XXXI. DECEMBER 7, 1941, IN WASHINGTON
A. INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS OTHER THAN PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P.m. MESSAGE"
Captain Safford said that an intercepted Japanese message in the shape of a circular telegram from Tokyo, using the "hidden word" code, dated 7 December 1941, (Exhibit 20), was received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, shortly before 11 o'clock in the morning of 7 December. Three of the words in this message had a secondary or hidden meaning, constituting the actual message. Captain Safford said that this message was translated in such a hurry on Sunday morning, 7 December, that only two of the three key words were given their hidden value. As a result, the message was translated (p. 125‑126):
"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation."
Captain Safford said that if the third and omitted key word had been given its hidden meaning, the message would have read (P 126, 609‑610):
"Relations between Japan and England and United States are not in accordance with expectation."
Captain Kramer made the following statement with regard to his translation of the "hidden word" message of 7 December 1941, referred to in the preceding paragraphs (p 133‑135):
"I do recall on that that after my return from the State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the fourteen‑part note from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text, a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking relations. As I recall it now, I dictated to a chief yeoman the sense of the message, glancing through the entire message, spotting another code word referring to England, and then two minutes after that was on my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately an hour later and was looking over the morning's traffic again that I again examined more closely this particular plain language message, which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the omission referring to the United States.
". . . My recollection is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted. I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or more phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which, if correct, would indicate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do definitely recall, however, that no retranslation of that message was made for distribution because of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State Department and Chief of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would be well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had been so much excitement late in the morning. I might further add that when the attack was first learned, I recall definitely feeling that there was no point in making the delivery at that time. That was perhaps 1:30."
Captain Kramer further stated that when he returned to his office at around noon on 7 December and noted the omission in the "hidden word" message of reference to the United States, he attempted to telephone all persons who had received the translation. However, he was able to contact only two of them, he thought these two were Captain McCollum and Colonel Bratton. Captain Kramer believed that he had made the telephone calls at about 12:30 (p. 595‑596).
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On December 7, 1941, there were three Japanese communications intercepted and translated by the Army in addition. to part fourteen of the Japanese reply and the "1 p.m. message." These were:
"From: Washington (Nomura)
"December 3, 1941
Re your #875 [a]
"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once."
"December 6, 1941
"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:
(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese‑American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.
(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us . . . (Message incomplete).
"December 7, 1941
"1104 Re my #103.
"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communiqué to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.
"Relayed to Berlin."
E. PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P.m. MESSAGE"
Also on December 7, 1941, the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply, and the Japanese instruction to the emissaries in Washington to deliver the reply at one p m. on the 7th of December were translated, as follows:
1. Navy translation‑(Document 39, Exhibit 63)
[a] See S. I. S. #25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo‑China.)
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"7 December 1941
"#902 Part 14 of 14
(NOTE: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English Phrase VERY IMPORTANT")
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo‑American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese‑American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."
2. Army translation (Document 41, Exhibit 63)
"December 7, 1941
"Purple (Urgent‑Very Important)
"#907 To be handled in government code.
"Re my #902(a).
"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time."
C. DELIVERY OF PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P.m. MESSAGE" AND ACTION TAKEN
Captain McCollum said that he arrived in the Navy Department at about 0730 on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, to assume a special watch in the Far Eastern Section of ONI. Shortly after his arrival Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, sent for him and a discussion was had concerning the situation in the Far East. A little before 8:30 both Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum went down to talk to Admiral Stark. At about 9 o'clock Captain McCollum received word that one of his officers wished to see him urgently. He stepped outside and Lieutenant Commander Kramer delivered to him the last part of the Japanese "Fourteen Part Reply," together with the instructions directing its presentation to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, Washington time (p. 34‑35) At that time Captain McCollum had a short talk with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance of the instructions and the loiter pointed out that 1 p.m. Washington time would mean about 7:30 in the morning, Honolulu time, and about 2 o'clock in the morning out in the Philippines; that the exact significance of this was not known, but that if an attack were coming it looked as if it were timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii (p. 33, 36). Captain McCollum said that he took the message and instructions in to Admiral Stark and pointed out to him the possible significance of the time in conjunction with the note (p 86). Captain McCollum stated: "We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the ambassadors, we felt there were important things which would move at that lime, and that was pointed out . . . to Admiral Stark. . . ." (p 33‑34)
Referring to the Japanese instructions to deliver the "Fourteen Part Reply" to the U. S. Secretary of State at 1 p.m., Washington time, on 7 December, Captain Kramer said that he had been impressed by the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was several hours before sunrise in the Kra Peninsula area, where he knew that the Japanese had been contemplating an attack on Kota Baru with the connivance of the Thai Chief of Staff. Consequently, when he delivered the "1 p.m. message" to Mr. Hull's private secretary, he pointed this fact out to the latter and to Colonel Bratton, who was also in Mr. Hull's outer office. He also mentioned the fact that 1 p.m. in Washington was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor (p. 137).
(a)‑S. I. S. #25843‑text of Japanese reply.)
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Captain Kramer said that in all he had pointed out the significance of the delivery time of the "Fourteen Part Reply" to perhaps eight or ten different people, including Commander McCollum, several people in the State Department, Colonel Bratton, possibly Admiral Wilkinson, and probably Captain Safford. He did not remember whether he had mentioned the matter when delivering the "1 p.m. message" to CNO's office. (p. 137‑138).
Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood said that the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply was received while he was on watch between midnight and 7 a.m., December 7, 1941 (page 925). Also a further dispatch was received during the watch, concerning the time of delivery of the long diplomatic message. The first dispatch, the long diplomatic message, was in English (part 14 of Exhibit 63). He thinks he delivered this to the Army. The second was in Japanese (page 926), and required translation which he thinks was done by an Army translator (part 41 of Exhibit 63). He left the dispatches for Kramer and left around seven before Kramer came in. He can't remember whether the translated message was back before he left the office at 7 a.m. (page 926).
Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering testified that on 7 December 1941 he was on duty in Op-20‑G of Naval‑Communications, beginning at 0700 (page 812). He said that Part 14 of the Japanese reply was processed and ready for delivery at 0700 and was delivered to Kramer on his arrival between 0900 and 1000; the "1 p.m. message" was received from an Army translator at about 0715 and was held until Kramer arrived and then was delivered to him (p. 813).
Lieutenant Commander Lynn testified that Part 14 of the Japanese reply did not require translation into English; it was received between 0305 and 0700 on December 7th, and, he thought, it was handed to Kramer at about 0900‑1000. He said that the "1 p.m. message" arrived between 0305 and 0700, 12‑7‑41 and was processed and in the Army's hands for translation at 0700, 12‑7‑41.
According to Captain Safford Part 14 came in and was decoded and ready at 0700, 12‑7‑41 (page 757), The "1 p.m. message" came in and was sent to the Army for translation from the Japanese, and came back about 1000, December 7 (page 758).
Kramer, he said, went to Admiral Stark's office, gave it to him personally or to an aide, then to Admiral Beardall at the White House, and then to the State Department with the 14th part at about 1000, where Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson were (page 758). (The Court here refused to sustain the Judge Advocate's objection to testimony by the witness as to what was told to him (page 748)).
Captain Safford continued, stating that Kramer came back and found the translation of the message instructing delivery at one p.m. There also was a message "in the hidden‑word code" which had been translated hurriedly and said, "relations in England not in accordance with expectation." In Kramer's haste they left out a word and the message should have read—(the witness was here interrupted). He then said that Kramer immediately redistributed the two messages; went to CNO and gave them to an aide, Admiral Stark being in conference; to the White House, there to an aide; to the State Department about 11 and gave copies to the Secretaries of War, State and Navy. He then said that to the copy which Kramer gave to the Secretary of the Navy was a note saying that this was sunrise at Honolulu and midnight at Manila and undoubtedly meant a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in a few hours. (On Admiral Stark's motion this was stricken out by the court since the witness had no personal knowledge.)
Captain Safford summarized the information which he said indicated the objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack, as follows:
"Going back to the late Spring of 1941, on May 22, we received positive proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern Asia and the Southwest Pacific. On July 24, a high authority in Japan directed the withdrawal of merchant shipping from the Northeast Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and Indian Ocean. On September 4, we received information indicating Japan's determination to carry out her program of southward expansion and to expel the United States and England from China, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. On October 15, we received unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern Asia. In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government
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had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless diplomatic victory. On November 12, we received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the dead‑line for negotiations then being conducted between the Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. At one time, when it looked as if Moscow would fall, there were indications from several sources that Japan would invade Siberia. On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p.m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable, and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally, at 10:15 a.m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time) that date. 1:00 p.m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor to about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper sent over from S. I. S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy. I do not know whether or not a copy of this note was appended to the paper given to Admiral Stark. At this same time, information was also received indicating that Japan was about to commence hostilities against the British Empire. This information was sent over to S. I. S. immediately." (p. 357‑8)
Captain Safford then discussed the distribution of information within the Navy Department and to the President and State Department, etc. His statement of the distribution by Commander Kramer from December 1 on was based, he said, on what Commander Kramer told him verbally.
Commander Kramer said that he received no phone call on the night of December 6th‑7th and came in at 0900 on December 7th, received the 14th part of the reply and took it and the first 13 parts to Admiral Stark's office about 0900 where there apparently was a meeting He was not certain who was in Admiral Stark's office. He was in a hurry. Admiral Wilkinson was there (page 973). He then left the Navy Department at 0930 to make delivery to the White House, and was at the State Department at 0950 waiting for Secretary Knox in order to deliver this additional material.
This delivery did not include the message setting 1 p.m. as the time for delivery of the reply. He did not get that until he returned to the Navy Department, at about 1020. He then found that a message had been received which directed delivery of the reply to the Secretary of State at 1300, and also other messages which directed destruction of Japanese codes still on hand, and one which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 1030. He handed the "1 p.m. message" to Admiral Stark's aide at 10:30 or 10:45 and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's desk. Document 41 of Exhibit 63 is the "1 p.m. message", which had been translated by Army. He then left to deliver this new material to the White House and the State Department. He handed the material to a State Department official, who customarily received such material for the Secretary of State, and who was to deliver it to Secretary Knox.
He invited attention, verbally, to the time involved (page 965); that is, that this was 7:30 in Honolulu and a few hours before sunrise at Koto Bharu. He did not tell the naval officers this as he figured they would know it. The remarks he made were not to Secretary Knox himself but to the State Department official who handled this material for Secretary Hull and who was to deliver it to Secretary
534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Knox. He did not advise the official in the State Department to tell the Secretary of the Navy that 1300 Washington time meant dawn in Pearl Harbor and that it might mean an attack on Pearl Harbor (page 985) And, he said, Captain Safford never stated to him or in his presence that the message concerning the delivery of the note indicated a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor (page 986).
Captain Heard, who was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI, stated that information about the Japanese reply was available in the Navy Department at 0900, 7 December 1941 (page 464). Sometime between 0900 and 1000 DONI took the Chief of the Far East Section, Commander McCollum, with him to CNO to present this information. This statement, he said, was based on official records, a report from McCollum, and an official statement of DONI made very shortly after the event (page 465). Lieutenant Commander Watts relieved McCollum at 0800, 7 December (page 466)
Admiral Schuirmann testified that on the morning of December 7, 1941, he knew that the Japanese Ambassadors would present a note to the Secretary of State at 1 p.m. He knew the general tenor of the note that would be presented (page 204). The note was in the nature of an ultimatum. He was in Admiral Stark's office in the morning of December 7th, and Admiral Stark had the information which he had. Admiral Stark talked to General Marshall on the telephone. The Japanese asking for an appointment at 1 p.m. on a Sunday was quite unusual and out of the known routine of the foreign service (page 205) Admiral Stark concurred in a dispatch to be sent by General Marshall. The State Department was not advised of this dispatch (page 205).
He also testified that information concerning delivery of the Japanese note at 1 p.m. was available to him between 0900 and 0930 on the morning of December 7th. He does not know when it got to the Navy Department (page 213).
Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of the contents of the Japanese message stating that a fourteen‑part reply would be sent, of the fourteen‑part reply, and of the "1 p.m. message." As to the "1 p.m. message," he repeated that he had this information at 0930 on December 7th, and believed that Admiral Stark received this information about that time (page 715). He talked to Admiral Stark about 1000 (page 214). General Marshall telephoned about 1030 (page 216).
Admiral Schuirmann testified that Commander Kramer delivered this type of material and that no record was kept of time of delivery. He discussed the situation with Admiral Stark but not specific messages. When he went to Admiral Stark's office on December 7th, he recalled, he waited a while for Stark to come in at about 0930 (page 729). He then knew of the prospective 1 o'clock delivery of the "sharply worded" Japanese note and that it was a reply to the United States note of November 26th, and so informed Admiral Stark. Admiral Stark knew of this when General Marshall telephoned. He believes that Stark had delivered to him that morning "the book" containing the messages received the previous night. He is positive that the Army had the same information the Navy had (page 730). He personally did not think Japan was going to attack us (page 732).
Admiral Stark testified that the outstanding thing in his mind concerning the evening of December 6th and the morning of December 7th was the "one p.m. message", which he learned about on the morning of December 7th. He did not remember the "14 part message" in reply to the State Department note of November 26th. Admiral Schuirmann, he said, may have given him a full picture on the morning of December 7th, and it is reasonable to assume that he did so (pages 789‑790).
He stated that he had no information about the "14 part" reply or the "1 p m. message" until he arrived at his office on December 7th (pages 790‑791). He said that on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, he received information that the Japanese Ambassador would deliver a message to Secretary Hull at exactly 1300. He was talking to Admiral Schuirmann when General Marshall called and asked if he had this information. He first told General Marshall he did not think this information should be sent out, but instantly changed his mind and called General Marshall back, asking him to have the Army authorities inform the Navy. He asked General Marshall if he could get the message out quickly and offered to send it via Navy communications. General Marshall said he could get it out quickly.
Admiral Stark recalled discussing with Admiral Schuirmann "the time element" in connection with the "one p.m. message" (page 170), but recalled no suggestion. made to him that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor. He did not recall what information he had about the Japanese message to be delivered at 1300, December 7, 1941, except the hour of delivery (page 172).
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Admiral Stark stated that he had not called Admiral Kimmel on the Trans-Pacific telephone before December 7th (page 190). He stated that he may have been derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply and regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel on December 7th concerning this (pages 113, 793), and also regretted not having paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (page 799).
General Marshall said that he first saw the "14 part message" and the "1 p.m. message" sometime Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 (page 873). He 'phoned Admiral Stark, and at first Admiral Stark did not think that any message to Hawaii was necessary because the recipients might be confused by too many messages. Admiral Stark 'phoned back in a few minutes, asking that the naval authorities be advised.
General Marshall was informed, after sending some of his men back two and three times to the message center, that his message would be received within 30 minutes after dispatch. It was in the message center at 1150 and sent by radio to all points except Hawaii; they were unable to raise the Hawaiian station and therefore sent it by wire. General Marshall did not know this until afterwards (pages 873‑4).
General Marshall estimated that he arrived at 10:30 a.m., Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, and first saw the "14 part message" and "1 p.m. message" shortly thereafter (pages 878‑9).
He said that Admiral Stark did not inquire as to the rapidity of War Department communications in connection with dispatching the Army message of December 7, 1941 (page 879).
Admiral Ingersoll said that he arrived at the office about 0900, December 7th. He did not recall any discussion with Admiral Stark about the fourteen part message or delivery thereof until Admiral Stark told him of his conversation with General Marshall (page 837). He stated that on the morning of December 7th, he knew that the Japanese Ambassador had requested an interview with Secretary Hull in the afternoon. At the same time, Admiral Stark told him that this had been discussed with General Marshall (page 831). Admiral Ingersoll said that there was no discussion on the morning of December 7th of the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was sunrise at Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila.
Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall when he saw the thirteen or fourteen part Japanese reply. (p. 429)
Admiral Turner said that he came to the Navy Department about 1030 or 1100 on December 7th. Admiral Stark called him and showed him a decrypted Japanese dispatch which required the Japanese Ambassador top resent the Japanese reply on the 7th. Admiral Stark said he had talked to General Marshall, who said he had sent a dispatch on the matter to Hawaii. Admiral Stark said that he thought Admiral Kimmel already had intercepted and decrypted the Japanese message; they thought that he had the 14 part reply and "1 p.m. message" (page 1000).
He first recalled the time of delivery as 10:30 and corrected this to 1 p.m. He said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that he could not give the Japanese an appointment until 2:30 p.m. Admiral Turner thought from this dispatch that an attack on the United States or Britain was coming that day or the next (page 1000). They had been warned, he said, that the scrambler telephone was not secure and so the Navy Department did not use it for secret matters (page 1001).
Admiral Noyes said he did not see the 14‑part message or delivery instruction prior to 7 December 1941 (page 1035, 1036); that there was no direct or convenient telephone circuit between CincPac and CNO on 7 December 1941 (page 1038) and that a Navy message from CNO, which had been designated for the fastest possible transmission, would be in CincPac's hands in a maximum of an hour (page 1044).
According to Admiral Smith, CincPac was not kept well informed of developments by the Navy Department (page 565). He testified regarding Secretary Knox's visit to Pearl Harbor, after the attack, and statements made by him there (page 556‑57). He said that at lunch he joined Secretary Knox, Kimmel, Pye, Bloch, Short, Beatty (Aide to Secretary), and that the Secretary said: "Did you not get a warning on the 6th of December?" They said, "No," and the Secretary then continued: "We learned surreptitiously on the 6th of December that Nomura and Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with Secretary Hull at 1 p.m. on Sunday, the 7th. I know that information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of course, it was sent to you." They never got that information (page
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566). The Secretary also said, "Frankly, I know of no one in the War Department or in the Navy Department, not even Kelly Turner, who expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor" (page 567). Admiral Smith said that it is easy to deduce from the 1 o'clock delivery dispatch, which they received after the attack, that Pearl Harbor was a logical place of attack as the time indicated was sunrise there.