XXIV. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AND. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR—JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS

 

A. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE

 

Admiral Bloch said that he had been advised by the District Intelligence Officer of the existence of about 200 representatives of the Japanese Consu­late who were spread over Oahu and who were not registered agents of the

 

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Japanese Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had definite information to convict these men of being unregistered agents. Admiral Bloch wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations on this matter dated November 10, 1941, file S‑A8‑5/EF37/ND14, Serial 01216. The reply thereto is identified as letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Com­mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classified Secret, dated 6 December 1941, file (SC) A8‑5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both of the above‑mentioned letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confi­dential File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The Army would not agree to the indictment of these Japanese and the matter was referred to Washington where the War and Navy Departments agreed that they would not be brought to trial. (p. 15)

Captain Murphy said that there was a general impression that the Japanese could know anything that they wanted to know about the Pacific Fleet. (p 200)

Admiral Brown said that he thought it quite probable that the Japanese had a copy of the employment schedule setting forth the Fleet Movements. (p. 145)

Captain Mayfield pointed out that the topography of Pearl Harbor permitted easy observation of the ships there. Captain Mayfield was of the belief that there were about 350 Japanese societies which were active. He said that there were also 250 consular agents which he believed were used by the Japanese consulate for the purpose of getting information. (p. 311)

Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of the domestic branch of ONI and the activities of the Counter‑Espionage Section and conference with the F. B. I. and the Army set‑up. (p. 284) Admiral Wilkinson also discussed the Navy's desire to have the Department of Justice prosecute various Japanese in Hawaii for being non‑registered agents of a foreign government and said that the Commanding General had urged that prose­cution be withheld in order not to disturb cordial relations between the Japanese and the Americans.

Captain Mayfield said that he had participated in conferences at Hawaii concerning the possible prosecution of the Japanese consular agents but that the Army had indicated that they did not want these men prosecuted. (p. 311‑312)

Concerning the use of Japanese fishing boats and Intelligence work, Captain Mayfield said there never was definite proof of espionage in all of these boats but he believed that they were used for that purpose. (p. 312) Captain Mayfield said that he had no exact information indicating that amateur radio transmitters were used for Intelligence work or regular com­mercial broadcasts from Hawaii. (p. 312)

Lt. Stephenson discussed the Japanese consular agents of which there were about 240 and the fact that one of them in June 1940 had been proved to have been engaged in espionage. He discussed the correspondence re­lating to the prosecution of these consular agents which was resisted by General Short.

Lt. Stephenson discussed the sources of Japanese espionage information and the limitations on counter Intelligence due to limited personnel in ONI and to other reasons. (p. 326)

Lt. Stephenson discussed the measures taken to prevent the acquisition of information by visiting Japanese merchant crewmen, etc. (p. 327)

Lt. Stephenson discussed at some length the various sources of informa­tion open to Japanese and the inability of the Intelligence Section to prevent the acquisition and transmission of such information.

Lt. Stephenson referred to reports which he had written concerning the espionage problem in Hawaii dated February 9 and February 14, 1942 in the Kuehn case and a report dated April 20, 1943 in the Counter‑Intelligence file of ONI. He said that it was known on the basis of information after the war that the consulate head used commercial communication facilities for the transmitting of vital Intelligence from and after December 3. (p. 331)

Lt. Stephenson said that no evidence had ever been found establishing that Japanese sampans had been used for espionage purposes but it, was recog­nized that they were so used. (p. 332)

Concerning Japanese espionage, Admiral Smith said:

"I remember an incident a few months before the war where an American came from San Francisco; he had communicated with the Fleet Intelligence Officer before doing so. He was in the employ of the Japanese and was sent

 

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out by the Japanese by plane. The Intelligence officer made contact with him by placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we removed from the files two or three papers, mostly on the results of target practice, and gave them to this American who flew back to the West Coast, and, as the result of all this, a Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe of Charles Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Depart­ment intervened and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was returned to Japan. What happened to the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew that the money had come from the Japanese Embassy. We did not know of the activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii, although it had been developed years before that some of the priests were ex‑Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick, who had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was made to deport one of these priests, but it was found nothing could be done because of an old agreement between the United States and Japan, based upon our missionary activities of the past, that once a man in the religious status arrived in the country, if he chose to undertake other activities, nothing could be done about it. I know that Admiral Bloch knew of that case. In the summer of 1940, when Admiral Richardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the entire Fleet one afternoon well off shore and a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that no one beyond the Staff of the Commander‑in‑Chief knew why we were out. We changed course after and engaged in no real tactical operations. What this was all about, I have never learned. But on our return to port, I learned, through Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the part of Japanese communications between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii, trying to learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were Japanese agents working, but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Commander‑in‑Chief did not know who these Japanese agents were. We suspected all of them."

 

Captain McCollum said that it had been suspected for some time prior to December 7, 1941, that Japanese submarines were keeping our fleet based in Pearl Harbor under observation. He said that at various times during the last 6 months of 1941 U. S. destroyers had reported contacts with enemy subs in and around the Hawaiian group: Several of these contacts were considered well authenticated. Although most of the contacts were not in the immediate vicinity of Honolulu, he believed that one had been made in Molokai Channel—the approach to the drill grounds of the fleet. In July or August, 1941, it had actually been suggested that a search be made of a certain point to the north of Midway, where at was believed that a Jap provision ship and tanker might be rendezvousing with some of the Japanese reconnaissance subs (p. 23‑24).

Vice Admiral Smith stated that there had been many reported submarine contacts prior to 7 December 1941 in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but that in most cases these contacts had not been considered authentic. He did not recall any submarine contacts during the period October‑December, 1941 (p. 840).

Captain John B. Earle, USN, in December, 1941, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, testified that in the several months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack there were ten to fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Harbor, most of the reports coming from sampans, occasionally from Army lookout posts, and now and then from planes (p. 451). Captain Earle recalled few of the details of these reports; he remembered none in the months of October and November, 1941, or in December prior to the 6th of that month (p. 451).

A search of the files of CinCPac by Admiral Hewitt's investigation resulted in locating dispatches that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor:

(1) On 3 November 1941 an oil slick area in latitude 20‑10, longitude 157‑41 was observed by a patrol plane and crossed by Task Force One. An air search of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area by the USS WORDEN and an investigation by the USS DALE produced negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920, 082035, 03,2133, 082300, 040042) .

(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, had issued an order requiring extreme vigilance against possible hostile sub­marines, restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and providing that all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, with­out knowledge of the CinCPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a

 

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restricted area (Exhibit 48; dispatch 280835). A search of part of the area by a task group of three destroyers was pursued from 1050 to 1845 on the 28th but produced no contacts (Exhibit 48; dispatches 281050, 281133, 281704, 281845).

(3) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20‑30, longitude 158‑23, which was lost in a change of range; it was evaluated as probably not indicating the presence of a submarine (Exhibit 48; dispatch 022336). An investigation, ordered to be made by DesRon 4 (Exhibit 48; dispatch 080040), apparently was negative.

Lieutenant Woodrum said that over a period of years considerable information had been gathered by the Naval Intelligence Service concerning Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. He said, "There are voluminous re­ports available concerning the visits of Japanese tankers, Japanese training ships, Japanese training squadrons to the Island of Oahu and to other islands in the Hawaiian group. It is well known that officers attached to these groups made ''sightseeing trips' of the islands, including such vantage points as Aiea Heights." (P.385.)

 

Admiral Pye stated that the Japanese had practically unlimited means of obtaining and transmitting information concerning United States ships at Oahu (page 429). Charts recovered after the attack, he said, indicated that the Japanese had. planned to attack certain berths, expecting the ships to be in the position in which they had been berthed three weeks earlier (page 430).

Admiral DeLany stated that the enemy had unlimited opportunity for observa­tion and for getting information opt of Pearl Harbor. The operating schedule for the Fleet provided a varying length of time for ships to be in port and at sea (page 499). But; he had no specific information that the Japanese were endeavor­ing to keep currently informed of the location and movements of Units of the Fleet immediately preceding December 7, 1941 (page 500).

Commander Rochefort said that Japanese opportunities for espionage and for transmission of information were ample (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, there were no restrictions on the Japanese getting information out of Hawaii, but the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables (pages 909‑910).

 

B. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR

 

Captain Rochefort, officer‑in‑charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor, said that his immediate superior was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. In his relations with the District Intelligence Officer, he freely exchanged information and views, except for "ultra" information. The relationship with the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to "exchange all information available and to endeavor to obtain information as desired by him." A copy of the communication intelligence summary was sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer every morning. With regard to the FBI, Captain Rochefort met the agent‑in-­charge frequently and discussed the general situation, but did not discuss ultra matters. In turn, the FBI agent kept Captain Rochefort informed of what he was doing, "possibly with some limitation." Captain Rochefort's relationship with the Army was similar to that with the FBI. He said that between 27 Novem­ber and 7 December 1941 he had several talks and exchanged opinions with Colonel Fielder, G‑2 to General Short. However, he gave the Army no ultra information. He said that his relationship with the Army was entirely on a personal basis—i.e., there was no official system set up for joint operations. Captain Rochefort's relations with the Federal Communications Commission were limited to technical matters, such as direction finding and the location of unauthorized stations (p 44‑46, 65).

Captain Rochefort said that during the latter part of 1941 the communication intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was assigned the tasks of attacking and exploit­ing Jap personnel code, administrative code, and the code in use in the Marshalls area. It was also to conduct research on all Japanese naval systems, except the "five‑numbered system." The Washington center was charged with general control of all three units and in addition worked on Jap diplomatic systems and such others as were directed (p. 44)

Admiral Hewitt's examination brought out information not, previously devel­oped regarding the intelligence sources and activities of Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

In this connection, Commander Fabian said that he had been attached in November and December, 1941, to the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor. This unit had a number of personnel detailed to the decryption of Japanese radio traffic and operated a direction finder, twenty‑six radio receivers, and other equip­ment necessary to intercept enemy transmissions. Its general mission was to

 

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study Japanese communications with a view to keeping track of the Jap fleet, and in this connection the unit was attempting to break the enemy naval system JN‑25 (p. 68‑69, 73). The unit also intercepted Jap diplomatic codes and of these was assigned the task of reading the machine cipher "purple," machine cipher "red" and the code J‑19. However, the exploitation of these codes was primarily for the purpose of obtaining local information: all purple traffic inter­cepted and certain other traffic in the red and J‑19 codes were sent to Washington for complete analysis. The latter messages were not sent to the Pearl Harbor unit, since this unit was not performing any cryptanalysis of the diplomatic codes (p. 70‑72). Commander Fabian said that from breaking the "purple" dispatches during the period 27 November to 7 December they knew that American-­Japanese negotiations in Washington were not proceeding satisfactorily and would probably be broken of (p. 72).

Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, during 1941, said that a copy of all Jap diplomatic messages decrypted by the Corregidor radio intelligence unit was furnished daily to the Army. The Army was not given copies of dispatches sent out by CinCAF to CinCPac or to Washington dealing with purely naval matters. Captain Mason said, however, that he conferred quite frequently with the head of intelligence in the Philippine Army Department and quite often provided estimates as to the locations of the Jap fleet. Speaking generally, Captain Mason said that he was in close contact with the Army most of the time and that information was freely exchanged. He said that the Army did not have a radio intelligence unit an the Philippines, although they did have an intercept station which merely copied Japanese Army and diplomatic traffic (p. 70‑71)

Captain Safford, chief of the Communications Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department, during 1941, said that the Corregidor radio intelligence unit had been intercepting messages in the Japanese "purple" code and other diplomatic systems for several years, up to and including 7 December 1941. Main interest of this unit was on the local Asiatic circuits for the infor­mation of CinCAF, but late in November, 1941, they were given the additional duty of covering the Berlin‑Tokyo circuit. These latter intercepts were forwarded to Washington and weren't touched locally (p. 98‑99).

With respect to the exchange of information among the Corregidor, Pearl Harbor and Washington radio intelligence units, Captain Safford made the following statement (p. 99):

"If Corregidor translated a message which they thought important, they would encipher the translation and forward it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the Tokyo‑Berlin circuit was enciphered; that is, the inter­cept was enciphered and forwarded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or im­portance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner, any translations of particular importance to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from Washington. We also had a very free and continuous exchange of technical information between the two units, by which I mean the keys for the 'purple' machine and keys for another system which we called JN‑19, and any other information which would help either unit in its performance of duty.

"With regard to communications between the Navy Department and our unit at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few."

Captain Safford said further that there was a free exchange of intelligence information between the Corregidor and Pearl Harbor units "so far as it per­tained to the projects they were assigned." However, since the dissemination of intelligence was considered a function of Naval Intelligence rather than Naval Communications, Captain Safford indicated that information regarding the Japanese fleet obtained by the Corregidor unit would not necessarily be passed to the Pearl Harbor unit. He said that such information would normally be passed to CinCAF or his Fleet Intelligence Officer, and further dissemination would be made by them (p. 100‑101).

Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN, was District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, in December, 1941. The mission of his office comprised general intelligence matters in cooperation  with other federal and local intelli­gence organizations, especially with respect to espionage and counter‑espionage and any other intelligence functions as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or the District Commandant. Lt. Col. Bicknell was the Army officer charged with local intelligence. The FBI official was Mr. Robert L. Shivers (p. 558).

 

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Admiral Mayfield testified that his directive from the Chief of Naval Oper­ations prescribed complete cooperation between the District Intelligence Office and G‑2 of the Army and the FBI. Admiral Mayfield stated that cooperation was full and whole‑hearted, that all information possessed by his office was readily available to G‑2 and the FBI, which were given copies of any material of interest (p. 559).

Admiral Mayfield stressed that despite free interchange of assistance between his office and the radio intelligence unit of the 14th Naval District, headed by Commander Rochefort, that unit was a separate organization and in no sense subordinate to the District Intelligence Office. Commander Rochefort's unit reported directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the opinion of Admiral Mayfield. As to the general nature of the work of Commander Rochefort's unit, Admiral Mayfield was unable to give definite information (p. 560).

Reports by Commander Rochefort's unit, concerning, the location or movements of Japanese fleet units, were not routed to the Distract Intelligence Office, and Admiral Mayfield said he had no knowledge of them (p. 561).

Relations between the District Intelligence Office and. the Fleet Intelligence Office were, according to Admiral Mayfield, cordial, close and cooperative. He was in "more or less constant" personal communication with Captain Layton (the Fleet Intelligence Officer), to whom he endeavored to furnish all information or interest (p. 560‑661).

Admiral Mayfield recalled no conversations with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral    Bloch, Captain Layton, or Commander Rochefort from November ,27th to December 7, 1941, concerning the prospects of war between Japan and the United States. Admiral May, said the only intelligence matters he discussed with Admiral Bloch and Captain Layton concerned counter-espionage measures. Admiral Mayfield added he was not advised of the receipt on November 27, 1941, of the so-called war warning (p. 574-575).

Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor of the so‑called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Admiral Bellinger added that not  until after 7 December 1941 did he see or know of the CNO dispatch of 28 November stating that hostile action by the Japanese was possible. Nor, said Admiral Bellinger, dad he see any of the daily communication intelligence summaries, 14 October to 5 December 1941, prepared by the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel (p. 498‑499).

Admiral Bellinger did not remember having seen a memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel on the subject of the location of the Japanese fleet (p. 499).

 

(1) Sources and distribution:

 

Admiral Kingman said that the details of administration of the investi­gative activities within the Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the direct control and supervision of the Commandant than was the case in those cases more closely connected with Washington. He recalled that the District Commandant was somewhat concerned about the investigative activities in the Fourteenth Naval District which were carried on by some of the inexperienced personnel on duty thereat, and thinks that this was mentioned in a personal letter from the Commandant to the Chief of Naval Operations which, however, the Examining Officer was unable subsequently to locate. (p. 336) Admiral Kingman could recall nothing relating to the activities of the so‑called consular agents at Hawaii. (p. 336)

The facilities for obtaining intelligence of possible enemies were, accord­ing to Admiral Bloch, as follows: When Admiral Bloch arrived at Pearl Harbor, there were two units at Pearl Harbor composed of communicators and Intelligence people, Japanese language students. The information they secured by radio intelligence and such other information as they secured was transmitted to Cavite and to the Navy Department. That was Admiral Bloch's principal source of Japanese intelligence. They also received the intelligence that was collected at Cavite.

When Admiral Bloch arrived, he was dissatisfied with this organization and he organized it into one unit known as "Combat Intelligence," where they were under one hand. This unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors and all the other things they had, with one officer in charge. In the middle of July, 1941, this unit was placed in a secure place, one big room in the basement of the office building, with their own channels of communications to the radio stations and radio direction finders. Admiral

 

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Bloch always did his best to augment this force by getting more and better men. In addition to that unit, they had the District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army Intelligence and the FBI and they also had such reports as were sent to them by the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. They kept in touch with the Commander‑in‑Chief as best they could and Admiral Bloch believed that they were getting everything that was pertinent although the Commander‑in‑Chief had many sources of information that Admiral Bloch did not have. Admiral Bloch felt, however, that Admiral Kimmel conscientiously endeavored to give to him everything that Admiral Kimmel thought he should have. Admiral Bloch believed that the Navy Department had more knowledge about actual conditions than they did. (p. 12) All of the information received by the Combat Intelligence unit, he said, was always delivered to the Commander‑in‑Chief. (p. 13)

Admiral Smith said that they got very little Intelligence on Oahu except Fleet Intelligence which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on the war, but that they had radio intelligence and every time that one or more of the three Task Force Commanders were in port or the Type Commanders were in port, Admiral Kimmel would have them over and have the Intelli­gence Officer point out on his chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of the location of all units of the Japanese Fleet. Admiral Smith was present at all of such conferences. The War Plans Officer (then Captain now Rear Admiral McMorris), the Operations Officer then Captain now Rear Admiral DeLany), the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Comdr. Layton) and the Fleet Communications Officer, were always fully informed of all intelligence in this manner. (p. 33)

Captain Edwin T. Layton was Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, during 1941. He had studied in Japan and qualified as a Japanese inter­preter and translator. (p. 214)

The sources from which he obtained information concerning the Japanese Navy in 1941 were:

"The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelli­gence reports, estimates of fleet organizations position and Fleet Com­manders, also from dispatches from Naval Attaché, Tokyo, Naval Attaché, Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and Washington, D. C.; also from Consular and State Department reports for­warded through ONI to the Commander‑in‑Chief; also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct through a representative attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu." (p. 215)

Captain Layton said that he thought that our intelligence coverage was good, although always incomplete.

Captain Layton said that he felt that the State Department undoubtedly had information which was not supplied to the Commander in Chief and which would have been of value. (p. 215)

Captain Layton said that he intimately concerned himself with the results obtained by the Combat Intelligence Organizations. He said that the information obtained and made available to the Commander in Chief was principally from the unit at Cavite and the local unit in Pearl Harbor, that almost nothing came from Washington, and that he felt that the principal unit in Washington might have contributed more toward the intelligence picture. (p. 216)

Captain Layton said that he communicated the available intelligence concerning Japanese naval forces daily at about 8:15 in the morning, and if subsequent to that time important information was received, he would report it to Admiral Kimmel at the First opportunity. When he reported to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions the War Plans Officer and senior Operations Officer were called in. When task force commanders would return to port, Admiral Kimmel would send for Layton and have him review the situation. (p. 216)

The discussions which he had with Admiral Kimmel were summarized generally as follows:

"The discussions were very general, generally starting with the Japanese situation, both political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their apparent intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was particularly interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air and other bases, and these matters were discussed in general with the task force commanders and other officers present, such as whether or not the

 

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Japanese had radar, whether it had been received from the Germans via the trip of the ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly to Europe by the Panama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls the estimated air strength in the area the question as to whether sound contacts obtained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and so forth, a discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence of baby submarines—they were called 'submerged submarines'—off Molokai, were submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature. The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject of conversations and discussions." (p. 217)

Commander Rochefort had studied Japanese in Japan for three years from about September, 1929 until September, 1932, and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator. Commander Rochefort's source of information in addition to the work of his own Combat Intelligence Unit were the Washington headquarters, a unit similar to his attached to CincAF, and other government agencies such as the FBI, the Army and F. C. C. in Honolulu. The information furnished by these latter agencies, he said, was of no value prior to December 7, 1941. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort said that any message originating in one of the combat intelligence units was automatically sent to the other two units. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort reported the intelligence which came into his hands to ComFOURTEEN personally and to the Commander‑in‑Chief, via the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Captain Mayfield said that the organization of the District Intelligence Office when he reported for duty consisted of about thirteen persons. He sought and obtained additional personnel but his opinion was that that organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some months after December 7. (p. 309) Captain Mayfield said that the cooperation between the FBI and the Army and Navy Intelligence at Hawaii was very good. (p. 309)

Captain Layton said that the Army's liaison with the Fleet was through Colonel Edward Bailey and that he saw Colonel Railey almost every day. He did not receive from any Army source any information available. (p. 218)

In his statement at the end of his examination Lt. Stephenson said that there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence organization that Admiral Bloch was not sufficiently security conscious and not sufficiently mindful of the enemy espionage potential at Hawaii. This, however, he said could make him cite no casual connection between the Commandant's apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack.

Captain Earle said that he was generally familiar with the activities of the District Intelligence Office in the Fourteenth Naval District, and so far as he knew both he and Admiral Bloch were satisfied with the activities of that office. He could recall nothing of the results obtained by Commander Rochefort's unit. (p. 373‑5)

Admiral McCormick remembered no instance where the War Plans Section received any intelligence derived from local sources, except one or two cases dealing with counter‑espionage.  (p .70) Admiral McCormick said that he had no knowledge of any Japanese movements until they saw the dispatches, in the days just before the war, in which the Asiatic Fleet had seen large movements on the way south, off Indo‑China. He said that the War Plans Section, as a whole, was not furnished with daily or periodic reports by the Staff Intelligence or Fleet Intelligence. (p. 70)

Admiral DeLany believed that the information furnished by Intelligence was the best that those sources could assemble but was aware that the sources were inadequate and believed that there was a general feeling that they were more or less operating in the dark not only from the information that they were able to collect in Pearl Harbor but also as to information furnished from other sources. This applied to information both as to the location of Japanese units and as to the probability of war. (p. 84)

Admiral Brown said that all senior officers received the Naval Intelligence bulletins. (p.138)

Admiral Pye said that Admiral Kimmel in effect turned over to him the training program and in connection with that his consultations with Admiral Kimmel were frequent. Also, Admiral Kimmel customarily called in the

 

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Intelligence officer and had him explain the situation on the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known. (p. 148)

Concerning the intelligence available from the middle of October until the time of the attack, Admiral McMorris said that they felt that they would like to have known lots more than they did and that on the whole, they felt it was somewhat insufficient but did not see any probability of achieving improvement. (p.241)

 

Admiral Kimmel testified that his Fleet Intelligence worked with ComFOURTEEN's Intelligence. He depended largely on units of the Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence for information. The Intelligence units were satisfactory (page 280). Also he received intelligence from ComFOURTEEN, Navy Department and forces afloat (page 280). Summaries of information were furnished him page 281). The number of war plans officers were increased by him. Serving as such were McMorris, McCormick, Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer, and a Lieutenant. All enemy intelligence went to war plans and estimates were drawn from day to day (page 281) Information was furnished to him, to his War Plans head, to his Chief of Staff, and to Captain DeLany (Operations). The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and he interexchanged intelligence (page 282). Prior to December 7th, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was informed of intelligence affecting Hawaii and other places where he had forces. He was not informed regarding plane for places distant from Hawaii (page 282). The Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel said, gave him all the information which he had (page 283).

Captain Layton said that, as Fleet Intelligence Officer, his main sources of information were from CNO and DONI, who forwarded reports from naval diplomatic sources, reports from observers, from the State Department, from the local  intelligence officers, and liaison with the British secret intelligence, and re­ports from ComTWELVE, ComSIXTEEN, and ComTHIRTEEN (page 904). He was kept informed of FBI and Army Intelligence at the time (page 909). He passed information to CincPac by hand in its original form. If the information was a long report, he made a brief of it (page 904).  He thought that local Army Intelligence was not getting the "highly secret" information from the Army; he informed them in general (page 908).

Admiral Bloch said that the intelligence unit of the Fourteenth Naval District was efficient, although not adequate in apace and personnel, and kept him and CincPac informed page 391). Intelligence was received from CincPac, the District Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence, and the FBI. He did not receive the intelligence bulletins from the Navy Department, his ONI probably did (page 392).

Commander Rochefort testified that he was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fourteenth Naval District from June through December, 1941 (page 471). Combat intelligence consisted of an interceptor unit, a direction finder unit, and a cryptographic or research group. Collaboration with the FBI, Army, and Federal Communications Commission was on a personal basis. They received, normally, reports from ONI at Washington, and the letters and dispatches in their own system, which were of a more technical nature. They would get all information of a technical nature from Washington, but all information available at ONI in Washington was not sent them as a matter of course (page 471). Only one or two bits of political or diplomatic information were sent to him (page 472). Military information would be sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Rochefort handled intelligence of Japanese ship movements. The information received was automatically passed to CNO. CincAsiatic, and to CincPac. Written summaries were sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer (page 472).

 

The following information was contained in the ComFourteen Radio Intelligence Summaries and was made available to Admiral Kimmel (p. 193):

1. The November 27th Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary, delivered on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little below normal due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo‑Takao circuit was unreadable on mid‑watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers. Bako, Samo and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major commanders. The direction  finder activity was very high. As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure‑Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third

 

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Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates, and also that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. Concerning airforces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters." This sum­mary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

The Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered No­vember 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this command also originated mes­sages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that "This activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Feet was said to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

3. The communication intelligence summary of the 29th of November, delivered the 30th, stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders, both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, Radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual A1 Nev ("Alnav"? LWJ), and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been ad­dressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was intentional in making positively known the existence of an air feet. Its composition was unknown. The dis­patches indicated that various units were under the immediate command of the Commander, in Chief, Second Fleet, including CarDiv 3, and the Third Fleet.

Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships, but their assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication with the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The CinC Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at Chichijima the previous day, and also some traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet (Hew. Exhibit 22).

The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past few days, and that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs. As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets were in Kure. In the same message the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent and dispatch to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief,

 

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Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was sail that the continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus the letter's known progress from the Empire to Chichijima and Saipan made his destination obviously the Marshalls; that various facts indicated a submarine concentration in the Marshalls. "Every evidence points to a concentration, not only of the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer (Hew. Exhibit 22).

5. The communication intelligence summary for December 1st, delivered on December 2nd, stated generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional pro­gressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December, indicated than an effort was made to deliver all despatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending. It should be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading, "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" was understood in red pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the best of his rec­ollection this was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.

The summary further stated, as to the First Fleet, "Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure‑Sasebo area in the direction of South China. and Indo‑China"; Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report except that a same associations of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo‑China forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to Fifth Fleet, "nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force it was stated, "No change." As to carriers, it was said, "No change." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

6. The communication intelligence summary delivered on December 3rd, covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that Com­SIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Sum­ming up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated

 

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that despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routine indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and appar­ently in company while another combined fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "No units have stood out prominently in the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the asso­ciation of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.

Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of infor­mation on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been, recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

7. The communication intelligence summary of December 3rd, delivered on the 4th, under the heading "General," stated that traffic volume was normal with receiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew Exhibit 22).

8. The communication intelligence summary of December 4th, delivered on the 6th, stated that in general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving con­ditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system, using the prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Com­bined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo‑China Force, and same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated, "The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CinC Second Fleet is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in that area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22.)

9. The radio intelligence summary for December 5th, which was delivered on the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo‑Mandates circuit in duplex operations. There were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old, which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition

 

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of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you have said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."

As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still frequently ad­dressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that "They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force had been seen either."

There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet, addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were moving probably to Indo‑China (Hew. Exhibit 22).

 

Any time important information was received, he said, CincPac and ComFOUR­TEEN would come and discuss it.

General Marshall said that prier to December 7th he thought that all pertinent Army intelligence was given to the Navy, but the Army did not then receive, as regular routine, intelligence from the Navy as to Japanese ship movements (page 864).

 

(2) Interception of Japanese communications:

 

Captain Rochefort said that certain communications with which the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was concerned (Exhibit 18) were received by him from the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, about 2 or 3 December 1941. He identified one of these as Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245, and said that due to the difficulties inherent in the code it had not been deciphered until the night of 10 December. The message prescribed a set of signals indicating the types of American vessels in the Hawaiian area and their activities, and included arrangements for lights in houses, on beaches, from boats, want ads over Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui Island (p. 57). Captain Rochefort said that aside from this communication he did not receive prior to December 7, 1941, any other Japanese reports regarding American ships in Pearl Harbor or preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack (p 58).

Captain Rochefort also read into the record two communications (part of Exhibit 18) which he did not recollect having seen before (p. 57-59). One of these referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives, the other to the lack of reconnaissance by the "fleet air arm" at Hawaii.

Admiral Mayfield said that the District Intelligence Office of the 14th Naval District had sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on February 9, 1942, a report (part of Exhibit 40) regarding a message sent by the Japanese consulate to Tokyo on 3 December 1941. A copy of this message had been delivered by Admiral Mayfield to Commander Rochefort's radio intelligence unit for decryp­tion on 4 or 5 December, but Admiral Mayfield did not learn its contents until 11 December. The message transmitted to Tokyo a proposed system of signaling by lights and other methods for the purpose of reporting departures of U. S. naval units from Pearl Harbor. This system had been conceived and submitted to the Japanese Consulate by one Otto Kuehn, a German resident on Oahu, who was later tried, convicted, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. Ad­miral Mayfield stated that neither his office nor the Federal Bureau of Investi­gation found definite information that any part of the proposed signals had ever been used (p. 564‑565).

Mr. William F. Friedman, Cryptanalyst and Director of Communications, Signal Security Agency, War Department, identified two Japanese messages from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 6 December 1941, (Exhibit 18) as having been intercepted by the Army. They had been decoded by the Army on 8 December 1941. One of these messages referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives and the other pointed out the lack of reconnaissance being conducted by "the fleet air arm" at Hawaii (p. 522‑523).

Captain Safford stated that the two messages referred to in the preceding paragraph (Exhibit 18) were in the Japanese PA‑K2 code and could have been

 

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decrypted by the Navy in one and a half to two hours. However, the Navy gave precedence to the processing of all "purple" and J‑19 messages and would not have touched the PA‑K2 communications as long as there were any J‑19's on hand (p. 530‑531).

Lt. Donald Woodrum, District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, produced transcripts of telephone conversations obtained by tapping the lines of the Japanese Consul and Vice‑Consul for the period 1 October 1941 to 2 De­cember 1941, when the taps were removed by order of Capt. Mayfield. The transcripts (marked Exhibit 38) contain little, if any, information of military significance, being concerned largely with routine consular activities and those of the local Japanese population. (p. 379)

To Lt. Woodrum's knowledge, there were only 2 local telephone intercepts which may have had military significance. The first was in 1940 from Vice Consul Okuda to a Buddhist priest on the island of Maui advising the latter to keep the Consulate informed on any United States fleet movements that came to his attention. In 1941, the exact date not stated, a woman very much agitated called the Consulate to say that the USS NEW ORLEANS had just left the harbor, to which the person at the Consulate made no reply. (p. 383)

Wire tapping was discontinued on 2 December because, in the opinion of Lt. Woodrum, the secrecy of the activity was jeopardized by the accidental discovery of similar activity on the part of the FBI by employees of the telephone company. (p. 379‑81)

With regard to his instruction of 2 December 1941, that tapping of the tele­phone wires of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul by officers of the District Intelligence Office cease, Admiral Mayfield gave as his reasons: (a) that the telephone company had discovered the FBI was also tapping these wires and he feared that the resulting disclosure of this tapping would jeopardize the security of the tapping by the District Intelligence Office, and (b) the interceptions up through 2 December had revealed nothing of intelligence value. (p. 571)

Lt. Woodrum stated that prior to 1 December 1941, efforts to obtain copies of coded messages sent from the Jap Consulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington via commercial cable companies were unsuccessful. As of 1 December, however, in accordance with an agreement between Mr. David Sarnoff, of RCA, and Admiral Bloch, copies of all messages sent via RCA were available to the naval service and the first of these were received at the Dis­trict Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December. It is Lt. Woodrum's understanding that these were sent immediately to Commander Rochefort's unit and, further, that they were not decoded until after the attack, it being neces­sary even then to use a Japanese code book that was found during a search of the Consulate on the 7th. Summaries of decoded copies of messages sent from 1 December to 6 December has been marked "Exhibit 40." (p. 383‑5)

Admiral Mayfield said that Exhibit 40 contained the translation and digest of several messages sent by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo via commercial cable companies on and after 3 December 1941. One of these messages dated 3 December, reported the departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. A message, dated December, reported the arrival of the HONOLULU. (p 565) Copies of these two messages were received in the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December (p. 566) and forwarded to Commander Rochefort's unit. Another Japanese consulate message, dated 5 December, reported the arrival of 3 battleships, their expected date of departure, the departure of the LEXINGTON, the departure of five heavy cruisers and other information. (p. 565) Admiral Mayfield did not know when this message had been received in his office. On 6 December, the Jap consulate filed two messages regarding U. S. ship movements and one regarding U. S. Army use of balloons. Admiral Mayfield believed that these probably did not reach his office until 7 December.(p. 566‑567)

Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet in December 1941, testified that none of the intelligence material he received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor included any information received from intercepted telephone conversation of the Japanese or from intercepted cable messages. None of these cable messages was seen by Admiral Smith until two days after the attack. (p. 360)

Mr. George Street, Honolulu District Manager for RCA Communications, Incorporated, testified that during the first week in December 1941, copies of all cable messages sent to Japan by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu were turned over to the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer, (Admiral Mayfield) at his request. Mr. Street added that all the RCA copies of those messages had been

 

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destroyed under authority of the Federal Communication's Commission, because of lack of storage space. (p. 411‑113)

Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer in the Hawaiian Department in November and December 1941, testified that the Army radio intercepted unit at Fort Shafter made no decryption whatever of intercepted Japanese messages. The intercepted messages were sent to Washington for decryption. (p. 387‑388)

 

Commander Rochefort said that the United States was handicapped because it could not censor Japanese communications (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables, but efforts were made to get those messages. However, they had no information concerning the messages which the Japanese consul was sending out (pages 909­-910).

 

Admiral Wilkinson said that the District Intelligence Officer of Hawaii had endeavored to obtain copies of dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents from the local cable companies but had been advised that the law did not permit interference of such messages. (p. 285) He said that despite the limitations on obtaining copies of cable messages, the District Intelligence Officer had arranged to tap the long distance telephone and kept a record of  the telephone conversations with Japan. This, he said, was done only in the last few days before December 7. The conversations in general appeared to be innocuous. There was one suspicious telephone conversation on the afternoon of December 6. Concerning this, Admiral Wilkinson said, "This conversation and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which we had not been allowed to intercept constituted as I recall, the only important information of any Japanese intelligence activities in Hawaii. Undoubtedly, much was contained in the mails, to which we had no access. There were rumors of unexplained flashing lights and illicit radio stations, but prior to December 7, investigation of most of these reports had disproved them, although of course some may have been correct." (p. 286)

Captain Mayfield said that messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General by cable or radio were not made available to him until after the visit of Mr. Sarnoff of RCA. He said that the Japanese Consulate Gen­eral sent its traffic using the various communication companies alternately. The Mackay Radio Company handled the traffic during the month of Novem­ber. Traffic was switched to RCA as of December 1 and thereafter Captain Mayfield was able to obtain all of his traffic from RCA. Since it was in code and he had no reading organization, it was necessary to submit it to another organization to be read. He learned the content of  various number of these messages after the attack and there was considerable information about movements of the Fleet and other military forces which he said was not entirely accurate. (p. 311) Captain Mayfield said that so far as he was aware, the telephone conversations of the Japanese were not recorded or censored. (p.313)

Admiral Bloch said that they were not able to get any information based on dispatches being transmitted by the Japanese. The various communication companies did not and would not give them such dispatches. They all went by cable and so far as Admiral Bloch knew, none went by radio. (p. 15)

Admiral Smith said that they did not have access to the files in the Cable Office; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some effort to get these files; that it was taken to Mr. MacKay of Postal Telegraph, being contrary to the United States law to divulge a telegraph cable message; at that time there were certain Japanese codes which they could break and the Intelli­gence Officer thought if he could get those messages, he might learn what was going on; that they did not get them until three days after the attack and never received any information from this source before the war. (p. 46)

Commander Rochefort said that he received from the Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, directly or otherwise copies of such communications in which the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was concerned—about December 1, 1941. These were about ten to fifteen messages and Commander Rochefort was asked to examine them, which he did. He succeeded in extracting some information from them within 12 hours, with the exception of two or three messages which he finished on the evening of December 10th. He said that the first messages did not contain any important information, but the latter two or three did contain important information. He said that

 

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he had been unable to obtain that information at an earlier date because of the inherent difficulties in the task, and that the task had been made a matter of paramount importance and about 12 to 16 hours daily were devoted to that work alone. (p 208‑9)

Commander Rochefort said that the F. C. C. was monitoring radio traffic in the so‑called "amateur" status, but that he never heard of their appre­hending any communications from Japanese spies to Japan. (p. 209)

Commander Rochefort said that the Consulate General at Hawaii com­municated with his superiors in Japan primarily by cable and occasionally by radio. (p. 209)

Commander Rochefort said that he had not been informed of any telephone communication between the Consulate General at Hawaii and Japan. (p. 209)

Concerning the receipt of communications of the Japanese Consulate General, Captain Layton said:

"26.Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time around 1 December or after?

"A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.

"27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to the attack?

"A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other source." (p. 218)

Captain Layton said that the District Intelligence Officer maintained cer­tain monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward apprecia­tion of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view, but that he did not recall the details of this. (p. 218)

 

Admiral Turner said that he did not know what type of decrypting Pearl Harbor was doing, but that Naval Communications had told him that CincPac was getting as much of the Japanese communications as they were, and sooner (page 1001). He said that the Director of Naval Communications had informed him that Cinc­Pac had the decrypted Japanese messages, and that was why no information of this nature was sent to CincPac. He was similarly assured by Admiral Noyes, he said.

Admiral Noyes denied telling Admiral Turner that Pearl Harbor was intercept­ing the same Japanese traffic as Washington (page 1036). He said that Pearl Harbor had an intercept station specializing in certain codes but was not inter­cepting Japanese cable messages, and the so‑called "purple" messages were usually sent by cable (pages 1037‑38).

Admiral Redman said that CincPac did not have facilities for decoding "purple" intercepts; the problem was not assigned to him and all translations were accom­plished in Washington (page 1106).

 

(3) Surveillance of consulate

 

Admiral Bloch stated that after the receipt of certain dispatches relating to the destruction of codes, which are later discussed, he had Intelligence arrange for a close surveillance of the Japanese Consulate. What, if any, surveillance was in effect before this does not appear.

 

C. INFORMATION CONCERNING JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS

 

Captain McCollum, who was Officer‑in‑Charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., during December, 1941, said that his duties consisted of evaluating and passing to the Director of Naval Intelligence all intelligence received concerning the Far East, including all information on the Jap Navy. (p. 10) Sources of intelligence available to his Section regarding the Jap Fleet were reports by our consular authorities and agents in Japan and on the Asiatic continent, reports by our merchant ships, reports on movements of Japanese merchant shipping, and radio intelligence supplied by Captain Safford's unit, Op‑20‑G. However, by the end of November, 1941, the Far Eastern Section had become almost wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of Jap naval forces. This was due to the fact that U. S. embargoes against Japan had swept U. S. merchant shipping out of the north Pacific and also discouraged Japanese shipping to the Americas. In addition, increasingly strict Japanese security

 

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measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get timely information out of the country. (p. 10, 12, 13) As a result of this situation, a dispatch was sent out by Opnav on 24 November (GCT) to Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, pointing out that information on the Jap fleet was unsatisfactory and requesting that every effort be made by use of radio intelligence methods to locate the Japanese naval forces. (Exhibit 8) Following this dispatch, estimates were received from ComFourteen and ComSixteen, dated  26 November (GCT). (Exhibit 8) These evaluations were virtually the same and estimated that two Jap task forces were being organized, one fairly well located in the Formosa‑southern Japan area, another possibly located in the Mandated Islands. However, ComFourteen estimated that there was a strong concentration of submarines and at least one carrier division with, the force in the Mandates, white ComSixteen could not confirm this. Greater reliance was placed on ComSixteen's dispatch because his radio organization was in a better position to intercept Japanese radio traffic and was stronger in numbers and continuity of operation. (p. 13‑14)

            Captain McCollum said that radio intelligence consisted of three distinct procedures: translations of the enemy's code dispatches, inferences drawn from the volume of enemy radio traffic, and a study of the call signs of enemy ships. (p. 12) He said that on about 1 December 1941 intelligence obtained from a study of the call signs of Japanese ships became considerably less valuable because there was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the Jap fleet: "In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet was changed at that time, which meant that a period of time elapsed before we could build up identifications of specific naval units based on call signs, and so on     the actual radios were still going out, but we couldn't get anything out of them very much." (p. 15‑16) Captain McCollum did not know of any general call sign change which had accompanied previous major movements of the Japanese. (p. 16) However, he said that taken in connection with the known regroupings of Jap naval forces and the fact that the Japanese fleet was believed ready for action the call sign change was interpreted as a "possible indication of action to come." He said that CincPac was as well informed as the Office of Naval Intelligence as to these changes in the call signs of the Jap fleet. (p. 17)

Other than the ONI bulletin of 1 December 1941, Captain McCollum was aware of no information sent out to the fleet from the Navy Department between 1 December and 7 December 1941 regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet. (p. 19)

Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer for CinCAF, and Commander Fabian, who was attached to the Corregidor radio intelligence unit, said that most of their information regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet was obtained from the analysis of enemy radio traffic; rather than from the decryption of Jap messages. (p. 73‑74) Other sources of information during the period 26 November to 7 December 1941 were reports from the Naval Attaché, Shanghai, and a number of sighting reports obtained by reconnaissance planes. On 2 December a despatch was sent from CinCAF to OpNav reporting the sighting of nine submarines. On the same date, another despatch to OpNav reported 3 submarines, 21 transports and enemy patrol planes in the Camranh Bay area. On 6 December, a despatch reported a convoy in Camranh Bay. Twenty‑four to forty‑eight hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a British report was received to the effect that heavy Japanese units were rounding Poulo Condore, French Indo China. During this period, it was believed that all known Jap carriers were in the Kure‑Sasebo area. (p. 75‑76)

Captain Rochefort stated that between 26 November and 7 December 1941 very little information was obtained regarding the location of the Jap fleet by radio intelligence means,. The reason for this was that while the total volume of Jap radio traffic remained about the same or increased the traffic which contained as an addressee or originator one of the major vessels was almost non‑existent. He said that the Japanese radio traffic which was received contained a certain amount of "padding or rejecting of messages," but that in his opinion there had been no attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in any of its forms. (p.63)

Admiral Wilkinson stated that the ONI summary of 1 December 1941 (Ex­hibit 9) represented the best of the knowledge and belief of the Office of Naval Intelligence at that time, and was based on the digest of all available information, radio intelligence, and sightings. He believed, but could not be certain, that a copy of the summary had been sent air mail to Pearl Harbor on or about the date of issue, 1 December 1941. (p. 395)

 

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Admiral Wilkinson recalled seeing a digest, prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI of daily Communication Intelligence summaries issued at Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 22). He recalled noting in particular those for the period 1 December to 5 December, 1941, and being aware that a large part of the Japanese fleet appeared to have gone into radio silence. The Admiral believed that this fact appeared daily in reports issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and these reports drew the conclusion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was imminent, since the only movements picked up were in that direction (p. 398)

Admiral Smith said that based on the communication intelligence summaries during the period 27 November to 6 December 1941, he had estimated that the Japanese carriers during that period were "some in the Marshalls and the, remainder in home areas." (p. 362) Referring further to the summaries, he said: (p. 363)

"Vice Admiral SMITH: Now, I see nothing very alarming in these dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of the Pacific Fleet, in May 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of radio traffic  from  the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

"Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?

"Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea, yes.

"Mr. SONNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic?

"Vice Admiral SMITH. No, except after saying there is no information, they usually wind up with, 'They are believed to be in home waters.' "

Admiral Smith said that he had not known about the change in call signs of the Jap Fleet which occurred on 1 December. (p. 364) He did not recall having discussed with Admiral Kimmel the lack of information on Japanese carriers indicated by the communication intelligence summaries after 1 December. (p. 365)

 

A fortnightly summary, issued by ONI on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57) stated concerning the Japanese military situation, that Japanese troops, supplies, and equipment were pouring into Indo‑China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continued. Japanese army strength in Indo‑China was believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking Province and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo‑China. Naval aircraft and craft also moved south. It was estimated that there were about 200 Japanese planes in Indo‑China, and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.

Concerning the Japanese naval situation, the report stated that deployment of naval forces to the southward had indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities. At the same time, troop transports and freighters were pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo‑China and Formosan ports. Move­ments to the south appeared to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, then definitely indicated, would probably take sharper form in the following few days.   To that date, this task force, under the command of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Second Fleet, appeared to be sub-divided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the groups.       Each constituted a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons; it asserted that although one division of battleships might be assigned, the major capital ship strength remained in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. It also stated that the equipment being carried south was a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consisted not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions, but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

The record does not contain other ONI summaries. Admiral Stark, however testified that the estimates as to the positions of Japanese carriers and battleship were conflicting and that the easternmost position estimated was the Mandate (pages 72‑3).

 

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Admiral Turner said that there had been a great deal of naval radio traffic which suddenly ceased, which meant that the Japanese fleet had put to sea (page 994). Admiral Turner also said that they did not know where the Japanese fleet was. Deductions were that there was to be a covering force in the Marshalls area and that some forces would carry on missions in the China Sea. Available information as to the location of the Japanese fleet, although considerable, was incomplete (page 1002).

Admiral Ingersoll stated that it was difficult to get information, on Japanese ships. Units in Cavite and Pearl Harbor for radio intelligence were practically the only sources (page 818). When there was a significant move reported, he knew about it.

Captain Smith‑Hutton said that in November, 1941, he could obtain no information of Japanese military movements except one to Southeast Asia. Japanese military movements did not appear in the press (page 1077). No information reached him indicating an attack on Pearl Harbor. In the latter part of 1941, he felt sure that Japanese would make an aggressive move to relieve economic pressure exerted by the United States embargo, but he was not sure this would involve the United States in war. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to him (page 1079).

Ambassador Grew had no information as to movement of a Japanese carrier force towards Pearl Harbor (page 1064).

Admiral Redman did not think that the December 1st ONI Bulletin was sent to CincPac by dispatch (pages 1107‑8).

 

Captain Layton

 

Captain Layton testified with respect to the photostatic copies of the various dispatches in exhibit 8 that he thought CinCPac received the dispatch of 24, November 1941, from OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac and others, that the dispatch from Com14  dated 26 November 1941, time date group 260110, had been sent by the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, and that Com16's dispatch of 26 November 1941, time date group 261381, was a reply to the Com14 dispatch 260110. (Page 190‑191)

Captain Layton testified that the three dispatches referred to above (exhibit 8) summarized the intelligence available to Com14, 16, CinCAF. and CinCPac, concerning Japanese naval movements during the month preceding 26 November. (Page 191)

Captain Layton testified that he noted that the Com16 unit stated in the dispatch 281331, that it could not confirm the supposition by Com14 that submarines and carriers in force were in the Mandates, and that Com16's best indications were that all First and Second Japanese Fleets were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. (Page 191)

Captain Layton considered that Com16's reference to First and Second Fleet carriers was made in relation to the Japanese naval organization as promulgated 29 July 1941; that the Japanese naval organization as stated by ONI at that time included information that there were attached to each of the First and Second Fleets, two carrier division, that is, CarDivs Three (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU) and Five (RYUJO, HOSHO) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the First Fleet; and that CarDiv One (AKAGI, KAGA) and CarDiv Two (SORYU, HIRYU) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the Second Fleet; thus, Captain Layton explained, the ONI bulletin of July, 1941, stated that there were eight carriers assigned by the Japanese to the First and Second Fleets, with no other carriers listed as assigned to any other fleets.

Therefore, Captain Layton testified the Com16 dispatch 261831 stating that its best indications were that all known operating Japanese carriers were believed to be in the Kure‑Sasebo area was understood by him to mean that all known operating Japanese carriers were in that area, and that Com14's estimate at that time differed from that of Com16, in that Com14 was of the opinion that there was at least one Japanese carrier in the Marshalls at that time. (Page 191‑192) (also see Page 248‑250)

 

said that in the latter part of November, he received information of two or more Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. He had reported to CincPac Japanese carriers at Truk and the Marshalls, in June, 1941 (page 912). On December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it showed available in the Empire "4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use in the home

 

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area." This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from their sources of information. The witness referred to his translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament money"—page 911), which stated that it would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships and cruisers; with Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending some of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was generally his reasoning (page 913). He knows now that there were certain decrypted messages in the Navy Department which by themselves might not mean much, but taken together would have warned of an attack against Hawaii more than the messages they received. This refers to ship movement messages later discussed. Some other messages in Exhibit 63 indicated war he said, but did not specifically refer to Pearl Harbor (page 916),

Commander Rochefort said that no Japanese ships were reported closer than the Marshalls during the latter part of November, up until December 7th (page 472). No information was received which indicated a Japanese attack other than at Guam or the Philippines, of the United States possessions. Nothing east of Guam was indicated.

Admiral DeLany stated that CincPac had no information contrary to the ONI Bulletin of December 1, 1941 (page 503). He recalled information that there was a small carrier force, prior to December 7th, to the southward of the Philippines, but that the main Japanese strength was at Japan (page 87).

Admiral McMorris stated that he had had no information that Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls (page 899).

 

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was familiar with the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Summaries, particularly those for the period 27 November‑5 December 1941 (Exhibit 22); that he recalled being familiar with the information contained in them and though, he frequently did not himself read them, he either heard them read or orally presented be Captain Layton; that he certainly had access to all the material contained in those summaries (pages 310‑311).

He, in many cases, identified his own and the initials of Admiral Kimmel appearing either on the Communication Intelligence Summaries (Exhibit 22) or on the Intelligence reports prepared and submitted by Captain Layton.(p. 310‑311).

He further testified that he had no independent recollection of having seen, the ComFOURTEEN dispatch of 26 November 1941, and other dispatches attached thereto in Exhibit 8, nor the memorandum dated 1 December 1941 pre­pared by Lt. Comdr. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer. He considered it improbable, however, that he did not see the Layton memorandum of 1 December 1941 (p. 311‑312).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that so far as he could recollect, he had believed the major elements of the Jap Fleet to be fairly well located on and after 1 December 1941. He remembered that on or about 1 December 1941 there was a change in the call signs of the Japanese fleet, and stated, with reference to the believed location of the Japanese carriers, that they were thought to be in home waters or towards Formosa (p. 313).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that offhand he could not recall the informa­tion on which his estimate as to the location, of the Jap carriers was based, and that it would require a considerable number of quotations from Communication Intelligence Summaries (Ex. 22) to point out the source of such belief (p. 313).

Following this, Vice Admiral McMorris did refer to the Communication Intelligence Summaries, in an effort to show the basis for his belief that the carriers were in home waters or towards Formosa:

24 November: A statement that on the 3rd there were a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division 3 with CinC Third Fleet.

25 November: A statement that one or more of the carrier divisions were present in the Mandates.

26 November: Reference was made to general traffic intelligence involving CinCs Second and Third Fleets, the China Fleet, the Fourth Fleet, and the  Combined Air Force, indicating a heavy traffic condition, but no reference was made to any part of the Summary which said anything about carriers.

27 November: Reference was made to information in the Summary concerning various Japanese fleets but not to information specifically referring to carriers or to the carrier fleet.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                    483

 

28 November: Vice Admiral McMorris referred to information in the Commu­nication Intelligence Summary of this date to the effect that there were many high precedence messages involving the Combined Fleet and to information con­cerning the Third Fleet, but he dad not point out any information concerning carriers (p. 314).

29 November: Reference was made to various items of information in this Intelligence Summary, but not to any involving the carriers.

30 November: Reference was made to information to the effect that there was a strong impression that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, was underway, and to the fact that one urgent dispatch was sent by NGS  to Chiefs of Staff of Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, and to the Combined Air Force.

1 December: No reference was made to any information concerning carriers (p. 315).

2 December: Reference was made to the paragraph in the Summary that there was almost a complete blank of information on carriers and that carrier traffic was at a low ebb.

3 December: Reference was made to various items of information but none concerning carriers (p. 3i6).

4 December: Reference was made to the large number of urgent messages from Tokyo, to the lack of messages from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet, and to the fact that the former was believed to be in the vicinity of Takao (p. 318‑317).

5 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders, and that there was no traffic from the Commander of the carriers or from the Commander of the Submarine Force (p. 3i7).

6 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders and to the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had originated several messages to the carriers (p. 317).

After reviewing the above Summaries, Vice Admiral McMorris admitted that between December 1st  and the time of the Japanese attack there was no Intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of a carrier fleet as such (p. 319). He stated, however, that it was his recollection that there had been one or two vague indications associating carriers with the Second and Third Fleets, and sortie possible associations with Palau and in at least one instance an association with the Marshalls (p. 320). Upon examination of the Fleet Intelligence Officer's memorandum of December 1st, Vice Admiral McMorris stated he could not find on it any reference to Carrier Divisions 1 or 2 (p. 320). He could not recall if there had been any conference between Ad­miral Kimmel and himself concerning the 1 December estimate of Captain Layton (p. 321).

He stated that he did not reach any conclusion that the carriers were operating independently of the rest of the Combined Fleet (p. 319).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that during the period in question, the infor­mation available as to the locations of the Japanese Fleet units was not as specific as was desirable; that he did not recall the lack of information as to the car­riers, and "taking into consideration the general situation and all other infor­mation at hand . . . we were extremely disturbed" (p. 321).

 

General Sort testified that he had received no information indicating Japanese movements east of Guam (p. 265).

Admiral Kimmel testified that the information from his own Fleet Intelligence was principally as to the movements of ships and, he said, it gave no indication of a Japanese attack (p. 327).

 

Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of ONI and pointed out that there was no established or effective method for the dissemination of infor­mation of Combat Intelligence. (p. 280) Admiral Wilkinson said that for some time the Japanese section of the foreign branch of ONI had been preparing daily an analysis of the situation as to Japanese Fleet locations and as to Japanese‑American relations. (p. 281) Admiral Wilkinson referred to the fortnight summary issued on December 1 and said that it had been discussed with Admirals Stark and Turner and had been sent out air mail on December 1.

According to Captain Safford, there were three main radio intelligence units—one in the Navy Department with subsidiary direction finder stations and intercept stations along the Atlantic seaboard and in the Atlantic Ocean; the second at Pearl Harbor with subsidiary intercept stations at Oahu, Mid‑

 

484                               CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

way, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor; the third at Corregidor. There were also intercept stations from the West Coast of the United States which fed their traffic directly to Washington. The main station in Washington was con­cerned particularly with that branch of intelligence relating to naval opera­tions in the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments. It was also used for training personnel. The station at Pearl Harbor was confined to that branch of intelligence dealing with the dispositions and plans of naval forces in the Pacific and surveillance over Japanese naval communications. These duties did not include surveillance over any diplomatic communications. The Asiatic unit at Corregidor was at the disposal of CinCAF to use as he saw fit. Up to early 1941, it was mostly concerned with diplomatic communications, but in October or November shifted its main attention to Japanese naval communications. (p. 356)

Captain Safford said that the unit at Pearl Harbor was kept fully informed only of results obtained by the Washington unit as to operations of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific with one important exception, namely that on December 1, 1941, CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN were sent a copy of a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that the Japanese were planning a landing in Malaya. (p. 356)

Captain Safford said that on November 26, 1941, estimates were received from Pearl Harbor and from ComSIXTEEN relating to the organization and distribution of the Japanese Fleet, and that the estimates differed. ComSIXTEEN's report place one carrier division as operating in the South China Sea and the remaining carriers in Japanese home waters, and further added that the evaluation was considered reliable. He said that in Washington they believed that the report from ComSIXTEEN was correct, but did not so advise the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that on November 24 ONI had sent a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that Sixteenth District's intercepts were considered most reliable and requesting that other reports be submitted from ComSIXTEEN to OpNav with copies to CinCPac for information. The basis for the belief that ComSIXTEEN's reports were better was the geographical location of ComSIXTEEN. (p. 357)

Captain Safford said, "Further information as to Pearl Harbor's estimates of locations of Japanese forces in early December 1941, may be found in the monthly report of Station 'H'‑in the 'Chronology' which was prepared daily and forwarded weekly by air mail. This information was, of course, prepared by and currently available to the Pearl Harbor C. I. Unit but was not received in the Navy Department until a delay of about two weeks." (p. 360‑2)

"Note: The examining officer has identified the documents mentioned by witness as being C. I. Station 'H' 'Chronology' for December 1‑Decem­ber 6, 1941, inclusive, now on file in Communication Intelligence Section (Op 20G), Office of Director, Naval Communications, Communications Annex, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., to which is attached a summary of more important extracts, made by the witness under examination."

Admiral Brainard said that the "War Information Room" received information from sources such as O. N. I, Naval observers and what was made known to them through the communications system and plotted the movements of Naval units including Japanese. To the best of his knowledge, they were receiving all Japanese information available in the department. (p 402).

Admiral Smith said that around the beginning of December 1941, the information he received from the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to the effect that one Japanese force was supposed to be at Truk and to the best of his recollection the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in Empire waters; that they had no knowledge as to the Japanese carriers; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had said that he did not know where the carriers were; and that Admiral Smith recalled no difference of opinion between the radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning the location of enemy carriers. (p. 47)

Admiral Smith said that the Pacific Fleet staff believed that the Japanese Navy was very efficient although they had little knowledge or information concerning the Japanese Navy; all of the information on the Japanese Fleet was by Radio Intelligence only, that is, as to the location of the Fleet. (p. 59)

Admiral Pye said that a rather high evaluation was placed upon the report of the Intelligence Officer concerning the Japanese Fleet inasmuch as no contrary or other information had been received. At the time, Admiral Pye

 

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knew the sources upon which the Intelligence Officer was relying for his information.

Concerning information from October on as to the movements of units of the Japanese Fleet, Captain Layton said:

"Commencing in late October, many reports were received from China, from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant Attachés in South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources, of the movements of considerable number of Japanese transports and troops to the South from Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton estuary, and the movements of troops southward from northern China through the Shanghai port of embarka­tion. The Naval Attaché at Tokyo informed us, on about 1 November, that elaborate plans for the joint Army‑Navy occupation of Thailand by the Japanese were complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-­Saeki area; that the invasion was to follow the line of the German blitzkrieg of Holland and Belgium and that considerable air forces were being assem­bled in the Taiwan-Hainan area, and that the Indo‑China forces were being strengthened to a total of 100,000. The withdrawal of the Japanese merchant ships from Western Hemisphere waters was noted locally as well as our being informed by OpNav. The movements of men and materiel to the Mandates was also observed in the early part of November. Recurring reports of movements of Japanese transports, escorted by destroyers, to the South along the China Coast, and their arrival in the French Indo‑China area and Haiphong and Saigon were received from time to time. The loadings of some of these transports—that is, landing craft, tanks, troops, railroad equipment, motorboats—led to a belief that amphibious operations were being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the South, exact location as yet undetermined. In mid‑November, our best intelligence sources detected the beginning of the formation of the Japanese surface‑force task forces; concerned and associated with southern destinations, as well as the movements of naval aircraft to the Hainan Islands‑Southern Formosa region. These were more or less confirmed by reports from the North China area by Army and Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by one report from the American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and activation of units of the Combined Fleet with southern destinations was noted and commented on by Admiral Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, specifically noted this activity as the fore­runner of operations, judging from past experience, and Admiral Kimmel asked what we had received from other units. I replied, 'Nothing yet.' He then directed me to tell Commander Rochefort that he desired them to initiate a special message concerning the developments noted to OpNav and Cavite, Guam then being inactive. This resulted in a dispatch sent by the Com14 Combat Intelligence Unit in which a task force organization was laid out in the general tenor as follows: That a task force under the Com­mander in Chief, Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet (which includes the First and Second Base Forces and Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally to our amphibious forces), the combined Air Force of the Shore‑based Air Command, the Destroyer Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one squadron from the First Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship Division. These were estimated to be forming up for movement to the South China area and associated with the French Indo‑China, Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihoku and Takao, Formosa. It was noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were somewhat connected with this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that perhaps certain of these units might even proceed in that direction. It was noted, also that there was a concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, and estimated that at least one Carrier Division, plus about a third of the submarine fleet, were in the Marshalls area. It was estimated that these forces would operate in the southern Asia area, with component part possibly operating from Palau and the Marshalls. Almost coincident with this time was an inquiry from the Dutch Naval Command as to the possibility of a Japanese seizure of Portuguese Timor and expressed the determination of the Dutch High Command that should Japanese forces carry out such an indicated thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an invasion and act accordingly. We were asked to comment on this develop­ment, but could find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After receipt of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of Japanese formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of move‑

 

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ment, the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications noted here and estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and Third Fleets and Submarine Force were comprised into a loose‑knit organization, apparently divided into two major sections. The majority of the strength of cruisers being in the first section and destined for the South China area. Minor strengths being probably destined for the Palau area, and that carriers of CarDiv 3 and possibly CarDiv 4 were concerned with the South China area movement of the No. 1 Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also estimated to be in the Sasebo‑Kure area. Com16's unit, however, could not confirm the supposition by 14's unit that carriers and submarines, in force, were in the Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of Novem­ber, the Commander‑in‑Chief received a dispatch from OpNav which stated, in substance, that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations then pending in Washington were very doubtful, and expressed the opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, to be a possibility, and cautioned against anything that would complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. On the 27th, as I recall it, a war warning was received from OpNav. I believe that it was aided by the two dispatches I referred to from the Com14 unit and the Com16 unit. It stated that the negotiations in Washington had ended and that an aggressive move by the Japanese within the next few days was expected, that an amphibious expedition was probably imminent against either the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. We were told the War Department was sending a similar warning. This message was passed in paraphrase form, which I wrote myself, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department. That same evening, incidentally, the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received separately, and showed this copy to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Chief of Staff, and other high ranking officers present. I did not see the Army dispatch, but from the discussion that came up, I could conclude only that it was almost a duplicate as those words were used. This Navy Liaison Officer reported to me, subsequently, that he had returned the Army dispatch to the senior officer of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both General Short and his Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the Navy's paraphrased war warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver it in person to General Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to deliver it in person, he gave it to the Senior Staff Officer on duty in G‑3 with the statement that this was a very secret dispatch sent over from Admiral Kimmel for General Short. On the 28th, information was received by the British Consul, locally, from a source usually reliable, stating that the Japa­nese would attack the Kra Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultima­tum or declaration of war. The main landing was to be at Singora. At this time, the message regarding the false weather broadcast to indicate a condi­tion of war was also received; and from the State Department were reports of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and French Indo‑China general area, substantiating previous estimates and reports of increased forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there was received a dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to regarding the intrigue in Thailand to get the British to attack, and in this Singora was again men­tioned and seemed to fit in with previous dispatches regarding future Japanese activity in that area. On 2 December, reports received from CincAF of Japanese submarines and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which checked previously indicated movements and previous information. On 3 December, there was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Exhibit 11, which tends to confirm the general picture presented to that time, that is, active military operations were about to commence with the "Southern Expansion Program" of the Japanese Navy to be put into effect. On 6 December, a report from CincAF received stated CincChina had reported a twenty‑five ship convoy, six cruisers, and ten destroyers, in a position in the Gulf of Siam, as well as another convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and two cruisers in a different position, all on course West. Also that CincAF forces sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 1 December, the Commander‑in‑Chief requested that I present to him a paper showing the approximate location of the Japanese naval units, which I pre­pared and submitted. It showed, briefly, that except for Battleships Divi‑

 

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sions One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and Cruiser Division Eight, and possibly CruDiv Six‑the latter was marked "May head for the Mandates?"—that all other important Japanese naval forces were South of Shanghai, the majority of which were in the Bako and Takao area, that a considerable concentration of shore‑based aircraft, probably 250, under Commander, Combined Air Force, were in the Hainan‑Takao area, and that the Clue Second Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the usual Fourth Fleet, consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight destroyers, one submarine tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelve auxiliary minelayers, patrol boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary transports, and 140 planes, Admiral Kimmel asked me how well identified and how well placed in Japan were the battleships and carrier divisions that I referred to previously. I told him that they were not positively identified in Japanese ports but were believed to be in Japanese waters, due to their past activity and lack of, or negative information.

"34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in one division?

"A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane guards to one division.

"35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total?

"A. That would mean that they had approximately five division's. At the time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier Division One of the AKAGI and KAGA; Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and HIRYU; Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and one unknown carrier; Carrier Division Four of the KASUGA and it was believed another carrier that we didn't know, nor do I know to this date; Carrier Division Five of the new SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were just completing training and had not been particularly active with the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest carriers.

"36. Q. As regards what type of ship was the main disagreement between those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts?

"A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit believed that a carrier division and one‑third of the Japanese submarine force was in the Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance, that they could not confirm the supposition that the above forces were in the Marshalls.

"37. Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards the number of carriers in home waters?

"A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of disagreement or agreement, as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports to OpNav and any dis­agreement in these matters would be not so much errors in judgment, as the matter of available material, due to distance and other factors. OpNav made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the war, to reconcile or evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the general picture from the reports produced. There may have been messages passed between Four­teen and Sixteen, of which I had no knowledge.

"'38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27 November onward, did you, personally, make anything which constituted an estimate of the situation on the possibility of an organization containing carriers striking at Hawaii?

"A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made after 27 November, but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed at some time previous. This occurred in a discussion wherein Japanese potentialities and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and I told him of their books, written for their own propaganda purposes and increased armaments; that in this book the author stated that the American Com­mander‑in‑Chief, when his Fleet was concentrated in Hawaii, would be concerned with three possible Japanese measures of attack: (1) Attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack on the Aleutians, including an occupation force; and (3) An attack on the American Mainland. The discussion was in a broad sense but I do not recall any of the details thereof.

"39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the set‑up of forces as placed by your Intelligence toward the end of November, the Jap­anese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers sufficient to form a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii?

"A. I do not believe that point was made specifically. That, however, was my personal estimate; that with the allocation of forces to the southern movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly in destroyers and

 

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cruisers, although potentially powerful in offense; that is, the carriers. I expressed that as an opinion before the Roberts' Commission and not as an estimate of the situation that I had expressed formally or informally, to Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall having expressed that as a formal or informal estimate.

"40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you had because of the lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence sources of the nature which you have just been discussing?

"A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the week‑end of the first of December, that I couldn't understand why Washington didn't give us more information, but presumed that perhaps they didn't have it. It was a source of considerable concern both to Commander Rochefort and me and we remained at our telephones throughout that week‑end, although I was back at the office on the Sunday to confer with Admiral Kimmel.

"41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten days prior to 7 December, '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of the Japanese Navy was, in itself, an ominous sign?

"A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese changed their call signs on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather ominous in view of the other information. The lack of identifiable traffic could be antic­ipated under those circumstances. The lack of great volumes of traffic does not always indicate an imminent move but it fitted very well with the picture of the southern movement discussed previously." (p. 219‑223)

Captain Layton said:

"I frequently took messages of secret, ultra‑secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CincAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there again a com­plete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message, but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down. Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversation, in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by‑pass our Philippine flank. It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds. I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig‑saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning." (p. 225)

In view of its importance, the following is quoted directly from the exam­ination of Commander Rochefort:

" 32.Q. Now, Commander, I will ask you to state, chronologically, as nearly as possible, the results which your unit obtained in keeping track of the movement of units of the Japanese Fleet, beginning on or about 1 Oc­tober 1941.

"A. On 1 October, the general mission of the unit at Pearl was to endeavor to obtain information from the specific types of traffic as assigned by Wash­ington. Secondly, to obtain information, by a study of radio traffic origi­nated by the Japanese stations. And, thirdly, to obtain information by radio direction finder bearings. As of 1 October, the first mission men­tioned was being only partially carried out due to inability on the part of the personnel concerned. The second and third missions were, with a reason­able degree of accuracy, being carried out. Late in October and during the month of November, some minor successes were obtained in the field covered by the first mission. However, the information thus obtained was not in any sense vital. Beginning in early November, it became apparent that certain moves were afoot, and after about three weeks constant study an estimate was drawn up which was submitted to the Commandant, who

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                    489

 

released a dispatch to Washington, Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander‑in‑Chief, U. S. Fleet. To the best of my knowledge, this dis­patch was sent out on 26 November. Between that date and the 7th of December, very little information was obtained by means of radio intelligence due to the lack of traffic. During the latter part of November and the first week in December, information previously unavailable, due to legal restric­tions, was made available from the files of the communication companies in Honolulu. This traffic contained the incoming and outgoing files of the personnel attached to the Consulate General in Honolulu.

"33. Q. On broad lines, what was the substance of that estimate which you made about 26 November?

"A. The estimate submitted on 26 November consisted, in the main, of the opinion that the Japanese were concentrating to the south of Japan, one force proceeding toward Indochina; the direction of advance of the other force was not known. An additional force of some strength and containing at least one carrier division was placed definitely in the Marshalls area.

" 34. Q. How many carriers did the Japs organize in one division?

"A. Two, sir.

"35. Q. At about the time of this aforesaid estimate, what were you getting along similar lines from the other two units?

"A. Nothing definite except that the Far East Unit had stated, on many occasions, that an offensive move was apparent. To the best of my knowl­edge, no direction or composition of forces was given prior to the dispatch of the estimate from Pearl.

" 36. Q. Narrowing this testimony down to Japanese carriers—do I understand you to say that you thought you had located two in the Marshall Islands or proceeding in that direction?

"A. In our opinion, at that time, at least two Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls area.

" 37. Q. Did you estimate other Japanese carriers to be to the southward of, say, Formosa?

"A. I do not recall whether the task forces which we included in our estimate contained carriers south of Formosa, or not.

"38. Q. On this subject of location of carriers, of which it is well understood the Japanese possessed ten, was the unit in the Far East in agreement with your estimate?

"A. No, sir.

" 39. Q. In what respect?

"A. The estimate mentioned previously was not replied to by Washington. The following day, the Far Eastern Unit, commented on the dispatch and I believe the Far Eastern Unit was in general agreement except for the direc­tion of movement and particularly the placing of at least one carrier division in the Marshalls.

"40. Q. Did the Far Eastern Unit suggest that more was known about the location of Japanese carriers than was shown in your estimate?

"A. I do not recall.

"41. Q. Do you know if the aforesaid estimate and the dispatch from Com14, which was based thereon, were communicated to the Commander-­in‑Chief?

"A. Yes, sir; the following morning the Commander‑in‑Chief, accom­panied by Com 14, came to my offices and discussed the matter at great length, at least an hour and a half, I would say.

"42. Q. Do you recall if that disagreement which came to you from the other unit in the East was likewise communicated to the Commander‑in­-Chief?

"A. I am almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that all messages of that type were given to the Commander‑in‑Chief.

"43. Q. Were you, at that time, aware of the very tense situation that existed between us and the Japanese, particularly insofar as diplomatic negotiations were concerned?

"A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.

"44. Q. You did not, however, obtain anything in the nature of a similar estimate from Washington, is that correct?

"A. No, sir, we did not. I might amend that slightly by stating that several days after the dispatch of our estimate and the dispatch of the Far Eastern Unit's estimate a warning dispatch was received from Washington. That was on the 27th. They, obviously, tied together but there was no direct answer.

 

490                               CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

"45. Q. Did it occur to you, at the time, in view of the importance of this subject, that you had a right to expect something from Washington?

"A. No, Sir. We had submitted our estimate to our superior officers in Washington. Whether or not they replied, I considered a matter within their purview.

"46. Q. Did you look upon Japanese battleships and carriers as the most important units?

"A. Yes, sir.

"47. Q. Do you recall any uneasiness of mind because you did not have a greater number of those ships located?

"A. There was great unease in all of our minds because of the lack of traffic. The inability to locate more battleships and carriers was not considered, in itself, as a bad sign by reason of the fact that up until that time we had generally been unsuccessful in locating the majority of the larger ships.

"48. Q. What particular type of Japanese man‑o‑war did you feel you were well in touch with and what importance did you put upon their movements?

"A. We maintained close touch with all of the vessels engaged in building up bases in the Mandates and, generally, with seaplane tenders, and occasional cruiser divisions.

"49. Q. Did your unit assume that because they did not hear the large Japanese ships talking that they were all in port?

"A. No, sir.

"50. Q. From, say, the 27th of November onward, do I understand you to say that Japanese naval radio traffic was unusually light?

"A. Yes, sir.

"51. Q. Did you recall any previous occasion when it was as sparse as during that period?

"A. Yes, Sir. During the advance and occupation of Hainan.

"52. Q. Did it occur to the minds in your unit that this silence might be presaging another offensive movement?

"A. Yes, sir, we considered that it did definitely presage another offensive movement.

"53. Q. Were you emphatic in calling the attention of your seniors to the importance of this lack of traffic?

"A. Yes, sir.

"54. Q. To whom did you represent that?

"A. To the Commandant and to my opposite number on the Commander-in‑Chief's Staff, namely, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. However, the objectives, insofar as my unit was concerned did not include areas to the eastward of the Mandate islands." (p. 210‑212)

Commander Wright discussed the equipment which was available at the Fourteenth Naval District unit for the detection and location of enemy ships. (p. 379‑80)