XXV.
INTERCEPTED JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS AFTER THE "WAR WARNING" AND UP TO
DECEMBER 6, 1941
A.
FAILURE TO TRANSMIT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL
After
November 27, 1941, when the "war warning" was sent to Admiral Kimmel,
and prior to the Japanese attack, there were a number of highly significant
Japanese coded communications intercepted, decoded and translated by the Navy
and the Army in Washington. Both the State Department and the Navy Department
believed, according to Admiral Schuirmann, that from November 27th to December
6th relations with the Japanese were constantly deteriorating (page 204) .
It
will be recalled that on November 28th, there were available in Washington the
intercepted Japanese communications showing the reaction of the Japanese to the
State Department note of November 26th; that it was regarded as a
"humiliating proposal;" that with a report of the views of the
Imperial Government to be sent in two or three days the negotiations would be
de facto ruptured; but, that the Japanese emissaries were not to give the
impression that the negotiations were broken off (supra, pages 60‑63).
Except
to the extent set forth in the following chapter, Admiral Kimmel was not
advised of any of this information. The reasons for this action have been
previously mentioned (supra, page 44). As Admiral Stark explained it, in part,
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 491
CincPac was not sent
all of the information that was available in Washington; it was the job of the
Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate that information; they tried to give
CincPac the most useful information; and, they left it to him as to what to do
after they gave him the picture as they saw it (page 800).
Admiral
Stark testified that the procedure by which he received classified information
was through his Flag Secretary or delivery to him personally by ONI. Comdr.
Kramer normally brought information from Intelligence. Sometimes the
information was evaluated and sometimes dispatches were brought in direct
before evaluation. Intelligence and War Plans did the evaluations which were
usually gone over by Admiral Ingersoll. A watch officer and duty officer in
Operations received information after office hours and decided whether it
should be sent to him at once. During the critical period from November 27th
to December 7th, he felt that he was receiving all of the important
information regarding Japanese‑United States relations (page 774).
Admiral
Ingersoll said that he was not sure that he had seen every document received
through interception (page 833).
B:
CONCERNING THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND SITUATION
On
November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from "Tokyo
to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated November 29, 1941 (Document 19,
Exhibit 63), requesting that they make one more attempt to discuss the
situation with the United States, and to state that the United States had
always taken a fair position in the past; that the Imperial Government could
not understand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new
Japanese proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made
new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would
greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States
should be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States
had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the United
States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed
in carrying out this instruction to be careful that this did not lead to
anything like a breaking off of
negotiations.
Admiral
Schuirmann testified that he was aware of this message but did not deliver it
to Admiral Stark.
Also
on November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans‑Pacific
radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto in Tokyo, in
which a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63). This indicated that
Kurusu expected a long message ("probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's
proposals"); that the President was returning apparently because of the
speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was having strong
repercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used
greater caution in speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a
very difficult position; that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that
they were being careful; that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the
emissaries here had expected to hear something different—some good word—but
instead got this (the Premier's speech); that the Japanese‑American
negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out;
that Kurusu needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both the Premier and
the Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their speeches and that
all would have to use some discretion; that Yamamoto said the real problem that
the Japanese were up against was the effect of happenings in the South.
There
were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on December 1, 1941,
as follows:
1.
Navy translation‑(Document 21, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"1 December 1941
"(Purple CA)
"#865 Re my #857
"1.
The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues
to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from
becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that
though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the
negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)
"2.
We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S, Ambassador to
Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the
necessary representations at your end only.
492 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"3.
There are reports here that. the President's sudden return to the capital is an
effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so
because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make
investigations into this matter."
Admiral
Stark testified that he did not recall this, but it may have been discussed
(page 778). He did not advise CincPac of this message since he did not consider
that it added anything (page 779). Admiral Schuirmann said that he was aware of
this message and the following one, but had not delivered them to Admiral Stark
(pages 702‑3). Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page 828).
2.
Army translation‑(Document 22, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Berlin
"November 30,
1941
"Purple
"#986 (Strictly
Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)
(Part
1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)
"1.
Japan‑American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this year.
Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the
Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri‑Partite Alliance as the
cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the
international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between
Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely
within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of
carrying through these negotiations.
"2.
Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of
defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and
ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations
rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French
Indo‑China), were completely in opposition to each other.
"Judging
from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to
loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological
tendency of managing international relations, re‑emphasized her fundamental
reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between
the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United
States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment
of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that
is to say, the aims of the Tri‑Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire
of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance
of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they
took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand
the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri‑Partite Alliance.
This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been
in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and
more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations
with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of
negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
[Part
2 of 2]
"3.
The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of
theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that
no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not
be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty,
namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the
Three‑Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the
European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give
assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let
alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal
for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this
plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they
did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in
collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with
Germany and Italy, as an enemy."
3.
The Navy report states that "on 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department
intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as
follows:
"The
conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured,
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 493
Say very secretly to
Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break
out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker
than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the
time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress
on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.' "
Commander
Kramer said that the President was so interested "in the dispatch" to
Berlin that Kramer was directed to prepare a special paraphrase for the President's
retention; otherwise neither the State Department or White House were permitted
to retain copies of the "super secret" dispatches (page 983).
4.
Army translation‑(Document 23, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington
(Nomura)
"To: Tokyo
"November 28,
1941
"Purple
"#1214 To be
handled in Government Code.
"Re my #1190.
"So
far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United
Staten; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and
headlines like this are appearing in the papers "Hull Hands Peace Plan to
Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say
that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four
principals, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon
Japan.
"This
we must carefully note."
In
connection with the diplomatic situation,
Admiral Schuirmann
said that the Navy Department had been kept fully informed of the progress of
negotiations with Nomura and Kurusu. (p. 411) Reference was made to page 138 in
"PEACE AND WAR" concerning which Admiral Schuirmann said that he did
not recall the particular meetings mentioned on November 25 and November 28.
Admiral Schuirmann did recall that on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl
Harbor, Secretary Hull telephoned him and said that he wanted Admiral
Schuirmann to know that he didn't seem to be able to do anything more with the
Japanese and that they were liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone.
Admiral Schuirmann assured Secretary Hull that a war warning had been sent out
and reported the conversation to Admiral Stark. (p. 412 Admiral Schuirmann
said that the general attitude of Admiral Stark and General Marshall was that
any time that could be gained in the outbreak of hostilities was to the benefit
of the United States. (p. 412)
it may be here noted
that on December 2nd, Under Secretary of State Welles had a conversation with
Nomura and Kurusu (page 311), which was summarized by Welles as follows:
"I
have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop
movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and
material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina.
It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement—and there is
no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement—between Japan and the
French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted
by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very
considerably less than the total amount of forces already there. The stationing
of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization
of these forces by Japan for the purpose of further aggression, since no such
number of forces could possible be required for the policing of that region.
Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine islands; against
the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either
through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking
the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional
to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude
towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese
Government. Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and
Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual
reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the
policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid
concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few
yearn in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has
involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free
and
494 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
independent peoples
through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for
that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should
like to know the intention of the Japanese Government.
"The
Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese Government of
its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter but that of
course he would communicate the statement immediately to his Government."
Admiral
Schuirmann could not recall that information as to this note was given to
Admiral Stark.
On
December 3, 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report by
Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated December 2, 1941 (Document 25, Exhibit 63)
which stated:
"Today,
the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Undersecretary of State
WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the
direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us
the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said: "Since we
haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in
French Indo‑China, we will transmit the gist of your representations
directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that
such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November
20th." The Under‑Secretary then said: "I want you to know that
the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all
parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and
other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us
Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than
forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this
question or the rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic
pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission
to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize
this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the
result of the four‑year incident in China; the President recently
expressed cognizance of the latter situation. Furthermore, I would have you
know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial
Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question
which has to do with our national destiny." Undersecretary of State
WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot
overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually
impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our
proposals preferred on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th,
representing our greatest conciliation based on the previous proposal, still
stand in spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing,
it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration
to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement
of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French
Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino‑Japanese incident
and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the
settlement of fundamental questions the question of the representations of
this date would naturally dissolve." The Under‑Secretary assiduously
heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought
about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of
the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the
opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to
confer with the Secretary." I got the impression from the manner in which
he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th
would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary of State
HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United
States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation.
I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement.
Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our
reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233."
It
may be noted that about December 3rd, according to Admiral Schuirmann, the
State Department felt that although there might be some further discussions
with the Japanese, it was inevitable that they would be unsuccessful. The Chief
of Naval Operations, he said, was kept informed (page 203).
There
were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available on
December 4, 1941, as follows:
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 495
1.
Navy translation‑(Document 26, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Hainking
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#893
".
. . In the event that Manchuria participates in the war . . . in view of
various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the
war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and
America that this country will take in case war breaks out.
"A
summary follows:
"1.
American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as
having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code
telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However, it is
desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be
comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries
resident in Japan.
"2.
The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private
property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded
by Japan.
"3.
British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be
recognized.
"However,
the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall
correspond to the measures taken by Japan.
"4.
The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the
provisions of the Japanese‑Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be
exercised not to antagonize Russia."
2.
Navy translation‑(Document 27, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1227
"(This
raised the question of the possibility of a conference between persons in whom
the leaders have confidence to have them make one final effort to reach some
agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Honolulu . . .
It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision as to war
or peace.)"
3.
Navy translation‑(Document 29, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#875 Chief of
Office routing.
"Re your #1232
"Please
explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:
"There
seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo‑China
are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual
amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French
Indo‑China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts
of northern French Indo‑China. There would naturally be some movement of
troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the
rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have
in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese‑French joint
defense agreement."
4.
Navy translation‑(Document 31, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1243
"If
we continue to increase our forces in French Indo‑China, it is expected
(that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration
should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the
consuls."
496 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On
December 5, 1941, there were available translations of additional intercepted
Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations, as follows:
1.
Army translation‑(Document 33, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1243
"Judging
from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great
Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a
definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."
2.
Navy translation‑(Document 34, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1225
"(This
is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with Secretary Hull
on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech, the
President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement as to the
impossibility of reaching an agreement.)"
C.
CONCERNING UNITED STATES SHIPS AND PLANES
On 4 December 1941,
the Army translated an intercepted communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated
20 November 1941, serial 7029, which stated:
(Exhibit 13)
"Please
investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian
military reservation."
Captain Safford sand
that to the best of his knowledge none of the Jap intercepts which were
translated in the period immediately prior to 7 December 1941 and which showed
interest in U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were sent to CinCPac. (p. 111) He added
that so far as he knew the codes used by the Japanese for reports on U. S.
ships at Pearl Harbor were not being read by the radio intelligence unit there.
(p 118)
"In addition to
the Japanese intercepts which were translated prior to 7 December 1941, a
number of Jap messages regarding U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were intercepted
before that date but not translated until after the attack (Exhibit 13)
"From: Tokyo
(Togo,)
"To: Honolulu
"November 28,
1941
"J19‑K9
"Intelligence of
this kind which are of mayor importance, please transmit to us in the following
manner.
"1. When
battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week
the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the
Hawaiian Islands, but could also have traveled far. Use your own judgment in
deciding on reports covering such movements.
"2. Report upon
the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain
at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure."
(Translated by the Army, 12/8/41.)
"From: Honolulu
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"#253
1. On the American
Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp
Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered for or five hundred balloons,
but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the
defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though
investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have
not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them.
Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of
balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage
balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 497
they have actually any. However, even
though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air
over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl
Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl
Harbor. I image that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left
to take advantage for a surprise attack, against these places.
"2. In my opinion
the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will
report the results of my investigation." (Translated by the Army 12/8/41.)
"From: Honolulu
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"PA‑K2
"1. On the
evening of the 6th, among the battleships which entered port were—and one
submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:
"9 battleships, 3
light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were
4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at
docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.)
"2. It appears
that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."
(Translated by the Army 12/8/41.)
"From Honolulu
"To: Tokyo
"November 28, 1941.
"J‑19.
"Military report:
"(1) There are
eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti‑aircraft
guns is (5,000 feet ?).
"(2) Our
observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are:—number of shots—12; interval of
flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.
"(3) 12,000 men
(mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during
December or January.
"(4) There has
usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet ?) south of Pearl
Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor."
(Translated by the Army, 12/8/11.)
"From: Honolulu (Kita).
"To: Tokyo
"6 December 1941
"(PA‑K2)
"(1) During
Friday morning, the 6th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239
arrived here.
"(2) The
LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
"(3) The
following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 6th:
"8 battleships
"3 light cruisers
"16 destroyers.
"Four ships of
the Honolulu class and . . . . were in dock." (Translated by the Navy, 12‑10‑41.)
(6) "From: Honolulu (Kita).
"To: Tokyo.
"1 December 1941
"(J19) Report on ship maneuvers in
Pearl Harbor;
"1. The place
where practice maneuvers are held is about 600 nautical miles southeast of
here.
"2. The usual
schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and
returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the
following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week."
(Translated by the Navy 12/10/41.)
498 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(7) "From: Honolulu (Kita).
"To: Tokyo.
"3 December 1941
"(PA‑K2)
"From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of
#3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.
"1. I wish to
change my method of communicating by signals to the following:
"1. Arrange the
eight signals in three columns as follows:
"Meaning |
|
Signal |
"Battleship
divisions including scouts and screen units. |
Preparing to sortie |
1 |
A number of carriers |
Preparing to sortie |
2 |
Battleship divisions |
All departed between 1st and 3rd |
3 |
Carriers |
Several departed between 1st and 3rd |
4 |
Carriers |
All departed between 1st and 3rd |
5 |
Battleship division |
All departed between 4th and 6th |
6 |
Carriers |
Several departed between 4th and 8th |
7 |
Carriers |
All departed between 4th and 8th |
8 |
"2.
Signals.
"1.
Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:
Signal
"One
light between 8 and 9 p. m.............................
1
" " " 9 and 10 p. m............................. 2
" " " 10 and 11 p. m............................. 3
"
" " 1l and 12 p. m............................. 4
"II.
"Two
lights " 12 and 1 a. m............................. 5
"
" " 1 and
2 a. m.............................
6
"
" " 2 and
3 a. m.............................
7
"
" " 3 and
4 a.
m............................. 8
[Part
2]
"III.
Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.
"If
there is a 'star' on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates
signals, 1, 2, 3, or 4.
"If
there is a 'star' and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.
"IV.
Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:
Times Signal
"1900‑X000.................................. 3
"2000‑2100.................................. 4
"2100‑2200.................................. 5
"2200‑2300.................................. 6
"2300‑2400.................................. 7
"0000‑O100..................................
8"
"V. K.G.M.B. *** Want ads.
"A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply
P.O. Box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
"B. CHIC . . CO farm etc. apply P.O.
box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
"C. Beauty operator wanted etc.
apply P.O. box 176 indicates signal 6 or 8.
"3. If the above
listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui
Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium **** at a point halfway
between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N., longitude 156°
19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island)
the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your signal is received:
Time Signal
From 7‑8.......................................
3 or 6
From 8‑9.......................................
4 or 7
From 9‑10...................................... 5
or 8
*Between Waimanalo
and Kailua Beaches on cast coast of Oahu.
**A beach
village on east coast of Oahu, 1 raffle northwest of Lanikai.
***A radio
broadcast station in Honolulu.
****At latitude
20‑48‑45 N., longitude 158‑20-20 W."
(Translated bit the Navy 12/11/41)
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 499
"From: Honolulu (Kita)
"To: Tokyo
"November 24, 1941.
"J‑19.
"1. According to
normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and
forthwith returns.
"2. Recently the
fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the
neighborhood, of Lahaiana Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels
who ride at anchor there.
"3. Battleships
seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one
has observed battleships in maneuver areas.
"4. The manner in
which the fleet moves:
"Battleships
exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct
maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the
southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders
operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and
bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of
the island of Kahoolawe." (Translated by the Army 12/16/41.)
Vice Admiral
Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, did not recall seeing
translations of intercepted Japanese messages prior to the attack, relating to
the presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. (Exhibit 13) (p. 406‑7)
Asked whether it was
his belief, prior to the attack on 7 December, 1941, that Japanese agents at
Pearl Harbor were reporting United States ships there, Admiral Wilkinson
replied that he believed such reports were being made; however, it was his
belief that the Japanese were concerned about the presence of the fleet
"with a view to its availability for distant operations rather than its
susceptibility as a target." (p. 407)
On
November 29th, there was an Army translation of a message from Manila to Tokyo;
dated November 22, 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 68), which reported on British
and American ships at Mamila.
On
December 3rd, the Navy translated an intercepted communication from Tokyo to
Honolulu, dated November 15, 1941 (Dot. 24, Exhibit 83), which stated:
"As
relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your
'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you
already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."
Admiral
Stark testified that he did not specifically recall this message, but may have
seen it, as the Japanese were reporting a great mass of ship movement
information, and he assumed they knew every move we made (page 781). He stated
that it was routine for the Japanese to report ship movements and the fact that
they reported such movements from Honolulu was not unusual (page 790).
To
have gone the limit, he said, in tightening up on espionage and on Japanese
facilities for getting information out might have precipitated the war which
they were trying to delay. He pointed out that they did stop Japanese ships
from using the Panama Canal and did reroute safely United States ships (page
795).
On
December 4th the following intercepts were available:
1.
Navy translation‑(Document 12, Exhibit 68)
"From: Manila
(Nihro)
"To: Tokyo
"25 November 1941
"(Purple)
"#790
"l.
On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland (5 or 6 thousand tons
apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port. (Probably the U. S.
HOLLAND of 8000 tons.)
"2.
On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.
"
3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown."
2.
Navy translation‑(Document 14, Exhibit 68)
"From: Tokyo
"To: San
Francisco
"29 November 1941
"(J19)
"Circular #2431
"Make
full report beginning December 1st on the following:
"Ship's
nationality, ship's name port from which it departed (or at which it arrived),
and port of destination (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in
detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific. Indian
Ocean, or South China seas."
500 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On
December 5th the following translations of intercepted communications were
available:
1.
Army translation‑(Document 37, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
(Togo)
"To: Honolulu
"November 18,
1941
"J-l9
"#113
"Please
report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area
"N". Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, (Probably means Mamala Bay), and the
areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy.
2.
Navy translation‑(Document 36, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Honolulu
"29 November 1941
"(J19)
"#122
"We
have been receiving reports from you on ship movements; but in future will you
also report even when there are no movements."
Admiral
Stark testified that he may have seen these two messages, but that they did not
change the situations as to which he had advised CincPac (page 781). Admiral
Schuirmann did not remember seeing these (page 720).
3.
Army translation‑(Document 13, Exhibit 68)
"From Manila
(Nihro)
"To: Tokyo
"November 28,
1941
"Purple
"#799
"Recently they
have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three
planes) in high‑level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four
o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city
independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and
windless, squalls come once a day."
On
December 6, 1941, there was available in Washington an Army translation of an
intercepted Japanese communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18,
1941 (Document 40, Exhibit 63), reading as follows:
"1.
The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my
#219[a] ([a]‑Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.)
on that day.
"Area A[b]‑([b]‑Waters between Ford Island
and the Arsenal.) A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker
left port.
"Area C[c]‑([c]‑East Loch) 3 warships of
the heavy cruiser classes were at anchor.
"2.
On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, ENTERPRISE, or
some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one
of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS.' 4 merchant vessels were at
anchor in Area D[d]-([d]‑Middle Loch).
"3.
At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering
the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of
1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl
Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C,
to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30
degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered
Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side."
Admiral
Stark testified that he did not see this message (pages 781‑2). Admiral
Schuirmann similarly testified (page 719).
It
is of interest to note that a Japanese message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated
December 2, 1941, was intercepted, apparently on December 23rd, and translated
by the Army on December 30th (Document 46, Exhibit 63), which read:
"(Secret
outside the department)
"In
view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of
your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there
are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications
that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are
provided with anti‑mine nets."
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 501
NOTE:
This message was received here on December 23.
Also
of interest is a similar message, dated December 6 1941, translated by the
Army, December 12, 1941 (Document 45, Exhibit 63), which directed that Honolulu
wire immediately the movements of the fleet subsequent to December 4th.
Admiral
J. R. Redman during the latter part of 1941 was Assistant Director of Naval
Communications (page 1091). He said that the general tenor of Japanese traffic
was a searching expedition all over the world, as to ship movement. This had
been going on for a long time, but was intensified during the several months
preceding December, 1941. There were about 700 dispatches in November 1941. In
the last month prior to December 7th, diplomatic intercepts averaged 25 a day.
September and October were heavy but there was an increase in November (page
1101).
Document
40 of Exhibit 63 (the location of ships in areas in Pearl Harbor) was more
specific than the other ship movement dispatches (page 1104).
Admiral
Turner did not specifically remember seeing the ships movements dispatches;
they had been going on for a long time (page 1004).
Admiral
Ingersoll said that he did not remember Documents 24, 36, and 37 of Exhibit 63
(ship movements reports). He would not have attached any significance to them
as he presumed such reports were being made as a matter of routine; same as to
Document 40 of Exhibit 63 (page 836). No record was kept of persons to whom
these documents were shown at the time.
Commander
Kramer said that he was generally familiar with Documents 24 and 36 in Exhibit
63 and stated that these would have been in daily folders submitted to the
regular recipients of this class of information. As to ships movements, the
Japanese were always reporting them, so that those were not unusual but
somewhat more emphatic (page 961).
Commander
Kramer said that he saw Document 36 of Exhibit 63 (concerning reports even when
there are no ship movements) on December 5th; Document 37 (requesting reports
on certain areas at Pearl Harbor) on December 5th; Document 40 (giving the
locations of ships at Pearl Harbor (about December 6th). Previously during the
year similar intercepts were received, but Document 40 of Exhibit 63 was the
first of the ship movement messages which had gone into detail as to the
location of ships at Pearl Harbor at a specific time. It was received December
6, 1941 (page 974) (also page 976).
The
inference he gathers from these is that the Japanese were concerned about the
location of United States ships but they had also been concerned Similarly
about planes in the Philippines and all aspects of military establishments in
the Netherlands East Indies (page 974). Moreover the inference was that since
we were working with the British and Dutch, the Japanese were concerned about
the action we were taking, and there was no indication from this material of
overt intentions against the United States (page 975). This was, however, the
first time the Japanese had asked for such detail (page 975).