"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"k. Counter‑espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"m. Any measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1936, Chapter IX.

"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, shall provide for:

"a. An inshore patrol.

"b. An offshore patrol.

"c. An escort force.

"d. An attack force.

"e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

"f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro‑acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU‑D. C. A. and installation of sub­marine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU‑D. C. A, as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

"h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

"i. Distant reconnaissance.

"j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

"k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

 

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"l.  In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intel­ligence.

"m.. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter‑espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

"o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

"p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities per­taining thereto." (Exhibit 80)

 

3. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941 (Exhibit 47) dealt with joint security measures and protection oaf the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

This provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces were insufficient), and was to become effective when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to. warrant such action.

It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobiliza­tion for war, there were adopted the following agreements:

Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provide that when the Com­manding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distant patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Com­mand Post of the Army Provisional Anti‑Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when; the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit is to their respective organizations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph IV related to joint anti‑aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, baboon barrages, Marine Corps anti‑aircraft artillery, and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means; will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable." (Ex. 47)

 

4. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu.

 

On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph 1 of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situations" which indicated that relations between. the United States and Orange were strained, un­certain, and varying, that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by

 

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a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that  it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete sur­prise (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust; that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier;" and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using. (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was stated that at would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred. (Exhibit 49)

Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Com­mander Naval Base Defense Air Force‑Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons. (Exhibit 49)

 

5. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security, of the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

 

 Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 14CL‑41, from the Commander in Chief; Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.

This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present exist­ing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

 

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Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

C. Sortie and entry.

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The, security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army anti‑aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would, assist the Army in manning them; and pro­vided that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all Fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti‑aircraft gunfire; and that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army, joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti‑aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills, etc.

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

"Anti‑aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth: The Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to origi­nate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding day­light period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accom­panied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means." (Exhibit 8, Naval Court of Inquiry).

 

The war and defense plans relating to Hawaii were contained in Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, U. S. Navy WPL‑46 (Exhibit 4); in United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5, WP‑PAC‑46 (Exhibit 5); in "Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935" (Exhibit 6); and, particularly, in Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Theatre, Orange 14ND‑JCD‑42 (Exhibit 7); and in Operation Plan No. 1‑41, issued by Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense Officer (Exhibit 53).

 

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In accordance with the Basic War Plans, United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 was approved by Admiral Kimmel and issued about July 1, 1941. It was offered in evidence as Exhibit 16. Admiral Smith said that these plans contemplated that the Pacific Fleet was to deny to the enemy the Marshalls and Carolines, and to capture a fleet base in Truk. With the available equipment and personnel, he said, the Marshalls could have been raided, but could not have possibly been captured.

Admiral Pye said that in his opinion, war plan Rainbow 5 was not yet up to date and that he considered that the whole basic war plans had really not been operations plans but development plans and had been used as a lever to get more men, ships and naval shore establishment development. (p. 160)

Admiral Pye said that under the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance off Hawaii was apparently the Navy's under the direction of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 163)

 

The record submitted by the Naval Court refers to, but does not include, copies of Exhibits 4 to 7, inclusive. There was, however, considerable testimony concerning the local plans for the Hawaiian area.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated March 28, 1941 (Exhibit 23) dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements were adopted.

Paragraph II provided for joint air operations. It stated that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander, directing the search operations.

Paragraph III provided for joint communications and, among other things, stated that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which was secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti‑Aircraft. Brigade. It also stated that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and that special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore which would be secured through Navy channels was to be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

Paragraph IV related to joint anti‑aircraft measures, dealt with arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, and Marine Corps anti‑aircraft artillery, and the Army Aircraft Warning Service. This stated that that service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army an "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Nay, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."

 

Admiral Brown said that he would have expected the Army to depend on Navy planes to discover the approach of the enemy. (p 144)

Admiral Bellinger said that the Commanding General of the Army's Air Force at Hawaii apparently expected the Navy would have early information and seemed surprised when Admiral Bellinger told him that they should not expect such information. (p. 131)

 

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ADMIRAL HEWITT'S EXAMINATION

 

Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District in December, 1941, was shown Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated 28 March 1941 (Exhibit 47), which deals with point Army and Navy measures for the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet. Regarding joint anti‑aircraft exercises and drills in the months preceding December, 1941, Captain Earle stated that definite problems were developed for training purposes, which would serve to develop the control features of anti‑aircraft defense and also develop the necessary coordination between Army and Navy operations. In addition, about once in every ten days a drill was held in which planes flew over Pearl Harbor during ether day or night and ships in the harbor simulated anti‑aircraft fore. The Pearl Harbor area was divided into sectors, with a naval sector commander aboard ship responsible for controlling the fire from that sector and making required reports (p. 457‑458).

Captain Earle stated that about once a month a drill was held which entailed locating an aircraft target at a certain bearing from Pearl Harbor, with warnings being sent to both Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier or unit was located at a certain distance and bearing. Fighters planes would then  be sent up and bombers dispatched to attack the simulated target. Captain Earle believed that at least three of these drills were held prior to 7 December 1941, but could not recall the date of the last drill or whether any was held between 27 November and 7 December (p. 168).

Questioned regarding the command set‑up for the joint exercises, Captain Earle said (p. 458‑459):

"My recollection is colored from operations that took place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my belief that the entire problem of this aircraft coordination was handled through the fleet and the Army. In other words, after the word came through that an enemy had been signed on a certain bearing, this word was given to the fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made between the commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate their operations, including order as to detailed directions as to direction, speed, and number of planes to be used, and so forth.

"To amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post or operations center actually set up for these drills before the war. The Operations Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle these drills from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the exact time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just after, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations Office. Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite steps had been taken as to location or details prior to the start of the war. It is my recollection that plans had been made for a joint command post, but this had not gone beyond the planning stage."

Exhibit 47 provided in part that pending completion by the Army of an aircraft warning service, the Navy would by radar and other appropriate means attempt to give such warnings of hostile attacks as might be practicable. Captain Earle said that to implement this agreement, the Navy had established communications with the Army over radio nets and the teletype system, so that any information received could be promptly disseminated; had ordered the communications activities to make prompt report of enemy movements; had directed the few destroyers assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District to promptly report contacts; and since there were no planes attached to the District, had instructed fleet planes to forward immediately to the Army any pertinent information (p. 460).

Captain Earle said that prior to 7 December 1941 the Fourteenth Naval District assigned a liaison officer to General Short's headquarters for general liaison duties (p. 160). Captain Earle stated further that there had been a naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their aircraft warning system installed and that at one time this officer came to ham and asked for assistance. This officer also stated that several naval liaison officers would be required at the warning center. Captain Earle told him that the District Communications Officer would be glad to give him all possible assistance, but that there were no spare personnel an the District who could be used for naval liaison officers at the center (p. 461).

 

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The above agreement was approved April 2, 1941, by Admiral Bloch and General Short.

 

Exhibit 22 is a letter forwarding the joint agreement between General Short and Admiral Bloch and the Joint Estimate, which was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 1, 1941. (p. 86)

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that the Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District would be a member of the Joint Planning Com­mittee established by that plan. Captain Earle, however, did not act formally as a member of that Committee, but said that the Chiefs of Staff acted informally with sub‑committees appointed for the majority of the detailed work. (p. 368)

Captain Earle said that when he first had his assignment as Chief of Staff it took some time to get the plans approved by the Army, but as time went on and various warnings were received, it became easier to accomplish joint action. (p. 369)

Captain Earle said that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not effective during the period preceding the attack, except as to the portion relating to planning. (p. 369)

Concerning annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which required the Army to expedite the warning service and the Navy to endeavor to give warning of hostile attack until such time as the Army system was in operation, Captain Earle had no recollection of discussion of this requirement. Neither did he have any definite recollection of the provision for liaison officers in connection with the dissemination of informa­tion, but vaguely recalled some talk with a fleet radar officer on the question of assignment of Navy personnel, and recalled that he told the fleet radar officer that as soon as they could get somebody who was qualified they would be glad to turn him over to the Army. (p. 369)

Captain Earle's recollection was vague as to other provisions of the Joint Plan such as procedure for recognition of aircraft and the use of barrage balloons, etc. (p. 370) Captain Earle could recall no plan for the coordination of Fleet anti‑aircraft fire with Army anti‑aircraft fire in the Pearl Harbor area. Captain Earle discussed generally his recollection of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 372‑3)

 

To the agreement was annexed Addendum One, dated March 31, 1941. Adden­dum One was a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.

 

Concerning the estimate in Admiral Bellinger's air plan that the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack, Admiral Pye said that the estimate did not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that than to do something else. (p. 160)

 

In paragraph I of the addendum there was a "Summary of the Situation." The summary indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange bad never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which Initiated hostile action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with nor prior warning from our Intelligence service.

Paragraph II of the addendum was a "Survey of Opposing Strengths." This indicated, among other things, that Orange might send into the are one or more, submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. Also that the most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure, that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

Paragraph III of the addendum dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." This stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two. Further, that it appeared that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be

 

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an air attack, which would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. That a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. It was also stated that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships ac­companied by a carrier." It was further stated that in a dawn air attack there was a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

Paragraph IV of the addendum dealt with "Action Open to Us." This stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. It contained other types of action open in the event of .a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the Island, and stated that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.

Paragraph V contained the "Decisions." The primary decision was that this force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. There were a number of subsidiary decisions, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force‑Commander Patrol Wing Two, and was to include various units in accord­ance with current conditions of readiness. These units included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons, among others.

Admiral Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 1‑41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit ‑53): The Task Organization prescribed was (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol), consisting of two destroy­ers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, an A/B boom and minesweepers, (b) Base Defense Air Force, (Commander Patrol Wing Two). In conjunction with the Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed attention to, among other things, the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and stated:

"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as, necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear", signals.

 

"ASSUMPTIONS

 

"(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing condi­tions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided na­tions of such powers may attempt:

"(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

"(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruc­tion in the channel.

"(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

"(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

"(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

"(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

"(3) A combination of these two—possible."

A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan was Annex "A" to Operation Plan 1‑41, a de­tailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was Annex "Baker," a detailed Anti­-Aircraft Defense Plan was Annex "C", a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan was Annex "D", and a detailed Communications Plan was Annex "Easy."

Annex "Baker", the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, was dated April 9, 1941, prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch.

 

According to Admiral Bloch, after Admiral Kimmel assumed command and before information was received about the correspondence between the

 

394                                           CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War dealing with the Pearl Harbor defenses, Admiral Kimmel reviewed certain information that had been left by Admiral Richardson and decided that since the ships had anti­aircraft batteries, they should be used to the fullest extent to increase the volume of fire and protection that the Fleet would have in the harbor. He also decided that since the Navy also had a number of planes on shore many of which were carrier planes that had been sent ashore while the carriers were alongside, they also should be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned Admiral Halsey and Admiral Ballinger to Admiral Bloch to talk over with the Army the coordination of action of the airplanes. Conferences were held with the Army authorities and an agreement reached with the Army under which all fighter planes, including Navy fighter planes on shore at the time of an attack, would be placed under the Army's command and that all bombers would be turned over to the Navy. (p. 4)

Admiral Bloch said that generally speaking, he took no exception to the Air Defense Plan which had been worked out by Admiral Ballinger and General Martin. (p. 89)

Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel had a copy of the Joint Air Operat­ing Plan; that it was fair to assume that he must have known about the plan; and that General Short also must have known about the plan. (p. 89)

Admiral Smith said that the Commander‑in‑Chief was apprised of all of the plans made by the Army and by Admiral Bloch. However, Admiral Smith did not recall the Joint Defense Plan, Exhibit 5. (p. 37)

 

It divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons, and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with, among, other things, the Joint Estimate, dated March 31, 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas. The plan was effective upon receipt and would become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by des­patch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum Two to this plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Com­FOURTEEN) for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a letter, such as "E", signifying that all aircraft were conducting routine operations and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and the condition of operational readiness by a number, such as "5", signifying that all types of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was also required that a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan stating the number of planes and readiness.

General Short testified that the local joint defense plan was in effect prior to the attack, but was not in operation because, he said, it was predicated on the Rainbow Plan which had not been executed, and, therefore, the action taken under it prior to the attack was only drills (pages 259‑260).

Admiral Bellinger testified that about March 1, 1941, CincPac directed him to report to ComFOURTEEN to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Force. He did so and worked with Major General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. The operations plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans, the most im­portant of which was the plan for the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which out­lined the proposed employment of all units made available to that force (page 661):

Army and Navy orders he said, were based on the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941. He believed this estimate was sound, but that unity of command was missing (page 662). The plan was to function through mutual cooperation of the Army and Navy, and the Naval Base Defense Air Force could. function only in an emergency or when proper authority directed. The composition varied with the planes made available by the various Army and Navy commanders; the determining factor of availability was the daily employment schedule of planes belonging to various units. Available planes were subject to operational control only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a function­ing status.

The normal procedure for vitalizing this organization for drill was an "air raid" dispatch from ComFourteen, as Base Defense Force Commander; then Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Commander, would send a dispatch to all units which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuits, ordering them to

 

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place all available planes in highest readiness; searches would immediately be started then, and an attack on enemy surface forces when located (page 662).

The authority of "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Officer" was non­existent until an emergency was apparent or appropriate authority placed that force in a functioning status, and when called into existence covered not pursuit, but only the search and attack groups of that force (page 663). The planes ac­tually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on naval base defense (page 663) .

Admiral Kimmel, he said, made final approval for naval aircraft operation. He or ComFourteen could vitalize the NBDA Force. ComFourteen worked under CincPac. NBDA Force was not composed of all aircraft but only of aircraft reported available (page 665).

Their estimate, he said, that "it appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence service" was an estimate of hostile action and not of Japa­nese war plans (page 666).

In summary, the NBDA Force would come into being in the event of: (a) a drill, (b) an actual emergency, (c) orders from higher authority based on infor­mation as to the imminence of attack (page 678).

 

Admiral Bloch said that the agreement with the Army concerning the use of aircraft was effective from the date of signature and would be put in exe­cution in the same manner as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. (P. 7)

 

B. TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE WAR PLANS IN GENERAL

 

Admiral Bellinger stated that unity of command is essential to the preparation for meeting such an air attack as that on Pearl Harbor; the organization, operat­ing twenty‑four hours a day, must be fully manned and functioning. Recon­naissance, radar nets, complete information regarding shipping, and control of all aircraft in. the zone of operations are essential. Such an organization must be in effect and functioning smoothly before the attack. Not much can be expected from a mutual cooperative organization existing only on paper, developed only through intermittent drills (p. 510).

 

It appears from the testimony of various of the witnesses that (1) the decisive theater, as laid down in the war plans, was the Atlantic, and that the military strategy in the Pacific was to be defensive; (2) that the primary responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's, and that the Navy was to assist the Army in that task; (3) that the method of command at Pearl Harbor was one of joint cooperation between the Army and Navy and not unity of command; (4) that the principal mission which had been assigned to the Pacific Fleet was to train for war with Japan; and (5) that the war plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the fleet technically mobilized.

 

(1) The decisive theatre the Atlantic; defensive strategy in the Pacific.

 

Admiral Bloch said that "Rainbow I" contemplated the United States at war with the Axis Powers, including Japan, without any assistance except perhaps some of the South American Republics; JCD was based on that plan; "Rainbow 3" was based on the assumption that the United States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the Axis nations, including Japan; he believed that the provisions of "Rainbow 5" were about the same as in the earlier plans insofar as they related to the Fourteenth Naval District. No. 1 was a purely defensive plan. No. 3 had certain offensive tasks in it, and he did not recall the tasks assigned by "Rainbow 5." (P 23)

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, on December 7, 1941, was assistant War Plans Officer to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, and was under then Captain McMorris. He was responsible for the preparation of the written war plans for the Pacific Fleet which were required to implement the basic Navy war plans then in effect. He had reported for that duty on February 1, 1941. (p 66)

Admiral McCormick said that the commitments of the Pacific Fleet for the first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 Plan, in general were to defend the United States and its possessions, some of which were in special categories such as Guam, which was regarded as more or less in­defensible; to divert the Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier by

 

396                                           CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

raids, and the capture of positions in the Marshall Islands; to protect our sea communications; and to raid or interrupt Japanese communications east of longitude 180. This provided, therefore, for the use of task forces composed of combatant ships for offensive operations consisting of raids, and if the use of a covering force were taken into account it might be said that the whole of the Fleet would thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first phase. (p. 66‑7) In his opinion, had the three carriers which were attached to the Fleet been available, they could have raided an island in the fringes of the Marshalls without undue risk. There were only two carriers available around December 7th, but it is Admiral McCormick's belief that Admiral Kimmel intended to carry out the plan even with the two carriers which were then available. The operating schedules were more or less built around the war plans insofar as the operations of the task forces were concerned. (p. 67)

Captain Glover worked on portions of Rainbow 5, which was completed in May. The plan contemplated, he said, the dispatch of certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. (p. 161) According to Captain Glover, the plan gave the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, an offensive task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. Also, to divert the enemy strength from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. Captain Glover's concept of the plan was that initially, the attitude of the Pacific Fleet was to be defensive and that it did not have the means available to assume an outright offensive. The movements which he had mentioned were to be classed as raids rather than movement of total force and he considered that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was sufficient for such raids. (p. 173)

Captain Glover said that he thought that WPL‑46 represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time and a calculated risk in the Pacific and that the plan was elastic.

Captain Glover referred to a memo, dated August 21, 3941, to the Plans Section of the War Plans Division re: "Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan ­Rainbow No. 5." This indicated that the Plans Section was charged with preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect and continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice might be given in regard to matters relating to the execution of the plan.

No change was made in Rainbow 5 prior to December, according to Captain Glover. (p.174)

Admiral Turner discussed the background and form of WPL-46, known as Rainbow 5. (p. 251‑2) Admiral Turner said that the contributory plan of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, was approved by the Navy Depart­ment in about September, 1941. Concerning the offensive tasks of the war plan, Admiral Turner said, "So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls. The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and or­ganizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a compara­tively short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether in writing or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the forces suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There was no disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory. But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it. While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific." (p. 252)

Captain Wellborn said that his recollection was that generally the officers concerned with the preparation of the war plans were of the view that the initial major effort must be in the Atlantic. (p 383‑4)

Concerning the concept that Germany was the principal enemy to be first disposed of, Admiral Ingersoll said: "Naturally, there was a discussion of the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized that if Japan

 

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entered the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Never­theless, the United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive warfare in both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major effort would be made in ode ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy to be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member, Italy, and that after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could con­centrate on Japan. I do not recall that there was any formal representation made to the Chief of Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At some time during 1941, the general features of WPL‑46 were explained at a conference in the Navy Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary Hull, and I believe the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were present. I'm quite sure that the general consensus of opinion was that Germany should be eliminated first, after Italy, and then Japan." (p. 422)

 

Admiral Stark testified that the over‑all military strategy which regarded the Atlantic as the decisive theatre had been established by the President, the Secre­tary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy (pages 80-1). Despite this, however, he said, the Atlantic did not have exactly priority over the Pacific, and he did not believe that men had been transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic (page 794).

Admiral Smith testified that he thought the CNO considered the Atlantic more important than the Pacific since in May, 1941, the best BB's, four CL's, and two squadrons of DD's were secretly transferred to the Atlantic (pages 529‑30).

 

Admiral Smith said that in May, 1941, the YORKTOWN, Battleship Division Three, Cruiser Division Eight, and two squadrons of destroyers were detached and sent to the Atlantic; these he said were equipped with all of the modern devices that they had tried to get for them while they were attached to the Pacific Fleet. (p. 38)

 

(2) Testimony concerning the primary responsibility for defense.

 

Both Admiral Stark (page 193) and Admiral Kimmel (page 294) testified that the basic responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's. The Army, Admiral Kimmel said, had the duty of locating and engaging enemy aircraft before they reached their objectives; the Navy was to support the Army. The Army had the duty of repulsing air attack by artillery, the Navy to assist. Under the joint plan, the Army operated ail pursuit planes and the Navy all bombers and patrol planes (page 295).

Admiral Pye stated that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor, assisted by the Navy in such manner as possible (page 438).

Admiral Bloch stated that the method of command was joint cooperation and that the Army's task under JCD‑42 was to hold Oahu against attack and sup­port the naval forces (page 385, Exhibit 7); the Navy's task was to patrol and control the coastal zone and to support the Army (page 386).

 

Admiral Bloch said that it might be stated that the Navy had no respon­sibility because there was nothing said in the Joint Coastal Defense Plan to the effect that the Navy had any responsibility for protecting Pearl Harbor against air attack, but yet, by 2CL the Commander‑in‑Chief felt the necessity to help out on account of the fact that he had means that he could use. (p. 11)

 

Admirals Ingersoll, Delaney, and Smith testified that under JCD‑42 the Army was responsible for the defense of Hawaii (pages 848, 505, 551).

Admiral Kitts testified that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 521). The Navy's function was to support the Army. When ships wire in port, the guns of the Fleet were made available to Army command through the Base Defense Officer (page 521).

Admiral McMorris said that the Fleet was not charged with its own defense while in Pearl Harbor.

 

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the phrase "territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area," as used in sub‑paragraph (h) page 24, of the "Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, (WPPac‑46)", (Exhibit 36), included Hawaii, and that the duty prescribed in sub‑paragraph (m) of Phase I of the Initial Tasks which was to "guard against a surprise attack by Japan," contemplated that it was a task of the Pacific Fleet to guard Hawaii against the surprise attack by Japan. (Page 295‑296).

 

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Vice Admiral McMorris further testified, with reference to the statements in the "Summary of the Situation" appearing in Addendum I to the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A‑1‑41 dated March 31, 1941, to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded by "a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor," that he agreed with the thought there expressed but had considered such an attack much more probable in the approaches to Pearl Harbor than in Pearl Harbor itself. (Page 299‑301).

Vice Admiral McMorris also testified that at or about the time of the issuance of the Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL‑41 (Revised), dated Oc­tober 14, 1941, he agreed with the assumption therein stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by either a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, or a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, or by a combi­nation of both of those two forms of attack. (Page 301‑302).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he had no specific recollection yet he entertained no doubt that he had reviewed, Annex VIII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier or Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and also that he had reviewed Addendum I of Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A‑1‑41, dated March 31, 1941. (Page 297‑298).

 

but CinCPac was concerned over the safety of the Fleet and felt a responsibility for urging the strengthening of the defenses (page 899).

 

Admiral McMorris said that Admiral Kimmel had felt an overall respon­sibility for safeguarding the Fleet, although he did look to ComFOURTEEN and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to protect Hawaii. (p. 239)

 

General Marshall said that the Army was responsible for protecting Pearl Harbor against air attack; the Navy was to do long distance patrol and to search for and to attack hostile surface ships (page 855). The mission of the Hawaiian Air Force was to defend Oahu against air attack in cooperation with fleet aircraft and to attack hostile vessels (page 863).

Colonel Phillips testified that the Army's mission was the defense of the island, but that the Navy was jointly responsible (page 479).

 

(3) Command by joint cooperation, not unity of command.

 

Admiral Bellinger said that one of the main impediments of the air agree­ment and of the air organizations was the provision requiring agreement between the Commanding General and the Navy Base Defense Officer that a hostile raid was sufficiently imminent to warrant action; the set‑up that existed was a paper organization which could not really function to prevent or take action in an air attack; it was not the primary objective of either the Army of the Navy; there was no unity of command or control. (p. 119‑120)

He said that if the Commanding General or he had seen an emergency situation, he felt that the Commanding General would have cooperated in any specific instance. Drills had been arranged previously by special arrangement with the Army. (p. 120)

Admiral Bellinger said that he did not talk over with Admiral Kimmel the possibility of a carrier raid by the Japanese nor was the wording of his esti­mate discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and that Admiral Kimmel knew, of course, that Admiral Bellinger was not satisfied with the organization's set­up because it was based on too much cooperation and on the assumption that it would go into effect when an emergency arose, and that no such organization is any good unless it functions on a 24‑hour basis. There were, he said, insufficient personnel to have an organization functioning on that basis. (p. 122‑3)

Admiral Bellinger said that when the situation in the Pacific grew more tense, those portions of his estimate dealing with a carrier raid came back to his mind; he remembered discussing the subject matter with a high Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he complimented Admiral Bellinger on the organization that had been set up, and Admiral Bellinger told him that that was all right but it would not work in case of war and indicated that there must be unity of command to make it work and also additional facilities and equipment. (p. 123)

Admiral Bellinger said that he did not think that any joint plan based on cooperation alone would or could function properly in an emergency and he mentioned his more or less dissatisfaction with the general set‑up of this air defense, both personally in conversation with Admiral Kimmel and also at one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of the Navy. (p. 124)

 

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Admiral Bellinger ended his testimony with a statement which in part was as follows:

"Although it was realized that facilities, personnel, and equipment were inadequate for proper and continuous air defense, the main idea was to evolve a plan and organization that would make the most of the tools that were available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to think that such a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of cooperation by the Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by special orders or by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non‑existent except during periodic drills, could go into action and function effectively at the occurrence of an actual emergency. An organization of this nature to be effective must function twenty‑four hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent thereto. However, considering shortages, and deficiencies, other necessary employment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little, if any more, in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances, could have done more. I know this, that the existing deficiencies, the varied duties and schedules of employment, the lack of authority due to lack of unity of command, placed the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force in a very embarrassing position." (p. 134)

Captain Glover said that unity of command for Hawaii had been discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action.

Admiral Pye said that for at least ten years before the attack, he felt that there was need for unity of command at Pearl Harbor; for more than a year before the attack, he had advised several Commanders‑in‑Chief that coor­dination was not adequate and that they should get some Army officers on their staff so that it would be better arranged at least. (p. 168)

 

Concerning the absence of unity of command, Admiral Stark testified that thought had been given to unity of command for the whole area, but that no satisfactory solution had been reached (page 29). He said that the President or Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War could have put unity of command in effect. Admiral Stark and General Marshall could have, subject to approval, he said, of the Secretaries. Local Army and Navy commanders could have done so by agreement. Admiral Bloch probably could not have acted independently of Admiral Kimmel (page 39). He occupied, under directive, a dual status when directed by OPNAV or on "M" day (page 41).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not discuss with the Army the desirability of invoking unity of command. Unity of command would have made operations easier. ComFOURTEEN could not, he said, have invoked unity of command without reference to him, and he would have referred the matter to the Navy Department (page 296).

Admiral Ingersoll said that unity of command at Hawaii was not discussed at the Secretary's and CNO's conferences when he was present (page 848).

Admiral Turner and General Marshall both said that there had been discussion of unity of command, but that no decision had been reached (pages 858, 1009).

 

Admiral Turner said, "That had been discussed at great length with the Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain cases in WPL‑46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on shore." (p.271)

 

(4) The principal mission which had been assigned was training for war.

 

Admiral Ingersoll said that he was familiar with the problems of the Pacific Fleet in 1941. The Pacific Fleet was assigned its missions in the War Plans, and until war broke out its major mission was to prepare for war (page 820).

Admiral Smith testified that the principal mission of the Pacific Fleet during 1941 was training for war with Japan (page 529). And this was not changed prior to December 7th (page 539).

 

(5) The plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the Fleet technically mobilized.

 

Admiral Stark admittedly sent out no order to mobilize under WPL‑46 (page 102) .

Admiral Pye discussed the various phases of mobilization at page 440.

 

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Admiral Smith's testimony concerning WPL‑46 and the assigned tasks of the Pacific Fleet appears at pages 541‑2. He said that the War Plan was not executed by the Navy Department before the attack (page 561).

Admiral Delaney said that no "M" day was set prior to December 7, 1941 (page 505). He did not consider the Fleet mobilized because of deficiencies in men and material.

Admiral McMorris said that the War Plans, which were not executed provided that the greater part of the patrol planes of the Fleet were to be advanced to Midway and Wake and a minimum number to be left under control of the sea frontier, based on Pearl Harbor (pages 901‑2).

Admiral Bloch also said that no parts of JCD‑42 (Exhibit 7) were executed prior to December 7th; parts of appendix VII thereof were in effect in regard to agreements for tactical control of aircraft in case of attack (page 386).

Admiral Turner, on page 1011, discussed the Rainbow War Plans and their development; WPL‑46 was a realistic plan. Mobilization without war, he said, is not practical in a democracy as the authority of Congress to mobilize is tantamount to a declaration of war. The Fleet was, however, so mobilized that the only thing left to be done by mobilization was the taking over of merchant shipping which can only be taken after war is declared. Execution of a part of WPL‑46 would have been an act of war. Provision for the execution of a part of the plan was put in to provide for war with Germany without war with Japan (page 1012).

Admiral Ingersoll (page 844), read Articles 3721 and 3722 of WPL‑46 (Exhibit 4). Mobilization of the Fleet, he said, was not ordered because the Fleet was in effect already mobilized. In this connection, the Government did not want to take any action that could be considered an overt act, and mobilization is always an act preliminary to war (page 845).

Admiral McMorris said that no technical execution of WPL‑46 was necessary, he thought, to put the Fleet on a war footing; it was on a war footing (page 895).

It may be noted that Admiral Kimmel was aware, at the end of November and early in December, that WPL‑46 was not yet in effect and that one of the first steps which his War Plans Officer recommended be taken in the event of American-Japanese war, was to send dispatches to Task Force Commanders advising that WPL‑46 was effective (Exhibits 69A and 69B).

 

C. ADEQUACY OF FLEET GENERALLY TO CARRY OUT ITS TASKS

 

Admiral Stark testified that certain, units were detached from the Pacific Fleet during 1941 for an amphibious operation in the Atlantic. The units transferred in June were three BB's, four CA's, one CV, and, one DesRon, which amounted to about 25 per cent of the Pacific Fleet (pages 100‑101).

He stated that from October to December, 1941, the Pacific Fleet was considered adequate to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL‑46 (pages 23, 25); and later testified that in 1941 the United States did not have sufficient men and material to meet an attack on one ocean, much less in both (page 800).

 

Admiral Ingersoll said that the Pacific Fleet was regarded as adequate to carry out the initial tasks prescribed for it in the War Plans, which were primarily defensive with the exception of diversionary raids against the Carolines and the Marshalls. (p 421‑2) Admiral Ingersoll discussed the transfer of ships of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic which he said was in accordance with the basic concept of the War Plans which indicated that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis powers. These contemplated that the British would release certain forces for the Far East but Admiral Ingersoll did not know why it took until November, 1941, for a small detachment of British capital ships to arrive in the Indian Ocean. (p. 419)

 

Admiral Turner considered that the Pacific Fleet was fully prepared on November 26th to carry out missions assigned to it in the War Plans. These missions were defensive, except for possible raids (page 1017).

 

Admiral Turner said that forces were withdrawn from the Pacific Fleet to support an occupation of the Azores but that project was abandoned and the occupation of Iceland was substituted and some of the forces which lead been withdrawn were then returned to the Pacific.

Admiral Turner said that he did not recall any official protest by Admiral Kimmel concerning the detachment of units to the Pacific Fleet, but that Admiral Kimmel did not approve the matter. (p. 253)

Admiral Turner discussed the Rainbow Plan No. 3, the practice of keeping the war plans up to date and the movement of forces in accordance with the commitments of the war plans. Concerning the adequacy of the Fleet,

 

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Admiral Turner said, "We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover that was being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up defenses in outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston Island, and Samoa. These places were all strengthened, air fields were built or in process of building, and we were distributing forces to those positions. The principal reason for building the defenses there was to detect and ward off enemy attacks against Hawaii, and to afford defensive cover for the sea operations of our Fleet. It was not possible, of course, to provide such a cover to the northward, and that was always recognized as a weak spot in our defense. I may say that I, personally, was not in favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was too far removed for proper support, and was certain to fall at an early date after the war broke out unless we could have an early successful engagement with the Japanese Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other positions were considered of great value and work was pushed on all of them to the limit of our available resources. As regards the strength of the Pacific Fleet, we felt that it was adequate for the tasks assigned to it, although we would have been happy to have had greater strength." (p. 256)

Admiral Turner said that the Fleet logistics were believed to be adequate for initial Fleet operations. (p. 257) .

 

According to Admiral McMorris, while there were deficiencies in the Pacific Fleet, he felt that it would be effective to carry out the missions of WPL‑46. WPL‑46 was based on the Japanese starting war (page 893). The Fleet would have been alerted by dispatch and was advised for sometime that the situation was tense (page 894).

 

Admiral McMorris was of the View that the Pacific Fleet was adequate to carry out the missions assigned to it in the War Plans, although there were many marked deficiencies in the Fleet, particularly in anti‑submarine craft. He said that he thought that Admiral Kimmel considered that the Pacific Fleet did consist of strong naval forces which could be effectively employed notwithstanding some handicaps. (p. 234)

Admiral McMorris said that he was not happy over the logistics situation, but certainly not discouraged over it. (p. 235)

Admiral McMorris thought the intention of Admiral Kimmel with respect to the carrying out of the War Plans in the event of war was to sweep for Japanese merchant ships, to make immediate reconnaissance of the Marshalls, to carry out as expeditiously as possible operations to establish our forces in the Marshalls, and to inaugurate patrol plane searches in the approaches to Hawaii. (p. 235)

 

Admiral Pye testified that the Pacific Fleet could have operated as far as the Marshall Islands, but no farther (page 431). It would have been difficult to operate long there because of the scarcity of tankers. Fuel was also short (page 432), but there was sufficient to operate up to 7 December. The fleet would have been more effective if the detachment had not been sent to the Atlantic (page 432).

 

Concerning the detachment of three battleships, four cruisers and a squadron of destroyers in June of 1941, Admiral Pye said that this materially reduced the power of the Pacific Fleet, but that it did not make much difference in what the Pacific Fleet could have accomplished because the situation with regard to logistics was such that the Fleet could not have operated more than 2,500 miles from Honolulu no matter what its strength. Admiral Pye said that the greatest deficiency was in tankers. Another deficiency was the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. He said that he thought all of the officers agreed that the Fleet could not operate to the westward of the Marshall Islands and that even with plenty of tankers, he doubted that the Fleet could have operated much farther west than that because of the lack of adequate repair facilities or bases. (p 151) Admiral Pye said that during the training periods previous to December 7, fuel was being used at a greater rate than the rate at which fuel was being delivered so that the reserve was being reduced. (p. 152)

 

Admiral Delaney testified that he was familiar with the naval war plans in 1941 (page 500). He stated that WPL‑46 could not have been executed with the forces then available to CincPac, but some of the tasks might have been carried out (page 501).

Admiral Calhoun was familiar with WPL‑46 and the preparation for carrying out the tasks of the Pacific Fleet (page 931) He said that their tankers were adequate to maintain the fuel supply at Pearl Harbor (the fuel tanks there were

 

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filled to capacity on December 7, 1941), but not sufficient to do this and also to supply the fleet while operating any considerable distance to the westward of Pearl Harbor and at high speeds (pages 932‑3). The number of provision ships was hopelessly inadequate to supply fresh provisions to the fleet if operating to the westward (page 933). The logistic support of the fleet, however, was adequate to carry out the initial tasks of WPL‑46, which were of a limited nature (page 938). There were, he said, personnel shortages in the Pacific Fleet in 1941 (page 943).

Admiral C. W. Nimitz testified that he was Chief of BuNav during 1941 (page 947). Because of the expansion of the fleets and new construction, it was neces­sary to draw on the fleets for trained personnel to man new ships. About Decem­ber, 1941, the ships were fully manned as to officers and about 90 per cent manned as to men. There was a large proportion of Reserve officers, and a large propor­tion of the men were untrained (page 948).