XIX.
REINFORCEMENT OF MIDWAY AND WAKE
It
will be recalled that on November 26th dispatches had been sent to CincPac by
the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the proposed reinforcement of Midway
and Wake with Army planes and personnel, and requesting that Admiral Kimmel
confer with General Short about this and advise the Chief of Naval Operations
as soon as practicable (supra, page 56).
Captain Wellborn said that he thought that the background of
the Navy's desire to have the Army take over the defense at Midway and Wake was
that the Navy felt that the defense of the islands was an Army responsibility
and that the small amount of Marine personnel and aviation available should be
reserved for amphibious work. One method of reducing overhead requirements of
the Marines was to relieve the Marine Corps Units of their static defensive
duties. (p. 386)
On
November 28th, dispatch 280627 (Exhibit 76) was sent by CincPac to OPNAV. This
advised that ground crews and material to operate one squadron of Marine planes
were being discharged at Wake.
Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor with Task Force Two on
November 28. (p.291‑293)
Admiral Halsey said that he recalled clearly one conference
on November 27 when it was decided to send fighting planes to Wake. He said
that he was with Admiral Kimmel that day until about six in the evening. The
discussion of the defense of Wake and the dispatch of fighter planes was
participated in by General Short, General Martin and some other Army officers and
Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey. He said
Marine planes were selected because the Army could not fly their fighters more
than 15 miles from the coast. (p. 297)
Admiral Halsey said that he recalled that there was some prior
discussion of sending Army units to outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had
looked upon those bases as part of the Fleet and for that reason he wished to
confine the forces ashore to Marine and Naval personnel. It soon became
evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain bases were
picked, he said, to be garrisoned by Army forces.
Admiral Halsey said that when he left to go to Wake Island,
he asked Admiral Kimmel how far Admiral Kimmel wanted him to go and Admiral
Kimmel said, "Use your common sense." (p. 298)
Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the
ENTERPRISE to deliver Marine fighters to Wake, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he
should do in case he met Japanese forces. Admiral Kimmel said that in that case
he was to use his own discretion. And, Admiral Halsey replied, that those were
the best orders he had received, to keep his movements secret and that if he
found even a Japanese sampan he would sink it. (p. 43)
that similar items
would be landed at Midway.
Admiral Newton said that he was at Pearl Harbor from
November 27 until the morning of December 5 and was temporarily in command of a
task force because Admiral Brown departed around December 4 for a cruise to
Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions. He
received no particular information concerning the international situation. (p.
316)
Although Admiral Newton was commander of the most powerful
unit under the Commander Scouting Force, he never saw the October 16 dispatch
nor was he ever informed of the contents of it and recalled no warnings or
instructions mentioning preparatory deployments which were given to him
thereafter. (p. 317) Admiral Newton said that he never saw or heard of
436 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the
November 24, November 27 and December 3 dispatches. Except for what he read in
the press, Admiral Newton during the period November 26 to December 5 did not
learn anything indicating the increased danger of the situation with Japan. (p.
317)
When Admiral Newton left on December 5, he was directed to
proceed to Midway to fly off a squadron of planes. He had the LEXINGTON, CHICAGO,
PORTLAND and five destroyers on that mission. He considered the mission solely
one to reinforce Midway and attached no special significance to the mission.
He considered that there might be more danger from submarines than in the past
and zig‑zagged his course and had scouring planes cover his advance. He
gave no special orders regarding arming of planes or making preparation for war
other than ordinary routine. (p. 318)
About November 26 or 27, Admiral Brown and his Task Force
Three had returned to Pearl Harbor. They left Pearl Harbor on December 5.
Admiral Brown was of the view that the movement of the two
task forces to the outlying islands after November 27, may have been in
pursuance of the instructions contained in the dispatch regarding defensive
deployment. (p. 141)
and that about
December 1st ground material for temporary operation of twelve Army bombers
would be sent, but that only six of such planes on Oahu were in operating
condition. The dispatch also discussed the use of Army pursuit planes for
insular defense and the need for additional, anti‑aircraft guns; the fact
that Army troop reinforcements were being made on outlying bases but that such
use was considered not advisable as Marines were available; that twelve Marine
fighters would leave November 28th in a carrier for Wake; that other Marine
planes would be sent to Midway later; and that on December 1st, twelve patrol
planes would be sent from Midway to Wake, and those at Midway would be replaced
by planes from Pearl Harbor.
The
Chief of Naval Operations replied on November 28th (Exhibit 75) in a dispatch
stating that the steps described in CincPac's 280627 appeared to be the best
that could be done under the circumstances. This also stated that the War
Department would instruct the Commanding General to cooperate with the Navy in
plans for use of Army pursuit planes and troops in support of Marines, and would
endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti‑aircraft defenses, but
that it was doubtful if much improvement was possible soon. An immediate report
on the effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in the immediate
future was requested.
Admiral Brainard said that a dispatch recently examined by
him showed that it was contemplated that a group of vessels under Admiral
Halsey's command would leave around December 1, 1941, to land reinforcements on
Wake but he found no indication of his having seen the dispatch at the time.
The daily movement sheets, he said, from 21 November to 10 December showed
movements of the WRIGHT, but no carrier movements between Pearl Harbor, Wake
and Midway. (p. 401)
Admiral Ingersoll said that they received reports of ship
movements which were plotted and that he thought that the movements to Wake and
Midway in early December were known at the time in Washington but he is not
certain. He said that in keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kimmel's
ships they relied on the ship movements reports and in the quarterly schedules
of employment. (p. 424)
In
letters of December 2nd to Admiral Stark (post, pages 113-114), Admiral Kimmel
further stated his views as to the desirability of using Army planes and
personnel at Midway and Wake and his concern that the replacement of Marines
would weaken the defense, would raise the question of unity of command, and
that the increase in Army and Navy stations requiring Fleet support would interfere
with offensive operations. (5)
Admiral Bloch discussed the various construction projects at
Pearl Harbor and at the outlying islands. (p. 91‑92)
Admiral Bloch said that the security of the outlying
islands, such as Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, was a matter of some concern
in November 1941; that the water capacity of the islands was small and that as
a result of having civilian construction workers present there, the garrisons
were small; he was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and Midway
than on Oahu. (p. 94)
According to Admiral DeLany, during the tense period
preceding December 7, the outlying islands such as Midway, Guam and Wake were a
matter of
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 437
great
concern to the Commander in Chief's staff. (p. 81) The proposal to change from
Marine to Army garrisons caused additional worry and concern and was a subject
of many conferences out there. (p. 81)
Admiral Smith stated that he did not believe that the
dispatch concerning the reinforcement of outlying islands by the Army was
considered related to the war warning of November 27. He said that the
discussions concerning the outlying islands lasted several days and, as a
result, there was a decided mental preoccupation with this on the part of the
highest Army and Navy officers in Hawaii. (p. 63)
Captain Glover said that the decision to reinforce Wake had
been made by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and that Captain Glover and
Captain Moors did not share the view that it should be done. They did believe
that Midway should be fortified. (p. 176)