XIX. REINFORCEMENT OF MIDWAY AND WAKE

 

It will be recalled that on November 26th dispatches had been sent to CincPac by the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the proposed reinforcement of Mid­way and Wake with Army planes and personnel, and requesting that Admiral Kimmel confer with General Short about this and advise the Chief of Naval Operations as soon as practicable (supra, page 56).

 

Captain Wellborn said that he thought that the background of the Navy's desire to have the Army take over the defense at Midway and Wake was that the Navy felt that the defense of the islands was an Army responsibility and that the small amount of Marine personnel and aviation available should be reserved for amphibious work. One method of reducing overhead requirements of the Marines was to relieve the Marine Corps Units of their static defensive duties. (p. 386)

 

On November 28th, dispatch 280627 (Exhibit 76) was sent by CincPac to OPNAV. This advised that ground crews and material to operate one squadron of Marine planes were being discharged at Wake.

 

Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor with Task Force Two on November 28. (p.291‑293)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled clearly one conference on Novem­ber 27 when it was decided to send fighting planes to Wake. He said that he was with Admiral Kimmel that day until about six in the evening. The discussion of the defense of Wake and the dispatch of fighter planes was participated in by General Short, General Martin and some other Army officers and Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey. He said Marine planes were selected because the Army could not fly their fighters more than 15 miles from the coast. (p. 297)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled that there was some prior discussion of sending Army units to outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had looked upon those bases as part of the Fleet and for that reason he wished to confine the forces ashore to Marine and Naval personnel. It soon be­came evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain bases were picked, he said, to be garrisoned by Army forces.

Admiral Halsey said that when he left to go to Wake Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far Admiral Kimmel wanted him to go and Admiral Kimmel said, "Use your common sense." (p. 298)

Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the ENTERPRISE to deliver Marine fighters to Wake, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces. Admiral Kimmel said that in that case he was to use his own discretion. And, Admiral Halsey replied, that those were the best orders he had received, to keep his movements secret and that if he found even a Japanese sampan he would sink it. (p. 43)

 

that similar items would be landed at Midway.

 

Admiral Newton said that he was at Pearl Harbor from November 27 until the morning of December 5 and was temporarily in command of a task force because Admiral Brown departed around December 4 for a cruise to Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions. He received no particular information concerning the international situation. (p. 316)

Although Admiral Newton was commander of the most powerful unit under the Commander Scouting Force, he never saw the October 16 dispatch nor was he ever informed of the contents of it and recalled no warnings or instructions mentioning preparatory deployments which were given to him thereafter. (p. 317) Admiral Newton said that he never saw or heard of

 

436                               CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

the November 24, November 27 and December 3 dispatches. Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton during the period November 26 to December 5 did not learn anything indicating the increased danger of the situation with Japan. (p. 317)

When Admiral Newton left on December 5, he was directed to proceed to Midway to fly off a squadron of planes. He had the LEXINGTON, CHI­CAGO, PORTLAND and five destroyers on that mission. He considered the mission solely one to reinforce Midway and attached no special signifi­cance to the mission. He considered that there might be more danger from submarines than in the past and zig‑zagged his course and had scouring planes cover his advance. He gave no special orders regarding arming of planes or making preparation for war other than ordinary routine. (p. 318)

About November 26 or 27, Admiral Brown and his Task Force Three had returned to Pearl Harbor. They left Pearl Harbor on December 5.

Admiral Brown was of the view that the movement of the two task forces to the outlying islands after November 27, may have been in pursuance of the instructions contained in the dispatch regarding defensive deployment. (p. 141)

 

and that about December 1st ground material for temporary operation of twelve Army bombers would be sent, but that only six of such planes on Oahu were in operating condition. The dispatch also discussed the use of Army pursuit planes for insular defense and the need for additional, anti‑aircraft guns; the fact that Army troop reinforcements were being made on outlying bases but that such use was considered not advisable as Marines were available; that twelve Marine fighters would leave November 28th in a carrier for Wake; that other Marine planes would be sent to Midway later; and that on December 1st, twelve patrol planes would be sent from Midway to Wake, and those at Midway would be re­placed by planes from Pearl Harbor.

The Chief of Naval Operations replied on November 28th (Exhibit 75) in a dispatch stating that the steps described in CincPac's 280627 appeared to be the best that could be done under the circumstances. This also stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General to cooperate with the Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and troops in support of Marines, and would endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti‑aircraft defenses, but that it was doubtful if much improvement was possible soon. An immediate report on the effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in the im­mediate future was requested.

 

Admiral Brainard said that a dispatch recently examined by him showed that it was contemplated that a group of vessels under Admiral Halsey's command would leave around December 1, 1941, to land reinforcements on Wake but he found no indication of his having seen the dispatch at the time. The daily movement sheets, he said, from 21 November to 10 December showed movements of the WRIGHT, but no carrier movements between Pearl Harbor, Wake and Midway. (p. 401)

Admiral Ingersoll said that they received reports of ship movements which were plotted and that he thought that the movements to Wake and Midway in early December were known at the time in Washington but he is not certain. He said that in keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kim­mel's ships they relied on the ship movements reports and in the quarterly schedules of employment. (p. 424)

 

In letters of December 2nd to Admiral Stark (post, pages 113-114), Admiral Kimmel further stated his views as to the desirability of using Army planes and personnel at Midway and Wake and his concern that the replacement of Marines would weaken the defense, would raise the question of unity of command, and that the increase in Army and Navy stations requiring Fleet support would inter­fere with offensive operations. (5)

 

Admiral Bloch discussed the various construction projects at Pearl Harbor and at the outlying islands. (p. 91‑92)

Admiral Bloch said that the security of the outlying islands, such as Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, was a matter of some concern in November 1941; that the water capacity of the islands was small and that as a result of having civilian construction workers present there, the garrisons were small; he was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and Midway than on Oahu. (p. 94)

According to Admiral DeLany, during the tense period preceding December 7, the outlying islands such as Midway, Guam and Wake were a matter of

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                    437

 

great concern to the Commander in Chief's staff. (p. 81) The proposal to change from Marine to Army garrisons caused additional worry and concern and was a subject of many conferences out there. (p. 81)

Admiral Smith stated that he did not believe that the dispatch concerning the reinforcement of outlying islands by the Army was considered related to the war warning of November 27. He said that the discussions concerning the outlying islands lasted several days and, as a result, there was a decided mental preoccupation with this on the part of the highest Army and Navy officers in Hawaii. (p. 63)

Captain Glover said that the decision to reinforce Wake had been made by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and that Captain Glover and Captain Moors did not share the view that it should be done. They did believe that Midway should be fortified. (p. 176)