XXIII.
ACTION TAKEN BY GENERAL SHORT
General
Short testified that Alert No. 1 against sabotage was put in effect. General
Short considered sabotage as the main danger since the information received was
that the Japanese would move Southward (page 239). He said that in a
conference, in response to Admiral Kimmel's question, Captain McMorris, his War
Plans Officer, had said there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor,
and that there was no disagreement. Also, he knew that Admiral Kimmel did not
think an air attack likely or he would have moved the ships out. The dispatch
which General Short had received put emphasis on not alarming the civilian
population and there had been no indication as to what form hostilities might
take. He pointed out that the Army sent in B‑24's on photo mission
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 463
unarmed, and also on
December 6th sent out twelve B‑17's not in combat condition (page 240).
He
said that although he had had conferences with Admiral Kimmel during this
period, no request was made of him for planes for long distance reconnaissance
(page 249).
He
did not recall having seen the dispatch of November 24th, but did see the
dispatch of November 28th, which had repeated the Army dispatch to him.
Captain Curts discussed the general procedure for delivering
copies of Navy messages to the Army and the procedure handled in connection
with the November 27 dispatch as follows:
"Our ordinary system in Pearl Harbor was to make a
paraphrase of such a dispatch, send an officer with the original and with a
paraphrase to the addressee's communication office, and have them ask the
Commanding General whether he was satisfied with the paraphrase and then to
sign the dispatch, the original, as having received the same. This particular
dispatch wasn't handled in that manner. This dispatch was delivered to Admiral
Kimmel who kept it in his desk drawer with all copies thereof, and, upon my
telling him that I had to deliver it to the Army, he informed me that he would
take care of it by sending his Intelligence officer to deliver this dispatch to
the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short. I tried
to get him to let me get their signatures but Admiral Kimmel refused, saying
that Commander Layton had taken care of it. I questioned Layton as to whether
he delivered it and he stated that he had delivered it to the Fourteenth Naval
District and, in the presence of Captain Earle, the Chief of Staff, had
delivered a copy to General Shorts G‑2 officer for delivery to General
Short, and later Layton informed me that this officer, this G‑2 officer,
told him that he had given the dispatch to General Short personally in his
bedroom that night. I was quite concerned, personally, about upsetting the
system of receipts, but, in my own mind, I am satisfied that this dispatch was
delivered to both the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to
General Short, although I held no receipt." (p. 112)
In
response to the direction contained in the Army dispatch, General Short advised
the War Department of the action taken by him. The War Department did not
reply. He received another telegram on November 28th which confirmed him in
his belief that sabotage wad considered the main danger (page 244). He replied
on that day telling what he had done (page 245). He did not report on long
range reconnaissance for that was the Navy's responsibility (page 246). He
received no further information from the War Department and did not change his
alert (page 243).
General
Marshall said that after the Army dispatch of November 27th, no further
warnings were sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short until December 7th
(page 869). Two other messages warning against sabotage were sent by other
parts of the War Department on November 28th, but General Marshall was not
familiar with these until after December 7th (page 869).
General
Marshall stated, concerning the dispatch in which General Short informed the
War Department of the measures taken pursuant to the warning of November 27th,
that so far as they could determine the reply from the Philippines and the
reply from Hawaii came in together and were stapled together. General Marshall
initialed the one from the Philippines, which was on top, but not the one from
Hawaii (pages 880‑1). He had no recollection one way or the other as to
whether he had seen the one from Hawaii. He was away from November 26th-28th (page 880), and at other times up to
December 7th, and had no recollection whether of not he knew of the precautions
which General Short had taken (page 881).
Admiral
Stark testified that he did not recall having been advised of General Short's
reply until after December 7th (pages 151, 802).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of alert the Army had effective
at this time, but he knew that they had some alert in effect (page 326).