XI.
THE FREEZING OF JAPANESE ASSETS—DETERIORATION OF SITUATION AND FLEET SECURITY
ORDER
A.
THE FREEZING ORDER
On
July 24, 1941 (Exhibit 71), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart and sent a copy
of the letter to Admiral Kimmel which, among other things, referred to a two‑hour
conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that he
thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that the United States and Japan
avoid an open rupture; they had a very plain talk; that Admiral Stark liked
him, and that he had many friends in the Navy that he had dwelt at length on
Japan's need for the rice and minerals of Indo‑China; that Admiral
Stark's guess was that with the establishment of bases in Indo‑China,
Japan would stop for the time being, consolidate her positions and await world
reaction; that no doubt the Japanese would use their Indo‑China bases
from which to take early action against the Burma Road; of course, there was
the possibility that they would strike at Borneo, but Admiral Stark doubted
this in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them.
Admiral Stark also said that he had talked with the President and hoped no open
rupture would come but conditions were not getting better.
Admiral Schuirmann did not recall the extent to which the
office of the Chief of Naval Operations participated in the decisions to
establish "moral embargoes" to prevent the export to Japan of various
strategic commodities. (p. 406) He did remember that there was a discussion of
the question of Japanese reaction particularly to the oil embargo and that
Admiral Stark expressed the view that a total embargo on oil would of necessity
force the Japanese to move south or to collapse. (p. 407)
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 409
In
connection with Admiral Stark's conversations with Nomura, it may be noted that
on July 25, 1941, Nomura reported (Document 1, Exhibit 63) to Tokyo that:
"Apparently
Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations,
for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him.
His opinions concerning U. S.‑Japanese relations coincide with mine; he
once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be
mutual exhaustion.
"Once
while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed
to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of
excellent character and qualifications.
"To
this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is
true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he
continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the
highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been
kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.
"Please
relay this information to the Navy."
Admiral
Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark on July 26th (Exhibit 34), requesting information
as to steps to be taken iv the event of Russian participation in the war, and
making various requests for equipment.
According
to Admiral Stark, the Navy Department knew of the proposal to freeze Japanese
assets but was not consulted prior to the issuance of the Executive Order.
Admiral Turner said that he did not participate in any
discussion prior to the freezing order, but was informed of it after the
decision was made. (p. 258)
Admiral Schuirmann believed that the Executive Order freezing
Japanese credits was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department.
He did not recall any reports by the Navy to the State Department concerning
the Navy's readiness in the Pacific as balanced against the risks of the
freezing order. Admiral Schuirmann said that his own state of mind was that the
Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo‑China and perhaps Malaya
and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States in hopes that
the division of opinion in the United States would delay effective measures by
the United States. (p. 408)
Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall whether or not
the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing the order in
July freezing Japanese credits. (p. 422)
He stated that he
advised the State Department that if the United States embargoed oil shipments
to Japan, Japan would go to war but "not necessarily with the United
States," and that such an embargo should not be made effective unless this
country were prepared to accept the risk of war (pages 43‑45).
Admiral
Turner said that the freezing order was issued without any particular advance
knowledge on his part, although he had heard it mentioned previously. He
thought this meant a war between Japan and the United States (page 989).
Admiral Turner said that the Navy and War Departments both
felt that the freezing of Japanese credits would almost surely result in war
with Japan within a comparatively short period of time. (p. 254)
As
a result of the freezing order the Japanese, according to Admiral Schuirmann,
conducted a bitter press campaign against the United States (page 198). And,
General Short testified, relations became strained and he noticed uneasiness in
the local Japanese population (page 247). Admiral Kimmel stated that this
worsened Japanese‑United States relations (page 296).
B.
FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION
The
correspondence between Admirals Stark and Kimmel indicated that the situation
in the Far East continued to deteriorate, and that the conversations with
Nomura were not improving the situation. Thus, in a letter dated July 31, 1941
(Exhibit 72), he discussed the over‑all situation, and stated that
"after the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that
they should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along with
the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies; that he thought
it fairly safe to say that opinion here in general held that Japan would not go
into the N. E. I.; but that Turner thought Japan would go into the Maritime
Provinces in August and that
410 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Turner might be right
and usually was; Admiral Stark's thought had been that while Japan could
ultimately go into Siberia she would delay going until she had the Indo‑China‑Thailand
situation more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of
the Russian‑German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia
and that he hoped that Russia and Germany would exhaust themselves; that a
Europe dominated by Russia was no more, and in fact, less attractive picture
than a Europe dominated by the Nazis. A postscript to this letter stated, among
other things, that "obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to
deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual."
In
a letter of August 28, 1941 (Exhibit 11), Admiral Stark, among other things,
discussed the status of the Japanese situation and said that the Japanese
seemed to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some
very strong messages had been sent to them, but just what they were going to do
Admiral Stark did not know; that he had told one of their statesmen that
another move, such as the one into Thailand, would go a long ways toward
destroying before the American public what good will still remained; that
Admiral Stark had had some extremely frank talks with them; that Admiral Stark
had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he could wish the
thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.
Admiral
Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter of September 12, 1941 (Exhibit
36), such as whether he should not change his orders and issue orders to shoot
to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel also raised
the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the
vicinity. He said, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all
contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we
now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"
Admiral
Stark answered on September 23, 1941 (Exhibit 12, 37), and stated, among other
things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders only for the
Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the longer they could keep
the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. He
said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those
set forth in Article 723 of the Navy Regulations, which Article was quoted. The
Article provides for the use of force in self‑preservation, in the sound
judgment of responsible officers, as a last resort.
The
letter also stated, in connection with the question of submarine contacts that
they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated in
close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that
existing orders, i.e. not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive
sea areas, were appropriate, and continued: "If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive,
evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United
States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against
such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."
Admiral
Stark also stated that the British planned to send various battleships to the
East Indian station by late December, and that these, with other British ships,
should make the task of the Japanese in moving forward considerably more
difficult. "It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she
has taken no action by that time."
Admiral
Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that the major
portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the
Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that in
all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively
even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly
could be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.
In
this letter, Admiral Stark asked "... would it not be possible for your
force to 'carefully' get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"
A
postscript to this letter stated that Secretary Hull bad informed Admiral Stark
that the conversations with the Japanese had practically reached an impasse. He
said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement and peace in
the Far East until there was some agreement between Japan and China, which
seemed to be remote. Whether their inability to come to any sort of an
understanding at the time was or was not a good thing, he hesitated to say.
A
second postscript to the letter referred to a conversation between Admiral
Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that Admiral Nomura usually came in when
he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to spare
at that end then. Admiral Stark stated that conversations without results could
not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked
likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark had again
talked to Hull and thought Hull would make one more try; Hull kept Admiral
Stark
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 411
pretty fully informed,
and if there was anything of moment, Stark would of course hasten to let Kimmel
know.
This
letter also enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral
Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines, which
indicated, among other things, that on September 30th, twenty‑six Flying
Fortresses would leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.
C.
INADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT AND EFFORTS TO RECTIFY
There
was during this period further correspondence on the inadequacy of equipment in
the Hawaiian area. Thus on July 26, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark
and stated that when the proposed visit of Mr. Forrestal had been announced, a
list of topics for discussion had been prepared by Admiral Kimmel's staff.
Admiral Kimmel said that not knowing the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit, or
whether Mr. Forrestal was informed of the war plans and of Admiral Kimmel's
problems that he decided it was better to combine the notes into a letter for
Admiral Stark. The principal items were then listed in the letter. These were
the importance of keeping CincPac advised of the Department's policies and
decisions, and changes to meet changes in the international situation;
questions of priorities in connection with a Pacific war, such as the need for
transports and for guns and ammunition for Marines, for new construction to
complete ammunition facilities, for building up the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor,
for more personnel, for small craft for patrol in the Naval District, etc; the
necessity of improvement as to communications, including identification, friend
or foe, equipment for aircraft; and, various aviation requirements.
On
August 22, 1941 (Exhibit 35), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (in answer
to Exhibit 34) and discussed the efforts made in connection with the development
of radar equipment, and the other requests made by Admiral Kimmel.
Again
in August (Exhibit 45), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac stating
that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Fourteenth
Naval District, and related his efforts to secure additional patrol vessels.
D.
ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER ON SECURITY OF THE FLEET
Admiral
McMorris testified that no formal written estimate of the situation was
maintained by him, but that a mental estimate was maintained (page 887).
His
estimate of the situation on October 1st was that United States‑Japanese
relations were strained and that the Japanese might go to war with Britain and
the United States, or possibly with Russia, in which case the United States
might not be involved (page 887); also, that war between the Japanese and Dutch
and British was possible without the United States being initially involved.
Pacific
Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL‑41 (Revised) from the Commander-in‑Chief,
Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet concerning the security of the Fleet at
base and in operating areas, was issued on October 14, 1941 (Exhibit 8). This
was Admiral Kimmel's security order for the Fleet and the only general order
for this purpose (page 278). This order, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not
primarily an estimate but was a basis for training in order to meet
contingencies (page 283). The possibilities of attack set forth therein, he
said, were not necessarily in order of importance as to probability of attack
(page 287).
Admiral Bloch said
that almost immediately after Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the U. S.
Fleet, he issued a "Base Defense Order" known as "2CL." As
Admiral Bloch understood it, the object of this was to assure the security of
Pearl Harbor and the Fleet insofar as the Commander‑in‑Chief could
augment the forces of the Army which really had the responsibility for the
defense of Pearl Harbor. This order was revised in October, 1941. (p. 3)
This
order provided that the security of the Fleet was predicated on two
assumptions:
(a)
that no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing
conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided
nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl
Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking
an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the
approaches to Pearl Harbor;
412 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b)
that a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships
in Pearl Harbor,* (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas,
(3) a combination of the two.
Admiral Smith said
that the October 14th directive on Fleet security contemplated air attack on
Pearl Harbor, but that in the minds of the people out there such an attack was
not expected. Unfortunately, he said, he believed that the attitude of most of
the officers there was that they did not believe that the Japanese had the
"guts" to try such an attack, and if they had they would not get away
with it. He said that the estimate of the situation contained in the Pacific
Fleet Contributory War Plan issued around July 1, 1991, had contemplated
Japanese attack upon the outlying islands and against Malay and the
Philippines, but did not consider an air attack against Pearl Harbor itself. (p. 57)
Security
measures were prescribed covering
A.
Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.
B.
Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air
patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from
the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry
of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships,
other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's
notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas as
directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force; an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of
a Fleet or Task Force; air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at
times other than described in the preceding. There was also to be a daily sweep
for magnetic and anchored mines.
Security
provisions were also prescribed for:
C.
Sortie and entry.
Concerning Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 2CL‑41
dealing with the security of the Fleet, Admiral Anderson said that prior to
December 7 on more than one occasion he had proposed changes to the effect that
whenever ships entered or sortied, depth charges should be dropped by the destroyers.
This would be for the purpose of training and also for the purpose of having
any Japanese submarines in the area assume defensive rather than offensive
attitudes. (p. 395)
D.
Operating areas.
E.
Ships at sea.
F.
Ships in port.
The
security provisions covering defense against air attack (G) referred to the
anti‑aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine
defense battalions would assist; that any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all
fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; that
air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor were prescribed;
Admiral Pye said that in regard to the Commander‑in‑Chief's
instructions for the security of ships at port, the only thing that was
questionable in his mind was the part about the sector fire control; he never
felt that ships could or should be confined to one sector; he had written a
modification of the order which he said was not in effect but simply to
eliminate the responsibility which he did not feel could be carried out by any
Sector Commander. (p. 167)
that the senior
officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop
the maximum anti‑aircraft gunfire; that ComFOURTEEN as Naval Base Defense
Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the
defense against air attack, and take other action including supervisory
control over naval shore based aircraft and arranging through the Commander of
Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army acid
the Navy and coordinating Fleet anti‑aircraft fire with the base defense
by advising the Senior Officer Present (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition
of readiness to maintain,
Admiral Smith interprets the directive in 2CL‑41 concerning
the condition of readiness as granting authority to ComFOURTEEN to order
conditions of readiness. (p. 55) and by holding drills, etc.
*This, Admiral Kimmel testified, contemplated a
surprise air attack. However, it was merely an assumption on which to base
training—there being sufficient probability of such an attack to justify
training. He thought it more probable that the Japanese would attack while the
Fleet was away from, rather than at, Pearl Harbor. But it was never considered
more than a possibility which ordinary prudence would make him guard against
(Page 287).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 413
Three
conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read
as follows:
"Anti‑aircraft
battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each
sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.)
Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."
The
procedure to be followed in the event of an air attack was also set forth,
under which the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie
orders sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines
for sortie, the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit,
etc., and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that
an attack was in progress or imminent, should inform the Task Force Commander
at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, should launch air search
for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.
The
action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth.
This provided, among other things, that in such event the ship attacked was,
among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the
essential details, various actions were to be taken by other ships, and the
Patrol Wings to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, carry out
search as directed by Task Force Commander, and prepare to establish station patrol
at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of
the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to
prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also
attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense
Officer would have priority. This also provided that "It must be
remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more
submarines waiting to attack." It also stated that "(3) it must be
remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a
considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefor, assembly his task groups as
quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be
prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or
other means.
It
may be noted that Admiral Kitts stated that he continued as Fleet Gunnery
Officer until September, 1942, and that the plans made by Admiral Kimmel were
not essentially changed after the attack. The plans were generally sound, he
said, but after Pearl Harbor, the Fleet got guns and men to make the plans
effective. Nets and balloons were subsequently installed, but the balloons were
later removed, as they interfered with operations (page 527).
Admiral McMorris said that they were not entirely satisfied
with the arrangements for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the
different services, and anti‑aircraft from ships and shore, and there
were discussions and conferences to improve the same. On the whole, however, he
felt that his view was that the security arrangements set forth in the Fleet
Security letter was satisfactory or else he would have recommended a change.
(p. 239)
Exhibit
58‑Pacific Fleet Letter 23CL‑42, prescribing battle organization
and conditions of readiness watches at sea, as issued by Admiral Nimitz on May
6, 1942, it was said, amounts to a reissue of Admiral Kimmel's instructions
(page 503). It may be noted that Condition III, as defined in this letter,
provided that all anti‑aircraft batteries were to be manned on BB's, CA's
and one-half on CV's. Also it may be noted that in this letter, Admiral Nimitz
stated that he believed that with efficient radar and the security afforded by
air and surface screening, Condition III would normally meet security
requirements when not in contact with the enemy. These provisions differ
somewhat from Admiral Kimmel's letter on the same subject, dated February 21,
1941, a copy of which is annexed to Exhibit 58.