On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information (Exhibit 19) which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue x Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action Possible at any moment x If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act x This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense x Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent x Report measures taken x a separate message is being sent to G‑2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States x Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan x Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers"

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL‑52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be planed in effect in that area, except as then in force in South­east Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further: "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act x be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur"


PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                    435


Exhibit 9 is the November 28 dispatch from CNO to CincPac.




General Marshall thought that he had seen the Army dispatch which was repeated in the Navy dispatch of November 28th (page 864). However, General Gerow did not think that Marshall had seen it. The language made Marshall believe that he had seen it particularly because the instruction that Japan must commit the first overt act came from the President. He had no recollection that the warning not to alarm the civilian population came from the same source (page 865).