General Short testified that Alert No. 1 against sabotage was put in effect. General Short considered sabotage as the main danger since the information received was that the Japanese would move Southward (page 239). He said that in a conference, in response to Admiral Kimmel's question, Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, had said there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there was no disagreement. Also, he knew that Admiral Kimmel did not think an air attack likely or he would have moved the ships out. The dispatch which General Short had received put emphasis on not alarming the civilian population and there had been no indication as to what form hostilities might take. He pointed out that the Army sent in B‑24's on photo mission


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unarmed, and also on December 6th sent out twelve B‑17's not in combat con­dition (page 240).

He said that although he had had conferences with Admiral Kimmel during this period, no request was made of him for planes for long distance reconnaissance (page 249).

He did not recall having seen the dispatch of November 24th, but did see the dispatch of November 28th, which had repeated the Army dispatch to him.


Captain Curts discussed the general procedure for delivering copies of Navy messages to the Army and the procedure handled in connection with the November 27 dispatch as follows:

"Our ordinary system in Pearl Harbor was to make a paraphrase of such a dispatch, send an officer with the original and with a paraphrase to the ad­dressee's communication office, and have them ask the Commanding General whether he was satisfied with the paraphrase and then to sign the dispatch, the original, as having received the same. This particular dispatch wasn't handled in that manner. This dispatch was delivered to Admiral Kimmel who kept it in his desk drawer with all copies thereof, and, upon my telling him that I had to deliver it to the Army, he informed me that he would take care of it by sending his Intelligence officer to deliver this dispatch to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short. I tried to get him to let me get their signatures but Admiral Kimmel refused, saying that Commander Layton had taken care of it. I questioned Layton as to whether he delivered it and he stated that he had delivered it to the Fourteenth Naval District and, in the presence of Captain Earle, the Chief of Staff, had delivered a copy to General Shorts G‑2 officer for delivery to General Short, and later Layton informed me that this officer, this G‑2 officer, told him that he had given the dispatch to General Short personally in his bedroom that night. I was quite concerned, personally, about up­setting the system of receipts, but, in my own mind, I am satisfied that this dispatch was delivered to both the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short, although I held no receipt." (p. 112)


In response to the direction contained in the Army dispatch, General Short advised the War Department of the action taken by him. The War Department did not reply. He received another telegram on November 28th which con­firmed him in his belief that sabotage wad considered the main danger (page 244). He replied on that day telling what he had done (page 245). He did not report on long range reconnaissance for that was the Navy's responsibility (page 246). He received no further information from the War Department and did not change his alert (page 243).

General Marshall said that after the Army dispatch of November 27th, no further warnings were sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short until December 7th (page 869). Two other messages warning against sabotage were sent by other parts of the War Department on November 28th, but General Marshall was not familiar with these until after December 7th (page 869).

General Marshall stated, concerning the dispatch in which General Short in­formed the War Department of the measures taken pursuant to the warning of November 27th, that so far as they could determine the reply from the Philippines and the reply from Hawaii came in together and were stapled together. General Marshall initialed the one from the Philippines, which was on top, but not the one from Hawaii (pages 880‑1). He had no recollection one way or the other as to whether he had seen the one from Hawaii. He was away from November 26th-28th  (page 880), and at other times up to December 7th, and had no recollection whether of not he knew of the precautions which General Short had taken (page 881).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having been advised of General Short's reply until after December 7th (pages 151, 802).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of alert the Army had effective at this time, but he knew that they had some alert in effect (page 326).