X. RECONNAISSANCE TOWARD JALUIT

 

Captain Layton testified that in the latter part of November, 1941, either Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnaissance and re­quested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence maternal for briefing. The recon­naissance never materialized, he stated, because only one plane arrived, and there were delays due to uncompleted camera installations. He was never informed that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that the reconnaissance

 

408                                           CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

be made at the earliest possible date and Admiral Kimmel, upon receipt of Captain Layton's memorandum concerning information he had obtained at the conference, asked him how soon the. reconnaissance might be expected. Captain Layton advised the Admiral to the effect that the delay was due to non‑installation. or non‑completion of installation of cameras and that the time was still not defi­nitely fixed. There is in evidence a photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28th from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance (Exhibit 28). Captain Layton stated that the question of using Navy planes for this reconnaissance was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY "Catalinas" could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls would have been an overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand, would have been ostensibly flying from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the Philippines. Captain Layton was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be carried out to check on his information as to the presence or absence of air strength, and carriers, submarines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including Truk (p. 265‑267).

Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnais­sance flight over the Mandated Islands (p. 499).

 

Admiral Bloch stated that long range reconnaissance was instituted in the summer of 1941 when he received some Intelligence information, and thought that it would be advisable to make long distance reconnaissance on a sector toward Jaluit (page 1139). Admiral Bloch went to Admiral Kimmel and recommended that he put in this service. He thought it was to 500 miles out (page 1140).

 

Admiral Bloch said: "In 1941, possibly July or August, some tense situa­tion arose and I cannot recall how we received information of it, whether it was by letter to the Commander‑in‑Chief or the radio. At any rate, Admiral Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advisability of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes with the median line of the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 to 20 degrees. And we sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted the suggestion and sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued." (p. 14)

Admiral Bloch said that somewhere about the summer of 1941, after the President by Executive Order designated Midway, Wake, Palmyra and Johnston as defensive sea areas, Admiral Bloch gave the commanding officers instructions that planes which came in and were not identified as friendly were to be fired on. (p. 14)