XXVI.
THE "WINDS" CODE AND MESSAGES
A.
THE WINDS CODE
On
November 28th, there was translated another intercepted Japanese communication
establishing the "winds code," in addition to the previous message of
November 26th, which in substance was as follows:
Navy
translation‑November 28, 1941 (Document 15, Exhibit 63):
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"19 November 1941
"(J19)
"Circular #2353
"Regarding
the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
"In
case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
"(1)
In case of a Japan‑U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East
wind rain).
"(2)
Japan‑U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (North wind cloudy).
"(3)
Japan‑British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clear).
"This
signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and
each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
502 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Forward
as urgent intelligence."
On
December 5th, Alusna at Batavia advised OPNAV
of a message "from Thorpe for Miles War Department" of a code
intercept to the effect that Japan would notify her consuls of "war
decision," by using the "winds code" words in Japanese weather
broadcasts (See Documents 2 and 3, Exhibit 64).
B.
MONITORING FOR THE CODE WORDS
Captain
L. F. Safford testified that in 1941 he was in charge of the Security Section
of Naval Communications, which collected information through intercepts (page
744). Document 15 of Exhibit 63 is the so‑called "Winds Code,"
which was available to the Navy on November 28th. This was repeated by
Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64. There is no material difference in these messages
(page 745). After receipt of these messages special effort was made to monitor
for these messages. C. I. units at Pearl Harbor and Cavite were also monitoring
(page 746).
Admiral
Turner said that at the time when he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 he discussed
it briefly with the Chief of Naval Operations and instructions were given to
watch for the code words.
Commander
Kramer said that he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (Winds message) on November
28, 1941 (page 956). Arrangements were made to watch for any use of the Winds
Code by the Japanese and to promptly notify senior officers who had cards
showing the message.
C.
ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF WINDS CODE
Admiral
Kimmel was advised by a copy of a dispatch dated November 28th from CincAF to
OPNAV (Exhibit 64), that according to an intercepted communication, if
diplomatic relations were on the verge of being severed, certain words would be
used in the Tokyo news broadcasts.
Captain
Layton testified that he had not seen Document 15 of Exhibit 63, but had
received the same information. Upon receipt of it special watches were set to
intercept the execute of the winds code, but no execute was ever received
(pages 905‑6).
D.
"WINDS" MESSAGES USING THE CODE WORDS FOR RUSSIA
On
December 4, 1941, the Federal Communications Commission reported a Japanese
radio broadcast apparently using the "winds code" words relating to
Russia (Document 2, Exhibit 65), as follows:
TOKYO
TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY
CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER
"KANAGAWA
PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS
"CHIBA
PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE
CALM"
Weather
message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December
4, 1941.
On
December 5, 1941, the FCC reported another Japanese broadcast again apparently
employing the "winds code" relating to Russia. The report (Document
3 Exhibit 65) was, in substance:
"TODAY
NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH
WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH
(repeated 3 times)
"Weather
message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December
5, 1941"
Lt.
Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood stated that he was watch officer in OP‑20‑G,
Naval Communications (page 919A). He first saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63
(intercept establishing the Winds Code) about November 30, 1941 (page 920). On
the evening of December 4, 1941, the FCC phoned an intercept to him. He did not
remember the exact text; but it did not contain the words that he was looking
for, which were the Japanese phrase: "Higashi No Kazeame:" These to
him would have indicated the severance of relations with the United States, and
war.
'The
watch officers in Op-20‑G had been instructed to telephone Admiral Noyes
when an execute message was received (page 920). He telephoned Admiral
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 503
Noyes and thought that
he again called the FCC (page 921). Admiral Noyes said to him, on receipt of
the message, that "he thought the wind was blowing from a funny
direction." He identified Document 2 of Exhibit 65 as apparently the
message received from the FCC (page 921). This meant to him that there would be
a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States, but with Russia
(page 921). He thinks that's why Admiral Noyes said to him that "the wind
was blowing from a funny direction."
A
pencil memo was the only written record of the above‑described intercept.
He did not know the disposition of this memo. He turned it over to the succeeding
watch officer (page 922). He had no recollection of any confirmation of this
message from the FCC (page 921). He did not know of any other intercept of an
execute message of the Winds Code (page 923). He can account for the inability
of the Navy to produce the message as recorded by him, or a confirmation of
it, only from his own viewpoint: He had instructions to transmit the message
orally, in view of its urgency. He, therefore, had to call Admiral Noyes at
once. He did not think that they had been ordered to make any record of the
message (page 925).
E.
WAS THERE A "WINDS CODE" MESSAGE RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES?
In a statement before
Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Captain Safford testified concerning the "winds
message" as follows:
He testified that in
the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court
martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of the important
witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around
to get information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use
in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no reference
to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted.
Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see
what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that it
would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the thing over
with various of the Army people. (pages 112‑114)
Captain Safford
testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood had written
back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposition of the
copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to the
United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a
misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds
Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 66 of the Naval Court), which apparently
related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast (page 116).
Safford stated that he
had information "third hand" concerning the Army's copies of the
"Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in the
testimony of Colonel Sadler before the Army investigation. He stated that his
information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the
War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the "Winds
Message" had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell
on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel
Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message and had
asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the "Winds
Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds that
the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel
Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation,. He also stated that a
Captain Shukraft of the Army knew that the "Winds Message" had been
received (pages 11 4‑116) .
Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer
shortly before his testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to
his earlier impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message" and
various other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the
Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to
Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also said
that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message"
specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's message to
the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in
McCollum's draft dispatch. (pages 117‑118)
Safford testified that
it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message" was received
early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than the night
before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected only the false
"Winds Message," and not the "True 'Winds Message'." The
vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being inter‑
504 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cepted only on the East Coast of the
United States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that
they had to call on Corrigedor to cover the Tokyo‑Berlin circuits because
the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast, West Coast,
Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty per cent coverage.
Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly intercepted
the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and has
second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated that the logs of these
stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during one of the
numerous moves and no record had been kept. (pages 119‑122)
Referring to the
message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood at 9:05 p.m.
on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he said that this was the
"false" message which appeared on the surface to use the
"winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine
weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral
Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted
and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received
twelve hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds
message." (page 123)
Safford identified
Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating to
England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl
Harbor (page 124).
Safford testified that
he had been advised that the Dutch had been monitoring for a "winds"
execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted no such
message (page 540).
On being recalled for
examination, Captain Safford testified that he never had a conversation with
Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds" message. He
stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call
from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of the receipt
of a message apparently using the Russian "winds" code words. He had
had a vague idea that there was another "winds" message, and, he
said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that
until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in
which the words relating to Russia were used (pages 538‑589).
Captain Kramer said
that he had testified previously concerning the "winds" message but
wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking it over
since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds"
message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but
after receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding
it, he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle
of the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and
walking with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned
it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been a
"winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it
might have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he
previously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at
the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view
was that, on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the
latter part of the week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention
of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was
under the impression when he testified during this investigation that the
message referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United
States, although it may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't
recall (pages 131‑182).
Captain Kramer
testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese "hidden
word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by him as he
was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other messages. The message
as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and Japan
are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his haste,
Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI" which was contained in the
Japanese message and which referred to the United States. He testified that
after he returned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p.m. on December
7th, he discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy
off the translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several
telephone, calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the
officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G‑2
of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy Department's
files do not disclose any correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer
testified concerning this that a number of copies of the translation were made
at the time, and that undoubtedly his correction was made on another copy which
has since been discarded (pages 133‑135).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 505
Captain Kramer also
stated that he had been under the impression until he testified before this
investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December 1941 had
been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word
message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word
message," which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was
among the group of messages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when
he hastily reviewed a folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done,
he said, because of the fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such
material (pages 183‑136).
Lieut. Comdr.
Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers who were on
watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December, 1941. He
said that he had never received or seen an intercept or message wherein the
"Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said
that about December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC in which
the words apparently relating to Russia were used; that he called Admiral
Noyes, who commented that the wind was blowing from a "funny"
direction, and that he, Brotherhood, did not think at the time that it was an
actual "Winds Message." Brotherhood stated that shortly before he
testified in this investigation, he had had a conversation with Safford who
stated that Brotherhood had called him about December 4th or 5th and had told
him that such a message had arrived. Brotherhood said he did not recall the
telephone conversation, but that as Captain Safford said he did make such a
call, he (Brotherhood) believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford
at that time (pages 144‑147).
Lieut. Comdr. Linn
testified that a 24‑hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's
section that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four
officers who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept
which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one
of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and
he never saw any intercept prior to 7 December 1941 in which the
"winds" code words relating to the United States were used (pages 140‑142)
Lieut. Comdr. Pering's
testimony was that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch during
the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew of the
existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using
the code words relating to the United States or to any other nation (page 148)
.
Lieut. Comdr. Murray
testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a 24‑hour
watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December, 1941. He
testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United States
ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack,
Linn had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December
1941 (pages 433‑441).
Lieut. Freeman
testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI intelligence
received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked very
closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor
for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by
Captain Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal
knowledge of the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United
States. He testified that he never knew of or saw any intercept of a
"winds" message relating to the United States (pages 149‑150).
Captain McCollum
testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that he
had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words relating
to the United States; that the message which contained the words apparently
relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December 1941,
but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further
that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch summarizing
the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no reference
to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was
based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a
"winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his
draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson
(pages 28‑32).
Admiral Wilkinson
testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was that
some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum, had
mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been
received. Possibly he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the
words relating to England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch
which McCollum had drafted and which Captain Safford had testified Admiral
Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out (pages 898‑401).
506 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander
Fabian, who was in the Radio
Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both testified that intensive efforts had been
made there to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds"
code, and that nothing was received wherein the words relating to the United
States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was the view
of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor because of its geographical
location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio broadcasts
than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see Exhibit 8).
They also testified
that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence services in the
Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a "winds" message
also, and that had such a message been received by the British, they most
certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no
information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message
prior to the attack. (pages 78, 78)
Captain Layton,
Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been familiar with
the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of
that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on
continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news
broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander
Rochefort and that no "winds intercept was received prior to 7 December
1941, nor did they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an
intercept had been heard.
Mr. Friedman, a
cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7 December 1941 he had
no information as to whether or not a "winds" message had been
intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain Safford
concerning the subject, the first one about a year and a half ago, and none
later than six months prior to his testimony in this investigation. He said
that Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there
had been a "winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the
Navy's files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy
East Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half
ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a
"winds" message had come in on the lath or 6th of December; that he
had been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral
Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some question about the
exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Sadler had not seen the
message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel Sadler also told him
that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes but had not been
successful, whereupon the G‑2 authorities simply passed the matter over
since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the
message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a
copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had
been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be
destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as
highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably
just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he
had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no
knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a
"winds" message relating to the United States, apart from his
conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler (pages 516‑520).
Captain Rochefort, who
was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that
they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering all known
broadcasts from Tokyo on a 24‑hour basis, and that results were nil. He
testified further that he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy
records and could find no trace of any "winds" message prior to 7
December 1941. (Pages 46‑7.)
There
was a sharp conflict in the testimony as to whether or not there had been any
Japanese message using the "winds code" words relating to the United
States:
(1)
Witnesses who said that there was no such message or that they recalled no such
message
Admiral
Stark stated that he knew of no execute of the "winds message" (page
783) .
Captain Wellborn said he knew of no "winds
message" indicating that the Japanese were going to attack the United
States. (p. 389)
General
Marshall thought that he had been aware of the "Winds Code" (Document
15, Exhibit 63), but did not recall any execute message (page 872).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 507
Admiral
Noyes said no intercept of such an execute of the Winds Code was ever received
in the Navy Department (page 1033. See pages 1047‑8). The explanation of
why such a "winds" message is missing from the Communications files
is that no such message was ever received by naval means (page 1040).
Admiral
Ingersoll said that he remembered the "winds" code (Document 15 of
Exhibit 63), and probably saw it on November 29th. He recalled that there was
some difference of opinion as to what it or the execution message meant. He did
not know whether this was discussed with Admiral Stark, and did not remember
what the doubt of the message was, but remembered that some message was
received prior to December 7th (page 825). He did not know where the document,
if any, showing a "winds" execute, was (page 826).
Admiral Ingersoll said that he knew of the "winds
code" and that he recalled seeing on or about December 4th the Japanese
broadcast directive indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both
Britain and the United States. He said that he did not know why this
information had not been sent to Admiral Kimmel except that probably it had
been supposed that the Hawaiian intercept station had also received that
broadcast. He said it may have been because of this that a message in regard to
the destruction of Japanese codes was sent. (p. 429)
Admiral
Redman saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (winds code), but never saw any execute of
it; he heard about it in discussions around December 6th or 7th, but doesn't
remember where. He heard about it from Admiral Noyes and from Commander Kramer
(page 1103).
Admiral
Schuirmann testified that he recalled that some broadcast had been intercepted,
but that there was lack of agreement as to whether or not it constituted the
"winds" message (page 723).
Lt.
Comdr. Lynn and Lt. Comdr. Pering testified that they did not see any execute
of the "winds" message (pages 740, 813).
Captain
Layton said that the messages establishing the "winds code" signified
that if the code word were sent it meant that diplomatic relations would be
severed and anything could happen (page 907).
He
did not know of the receipt by any unit of the Navy of any execute of the
"winds" message (page 908). He asserted that if an execute of the
"winds" message had been received, it would have been rapidly and
aggressively acted upon (page 917); he believed that all personnel would have
been recalled to their ships, an anti‑submarine and distance patrol would
have been started, and that a task force would have sortied (page 917). He did
not think that the "war warning" message meant the same as the
"winds code" for it concerned the cessation of negotiations but that
did not necessarily mean the cessation of diplomatic relations or war (page
918).
(2)
Witnesses who said that there was such a message, or some such message
Captain
Safford stated that at 0800 on December 4, 1941, Lt. Murray, possibly Kramer,
came in with a yellow teletype sheet and said, "Here it is." He
thought that the message translated read: "War with America; War with
England; Peace with Russia." He has not seen a copy of this since December
15, 1941. It came in from an East Coast station (page 746), but he can't
determine what station. There was no confirmation of this intercept from other
sources. He had a vague recollection of a second "winds" message, but
was unable to find any trace until he testified before Admiral Hart. Since then
he learned that the FCC had intercepted a "winds" message at
Portland. He saw that message for the first time at the hearing and did not
recognize it (page 747). He did not recall any of the messages in Exhibit 65
(FCC intercepts). They do not indicate a break with the United States.
He
asserted that the "winds" message he saw on December 4th is not on
file and cannot be found despite repeated search since November, 1943; that Lt.
Comdr. Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them but did
not care to tell him. The witness said he also knew what happened to the Army
copies, through very "second‑hand and devious sources" (pages
747‑8).
He
said that Document 15 of Exhibit 63 indicated that a "winds" message
would be "a break of diplomatic relations;" the Dutch translation
said it would mean "war." It was interpreted by DONI as meaning war
and a signal for execution of Japanese war plans (page 748). Two sources said
it meant a break in diplomatic relations; two said it meant war (page 748). The
breaking of diplomatic relations and war were regarded by them, he said, as
synonymous in Japanese‑United States relations (page 754).
508 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He
was certain that an immediate distribution was made on December 4th of the
"winds" message to CNO, DONI, Director of War Plans, Assistant CNO,
State Department, White House, and War Department, and that Commander Kramer
could tell about this (page 749). This information was not passed to CincPac,
though McCollum wrote a long dispatch estimating the situation, and including
this information, which dispatch was not sent. This draft dispatch had been
given to Admiral Wilkinson, who wanted to sent it; Admiral Noyes said it was an
"insult to intelligence of CincPac" (page 749). Admiral Wilkinson
disagreed and went to the "front office" to try to get it released.
He knew of no copy of this draft message now in existence (page 750).
In another lengthy statement at the close of the examination
Captain Safford reviewed the McCollum dispatch and the "Winds"
message as follows:
"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum
drafted a long warning message to the Commanders‑in‑Chief of the
Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date,
quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was
imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral
Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read
it, and saw it at about three p.m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941.
Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes
replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander‑in‑Chief.'
Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very
busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as
clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander‑in‑Chief
that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released
by the front office.' Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes
later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this
message of warning had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when
I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not
been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous
question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the 'Winds Message'. The
'Winds Message' was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio
intelligence duties to identify a plain‑language Japanese news broadcast
in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the
Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain
(including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip‑off from the
British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to
the Navy Department by the Commander‑in‑Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet,
with an information copy to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet.
We also received a tip‑off from the Dutch in Java through the American
Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip‑off
was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department, War
Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested
that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the 'Winds Message'
when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on
Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept
stations, as follows: N. E. 1. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at
Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four
or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in
the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain language
broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per
day for this material alone. The 'Winds Message' was actually broadcast during
the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by
Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and
radio propagation was such that the 'Winds Message' was heard only on the East
Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy
stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I.
Units, not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not receiving any word
from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the 'Winds Message' had not
yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the
initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British
at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as
surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 509
Hawaii.
It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to
send out information that the 'Winds Message' had been sent by Tokyo. The
'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department during the evening of
December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R.,
was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this
message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been
anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down
that evening and identified that message as the 'Winds Message' we had been
looking for. The significant part of the 'Winds Message' read: 'HIGASHI NO
KAZE AME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI'. The
literal translation of these phrases is: 'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR.
NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY'. The meaning of this message from the
previously mentioned tip‑off was: 'War with the United States. War with
Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia.' I first saw the
'Winds Message' about 8:00 a.m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A.
Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and piece
of paper in his hand and said, 'Here it is!' as he handed me the 'Winds
Message.' As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the
significant 'Winds' underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the
bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and
distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As
the direct result of the 'Winds Message.' I prepared a total of five messages,
which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction
of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain
activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Message', McCollum
drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved
by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been
sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the
'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with
the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had
been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by
Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following
officers recall having seen and having read the 'Winds Message': Captain L. F.
Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R.,
Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L.
Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the 'Winds
Message' had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves:
Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.,
Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. The
following officers should have some recollection of the 'Winds Message': U. S.
Navy Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone
(U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer,
Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. U. S. Army‑Brigadier
General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadder, Colonel R. S. Bratton, Colonel Rex
Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold Doud, and Lieutenant Colonel
ft. E. Shukraft. The 'Winds Message' was last seen by myself about December 14,
1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were
assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of
Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission,
according to my understanding at the time." (p. 360‑361)
Because
his section knew the Japanese, he said, they considered them tricky and
underhanded, and Japanese history showed that they began war without a
declaration or the breaking of diplomatic relations (page 755).
Commander
Kramer said that on December 3rd or 4th, he was shown a "winds"
message by CY watch officer and
took it immediately to Captain Safford, and Captain Safford took it to Admiral
Noyes. Kramer did not handle this as it was a plain language message (page
956). The message received and shown him was "Higashi No Kazeame,"
translated as "East Wind Rain." This meant strained relations or a
break in relations and possibly war with the United States. That message was on
teletype paper when he saw it, which indicated that it had come through a USN
Intercept Station. He has not seen this message since (page 957) .
510 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The
different meanings he gave of the "winds" message are inherent in the
nature of the Japanese language. He could not definitely interpret a message
executing the code as meaning war (page 969).
The
"winds" message did not necessarily mean war (page 987).
He
has seen the messages in Exhibit 65, but he did not handle these (page 957).
There is no question that the "important" documents in Exhibit 63
were in the folder delivered regularly to CNO (page 980). He was sure that the
"winds" message was sent to the office of CNO (page 981).
Admiral
Turner said that to his knowledge none of the code words were received prior to
December 7, 1941. He changed his testimony and said that Admiral Noyes had
called him on the telephone‑the date he could not recall; he thought it
was December 6th‑and had said "the winds message has come in"
(page 1004). He understood that Admiral Noyes had told CNO. He assumed that
CincPac had the "winds" message. The "winds" message meant
at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war (page 1005).
(3)
Testimony concerning the "McCollum Dispatch"
It
will be recalled that Captain Safford testified that McCollum had drafted a
long dispatch estimating the situation, and including information as to the
"winds" message, which he and Admiral Wilkinson desired to send to
Admiral Kimmel, and which Admiral Noyes opposed.
Admiral
Noyes testified that he had discussed McCollum's dispatch with Admiral
Wilkinson, and had thought that such estimates should come from CNO (page
1039).
Admiral
Stark testified that he did not recall a draft dispatch prepared by Comdr.
McCollum during this period which was not sent out (pages 154A, 780). Nor did
he recall any conversations about this time concerning the sending of
additional messages to Admiral Kimmel (page 165).
Admiral
Turner said that he had known about the dispatch prepared by McCollum and had
discussed it with McCollum. He did not know what happened to the dispatch, or
whether it was transmitted. He thought he initialed it and gave it back to
McCollum (page 998), but he "is not sure of it" (page 1004).
Commander
Kramer heard, after December 7th, of a long draft dispatch which had been
prepared by McCollum. He did not know how it had been handled (page 960).
Admirals
Ingersoll and Redman did not recall the draft dispatch to CincPac which had
been prepared by McCollum (pages 830, 1106).