XI. THE FREEZING OF JAPANESE ASSETS—DETERIORATION OF SITUATION AND FLEET SECURITY ORDER

 

A. THE FREEZING ORDER

 

On July 24, 1941 (Exhibit 71), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart and sent a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel which, among other things, referred to a two‑hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that he thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that the United States and Japan avoid an open rupture; they had a very plain talk; that Admiral Stark liked him, and that he had many friends in the Navy that he had dwelt at length on Japan's need for the rice and minerals of Indo‑China; that Admiral Stark's guess was that with the establishment of bases in Indo‑China, Japan would stop for the time being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that no doubt the Japanese would use their Indo‑China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road; of course, there was the possibility that they would strike at Borneo, but Admiral Stark doubted this in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them. Admiral Stark also said that he had talked with the President and hoped no open rupture would come but conditions were not getting better.

 

Admiral Schuirmann did not recall the extent to which the office of the Chief of Naval Operations participated in the decisions to establish "moral embargoes" to prevent the export to Japan of various strategic commodities. (p. 406) He did remember that there was a discussion of the question of Japanese reaction particularly to the oil embargo and that Admiral Stark expressed the view that a total embargo on oil would of necessity force the Japanese to move south or to collapse. (p. 407)

 

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In connection with Admiral Stark's conversations with Nomura, it may be noted that on July 25, 1941, Nomura reported (Document 1, Exhibit 63) to Tokyo that:

"Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.‑Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

"Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

"To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

"Please relay this information to the Navy."

Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark on July 26th (Exhibit 34), requesting information as to steps to be taken iv the event of Russian participation in the war, and making various requests for equipment.

According to Admiral Stark, the Navy Department knew of the proposal to freeze Japanese assets but was not consulted prior to the issuance of the Executive Order.

 

Admiral Turner said that he did not participate in any discussion prior to the freezing order, but was informed of it after the decision was made. (p. 258)

Admiral Schuirmann believed that the Executive Order freezing Japanese credits was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department. He did not recall any reports by the Navy to the State Department concerning the Navy's readiness in the Pacific as balanced against the risks of the freezing order. Admiral Schuirmann said that his own state of mind was that the Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo‑China and perhaps Malaya and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States in hopes that the division of opinion in the United States would delay effective measures by the United States. (p. 408)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall whether or not the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing the order in July freezing Japanese credits. (p. 422)

 

He stated that he advised the State Department that if the United States em­bargoed oil shipments to Japan, Japan would go to war but "not necessarily with the United States," and that such an embargo should not be made effective unless this country were prepared to accept the risk of war (pages 43‑45).

Admiral Turner said that the freezing order was issued without any particular advance knowledge on his part, although he had heard it mentioned previously. He thought this meant a war between Japan and the United States (page 989).

 

Admiral Turner said that the Navy and War Departments both felt that the freezing of Japanese credits would almost surely result in war with Japan within a comparatively short period of time. (p. 254)

 

As a result of the freezing order the Japanese, according to Admiral Schuirmann, conducted a bitter press campaign against the United States (page 198). And, General Short testified, relations became strained and he noticed uneasiness in the local Japanese population (page 247). Admiral Kimmel stated that this worsened Japanese‑United States relations (page 296).

 

B. FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION

 

The correspondence between Admirals Stark and Kimmel indicated that the situation in the Far East continued to deteriorate, and that the conversations with Nomura were not improving the situation. Thus, in a letter dated July 31, 1941 (Exhibit 72), he discussed the over‑all situation, and stated that "after the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies; that he thought it fairly safe to say that opinion here in general held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I.; but that Turner thought Japan would go into the Maritime Provinces in August and that

 

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Turner might be right and usually was; Admiral Stark's thought had been that while Japan could ultimately go into Siberia she would delay going until she had the Indo‑China‑Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the Russian‑German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia and that he hoped that Russia and Germany would exhaust themselves; that a Europe dominated by Russia was no more, and in fact, less attractive picture than a Europe dominated by the Nazis. A postscript to this letter stated, among other things, that "obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual."

In a letter of August 28, 1941 (Exhibit 11), Admiral Stark, among other things, discussed the status of the Japanese situation and said that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages had been sent to them, but just what they were going to do Admiral Stark did not know; that he had told one of their statesmen that another move, such as the one into Thailand, would go a long ways toward destroying before the American public what good will still remained; that Admiral Stark had had some extremely frank talks with them; that Admiral Stark had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he could wish the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.

Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter of September 12, 1941 (Exhibit 36), such as whether he should not change his orders and issue orders to shoot to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. He said, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"

Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941 (Exhibit 12, 37), and stated, among other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in Article 723 of the Navy Regulations, which Article was quoted. The Article provides for the use of force in self‑preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last resort.

The letter also stated, in connection with the question of submarine contacts that they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i.e. not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, were appropriate, and continued: "If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."

Admiral Stark also stated that the British planned to send various battleships to the East Indian station by late December, and that these, with other British ships, should make the task of the Japanese in moving forward considerably more difficult. "It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time."

Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

In this letter, Admiral Stark asked "... would it not be possible for your force to 'carefully' get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"

A postscript to this letter stated that Secretary Hull bad informed Admiral Stark that the conversations with the Japanese had practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there was some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. Whether their inability to come to any sort of an understanding at the time was or was not a good thing, he hesitated to say.

A second postscript to the letter referred to a conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that Admiral Nomura usually came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark stated that conversations without results could not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark had again talked to Hull and thought Hull would make one more try; Hull kept Admiral Stark

 

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pretty fully informed, and if there was anything of moment, Stark would of course hasten to let Kimmel know.

This letter also enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines, which indicated, among other things, that on September 30th, twenty‑six Flying Fortresses would leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

 

C. INADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT AND EFFORTS TO RECTIFY

 

There was during this period further correspondence on the inadequacy of equipment in the Hawaiian area. Thus on July 26, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark and stated that when the proposed visit of Mr. Forrestal had been announced, a list of topics for discussion had been prepared by Admiral Kimmel's staff. Admiral Kimmel said that not knowing the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit, or whether Mr. Forrestal was informed of the war plans and of Admiral Kimmel's problems that he decided it was better to combine the notes into a letter for Admiral Stark. The principal items were then listed in the letter. These were the importance of keeping CincPac advised of the Department's policies and decisions, and changes to meet changes in the international situation; questions of priorities in connection with a Pacific war, such as the need for transports and for guns and ammunition for Marines, for new construction to complete ammunition facilities, for building up the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor, for more personnel, for small craft for patrol in the Naval District, etc; the necessity of improvement as to communications, including identification, friend or foe, equipment for aircraft; and, various aviation requirements.

On August 22, 1941 (Exhibit 35), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (in answer to Exhibit 34) and discussed the efforts made in connection with the development of radar equipment, and the other requests made by Admiral Kimmel.

Again in August (Exhibit 45), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac stating that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Fourteenth Naval District, and related his efforts to secure additional patrol vessels.

 

D. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER ON SECURITY OF THE FLEET

 

Admiral McMorris testified that no formal written estimate of the situation was maintained by him, but that a mental estimate was maintained (page 887).

His estimate of the situation on October 1st was that United States‑Japanese relations were strained and that the Japanese might go to war with Britain and the United States, or possibly with Russia, in which case the United States might not be involved (page 887); also, that war between the Japanese and Dutch and British was possible without the United States being initially involved.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL‑41 (Revised) from the Commander-in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued on October 14, 1941 (Exhibit 8). This was Admiral Kimmel's security order for the Fleet and the only general order for this purpose (page 278). This order, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not primarily an estimate but was a basis for training in order to meet contingencies (page 283). The possibilities of attack set forth therein, he said, were not necessarily in order of importance as to probability of attack (page 287).

 

Admiral Bloch said that almost immediately after Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the U. S. Fleet, he issued a "Base Defense Order" known as "2CL." As Admiral Bloch understood it, the object of this was to assure the security of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet insofar as the Commander‑in‑Chief could augment the forces of the Army which really had the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor. This order was revised in October, 1941. (p. 3)

 

This order provided that the security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) that no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

 

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(b) that a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,* (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

 

Admiral Smith said that the October 14th directive on Fleet security contemplated air attack on Pearl Harbor, but that in the minds of the people out there such an attack was not expected. Unfortunately, he said, he believed that the attitude of most of the officers there was that they did not believe that the Japanese had the "guts" to try such an attack, and if they had they would not get away with it. He said that the estimate of the situation contained in the Pacific Fleet Contributory War Plan issued around July 1, 1991, had contemplated Japanese attack upon the outlying islands and against Malay and the Philippines, but did not consider an air attack against Pearl Harbor itself. (p. 57)

 

Security measures were prescribed covering

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force; an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force; air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in the preceding. There was also to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

Security provisions were also prescribed for:

C. Sortie and entry.

 

Concerning Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 2CL‑41 dealing with the security of the Fleet, Admiral Anderson said that prior to December 7 on more than one occasion he had proposed changes to the effect that whenever ships entered or sortied, depth charges should be dropped by the destroyers. This would be for the purpose of training and also for the purpose of having any Japanese submarines in the area assume defensive rather than offensive attitudes. (p. 395)

 

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G) referred to the anti‑aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist; that any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; that air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor were prescribed;

 

Admiral Pye said that in regard to the Commander‑in‑Chief's instructions for the security of ships at port, the only thing that was questionable in his mind was the part about the sector fire control; he never felt that ships could or should be confined to one sector; he had written a modification of the order which he said was not in effect but simply to eliminate the responsi­bility which he did not feel could be carried out by any Sector Commander. (p. 167)

 

that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti‑aircraft gunfire; that ComFOURTEEN as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action including super­visory control over naval shore based aircraft and arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army acid the Navy and coordinating Fleet anti‑aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Present (exclusive of CincPac) of the con­dition of readiness to maintain,

 

Admiral Smith interprets the directive in 2CL‑41 concerning the condition of readiness as granting authority to ComFOURTEEN to order conditions of readiness. (p. 55) and by holding drills, etc.


*This, Admiral Kimmel testified, contemplated a surprise air attack. However, it was merely an assumption on which to base training—there being sufficient probability of such an attack to justify training. He thought it more probable that the Japanese would attack while the Fleet was away from, rather than at, Pearl Harbor. But it was never considered more than a possibility which ordinary prudence would make him guard against (Page 287).

 

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Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

 

"Anti‑aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

 

The procedure to be followed in the event of an air attack was also set forth, under which the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie orders sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and sub­marines for sortie, the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc., and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, should inform the Task Force Com­mander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, should launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. This provided, among other things, that in such event the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details, various actions were to be taken by other ships, and the Patrol Wings to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. This also provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack." It also stated that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefor, assembly his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

It may be noted that Admiral Kitts stated that he continued as Fleet Gunnery Officer until September, 1942, and that the plans made by Admiral Kimmel were not essentially changed after the attack. The plans were generally sound, he said, but after Pearl Harbor, the Fleet got guns and men to make the plans effective. Nets and balloons were subsequently installed, but the balloons were later re­moved, as they interfered with operations (page 527).

 

Admiral McMorris said that they were not entirely satisfied with the arrangements for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the different services, and anti‑aircraft from ships and shore, and there were discussions and conferences to improve the same. On the whole, however, he felt that his view was that the security arrangements set forth in the Fleet Security letter was satisfactory or else he would have recommended a change. (p. 239)

 

Exhibit 58‑Pacific Fleet Letter 23CL‑42, prescribing battle organization and conditions of readiness watches at sea, as issued by Admiral Nimitz on May 6, 1942, it was said, amounts to a reissue of Admiral Kimmel's instructions (page 503). It may be noted that Condition III, as defined in this letter, provided that all anti‑aircraft batteries were to be manned on BB's, CA's and one-half on CV's. Also it may be noted that in this letter, Admiral Nimitz stated that he believed that with efficient radar and the security afforded by air and surface screening, Condition III would normally meet security requirements when not in contact with the enemy. These provisions differ somewhat from Admiral Kimmel's letter on the same subject, dated February 21, 1941, a copy of which is annexed to Exhibit 58.