XXIV.
JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AND. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR—JAPANESE
MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS
A.
JAPANESE ESPIONAGE
Admiral Bloch said that he had been advised by the District
Intelligence Officer of the existence of about 200 representatives of the
Japanese Consulate who were spread over Oahu and who were not registered
agents of the
464 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese
Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had definite information to
convict these men of being unregistered agents. Admiral Bloch wrote a letter to
the Chief of Naval Operations on this matter dated November 10, 1941, file S‑A8‑5/EF37/ND14,
Serial 01216. The reply thereto is identified as letter from the Chief of Naval
Operations to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classified Secret, dated
6 December 1941, file (SC) A8‑5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both of the above‑mentioned
letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential
File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The Army would not agree to the
indictment of these Japanese and the matter was referred to Washington where
the War and Navy Departments agreed that they would not be brought to trial.
(p. 15)
Captain Murphy said that there was a general impression that
the Japanese could know anything that they wanted to know about the Pacific
Fleet. (p 200)
Admiral Brown said that he thought it quite probable that
the Japanese had a copy of the employment schedule setting forth the Fleet
Movements. (p. 145)
Captain Mayfield pointed out that the topography of Pearl
Harbor permitted easy observation of the ships there. Captain Mayfield was of
the belief that there were about 350 Japanese societies which were active. He
said that there were also 250 consular agents which he believed were used by
the Japanese consulate for the purpose of getting information. (p. 311)
Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of the domestic
branch of ONI and the activities of the Counter‑Espionage Section and
conference with the F. B. I. and the Army set‑up. (p. 284) Admiral
Wilkinson also discussed the Navy's desire to have the Department of Justice
prosecute various Japanese in Hawaii for being non‑registered agents of a
foreign government and said that the Commanding General had urged that prosecution
be withheld in order not to disturb cordial relations between the Japanese and
the Americans.
Captain Mayfield said that he had participated in
conferences at Hawaii concerning the possible prosecution of the Japanese
consular agents but that the Army had indicated that they did not want these
men prosecuted. (p. 311‑312)
Concerning the use of Japanese fishing boats and
Intelligence work, Captain Mayfield said there never was definite proof of
espionage in all of these boats but he believed that they were used for that
purpose. (p. 312) Captain Mayfield said that he had no exact information
indicating that amateur radio transmitters were used for Intelligence work or
regular commercial broadcasts from Hawaii. (p. 312)
Lt. Stephenson discussed the Japanese consular agents of
which there were about 240 and the fact that one of them in June 1940 had been
proved to have been engaged in espionage. He discussed the correspondence relating
to the prosecution of these consular agents which was resisted by General
Short.
Lt. Stephenson discussed the sources of Japanese espionage
information and the limitations on counter Intelligence due to limited
personnel in ONI and to other reasons. (p. 326)
Lt. Stephenson discussed the measures taken to prevent the
acquisition of information by visiting Japanese merchant crewmen, etc. (p. 327)
Lt. Stephenson discussed at some length the various sources
of information open to Japanese and the inability of the Intelligence Section
to prevent the acquisition and transmission of such information.
Lt. Stephenson referred to reports which he had written
concerning the espionage problem in Hawaii dated February 9 and February 14,
1942 in the Kuehn case and a report dated April 20, 1943 in the Counter‑Intelligence
file of ONI. He said that it was known on the basis of information after the
war that the consulate head used commercial communication facilities for the
transmitting of vital Intelligence from and after December 3. (p. 331)
Lt. Stephenson said that no evidence had ever been found
establishing that Japanese sampans had been used for espionage purposes but it,
was recognized that they were so used. (p. 332)
Concerning Japanese espionage, Admiral Smith said:
"I remember an incident a few months before the war
where an American came from San Francisco; he had communicated with the Fleet
Intelligence Officer before doing so. He was in the employ of the Japanese and
was sent
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 465
out
by the Japanese by plane. The Intelligence officer made contact with him by
placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we removed from the files two or
three papers, mostly on the results of target practice, and gave them to this
American who flew back to the West Coast, and, as the result of all this, a
Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe of Charles
Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Department intervened
and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was returned to Japan. What happened to
the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew that the money had come from
the Japanese Embassy. We did not know of the activities of Japanese agents in
Hawaii, although it had been developed years before that some of the priests
were ex‑Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick, who had been
a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was made to deport one of these
priests, but it was found nothing could be done because of an old agreement
between the United States and Japan, based upon our missionary activities of
the past, that once a man in the religious status arrived in the country, if he
chose to undertake other activities, nothing could be done about it. I know
that Admiral Bloch knew of that case. In the summer of 1940, when Admiral
Richardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the entire Fleet one
afternoon well off shore and a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that
no one beyond the Staff of the Commander‑in‑Chief knew why we were
out. We changed course after and engaged in no real tactical operations. What
this was all about, I have never learned. But on our return to port, I learned,
through Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the part
of Japanese communications between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii, trying to
learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were Japanese agents working,
but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the
Commander‑in‑Chief did not know who these Japanese agents were. We
suspected all of them."
Captain McCollum said
that it had been suspected for some time prior to December 7, 1941, that
Japanese submarines were keeping our fleet based in Pearl Harbor under
observation. He said that at various times during the last 6 months of 1941 U.
S. destroyers had reported contacts with enemy subs in and around the Hawaiian
group: Several of these contacts were considered well authenticated. Although
most of the contacts were not in the immediate vicinity of Honolulu, he
believed that one had been made in Molokai Channel—the approach to the drill
grounds of the fleet. In July or August, 1941, it had actually been suggested
that a search be made of a certain point to the north of Midway, where at was
believed that a Jap provision ship and tanker might be rendezvousing with some
of the Japanese reconnaissance subs (p. 23‑24).
Vice Admiral Smith
stated that there had been many reported submarine contacts prior to 7 December
1941 in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but that in most cases
these contacts had not been considered authentic. He did not recall any
submarine contacts during the period October‑December, 1941 (p. 840).
Captain John B. Earle,
USN, in December, 1941, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, testified
that in the several months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack there were ten to
fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Harbor, most of the reports
coming from sampans, occasionally from Army lookout posts, and now and then
from planes (p. 451). Captain Earle recalled few of the details of these
reports; he remembered none in the months of October and November, 1941, or in
December prior to the 6th of that month (p. 451).
A search of the files
of CinCPac by Admiral Hewitt's investigation resulted in locating dispatches
that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl
Harbor:
(1) On 3 November 1941
an oil slick area in latitude 20‑10, longitude 157‑41 was observed
by a patrol plane and crossed by Task Force One. An air search of a fifteen
mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area by the USS
WORDEN and an investigation by the USS DALE produced negative results (Exhibit
48; dispatches 031920, 082035, 03,2133, 082300, 040042) .
(2) On 28 November
1941, after the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, had issued an
order requiring extreme vigilance against possible hostile submarines,
restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and providing that
all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth
bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of
the CinCPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a
466 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
restricted area (Exhibit 48; dispatch
280835). A search of part of the area by a task group of three destroyers was
pursued from 1050 to 1845 on the 28th but produced no contacts (Exhibit 48;
dispatches 281050, 281133, 281704, 281845).
(3) During the night
of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a clear metallic echo in latitude
20‑30, longitude 158‑23, which was lost in a change of range; it
was evaluated as probably not indicating the presence of a submarine (Exhibit
48; dispatch 022336). An investigation, ordered to be made by DesRon 4 (Exhibit
48; dispatch 080040), apparently was negative.
Lieutenant Woodrum
said that over a period of years considerable information had been gathered by
the Naval Intelligence Service concerning Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor and
the Island of Oahu. He said, "There are voluminous reports available
concerning the visits of Japanese tankers, Japanese training ships, Japanese
training squadrons to the Island of Oahu and to other islands in the Hawaiian
group. It is well known that officers attached to these groups made
''sightseeing trips' of the islands, including such vantage points as Aiea
Heights." (P.385.)
Admiral
Pye stated that the Japanese had practically unlimited means of obtaining and
transmitting information concerning United States ships at Oahu (page 429).
Charts recovered after the attack, he said, indicated that the Japanese had.
planned to attack certain berths, expecting the ships to be in the position in
which they had been berthed three weeks earlier (page 430).
Admiral
DeLany stated that the enemy had unlimited opportunity for observation and for
getting information opt of Pearl Harbor. The operating schedule for the Fleet
provided a varying length of time for ships to be in port and at sea (page 499).
But; he had no specific information that the Japanese were endeavoring to keep
currently informed of the location and movements of Units of the Fleet
immediately preceding December 7, 1941 (page 500).
Commander
Rochefort said that Japanese opportunities for espionage and for transmission
of information were ample (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, there
were no restrictions on the Japanese getting information out of Hawaii, but the
FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables (pages 909‑910).
B.
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR
Captain Rochefort,
officer‑in‑charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl
Harbor, said that his immediate superior was the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District. In his relations with the District Intelligence Officer, he freely
exchanged information and views, except for "ultra" information. The
relationship with the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to "exchange all
information available and to endeavor to obtain information as desired by
him." A copy of the communication intelligence summary was sent to the
Fleet Intelligence Officer every morning. With regard to the FBI, Captain
Rochefort met the agent‑in-charge frequently and discussed the general
situation, but did not discuss ultra matters. In turn, the FBI agent kept
Captain Rochefort informed of what he was doing, "possibly with some
limitation." Captain Rochefort's relationship with the Army was similar to
that with the FBI. He said that between 27 November and 7 December 1941 he had
several talks and exchanged opinions with Colonel Fielder, G‑2 to General
Short. However, he gave the Army no ultra information. He said that his
relationship with the Army was entirely on a personal basis—i.e., there was no
official system set up for joint operations. Captain Rochefort's relations with
the Federal Communications Commission were limited to technical matters, such
as direction finding and the location of unauthorized stations (p 44‑46,
65).
Captain Rochefort said
that during the latter part of 1941 the communication intelligence unit at
Pearl Harbor was assigned the tasks of attacking and exploiting Jap personnel
code, administrative code, and the code in use in the Marshalls area. It was
also to conduct research on all Japanese naval systems, except the "five‑numbered
system." The Washington center was charged with general control of all
three units and in addition worked on Jap diplomatic systems and such others as
were directed (p. 44)
Admiral Hewitt's
examination brought out information not, previously developed regarding the
intelligence sources and activities of Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic
Fleet.
In this connection,
Commander Fabian said that he had been attached in November and December, 1941,
to the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor. This unit had a number of
personnel detailed to the decryption of Japanese radio traffic and operated a
direction finder, twenty‑six radio receivers, and other equipment
necessary to intercept enemy transmissions. Its general mission was to
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 467
study Japanese communications with a view
to keeping track of the Jap fleet, and in this connection the unit was
attempting to break the enemy naval system JN‑25 (p. 68‑69, 73).
The unit also intercepted Jap diplomatic codes and of these was assigned the
task of reading the machine cipher "purple," machine cipher
"red" and the code J‑19. However, the exploitation of these
codes was primarily for the purpose of obtaining local information: all purple
traffic intercepted and certain other traffic in the red and J‑19 codes
were sent to Washington for complete analysis. The latter messages were not
sent to the Pearl Harbor unit, since this unit was not performing any
cryptanalysis of the diplomatic codes (p. 70‑72). Commander Fabian said
that from breaking the "purple" dispatches during the period 27
November to 7 December they knew that American-Japanese negotiations in
Washington were not proceeding satisfactorily and would probably be broken of
(p. 72).
Captain Mason, Fleet
Intelligence Officer on the staff of Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, during 1941, said that a copy of all Jap diplomatic messages decrypted
by the Corregidor radio intelligence unit was furnished daily to the Army. The
Army was not given copies of dispatches sent out by CinCAF to CinCPac or to
Washington dealing with purely naval matters. Captain Mason said, however, that
he conferred quite frequently with the head of intelligence in the Philippine
Army Department and quite often provided estimates as to the locations of the
Jap fleet. Speaking generally, Captain Mason said that he was in close contact
with the Army most of the time and that information was freely exchanged. He
said that the Army did not have a radio intelligence unit an the Philippines,
although they did have an intercept station which merely copied Japanese Army
and diplomatic traffic (p. 70‑71)
Captain Safford, chief
of the Communications Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy
Department, during 1941, said that the Corregidor radio intelligence unit had
been intercepting messages in the Japanese "purple" code and other
diplomatic systems for several years, up to and including 7 December 1941. Main
interest of this unit was on the local Asiatic circuits for the information of
CinCAF, but late in November, 1941, they were given the additional duty of
covering the Berlin‑Tokyo circuit. These latter intercepts were forwarded
to Washington and weren't touched locally (p. 98‑99).
With respect to the
exchange of information among the Corregidor, Pearl Harbor and Washington radio
intelligence units, Captain Safford made the following statement (p. 99):
"If Corregidor
translated a message which they thought important, they would encipher the
translation and forward it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the
Tokyo‑Berlin circuit was enciphered; that is, the intercept was
enciphered and forwarded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison
with the British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or importance received
from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner, any translations of
particular importance to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
were sent out from Washington. We also had a very free and continuous exchange
of technical information between the two units, by which I mean the keys for
the 'purple' machine and keys for another system which we called JN‑19,
and any other information which would help either unit in its performance of
duty.
"With regard to
communications between the Navy Department and our unit at Pearl Harbor, there
were comparatively few."
Captain Safford said
further that there was a free exchange of intelligence information between the
Corregidor and Pearl Harbor units "so far as it pertained to the projects
they were assigned." However, since the dissemination of intelligence was
considered a function of Naval Intelligence rather than Naval Communications,
Captain Safford indicated that information regarding the Japanese fleet
obtained by the Corregidor unit would not necessarily be passed to the Pearl
Harbor unit. He said that such information would normally be passed to CinCAF
or his Fleet Intelligence Officer, and further dissemination would be made by
them (p. 100‑101).
Rear Admiral Irving H.
Mayfield, USN, was District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, in
December, 1941. The mission of his office comprised general intelligence
matters in cooperation with other
federal and local intelligence organizations, especially with respect to
espionage and counter‑espionage and any other intelligence functions as
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or the District Commandant. Lt. Col.
Bicknell was the Army officer charged with local intelligence. The FBI official
was Mr. Robert L. Shivers (p. 558).
468 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Mayfield
testified that his directive from the Chief of Naval Operations prescribed
complete cooperation between the District Intelligence Office and G‑2 of
the Army and the FBI. Admiral Mayfield stated that cooperation was full and
whole‑hearted, that all information possessed by his office was readily
available to G‑2 and the FBI, which were given copies of any material of
interest (p. 559).
Admiral Mayfield
stressed that despite free interchange of assistance between his office and the
radio intelligence unit of the 14th Naval District, headed by Commander
Rochefort, that unit was a separate organization and in no sense subordinate to
the District Intelligence Office. Commander Rochefort's unit reported directly
to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the opinion of Admiral Mayfield. As to the
general nature of the work of Commander Rochefort's unit, Admiral Mayfield was
unable to give definite information (p. 560).
Reports by Commander
Rochefort's unit, concerning, the location or movements of Japanese fleet
units, were not routed to the Distract Intelligence Office, and Admiral
Mayfield said he had no knowledge of them (p. 561).
Relations between the
District Intelligence Office and. the Fleet Intelligence Office were, according
to Admiral Mayfield, cordial, close and cooperative. He was in "more or
less constant" personal communication with Captain Layton (the Fleet
Intelligence Officer), to whom he endeavored to furnish all information or interest
(p. 560‑661).
Admiral Mayfield
recalled no conversations with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, Captain Layton, or Commander Rochefort from November ,27th
to December 7, 1941, concerning the prospects of war between Japan and the
United States. Admiral May, said the only intelligence matters he discussed
with Admiral Bloch and Captain Layton concerned counter-espionage measures.
Admiral Mayfield added he was not advised of the receipt on November 27, 1941,
of the so-called war warning (p. 574-575).
Admiral Bellinger
stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor of the
so‑called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Admiral
Bellinger added that not until after 7
December 1941 did he see or know of the CNO dispatch of 28 November stating
that hostile action by the Japanese was possible. Nor, said Admiral Bellinger,
dad he see any of the daily communication intelligence summaries, 14 October to
5 December 1941, prepared by the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Captain Layton) for
delivery to Admiral Kimmel (p. 498‑499).
Admiral Bellinger did
not remember having seen a memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Captain Layton to
Admiral Kimmel on the subject of the location of the Japanese fleet (p. 499).
(1) Sources
and distribution:
Admiral Kingman said
that the details of administration of the investigative activities within the
Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the direct control and supervision
of the Commandant than was the case in those cases more closely connected with
Washington. He recalled that the District Commandant was somewhat concerned
about the investigative activities in the Fourteenth Naval District which were
carried on by some of the inexperienced personnel on duty thereat, and thinks
that this was mentioned in a personal letter from the Commandant to the Chief
of Naval Operations which, however, the Examining Officer was unable
subsequently to locate. (p. 336) Admiral Kingman could recall nothing relating
to the activities of the so‑called consular agents at Hawaii. (p. 336)
The facilities for
obtaining intelligence of possible enemies were, according to Admiral Bloch,
as follows: When Admiral Bloch arrived at Pearl Harbor, there were two units at
Pearl Harbor composed of communicators and Intelligence people, Japanese
language students. The information they secured by radio intelligence and such
other information as they secured was transmitted to Cavite and to the Navy
Department. That was Admiral Bloch's principal source of Japanese intelligence.
They also received the intelligence that was collected at Cavite.
When Admiral Bloch
arrived, he was dissatisfied with this organization and he organized it into
one unit known as "Combat Intelligence," where they were under one
hand. This unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors and
all the other things they had, with one officer in charge. In the middle of
July, 1941, this unit was placed in a secure place, one big room in the
basement of the office building, with their own channels of communications to
the radio stations and radio direction finders. Admiral
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 469
Bloch always did his best to augment this
force by getting more and better men. In addition to that unit, they had the
District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army Intelligence and
the FBI and they also had such reports as were sent to them by the Office of
Naval Intelligence in Washington. They kept in touch with the Commander‑in‑Chief
as best they could and Admiral Bloch believed that they were getting everything
that was pertinent although the Commander‑in‑Chief had many sources
of information that Admiral Bloch did not have. Admiral Bloch felt, however,
that Admiral Kimmel conscientiously endeavored to give to him everything that Admiral
Kimmel thought he should have. Admiral Bloch believed that the Navy Department
had more knowledge about actual conditions than they did. (p. 12) All of the
information received by the Combat Intelligence unit, he said, was always
delivered to the Commander‑in‑Chief. (p. 13)
Admiral Smith said
that they got very little Intelligence on Oahu except Fleet Intelligence which
was more on the possibility of sabotage than on the war, but that they had
radio intelligence and every time that one or more of the three Task Force
Commanders were in port or the Type Commanders were in port, Admiral Kimmel
would have them over and have the Intelligence Officer point out on his chart
his estimate, by radio intelligence, of the location of all units of the
Japanese Fleet. Admiral Smith was present at all of such conferences. The War
Plans Officer (then Captain now Rear Admiral McMorris), the Operations Officer
then Captain now Rear Admiral DeLany), the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Comdr.
Layton) and the Fleet Communications Officer, were always fully informed of all
intelligence in this manner. (p. 33)
Captain Edwin T.
Layton was Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, during 1941. He had
studied in Japan and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator. (p. 214)
The sources from which
he obtained information concerning the Japanese Navy in 1941 were:
"The principal
source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelligence reports,
estimates of fleet organizations position and Fleet Commanders, also from
dispatches from Naval Attaché, Tokyo, Naval Attaché, Chungking, and his
assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence Organization, which had
sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and Washington, D. C.; also from
Consular and State Department reports forwarded through ONI to the Commander‑in‑Chief;
also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct
through a representative attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu."
(p. 215)
Captain Layton said
that he thought that our intelligence coverage was good, although always
incomplete.
Captain Layton said
that he felt that the State Department undoubtedly had information which was
not supplied to the Commander in Chief and which would have been of value. (p.
215)
Captain Layton said
that he intimately concerned himself with the results obtained by the Combat
Intelligence Organizations. He said that the information obtained and made
available to the Commander in Chief was principally from the unit at Cavite and
the local unit in Pearl Harbor, that almost nothing came from Washington, and
that he felt that the principal unit in Washington might have contributed more
toward the intelligence picture. (p. 216)
Captain Layton said
that he communicated the available intelligence concerning Japanese naval
forces daily at about 8:15 in the morning, and if subsequent to that time
important information was received, he would report it to Admiral Kimmel at the
First opportunity. When he reported to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Chief of
Staff was most always present. On important occasions the War Plans Officer and
senior Operations Officer were called in. When task force commanders would
return to port, Admiral Kimmel would send for Layton and have him review the
situation. (p. 216)
The discussions which
he had with Admiral Kimmel were summarized generally as follows:
"The discussions
were very general, generally starting with the Japanese situation, both
political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their apparent
intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was particularly
interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air and other bases,
and these matters were discussed in general with the task force commanders and
other officers present, such as whether or not the
470 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese had radar, whether it had been
received from the Germans via the trip of the ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly
to Europe by the Panama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls
the estimated air strength in the area the question as to whether sound
contacts obtained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish
and so forth, a discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a
depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence
of baby submarines—they were called 'submerged submarines'—off Molokai, were
submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature.
The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on
military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet
or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject of
conversations and discussions." (p. 217)
Commander Rochefort had studied Japanese in Japan for three
years from about September, 1929 until September, 1932, and qualified as a
Japanese interpreter and translator. Commander Rochefort's source of
information in addition to the work of his own Combat Intelligence Unit were
the Washington headquarters, a unit similar to his attached to CincAF, and
other government agencies such as the FBI, the Army and F. C. C. in Honolulu.
The information furnished by these latter agencies, he said, was of no value
prior to December 7, 1941. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort said that any message
originating in one of the combat intelligence units was automatically sent to
the other two units. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort reported the intelligence
which came into his hands to ComFOURTEEN personally and to the Commander‑in‑Chief,
via the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
Captain Mayfield said that the organization of the District
Intelligence Office when he reported for duty consisted of about thirteen
persons. He sought and obtained additional personnel but his opinion was that
that organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some
months after December 7. (p. 309) Captain Mayfield said that the cooperation
between the FBI and the Army and Navy Intelligence at Hawaii was very good. (p.
309)
Captain Layton said that the Army's liaison with the Fleet
was through Colonel Edward Bailey and that he saw Colonel Railey almost every
day. He did not receive from any Army source any information available. (p.
218)
In his statement at the end of his examination Lt.
Stephenson said that there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence
organization that Admiral Bloch was not sufficiently security conscious and not
sufficiently mindful of the enemy espionage potential at Hawaii. This, however,
he said could make him cite no casual connection between the Commandant's
apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack.
Captain Earle said that he was generally familiar with the
activities of the District Intelligence Office in the Fourteenth Naval
District, and so far as he knew both he and Admiral Bloch were satisfied with
the activities of that office. He could recall nothing of the results obtained
by Commander Rochefort's unit. (p. 373‑5)
Admiral McCormick remembered no instance where the War Plans
Section received any intelligence derived from local sources, except one or two
cases dealing with counter‑espionage.
(p .70) Admiral McCormick said that he had no knowledge of any Japanese
movements until they saw the dispatches, in the days just before the war, in
which the Asiatic Fleet had seen large movements on the way south, off Indo‑China.
He said that the War Plans Section, as a whole, was not furnished with daily or
periodic reports by the Staff Intelligence or Fleet Intelligence. (p. 70)
Admiral DeLany believed that the information furnished by
Intelligence was the best that those sources could assemble but was aware that
the sources were inadequate and believed that there was a general feeling that
they were more or less operating in the dark not only from the information that
they were able to collect in Pearl Harbor but also as to information furnished
from other sources. This applied to information both as to the location of
Japanese units and as to the probability of war. (p. 84)
Admiral Brown said that all senior officers received the
Naval Intelligence bulletins. (p.138)
Admiral Pye said that Admiral Kimmel in effect turned over
to him the training program and in connection with that his consultations with
Admiral Kimmel were frequent. Also, Admiral Kimmel customarily called in the
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 471
Intelligence
officer and had him explain the situation on the Japanese Fleet insofar as it
was known. (p. 148)
Concerning the intelligence available from the middle of
October until the time of the attack, Admiral McMorris said that they felt that
they would like to have known lots more than they did and that on the whole,
they felt it was somewhat insufficient but did not see any probability of
achieving improvement. (p.241)
Admiral
Kimmel testified that his Fleet Intelligence worked with ComFOURTEEN's
Intelligence. He depended largely on units of the Fourteenth Naval District
Intelligence for information. The Intelligence units were satisfactory (page
280). Also he received intelligence from ComFOURTEEN, Navy Department and
forces afloat (page 280). Summaries of information were furnished him page
281). The number of war plans officers were increased by him. Serving as such
were McMorris, McCormick, Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer, and a Lieutenant. All enemy
intelligence went to war plans and estimates were drawn from day to day (page
281) Information was furnished to him, to his War Plans head, to his Chief of
Staff, and to Captain DeLany (Operations). The Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, and he interexchanged intelligence (page 282). Prior to December
7th, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was informed of intelligence
affecting Hawaii and other places where he had forces. He was not informed regarding
plane for places distant from Hawaii (page 282). The Commanding General,
Admiral Kimmel said, gave him all the information which he had (page 283).
Captain
Layton said that, as Fleet Intelligence Officer, his main sources of
information were from CNO and DONI, who forwarded reports from naval diplomatic
sources, reports from observers, from the State Department, from the local intelligence officers, and liaison with the
British secret intelligence, and reports from ComTWELVE, ComSIXTEEN, and ComTHIRTEEN
(page 904). He was kept informed of FBI and Army Intelligence at the time (page
909). He passed information to CincPac by hand in its original form. If the
information was a long report, he made a brief of it (page 904). He thought that local Army Intelligence was
not getting the "highly secret" information from the Army; he
informed them in general (page 908).
Admiral
Bloch said that the intelligence unit of the Fourteenth Naval District was
efficient, although not adequate in apace and personnel, and kept him and
CincPac informed page 391). Intelligence was received from CincPac, the
District Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence, and the FBI. He did not
receive the intelligence bulletins from the Navy Department, his ONI probably
did (page 392).
Commander
Rochefort testified that he was in charge of combat intelligence of the
Fourteenth Naval District from June through December, 1941 (page 471). Combat
intelligence consisted of an interceptor unit, a direction finder unit, and a
cryptographic or research group. Collaboration with the FBI, Army, and Federal
Communications Commission was on a personal basis. They received, normally,
reports from ONI at Washington, and the letters and dispatches in their own
system, which were of a more technical nature. They would get all information
of a technical nature from Washington, but all information available at ONI in
Washington was not sent them as a matter of course (page 471). Only one or two
bits of political or diplomatic information were sent to him (page 472).
Military information would be sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Rochefort
handled intelligence of Japanese ship movements. The information received was
automatically passed to CNO. CincAsiatic, and to CincPac. Written summaries
were sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer (page 472).
The following
information was contained in the ComFourteen Radio Intelligence Summaries and
was made available to Admiral Kimmel (p. 193):
1. The November 27th
Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary, delivered on November 28th, stated
that in general traffic volume was a little below normal due to poor signals on
certain frequencies and that the Tokyo‑Takao circuit was unreadable on
mid‑watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers.
Bako, Samo and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo originator was
the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major commanders.
The direction finder activity was very
high. As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of
any further movement from the Kure‑Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the
Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address; he had been
fairly inactive as an originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet,
originated many messages to the Third
472 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleet
and other
units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing to indicate
any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that he frequently
addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates, and also that there
was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the
Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the
Chichijima area. Concerning airforces in general, it was indicated that an air
unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that
"Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was
initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).
The Com Fourteen radio
intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered November 29th, stated generally
that traffic volume was normal, communications to and from South China and
between the Mandates and the Empire were heavy. No tactical traffic was seen.
The suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming more so.
Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder command from various
stations and this command also originated messages of high precedence to the
major fleet commanders. It was said that "This activity is interpreted to
indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U.
S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet,
it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its units. As
to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units save for the
Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Feet was said to be still at Truk.
The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated more traffic than
usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in
Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little
indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel
(Hew. Exhibit 22).
3. The communication
intelligence summary of the 29th of November, delivered the 30th, stated
generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South
China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages
of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the
day to major commanders, both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence
activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition
to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, Radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent
in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The
direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with
much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual A1 Nev ("Alnav"? LWJ), and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second
Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which
had been addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose
address was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he
had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since
this had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was
intentional in making positively known the existence of an air feet. Its composition
was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units were under the
immediate command of the Commander, in Chief, Second Fleet, including CarDiv 3,
and the Third Fleet.
Associated with the
Third Fleet were two battleships, but their assignment was not yet definite.
Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held
extensive communication with the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako.
The CinC Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area.
There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at Chichijima the
previous day, and also some traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet
(Hew. Exhibit 22).
The communication
intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on December 1st, stated generally
that traffic volume was less than for the past few days, and that the traffic
consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No reason could be given for
the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for the
past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of
dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit
heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs. As to the Combined
Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets were
in Kure. In the same message the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not listed
in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The
Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent and dispatch to his usual addressees of
the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and HIYEI,
which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The HIYEI was
actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said,
"No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief,
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 473
Third Fleet, which gives the strong
impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still
in the Truk area. It was sail that the continued association of Jaluit and
Commander Submarine Force, plus the letter's known progress from the Empire to
Chichijima and Saipan made his destination obviously the Marshalls; that
various facts indicated a submarine concentration in the Marshalls. "Every
evidence points to a concentration, not only of the small Fourth Fleet
submarines there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the
Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of
plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the
Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication
summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans
Officer (Hew. Exhibit 22).
5. The communication
intelligence summary for December 1st, delivered on December 2nd, stated
generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at
0000, 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a period of
six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that
service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional progressive step
in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to
three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic
consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the
Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of
traffic prior to 0000, 1 December, indicated than an effort was made to deliver
all despatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there
would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and
compromise. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used
to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.
It should be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading, "The
fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional
progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" was
understood in red pencil commencing with the words "service calls."
Captain Layton testified that to the best of his recollection this was
underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.
The summary further
stated, as to the First Fleet, "Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a
fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet, it
was stated, "This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure‑Sasebo
area in the direction of South China. and Indo‑China"; Takao did not
appear to play an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption
was made that this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was
stated there was "nothing to report except that a same associations of
Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo‑China
forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or
Mandates area." As to Fifth Fleet, "nothing to report." As to
submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to
be in the area eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air
Force it was stated, "No change." As to carriers, it was said,
"No change." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew.
Exhibit 22).
6. The communication
intelligence summary delivered on December 3rd, covering the 2nd, stated
generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent
confusion in the routing of traffic for certain parts of the Japanese Fleet.
There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after
it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the
same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEEN had
reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was
broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not
uncovered at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one
indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances,
Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Summing
up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of
Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not
close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not
close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on
December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of
this date of the units now in the southern area. To further complicate the
situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which
obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area."
Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage
of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo."
As to the First Fleet, it was stated
474 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that despite
the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet
and that "from inconclusive
evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or
normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with
staffs. As an example, traffic routine indicates one combined fleet call
associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and apparently in company while
another combined fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third
Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "No units have stood
out prominently in the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of
new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part
of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it
said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the association
of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.
Concerning carriers,
this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of information on the
carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of
information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially
identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call
has been, recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).
7. The communication
intelligence summary of December 3rd, delivered on the 4th, under the heading
"General," stated that traffic volume was normal with receiving
conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much
detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the
major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units had
been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff
originated three long dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second,
and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same
addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second
Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that
it was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but
that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that
there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity
was not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines
or carriers." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew Exhibit
22).
8. The communication
intelligence summary of December 4th, delivered on the 6th, stated that in
general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao radio
instituted a fleet broadcast system, using the prefix UTU in heading so that
there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only a few messages
had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent
messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence
originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third
Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo‑China Force, and same. In all, this
activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the Combined
Fleet, it was stated, "The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack
of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief,
Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet.
While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from
these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still
prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second
Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence
is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CinC Second Fleet
is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the
Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check
could be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that
Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it
was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many messages
to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all
units in that area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel
(Hew. Exhibit 22.)
9. The radio intelligence
summary for December 5th, which was delivered on the 6th, was the last summary
delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It stated in general that
traffic volume was heavy. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts
going over full 24 hours. Tokyo‑Mandates circuit in duplex operations.
There were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that some
traffic being broadcast was several days old, which indicated the uncertainty
of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of
high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 475
of
all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA
from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the
Political Affairs Bureau, saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis
what you have said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what
you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."
As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the
Second nor Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still
frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was
stated that "They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the
Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander
Carriers or Submarine Force had been seen either."
There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic
to that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet, addressed at
Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet,
was in the Marshalls. As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to
the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active
originator with many dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander
Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several
of which were moving probably to Indo‑China (Hew. Exhibit 22).
Any time important
information was received, he said, CincPac and ComFOURTEEN would come and
discuss it.
General
Marshall said that prier to December 7th he thought that all pertinent Army
intelligence was given to the Navy, but the Army did not then receive, as
regular routine, intelligence from the Navy as to Japanese ship movements (page
864).
(2) Interception
of Japanese
communications:
Captain Rochefort said
that certain communications with which the Japanese consul general in Honolulu
was concerned (Exhibit 18) were received by him from the District Intelligence
Officer, 14th Naval District, about 2 or 3 December 1941. He identified one of
these as Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245, and said that due to
the difficulties inherent in the code it had not been deciphered until the
night of 10 December. The message prescribed a set of signals indicating the
types of American vessels in the Hawaiian area and their activities, and
included arrangements for lights in houses, on beaches, from boats, want ads
over Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui Island (p. 57). Captain
Rochefort said that aside from this communication he did not receive prior to
December 7, 1941, any other Japanese reports regarding American ships in Pearl
Harbor or preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack (p 58).
Captain Rochefort also
read into the record two communications (part of Exhibit 18) which he did not
recollect having seen before (p. 57-59). One of these referred to a
"surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives, the other to the lack
of reconnaissance by the "fleet air arm" at Hawaii.
Admiral Mayfield said
that the District Intelligence Office of the 14th Naval District had sent to
the Chief of Naval Operations on February 9, 1942, a report (part of Exhibit
40) regarding a message sent by the Japanese consulate to Tokyo on 3 December
1941. A copy of this message had been delivered by Admiral Mayfield to
Commander Rochefort's radio intelligence unit for decryption on 4 or 5
December, but Admiral Mayfield did not learn its contents until 11 December.
The message transmitted to Tokyo a proposed system of signaling by lights and
other methods for the purpose of reporting departures of U. S. naval units from
Pearl Harbor. This system had been conceived and submitted to the Japanese
Consulate by one Otto Kuehn, a German resident on Oahu, who was later tried,
convicted, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. Admiral Mayfield
stated that neither his office nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation found
definite information that any part of the proposed signals had ever been used
(p. 564‑565).
Mr. William F.
Friedman, Cryptanalyst and Director of Communications, Signal Security Agency,
War Department, identified two Japanese messages from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated
6 December 1941, (Exhibit 18) as having been intercepted by the Army. They had
been decoded by the Army on 8 December 1941. One of these messages referred to
a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives and the other pointed
out the lack of reconnaissance being conducted by "the fleet air arm"
at Hawaii (p. 522‑523).
Captain Safford stated
that the two messages referred to in the preceding paragraph (Exhibit 18) were
in the Japanese PA‑K2 code and could have been
476 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
decrypted by the Navy in one and a half
to two hours. However, the Navy gave precedence to the processing of all
"purple" and J‑19 messages and would not have touched the PA‑K2
communications as long as there were any J‑19's on hand (p. 530‑531).
Lt. Donald Woodrum,
District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, produced transcripts
of telephone conversations obtained by tapping the lines of the Japanese Consul
and Vice‑Consul for the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941, when
the taps were removed by order of Capt. Mayfield. The transcripts (marked
Exhibit 38) contain little, if any, information of military significance, being
concerned largely with routine consular activities and those of the local
Japanese population. (p. 379)
To Lt. Woodrum's
knowledge, there were only 2 local telephone intercepts which may have had
military significance. The first was in 1940 from Vice Consul Okuda to a
Buddhist priest on the island of Maui advising the latter to keep the Consulate
informed on any United States fleet movements that came to his attention. In
1941, the exact date not stated, a woman very much agitated called the
Consulate to say that the USS NEW ORLEANS had just left the harbor, to which
the person at the Consulate made no reply. (p. 383)
Wire tapping was
discontinued on 2 December because, in the opinion of Lt. Woodrum, the secrecy
of the activity was jeopardized by the accidental discovery of similar activity
on the part of the FBI by employees of the telephone company. (p. 379‑81)
With regard to his instruction
of 2 December 1941, that tapping of the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul
and Vice Consul by officers of the District Intelligence Office cease, Admiral
Mayfield gave as his reasons: (a) that the telephone company had discovered the
FBI was also tapping these wires and he feared that the resulting disclosure of
this tapping would jeopardize the security of the tapping by the District
Intelligence Office, and (b) the interceptions up through 2 December had
revealed nothing of intelligence value. (p. 571)
Lt. Woodrum stated
that prior to 1 December 1941, efforts to obtain copies of coded messages sent
from the Jap Consulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington via
commercial cable companies were unsuccessful. As of 1 December, however, in
accordance with an agreement between Mr. David Sarnoff, of RCA, and Admiral
Bloch, copies of all messages sent via RCA were available to the naval service
and the first of these were received at the District Intelligence Office on
the morning of 5 December. It is Lt. Woodrum's understanding that these were
sent immediately to Commander Rochefort's unit and, further, that they were not
decoded until after the attack, it being necessary even then to use a Japanese
code book that was found during a search of the Consulate on the 7th. Summaries
of decoded copies of messages sent from 1 December to 6 December has been
marked "Exhibit 40." (p. 383‑5)
Admiral Mayfield said
that Exhibit 40 contained the translation and digest of several messages sent
by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo via commercial cable companies on
and after 3 December 1941. One of these messages dated 3 December, reported the
departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. A message, dated December,
reported the arrival of the HONOLULU. (p 565) Copies of these two messages were
received in the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December (p.
566) and forwarded to Commander Rochefort's unit. Another Japanese consulate
message, dated 5 December, reported the arrival of 3 battleships, their
expected date of departure, the departure of the LEXINGTON, the departure of
five heavy cruisers and other information. (p. 565) Admiral Mayfield did not
know when this message had been received in his office. On 6 December, the Jap
consulate filed two messages regarding U. S. ship movements and one regarding
U. S. Army use of balloons. Admiral Mayfield believed that these probably did
not reach his office until 7 December.(p. 566‑567)
Vice Admiral Smith,
Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet in December 1941, testified that none of
the intelligence material he received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor
included any information received from intercepted telephone conversation of
the Japanese or from intercepted cable messages. None of these cable messages
was seen by Admiral Smith until two days after the attack. (p. 360)
Mr. George Street,
Honolulu District Manager for RCA Communications, Incorporated, testified that
during the first week in December 1941, copies of all cable messages sent to
Japan by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu were turned over to the 14th Naval
District Intelligence Officer, (Admiral Mayfield) at his request. Mr. Street
added that all the RCA copies of those messages had been
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 477
destroyed under authority of the Federal
Communication's Commission, because of lack of storage space. (p. 411‑113)
Brigadier General
Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer in the Hawaiian Department in November
and December 1941, testified that the Army radio intercepted unit at Fort
Shafter made no decryption whatever of intercepted Japanese messages. The
intercepted messages were sent to Washington for decryption. (p. 387‑388)
Commander Rochefort said that the United States was
handicapped because it could not censor Japanese communications (page 473).
And, according to Captain Layton, the FBI was restricted by law from getting
Japanese cables, but efforts were made to get those messages. However, they had
no information concerning the messages which the Japanese consul was sending
out (pages 909-910).
Admiral Wilkinson said
that the District Intelligence Officer of Hawaii had endeavored to obtain
copies of dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents from the local cable
companies but had been advised that the law did not permit interference of such
messages. (p. 285) He said that despite the limitations on obtaining copies of
cable messages, the District Intelligence Officer had arranged to tap the long
distance telephone and kept a record of
the telephone conversations with Japan. This, he said, was done only in
the last few days before December 7. The conversations in general appeared to
be innocuous. There was one suspicious telephone conversation on the afternoon
of December 6. Concerning this, Admiral Wilkinson said, "This conversation
and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which we had not been allowed
to intercept constituted as I recall, the only important information of any
Japanese intelligence activities in Hawaii. Undoubtedly, much was contained in
the mails, to which we had no access. There were rumors of unexplained flashing
lights and illicit radio stations, but prior to December 7, investigation of
most of these reports had disproved them, although of course some may have been
correct." (p. 286)
Captain Mayfield said
that messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General by cable or radio
were not made available to him until after the visit of Mr. Sarnoff of RCA. He
said that the Japanese Consulate General sent its traffic using the various
communication companies alternately. The Mackay Radio Company handled the
traffic during the month of November. Traffic was switched to RCA as of
December 1 and thereafter Captain Mayfield was able to obtain all of his traffic
from RCA. Since it was in code and he had no reading organization, it was
necessary to submit it to another organization to be read. He learned the
content of various number of these
messages after the attack and there was considerable information about
movements of the Fleet and other military forces which he said was not entirely
accurate. (p. 311) Captain Mayfield said that so far as he was aware, the
telephone conversations of the Japanese were not recorded or censored. (p.313)
Admiral Bloch said that
they were not able to get any information based on dispatches being transmitted
by the Japanese. The various communication companies did not and would not give
them such dispatches. They all went by cable and so far as Admiral Bloch knew,
none went by radio. (p. 15)
Admiral Smith said
that they did not have access to the files in the Cable Office; that the Fleet
Intelligence Officer had made some effort to get these files; that it was taken
to Mr. MacKay of Postal Telegraph, being contrary to the United States law to
divulge a telegraph cable message; at that time there were certain Japanese
codes which they could break and the Intelligence Officer thought if he could
get those messages, he might learn what was going on; that they did not get
them until three days after the attack and never received any information from
this source before the war. (p. 46)
Commander Rochefort
said that he received from the Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District,
directly or otherwise copies of such communications in which the Japanese
Consulate General at Honolulu was concerned—about December 1, 1941. These were
about ten to fifteen messages and Commander Rochefort was asked to examine
them, which he did. He succeeded in extracting some information from them
within 12 hours, with the exception of two or three messages which he finished
on the evening of December 10th. He said that the first messages did not
contain any important information, but the latter two or three did contain
important information. He said that
478 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
he
had been unable to obtain that information at an earlier date because of the
inherent difficulties in the task, and that the task had been made a matter of
paramount importance and about 12 to 16 hours daily were devoted to that work
alone. (p 208‑9)
Commander Rochefort said that the F. C. C. was monitoring
radio traffic in the so‑called "amateur" status, but that he
never heard of their apprehending any communications from Japanese spies to
Japan. (p. 209)
Commander Rochefort said that the Consulate General at
Hawaii communicated with his superiors in Japan primarily by cable and
occasionally by radio. (p. 209)
Commander Rochefort said that he had not been informed of
any telephone communication between the Consulate General at Hawaii and Japan.
(p. 209)
Concerning the receipt of communications of the Japanese
Consulate General, Captain Layton said:
"26.Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence
Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which
the Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time
around 1 December or after?
"A. I recall receipt of material received from
Commander Rochefort on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.
"27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those
prior to the attack?
"A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from
any other source." (p. 218)
Captain Layton said that the District Intelligence Officer
maintained certain monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward
appreciation of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view, but that he did
not recall the details of this. (p. 218)
Admiral
Turner said that he did not know what type of decrypting Pearl Harbor was
doing, but that Naval Communications had told him that CincPac was getting as
much of the Japanese communications as they were, and sooner (page 1001). He
said that the Director of Naval Communications had informed him that CincPac
had the decrypted Japanese messages, and that was why no information of this
nature was sent to CincPac. He was similarly assured by Admiral Noyes, he said.
Admiral
Noyes denied telling Admiral Turner that Pearl Harbor was intercepting the
same Japanese traffic as Washington (page 1036). He said that Pearl Harbor had
an intercept station specializing in certain codes but was not intercepting
Japanese cable messages, and the so‑called "purple" messages
were usually sent by cable (pages 1037‑38).
Admiral
Redman said that CincPac did not have facilities for decoding
"purple" intercepts; the problem was not assigned to him and all
translations were accomplished in Washington (page 1106).
(3) Surveillance of consulate
Admiral
Bloch stated that after the receipt of certain dispatches relating to the
destruction of codes, which are later discussed, he had Intelligence arrange
for a close surveillance of the Japanese Consulate. What, if any, surveillance
was in effect before this does not appear.
C.
INFORMATION CONCERNING JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS
Captain McCollum, who
was Officer‑in‑Charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of
Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., during December, 1941,
said that his duties consisted of evaluating and passing to the Director of
Naval Intelligence all intelligence received concerning the Far East, including
all information on the Jap Navy. (p. 10) Sources of intelligence available to
his Section regarding the Jap Fleet were reports by our consular authorities
and agents in Japan and on the Asiatic continent, reports by our merchant
ships, reports on movements of Japanese merchant shipping, and radio
intelligence supplied by Captain Safford's unit, Op‑20‑G. However,
by the end of November, 1941, the Far Eastern Section had become almost wholly
dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of
Jap naval forces. This was due to the fact that U. S. embargoes against Japan
had swept U. S. merchant shipping out of the north Pacific and also discouraged
Japanese shipping to the Americas. In addition, increasingly strict Japanese
security
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 479
measures made it almost impossible for
agents in Japan to get timely information out of the country. (p. 10, 12, 13)
As a result of this situation, a dispatch was sent out by Opnav on 24 November
(GCT) to Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, pointing out that
information on the Jap fleet was unsatisfactory and requesting that every
effort be made by use of radio intelligence methods to locate the Japanese
naval forces. (Exhibit 8) Following this dispatch, estimates were received from
ComFourteen and ComSixteen, dated 26
November (GCT). (Exhibit 8) These evaluations were virtually the same and estimated
that two Jap task forces were being organized, one fairly well located in the
Formosa‑southern Japan area, another possibly located in the Mandated
Islands. However, ComFourteen estimated that there was a strong concentration
of submarines and at least one carrier division with, the force in the
Mandates, white ComSixteen could not confirm this. Greater reliance was placed
on ComSixteen's dispatch because his radio organization was in a better
position to intercept Japanese radio traffic and was stronger in numbers and
continuity of operation. (p. 13‑14)
Captain McCollum said that radio
intelligence consisted of three distinct procedures: translations of the
enemy's code dispatches, inferences drawn from the volume of enemy radio traffic, and a study of the call signs of enemy ships. (p. 12) He said
that on about 1 December 1941 intelligence obtained from a study of the call
signs of Japanese ships became considerably less valuable because there was a
change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the Jap fleet: "In
other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet was changed at
that time, which meant that a period of time elapsed before we could build up
identifications of specific naval units based on call signs, and so on the actual radios were still going out, but
we couldn't get anything out of them very much." (p. 15‑16) Captain
McCollum did not know of any general call sign change which had accompanied
previous major movements of the Japanese. (p. 16) However, he said that taken
in connection with the known regroupings of Jap naval forces and the fact that
the Japanese fleet was believed ready for action the call sign change was
interpreted as a "possible indication of action to come." He said
that CincPac was as well informed as the Office of Naval Intelligence as to
these changes in the call signs of the Jap fleet. (p. 17)
Other than the ONI
bulletin of 1 December 1941, Captain McCollum was aware of no information sent
out to the fleet from the Navy Department between 1 December and 7 December
1941 regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet. (p. 19)
Captain Mason, Fleet
Intelligence Officer for CinCAF, and Commander Fabian, who was attached to the
Corregidor radio intelligence unit, said that most of their information
regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet was obtained from the
analysis of enemy radio traffic; rather than from the decryption of Jap
messages. (p. 73‑74) Other sources of information during the period 26
November to 7 December 1941 were reports from the Naval Attaché, Shanghai, and
a number of sighting reports obtained by reconnaissance planes. On 2 December a
despatch was sent from CinCAF to OpNav reporting the sighting of nine
submarines. On the same date, another despatch to OpNav reported 3 submarines,
21 transports and enemy patrol planes in the Camranh Bay area. On 6 December, a
despatch reported a convoy in Camranh Bay. Twenty‑four to forty‑eight
hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a British report was received to the
effect that heavy Japanese units were rounding Poulo Condore, French Indo
China. During this period, it was believed that all known Jap carriers were in
the Kure‑Sasebo area. (p. 75‑76)
Captain Rochefort
stated that between 26 November and 7 December 1941 very little information was
obtained regarding the location of the Jap fleet by radio intelligence means,.
The reason for this was that while the total volume of Jap radio traffic
remained about the same or increased the traffic which contained as an
addressee or originator one of the major vessels was almost non‑existent.
He said that the Japanese radio traffic which was received contained a certain
amount of "padding or rejecting of messages," but that in his opinion
there had been no attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio
deception in any of its forms. (p.63)
Admiral Wilkinson
stated that the ONI summary of 1 December 1941 (Exhibit 9) represented the
best of the knowledge and belief of the Office of Naval Intelligence at that
time, and was based on the digest of all available information, radio
intelligence, and sightings. He believed, but could not be certain, that a copy
of the summary had been sent air mail to Pearl Harbor on or about the date of
issue, 1 December 1941. (p. 395)
480 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson
recalled seeing a digest, prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI of daily
Communication Intelligence summaries issued at Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 22). He
recalled noting in particular those for the period 1 December to 5 December,
1941, and being aware that a large part of the Japanese fleet appeared to have
gone into radio silence. The Admiral believed that this fact appeared daily in
reports issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and these reports drew the
conclusion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was imminent,
since the only movements picked up were in that direction (p. 398)
Admiral Smith said
that based on the communication intelligence summaries during the period 27
November to 6 December 1941, he had estimated that the Japanese carriers during
that period were "some in the Marshalls and the, remainder in home
areas." (p. 362) Referring further to the summaries, he said: (p. 363)
"Vice Admiral
SMITH: Now, I see nothing very alarming in these dispatches up to Pearl Harbor.
On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day
it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear
from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily
mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea
exercising maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of
the Pacific Fleet, in May 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic was
heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of radio
traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.
"Mr. SONNETT.
Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?
"Vice Admiral
SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea, yes.
"Mr. SONNETT. And
it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was no information from the
Japanese carriers' radio traffic?
"Vice Admiral
SMITH. No, except after saying there is no information, they usually wind up
with, 'They are believed to be in home waters.' "
Admiral Smith said
that he had not known about the change in call signs of the Jap Fleet which
occurred on 1 December. (p. 364) He did not recall having discussed with
Admiral Kimmel the lack of information on Japanese carriers indicated by the
communication intelligence summaries after 1 December. (p. 365)
A
fortnightly summary, issued by ONI on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57) stated
concerning the Japanese military situation, that Japanese troops, supplies, and
equipment were pouring into Indo‑China during the past fifteen days.
Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved
quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The
arrival of reinforcements continued. Japanese army strength in Indo‑China
was believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking Province and between 70,000 and
100,000 in south Indo‑China. Naval aircraft and craft also moved south.
It was estimated that there were about 200 Japanese planes in Indo‑China,
and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.
Concerning
the Japanese naval situation, the report stated that deployment of naval forces
to the southward had indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under
way for hostilities. At the same time, troop transports and freighters were
pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed
south, apparently for French Indo‑China and Formosan ports. Movements to
the south appeared to be carried out by small individual units, but the
organization of an extensive task force, then definitely indicated, would
probably take sharper form in the following few days. To that date, this task force, under the command of the Commander‑in‑Chief,
Second Fleet, appeared to be sub-divided into two major task groups, one
gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the
groups. Each constituted a strong
striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force,
destroyer and submarine squadrons; it asserted that although one division of
battleships might be assigned, the major capital ship strength remained in home
waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. It also stated that
the equipment being carried south was a vast assortment, including landing
boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control,
consisted not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions,
but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.
The
record does not contain other ONI summaries. Admiral Stark, however testified
that the estimates as to the positions of Japanese carriers and battleship were
conflicting and that the easternmost position estimated was the Mandate (pages
72‑3).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 481
Admiral
Turner said that there had been a great deal of naval radio traffic which
suddenly ceased, which meant that the Japanese fleet had put to sea (page 994).
Admiral Turner also said that they did not know where the Japanese fleet was.
Deductions were that there was to be a covering force in the Marshalls area and
that some forces would carry on missions in the China Sea. Available
information as to the location of the Japanese fleet, although considerable,
was incomplete (page 1002).
Admiral
Ingersoll stated that it was difficult to get information, on Japanese ships.
Units in Cavite and Pearl Harbor for radio intelligence were practically the
only sources (page 818). When there was a significant move reported, he knew
about it.
Captain
Smith‑Hutton said that in November, 1941, he could obtain no information
of Japanese military movements except one to Southeast Asia. Japanese military
movements did not appear in the press (page 1077). No information reached him
indicating an attack on Pearl Harbor. In the latter part of 1941, he felt sure
that Japanese would make an aggressive move to relieve economic pressure
exerted by the United States embargo, but he was not sure this would involve
the United States in war. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to him
(page 1079).
Ambassador
Grew had no information as to movement of a Japanese carrier force towards
Pearl Harbor (page 1064).
Admiral
Redman did not think that the December 1st ONI Bulletin was sent to CincPac by
dispatch (pages 1107‑8).
Captain
Layton
Captain Layton
testified with respect to the photostatic copies of the various dispatches in
exhibit 8 that he thought CinCPac received the dispatch of 24, November 1941,
from OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac and others, that the dispatch from
Com14 dated 26 November 1941, time date
group 260110, had been sent by the Fourteenth Naval District Communication
Intelligence Unit at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, and that Com16's dispatch
of 26 November 1941, time date group 261381, was a reply to the Com14 dispatch
260110. (Page 190‑191)
Captain Layton
testified that the three dispatches referred to above (exhibit 8) summarized
the intelligence available to Com14, 16, CinCAF. and CinCPac, concerning
Japanese naval movements during the month preceding 26 November. (Page 191)
Captain Layton testified
that he noted that the Com16 unit stated in the dispatch 281331, that it could
not confirm the supposition by Com14 that submarines and carriers in force were
in the Mandates, and that Com16's best indications were that all First and
Second Japanese Fleets were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. (Page 191)
Captain Layton
considered that Com16's reference to First and Second Fleet carriers was made
in relation to the Japanese naval organization as promulgated 29 July 1941;
that the Japanese naval organization as stated by ONI at that time included
information that there were attached to each of the First and Second Fleets,
two carrier division, that is, CarDivs Three (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU) and Five
(RYUJO, HOSHO) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the First Fleet;
and that CarDiv One (AKAGI, KAGA) and CarDiv Two (SORYU, HIRYU) with destroyer
plane guards, were attached to the Second Fleet; thus, Captain Layton
explained, the ONI bulletin of July, 1941, stated that there were eight
carriers assigned by the Japanese to the First and Second Fleets, with no other
carriers listed as assigned to any other fleets.
Therefore, Captain
Layton testified the Com16 dispatch 261831 stating that its best indications
were that all known operating Japanese carriers were believed to be in the Kure‑Sasebo
area was understood by him to mean that all known operating Japanese carriers
were in that area, and that Com14's estimate at that time differed from that of
Com16, in that Com14 was of the opinion that there was at least one Japanese
carrier in the Marshalls at that time. (Page 191‑192) (also see Page 248‑250)
said that in the
latter part of November, he received information of two or more Japanese
carriers in the Marshalls. He had reported to CincPac Japanese carriers at Truk
and the Marshalls, in June, 1941 (page 912). On December 1, 1941, he submitted
to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all major units
of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this was typed, more recent information
caused it to be changed, in red; it showed available in the Empire "4
aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy
cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use
in the home
482 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
area." This was a
portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as
disposed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from their sources
of information. The witness referred to his translation of a book ("a
novel published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament
money"—page 911), which stated that it would be very dangerous for Japan
to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships and
cruisers; with Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could
not afford to gamble its defenses by sending some of this force on a raid which
would denude the Empire of vessels. That was generally his reasoning (page
913). He knows now that there were certain decrypted messages in the Navy
Department which by themselves might not mean much, but taken together would
have warned of an attack against Hawaii more than the messages they received.
This refers to ship movement messages later discussed. Some other messages in
Exhibit 63 indicated war he said, but did not specifically refer to Pearl
Harbor (page 916),
Commander
Rochefort said that no Japanese ships were reported closer than the Marshalls
during the latter part of November, up until December 7th (page 472). No
information was received which indicated a Japanese attack other than at Guam
or the Philippines, of the United States possessions. Nothing east of Guam was
indicated.
Admiral
DeLany stated that CincPac had no information contrary to the ONI Bulletin of December
1, 1941 (page 503). He recalled information that there was a small carrier
force, prior to December 7th, to the southward of the Philippines, but that the
main Japanese strength was at Japan (page 87).
Admiral
McMorris stated that he had had no information that Japanese carriers were in
the Marshalls (page 899).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was familiar with
the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Summaries,
particularly those for the period 27 November‑5 December 1941 (Exhibit
22); that he recalled being familiar with the information contained in them and
though, he frequently did not himself read them, he either heard them read or
orally presented be Captain Layton; that he certainly had access to all the
material contained in those summaries (pages 310‑311).
He, in many cases, identified his own and the initials of
Admiral Kimmel appearing either on the Communication Intelligence Summaries
(Exhibit 22) or on the Intelligence reports prepared and submitted by Captain
Layton.(p. 310‑311).
He further testified that he had no independent recollection
of having seen, the ComFOURTEEN dispatch of 26 November 1941, and other
dispatches attached thereto in Exhibit 8, nor the memorandum dated 1 December
1941 prepared by Lt. Comdr. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer. He considered
it improbable, however, that he did not see the Layton memorandum of 1 December
1941 (p. 311‑312).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that so far as he could
recollect, he had believed the major elements of the Jap Fleet to be fairly
well located on and after 1 December 1941. He remembered that on or about 1
December 1941 there was a change in the call signs of the Japanese fleet, and
stated, with reference to the believed location of the Japanese carriers, that
they were thought to be in home waters or towards Formosa (p. 313).
Vice Admiral McMorris stated that offhand he could not
recall the information on which his estimate as to the location, of the Jap
carriers was based, and that it would require a considerable number of
quotations from Communication Intelligence Summaries (Ex. 22) to point out the
source of such belief (p. 313).
Following this, Vice Admiral McMorris did refer to the
Communication Intelligence Summaries, in an effort to show the basis for his
belief that the carriers were in home waters or towards Formosa:
24 November: A statement that on the 3rd there were a large
number of dispatches associating Carrier Division 3 with CinC Third Fleet.
25 November: A statement that one or more of the carrier
divisions were present in the Mandates.
26 November: Reference was made to general traffic
intelligence involving CinCs Second and Third Fleets, the China Fleet, the
Fourth Fleet, and the Combined Air
Force, indicating a heavy traffic condition, but no reference was made to any
part of the Summary which said anything about carriers.
27 November: Reference was made to information in the
Summary concerning various Japanese fleets but not to information specifically
referring to carriers or to the carrier fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 483
28 November: Vice
Admiral McMorris referred to information in the Communication Intelligence
Summary of this date to the effect that there were many high precedence
messages involving the Combined Fleet and to information concerning the Third
Fleet, but he dad not point out any information concerning carriers (p. 314).
29 November: Reference
was made to various items of information in this Intelligence Summary, but not
to any involving the carriers.
30 November: Reference
was made to information to the effect that there was a strong impression that
the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, was underway, and to the fact that one
urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to
Chiefs of Staff of Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, and to
the Combined Air Force.
1 December: No
reference was made to any information concerning carriers (p. 315).
2 December: Reference
was made to the paragraph in the Summary that there was almost a complete blank
of information on carriers and that carrier traffic was at a low ebb.
3 December: Reference
was made to various items of information but none concerning carriers (p. 3i6).
4 December: Reference
was made to the large number of urgent messages from Tokyo, to the lack of messages
from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet, and to the fact that the former
was believed to be in the vicinity of Takao (p. 318‑317).
5 December: Reference
was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders, and
that there was no traffic from the Commander of the carriers or from the
Commander of the Submarine Force (p. 3i7).
6 December: Reference
was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders and to
the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had originated
several messages to the carriers (p. 317).
After reviewing the
above Summaries, Vice Admiral McMorris admitted that between December 1st and the time of the Japanese attack there
was no Intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of a
carrier fleet as such (p. 319). He stated, however, that it was his
recollection that there had been one or two vague indications associating
carriers with the Second and Third Fleets, and sortie possible associations
with Palau and in at least one instance an association with the Marshalls (p.
320). Upon examination of the Fleet Intelligence Officer's memorandum of
December 1st, Vice Admiral McMorris stated he could not find on it any
reference to Carrier Divisions 1 or 2 (p. 320). He could not recall if there
had been any conference between Admiral Kimmel and himself concerning the 1
December estimate of Captain Layton (p. 321).
He stated that he did
not reach any conclusion that the carriers were operating independently of the
rest of the Combined Fleet (p. 319).
Vice Admiral McMorris
stated that during the period in question, the information available as to the
locations of the Japanese Fleet units was not as specific as was desirable;
that he did not recall the lack of information as to the carriers, and
"taking into consideration the general situation and all other information
at hand . . . we were extremely disturbed" (p. 321).
General
Sort testified that he had received no information indicating Japanese
movements east of Guam (p. 265).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that the information from his own Fleet Intelligence was
principally as to the movements of ships and, he said, it gave no indication of
a Japanese attack (p. 327).
Admiral Wilkinson
discussed the organization of ONI and pointed out that there was no established
or effective method for the dissemination of information of Combat
Intelligence. (p. 280) Admiral Wilkinson said that for some time the Japanese
section of the foreign branch of ONI had been preparing daily an analysis of
the situation as to Japanese Fleet locations and as to Japanese‑American
relations. (p. 281) Admiral Wilkinson referred to the fortnight summary issued
on December 1 and said that it had been discussed with Admirals Stark and
Turner and had been sent out air mail on December 1.
According to Captain
Safford, there were three main radio intelligence units—one in the Navy
Department with subsidiary direction finder stations and intercept stations
along the Atlantic seaboard and in the Atlantic Ocean; the second at Pearl
Harbor with subsidiary intercept stations at Oahu, Mid‑
484 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
way,
Samoa, and Dutch Harbor; the third at Corregidor. There were also intercept
stations from the West Coast of the United States which fed their traffic
directly to Washington. The main station in Washington was concerned
particularly with that branch of intelligence relating to naval operations in
the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments. It was also
used for training personnel. The station at Pearl Harbor was confined to that
branch of intelligence dealing with the dispositions and plans of naval forces
in the Pacific and surveillance over Japanese naval communications. These
duties did not include surveillance over any diplomatic communications. The
Asiatic unit at Corregidor was at the disposal of CinCAF to use as he saw fit.
Up to early 1941, it was mostly concerned with diplomatic communications, but
in October or November shifted its main attention to Japanese naval
communications. (p. 356)
Captain Safford said that the unit at Pearl Harbor was kept
fully informed only of results obtained by the Washington unit as to operations
of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific with one important exception, namely that
on December 1, 1941, CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN were sent a copy of a dispatch to
CinCAF indicating that the Japanese were planning a landing in Malaya. (p. 356)
Captain Safford said that on November 26, 1941, estimates
were received from Pearl Harbor and from ComSIXTEEN relating to the
organization and distribution of the Japanese Fleet, and that the estimates
differed. ComSIXTEEN's report place one carrier division as operating in the
South China Sea and the remaining carriers in Japanese home waters, and further
added that the evaluation was considered reliable. He said that in Washington
they believed that the report from ComSIXTEEN was correct, but did not so
advise the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that on November 24 ONI had sent
a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that Sixteenth District's intercepts were
considered most reliable and requesting that other reports be submitted from
ComSIXTEEN to OpNav with copies to CinCPac for information. The basis for the
belief that ComSIXTEEN's reports were better was the geographical location of
ComSIXTEEN. (p. 357)
Captain Safford said, "Further information as to Pearl
Harbor's estimates of locations of Japanese forces in early December 1941, may
be found in the monthly report of Station 'H'‑in the 'Chronology' which
was prepared daily and forwarded weekly by air mail. This information was, of
course, prepared by and currently available to the Pearl Harbor C. I. Unit but
was not received in the Navy Department until a delay of about two weeks."
(p. 360‑2)
"Note: The examining officer has identified the
documents mentioned by witness as being C. I. Station 'H' 'Chronology' for
December 1‑December 6, 1941, inclusive, now on file in Communication
Intelligence Section (Op 20G), Office of Director, Naval Communications,
Communications Annex, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., to which is attached
a summary of more important extracts, made by the witness under
examination."
Admiral Brainard said that the "War Information
Room" received information from sources such as O. N. I, Naval observers
and what was made known to them through the communications system and plotted
the movements of Naval units including Japanese. To the best of his knowledge,
they were receiving all Japanese information available in the department. (p
402).
Admiral Smith said that around the beginning of December
1941, the information he received from the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to
the effect that one Japanese force was supposed to be at Truk and to the best
of his recollection the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in
Empire waters; that they had no knowledge as to the Japanese carriers; that the
Fleet Intelligence Officer had said that he did not know where the carriers
were; and that Admiral Smith recalled no difference of opinion between the
radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning the
location of enemy carriers. (p. 47)
Admiral Smith said that the Pacific Fleet staff believed
that the Japanese Navy was very efficient although they had little knowledge or
information concerning the Japanese Navy; all of the information on the
Japanese Fleet was by Radio Intelligence only, that is, as to the location of
the Fleet. (p. 59)
Admiral Pye said that a rather high evaluation was placed
upon the report of the Intelligence Officer concerning the Japanese Fleet
inasmuch as no contrary or other information had been received. At the time,
Admiral Pye
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 485
knew
the sources upon which the Intelligence Officer was relying for his
information.
Concerning information from October on as to the movements
of units of the Japanese Fleet, Captain Layton said:
"Commencing in late October, many reports were received
from China, from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant
Attachés in South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources, of the
movements of considerable number of Japanese transports and troops to the South
from Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton estuary, and the movements of
troops southward from northern China through the Shanghai port of embarkation.
The Naval Attaché at Tokyo informed us, on about 1 November, that elaborate
plans for the joint Army‑Navy occupation of Thailand by the Japanese were
complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-Saeki area; that the
invasion was to follow the line of the German blitzkrieg of Holland and Belgium
and that considerable air forces were being assembled in the Taiwan-Hainan
area, and that the Indo‑China forces were being strengthened to a total
of 100,000. The withdrawal of the Japanese merchant ships from Western
Hemisphere waters was noted locally as well as our being informed by OpNav. The
movements of men and materiel to the Mandates was also observed in the early
part of November. Recurring reports of movements of Japanese transports,
escorted by destroyers, to the South along the China Coast, and their arrival
in the French Indo‑China area and Haiphong and Saigon were received from
time to time. The loadings of some of these transports—that is, landing craft,
tanks, troops, railroad equipment, motorboats—led to a belief that amphibious
operations were being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the South,
exact location as yet undetermined. In mid‑November, our best intelligence
sources detected the beginning of the formation of the Japanese surface‑force
task forces; concerned and associated with southern destinations, as well as
the movements of naval aircraft to the Hainan Islands‑Southern Formosa
region. These were more or less confirmed by reports from the North China area
by Army and Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by one report from the
American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and activation of units of the
Combined Fleet with southern destinations was noted and commented on by Admiral
Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District,
specifically noted this activity as the forerunner of operations, judging from
past experience, and Admiral Kimmel asked what we had received from other
units. I replied, 'Nothing yet.' He then directed me to tell Commander
Rochefort that he desired them to initiate a special message concerning the
developments noted to OpNav and Cavite, Guam then being inactive. This resulted
in a dispatch sent by the Com14 Combat Intelligence Unit in which a task force
organization was laid out in the general tenor as follows: That a task force
under the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of
the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet (which includes the First and Second Base
Forces and Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally to our amphibious
forces), the combined Air Force of the Shore‑based Air Command, the
Destroyer Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one squadron from the
First Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship Division. These were estimated
to be forming up for movement to the South China area and associated with the
French Indo‑China, Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihoku and Takao, Formosa.
It was noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were somewhat connected with
this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that perhaps certain of these units
might even proceed in that direction. It was noted, also that there was a
concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, and estimated that
at least one Carrier Division, plus about a third of the submarine fleet, were
in the Marshalls area. It was estimated that these forces would operate in the
southern Asia area, with component part possibly operating from Palau and the
Marshalls. Almost coincident with this time was an inquiry from the Dutch Naval
Command as to the possibility of a Japanese seizure of Portuguese Timor and
expressed the determination of the Dutch High Command that should Japanese
forces carry out such an indicated thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an
invasion and act accordingly. We were asked to comment on this development,
but could find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After receipt
of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of Japanese
formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of move‑
486 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment,
the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications noted here and
estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and Third Fleets and
Submarine Force were comprised into a loose‑knit organization, apparently
divided into two major sections. The majority of the strength of cruisers being
in the first section and destined for the South China area. Minor strengths
being probably destined for the Palau area, and that carriers of CarDiv 3 and
possibly CarDiv 4 were concerned with the South China area movement of the No.
1 Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also estimated to be in the
Sasebo‑Kure area. Com16's unit, however, could not confirm the
supposition by 14's unit that carriers and submarines, in force, were in the
Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of November, the Commander‑in‑Chief
received a dispatch from OpNav which stated, in substance, that the chances of
a favorable outcome of negotiations then pending in Washington were very
doubtful, and expressed the opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any
direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, to be a possibility,
and cautioned against anything that would complicate an already tense situation
or precipitate Japanese action. On the 27th, as I recall it, a war warning was
received from OpNav. I believe that it was aided by the two dispatches I
referred to from the Com14 unit and the Com16 unit. It stated that the
negotiations in Washington had ended and that an aggressive move by the
Japanese within the next few days was expected, that an amphibious expedition
was probably imminent against either the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. We were told the War Department was sending a
similar warning. This message was passed in paraphrase form, which I wrote
myself, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the liaison
officer with the Hawaiian Department. That same evening, incidentally, the
liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received separately, and
showed this copy to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Chief of Staff, and
other high ranking officers present. I did not see the Army dispatch, but from
the discussion that came up, I could conclude only that it was almost a
duplicate as those words were used. This Navy Liaison Officer reported to me,
subsequently, that he had returned the Army dispatch to the senior officer of
the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both General Short and
his Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the Navy's paraphrased war
warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver it in person to General
Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to deliver it in person, he gave it to
the Senior Staff Officer on duty in G‑3 with the statement that this was
a very secret dispatch sent over from Admiral Kimmel for General Short. On the
28th, information was received by the British Consul, locally, from a source
usually reliable, stating that the Japanese would attack the Kra Isthmus from
sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration of war. The main landing
was to be at Singora. At this time, the message regarding the false weather
broadcast to indicate a condition of war was also received; and from the State
Department were reports of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and
French Indo‑China general area, substantiating previous estimates and
reports of increased forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there was
received a dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to regarding the intrigue
in Thailand to get the British to attack, and in this Singora was again mentioned
and seemed to fit in with previous dispatches regarding future Japanese
activity in that area. On 2 December, reports received from CincAF of Japanese
submarines and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which checked
previously indicated movements and previous information. On 3 December, there
was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Exhibit 11, which tends to
confirm the general picture presented to that time, that is, active military
operations were about to commence with the "Southern Expansion
Program" of the Japanese Navy to be put into effect. On 6 December, a
report from CincAF received stated CincChina had reported a twenty‑five
ship convoy, six cruisers, and ten destroyers, in a position in the Gulf of
Siam, as well as another convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and two cruisers
in a different position, all on course West. Also that CincAF forces sighted
thirty ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 1 December, the Commander‑in‑Chief
requested that I present to him a paper showing the approximate location of the
Japanese naval units, which I prepared and submitted. It showed, briefly, that
except for Battleships Divi‑
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 487
sions
One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and Cruiser Division Eight, and
possibly CruDiv Six‑the latter was marked "May head for the
Mandates?"—that all other important Japanese naval forces were South of
Shanghai, the majority of which were in the Bako and Takao area, that a
considerable concentration of shore‑based aircraft, probably 250, under
Commander, Combined Air Force, were in the Hainan‑Takao area, and that
the Clue Second Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers, destroyers, and
submarines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the usual Fourth Fleet,
consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight destroyers, one submarine
tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelve auxiliary minelayers, patrol
boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary transports, and 140 planes, Admiral Kimmel
asked me how well identified and how well placed in Japan were the battleships
and carrier divisions that I referred to previously. I told him that they were
not positively identified in Japanese ports but were believed to be in Japanese
waters, due to their past activity and lack of, or negative information.
"34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in
one division?
"A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane
guards to one division.
"35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total?
"A. That would mean that they had approximately five
division's. At the time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier
Division One of the AKAGI and KAGA; Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and
HIRYU; Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and one unknown carrier; Carrier
Division Four of the KASUGA and it was believed another carrier that we didn't
know, nor do I know to this date; Carrier Division Five of the new SHOKAKU and
ZUIKAKU were just completing training and had not been particularly active with
the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest carriers.
"36. Q. As regards what type of ship was the main
disagreement between those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts?
"A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit
believed that a carrier division and one‑third of the Japanese submarine
force was in the Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance,
that they could not confirm the supposition that the above forces were in the
Marshalls.
"37. Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards
the number of carriers in home waters?
"A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of
disagreement or agreement, as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports
to OpNav and any disagreement in these matters would be not so much errors in
judgment, as the matter of available material, due to distance and other
factors. OpNav made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the war, to
reconcile or evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the general picture
from the reports produced. There may have been messages passed between Fourteen
and Sixteen, of which I had no knowledge.
"'38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27
November onward, did you, personally, make anything which constituted an
estimate of the situation on the possibility of an organization containing
carriers striking at Hawaii?
"A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made
after 27 November, but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed
at some time previous. This occurred in a discussion wherein Japanese
potentialities and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and I
told him of their books, written for their own propaganda purposes and
increased armaments; that in this book the author stated that the American Commander‑in‑Chief,
when his Fleet was concentrated in Hawaii, would be concerned with three
possible Japanese measures of attack: (1) Attack on Pearl Harbor using
carriers, cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack on the Aleutians,
including an occupation force; and (3) An attack on the American Mainland. The
discussion was in a broad sense but I do not recall any of the details thereof.
"39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the
set‑up of forces as placed by your Intelligence toward the end of
November, the Japanese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers
sufficient to form a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii?
"A. I do not believe that point was made specifically.
That, however, was my personal estimate; that with the allocation of forces to
the southern movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly in
destroyers and
488 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cruisers,
although potentially powerful in offense; that is, the carriers. I expressed
that as an opinion before the Roberts' Commission and not as an estimate of the
situation that I had expressed formally or informally, to Admiral Kimmel. I do
not recall having expressed that as a formal or informal estimate.
"40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you
had because of the lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence
sources of the nature which you have just been discussing?
"A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the
week‑end of the first of December, that I couldn't understand why
Washington didn't give us more information, but presumed that perhaps they
didn't have it. It was a source of considerable concern both to Commander
Rochefort and me and we remained at our telephones throughout that week‑end,
although I was back at the office on the Sunday to confer with Admiral Kimmel.
"41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten
days prior to 7 December, '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of
the Japanese Navy was, in itself, an ominous sign?
"A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese
changed their call signs on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather
ominous in view of the other information. The lack of identifiable traffic
could be anticipated under those circumstances. The lack of great volumes of
traffic does not always indicate an imminent move but it fitted very well with
the picture of the southern movement discussed previously." (p. 219‑223)
Captain Layton said:
"I frequently took messages of secret, ultra‑secret,
and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific
occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have
mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval
and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CincAF forces. I
took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there again a complete
and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this
message, but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place that I
recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I
considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or
not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way
down. Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the
Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral
Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversation, in abbreviated
form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the
status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very
anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that
Japan could by‑pass our Philippine flank. It was my personal opinion that
the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most
people's minds. I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence
sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig‑saw
puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as
surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning." (p.
225)
In view of its importance, the following is quoted directly
from the examination of Commander Rochefort:
" 32.Q. Now, Commander, I will ask you to state,
chronologically, as nearly as possible, the results which your unit obtained in
keeping track of the movement of units of the Japanese Fleet, beginning on or
about 1 October 1941.
"A. On 1 October, the general mission of the unit at
Pearl was to endeavor to obtain information from the specific types of traffic
as assigned by Washington. Secondly, to obtain information, by a study of
radio traffic originated by the Japanese stations. And, thirdly, to obtain
information by radio direction finder bearings. As of 1 October, the first
mission mentioned was being only partially carried out due to inability on the
part of the personnel concerned. The second and third missions were, with a
reasonable degree of accuracy, being carried out. Late in October and during
the month of November, some minor successes were obtained in the field covered
by the first mission. However, the information thus obtained was not in any
sense vital. Beginning in early November, it became apparent that certain moves
were afoot, and after about three weeks constant study an estimate was drawn up
which was submitted to the Commandant, who
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 489
released
a dispatch to Washington, Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and
Commander‑in‑Chief, U. S. Fleet. To the best of my knowledge, this
dispatch was sent out on 26 November. Between that date and the 7th of
December, very little information was obtained by means of radio intelligence
due to the lack of traffic. During the latter part of November and the first
week in December, information previously unavailable, due to legal restrictions,
was made available from the files of the communication companies in Honolulu.
This traffic contained the incoming and outgoing files of the personnel
attached to the Consulate General in Honolulu.
"33. Q. On broad lines, what was the substance of that
estimate which you made about 26 November?
"A. The estimate submitted on 26 November consisted, in
the main, of the opinion that the Japanese were concentrating to the south of
Japan, one force proceeding toward Indochina; the direction of advance of the
other force was not known. An additional force of some strength and containing
at least one carrier division was placed definitely in the Marshalls area.
" 34. Q. How many carriers did the Japs organize in one
division?
"A. Two, sir.
"35. Q. At about the time of this aforesaid estimate,
what were you getting along similar lines from the other two units?
"A. Nothing definite except that the Far East Unit had
stated, on many occasions, that an offensive move was apparent. To the best of
my knowledge, no direction or composition of forces was given prior to the
dispatch of the estimate from Pearl.
" 36. Q. Narrowing this testimony down to Japanese
carriers—do I understand you to say that you thought you had located two in the
Marshall Islands or proceeding in that direction?
"A. In our opinion, at that time, at least two Japanese
carriers were in the Marshalls area.
" 37. Q. Did you estimate other Japanese carriers to be
to the southward of, say, Formosa?
"A. I do not recall whether the task forces which we
included in our estimate contained carriers south of Formosa, or not.
"38. Q. On this subject of location of carriers, of
which it is well understood the Japanese possessed ten, was the unit in the Far
East in agreement with your estimate?
"A. No, sir.
" 39. Q. In what respect?
"A. The estimate mentioned previously was not replied
to by Washington. The following day, the Far Eastern Unit, commented on the
dispatch and I believe the Far Eastern Unit was in general agreement except for
the direction of movement and particularly the placing of at least one carrier
division in the Marshalls.
"40. Q. Did the Far Eastern Unit suggest that more was
known about the location of Japanese carriers than was shown in your estimate?
"A. I do not recall.
"41. Q. Do you know if the aforesaid estimate and the
dispatch from Com14, which was based thereon, were communicated to the
Commander-in‑Chief?
"A. Yes, sir; the following morning the Commander‑in‑Chief,
accompanied by Com 14, came to my offices and discussed the matter at great
length, at least an hour and a half, I would say.
"42. Q. Do you recall if that disagreement which came
to you from the other unit in the East was likewise communicated to the
Commander‑in-Chief?
"A. I am almost positive that it was by reason of the
fact that all messages of that type were given to the Commander‑in‑Chief.
"43. Q. Were you, at that time, aware of the very tense
situation that existed between us and the Japanese, particularly insofar as
diplomatic negotiations were concerned?
"A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.
"44. Q. You did not, however, obtain anything in the
nature of a similar estimate from Washington, is that correct?
"A. No, sir, we did not. I might amend that slightly by
stating that several days after the dispatch of our estimate and the dispatch
of the Far Eastern Unit's estimate a warning dispatch was received from
Washington. That was on the 27th. They, obviously, tied together but there was
no direct answer.
490 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"45. Q. Did it occur to you, at the time, in view of the
importance of this subject, that you had a right to expect something from
Washington?
"A. No, Sir. We had submitted our estimate to our
superior officers in Washington. Whether or not they replied, I considered a
matter within their purview.
"46. Q. Did you look upon Japanese battleships and
carriers as the most important units?
"A. Yes, sir.
"47. Q. Do you recall any uneasiness of mind because
you did not have a greater number of those ships located?
"A. There was great unease in all of our minds because
of the lack of traffic. The inability to locate more battleships and carriers
was not considered, in itself, as a bad sign by reason of the fact that up
until that time we had generally been unsuccessful in locating the majority of
the larger ships.
"48. Q. What particular type of Japanese man‑o‑war
did you feel you were well in touch with and what importance did you put upon
their movements?
"A. We maintained close touch with all of the vessels
engaged in building up bases in the Mandates and, generally, with seaplane
tenders, and occasional cruiser divisions.
"49. Q. Did your unit assume that because they did not
hear the large Japanese ships talking that they were all in port?
"A. No, sir.
"50. Q. From, say, the 27th of November onward, do I
understand you to say that Japanese naval radio traffic was unusually light?
"A. Yes, sir.
"51. Q. Did you recall any previous occasion when it
was as sparse as during that period?
"A. Yes, Sir. During the advance and occupation of
Hainan.
"52. Q. Did it occur to the minds in your unit that
this silence might be presaging another offensive movement?
"A. Yes, sir, we considered that it did definitely
presage another offensive movement.
"53. Q. Were you emphatic in calling the attention of
your seniors to the importance of this lack of traffic?
"A. Yes, sir.
"54. Q. To whom did you represent that?
"A. To the Commandant and to my opposite number on the
Commander-in‑Chief's Staff, namely, the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
However, the objectives, insofar as my unit was concerned did not include areas
to the eastward of the Mandate islands." (p. 210‑212)
Commander Wright discussed the equipment which was available
at the Fourteenth Naval District unit for the detection and location of enemy
ships. (p. 379‑80)