XXX. JAPANESE MESSAGE ADVISING OF FOURTEEN PART REPLY AND FIRST THIRTEEN PARTS

 

A. MESSAGE ADVISING OF FOURTEEN PART REPLY

 

On December 6, 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communica­tion (document 38, Exhibit 63), as follows:

"From: Tokyo

"To: Washington

"December 6, 1941 "Purple

"#909 Re my #644 (a).

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

 

B. THE FIRST THIRTEEN PARTS OF THE REPLY

 

Also on December 6, 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63), which had been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indicated as Navy


 (a) See S. I. S. #225445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three day, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured, Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.)

 

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translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were translated by the Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly part 13 disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal, viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotiations.

 

C. DELIVERY OF THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE ABOVE MESSAGES

 

Captain Heard testified that he did not know what information was available. On the evening of 6 December 1941, but that a 24‑hour watch, headed by a senior officer, had been maintained in ONI since 27 May 1941 (page 467). Also a 24‑hour watch in the Far Eastern Section had been commenced on 4 December 1941 (page 467), and ONI had a direct wire to Secretary Hull (page 468).

Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn in December 1941, was Senior Watch Officer in Op-20‑G, which handled the decoding of Japanese diplomatic cryptographs (page 734). He was familiar in general with Exhibit 63, the file of intercepts. The Army and Navy cooperated to get this material; each main­tained interception stations (page 734). The Army intercepts were cleared through the Navy and vice versa. The division made on the basis of dates; the Army was responsible for even dates; the Navy odd (page 735). Documents were noted as to time of translation; the dates at the top were the dates of inter­ception. (page 735).

He said that Document 39 (14 part dispatch) was received in the Navy De­partment from station as follows: (all times Washington time).

Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 received 1149, 12‑6‑41:

Parts 9, 10 received between 1149 and 1451, 12‑6‑41

Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13 received at 1451, 12‑6‑41;

These first 13 pacts were processed and given to Commander Kramer between 2100 and 2200, 12‑6‑41.

Commander Kramer said that the fourteen part message was received by him (Document 39, Exhibit 63) and he got the first 13 parts broken down and translated by 2105, December 6th. He called Admiral Wilkinson, who confirmed his plan of distribution. He went to the White House and gave a folder to one of Admiral Beardall's assistants, which contained the 13 parts of the Japanese reply, with instructions to get it to the President right away. The President was entertaining. He then went to Secretary Knox's house and waited while the Secretary read the message, and had a brief discussion of it. When he delivered the messages to Secretary Knox, Secretary Knox did not comment as his wife and a business associate were present (page 972). Later Kramer and the Secretary privately discussed some of the points of the 13 parts of the reply Secretary Knox called Secretaries Stimson and Hull, and these calls indicated a meeting of the three Secretaries at 1000, December 7th. Kramer was instructed to be there with this and any other material which came in. He then took the transla­tions to Admiral Wilkinson, in his quarters. He thought that Admiral Wilkinson called Admirals Turner and Stark, but is not certain (page 982). He arrived back in the Navy Department at 0030. He then secured and went home, but could be reached by telephone at any time.

Document 38 of Exhibit 63, advising that the time of delivery of the 14 part reply would be directed by a separate dispatch, was received and delivered by Kramer on December 6th along with the 13 parts (page 971).

Captain Safford said that on the week‑end of December 6, 1941, his unit handled three times the normal traffic for a busy day (page 756). Thirteen parts of the 14‑part message came in and were distributed by Kramer between 2100 and 2400 on December 6th. The Army advised that it had informed Secre­tary Hull by 2230.

Apparently based on conversations with Kramer, Captain Safford stated that Kramer distributed the messages to the White House and to Admiral Wilkinson; that he believed that Admiral Wilkinson telephoned Admiral Stark; and that Kramer returned to Navy Department at 1 a.m., then went home, and left instructions for a call when part 14 came in, as he had instructions to deliver all of the message to Admiral Stark at 0900, December 7, 1941.

According to Admiral Ingersoll, he saw the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply on the night of December 6th‑7th. This, he said, indicated that the situation was very tense (page 828). He did not remember the other message (Document 38).

Admiral Turner remembered Document 38, but he did not remember when he saw it (page 999).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall the above translations or any information delivered to him at his home by office messenger on the evening of

 

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December 6th nor any conversation with Secretary Knox or Admiral Wilkinson (pages 780, 166).*

 


* It will be recalled that on December 8th there was also available in Washington an intercepted Japanese communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18th, describing ships, and the courses of ships in Pearl Harbor (Document 40, Exhibit 83).