XX. PEARL HARBOR—ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION

 

A. ADMIRAL KIMMEL

 

Admiral Kimmel testified that after receiving the "war warning" dispatch of November 27th, his estimate was that the Japanese would move within the next few days by amphibious expedition against the Philippines or Kra, or possibly Borneo, and that there was a good chance of a mass submarine attack at Oahu. He did not expect an air attack at Pearl Harbor, although an air attack was still a "remote possibility" because, he said, of the tenor of the dispatches sent to him, the other information which he had, the difficulties of making such an attack, and information received from the Navy Department and from other sources indicat­ing that the greater portion of the Japanese carrier forces was in home waters. He thought that a primary cause for the "war warning" dispatch was the fact that diplomatic negotiations had ceased, and when the newspapers indicated that the negotiations were resumed, the warning lost much of its force. He further assumed that no ultimatum had been given to the Japanese because the Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the President that no ultimatum be given to them (page 301). He testified that the phrasing of the "war warning" dispatch and the phrasing of the dispatch of November 28th led him to believe that anything other than a submarine attach on Pearl Harbor was most improbable (page 302). In his testimony concerning the November 28th message, Admiral Kimmel stated that it furnished no new information and that it stressed that Japan should be permitted to commit the first overt act (page 325).

The "war warning," was discussed with ComFOURTEEN. A dawn fighter flight patrol was considered, but was not regarded as practical because of the limitations of the Army planes (page 303).

He considered that the action of the Navy Department in failing to make any change in his plans to send carriers to Midway and Wake indicated that the Navy Department expected no immediate activity in either the outlying areas (page 307) or in the Hawaiian area (page 309).

He further testified that the day after receipt of the "war warning" of Novem­ber 27th, he had a conference with General Short, attended by members of their staffs.

 

Admiral Smith said that there was no set hour for a Staff conference, that Admiral Kimmel had a conference practically every day and would send for the people that he wanted; he would usually have over officers from the Fleet and very frequently would have Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye, at such conferences (p. 34).

 

He said that while he presently did not recall the incident that General Short testified to a statement made by McMorris at that conference, in response to a question by General Short, to the effect that there was no chance of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Finally, he testified that the message of November 27th followed a pattern that he had been continuing for some time, and that he felt that before hostilities commenced he would receive additional information which would be more definite. When the attack came without this information, he was inclined to blame him­self for not having been smarter, but when he found some time later that the information was in fact available in the Navy Department which would have changed the action taken by him had he known it, he felt differently about the matter. If he had had that information, he said, he would have thoroughly alerted all shore going activities, including the Army, and in all probability would have had the Fleet put to sea in an intercepting position, and would have instituted reconnaissance to the best of their ability.

 

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Admiral Kimmel admitted, however, that during the entire period when he was CincPac, he maintained the same estimate as was set froth in his letter of February 18th (Exhibit 30), which stated that "a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility . . ."

 

B. ADMIRAL BLOCH

 

Admiral Bloch testified that he had estimated that if the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor, it would be by (1) submarine attack, (2) blocking the channel, (3) laying mines, (4) sabotage. He believed that an aerial torpedo attack could not be successful and if there were an air attack it would be by bombs (page 409). He considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility (page 394). He saw the "war warning" dispatch, conferred with Admiral Kimmel and did not disagree with his conclusions.

 

On November 27, after the receipt of the "War Warning", the Chief of Staff brought over a paraphrase of the dispatch. Admiral Bloch saw Ad­miral Kimmel the next morning. There were others present but he does not recall who they were. There was a term in the dispatch concerning defense deployment. Just what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was Admiral Bloch did not know, but they had at that time two submarines at Midway and two at Wake. (p. 14)

 

The dispatch concerning the sending of planes to Midway and Wake (Exhibit 18) did not change his estimate (page 394). The part of the November 28th dispatch which impressed him was the desire that Japan should be allowed to commit the first overt act and that the public should not be alarmed (page 395)

 

Admiral Bloch said that after the War Warning of November 27, negotia­tions between Japan and the United States were resumed and that this had a very definite effect on his mind. Also, he said he had no feeling of impend­ing hostilities in the Hawaiian area around the 7th of December. (pp. 15 and 16)

Admiral Bloch volunteered at the end of his testimony a statement that the Navy Department had more information than they had in Hawaii; that a number of warnings were sent to them; that the Navy Department had in the War Plans a means of putting into effect all of the plans prior to "M" day; that such action would have been more effective than the warnings sent out; and in this connection he referred to the State Department note of November 26 concerning which he had no knowledge until after December 7.

Admiral Bloch said that he had not seriously considered nor had he heard anybody else talk about the influence on public opinion in the United States which an attack on Pearl Harbor would produce. (p. 88)

Prior to December 7, Admiral Bloch was of the opinion that a carrier attack against Hawaii prior to a declaration of war was remote; one important con­sideration was his belief that a large body of surface vessels could not cross such a large expanse of water without the Navy having some knowledge. (p. 89)

Admiral Bloch said that although he could not recall that any officer had ever expressed the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was improbable; yet he was definitely of the opinion that such an attack was remote although he is unable to analyze that opinion and to determine the various factors which had caused him to reach that opinion. (pp. 89 and 90)

Captain Earle said that they had considered the estimate indicating that the most likely form of attack would be by air, but somehow or other they always felt that it couldn't happen here and that the Japanese would not take that chance. (p. 377)

 

C. ADMIRAL PYE

 

Admiral Pye testified that he saw the November 24th dispatch (warning of an aggressive move in any direction) on November 29th. He recalled no decisions made as a result of it (page 424)

 

Admiral Pye said that on November 29, he had a conference with Admiral Kimmel during which Admiral Kimmel showed him the November 24 message and called in his Intelligence Officer who explained the locations of the enemy forces, indicating no unusual activity in the Naval forces of the Japanese navy. They discussed possible action to be taken by Task Force 1 which was the only Task Force in port aside from the battleships of Task Force 3

 

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and decided that there was no action that could be taken by that Task Force which would better prepare them for the possible action that might come. (p. 153)

Admiral Pye said that he was not present at any conferences between Admiral Kimmel and his staff or other senior officers. In his own discussions with Admiral Kimmel, there was no mention of the possibility that Oahu might be attacked by air. For some months there had been a feeling that a surprise attack by submarines might be possible. His feeling in this con­nection was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without definite proof that it was enemy action but an air attack could not. In the absence of any protection by carriers it was felt that the Fleet in port with the presumed effectiveness of the Army air forces would be in a better posi­tion for defense than they would be at sea. Admiral Pye also saw the war warning message on the same day, i.e., on November 29. (p. 154)

Admiral Anderson said that the war warning was shown to a group of Flag officers including Admiral Anderson in the office of the Commander in Chief. Under the war plans in force, Admiral Anderson had no specific duties to perform. He said that he knew that there were two task forces at sea and knew that there was an excellent plan in existence for long distance daily air reconnaissance. He assumed that whatever was considered necessary to be done was being taken care of. (p. 393)

Admiral Anderson said that his ideas during early December were that he expected the Japanese would not attack farther east than the Philippines. He was influenced in all his thoughts as to security by the knowledge or what he thought was the knowledge that a long distance daily reconnaissance by air was being maintained. He assumed that such distant air reconnaissance was being maintained and said that he had read a very complete plan for such daily reconnaissance and knew that it had been placed into effect but did not know that it had been discontinued prior to December 7. (p. 394)

 

He felt that this dispatch indicated an attack on the Philippines or Guam. He saw the "War Warning" at the same time and discussed it with CincPac. It was sent to several addressees. The "War Warning" to him was nothing more than they had been receiving for some time (page 425) He did not see the November 28th message until after December 7th (page 427).

Admiral Pye testified first that he had not made any estimate of the situation during the period November 27th to December 7th (page 429). In response to the Court's questions he then stated that the maneuvers which he was on had not prevented him from making an estimate, but that he had made no written esti­mate (page 434). He kept a running mental estimate. He considered a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility but not a probability (page 435) He thought it a bad move because it was the one thing to unite the United States people in an all‑out effort, and therefore that it was unlikely to be undertaken (page 435). He considered a submarine attack the most likely act in advance of war (page 436). Before the attack he felt the defense measures taken were con­sistent with the situation; they thought torpedoes could not be launched from the air in waters less than 75 feet deep (page 436); and a bombing attack alone would not have been profitable (page 437)

He thought an air attack on Pearl Harbor was remotely possible and did not consider that such an attack would be made before diplomatic relations were broken off (page 438).

Admiral Pye stated that WPL‑46 required the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor, but there were no carriers in port and the Fleet at sea without carriers would be more vulnerable than in port; moreover, Intelligence had indicated that all major units of the Japanese fleet were in home ports. No additional security measures were taken in his command. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the phrase "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment prior to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL-46" was meaningless, according to Admiral Pye (page 426).

He did not know if CincPac had made a direct estimate as to air attack (page 426) .

 

Concerning his estimate of the probability of a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said that a primary feature was that he felt that Japan could gain more by delaying our entry into the war than they could possible gain by any damage that they could do at Pearl Harbor. He said further that the Secretary of the Navy when he came to Pearl Harbor after the 7th of December said that no one in Washington had stated to him that there was any possibility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner who

 

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was the most aggressive minded of all. Admiral Pye thought that the feeling in Honolulu was influenced by the attitude of the Department in the preceding months in taking forces from the Pacific and indicating that they considered the German situation more serious than the Japanese situation. He also said that they had not been adequately advised of the development of conditions as known in Washington.

Admiral Pye said that although an attack against the United States was not expected, they did expect the Japanese to proceed against the Dutch and British. Admiral Pye said that he thought that the general impression then had been that the Japanese naval air pilots were fairly good but that they did not think that these pilots were as good as they appeared to be immediately after Pearl Harbor. (p. 158) Admiral Pye said that they had had no information as to the torpedoes which had actually been developed by other nations. (p. 158)

Admiral Pye said that he did not think that any of them had felt that an attack would be made before a declaration of war, if ever. (p. 151)

Admiral Brown was not familiar with the security measures such as air search and other matters relating to the internal defense of Oahu except in a most general way. (p. 137)

Admiral Brown's Task Force had assigned to it the task of developing the technique and examining the materials for amphibious warfare and during the six months preceding the attack, his energies and the energies of his staff were devoted to that subject. The primary task was training. During the year preceding Pearl Harbor, it was his impression that there must have been at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would break out with the Japanese and each time the question was discussed whether or not defensive measures should be taken or training continued. His feeling was that training should be continued until the moment that war developed. This is what happened to the Fleet. (p. 137)

During the last days of November, Admiral Brown participated in conferences with the Commander in Chief. His recollection was that the greatest concern had been as to the security of the outlying islands. They had all believed that Japanese submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when war came and had discussed the possibility of an air raid. His belief was that an air raid was possible but highly improbable; that dispositions should be made for the defense of the outlying islands and he believed that the greatest threat to Pearl Harbor was local sabotage. (p. 137) Admiral Brown believes that during the week preceding December 7, he was in almost daily conference with the Commander-in-Chief. Admiral Brown said he did not remember whether or not he saw the November 27 dispatch. It was his recollection that there was a prolonged discussion of that dispatch. (p. 139)

Admiral Brown said that during the last few days prior to December 7, he felt that the chance of an air attack was extremely remote because of his misunderstanding of Japanese air ability. He did not consider the air a menace and was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor. His own estimate in December was that the Japanese would avoid an open break with the United States and confine their first attack to one against the Dutch or the British. He probably banked too much on that estimate of the situation. (p. 145)

Admiral Brown's recollection of the conferences which were attended by Army representatives was vague. He believed that the conferences primarily were in connection with internal security on the island and with shortages in defense weapons and various forms of air craft. He recalled that in about November, somebody suggested that there might be a surprise air attack at Hawaii, that at the time Admiral Halsey was present that Admiral Brown expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were not capable of executing such a mission successfully and that if they did, we should certainly be able to follow their planes back to their carriers and destroy the carriers so that it would be a very expensive experiment. (p. 142)

Admiral Brown said that his erroneous belief at that time was that all Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior to American fliers. (p. 142)

Admiral Halsey said that the war warning dispatch affected him very seriously. He thought that there was going to be a fight before he got back to Pearl Harbor. He said that when he left Pearl Harbor, he diverted the battleships, cruisers and destroyers and told them to carry out exercises in a certain area and then headed West with the remainder of his task force. He then issued orders to put in war heads in all torpedoes, to regard any submarine as hostile and to sink it, to arm the planes with bombs and to

 

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shoot down any plane that was not identified. When they neared Wake, they went from Condition 3 to Condition 2. He tried to make full preparation for combat and he carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles. Admiral Halsey said that he felt he might be attacked before he returned to Pearl Harbor and thought it might precipitate war. (p. 299)

Admiral Halsey said that he did not feel that they were informed on what the Japs were doing and felt that they were operating in the dark. He thought that a good deal more was known in Washington than was known in Pearl Harbor. (p. 300)

Admiral Halsey said that they thought the Japanese attack would take place in the Far East except by submarine and that they underestimated the Japanese ability to operate carriers or did not give it enough consideration. (p. 301)

Admiral Halsey said that the question of an air attack on Pearl Harbor had been on everyone's mind but that he personally did not expect an air attack. He pointed out that anti‑aircraft drills had been had on many occasions. (p.302)

Admiral Halsey said his personal and official relations with Admiral Kimmel were very close and that they conferred every time he returned to port. He said that Admiral Kimmel was principally worried about materiel conditions, the very heavy turnover in personnel and the question of balancing training against security. (p 294)

Admiral Halsey said that there was a continuous flow of messages crying "wolf" and consequently the senses tended to be dull but the possibility of the international situation was constantly before their minds. (p. 296)

Admiral Newton said that for several months preceding December 7, all hands had felt a tautening up of the situation and he believed that the majority were of the view that submarines were their greatest menace. (p. 332)

Admiral Leary said that after their return to port on November 28, 1941, the security conditions existing on the ship were the same as on the previous stay in port which had ended about November 21. Admiral Leary said that the question of training is always a paramount one and that it was not possible to carry out the required training and maintain entirely satisfactory security measures. (p. 365) Admiral Leary said that in the few weeks prior to December 7, he had thought in a general way of the possibility of a surprise attack, and that they all felt that the contingency was remote and that the Intelligence Services would give adequate warning. (p. 365) He said that his estimate was that a surprise attack would be an air attack. (p. 366) He recalls no specific discussion along that line.

Admiral Bunkley said that on October 15, the CALIFORNIA was at Long Beach and received orders to be ready to sail at 24 hours' notice. He received the drastic change of orders without being taken into the confidence of Admiral Pye as to any messages received which caused such a change in plans. (p.415)

Admiral Bunkley had no idea of any warnings having been sent in November and December indicating that the situation was dangerous. His opinion at the time was that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. He did think that an attack would come in the Philippines. (p. 415)

 

D. ADMIRAL SMITH

 

Admiral Smith testified that Admiral Kimmel kept him informed of everything (page 530). He saw the "War Warning," but though the press or radio learned that negotiations were resumed (page 531). Each day the War Plans Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave CincPac an estimate of what was happening. He remembered. the November 28th message mainly because of the emphasis therein not to alarm the civilian population (page 531); but this did not. affect his estimate.

It seemed odd to him to take Navy and Marine planes off Midway and Wake in accordance with the November 26th dispatch and to put Army planes there. The Army planes had to be transported by carrier (page 532). It would take two weeks to deliver these planes, and this meant the absence of carriers in the direction of Japan, and while not fully prepared for war (page 533). Admiral Smith testified that he considered this dispatch a directive, despite its language (page 543) .

He said that the inference from Exhibits 15 and 17 was plain that the warning was directed against an attack on the Philippines or Guam (page 545). The

 

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"in any direction" dispatch of November 24th may have intensified the action they were taking, but did not at all change their general estimate (page 546).

The "war warning" message, he said, would have been more effective if it had stopped with the word "warning" (page 534).

Admiral Smith stated that in the Pacific Fleet they were not thinking of the defense of Pearl Harbor, but about the Fleet and readiness of the Fleet. The ships were ready for anything, but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get out into battle, not the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 548).

He stated that the Roberts' Report was correct in stating they were aware of the possibility of hostile action without declaration of war (page 556), but they expected that the Japanese might hit the Philippines, Midway, or Guam, but not Pearl Harbor.

 

Admiral Smith said that the basis for his estimate that a surprise air attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable was as follows (p. 374‑375):

"There was a great deal of doubt in our minds that Japan would go to war with us unless Germany did so also. Our information from all sources, including the Navy Department, and our intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese fleet had any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese fleet, as located, indicated no move in this direction, and, I believe, most important of all, we doubted whether the Japanese would dare send a large force as far to the eastward as Hawaii. The possibility that they might be located even by a neutral ship existed. They might have been located several times before their arrival there, in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. I believe that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was for this reason that we did not fear an air attack."

 

They did regard a submarine attack in the Hawaiian area as a sure thing (page 557).

 

Admiral Smith said that they were very submarine conscious, and one reason for that was that they had had several sound contacts; perhaps all of them were false. On one occasion, in the month of February 1941, they had a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head which occurred again a month later. They never found out exactly what it was, but after investiga­tion came to the conclusion that the contact was due to two different levels of water temperature although the destroyers had claimed that they had heard propeller noises. At one time, Admiral Kimmel, about six o'clock in the morning, told him to issue orders to bomb this contact. Before the order went out, however, he canceled it and reported the fact to CNO saying that he had no authority to do this except within the three‑mile limit around Pearl Harbor; a reply of the CNO was to the effect that it was a good thing that such orders had not been issued. So, Admiral Smith said, probably all of the contacts were false, but they were submarine conscious more than air conscious and everyone in the Fleet believed that if an attack came it would be by submarine rather than by aircraft. Admiral Smith believed that the officers of the Fleet felt that there was little danger of an air attack. (p. 42)

Admiral Smith said that the warnings sent to them mentioned attacks in the Far East, and this probably resulted in a state of mind where they did not believe that they would be subjected to an air attack on Pearl Harbor, although they did expect submarine attack. (p. 64)

Admiral Smith said that he thought there had been too much "crying wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson. (p. 64)

Admiral Smith said that his thought was at the time, and still was, that they spent too much time in worrying about the outlying islands. They had large forces of civilians working on Wake and Midway, and the Commander-­in-Chief spent a great deal of time, more than he should have spent, in efforts to complete the defenses of the outlying islands. He even went to the extent of personally auditing the records of the number of rounds of ammunition of all sorts on each island. He was much more concerned about the outlying islands than about Oahu, as the estimate shown in the Pacific War Plan would indicate. Looking back on it, Admiral Smith thinks that they probably gave too much thought to these islands and not enough to the larger things. (p. 64)

 

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E. ADMIRAL McMORRIS

 

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the "war warning"dispatch of 27 November 1941 occasioned no surprise and did not convey any considerable amount of additional or startling information, because the situation with refer­ence to Japan had been tense throughout the year of 1941 (p. 325).

 

Admiral McMorris said that he had thought that sabotage or a submarine attack was a distinct possibility (page 887). Up to the time of the attack he considered the possibility of an air torpedo attack very remote (page 888) and gave as reasons therefor: (a) increasing evidence of Japanese movements toward Kra Peninsula; (b) concentration of troops in South China Area; (c) movement of combatant ships from the Empire to the South; (d) Navy warnings indicated the possibility of hostilities in that area, attack on Philippines, or movement of Japanese forces in Halmahera; (e) distance involved and logistic problem; (f) de­spite British attack on Italian Fleet in southern Italy—here the depth of water and short distance for run of torpedo was important; (g) confidence in anti­aircraft defenses against torpedo planes.

 

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he considered sound the views expressed by the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of 24 January 1941 (Naval Court Exhibit 9), though he had not been completely in accord as to the elements of danger as listed in importance by the Secretary (p. 325‑327)*

Vice Admiral McMorris further testified that he had considered an air attack possible but not probable and further than he considered the Fleet should not take as its sole object of existence the defending of itself against a surprise at­tack and that it should carry on other fundamental duties, including training and readying itself for operations (p. 327).

 

He felt that the attack would be on the Philippines with a possible raid on Wake and Midway, and Guam would be seriously endangered (page 889). He felt that a submarine attack on Hawaii was probable.

 

Vice Admiral McMorris testified, with reference to his estimate of the situation and possible courses of enemy action during the period of 27 November to 6 December 1941, that substantially he estimated the Japanese were on the point of commencing a war against Great Britain by operations in Malaysia. His early estimate was that the Japanese would act with the expectation that the United States would not enter the war with Great Britain unless it was itself attacked, but later he came to the conclusion that the Japanese might be unwilling to leave the line of communications abreast the Philippines exposed to attack in which case the United States would come into the war, and therefore, he esti­mated that heavy attacks on the Philippines had become not only a distinct possibility but were probable.

He further estimated that the Japanese would seize Guam when they initiated the war, because of the negligible defenses there, and that, because the defense of Midway was stronger, with which the Japanese were probably familiar, it was initially a probability that Midway would be subjected to heavy raids but that it was less likely that there would be any Japanese effort towards seizing Midway.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he further estimated that there were likely to be heavy Japanese submarine concentrations in the Hawaiian area and the approaches thereto; that submarine attacks would be directed primarily at our task forces operating at sea, and that there was a likelihood of attempts being made to sink a ship an the Pearl Harbor channel, in order to block ingress and egress. He also expected that there would be enemy submarine activity along the Pacific Coast. (Page 303‑304.)

 

After receipt of the message of November 27th, a discussion was had as to whether or not any general message should be sent to the Fleet, particularly those in training and operating areas, and it was felt that the situation was already well in hand and it would, in effect, be a message to continue what they were doing: The only message was an injunction to be particularly alert for submarines (page 895).


*NOTE.—This was the letter in which the Secretary envisioned the initiation of a Japanese war by a surprise attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and listed the dangers in order of importance as air bombing attack, air torpedo plane attack, sabotage, submarine attack, mining, and bombardment by gunfire. The Secretary further stated that the countermeasures to be considered in order of importance, were the location and engagement of enemy carriers, and supporting vessels before an air attack could be launched pointing out that these were largely functions of the Fleet, though Perhaps not possible of being carried out in the event of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war (p. 3,26).

 

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Admiral McMorris said that the dispatch of November 26th from the Chief of Naval Operations regarding the transfer of planes to Wake, of which CincPac was an addressee, probably influenced whatever ideas or views resulted from the series of dispatches, but the question of moving Army planes there was given extensive consideration and the determination was made to send defensive planes to Midway and Wake, preferably Marine, and they felt it imperative to have protective fighters there because they anticipated operating a number of patrol planes from Wake if war should start (page 891).

A squadron of patrol planes searched in advance of the carrier and was with­drawn after she had discharged the planes at Wake (page 892). When Halsey and "Newton" moved to Wake and Midway for delivery of Marine aircraft, they were well aware of the fact that hostilities might commence before they again entered port (page 894).

 

As Admiral McMorris recalled it, orders to depth bomb submarine con­tacts were issued after the war warning and orders given to Admirals Newton and Halsey to repel hostile planes. (p. 246)

 

The proposal to send Army troops and planes to Midway and Wake did not, so far as he was concerned, weaken the "war warning." He thought those places would be weakened in defense by such a change; that they were important; and might be subject to attack so that the time was inauspicious (page 896).

 

Admiral McMorris recalled that at not a great while before the com­mencement of war, there was a suggestion to replace the marines at outlying islands with Army forces and that this was discussed with General Short. It was concluded not to send them. They felt that the Washington proposal was badly timed. He did not feel that it vitiated the war warning dispatch. (p. 247)

 

Those dispatches (Exhibits 18, 40) were proposals and not directives and the recommendation was against the proposals and recommendation was accepted (page 896).

He believed from the limited knowledge he had that the danger from enemy aircraft was not great (page 896). He did not consider that the Japanese would make a surprise air attack; he felt that the only serious danger was sabotage or submarines (page 900).

 

With reference to testimony given by him in previous investigations to the effect that in his opinion the island defense was adequate. and that the chances of an air attack inflicting damage were small, Vice Admiral McMorris testified generally that the bases of that opinion were as follows:

(a) That the anti‑aircraft guns and the fighters would destroy a large propor­tion of attacking planes;

(b) That bombing by enemy planes would not be sufficiently accurate to obtain a large number of hits;

(e) That notwithstanding the success of the British air torpedo attack at  Taranto, which he believed was attributable to peculiar conditions that existed at Taranto, he did not believe there was any serious hazard in an air torpedo attack at Pearl, because: (1) the attacking planes would have to fly very low, thereby exposing themselves to anti‑aircraft fire and fighter interception, and (2) the shallowness of the water and the short distance available for torpedo runs would operate to reduce the effectiveness of this type of attack. He stated that mani­festly his conclusions were entirely wrong, but that they had been reached by reading available information as to torpedo performance an our own Navy;

(d) He admitted that he did not have any knowledge as to whether the Army anti‑aircraft defenses were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness, but he assumed that they were in a state of readiness. "Perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I felt. We were a bit too complacent there. Nonetheless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness being maintained or the watches being kept with respect to the aircraft defenses of Hawaii (p. 330-332).

 

Admiral McMorris said that he saw the November 28th dispatch and con­sidered the directive for reconnaissance to mean search by aircraft for submarines or a raiding cruiser.

 

Admiral McMorris said that he did not believe that a surprise air attack was likely in the Hawaiian area although he did consider such an attack

 

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possible in the Philippines and even against Midway or Wake. Probably he said, some discussions along those lines may have taken place but he had no specific recollection of such a discussion. (p. 236) He personally never considered an air attack as more than a remote possibility and he is certain that Admiral Kimmel was not anticipating such an attack.

Admiral McMorris said that the characteristics of the leaders of the Japanese Navy had been discussed from time to time between Admiral Kimmel, Admiral McMorris, and others, and the general impression was that they were rather capable and aggressive leaders. (p. 236)

The reasons why Admiral McMorris thought a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility were as follows:

"For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steaming long distance with probability of detection and then attack in the face of shore­-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged ships might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found to the southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably employed there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island defenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite disproportionate to the damage they might inflict." (p. 237)

Admiral McMorris said that they did anticipate that mass submarine attacks in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor were quite possible. (p. 238)

Admiral McCormick who at the time was under McMorris, said that the courses open to the enemy, as the War Plans Officer saw them, were in the nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of air and submarine attacks and the seizure of all of our possessions in the western Pacific; it was considered most improbable that they would venture out of the western Pacific; an air attack on Pearl Harbor was listed as a possible course of Japanese action. Predominant attention was focused on the prep­aration for offensive movement, the countering of Japanese action against Wake and Midway, and protection of the Fleet against submarine attack. A very low degree of probability was assigned to air attack at Pearl Harbor. (p. 68) He said that he did not think that any of Admiral Kimmel's advisers had any real conception of how far the Japanese had come in their training and preparations for such an attack as they made.

Admiral McCormick said that in formulating estimates of the situation, the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders were not, so far as he knew, taken into consideration. (p. 70)

Admiral McCormick said that the term "defensive deployment" use in the war warning puzzled them. The further strengthening of the islands to the westward and defensive submarine patrols were the only changes that Admiral Kimmel and his staff could derive from this directive.

Admiral McCormick said that he knew of not one person at Pearl Harbor who was not completely surprised by the Japanese air attack. (p. 71)

Admiral McCormick, at the end of his statement, said that Admiral Kimmel was whole‑heartedly and self‑sacrificingly devoted to getting the Fleet ready for war; that "There is no doubt about the fact that we, at Pearl Harbor, did, for various reasons, have what you might call a blind spot in connection with any real probability of the carrier raid on Pearl Harbor. I think that with the means at hand, and with the known difficulty of detecting such an approach, as has been proved many times by our carrier task forces in this war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this blind spot that I mentioned had not existed." (p. 72)

Captain Murphy said that he did not think that an attack, such as the attack that was made, would be made. He thought that it would be stupid for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor and that they might have gone into Thailand, Malay and the Dutch East Indies without involving the United States. He thought they might attack the Philippines.

Captain Murphy said that he thought the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks involved in Rain­bow 5. (p. 199) He was not sure whether the words defensive deployment in any way signified security measures, but interpreted the words as leaving the matter open to those in Pearl Harbor. (p. 200)

 

446                               CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

F. ADMIRAL DELANY

 

Admiral DeLany stated that he saw all of the messages from the Navy Depart­ment. He did not consider that CincPac had been furnished complete information on relations between the United States and Japan, because full information of the negotiations and discussions were not forwarded to CinCPac (page 506).

The "War Warning" dispatch meant to him that Japan was on the move, but he did not interpret it as showing an immediate Japanese attack on the United States.

Admiral DeLany said that between November 27th and December 7th, he knew that Japan was on the move, but he thought they would go into the Malays or Thailand. He did not know what we would have done if this had included an overt act against the United States. The Pacific Fleet had not been given any clear‑cut view of the attitude which the United States Government was assuming toward Japan. He had not thought that the Japanese would initiate a war by attacking the Pacific Fleet as such an attack would wake up the United States more than anything; also because they had reports that the Japanese fleet was primarily based in the Empire (page 497).

In his opinion, if there were an attack, it would be by submarine. He did not envisage an attack by air or surface ships (page 498).

 

Rear Admiral DeLany reaffirmed his belief, previously stated to the Roberts Commission, that there was no discussion between 27 November and 7 December by the staff as to the probability of an air attack of the nature of that which occurred. (p. 166)

Asked what consideration was given to possible directions of aggressive move­ments, warned against in the 24 November message from OpNav to CinCPac and Commander‑in‑Chief Asiatic, he replied that aircraft carriers were sent to deliver planes to Midway and Wake but that an attack farther to the eastward was not contemplated. (p.170)

Following the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November conferences between the Army and Navy retained the concept previously held that the greatest danger to the Hawaiian area lay in the possibility of submarine attacks and sabotage. (p. 172).

Admiral DeLany stated that joint Army and Navy exercises relating to defense the islands were handicapped by lack of equipment necessary to provide a central air warning control post. This equipment, together with anti‑aircraft weapons, communication facilities and planes, was declared not available although following the Pearl Harbor attack they were received almost immediately. (p. 174‑176)

Adequate air reconnaissance was impossible, in his opinion, due to the small number of planes and crews, condition of the planes and the necessity for main­taining them in readiness for an emergency. (p. 181)

 

From the information which he had in November 1941, he did not think a tor­pedo plane attack in Pearl Harbor could be launched because of the depth of the water. This information had been sent in letters by the Chief of Naval Opera­tions.

 

Concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installa­tions at Pearl Harbor, Admiral DeLany said that he did not and never would have expected that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor as they did; that everyone was of the opinion that the danger lay in the fact that submarines might operate in the area; and that there might be sabotage on the island. The general concept of the defense of the island and the security of the base there was based on that idea. (p. 77)

Admiral DeLany said that nothing in the dispatches received by them indicated that hostilities would be started in the way in which they did in fact start. (p. 78)

Admiral DeLany said that the reasons why they regarded a surprise air attack at Pearl Harbor as improbable were that the last information which they had placed the Japanese Fleet in home waters; there was inherent danger for the Japanese in bringing their Fleet in for such an attack; and it was felt that the one single thing which would inflame Americans would be an attack upon their home territory. (p. 80)

Admiral DeLany thought that in formulating the opinion that an air attack was unlikely, consideration was given to the characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, an air expert. (p. 81)

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                    447

 

G. ADMIRAL CALHOUN

 

Admiral Calhoun said that he had been present at Admiral Kimmel's confer­ences ever morning and heard all the information that Admiral Kimmel dis­cussed. He knew of the "war warning" dispatch and interpreted it to mean that war would start in the Philippines (page 935). Nobody had expected war imme­diately, he said, and Admiral Kimmel did not indicate any contrary view (page 938). When the "War Warning" was read, he had thought, and believed the others also had thought that it did not necessarily mean that war was imminent and that the Fleet should go on a war footing (page 939).

 

In his voluntary statement at the end of his testimony, Admiral Calhoun discussed the fact that he attended all of Admiral Kimmel's conferences and that neither he nor anyone else expected any immediate sneak attack by the Japanese at the time when it came. (p. 228)

 

H. CAPTAIN LAYTON

 

Captain Layton stated that he had seen the "War Warning" and had considered that it fitted into the picture that the Japanese were going to strike in Southeast Asia (page 911). He had no apprehension of an air attack on Hawaii. He at one time translated a Japanese novel which academically discussed an attack on Pearl Harbor. He showed this to Admiral Kimmel about three or four months prior to December 7, 1941 (page 911). From the "War Warning" message and other information he had at the time, he expected the Japanese to attack Thailand, and possibly the Philippines (page 912) and after our search planes from Manila had reported Japanese forces off Cameron Bay and in the Gulf of Siam, he reported this estimate to CinCPac. This was in agreement with the "War Warning" (pages 912‑3). Air attack on Pearl Harbor was a capability of the Japanese but he had considered it a remote possibility. Surprise attack was a Japanese characteristic (page 913).

 

Captain Layton knew Admiral Yamamoto personally and was familiar with his characteristics. He did not specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that in view of Admiral Yamamoto's characteristics a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor was likely (page 223). He said that on one occasion when he did discuss with Admiral Kimmel a book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was mentioned and Admiral Kimmel asked him what he thought of the chances. He said "I only hope we can intercept them and I hope that the air search will find them in plenty of time." He also said that in the discussion in general regarding Japan's strength, he thought that the subject of Japan's carriers was mentioned, and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much in the first battle. (p. 224)

Captain Layton said that he saw the war warning of November 27th and thought that it fitted in with the picture up to date as he saw it, namely, that the Japanese were moving to the South. His estimate was unclear as to whether or not the Japanese would attack the Philippines or would leave their flank unguarded and attempt to work some compromise deal through Kurusu and Nomura. (p. 224)

 

Captain Layton said that there was no discussion from November 27th to December 7th in his presence, "in higher authority" as to the importance of guarding against internal sabotage (page 914).

 

I. ADMIRAL BELLINGER

 

Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor, of the so‑called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Neither did he see or know of the CNO despatch of 28 November regarding possible hostile action by the Japanese. (P. 498‑499)

 

Admiral Bellinger referred to Addendum I of Exhibit 53, which stated that an air attack from carriers at 300 miles was the most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor. He envisaged air attack as the most logical form for the greatest success (page 668). He expected a bombing, not a torpedo attack (page 669).

Admiral Bellinger said that he had not thought it probable that an attack would be made on Oahu as the opening event of the Japanese‑United States war (page 688), and his estimate contained in the plans was in order to work out a defense of Pearl Harbor and not an estimate of the war plans of the Japanese (page 687) .

 

448                               CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

During the five days preceding December 7, Admiral Bellinger was in bed with the "flu." His assistant, Captain Ramsey, conferred with him. (p. 122)

Admiral Bellinger said that late in November, 1941, he thought the most probable form of Japanese attack would be by submarine or by means of sabotage. (p.123‑124)

 

J. ADMIRAL KITTS

 

Admiral Kitts testified that he had thought an air torpedo attack was possible in Pearl Harbor, and antiaircraft measures such as nets and balloons had been considered (page 516).

 

Admiral Kitts did not attend staff conferences generally. He was not shown any warning dispatch but knew the general tenor of some of the warnings. (p. 185) Admiral Kitts said that he had considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a serious possibility and also a submarine attack or a combination of the two. (p. 186) Admiral Kitts said that he helped draft the Fleet Circular letter in February or March known as 2CL‑41 which indicated that a surprise air attack was a definite possibility. (p. 186)

 

His feeling in this regard was minimized by two letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, stating that the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow for a successful torpedo run. Nets had not been put in because they were a hindrance to ships' movements and because it was felt that the danger of torpedo attack was slight. Balloon barrages had not been put in because of interference with normal opera­tions of our own aircraft (page 516). Nets had been placed at the entrance to Pearl Harbor (page 517).

The deepest water in Pearl Harbor was 42 feet, or 7 fathoms, and he recalled that the Navy Department had estimated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched in less than 10 fathoms (page 519).

 

K. ADMIRAL WITHERS

 

Admiral Withers said that he had seen the "War Warning" and had been present at a conference held on November 28, 1941. He said that he told Admiral Kimmel that he thought the dispatch meant war and that he would sink Japanese ships if they came within 500 miles of Hawaii and didn't turn back (page 1085). General Short was not at this conference (page 1086). He had no orders to take offensive action against enemy ships within the 500 mile area from Pearl Harbor (page 1086).

He had thought there would be an attack on Hawaii, but did not consider what kind of attack (page 1086). The "War Warning" message did mention the Philippines and he had felt that an attack might come anywhere but had thought that the chances were that it would be on the Philippines (page 1087).

 

Captain Curts said that he had been apprehensive for a long time prior to December 7 about the danger of the Japanese starting a war without a formal declaration and he feared particularly sabotage. (p. 108)

 

L. COLONEL PHILLIPS

 

Colonel Phillips testified that General Short received an Army dispatch, corre­sponding to Exhibit 19, on November 27th or November 28th, and that a con­ference was held with Admiral Kimmel (page 483). He said that at the time of receipt of the dispatch an estimate of the situation was made which resulted in the sabotage alert. He estimated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable, and that if there were an attack, it would be by air. He did not recall receiving any information additional to that message until the afternoon of December 7, 1941 (page 485). He did not recall having seen the Navy "War Warning" message (page 486).

He stated that his opinion that the enemy might attack by air had been his own personal opinion (page 493).

 

M. GENERAL SHORT

 

General Short said that at this time he considered sabotage the main danger at Pearl Harbor since the information they had indicated that the Japanese would move southward (page 239). He said that during a conference with Admiral Kimmel, McMorris had stated that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there had been no disagreement by those present. He also knew

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                449

 

that Admiral Kimmel would have moved the ships out if he had thought an air attack likely.