XXVI. THE "WINDS" CODE AND MESSAGES
A. THE WINDS CODE
On November 28th, there was translated another intercepted Japanese communication establishing the "winds code," in addition to the previous message of November 26th, which in substance was as follows:
Navy translation‑November 28, 1941 (Document 15, Exhibit 63):
"19 November 1941
"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
"(1) In case of a Japan‑U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East wind rain).
"(2) Japan‑U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (North wind cloudy).
"(3) Japan‑British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clear).
"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
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"Forward as urgent intelligence."
On December 5th, Alusna at Batavia advised OPNAV of a message "from Thorpe for Miles War Department" of a code intercept to the effect that Japan would notify her consuls of "war decision," by using the "winds code" words in Japanese weather broadcasts (See Documents 2 and 3, Exhibit 64).
B. MONITORING FOR THE CODE WORDS
Captain L. F. Safford testified that in 1941 he was in charge of the Security Section of Naval Communications, which collected information through intercepts (page 744). Document 15 of Exhibit 63 is the so‑called "Winds Code," which was available to the Navy on November 28th. This was repeated by Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64. There is no material difference in these messages (page 745). After receipt of these messages special effort was made to monitor for these messages. C. I. units at Pearl Harbor and Cavite were also monitoring (page 746).
Admiral Turner said that at the time when he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 he discussed it briefly with the Chief of Naval Operations and instructions were given to watch for the code words.
Commander Kramer said that he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (Winds message) on November 28, 1941 (page 956). Arrangements were made to watch for any use of the Winds Code by the Japanese and to promptly notify senior officers who had cards showing the message.
C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF WINDS CODE
Admiral Kimmel was advised by a copy of a dispatch dated November 28th from CincAF to OPNAV (Exhibit 64), that according to an intercepted communication, if diplomatic relations were on the verge of being severed, certain words would be used in the Tokyo news broadcasts.
Captain Layton testified that he had not seen Document 15 of Exhibit 63, but had received the same information. Upon receipt of it special watches were set to intercept the execute of the winds code, but no execute was ever received (pages 905‑6).
D. "WINDS" MESSAGES USING THE CODE WORDS FOR RUSSIA
On December 4, 1941, the Federal Communications Commission reported a Japanese radio broadcast apparently using the "winds code" words relating to Russia (Document 2, Exhibit 65), as follows:
TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER
"KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS
"CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM"
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.
On December 5, 1941, the FCC reported another Japanese broadcast again apparently employing the "winds code" relating to Russia. The report (Document 3 Exhibit 65) was, in substance:
"TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH
(repeated 3 times)
"Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941"
Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood stated that he was watch officer in OP‑20‑G, Naval Communications (page 919A). He first saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (intercept establishing the Winds Code) about November 30, 1941 (page 920). On the evening of December 4, 1941, the FCC phoned an intercept to him. He did not remember the exact text; but it did not contain the words that he was looking for, which were the Japanese phrase: "Higashi No Kazeame:" These to him would have indicated the severance of relations with the United States, and war.
'The watch officers in Op-20‑G had been instructed to telephone Admiral Noyes when an execute message was received (page 920). He telephoned Admiral
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Noyes and thought that he again called the FCC (page 921). Admiral Noyes said to him, on receipt of the message, that "he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction." He identified Document 2 of Exhibit 65 as apparently the message received from the FCC (page 921). This meant to him that there would be a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States, but with Russia (page 921). He thinks that's why Admiral Noyes said to him that "the wind was blowing from a funny direction."
A pencil memo was the only written record of the above‑described intercept. He did not know the disposition of this memo. He turned it over to the succeeding watch officer (page 922). He had no recollection of any confirmation of this message from the FCC (page 921). He did not know of any other intercept of an execute message of the Winds Code (page 923). He can account for the inability of the Navy to produce the message as recorded by him, or a confirmation of it, only from his own viewpoint: He had instructions to transmit the message orally, in view of its urgency. He, therefore, had to call Admiral Noyes at once. He did not think that they had been ordered to make any record of the message (page 925).
E. WAS THERE A "WINDS CODE" MESSAGE RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES?
In a statement before Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Captain Safford testified concerning the "winds message" as follows:
He testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people. (pages 112‑114)
Captain Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposition of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 66 of the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast (page 116).
Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the Army's copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadler before the Army investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the "Winds Message" had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the "Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation,. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of the Army knew that the "Winds Message" had been received (pages 11 4‑116) .
Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message" and various other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message" specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in McCollum's draft dispatch. (pages 117‑118)
Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message" was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected only the false "Winds Message," and not the "True 'Winds Message'." The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being inter‑
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cepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corrigedor to cover the Tokyo‑Berlin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty per cent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and has second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated that the logs of these stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept. (pages 119‑122)
Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood at 9:05 p.m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he said that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the "winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message." (page 123)
Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor (page 124).
Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monitoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted no such message (page 540).
On being recalled for examination, Captain Safford testified that he never had a conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds" message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds" code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds" message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were used (pages 538‑589).
Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the "winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking it over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walking with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that, on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall (pages 131‑182).
Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese "hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by him as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other messages. The message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and Japan are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his haste, Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI" which was contained in the Japanese message and which referred to the United States. He testified that after he returned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p.m. on December 7th, he discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy off the translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several telephone, calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G‑2 of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy Department's files do not disclose any correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this that a number of copies of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly his correction was made on another copy which has since been discarded (pages 133‑135).
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Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until he testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word message," which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was among the group of messages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed a folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material (pages 183‑136).
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers who were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December, 1941. He said that he had never received or seen an intercept or message wherein the "Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said that about December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC in which the words apparently relating to Russia were used; that he called Admiral Noyes, who commented that the wind was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brotherhood, did not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brotherhood stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had had a conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called him about December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived. Brotherhood said he did not recall the telephone conversation, but that as Captain Safford said he did make such a call, he (Brotherhood) believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at that time (pages 144‑147).
Lieut. Comdr. Linn testified that a 24‑hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's section that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four officers who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and he never saw any intercept prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds" code words relating to the United States were used (pages 140‑142)
Lieut. Comdr. Pering's testimony was that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using the code words relating to the United States or to any other nation (page 148) .
Lieut. Comdr. Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a 24‑hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December, 1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United States ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December 1941 (pages 433‑441).
Lieut. Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United States. He testified that he never knew of or saw any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States (pages 149‑150).
Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words relating to the United States; that the message which contained the words apparently relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December 1941, but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a "winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson (pages 28‑32).
Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been received. Possibly he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating to England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted and which Captain Safford had testified Admiral Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out (pages 898‑401).
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Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both testified that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was received wherein the words relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor because of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see Exhibit 8).
They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a "winds" message also, and that had such a message been received by the British, they most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the attack. (pages 78, 78)
Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and that no "winds intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.
Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds" message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and a half ago, and none later than six months prior to his testimony in this investigation. He said that Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a "winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a "winds" message had come in on the lath or 6th of December; that he had been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G‑2 authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a "winds" message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler (pages 516‑520).
Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a 24‑hour basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy records and could find no trace of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941. (Pages 46‑7.)
There was a sharp conflict in the testimony as to whether or not there had been any Japanese message using the "winds code" words relating to the United States:
(1) Witnesses who said that there was no such message or that they recalled no such message
Admiral Stark stated that he knew of no execute of the "winds message" (page 783) .
Captain Wellborn said he knew of no "winds message" indicating that the Japanese were going to attack the United States. (p. 389)
General Marshall thought that he had been aware of the "Winds Code" (Document 15, Exhibit 63), but did not recall any execute message (page 872).
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Admiral Noyes said no intercept of such an execute of the Winds Code was ever received in the Navy Department (page 1033. See pages 1047‑8). The explanation of why such a "winds" message is missing from the Communications files is that no such message was ever received by naval means (page 1040).
Admiral Ingersoll said that he remembered the "winds" code (Document 15 of Exhibit 63), and probably saw it on November 29th. He recalled that there was some difference of opinion as to what it or the execution message meant. He did not know whether this was discussed with Admiral Stark, and did not remember what the doubt of the message was, but remembered that some message was received prior to December 7th (page 825). He did not know where the document, if any, showing a "winds" execute, was (page 826).
Admiral Ingersoll said that he knew of the "winds code" and that he recalled seeing on or about December 4th the Japanese broadcast directive indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States. He said that he did not know why this information had not been sent to Admiral Kimmel except that probably it had been supposed that the Hawaiian intercept station had also received that broadcast. He said it may have been because of this that a message in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes was sent. (p. 429)
Admiral Redman saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (winds code), but never saw any execute of it; he heard about it in discussions around December 6th or 7th, but doesn't remember where. He heard about it from Admiral Noyes and from Commander Kramer (page 1103).
Admiral Schuirmann testified that he recalled that some broadcast had been intercepted, but that there was lack of agreement as to whether or not it constituted the "winds" message (page 723).
Lt. Comdr. Lynn and Lt. Comdr. Pering testified that they did not see any execute of the "winds" message (pages 740, 813).
Captain Layton said that the messages establishing the "winds code" signified that if the code word were sent it meant that diplomatic relations would be severed and anything could happen (page 907).
He did not know of the receipt by any unit of the Navy of any execute of the "winds" message (page 908). He asserted that if an execute of the "winds" message had been received, it would have been rapidly and aggressively acted upon (page 917); he believed that all personnel would have been recalled to their ships, an anti‑submarine and distance patrol would have been started, and that a task force would have sortied (page 917). He did not think that the "war warning" message meant the same as the "winds code" for it concerned the cessation of negotiations but that did not necessarily mean the cessation of diplomatic relations or war (page 918).
(2) Witnesses who said that there was such a message, or some such message
Captain Safford stated that at 0800 on December 4, 1941, Lt. Murray, possibly Kramer, came in with a yellow teletype sheet and said, "Here it is." He thought that the message translated read: "War with America; War with England; Peace with Russia." He has not seen a copy of this since December 15, 1941. It came in from an East Coast station (page 746), but he can't determine what station. There was no confirmation of this intercept from other sources. He had a vague recollection of a second "winds" message, but was unable to find any trace until he testified before Admiral Hart. Since then he learned that the FCC had intercepted a "winds" message at Portland. He saw that message for the first time at the hearing and did not recognize it (page 747). He did not recall any of the messages in Exhibit 65 (FCC intercepts). They do not indicate a break with the United States.
He asserted that the "winds" message he saw on December 4th is not on file and cannot be found despite repeated search since November, 1943; that Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them but did not care to tell him. The witness said he also knew what happened to the Army copies, through very "second‑hand and devious sources" (pages 747‑8).
He said that Document 15 of Exhibit 63 indicated that a "winds" message would be "a break of diplomatic relations;" the Dutch translation said it would mean "war." It was interpreted by DONI as meaning war and a signal for execution of Japanese war plans (page 748). Two sources said it meant a break in diplomatic relations; two said it meant war (page 748). The breaking of diplomatic relations and war were regarded by them, he said, as synonymous in Japanese‑United States relations (page 754).
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He was certain that an immediate distribution was made on December 4th of the "winds" message to CNO, DONI, Director of War Plans, Assistant CNO, State Department, White House, and War Department, and that Commander Kramer could tell about this (page 749). This information was not passed to CincPac, though McCollum wrote a long dispatch estimating the situation, and including this information, which dispatch was not sent. This draft dispatch had been given to Admiral Wilkinson, who wanted to sent it; Admiral Noyes said it was an "insult to intelligence of CincPac" (page 749). Admiral Wilkinson disagreed and went to the "front office" to try to get it released. He knew of no copy of this draft message now in existence (page 750).
In another lengthy statement at the close of the examination Captain Safford reviewed the McCollum dispatch and the "Winds" message as follows:
"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders‑in‑Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p.m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander‑in‑Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander‑in‑Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.' Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the 'Winds Message'. The 'Winds Message' was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain‑language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip‑off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander‑in‑Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip‑off from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip‑off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the 'Winds Message' when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. 1. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The 'Winds Message' was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the 'Winds Message' was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units, not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the 'Winds Message' had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in
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Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the 'Winds Message' had been sent by Tokyo. The 'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified that message as the 'Winds Message' we had been looking for. The significant part of the 'Winds Message' read: 'HIGASHI NO KAZE AME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI'. The literal translation of these phrases is: 'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY'. The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip‑off was: 'War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia.' I first saw the 'Winds Message' about 8:00 a.m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and said, 'Here it is!' as he handed me the 'Winds Message.' As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant 'Winds' underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the 'Winds Message.' I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Message', McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the 'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the 'Winds Message': Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the 'Winds Message' had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R., Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. The following officers should have some recollection of the 'Winds Message': U. S. Navy Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone (U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer, Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. U. S. Army‑Brigadier General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadder, Colonel R. S. Bratton, Colonel Rex Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold Doud, and Lieutenant Colonel ft. E. Shukraft. The 'Winds Message' was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time." (p. 360‑361)
Because his section knew the Japanese, he said, they considered them tricky and underhanded, and Japanese history showed that they began war without a declaration or the breaking of diplomatic relations (page 755).
Commander Kramer said that on December 3rd or 4th, he was shown a "winds" message by CY watch officer and took it immediately to Captain Safford, and Captain Safford took it to Admiral Noyes. Kramer did not handle this as it was a plain language message (page 956). The message received and shown him was "Higashi No Kazeame," translated as "East Wind Rain." This meant strained relations or a break in relations and possibly war with the United States. That message was on teletype paper when he saw it, which indicated that it had come through a USN Intercept Station. He has not seen this message since (page 957) .
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The different meanings he gave of the "winds" message are inherent in the nature of the Japanese language. He could not definitely interpret a message executing the code as meaning war (page 969).
The "winds" message did not necessarily mean war (page 987).
He has seen the messages in Exhibit 65, but he did not handle these (page 957). There is no question that the "important" documents in Exhibit 63 were in the folder delivered regularly to CNO (page 980). He was sure that the "winds" message was sent to the office of CNO (page 981).
Admiral Turner said that to his knowledge none of the code words were received prior to December 7, 1941. He changed his testimony and said that Admiral Noyes had called him on the telephone‑the date he could not recall; he thought it was December 6th‑and had said "the winds message has come in" (page 1004). He understood that Admiral Noyes had told CNO. He assumed that CincPac had the "winds" message. The "winds" message meant at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war (page 1005).
(3) Testimony concerning the "McCollum Dispatch"
It will be recalled that Captain Safford testified that McCollum had drafted a long dispatch estimating the situation, and including information as to the "winds" message, which he and Admiral Wilkinson desired to send to Admiral Kimmel, and which Admiral Noyes opposed.
Admiral Noyes testified that he had discussed McCollum's dispatch with Admiral Wilkinson, and had thought that such estimates should come from CNO (page 1039).
Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall a draft dispatch prepared by Comdr. McCollum during this period which was not sent out (pages 154A, 780). Nor did he recall any conversations about this time concerning the sending of additional messages to Admiral Kimmel (page 165).
Admiral Turner said that he had known about the dispatch prepared by McCollum and had discussed it with McCollum. He did not know what happened to the dispatch, or whether it was transmitted. He thought he initialed it and gave it back to McCollum (page 998), but he "is not sure of it" (page 1004).
Commander Kramer heard, after December 7th, of a long draft dispatch which had been prepared by McCollum. He did not know how it had been handled (page 960).
Admirals Ingersoll and Redman did not recall the draft dispatch to CincPac which had been prepared by McCollum (pages 830, 1106).