XXVII.
INFORMATION SENT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL AFTER THE "WAR
WARNING"
As of this time there
was available to CincPac information of the organization of the Japanese fleets
as follows:
(1) On 29 July 1941
the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report, which had been
prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the organization of the Japanese
Navy. This report stated that as a result of information which had been received,
it was possible to give a much more complete picture of the organization of the
Japanese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces afloat were organized
into two main commands the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in
China. The Combined Fleet included:
(a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
(b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force,
(c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping
Control Force.
(d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands
Defensive Force.
(e) Submarine Force (also called the
Sixth Fleet).
The Combined Fleet and
First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Yamamoto, consisted of various
BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs and two destroyer squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO,
HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) was included. The carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU,
SHOKAKU); CarDiv 6 (RYUJO, HOSHO); and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO).
The Second Fleet,
under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included various cruiser divisions, two
carrier divisions and two destroyer squadrons. CruDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was
included. The carrier divisions were: CarDiv 1 (AKAGI and KAGA); and CarDiv 2
(SORYU and HIRYU).
The Third Fleet
included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA MARU and various minelayer and
minesweeper divisions, a base force, and sub‑chaser
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 511
The composition of the
Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the Submarine Fleet, and of the Japanese
Naval Forces in China was also given (Hew. Exhibit 81; Hew. page 613).
(2) On 37 November
1941 (when the "war warning" was received) the Commander-in‑Chief,
Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 46‑41
(Exhibit 2l). This bulletin dealt with the organization of the Japanese Navy
and with Japanese forces and installations in the Mandated Islands. It was a
revision of the ONI Bulletin above summarized and replaced that bulletin on the
subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated:
"The principal
change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has
arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into
separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection
with the southward advance into Indo‑China. The regrouping has resulted
in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below:
Major feet commands
"I. Combined Fleet
1. First Fleet
(Battle Force) 3
Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons
2. Second Fleet (Scouting
Force) 4
Crudiv, 8 Desrons, etc.
3. Third Fleet (Blockade
& Transport Force) Small
Craft.
4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate
Defense Force) 1
Desron, 1 Subron and
many small units.
5. Fifth Fleet
6. Sixth Fleet (Submarine
Fleet) 6
Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet (Aircraft
Carriers) 6
Cardiv
8. Combined Air Force (Seaplane
tenders, etc.) 4
Airons & shore based
planes.
"II. Japanese
Naval Forces in (Staff Hdqtrs.) 1
PG and 3 DD's
China.
1. First China Exped. Fleet (Central
China) Gunboats
2. Second China Exped. Fleet (South
China) 1
CA, 1 CL and small craft
3. Third China Exped. Fleet (North
China) Torpedo
Boats, etc.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet (Saigon) 1
CL, transports and mine
craft.
"The Japanese
Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More
merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant
ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the tame: The base forces and guard
divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of
the Navy, which is on full war‑time footing."
The Combined Fleet and
First Fleet as listed an this bulletin included three BatDivs, among which was
BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and HARUNA‑as to the latter it was
stated that it had been inactive during 1941 and was probably undergoing major
repairs). Also included was a cruiser division and two destroyer squadrons.
The Second Fleet
included four CruDivs and two destroyer squadrons. One of the CruDivs was
CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA).
The composition of the
Third, Fourth, and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was given in some detail in this
bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated, "The composition of a new Fifth
Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has been reported at Maizuru."
(Exhibit 21; p. 185.)
Admiral
McMorris stated that he did not know whether Washington kept CincPac fully
informed but, he said, the information which was received was taken at its face
value (page 899).
The
"war warning," it will be recalled, had been sent to Admiral Kimmel
on November 27th. On November 28th, the Army dispatch had been repeated to
Admiral Kimmel, advising, among other things, that Japanese future action was
unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. Also on
November 28th, there had been sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of CinCAF's
dispatch advising of the "winds code" to be used if diplomatic
relations were on the verge of being severed. And, on the same day, he had been
in communication with OPNAV concerning his plan for the reinforcement of Midway
and Wake, and, in that connection there had been mention made of the shortage
of antiaircraft guns.
On
November 30th, Admiral Kimmel sent a dispatch (Exhibit 77) urgently
recommending the shipment of 37 mm. anti‑aircraft guns and ammunition for
familiarization and training.
On
November 30, 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to CinCPac
for information (Exhibit 76), which advised in part:
512 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Indications
that Japan about to attack points on KRA by overseas expedition X. Desire you
cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt
of this dispatch X.
A second similar
dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77) requesting a daily report
from CincAF, even if there were no contacts and the information were all
negative.
Exhibit 10 is a dispatch of November 30 from CNO to CinCAF,
information CincPac.
Also
on November 30th Admiral McMorris prepared, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel,
a memorandum setting forth the steps which he recommended to be taken in the
event of American‑Japanese war within the ensuing twenty‑, four
hours (Exhibit 69A). This was revised on December 5th and set forth the
steps
to be taken in the event of war within forty‑eight hours (Exhibit 69B).
Vice Admiral McMorris
testified that during the first week of December, 1941, he, and he was sure
Admiral Kimmel, had in mind constantly the "war warning," the fact
that the Japanese forces were, according to Intelligence, on the move, the fact
that the Japanese were destroying codes, and that the Japanese in the past had
attacked without declaration of war (p. 328).
He stated further that
during that time he was also considering the tasks set forth in Phase IA of the
Pacific Fleet Plan, and that daily or on alternate days he furnished Admiral
Kimmel with an informal memorandum as to the action that should be taken by
important elements of the Fleet if war were initiated within twenty‑four
hours. He stated that typical of such memoranda were Naval Court of Inquiry
Exhibits 69A and 69B, which were dated 30 November and 5 December 1941,
respectively (p. 328‑329).
With reference to the
Phase IA task of maintaining air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches
to Oahu and the fact that no provision was made for carrying out that task,
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that submarines were considered to be the
greatest element of danger. He said that anti‑submarine patrols had been
placed in effect (p. 339).
At
about this time, it will be recalled, Admiral Kimmel also received information
concerning the estimated position of the Japanese Fleet. As Captain Layton
expressed it:
Captain Layton
testified that in accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, he prepared a
memorandum for the Admiral, dealing with the location of the Japanese Fleet.
This was prepared, according to Layton, on the evening of December 1st and was
submitted by him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum
bears certain notations in red pencil which, Layton testified, were inserted by
him on December 2nd prior to submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel and
which reflected the later information received after Preparation of the
memorandum on the night of December 1st‑2nd. It also bears certain lead
pencil notations which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel.
This memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the
location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to him and
to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.
Layton's estimate
stated that from the best available information, units of the Orange (Japanese)
fleet were "thought" to be located as listed in the memorandum. In
the Kure‑Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of the Combined
Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six battleships,
"(f)" and other units. He listed the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet,
at Nagara initially and then corrected it in red to indicate that it was at
Takao. Also in the Kure‑Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.
In the Shanghai area,
Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief, China Fleet, the Shanghai
Base Force, and an air group.
In the Bako‑Takao
area Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons and various destroyers and
the commander of the Combined Air Force with numerous air groups and the KASUGA
MARU (thought to be a converted carrier with 36 planes). He estimated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been en route to Takao
(this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he was at Takao) with a
cruiser division, destroyers, and with "Cardiv 4‑two CV and four DD;
Cardiv 3‑two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3 less HARUNA‑3 BB (maybe 2 BB)
and, he added in red pencil, certain cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.
In the Hainan‑Canton
area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet and
various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In the
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 513
French Indo‑China Area, he located
the Commander in Chief of an Expeditionary Fleet with various ships, including
21 transports and some base forces, among others. In the Mandates area, he
located at Palao an air group and base force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief
of the Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air
group At Saipan he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine Force with
possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force. In the Marshalls
area, he located various air groups and the carrier "KORYU" plus
plane guards," and several submarine squadrons and base force (Hew. Ex.
23).
Layton's memorandum
did not make any reference to the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the
Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en route to attack Pearl Harbor). According
to Layton, on 2 December 1941, during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the
Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of information concerning
Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 3. In his testimony, he described the
conversation on this point as follows:
"Mr. SONNETT:
Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you
recall it?
"Captain LAYTON:
As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier
Division 1 and Carrier Division 3 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I
think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of
those units, 1 feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel
looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet
partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they
could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that
effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words
to that effect . . . . (P. 213‑213)
"Mr. SONNETT:
Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your
description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am
trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information
concerning Cardivs 1 and 3 a serious jocular one?
"Captain LAYTON:
His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and
,t??' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say
that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a
long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month
and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do
you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head? or words to that effect.
In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact
location.
"Mr. SONNETT: He
was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?
"Captain LAYTON.
This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him
exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point
out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their
location" (P. 255‑,266).
On
December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of
the locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this
was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it showed
available in the Empire—4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question
mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available
for use in the home area. This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the
majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and implicated in the
impending moves, from their sources of information. The witness referred to his
translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokyo to inflame public
opinion toward larger armament money"—page 911), which stated that it
would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
using carriers, battleships, and cruisers; with Japan staking its existence on
the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending
some of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was
generally his reasoning (page 913);
Captain Layton further
testified that there were delivered to him, for presentation to Admiral
Kimmel, daily communication intelligence summaries, during the period of time
subsequent to the sending and receipt of the dispatches of 26 November. (Page
192). Captain Layton identified such summaries for the period 14 October to 14
December 1941, (Exhibit 22), and pointed out that the initials appearing in the
lower right hand corner of these documents reading HEK, appeared on the
original and were the initials of Admiral Kimmel (Page 193‑194).
514 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Layton stated
further that on certain of the originals of the communication intelligence
summaries there appeared underscoring of certain portions, and that certain of
the underscores were performed by Admiral Kimmel while certain other marks
appearing on the summaries, including marks as to direction finder bearings and
positions of ships were made by he, himself (Captain Layton). (Page 193).
Captain Layton
summarized and made reference in his testimony to what he considered to be the
significant parts of the Communications Intelligence Summaries dated from 27
November to 6 December 1941, and of the dispatches received and sent during
the same period, (Pages 194, 237, 244, 245), including his 1 December 1941
estimate as to the location of the Japanese Fleet Units, (pages 244, 245, 252,
253), and to the comments made on 2 December 1941 by Admiral Kimmel when, in
discussing the 1 December 1941 Layton estimate, Admiral Kimmel noted and
commented on the absence of the information concerning the location of two
Japanese carrier divisions. (Pages 212, 213, 255, 256). This intelligence, as
summarized by him, particularly concerning the locations of Japanese carriers,
but not entirely confined to them, was briefly, as follows:
A. 27 November 1941:
(a) (1) The
Communication Intelligence Summary Information of 27 November, delivered 28
November, was: Some tactical traffic from carriers. Four enciphered addressees
were noted, indicating a new command and a newly formed unit became active in
an operational or maneuverable stage and not in an administrative or routine
role. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the
Mandates; it was stated that carriers were still located in home waters. The
commander of the submarine forces was located in the Chichijima area and this
was of significance. (Page 194‑196).
(2) The term,
"home waters" as used in the summary, with reference to the location
of the carriers, meant Japanese home waters, that as, the drill grounds of the
Inland Sea and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei
Bay area, and, in general, the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu.
The term, "home waters" did not include Etorofu, since places in
northern Japan, including Hokkaido and the Kuriles, were referred to as the
high north area. The area east of Japan that would be included in the term,
"home waters", would embrace perhaps 40 to 60 miles or more; it would
be about the same distance that the United States Fleet operations would take
us west of San Clemente, San Pedro or San Diego. The definition of the term,
"home waters", as indicated above, was understood by Admiral Kimmel.
(Page 198).
(b) (1) The Naval
Attaché at Shanghai in dispatch number 270855, reported sightings between Hong
Kong and Shanghai, of many transports that were proceeding south, and that
military wharves at Shanghai were abnormally empty. (Page 196).
(2) OpNav dispatch to
CinCPac and CinCAF, information CinCLant, number 272337, was received. This was
the war warning message. It directed an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. (Page 196‑197).
B. 28 November 1941:
(a) (1) In the
Communication Intelligence Summary information of 28 November, delivered 29
November, it was noted that Tokyo originators were sending a considerably high
precedence traffic to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Second and Third
Fleets and Combined Air Force. It was further noted that no movements of
Combined Fleet Units were detected. Communications noted between the Army
Commander on Formosa and the Commander, Amphibious Force, were considered a
sure sign of amphibious operations. No submarine traffic was observed. (Page
198‑200).
(b) (1) The following
dispatch traffic occurred:
a. Com l4 to OpNav,
information CinCAF, stating the British consul advised the Japanese would
attack Krakow Isthmus on 1 December without an ultimatum. (Page 200‑201).
b. CinCAF to OpNav,
CinCpac, Com14, Com16, establishing the winds code in two variations one from
Tokyo to the, diplomatic net, the other from Japanese language foreign
broadcasts. (Page 20l).
c. Com16 to CinCAF,
OpNav, CinCPac and Com l4, advising that an unidentified ship had relieved the
KASHII and was in the Camranh Bay‑Saigon area. (Page 201).
d. OpNav to CinCAF
information CinCPac Com16 and Com14, dispatch number 281633, advising of
information received from the State Department of
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 515
various reports from sources in Asia
concerning the movement of Japanese forces southward. (Page 20l‑202).
C. 29 November 1941:
(a) (1) In the
Communication Intelligence Summary information of 29 November, delivered 30
November, it was noted that eleven messages from Tokyo intelligence, and four
long messages from Tokyo radio intelligence were sent to major commanders. The
Jaluit radio direction finder station included the Commander, Submarines as an
information addressee, which indicated that he was in the approaches to, or about
to enter the Mandated Islands, likely the Marshalls.
It was noted that
there was under the immediate command of the Commander-in‑Chief, Second
Fleet, who was in charge of the south invasion forces, Carrier Division 3,
along with 2 cruiser divisions, 2 destroyer squadrons, 2 submarine squadrons,
the Third Fleet or Amphibious Forces, and the French‑Indo‑China
Forces. The Commander of the Submarine Forces had his traffic routed through
Saipan, though on the previous day, it had been routed through Chichijima,
indicating a southerly or southeastern movement. (Page 202‑204).
(2) The only reference
to carriers appearing in the Communications Intelligence Summary of this date
was that CarDiv 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander‑in‑Chief,
Second Fleet; and there was no other information on that date relating to
Japanese carriers. (Page 205‑206).
(3) It was believed
that CarDiv 3 was composed of the RYUJO and Hosho. (Page 205).
(b) (1) The
Communications Intelligence Unit at Cavite sent a dispatch noting general radio
intelligence obtained by it on the previous two days. It referred, in dispatch
number 261331, to new Japanese ship arrivals in the Takao area. (Page 204).
(2) There was received
OpNav dispatch number 290110, addressed to Commander Northern Pacific Naval
Frontier, Commander South Pacific Naval Frontier, information CinCPac and
Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, advising that the Army had sent a war
warning dispatch to the Western Defense Command, and quoting that dispatch,
which advised of the termination of the negotiations with the Japanese, stated
hostile action possible at any moment, directed the undertaking of
reconnaissance and preparations to carry out WPL‑46. (Page 204‑205).
D. 30 November 1941:
(a) (1) In the
Communication Intelligence Summary information of 30 November, delivered 1
December, it was noted that general radio traffic was less than usual, and that
the only tactical circuit was between the AKAGI and several MARUs. The
significance of the term, "tactical circuit" is that the vessel
itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work
directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the
broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The
working of the AKAGI with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements
for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address
a Maru. (Page 206).
(2) It was noted
further that the battleships KONGO and HIYEI were placed as units in the CinC,
Second's task force. Captain Layton explained that while it was a mistake to
place the HIYEI as a member of the second fleet's task force, as it is now
known that the HIYEI was one of the battleships that attacked Pearl Harbor, and
that it was, on 30 November 1941, on the high seas enroute to Pearl Harbor.
This mistake was an error in fact but not an error in substance and arose from
a bad identification of a ship similar to the HIYEI, that is, the HARUNA,
which, in fact, did take part in the second expedition under the CinC, Second
Fleet. (Page 207‑208).
(3) It was further
noted that there was a strong impression that the CinC, Third Fleet was on its
way, and that there was a continued association of the Commander, Submarine
Forces with Jaluit, which, along with his known progress through the Chichijima
area to the Saipan zone, made his destination obviously the Marshalls.
Consequently, the communication intelligence summary pointed out that this bore
out Com 14's previous contention that there was a submarine concentration in
the Marshalls, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines, but also a good
portion of the submarines of the Submarine Force. (Page 208).
(4) It was also noted
that there was in the Marshalls, a unit of plane guard destroyers, indicating
the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although that fact was
not confirmed. (Page 209).
516 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(5) There were other
indications of air‑submarine operations from the Marshalls, following
from the fact that Naval Air Squadron 24 plus the Yokohama Naval Air Corps were
located there. (Page 208‑209).
(6) The Communication
Intelligence Summary of this date was initialed by Admiral (then Captain)
McMorris, War Plans Officer. (Page 209).
(b) (1) CinCPac
received from Com16 a dispatch addressed to OpNav, information CinCAF, CinCPac
and Com14, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had
occurred at midnight, that they followed the same garble pattern as before, and
that the shore addressees' call signs had not been changed. (Page 210).
(2) OpNav dispatch
number 301709, addressed to CinCAF, information CinCPac, was received. It
requested CinCAF to report daily as to whether any contacts were made in the
air search being conducted between Manila and Camranh Bay, and that such
reports should be made even though the results were negative. This search was
being made by CinCAF in pursuant of the directive by OpNav in its dispatch
number 300419. (Page 210).
E. 1 December 1941:
(a) (1) In the
Communication Intelligence Summary information of 1 December, delivered 2
December, it was confirmed that all service radio calls of the Japanese naval
forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 1 December, minus nine time. (Page
213).
(2) This change in
service calls was of particular significance since it was the Japanese custom
ordinarily not to change their radio calls until after the same had been in use
for a period of six months or more. The last change in calls had occurred on 1
November 1941, so that the discontinued service calls had been used for only
one month. This indicated a progressive step toward preparing for active
operations on a large scale. (P. 213).
(3) Captain Layton
testified that the underlining in red on the original of the communication
intelligence summary of the words that the change in calls indicated a
progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale was, to
the best of his recollection, made by Admiral Kimmel. (Page 213‑214).
(4) It was further
noted in the communication intelligence summary that the Japanese were adopting
more and more security provisions in handling their radio traffic. (Page 213‑214).
(5) No change was
noted as to the location of the Submarine Force, which was believed to be
eastward of the line between Yokosuka‑Chichijima‑Saipan, and under
"carriers", it was stated that there was no change. This, Capt.
Layton explained, meant that there was no change in the previous report as to
the location of carriers. The last report as to carriers, he stated, was that
they were in the Empire area with the exception of Car‑Div 3, and with
the further exception that there was possibly 1 carrier in the Mandates. (Page
215).
(6) The Communications
Intelligence Summary noted further that there was nothing to report concerning
the Fifth Fleet. (Page 215).
(7) Captain Layton
explained that the Fifth Fleet was on organization of which little or nothing
was known but there that were indications in the past that it was a force
assembled for operations in the Northern waters. (Page 216).
(b) The following
dispatches were handled:
(1) OpNav to CinCAF
and Com16, information CinCPac and Com14, referring to an intrigue in Thailand,
intended to draw the British and Japanese into war over that country. (Page
217).
(2) Com 16 to CinCAF,
information CinCPac, Com14 and OpNav, advising that Japanese station JVJ in
closing at 1700 hours, presumably minus nine time, stated that all listeners
should be sure to tune in at 0700 tomorrow morning since there may be important
news. Com16 suggested several radio frequencies that might be used. (Page 217).
(3) Com16 advised of
the results of its radio intelligence activity which included the obtaining of
information of Jap ship arrivals in the Takao area, which were under the
command of the CinC, Third Fleet, and that the ATAGO had shifted from the Kure
to the Sasebo communication zone and was apparently enroute to South China
waters. (Page 217‑218).
It also advised that
there was an impression that the broadcast scheduled by the Japanese radio
station JVJ, indicated above, would be an execute winds code message. Captain
Layton testified that as a result of receiving this dispatch, the monitors were
put on a double alert but nothing came of it. (Page 218).
F. 2 December 1941:
(a) (1) On this day there was presented by
Captain (then Lieutenant Commander) Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the 1 December
1941 Layton estimate
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 517
of the location of the Japanese Fleet
Unit. Admiral Kimmel directed Layton to prepare the estimate late on the
afternoon of Sunday, 30 November 1941, directing that it be prepared as of 1
December. (Page 310).
(2) The memorandum was
prepared by Layton and dated 1 December, and, afterwards, Layton obtained
certain substantiating and additional information from the officer who prepared
the daily communication intelligence summaries. When the 1 December estimate
was shown by Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noted that it contained a
typographical error on page 4, which he corrected in his handwriting. (The
error consisted of a reference to "20 CL", which should have read,
and was corrected by Admiral Kimmel to read "2 OCL". The 1 December
Layton estimate is exhibit 23. (Page 211).
(3) Admiral Kimmel
discussed this estimate with Layton and noted that it did not contain any
information as to the locations of the Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2,
consisting of four carriers, though it dad list Carrier Divisions 3 and 4, and
the KASUGA MAR U, 1 XCV, as being located in the Bako-Takao area, and the
KORYU, 1 CV, in the Marshalls. It was in connection with the absence of
reliable information on which to base an estimate as to the locations of
CarDivs 1 and 2 that Admiral Kimmel addressed to Layton the question whether they
might be rounding Diamond Head at that moment or words to that effect, to which
Layton replied that he hoped that in such case they would be sighted before
now. (Page 211‑212‑213).
(b) (1) It was noted
in the Communication Intelligence Summary of 2 December, delivered 3 December,
that the Japanese were having difficulty in routing their radio traffic, which
arose from their change to call signs, which was probably due to the
unfamiliarity of the operators with the new calls and with the location of the units
affected. The summary noted that Com16 reported the Second and Third Fleets to
be in the Takao area, but the Communication Intelligence Unit in Hawaii noted
that there was one indication that the two fleets were not close to Takao and
it expressed a belief that a large fleet, made up of First, Second Third Fleet
Units, had left Empire waters and was proceeding on a course that was not close
to Takao. (Page 218).
(2) The First Fleet
appeared to remain relatively quiet. The association of the Submarine Force
with the Mandates Fleet continued. Under "carriers" it was stated,
"almost a complete blank on information of the carriers today." It
was stated further that though over 200 service calls had been partially identified
since the 1st of December, yet not one carrier call had been recovered since
that date, causing it to be evident that carrier traffic was at a low ebb.
(Page 219).
(3) Captain Layton
stated that Admiral Kimmel read the statement in the Communication Intelligence
Summary with reference to carriers, and the failure to identify carrier call
signs, as well as the information that carrier traffic was at a low ebb. (Page
220).
(4) Captain Layton
explained the difference between the reference in the Communication
Intelligence Summary that there was almost a complete blank of information on
the carriers, and the reference in this summary in connection with the Second
Fleet that a lack of new identification contributed to the belief that a large
part of the Second Fleet was underway in company, as follows:
a. There was no radio
silence insofar as the Second Fleet was concerned.
b. The Second Fleet
was using its radio and was on the air on known frequencies;
c. That Fleet was
handling a normal pattern of traffic; there was a normal number of calls in its
circuits though a number of them were not identified.
The lack of
identification was due to the change in call signs. However, the normal amount
of the traffic, associated with the lack of identification, caused it to be
believed that the Second Fleet was at sea. However, with reference to carriers,
there was a complete blank of information, meaning that the carrier circuits
were definitely not up to normal use. This would have meant either that the carriers
were under radio silence wherever located or operating, or else that they were
operating so close to home that they were using a broadcast frequency which
could not be heard far away. (Page 220‑225) .
(5) Captain Layton in
his testimony, however, insisted that the statement in the Communication Intelligence
Summary that carrier traffic was at a low ebb did not signify anything unusual
to him at that time, (page 225), since it was sometimes the custom of the
Japanese to take their carriers into the Inland Sea area where they would not
be heard from for a considerable period of time. (Page 225‑226).
(6) He stated that he
could not recall whether he had any discussions with Admiral Kimmel concerning
the lack of carrier traffic. (Page 226).
518 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(c) (1) Com16 advised
OpNav, CinCPac, CinCAF and Com14 that the CinC, Second and Third Fleets were in
the Takao area, and stated further that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok has
requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes. (Page 226).
(2) CinCAF dispatch
number 020345 to OpNav, Information CinCPac advised that a patrol plane had
spotted nine submarines on a southerly course. (Page 226) .
(3) CinCAF dispatch
number 020730 to OpNav information CinCPac, reported further sightings of
Japanese submarines and some ships in Camranh Bay. (Page 226‑227).
(4) Assistant Naval
Attaché in Shanghai to OpNav, information CinCPac, advised of Japanese troop
movements in the vicinity of Shanghai. (Page 227).
G. 3 December 1941:
(a) (1) It was noted
in the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 3 December, delivered
4 December, that though the volume of traffic was normal, the state of call
recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. It was noted
that there was an extensive use of alternate calls by major commands which
slowed up identification. It was stated "no information on Japanese
submarines or carriers." (Page 227‑228).
(b) (1) On this day,
OpNav addressed a dispatch to CinCAF and Com16, information CinCPac and Com14
that Tokyo had ordered its embassies to destroy its purple machine. (Page
228). Captain Layton obtained information as to what the purple machine was and
at Admiral Kimmel's request, advised him of that information. (Page 228‑229).
Admiral Kimmel was also advised that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was burning
papers. (Page 229).
(2) OpNav in dispatch
number 031850 advised that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were
destroying their codes and important papers. (Page 230).
(3) The Naval Attaché
in Singapore in dispatch number 020335 stated that the CinC, China Fleet had
restricted the movement of Allied ships in China waters. (Page 230).
H. 4 December 1941:
(a) (1) It was noted
in the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 4 December, delivered
5 December, that an important move had been made by the Takao radio in
inaugurating a Fleet broadcast using the same prefix indicator that was used by
the Tokyo radio, showing that Takao had now assumed the position of handling
major fleet traffic on high speed circuits. Many urgent messages were also
noted, being addressed by Tokyo to major commanders and among these was a seven
part Tokyo intelligence dispatch. The outstanding item of the day was the lack
of messages originating from the CinC Second and Third Fleets, who previously
had been very talkative and now very quiet. (Page 230231).
(2) There was no
traffic which enabled any check to be made on the presence of the Fourth Fleet
Units in the Marshalls. The impression obtained from the fact that the
previously talkative commanders were silent, though still prominent as
addressees, especially of intelligence dispatches, was that they were at sea
and maintaining radio silence though still receiving. Captain Layton explained
that as of that time the Japanese had not learned how to use the American trick
of putting out messages without indicating who was the originator. (Page 232).
(b) (1) The dispatches
handled on this day referred to Japanese troop and ship movements of China and
Indo‑China, and other general information, obtained from the Assistant
Naval Attaché, Shanghai, dispatch numbers 020704, and 020702, and Naval
Attaché, Tokyo, dispatch number 030630. (Page 232‑233).
I. 5 December 1941:
(a) (1) The
Communication Intelligence Summary of 5 December, delivered 6 December, noted
that the traffic volume was extremely heavy and that all circuits were
overloaded. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to cause
a jammed condition on all circuits. Neither the CinC Third or Second Fleets
originated any traffic although they were still frequently addressed and it is
believed that they were undoubtedly in the Takao area or further south. (Page
233‑234).
(b) It was noted that
a number of Marus had addressed the CinC, Third Fleet, and there was traffic
strengthening the impression that the CinC Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls.
There was no traffic from the Commanders of the Carrier or Submarine Forces.
(Page 233‑235).
J. 6 December 1941:
(a) (1) The
Communication Intelligence Summary of 6 December was not delivered until after
the attack on 7 December. (Page 235).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 519
(b) (1) Certain
dispatches were also received on the 7th, which Captain Layton thought were
received after the attack. (Page 235‑237).
The information sent
to Admiral Kimmel.
(ii) Vice Admiral
McMorris testified that in advising Admiral Kimmel during the critical period of
1941, he considered the negative as well
as the positive information available concerning the whereabouts of the
Japanese carriers, and that such negative information included the Intelligence
that there was no information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers
(page 330).
during this period, as
previously noted, included the fortnightly summary of current national
situations, prepared by ONI and issued on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57). In
addition to the military and naval information furnished, this stated,
concerning the Japanese diplomatic situation, that unless the Japanese
requested a continuance of the conversations, the Japanese‑American
negotiations would have virtually broken down; the Japanese government and
press were proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work
of building the greater East Asia sphere; the press was also criticising
Thailand severely; strong indications pointed to an early Japanese advance
against Thailand; and, relations between Japan and Russia remained strained.
On
December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark (Exhibit 50) and
advised that Admiral Halsey's advance in the ENTERPRISE to Wake had been
covered by two patrol squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway, and Wake, and
that upon completion of the movement, Admiral Kimmel planned to return one
squadron to Pearl Harbor and leave the other at Midway and awaiting
developments. The letter discussed the difficulty of supply and defense of the
outlying islands. The letter also stated that consideration was being given to
the dispatches concerning the use of Army personnel in outlying islands; and,
that Admiral Kimmel had frequently called Admiral Stark's attention to the
inadequacy of Army anti‑aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area, with
particular reference to the shortage of anti‑aircraft guns. So far, he
said, very little had been done to improve this situation. It was pointed out
that because of the Army's lack of equipment, Admiral Kimmel was unable to
understand the dispatches directing that the Army be utilized in the defense
of the outlying islands.
A
postscript to this letter stated, "You will note that I have issued orders
to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating
area." It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he took no
exception to this (page 153).
In
connection with the Army's development of airfields in Fiji and New Caledonia,
Admiral Kimmel stated in a further postscript to his letter that the Navy was
bound to be involved in the protection of shipping and of the fields. He said,
"I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles, that we may
become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense
will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive."
Also
on December 2nd, Admiral Kimmel sent an official letter to the Chief of Naval
Operations concerning the defense of outlying islands and referring, among
other things, to the November 28th dispatches in this connection. After some
discussion, this letter concluded that Marine armament could be withdrawn from
outlying islands to a very limited extent; that, if the Marines were replaced,
the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, would be valueless as a defense
battalion; that replacing the Marines would very materially weaken the defense
because of less proficient personnel; and, that considering all aspects, Marine
planes were more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.
It
was also stated that the presence of Army forces on outlying bases would
inevitably bring up the question of command; that Midway, Wake, Johnston and
Palmyra were Navy bases; that unity of command would be necessary; and, that
command would have to be vested in the Navy's commanding officer at each
station.
This
letter also said that Admiral Kimmel had conferred with General Short on the
matter and that arrangements were in progress looking toward the organization
of three Army defense battalions, the training of such units with available
equipment, the obtaining by the Army of requisite equipment, the Army organization
of three pursuit plane squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status, and
bringing said units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them
available to support or replace Marines or for use on other islands not manned
by Marines.
Admiral
Kimmel stated also that the major point was that the Advanced Bases were
"going concerns;" that "the international situation is such that
active
520 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
defense against
hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice;" and, that any radical
change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there were compelling
necessity therefor.
In
his letter Admiral Kimmel also expressed "growing concern" over the
increase in the Army and Navy stations that might require support from the Fleet;
that such involvement "may seriously interfere with offensive operations
of the Fleet;" that this should be curtailed; and, that the Fleet in a
series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific could not
contribute very much toward victory over a power thousands of miles to the
westward.
Admiral
Kimmel's letter closed with various recommendations consistent with the views
expressed in his letter.
Admiral
Smith, during recross examination by Admiral Stark, said that Admiral Kimmel
had regularly reported to Admiral Stark the action he took, but not after the
"war warning" message (page 552). On recross by Admiral Kimmel, he
stated that Exhibit 50, the December 2nd letter, did report what Admiral Kimmel
was doing. Admiral Stark's lawyer contended this was not a reply to that
message but to the earlier one about plane movements; the witness finally
characterized the letter as a "routine weekly report" (pages 533‑534).
He remembered no dispatch which reported the action taken by Admiral Kimmel after
the "war warning" (page 554), but said "probably there was"
(page 555).
In
addition to the December 2nd letter, it will be recalled, Admiral Kimmel had
sent a dispatch on November 28th, concerning the same subject.
On
December 3, 1941, OPNAV sent two dispatches advising of Japanese instructions
to destroy codes as follows:
1.
A dispatch from OPNAV to CincAF, ComSIXTEEN for action, and to CinCPac and
ComFOURTEEN for information which advised that Tokyo ordered London, Hongkong,
Singapore, and Manila to destroy Purple machine and the Batavia machine already
had been sent to Tokyo; Washington also had been directed to destroy the Purple
and all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents; also, that the
British Admiralty had reported that the Embassy at London had complied (Exhibit
66).
Captain Safford referred to OpNav secret dispatch 031855
which he said he prepared on December 3, and to a similar dispatch released by
Admiral Wilkinson. He then said:
"Before drafting my message, I called Commander
McCollum on the telephone and asked him, "Are you people in Naval
Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?'
McCollum emphasized both "we's'. McCollum replied, 'We are doing
everything we can to get the news out to the Fleet.' In sending this
information, I was overstepping the bounds as established by approved war plans
and joint agreement between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I
did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released.
OpNav 031855 was addressed to CinCAF and Com 16 for action, but was routed to
CinCPac and Com 14 for information. It was written in highly technical language
and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M.
Coleman, U. S. N., on CinCPac's Staff, could have explained its
significance." (p.359‑360)
Captain Safford said that the unit in the Fourteenth Naval
District did not have any material from which they could have gained this
information through their own efforts. (p. 360)
2.
A dispatch from OPNAV to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, for action:
"Highly
reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions
were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong X
Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their
codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important and confidential and
secret documents" (Exhibit 20)
Admiral Pye said that he saw the December 3 dispatch
concerning the destruction of codes and discussed it with the Commander in
Chief, that it seemed perfectly evident that such action could precede war by
many days and it did not indicate immediate action. They were unaware of the
source of this information and as it had appeared in the newspapers it probably
did not mean as much as it would have meant had they known the source. Admiral
Pye felt that at Oahu they were pretty much operating in the dark so far as the
international situation was concerned. (p. 157)
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 521
Exhibit 11 is the December 3 dispatch by CNO to CinCAF,
CinCPac and others.
Concerning the code destruction messages, Admiral Turner
said that it was impossible for him to understand how anyone could believe that
because of the messages the war was coming in the Western Pacific and would not
involve Oahu. He pointed out that both Washington and Manila had been included
in the dispatch.
Admiral McMorris said that the December 3rd dispatch
concerning codes was the best indication, in his opinion, that the United
States would be involved in war with Japan. He did not recall Admiral Kimmel's
view. (p. 247)
Admiral Anderson said that he had not precise knowledge but
he thought that there had been a proper dissemination of information among the
officers of the higher command. He saw the Commander in Chief at least weekly.
Admiral Anderson did not think that he had seen nor had he been told about the
October 16 dispatch. (p. 392). Admiral Anderson could not recall the November
24 dispatch or the November 30 dispatch to CinCAF with copy to CinCPac for
information. He did remember having seen the war warning and believed that he
had seen the December 3 dispatch.
As
a matter of interest, it may be noted that a sentence appearing at the end of
this copy of the dispatch, which was released by T. S. Wilkinson, was stricken
out in pencil. That sentence read: "From foregoing infer that Orange plans
early action in Southeast Asia."
On
December 4 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21) to NavStaGuam for action,
and to CincAF; CincPac; ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN for information stating:
"Guam
destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified mat
matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence
retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications
with CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and OpNav X Be prepared to
destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X
Report crypto channels retained"
On
December 6, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 22) bearing time‑date stamp 061743
was sent by OPNAV to CinCPac for action, and to CincAF for information. This
stated:
"In
view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying
Pacific islands, you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and
confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X
Means of communication to support our current operations and special
intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment"
Commander
Kramer drafted Exhibit 66, the December 3rd dispatch concerning Japanese
destruction of the "purple" machine. This was sent on the
"Kopek" Channel, which was a channel for technical traffic between
the Navy Department; Pearl Harbor and the Asiatic Station (page 971). It
indicated, he said, a break in diplomatic relations. Exhibit 20, sent out by
OPNAV on the same day as Exhibit 66, was the interpretive dispatch of Exhibit
66 (page 960).
Admiral
Noyes said that Exhibit 21 (dispatch to Guam of December 4th, directing the
destruction of codes) was prepared by him and motivated by the growing feeling
that war in the Pacific was imminent (page 1031). It was released by Admiral
Ingersoll.
Admiral
Noyes said that Exhibit 22 (authorizing destruction of codes on outlying
islands, dated December 6, 1941) was prepared by him and treated as priority
dispatch, despite the lack of priority shown on its face (pages 1040, 1042).
Admiral
Stark testified that the code destruction message was sent to Guam because he
felt that Guam was in the most danger; he did not similarly advise ComFOURTEEN
because he did not think Hawaii was in as much danger as was Guam. (page 69).
At this time, Admiral Stark testified, he believed that war was imminent. Of
particular significance he felt, was the information relating the destruction
of codes (pages 165‑6). We also knew that the Japanese consuls were
advising the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Malay, the Philippines,
Hawaii, the United States, etc. (page 157). Admiral Ingersoll stated that the
dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of codes strengthened the "war
warning" (page 835).
Admiral
Turner said that on Friday, December 5, 1941, there was a discussion between
Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll and himself concerning the general situation,
and they all felt that all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of
command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary (page
522 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1006). They did send
some other messages about destruction of codes, both Japanese and our own (page
1007).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that he regarded the dispatches concerning Japanese
destruction of codes as indicating that the Japanese were going to take steps
to prevent the seizure of their codes upon the breaking off of diplomatic
negotiations, and regarded the dispatch directing Guam to destroy classified
matter as a general precautionary measure (page 327). He "presumed"
that he received the December 6th dispatch prior to the attack (page 327).
Admiral
Smith testified that he saw the dispatches relating to the destruction of codes
but that this meant little to him as CincPac was prepared to destroy codes
(page 533). At this time, he said, war was inevitable (page 534).
About December 3rd, Admiral Smith said, after receipt of the
dispatch of that date, and information from the Asiatic Fleet to the effect
that heavy Japanese movements were on the way to the Southward, he believed
that the Japanese were going to attack Malay Peninsula and possibly the Philip.
pines; he thinks that the reaction of others at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters
was the same.
Admiral
Pye testified that he saw Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes) on December
4th, but that this information was published in the newspapers (page 427).
Admiral Pye testified that he had not seen Exhibits 21 and 22 (Page 428).
Commander
Rochefort, who was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fourteenth Naval
District, stated that during this period the Japanese Consulate was burning or
destroying various papers (page 474).
Captain
Layton said that the messages concerning Japanese code destruction meant to him
only that the Japanese, were destroying a cipher machine; he knew
"purple" designated it as a diplomatic code (pages 904‑5) and
that the "purple" cipher was A high class cipher (page 908).
On
December 5, 1941, he said, they received word from the Naval Observer at
Wellington that the Japanese were destroying codes. This was given to CincPac
and was considered along with other information received at that time (page
906). At that time, they received messages from the British and from Washington
Stating that highly secret and reliable information indicated a Japanese
attack on the Kra Peninsula; this seemed to dovetail with the other information
which they had (page 906).
There
was a discussion concerning the significance of the code destruction messages;
they seemed to indicate to Layton that Japan was preparing for all eventualities.
He presumed that when it was discussed by Admiral Kimmel with the War Plans
Officer and others, it was a matter of discussion (page 906).
Admiral
McMorris said that he felt that Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes)
indicated strongly that there would be war with Japan. He did not recall
whether this opinion was prevalent on CincPac's staff, but believed it was
thought by CincPac that war was then extremely possible (page 895).
It
may be noted that although Admiral Kimmel stated that he had kept General
Short informed, he did not personally direct that General Short be given the
dispatches concerning codes destruction (Exhibits 20, 21, 22) and did not know
whether they were given to him (page 327).
The only action that Admiral Bloch recalled as a result of
the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes was the security
measures already prescribed, the additional inshore patrol in Honolulu, a
warning that was given to the Destroyer captains, and his belief the Army was
on a full alert. (p. 18)
Admiral Bloch did not believe that the Army had been
informed of these warning (code) messages. The messages, he said, 'were secret
and they had been admonished to keep them secret to prevent alarming people,
and one thing and another, Admiral Bloch's War Plans Officer would know about
them. Admiral Bloch said that since General Short and he saw one another very
frequently and Admiral Kimmel and he saw one another practically every day, it
is hard to believe that anything of importance could take place or that
anything could be received of even small importance that was not discussed
because it is only fair to assume that they discussed everything. (p 18)
General Short, he said, had an Army Colonel as a liaison
officer in Admiral Bloch's office and Admiral Bloch had in the General's office
a Lieutenant of the Naval Reserve as a liaison officer and these men were
supposed to be kept informed. Admiral Bloch's liaison officer did not know of
the dis‑
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 523
patches
that had been received because Admiral Bloch did not consider that it was
proper to tell him; he was quite inexperienced. Nor was Admiral Bloch sure that
the Army's liaison officer knew of the messages, but he said they were in close
touch through these liaison officers and felt that they knew what was going on.
He said that it was indicated that there were some things which they were not
correctly informed about. (p. 18)
Neither
General Short nor his Chief of Staff recalled having seen these messages prior
to the attack (pages 255, 486).