X.
RECONNAISSANCE TOWARD JALUIT
Captain Layton testified that in the latter part of November,
1941, either Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian
Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number,
Colonel Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnaissance
and requested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives
and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence maternal for briefing.
The reconnaissance never materialized, he stated, because only one plane
arrived, and there were delays due to uncompleted camera installations. He was
never informed that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was
destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that
the reconnaissance
408 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be made at the earliest possible date and
Admiral Kimmel, upon receipt of Captain Layton's memorandum concerning
information he had obtained at the conference, asked him how soon the.
reconnaissance might be expected. Captain Layton advised the Admiral to the
effect that the delay was due to non‑installation. or non‑completion
of installation of cameras and that the time was still not definitely fixed.
There is in evidence a photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28th from
Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance (Exhibit 28).
Captain Layton stated that the question of using Navy planes for this
reconnaissance was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY
"Catalinas" could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls
would have been an overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand, would
have been ostensibly flying from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the
Philippines. Captain Layton was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance
be carried out to check on his information as to the presence or absence of air
strength, and carriers, submarines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls
area, including Truk (p. 265‑267).
Admiral Bellinger
recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance flight over the
Mandated Islands (p. 499).
Admiral
Bloch stated that long range reconnaissance was instituted in the summer of
1941 when he received some Intelligence information, and thought that it would
be advisable to make long distance reconnaissance on a sector toward Jaluit
(page 1139). Admiral Bloch went to Admiral Kimmel and recommended that he put
in this service. He thought it was to 500 miles out (page 1140).
Admiral Bloch said: "In 1941, possibly July or August,
some tense situation arose and I cannot recall how we received information of
it, whether it was by letter to the Commander‑in‑Chief or the
radio. At any rate, Admiral Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I
suggested to him the advisability of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes
with the median line of the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was
15 to 20 degrees. And we sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted
the suggestion and sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued."
(p. 14)
Admiral Bloch said that somewhere about the summer of 1941,
after the President by Executive Order designated Midway, Wake, Palmyra and
Johnston as defensive sea areas, Admiral Bloch gave the commanding officers
instructions that planes which came in and were not identified as friendly were
to be fired on. (p. 14)