XX.
PEARL HARBOR—ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION
A.
ADMIRAL KIMMEL
Admiral
Kimmel testified that after receiving the "war warning" dispatch of
November 27th, his estimate was that the Japanese would move within the next
few days by amphibious expedition against the Philippines or Kra, or possibly
Borneo, and that there was a good chance of a mass submarine attack at Oahu. He
did not expect an air attack at Pearl Harbor, although an air attack was still
a "remote possibility" because, he said, of the tenor of the
dispatches sent to him, the other information which he had, the difficulties of
making such an attack, and information received from the Navy Department and
from other sources indicating that the greater portion of the Japanese carrier
forces was in home waters. He thought that a primary cause for the "war
warning" dispatch was the fact that diplomatic negotiations had ceased,
and when the newspapers indicated that the negotiations were resumed, the
warning lost much of its force. He further assumed that no ultimatum had been
given to the Japanese because the Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the
President that no ultimatum be given to them (page 301). He testified that the
phrasing of the "war warning" dispatch and the phrasing of the
dispatch of November 28th led him to believe that anything other than a
submarine attach on Pearl Harbor was most improbable (page 302). In his
testimony concerning the November 28th message, Admiral Kimmel stated that it
furnished no new information and that it stressed that Japan should be
permitted to commit the first overt act (page 325).
The
"war warning," was discussed with ComFOURTEEN. A dawn fighter flight
patrol was considered, but was not regarded as practical because of the
limitations of the Army planes (page 303).
He
considered that the action of the Navy Department in failing to make any change
in his plans to send carriers to Midway and Wake indicated that the Navy
Department expected no immediate activity in either the outlying areas (page
307) or in the Hawaiian area (page 309).
He
further testified that the day after receipt of the "war warning" of
November 27th, he had a conference with General Short, attended by members of
their staffs.
Admiral Smith said that there was no set hour for a Staff
conference, that Admiral Kimmel had a conference practically every day and
would send for the people that he wanted; he would usually have over officers
from the Fleet and very frequently would have Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye,
especially Admiral Pye, at such conferences (p. 34).
He
said that while he presently did not recall the incident that General Short
testified to a statement made by McMorris at that conference, in response to a
question by General Short, to the effect that there was no chance of a Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Finally,
he testified that the message of November 27th followed a pattern that he had
been continuing for some time, and that he felt that before hostilities
commenced he would receive additional information which would be more definite.
When the attack came without this information, he was inclined to blame himself
for not having been smarter, but when he found some time later that the
information was in fact available in the Navy Department which would have
changed the action taken by him had he known it, he felt differently about the
matter. If he had had that information, he said, he would have thoroughly
alerted all shore going activities, including the Army, and in all probability
would have had the Fleet put to sea in an intercepting position, and would have
instituted reconnaissance to the best of their ability.
438 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral
Kimmel admitted, however, that during the entire period when he was CincPac, he
maintained the same estimate as was set froth in his letter of February 18th
(Exhibit 30), which stated that "a surprise attack (submarine, air, or
combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility . . ."
B.
ADMIRAL BLOCH
Admiral
Bloch testified that he had estimated that if the Japanese did attack Pearl
Harbor, it would be by (1) submarine attack, (2) blocking the channel, (3)
laying mines, (4) sabotage. He believed that an aerial torpedo attack could not
be successful and if there were an air attack it would be by bombs (page 409).
He considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility (page 394).
He saw the "war warning" dispatch, conferred with Admiral Kimmel and
did not disagree with his conclusions.
On November 27, after the receipt of the "War
Warning", the Chief of Staff brought over a paraphrase of the dispatch.
Admiral Bloch saw Admiral Kimmel the next morning. There were others present
but he does not recall who they were. There was a term in the dispatch
concerning defense deployment. Just what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was Admiral
Bloch did not know, but they had at that time two submarines at Midway and two
at Wake. (p. 14)
The
dispatch concerning the sending of planes to Midway and Wake (Exhibit 18) did
not change his estimate (page 394). The part of the November 28th dispatch
which impressed him was the desire that Japan should be allowed to commit the
first overt act and that the public should not be alarmed (page 395)
Admiral Bloch said that after the War Warning of November 27,
negotiations between Japan and the United States were resumed and that this
had a very definite effect on his mind. Also, he said he had no feeling of
impending hostilities in the Hawaiian area around the 7th of December. (pp. 15
and 16)
Admiral Bloch volunteered at the end of his testimony a
statement that the Navy Department had more information than they had in
Hawaii; that a number of warnings were sent to them; that the Navy Department
had in the War Plans a means of putting into effect all of the plans prior to
"M" day; that such action would have been more effective than the
warnings sent out; and in this connection he referred to the State Department
note of November 26 concerning which he had no knowledge until after December
7.
Admiral Bloch said that he had not seriously considered nor
had he heard anybody else talk about the influence on public opinion in the
United States which an attack on Pearl Harbor would produce. (p. 88)
Prior to December 7, Admiral Bloch was of the opinion that a
carrier attack against Hawaii prior to a declaration of war was remote; one
important consideration was his belief that a large body of surface vessels
could not cross such a large expanse of water without the Navy having some
knowledge. (p. 89)
Admiral Bloch said that although he could not recall that
any officer had ever expressed the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor
was improbable; yet he was definitely of the opinion that such an attack was
remote although he is unable to analyze that opinion and to determine the
various factors which had caused him to reach that opinion. (pp. 89 and 90)
Captain Earle said that they had considered the estimate
indicating that the most likely form of attack would be by air, but somehow or
other they always felt that it couldn't happen here and that the Japanese would
not take that chance. (p. 377)
C.
ADMIRAL PYE
Admiral
Pye testified that he saw the November 24th dispatch (warning of an aggressive
move in any direction) on November 29th. He recalled no decisions made as a
result of it (page 424)
Admiral Pye said that on November 29, he had a conference
with Admiral Kimmel during which Admiral Kimmel showed him the November 24
message and called in his Intelligence Officer who explained the locations of
the enemy forces, indicating no unusual activity in the Naval forces of the
Japanese navy. They discussed possible action to be taken by Task Force 1 which
was the only Task Force in port aside from the battleships of Task Force 3
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 439
and
decided that there was no action that could be taken by that Task Force which
would better prepare them for the possible action that might come. (p. 153)
Admiral Pye said that he was not present at any conferences
between Admiral Kimmel and his staff or other senior officers. In his own
discussions with Admiral Kimmel, there was no mention of the possibility that
Oahu might be attacked by air. For some months there had been a feeling that a
surprise attack by submarines might be possible. His feeling in this connection
was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without definite
proof that it was enemy action but an air attack could not. In the absence of
any protection by carriers it was felt that the Fleet in port with the presumed
effectiveness of the Army air forces would be in a better position for defense
than they would be at sea. Admiral Pye also saw the war warning message on the
same day, i.e., on November 29. (p. 154)
Admiral Anderson said that the war warning was shown to a
group of Flag officers including Admiral Anderson in the office of the
Commander in Chief. Under the war plans in force, Admiral Anderson had no
specific duties to perform. He said that he knew that there were two task
forces at sea and knew that there was an excellent plan in existence for long
distance daily air reconnaissance. He assumed that whatever was considered
necessary to be done was being taken care of. (p. 393)
Admiral Anderson said that his ideas during early December
were that he expected the Japanese would not attack farther east than the
Philippines. He was influenced in all his thoughts as to security by the
knowledge or what he thought was the knowledge that a long distance daily
reconnaissance by air was being maintained. He assumed that such distant air
reconnaissance was being maintained and said that he had read a very complete
plan for such daily reconnaissance and knew that it had been placed into effect
but did not know that it had been discontinued prior to December 7. (p. 394)
He
felt that this dispatch indicated an attack on the Philippines or Guam. He saw
the "War Warning" at the same time and discussed it with CincPac. It
was sent to several addressees. The "War Warning" to him was nothing
more than they had been receiving for some time (page 425) He did not see the
November 28th message until after December 7th (page 427).
Admiral
Pye testified first that he had not made any estimate of the situation during
the period November 27th to December 7th (page 429). In response to the Court's
questions he then stated that the maneuvers which he was on had not prevented
him from making an estimate, but that he had made no written estimate (page
434). He kept a running mental estimate. He considered a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor as a possibility but not a probability (page 435) He thought it a
bad move because it was the one thing to unite the United States people in an
all‑out effort, and therefore that it was unlikely to be undertaken (page
435). He considered a submarine attack the most likely act in advance of war
(page 436). Before the attack he felt the defense measures taken were consistent
with the situation; they thought torpedoes could not be launched from the air
in waters less than 75 feet deep (page 436); and a bombing attack alone would
not have been profitable (page 437)
He
thought an air attack on Pearl Harbor was remotely possible and did not
consider that such an attack would be made before diplomatic relations were
broken off (page 438).
Admiral
Pye stated that WPL‑46 required the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor, but
there were no carriers in port and the Fleet at sea without carriers would be
more vulnerable than in port; moreover, Intelligence had indicated that all
major units of the Japanese fleet were in home ports. No additional security
measures were taken in his command. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned,
the phrase "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment prior to carrying
out tasks assigned in WPL-46" was meaningless, according to Admiral Pye
(page 426).
He
did not know if CincPac had made a direct estimate as to air attack (page 426)
.
Concerning his estimate of the probability of a surprise
attack at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said that a primary feature was that he
felt that Japan could gain more by delaying our entry into the war than they
could possible gain by any damage that they could do at Pearl Harbor. He said
further that the Secretary of the Navy when he came to Pearl Harbor after the
7th of December said that no one in Washington had stated to him that there was
any possibility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner who
440 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was
the most aggressive minded of all. Admiral Pye thought that the feeling in
Honolulu was influenced by the attitude of the Department in the preceding
months in taking forces from the Pacific and indicating that they considered
the German situation more serious than the Japanese situation. He also said
that they had not been adequately advised of the development of conditions as
known in Washington.
Admiral Pye said that although an attack against the United
States was not expected, they did expect the Japanese to proceed against the
Dutch and British. Admiral Pye said that he thought that the general impression
then had been that the Japanese naval air pilots were fairly good but that they
did not think that these pilots were as good as they appeared to be immediately
after Pearl Harbor. (p. 158) Admiral Pye said that they had had no information
as to the torpedoes which had actually been developed by other nations. (p.
158)
Admiral Pye said that he did not think that any of them had
felt that an attack would be made before a declaration of war, if ever. (p.
151)
Admiral Brown was not familiar with the security measures
such as air search and other matters relating to the internal defense of Oahu
except in a most general way. (p. 137)
Admiral Brown's Task Force had assigned to it the task of
developing the technique and examining the materials for amphibious warfare and
during the six months preceding the attack, his energies and the energies of
his staff were devoted to that subject. The primary task was training. During
the year preceding Pearl Harbor, it was his impression that there must have
been at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would break out
with the Japanese and each time the question was discussed whether or not
defensive measures should be taken or training continued. His feeling was that
training should be continued until the moment that war developed. This is what
happened to the Fleet. (p. 137)
During the last days of November, Admiral Brown participated
in conferences with the Commander in Chief. His recollection was that the
greatest concern had been as to the security of the outlying islands. They had
all believed that Japanese submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when war came
and had discussed the possibility of an air raid. His belief was that an air
raid was possible but highly improbable; that dispositions should be made for
the defense of the outlying islands and he believed that the greatest threat to
Pearl Harbor was local sabotage. (p. 137) Admiral Brown believes that during
the week preceding December 7, he was in almost daily conference with the
Commander-in-Chief. Admiral Brown said he did not remember whether or not he
saw the November 27 dispatch. It was his recollection that there was a
prolonged discussion of that dispatch. (p. 139)
Admiral Brown said that during the last few days prior to
December 7, he felt that the chance of an air attack was extremely remote
because of his misunderstanding of Japanese air ability. He did not consider
the air a menace and was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl
Harbor. His own estimate in December was that the Japanese would avoid an open
break with the United States and confine their first attack to one against the
Dutch or the British. He probably banked too much on that estimate of the
situation. (p. 145)
Admiral Brown's recollection of the conferences which were
attended by Army representatives was vague. He believed that the conferences
primarily were in connection with internal security on the island and with
shortages in defense weapons and various forms of air craft. He recalled that
in about November, somebody suggested that there might be a surprise air attack
at Hawaii, that at the time Admiral Halsey was present that Admiral Brown
expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were not capable of executing such a
mission successfully and that if they did, we should certainly be able to
follow their planes back to their carriers and destroy the carriers so that it
would be a very expensive experiment. (p. 142)
Admiral Brown said that his erroneous belief at that time
was that all Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior to American fliers. (p.
142)
Admiral Halsey said that the war warning dispatch affected
him very seriously. He thought that there was going to be a fight before he got
back to Pearl Harbor. He said that when he left Pearl Harbor, he diverted the
battleships, cruisers and destroyers and told them to carry out exercises in a
certain area and then headed West with the remainder of his task force. He then
issued orders to put in war heads in all torpedoes, to regard any submarine as
hostile and to sink it, to arm the planes with bombs and to
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 441
shoot
down any plane that was not identified. When they neared Wake, they went from
Condition 3 to Condition 2. He tried to make full preparation for combat and he
carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles. Admiral Halsey said
that he felt he might be attacked before he returned to Pearl Harbor and
thought it might precipitate war. (p. 299)
Admiral Halsey said that he did not feel that they were informed
on what the Japs were doing and felt that they were operating in the dark. He
thought that a good deal more was known in Washington than was known in Pearl
Harbor. (p. 300)
Admiral Halsey said that they thought the Japanese attack
would take place in the Far East except by submarine and that they
underestimated the Japanese ability to operate carriers or did not give it
enough consideration. (p. 301)
Admiral Halsey said that the question of an air attack on
Pearl Harbor had been on everyone's mind but that he personally did not expect
an air attack. He pointed out that anti‑aircraft drills had been had on
many occasions. (p.302)
Admiral Halsey said his personal and official relations with
Admiral Kimmel were very close and that they conferred every time he returned
to port. He said that Admiral Kimmel was principally worried about materiel
conditions, the very heavy turnover in personnel and the question of balancing
training against security. (p 294)
Admiral Halsey said that there was a continuous flow of
messages crying "wolf" and consequently the senses tended to be dull
but the possibility of the international situation was constantly before their
minds. (p. 296)
Admiral Newton said that for several months preceding
December 7, all hands had felt a tautening up of the situation and he believed
that the majority were of the view that submarines were their greatest menace.
(p. 332)
Admiral Leary said that after their return to port on
November 28, 1941, the security conditions existing on the ship were the same
as on the previous stay in port which had ended about November 21. Admiral
Leary said that the question of training is always a paramount one and that it
was not possible to carry out the required training and maintain entirely
satisfactory security measures. (p. 365) Admiral Leary said that in the few
weeks prior to December 7, he had thought in a general way of the possibility
of a surprise attack, and that they all felt that the contingency was remote
and that the Intelligence Services would give adequate warning. (p. 365) He
said that his estimate was that a surprise attack would be an air attack. (p.
366) He recalls no specific discussion along that line.
Admiral Bunkley said that on October 15, the CALIFORNIA was
at Long Beach and received orders to be ready to sail at 24 hours' notice. He
received the drastic change of orders without being taken into the confidence
of Admiral Pye as to any messages received which caused such a change in plans.
(p.415)
Admiral Bunkley had no idea of any warnings having been sent
in November and December indicating that the situation was dangerous. His
opinion at the time was that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl
Harbor. He did think that an attack would come in the Philippines. (p. 415)
D.
ADMIRAL SMITH
Admiral
Smith testified that Admiral Kimmel kept him informed of everything (page 530).
He saw the "War Warning," but though the press or radio learned that
negotiations were resumed (page 531). Each day the War Plans Officer and the
Fleet Intelligence Officer gave CincPac an estimate of what was happening. He
remembered. the November 28th message mainly because of the emphasis therein
not to alarm the civilian population (page 531); but this did not. affect his
estimate.
It
seemed odd to him to take Navy and Marine planes off Midway and Wake in
accordance with the November 26th dispatch and to put Army planes there. The
Army planes had to be transported by carrier (page 532). It would take two
weeks to deliver these planes, and this meant the absence of carriers in the
direction of Japan, and while not fully prepared for war (page 533). Admiral
Smith testified that he considered this dispatch a directive, despite its
language (page 543) .
He
said that the inference from Exhibits 15 and 17 was plain that the warning was
directed against an attack on the Philippines or Guam (page 545). The
442 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"in any
direction" dispatch of November 24th may have intensified the action they
were taking, but did not at all change their general estimate (page 546).
The
"war warning" message, he said, would have been more effective if it
had stopped with the word "warning" (page 534).
Admiral
Smith stated that in the Pacific Fleet they were not thinking of the defense of
Pearl Harbor, but about the Fleet and readiness of the Fleet. The ships were
ready for anything, but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get
out into battle, not the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 548).
He
stated that the Roberts' Report was correct in stating they were aware of the
possibility of hostile action without declaration of war (page 556), but they
expected that the Japanese might hit the Philippines, Midway, or Guam, but not
Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Smith said
that the basis for his estimate that a surprise air attack by the Japanese on
Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable was as follows (p. 374‑375):
"There was a
great deal of doubt in our minds that Japan would go to war with us unless
Germany did so also. Our information from all sources, including the Navy
Department, and our intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese fleet had
any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese fleet, as
located, indicated no move in this direction, and, I believe, most important of
all, we doubted whether the Japanese would dare send a large force as far to
the eastward as Hawaii. The possibility that they might be located even by a
neutral ship existed. They might have been located several times before their
arrival there, in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. I
believe that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was
for this reason that we did not fear an air attack."
They
did regard a submarine attack in the Hawaiian area as a sure thing (page 557).
Admiral Smith said that they were very submarine conscious,
and one reason for that was that they had had several sound contacts; perhaps
all of them were false. On one occasion, in the month of February 1941, they
had a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head which occurred again a
month later. They never found out exactly what it was, but after investigation
came to the conclusion that the contact was due to two different levels of
water temperature although the destroyers had claimed that they had heard
propeller noises. At one time, Admiral Kimmel, about six o'clock in the
morning, told him to issue orders to bomb this contact. Before the order went
out, however, he canceled it and reported the fact to CNO saying that he had no
authority to do this except within the three‑mile limit around Pearl
Harbor; a reply of the CNO was to the effect that it was a good thing that such
orders had not been issued. So, Admiral Smith said, probably all of the
contacts were false, but they were submarine conscious more than air conscious
and everyone in the Fleet believed that if an attack came it would be by
submarine rather than by aircraft. Admiral Smith believed that the officers of
the Fleet felt that there was little danger of an air attack. (p. 42)
Admiral Smith said that the warnings sent to them mentioned
attacks in the Far East, and this probably resulted in a state of mind where
they did not believe that they would be subjected to an air attack on Pearl
Harbor, although they did expect submarine attack. (p. 64)
Admiral Smith said that he thought there had been too much
"crying wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only
during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral
Richardson. (p. 64)
Admiral Smith said that his thought was at the time, and
still was, that they spent too much time in worrying about the outlying
islands. They had large forces of civilians working on Wake and Midway, and the
Commander-in-Chief spent a great deal of time, more than he should have spent,
in efforts to complete the defenses of the outlying islands. He even went to
the extent of personally auditing the records of the number of rounds of
ammunition of all sorts on each island. He was much more concerned about the
outlying islands than about Oahu, as the estimate shown in the Pacific War Plan
would indicate. Looking back on it, Admiral Smith thinks that they probably
gave too much thought to these islands and not enough to the larger things. (p.
64)
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 443
E.
ADMIRAL McMORRIS
Vice Admiral McMorris
testified that the "war warning"dispatch of 27 November 1941
occasioned no surprise and did not convey any considerable amount of additional
or startling information, because the situation with reference to Japan had
been tense throughout the year of 1941 (p. 325).
Admiral
McMorris said that he had thought that sabotage or a submarine attack was a
distinct possibility (page 887). Up to the time of the attack he considered the
possibility of an air torpedo attack very remote (page 888) and gave as reasons
therefor: (a) increasing evidence of Japanese movements toward Kra Peninsula;
(b) concentration of troops in South China Area; (c) movement of combatant
ships from the Empire to the South; (d) Navy warnings indicated the possibility
of hostilities in that area, attack on Philippines, or movement of Japanese
forces in Halmahera; (e) distance involved and logistic problem; (f) despite
British attack on Italian Fleet in southern Italy—here the depth of water and
short distance for run of torpedo was important; (g) confidence in antiaircraft
defenses against torpedo planes.
Vice Admiral McMorris
testified that he considered sound the views expressed by the Secretary of the
Navy in his letter of 24 January 1941 (Naval Court Exhibit 9), though he had
not been completely in accord as to the elements of danger as listed in
importance by the Secretary (p. 325‑327)*
Vice Admiral McMorris
further testified that he had considered an air attack possible but not
probable and further than he considered the Fleet should not take as its sole
object of existence the defending of itself against a surprise attack and that
it should carry on other fundamental duties, including training and readying
itself for operations (p. 327).
He
felt that the attack would be on the Philippines with a possible raid on Wake
and Midway, and Guam would be seriously endangered (page 889). He felt that a
submarine attack on Hawaii was probable.
Vice Admiral McMorris
testified, with reference to his estimate of the situation and possible courses
of enemy action during the period of 27 November to 6 December 1941, that
substantially he estimated the Japanese were on the point of commencing a war
against Great Britain by operations in Malaysia. His early estimate was that
the Japanese would act with the expectation that the United States would not
enter the war with Great Britain unless it was itself attacked, but later he
came to the conclusion that the Japanese might be unwilling to leave the line
of communications abreast the Philippines exposed to attack in which case the
United States would come into the war, and therefore, he estimated that heavy
attacks on the Philippines had become not only a distinct possibility but were
probable.
He further estimated
that the Japanese would seize Guam when they initiated the war, because of the
negligible defenses there, and that, because the defense of Midway was
stronger, with which the Japanese were probably familiar, it was initially a
probability that Midway would be subjected to heavy raids but that it was less
likely that there would be any Japanese effort towards seizing Midway.
Vice Admiral McMorris
testified that he further estimated that there were likely to be heavy Japanese
submarine concentrations in the Hawaiian area and the approaches thereto; that
submarine attacks would be directed primarily at our task forces operating at
sea, and that there was a likelihood of attempts being made to sink a ship an
the Pearl Harbor channel, in order to block ingress and egress. He also
expected that there would be enemy submarine activity along the Pacific Coast.
(Page 303‑304.)
After
receipt of the message of November 27th, a discussion was had as to whether or
not any general message should be sent to the Fleet, particularly those in
training and operating areas, and it was felt that the situation was already
well in hand and it would, in effect, be a message to continue what they were
doing: The only message was an injunction to be particularly alert for
submarines (page 895).
*NOTE.—This
was the letter in which the Secretary envisioned the initiation of a Japanese
war by a surprise attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and listed the dangers
in order of importance as air bombing attack, air torpedo plane attack,
sabotage, submarine attack, mining, and bombardment by gunfire. The Secretary
further stated that the countermeasures to be considered in order of
importance, were the location and engagement of enemy carriers, and supporting
vessels before an air attack could be launched pointing out that these were
largely functions of the Fleet, though Perhaps not possible of being carried
out in the event of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a
declaration of war (p. 3,26).
444 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral
McMorris said that the dispatch of November 26th from the Chief of Naval
Operations regarding the transfer of planes to Wake, of which CincPac was an
addressee, probably influenced whatever ideas or views resulted from the series
of dispatches, but the question of moving Army planes there was given extensive
consideration and the determination was made to send defensive planes to Midway
and Wake, preferably Marine, and they felt it imperative to have protective
fighters there because they anticipated operating a number of patrol planes
from Wake if war should start (page 891).
A
squadron of patrol planes searched in advance of the carrier and was withdrawn
after she had discharged the planes at Wake (page 892). When Halsey and
"Newton" moved to Wake and Midway for delivery of Marine aircraft,
they were well aware of the fact that hostilities might commence before they
again entered port (page 894).
As Admiral McMorris recalled it, orders to depth bomb submarine
contacts were issued after the war warning and orders given to Admirals Newton
and Halsey to repel hostile planes. (p. 246)
The proposal to send
Army troops and planes to Midway and Wake did not, so far as he was concerned,
weaken the "war warning." He thought those places would be weakened
in defense by such a change; that they were important; and might be subject to
attack so that the time was inauspicious (page 896).
Admiral McMorris recalled that at not a great while before
the commencement of war, there was a suggestion to replace the marines at
outlying islands with Army forces and that this was discussed with General
Short. It was concluded not to send them. They felt that the Washington
proposal was badly timed. He did not feel that it vitiated the war warning
dispatch. (p. 247)
Those
dispatches (Exhibits 18, 40) were proposals and not directives and the
recommendation was against the proposals and recommendation was accepted (page
896).
He
believed from the limited knowledge he had that the danger from enemy aircraft
was not great (page 896). He did not consider that the Japanese would make a
surprise air attack; he felt that the only serious danger was sabotage or
submarines (page 900).
With reference to
testimony given by him in previous investigations to the effect that in his
opinion the island defense was adequate. and that the chances of an air attack
inflicting damage were small, Vice Admiral McMorris testified generally that
the bases of that opinion were as follows:
(a) That the anti‑aircraft
guns and the fighters would destroy a large proportion of attacking planes;
(b) That bombing by
enemy planes would not be sufficiently accurate to obtain a large number of
hits;
(e) That
notwithstanding the success of the British air torpedo attack at Taranto, which he believed was attributable
to peculiar conditions that existed at Taranto, he did not believe there was
any serious hazard in an air torpedo attack at Pearl, because: (1) the
attacking planes would have to fly very low, thereby exposing themselves to
anti‑aircraft fire and fighter interception, and (2) the shallowness of
the water and the short distance available for torpedo runs would operate to
reduce the effectiveness of this type of attack. He stated that manifestly his
conclusions were entirely wrong, but that they had been reached by reading
available information as to torpedo performance an our own Navy;
(d) He admitted that
he did not have any knowledge as to whether the Army anti‑aircraft
defenses were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness, but he
assumed that they were in a state of readiness. "Perhaps I was remiss in
not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew that our
own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I
felt. We were a bit too complacent there. Nonetheless, I was not directly
acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness being
maintained or the watches being kept with respect to the aircraft defenses of
Hawaii (p. 330-332).
Admiral
McMorris said that he saw the November 28th dispatch and considered the
directive for reconnaissance to mean search by aircraft for submarines or a
raiding cruiser.
Admiral McMorris said that he did not believe that a
surprise air attack was likely in the Hawaiian area although he did consider
such an attack
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 445
possible
in the Philippines and even against Midway or Wake. Probably he said, some
discussions along those lines may have taken place but he had no specific
recollection of such a discussion. (p. 236) He personally never considered an
air attack as more than a remote possibility and he is certain that Admiral
Kimmel was not anticipating such an attack.
Admiral McMorris said that the characteristics of the
leaders of the Japanese Navy had been discussed from time to time between
Admiral Kimmel, Admiral McMorris, and others, and the general impression was
that they were rather capable and aggressive leaders. (p. 236)
The reasons why Admiral McMorris thought a surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility were as follows:
"For us to make an attack on Japan would have required
steaming long distance with probability of detection and then attack in the
face of shore-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and
difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged
ships might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the
same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It
also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found to the
southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably employed
there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island defenses
would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and that the attacking
forces would suffer heavy casualties quite disproportionate to the damage they
might inflict." (p. 237)
Admiral McMorris said that they did anticipate that mass
submarine attacks in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor were quite possible. (p. 238)
Admiral McCormick who at the time was under McMorris, said
that the courses open to the enemy, as the War Plans Officer saw them, were in
the nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of air and
submarine attacks and the seizure of all of our possessions in the western
Pacific; it was considered most improbable that they would venture out of the
western Pacific; an air attack on Pearl Harbor was listed as a possible course
of Japanese action. Predominant attention was focused on the preparation for
offensive movement, the countering of Japanese action against Wake and Midway,
and protection of the Fleet against submarine attack. A very low degree of
probability was assigned to air attack at Pearl Harbor. (p. 68) He said that he
did not think that any of Admiral Kimmel's advisers had any real conception of
how far the Japanese had come in their training and preparations for such an
attack as they made.
Admiral McCormick said that in formulating estimates of the
situation, the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders were not,
so far as he knew, taken into consideration. (p. 70)
Admiral McCormick said that the term "defensive
deployment" use in the war warning puzzled them. The further strengthening
of the islands to the westward and defensive submarine patrols were the only
changes that Admiral Kimmel and his staff could derive from this directive.
Admiral McCormick said that he knew of not one person at
Pearl Harbor who was not completely surprised by the Japanese air attack. (p.
71)
Admiral McCormick, at the end of his statement, said that
Admiral Kimmel was whole‑heartedly and self‑sacrificingly devoted
to getting the Fleet ready for war; that "There is no doubt about the fact
that we, at Pearl Harbor, did, for various reasons, have what you might call a
blind spot in connection with any real probability of the carrier raid on Pearl
Harbor. I think that with the means at hand, and with the known difficulty of
detecting such an approach, as has been proved many times by our carrier task
forces in this war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this
blind spot that I mentioned had not existed." (p. 72)
Captain Murphy said that he did not think that an attack,
such as the attack that was made, would be made. He thought that it would be
stupid for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor and that they might have gone
into Thailand, Malay and the Dutch East Indies without involving the United
States. He thought they might attack the Philippines.
Captain Murphy said that he thought the presence of heavy
ships in Pearl Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks involved
in Rainbow 5. (p. 199) He was not sure whether the words defensive deployment
in any way signified security measures, but interpreted the words as leaving
the matter open to those in Pearl Harbor. (p. 200)
446 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
F.
ADMIRAL DELANY
Admiral
DeLany stated that he saw all of the messages from the Navy Department. He did
not consider that CincPac had been furnished complete information on relations
between the United States and Japan, because full information of the
negotiations and discussions were not forwarded to CinCPac (page 506).
The
"War Warning" dispatch meant to him that Japan was on the move, but
he did not interpret it as showing an immediate Japanese attack on the United
States.
Admiral
DeLany said that between November 27th and December 7th, he knew that Japan was
on the move, but he thought they would go into the Malays or Thailand. He did
not know what we would have done if this had included an overt act against the
United States. The Pacific Fleet had not been given any clear‑cut view of
the attitude which the United States Government was assuming toward Japan. He
had not thought that the Japanese would initiate a war by attacking the Pacific
Fleet as such an attack would wake up the United States more than anything;
also because they had reports that the Japanese fleet was primarily based in
the Empire (page 497).
In
his opinion, if there were an attack, it would be by submarine. He did not
envisage an attack by air or surface ships (page 498).
Rear Admiral DeLany
reaffirmed his belief, previously stated to the Roberts Commission, that there
was no discussion between 27 November and 7 December by the staff as to the
probability of an air attack of the nature of that which occurred. (p. 166)
Asked what
consideration was given to possible directions of aggressive movements, warned
against in the 24 November message from OpNav to CinCPac and Commander‑in‑Chief
Asiatic, he replied that aircraft carriers were sent to deliver planes to
Midway and Wake but that an attack farther to the eastward was not
contemplated. (p.170)
Following the
"war warning" dispatch of 27 November conferences between the Army
and Navy retained the concept previously held that the greatest danger to the
Hawaiian area lay in the possibility of submarine attacks and sabotage. (p.
172).
Admiral DeLany stated
that joint Army and Navy exercises relating to defense the islands were
handicapped by lack of equipment necessary to provide a central air warning
control post. This equipment, together with anti‑aircraft weapons,
communication facilities and planes, was declared not available although
following the Pearl Harbor attack they were received almost immediately. (p.
174‑176)
Adequate air
reconnaissance was impossible, in his opinion, due to the small number of
planes and crews, condition of the planes and the necessity for maintaining
them in readiness for an emergency. (p. 181)
From
the information which he had in November 1941, he did not think a torpedo
plane attack in Pearl Harbor could be launched because of the depth of the
water. This information had been sent in letters by the Chief of Naval Operations.
Concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships
and installations at Pearl Harbor, Admiral DeLany said that he did not and
never would have expected that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor as they
did; that everyone was of the opinion that the danger lay in the fact that
submarines might operate in the area; and that there might be sabotage on the
island. The general concept of the defense of the island and the security of
the base there was based on that idea. (p. 77)
Admiral DeLany said that nothing in the dispatches received
by them indicated that hostilities would be started in the way in which they
did in fact start. (p. 78)
Admiral DeLany said that the reasons why they regarded a surprise
air attack at Pearl Harbor as improbable were that the last information which
they had placed the Japanese Fleet in home waters; there was inherent danger
for the Japanese in bringing their Fleet in for such an attack; and it was felt
that the one single thing which would inflame Americans would be an attack upon
their home territory. (p. 80)
Admiral DeLany thought that in formulating the opinion that
an air attack was unlikely, consideration was given to the characteristics of
Admiral Yamamoto, an air expert. (p. 81)
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 447
G.
ADMIRAL CALHOUN
Admiral
Calhoun said that he had been present at Admiral Kimmel's conferences ever
morning and heard all the information that Admiral Kimmel discussed. He knew
of the "war warning" dispatch and interpreted it to mean that war
would start in the Philippines (page 935). Nobody had expected war immediately,
he said, and Admiral Kimmel did not indicate any contrary view (page 938). When
the "War Warning" was read, he had thought, and believed the others
also had thought that it did not necessarily mean that war was imminent and
that the Fleet should go on a war footing (page 939).
In his voluntary statement at the end of his testimony,
Admiral Calhoun discussed the fact that he attended all of Admiral Kimmel's
conferences and that neither he nor anyone else expected any immediate sneak
attack by the Japanese at the time when it came. (p. 228)
H.
CAPTAIN LAYTON
Captain
Layton stated that he had seen the "War Warning" and had considered
that it fitted into the picture that the Japanese were going to strike in
Southeast Asia (page 911). He had no apprehension of an air attack on Hawaii.
He at one time translated a Japanese novel which academically discussed an
attack on Pearl Harbor. He showed this to Admiral Kimmel about three or four
months prior to December 7, 1941 (page 911). From the "War Warning"
message and other information he had at the time, he expected the Japanese to
attack Thailand, and possibly the Philippines (page 912) and after our search
planes from Manila had reported Japanese forces off Cameron Bay and in the Gulf
of Siam, he reported this estimate to CinCPac. This was in agreement with the
"War Warning" (pages 912‑3). Air attack on Pearl Harbor was a
capability of the Japanese but he had considered it a remote possibility.
Surprise attack was a Japanese characteristic (page 913).
Captain Layton knew Admiral Yamamoto personally and was
familiar with his characteristics. He did not specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that
in view of Admiral Yamamoto's characteristics a surprise air raid on Pearl
Harbor was likely (page 223). He said that on one occasion when he did discuss
with Admiral Kimmel a book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was mentioned and
Admiral Kimmel asked him what he thought of the chances. He said "I only
hope we can intercept them and I hope that the air search will find them in
plenty of time." He also said that in the discussion in general regarding
Japan's strength, he thought that the subject of Japan's carriers was
mentioned, and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much in the first
battle. (p. 224)
Captain Layton said that he saw the war warning of November
27th and thought that it fitted in with the picture up to date as he saw it,
namely, that the Japanese were moving to the South. His estimate was unclear as
to whether or not the Japanese would attack the Philippines or would leave
their flank unguarded and attempt to work some compromise deal through Kurusu
and Nomura. (p. 224)
Captain
Layton said that there was no discussion from November 27th to December 7th in
his presence, "in higher authority" as to the importance of guarding
against internal sabotage (page 914).
I.
ADMIRAL BELLINGER
Admiral Bellinger
stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor, of
the so‑called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941.
Neither did he see or know of the CNO despatch of 28 November regarding
possible hostile action by the Japanese. (P. 498‑499)
Admiral
Bellinger referred to Addendum I of Exhibit 53, which stated that an air attack
from carriers at 300 miles was the most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor.
He envisaged air attack as the most logical form for the greatest success (page
668). He expected a bombing, not a torpedo attack (page 669).
Admiral
Bellinger said that he had not thought it probable that an attack would be made
on Oahu as the opening event of the Japanese‑United States war (page
688), and his estimate contained in the plans was in order to work out a
defense of Pearl Harbor and not an estimate of the war plans of the Japanese
(page 687) .
448 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
During the five days preceding December 7, Admiral Bellinger
was in bed with the "flu." His assistant, Captain Ramsey, conferred
with him. (p. 122)
Admiral Bellinger said that late in November, 1941, he
thought the most probable form of Japanese attack would be by submarine or by
means of sabotage. (p.123‑124)
J.
ADMIRAL KITTS
Admiral
Kitts testified that he had thought an air torpedo attack was possible in Pearl
Harbor, and antiaircraft measures such as nets and balloons had been considered
(page 516).
Admiral Kitts did not attend staff conferences generally. He
was not shown any warning dispatch but knew the general tenor of some of the
warnings. (p. 185) Admiral Kitts said that he had considered an air attack on
Pearl Harbor as a serious possibility and also a submarine attack or a
combination of the two. (p. 186) Admiral Kitts said that he helped draft the
Fleet Circular letter in February or March known as 2CL‑41 which
indicated that a surprise air attack was a definite possibility. (p. 186)
His feeling in this
regard was minimized by two letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, stating
that the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow for a successful torpedo run.
Nets had not been put in because they were a hindrance to ships' movements and
because it was felt that the danger of torpedo attack was slight. Balloon
barrages had not been put in because of interference with normal operations of
our own aircraft (page 516). Nets had been placed at the entrance to Pearl
Harbor (page 517).
The
deepest water in Pearl Harbor was 42 feet, or 7 fathoms, and he recalled that
the Navy Department had estimated that torpedoes could not be successfully
launched in less than 10 fathoms (page 519).
K.
ADMIRAL WITHERS
Admiral
Withers said that he had seen the "War Warning" and had been present
at a conference held on November 28, 1941. He said that he told Admiral Kimmel
that he thought the dispatch meant war and that he would sink Japanese ships if
they came within 500 miles of Hawaii and didn't turn back (page 1085). General
Short was not at this conference (page 1086). He had no orders to take
offensive action against enemy ships within the 500 mile area from Pearl Harbor
(page 1086).
He
had thought there would be an attack on Hawaii, but did not consider what kind
of attack (page 1086). The "War Warning" message did mention the
Philippines and he had felt that an attack might come anywhere but had thought
that the chances were that it would be on the Philippines (page 1087).
Captain Curts said that he had been apprehensive for a long
time prior to December 7 about the danger of the Japanese starting a war without
a formal declaration and he feared particularly sabotage. (p. 108)
L.
COLONEL PHILLIPS
Colonel
Phillips testified that General Short received an Army dispatch, corresponding
to Exhibit 19, on November 27th or November 28th, and that a conference was
held with Admiral Kimmel (page 483). He said that at the time of receipt of the
dispatch an estimate of the situation was made which resulted in the sabotage
alert. He estimated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but not
probable, and that if there were an attack, it would be by air. He did not
recall receiving any information additional to that message until the afternoon
of December 7, 1941 (page 485). He did not recall having seen the Navy
"War Warning" message (page 486).
He
stated that his opinion that the enemy might attack by air had been his own
personal opinion (page 493).
M.
GENERAL SHORT
General
Short said that at this time he considered sabotage the main danger at Pearl
Harbor since the information they had indicated that the Japanese would move
southward (page 239). He said that during a conference with Admiral Kimmel,
McMorris had stated that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor,
and that there had been no disagreement by those present. He also knew
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 449
that Admiral Kimmel
would have moved the ships out if he had thought an air attack likely.