XXI.
CONFERENCES BETWEEN ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT AFTER NOVEMBER 27th
Admiral
Smith said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect; Admiral Kimmel and General
Short, he "estimates," conferred every day between November 27th and
December 7th (page 546). He present at some of the staff conferences (page
547).
He
said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect in stating that Admiral Kimmel did
not inform himself of measures taken by General Short; Admiral Smith was
present at most of the conferences, and had been early directed by Admiral
Kimmel to cooperate with the Army (page 550); also, Short informed himself of
Kimmel's actions (page. 551).
He
stated that within twenty‑four hours of the receipt of the "war
warning," Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred. General Short had
been promptly advised of this message (page 561).
Commander Harold S.
Burr, then Naval Liaison Officer for the Commandant at the headquarters,
Commanding General Hawaiian Department, while at CincPac Headquarters in the
presence of Capt. Earle received from Lt. Commander Layton a copy of the
"war warning" dispatch of 27 November (Exhibit 17, Naval Court of
Inquiry) with instructions to deliver it to General Short. Commander Burr could
not locate General Short or the Chief of Staff and left the dispatch. with the
Senior Officer Present, Lt. Col William Donnegan, G‑3, explaining its urgent nature. Commander Burr stated
that on the following day Col. Donnegan told him that the dispatch had been
delivered to General Short. (pages 877‑8)
He did not recall
"the details" of that conference. He thought that the message was
intended to put them on their toes and to get them ready to carry out the War
Plan.
Admiral Kimmel, according to Admiral Smith, had a shock in
the week preceding Pearl Harbor when orders were received from the Navy Department
to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all of the Marines off of the
outlying islands and Marine and Navy planes and replacing them with soldiers
and with Army planes. As Admiral Smith remembered it, practically
the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two staffs together. He
said "the Army was undecided whether to put P‑39's or P‑40's
on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain
there for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to take off
from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship
in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General
Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General
Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War
Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral
Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And
General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen
miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's
reply was, "Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was
never made because the war broke before‑hand. The only dispute between
the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I
have to man these islands, I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel
replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I
wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports." or words to that
effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands,
I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command
them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral
Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried
out." (p. 40‑41)
Concerning the "war warning", Admiral Smith said
that it was received somewhere in the mid-afternoon on the 27th of November.
General Short was immediately sent for and a conference was held. By six
o'clock that evening, the Army was on the march, unfortunately what they did
was to station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, and the bridges. In
other words, they alerted against sabotage because it was the consensus of
opinion
450 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
from this dispatch that attacks would be
against the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo. What
was considered most likely by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at
sea and by the others sabotage on the Japanese population. The war warning, he
said, was carefully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers so as to
determine its exact meaning He thought that the question of the defense of
Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except as to the
danger of sabotage. The question of possible attack by air did not arise.
Admiral Smith was not apprised of the contemplated action of the Army and did
not believe that Admiral Kimmel had been advised. Admiral Bloch was at the
conference, but Admiral Smith recalled no discussion of measures to be taken by
Admiral Bloch's task force in light of the warning. Admiral Smith did not
recall what condition of readiness was set for ships in port. He said the ships
at sea were apprised of this warning.
Admiral Smith said
that the operating schedule for ships which had been previously issued was not
departed from except that the ENTERPRISE was sent to deliver planes to Wake. He
said that as a result, at the time of the war warning, two of the three task
forces were at sea; Admiral Pye's task force returned about the 5th of
December, he thought, and also part of Admiral Halsey's task force; Admiral.
Brown's task force departed on the 4th of December, he had the LEXINGTON and
some cruisers and destroyers, but no battleships; the net result of the
adherence to the operating schedules previously issued was that there was a
movement of ships inward to port rather than the deployment involving movement
outward. Admiral Smith said that it might very well be that these plans had
been known to the Japanese and that they chose their time to attack when two
task forces were scheduled to be in port.
The war warning,
Admiral Smith said, did not indicate to him that there would be an attack on
Pearl Harbor. He knew that a greater part of the approaches to Pearl Harbor
were not covered by any reconnaissance, but recalled no discussion at the
conferences concerning this fact. (p. 50‑53)
General
Short stated that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed his anti‑sabotage
alert into effect. According to Admiral Smith and Colonel Phillips, the Army
went on the anti‑sabotage alert on November 27th (pages 537, 479).
General Short stated that he also conferred with Admiral Kimmel on December
1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251), they talked over every phase of what they were
doing (page 242).
Admiral
McMorris recalled that at about this time a conference was held between Admiral
Kimmel and General Short regarding utilization of Army aircraft to strengthen
defenses at Midway and Wake (page 889).
Admiral Brown said that he had overheard Admiral Kimmel
frequently question General Short as to the Army's adequacy to defend Pearl
Harbor against enemy air attack and that General Short had replied that his
equipment was wholly inadequate and that he had done everything possible to try
to have it increased.
Admiral Pye said that he personally attended no conferences
in which the situation was discussed by the Army High command; his conferences
with Admiral Kimmel were concerned with Fleet operations. (p. 149)
Captain Murphy said that after the receipt of the war
warning he, Captain Smith, Captain McMorris, Captain DeLany, and Captain
Layton, were called into Admiral Kimmel's office, and he read the dispatch and
asked for their opinion. Admiral Kimmel said that he would have a further
conference that afternoon. Captain Murphy said that he thought that at that
conference the decision was made to reinforce Wake and to send some planes to
Midway. (p. 197).
Admiral
Bellinger did not see the warning dispatches (Exhibits 15 and 17) before
December 7th, and between November 27th and December 7th did no confer with the
Army Air Force Commander regarding long range reconnaissance (page 672).
Admiral
Bloch recalled no discussions concerning unity of command (page 395).