XXXI. DECEMBER 7, 1941, IN WASHINGTON
A. INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS OTHER THAN PART
FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P.m. MESSAGE"
Captain Safford said
that an intercepted Japanese message in the shape of a circular telegram from
Tokyo, using the "hidden word" code, dated 7 December 1941, (Exhibit
20), was received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, shortly
before 11 o'clock in the morning of 7 December. Three of the words in this
message had a secondary or hidden meaning, constituting the actual message.
Captain Safford said that this message was translated in such a hurry on Sunday
morning, 7 December, that only two of the three key words were given their
hidden value. As a result, the message was translated (p. 125‑126):
"Relations
between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation."
Captain Safford said
that if the third and omitted key word had been given its hidden meaning, the
message would have read (P 126, 609‑610):
"Relations between
Japan and England and United States are not in accordance with
expectation."
Captain Kramer made
the following statement with regard to his translation of the "hidden
word" message of 7 December 1941, referred to in the preceding paragraphs
(p 133‑135):
"I do recall on
that that after my return from the State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7
December, we had just had translated a message specifying the time of delivery
of the fourteen‑part note from the Japanese Government to the United
States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking the
Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and another
directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to
take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get the
word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I
was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that
had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it
now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text,
a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking relations. As I recall
it now, I dictated to a chief yeoman the sense of the message, glancing through
the entire message, spotting another code word referring to England, and then
two minutes after that was on my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office
approximately an hour later and was looking over the morning's traffic again
that I again examined more closely this particular plain language message,
which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the omission
referring to the United States.
". . . My
recollection is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted. I
do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or more phone calls
at the time the discrepancy was noted, which, if correct, would indicate that
that discrepancy was noted perhaps a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do
definitely recall, however, that no retranslation of that message was made for
distribution because of the fact that before it could be delivered to the
recipients of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State
Department and Chief of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would be
well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had been so much
excitement late in the morning. I might further add that when the attack was
first learned, I recall definitely feeling that there was no point in making
the delivery at that time. That was perhaps 1:30."
Captain Kramer further
stated that when he returned to his office at around noon on 7 December and
noted the omission in the "hidden word" message of reference to the
United States, he attempted to telephone all persons who had received the
translation. However, he was able to contact only two of them, he thought these
two were Captain McCollum and Colonel Bratton. Captain Kramer believed that he
had made the telephone calls at about 12:30 (p. 595‑596).
530 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On
December 7, 1941, there were three Japanese communications intercepted and
translated by the Army in addition. to part fourteen of the Japanese reply and
the "1 p.m. message." These were:
1.
"From: Washington
(Nomura)
"To: Tokyo
"December 3, 1941
"Purple (Urgent)
"#1256.
Re your #875 [a]
"I
received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a
result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States
Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially
since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among
the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be
war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what
the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply
is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a
settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them
nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made
for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of
what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on
November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of
our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with
this in mind and wire me at once."
2.
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"Purple (Urgent)
"#1272
"In
addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we
also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close
relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because
of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point
strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:
(1)
On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and
advised him against a Japanese‑American war and urged him to do the
"introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President
did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude
of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed
matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so
on the advice of these individuals.
(2)
Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November
20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the
United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or
advantageous to us . . . (Message incomplete).
3.
"From: Budapest
"To: Tokyo
"December 7, 1941
"LA
"1104 Re my #103.
"On
the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a
British Government communiqué to the effect that a state of war would break out
on the 7th.
"Relayed
to Berlin."
E. PART FOURTEEN AND THE
"1 P.m. MESSAGE"
Also
on December 7, 1941, the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply, and the
Japanese instruction to the emissaries in Washington to deliver the reply at
one p m. on the 7th of December were translated, as follows:
1.
Navy translation‑(Document 39, Exhibit 63)
[a] See S. I. S. #25725—Explanation of Japan's
increase of their forces in French Indo‑China.)
PROCEEDINGS OF
]HEWITT INQUIRY 531
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"7 December 1941
"(Purple‑Eng)
"#902 Part 14 of
14
(NOTE: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station
handling this part, appeared the plain English Phrase VERY IMPORTANT")
"7.
Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great
Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the
establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and
especially to preserve Anglo‑American rights and interests by keeping
Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the
course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese
Government to adjust Japanese‑American relations and to preserve and
promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American
Government has finally been lost.
"The
Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government
that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider
that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."
2.
Army translation (Document 41, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"December 7, 1941
"Purple (Urgent‑Very
Important)
"#907 To be
handled in government code.
"Re my #902(a).
"Will
the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to
the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th,
your time."
C.
DELIVERY OF PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P.m. MESSAGE" AND ACTION TAKEN
Captain McCollum said
that he arrived in the Navy Department at about 0730 on Sunday morning,
December 7, 1941, to assume a special watch in the Far Eastern Section of ONI.
Shortly after his arrival Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence,
sent for him and a discussion was had concerning the situation in the Far East.
A little before 8:30 both Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum went down to
talk to Admiral Stark. At about 9 o'clock Captain McCollum received word that
one of his officers wished to see him urgently. He stepped outside and
Lieutenant Commander Kramer delivered to him the last part of the Japanese
"Fourteen Part Reply," together with the instructions directing its
presentation to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, Washington time (p. 34‑35)
At that time Captain McCollum had a short talk with Lieutenant Commander Kramer
as to the significance of the instructions and the loiter pointed out that 1
p.m. Washington time would mean about 7:30 in the morning, Honolulu time, and
about 2 o'clock in the morning out in the Philippines; that the exact
significance of this was not known, but that if an attack were coming it looked
as if it were timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii
(p. 33, 36). Captain McCollum said that he took the message and instructions in
to Admiral Stark and pointed out to him the possible significance of the time
in conjunction with the note (p 86). Captain McCollum stated: "We had no
way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of
this note had been stressed to the ambassadors, we felt there were important
things which would move at that lime, and that was pointed out . . . to Admiral
Stark. . . ." (p 33‑34)
Referring to the
Japanese instructions to deliver the "Fourteen Part Reply" to the U.
S. Secretary of State at 1 p.m., Washington time, on 7 December, Captain Kramer
said that he had been impressed by the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was
several hours before sunrise in the Kra Peninsula area, where he knew that the
Japanese had been contemplating an attack on Kota Baru with the connivance of
the Thai Chief of Staff. Consequently, when he delivered the "1 p.m.
message" to Mr. Hull's private secretary, he pointed this fact out to the
latter and to Colonel Bratton, who was also in Mr. Hull's outer office. He also
mentioned the fact that 1 p.m. in Washington was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor (p. 137).
(a)‑S. I. S.
#25843‑text of Japanese reply.)
532 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Kramer said
that in all he had pointed out the significance of the delivery time of the
"Fourteen Part Reply" to perhaps eight or ten different people, including
Commander McCollum, several people in the State Department, Colonel Bratton,
possibly Admiral Wilkinson, and probably Captain Safford. He did not remember
whether he had mentioned the matter when delivering the "1 p.m.
message" to CNO's office. (p. 137‑138).
Lieutenant
Commander Brotherhood said that the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply was
received while he was on watch between midnight and 7 a.m., December 7, 1941
(page 925). Also a further dispatch was received during the watch, concerning
the time of delivery of the long diplomatic message. The first dispatch, the
long diplomatic message, was in English (part 14 of Exhibit 63). He thinks he
delivered this to the Army. The second was in Japanese (page 926), and required
translation which he thinks was done by an Army translator (part 41 of Exhibit
63). He left the dispatches for Kramer and left around seven before Kramer came
in. He can't remember whether the translated message was back before he left
the office at 7 a.m. (page 926).
Lieutenant
Commander A. V. Pering testified that on 7 December 1941 he was on duty in
Op-20‑G of Naval‑Communications, beginning at 0700 (page 812). He
said that Part 14 of the Japanese reply was processed and ready for delivery at
0700 and was delivered to Kramer on his arrival between 0900 and 1000; the
"1 p.m. message" was received from an Army translator at about 0715
and was held until Kramer arrived and then was delivered to him (p. 813).
Lieutenant
Commander Lynn testified that Part 14 of the Japanese reply did not require
translation into English; it was received between 0305 and 0700 on December
7th, and, he thought, it was handed to Kramer at about 0900‑1000. He said
that the "1 p.m. message" arrived between 0305 and 0700, 12‑7‑41
and was processed and in the Army's hands for translation at 0700, 12‑7‑41.
According
to Captain Safford Part 14 came in and was decoded and ready at 0700, 12‑7‑41
(page 757), The "1 p.m. message" came in and was sent to the Army for
translation from the Japanese, and came back about 1000, December 7 (page 758).
Kramer,
he said, went to Admiral Stark's office, gave it to him personally or to an
aide, then to Admiral Beardall at the White House, and then to the State Department
with the 14th part at about 1000, where Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox and
Secretary Stimson were (page 758). (The Court here refused to sustain the Judge
Advocate's objection to testimony by the witness as to what was told to him
(page 748)).
Captain
Safford continued, stating that Kramer came back and found the translation of
the message instructing delivery at one p.m. There also was a message "in
the hidden‑word code" which had been translated hurriedly and said,
"relations in England not in accordance with expectation." In
Kramer's haste they left out a word and the message should have read—(the
witness was here interrupted). He then said that Kramer immediately
redistributed the two messages; went to CNO and gave them to an aide, Admiral
Stark being in conference; to the White House, there to an aide; to the State
Department about 11 and gave copies to the Secretaries of War, State and Navy.
He then said that to the copy which Kramer gave to the Secretary of the Navy
was a note saying that this was sunrise at Honolulu and midnight at Manila and
undoubtedly meant a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in a few hours. (On
Admiral Stark's motion this was stricken out by the court since the witness had
no personal knowledge.)
Captain Safford summarized the information which he said
indicated the objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack, as
follows:
"Going back to the late Spring of 1941, on May 22, we
received positive proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern Asia
and the Southwest Pacific. On July 24, a high authority in Japan directed the
withdrawal of merchant shipping from the Northeast Pacific, Southwest Pacific,
and Indian Ocean. On September 4, we received information indicating Japan's
determination to carry out her program of southward expansion and to expel the
United States and England from China, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest
Pacific. On October 15, we received unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans
and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern Asia. In October, 1941, the
Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese
Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii,
America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4,
we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both
political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate
that the Japanese Government
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 533
had to distract popular attention by a
foreign war or else by bloodless diplomatic victory. On November 12, we
received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November
25 as the dead‑line for negotiations then being conducted between the
Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information
from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in
Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. At one
time, when it looked as if Moscow would fall, there were indications from
several sources that Japan would invade Siberia. On November 24, 1941, we
learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date
for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean
that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest
Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our
minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to
wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December
1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was
going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that
Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received
definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack
the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00
p.m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that
Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified
thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable, and was made
available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally, at 10:15 a.m.
(Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the
Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of
war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time)
that date. 1:00 p.m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately
midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl
Harbor to about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper
sent over from S. I. S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy. I do
not know whether or not a copy of this note was appended to the paper given to
Admiral Stark. At this same time, information was also received indicating that
Japan was about to commence hostilities against the British Empire. This
information was sent over to S. I. S. immediately." (p. 357‑8)
Captain Safford then
discussed the distribution of information within the Navy Department and to the
President and State Department, etc. His statement of the distribution by
Commander Kramer from December 1 on was based, he said, on what Commander
Kramer told him verbally.
Commander
Kramer said that he received no phone call on the night of December 6th‑7th
and came in at 0900 on December 7th, received the 14th part of the reply and
took it and the first 13 parts to Admiral Stark's office about 0900 where there
apparently was a meeting He was not certain who was in Admiral Stark's office.
He was in a hurry. Admiral Wilkinson was there (page 973). He then left the
Navy Department at 0930 to make delivery to the White House, and was at the
State Department at 0950 waiting for Secretary Knox in order to deliver this
additional material.
This
delivery did not include the message setting 1 p.m. as the time for delivery of
the reply. He did not get that until he returned to the Navy Department, at
about 1020. He then found that a message had been received which directed
delivery of the reply to the Secretary of State at 1300, and also other
messages which directed destruction of Japanese codes still on hand, and one
which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material was delivered to
Admiral Stark at about 1030. He handed the "1 p.m. message" to
Admiral Stark's aide at 10:30 or 10:45 and saw him take it in to Admiral
Stark's desk. Document 41 of Exhibit 63 is the "1 p.m. message",
which had been translated by Army. He then left to deliver this new material to
the White House and the State Department. He handed the material to a State
Department official, who customarily received such material for the Secretary
of State, and who was to deliver it to Secretary Knox.
He
invited attention, verbally, to the time involved (page 965); that is, that
this was 7:30 in Honolulu and a few hours before sunrise at Koto Bharu. He did
not tell the naval officers this as he figured they would know it. The remarks
he made were not to Secretary Knox himself but to the State Department official
who handled this material for Secretary Hull and who was to deliver it to
Secretary
534 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Knox. He did not advise
the official in the State Department to tell the Secretary of the Navy that
1300 Washington time meant dawn in Pearl Harbor and that it might mean an
attack on Pearl Harbor (page 985) And, he said, Captain Safford never stated to
him or in his presence that the message concerning the delivery of the note
indicated a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor (page 986).
Captain
Heard, who was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI, stated that information
about the Japanese reply was available in the Navy Department at 0900, 7
December 1941 (page 464). Sometime between 0900 and 1000 DONI took the Chief of
the Far East Section, Commander McCollum, with him to CNO to present this
information. This statement, he said, was based on official records, a report
from McCollum, and an official statement of DONI made very shortly after the
event (page 465). Lieutenant Commander Watts relieved McCollum at 0800, 7
December (page 466)
Admiral
Schuirmann testified that on the morning of December 7, 1941, he knew that the
Japanese Ambassadors would present a note to the Secretary of State at 1 p.m.
He knew the general tenor of the note that would be presented (page 204). The
note was in the nature of an ultimatum. He was in Admiral Stark's office in the
morning of December 7th, and Admiral Stark had the information which he had.
Admiral Stark talked to General Marshall on the telephone. The Japanese asking
for an appointment at 1 p.m. on a Sunday was quite unusual and out of the known
routine of the foreign service (page 205) Admiral Stark concurred in a dispatch
to be sent by General Marshall. The State Department was not advised of this
dispatch (page 205).
He
also testified that information concerning delivery of the Japanese note at 1
p.m. was available to him between 0900 and 0930 on the morning of December 7th.
He does not know when it got to the Navy Department (page 213).
Admiral
Schuirmann testified that he was aware of the contents of the Japanese message
stating that a fourteen‑part reply would be sent, of the fourteen‑part
reply, and of the "1 p.m. message." As to the "1 p.m.
message," he repeated that he had this information at 0930 on December
7th, and believed that Admiral Stark received this information about that time
(page 715). He talked to Admiral Stark about 1000 (page 214). General Marshall
telephoned about 1030 (page 216).
Admiral
Schuirmann testified that Commander Kramer delivered this type of material and
that no record was kept of time of delivery. He discussed the situation with
Admiral Stark but not specific messages. When he went to Admiral Stark's office
on December 7th, he recalled, he waited a while for Stark to come in at about
0930 (page 729). He then knew of the prospective 1 o'clock delivery of the
"sharply worded" Japanese note and that it was a reply to the United
States note of November 26th, and so informed Admiral Stark. Admiral Stark knew
of this when General Marshall telephoned. He believes that Stark had delivered
to him that morning "the book" containing the messages received the previous
night. He is positive that the Army had the same information the Navy had (page
730). He personally did not think Japan was going to attack us (page 732).
Admiral
Stark testified that the outstanding thing in his mind concerning the evening
of December 6th and the morning of December 7th was the "one p.m.
message", which he learned about on the morning of December 7th. He did
not remember the "14 part message" in reply to the State Department
note of November 26th. Admiral Schuirmann, he said, may have given him a full
picture on the morning of December 7th, and it is reasonable to assume that he
did so (pages 789‑790).
He
stated that he had no information about the "14 part" reply or the
"1 p m. message" until he arrived at his office on December 7th
(pages 790‑791). He said that on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, he
received information that the Japanese Ambassador would deliver a message to
Secretary Hull at exactly 1300. He was talking to Admiral Schuirmann when
General Marshall called and asked if he had this information. He first told
General Marshall he did not think this information should be sent out, but
instantly changed his mind and called General Marshall back, asking him to have
the Army authorities inform the Navy. He asked General Marshall if he could get
the message out quickly and offered to send it via Navy communications. General
Marshall said he could get it out quickly.
Admiral
Stark recalled discussing with Admiral Schuirmann "the time element"
in connection with the "one p.m. message" (page 170), but recalled no
suggestion. made to him that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor.
He did not recall what information he had about the Japanese message to be
delivered at 1300, December 7, 1941, except the hour of delivery (page 172).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 535
Admiral
Stark stated that he had not called Admiral Kimmel on the Trans-Pacific
telephone before December 7th (page 190). He stated that he may have been
derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the
Japanese reply and regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel on
December 7th concerning this (pages 113, 793), and also regretted not having
paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (page 799).
General
Marshall said that he first saw the "14 part message" and the "1
p.m. message" sometime Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 (page 873). He
'phoned Admiral Stark, and at first Admiral Stark did not think that any
message to Hawaii was necessary because the recipients might be confused by too
many messages. Admiral Stark 'phoned back in a few minutes, asking that the
naval authorities be advised.
General
Marshall was informed, after sending some of his men back two and three times
to the message center, that his message would be received within 30 minutes
after dispatch. It was in the message center at 1150 and sent by radio to all
points except Hawaii; they were unable to raise the Hawaiian station and
therefore sent it by wire. General Marshall did not know this until afterwards
(pages 873‑4).
General
Marshall estimated that he arrived at 10:30 a.m., Sunday morning, December 7,
1941, and first saw the "14 part message" and "1 p.m.
message" shortly thereafter (pages 878‑9).
He
said that Admiral Stark did not inquire as to the rapidity of War Department
communications in connection with dispatching the Army message of December 7,
1941 (page 879).
Admiral
Ingersoll said that he arrived at the office about 0900, December 7th. He did
not recall any discussion with Admiral Stark about the fourteen part message or
delivery thereof until Admiral Stark told him of his conversation with General
Marshall (page 837). He stated that on the morning of December 7th, he knew
that the Japanese Ambassador had requested an interview with Secretary Hull in
the afternoon. At the same time, Admiral Stark told him that this had been
discussed with General Marshall (page 831). Admiral Ingersoll said that there
was no discussion on the morning of December 7th of the fact that 1 o'clock in
Washington was sunrise at Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila.
Admiral Ingersoll said
that he did not recall when he saw the thirteen or fourteen part Japanese
reply. (p. 429)
Admiral
Turner said that he came to the Navy Department about 1030 or 1100 on December
7th. Admiral Stark called him and showed him a decrypted Japanese dispatch
which required the Japanese Ambassador top resent the Japanese reply on the
7th. Admiral Stark said he had talked to General Marshall, who said he had sent
a dispatch on the matter to Hawaii. Admiral Stark said that he thought Admiral
Kimmel already had intercepted and decrypted the Japanese message; they thought
that he had the 14 part reply and "1 p.m. message" (page 1000).
He
first recalled the time of delivery as 10:30 and corrected this to 1 p.m. He
said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that he could not give the Japanese
an appointment until 2:30 p.m. Admiral Turner thought from this dispatch that
an attack on the United States or Britain was coming that day or the next (page
1000). They had been warned, he said, that the scrambler telephone was not
secure and so the Navy Department did not use it for secret matters (page
1001).
Admiral
Noyes said he did not see the 14‑part message or delivery instruction
prior to 7 December 1941 (page 1035, 1036); that there was no direct or
convenient telephone circuit between CincPac and CNO on 7 December 1941 (page
1038) and that a Navy message from CNO, which had been designated for the
fastest possible transmission, would be in CincPac's hands in a maximum of an
hour (page 1044).
According
to Admiral Smith, CincPac was not kept well informed of developments by the
Navy Department (page 565). He testified regarding Secretary Knox's visit to
Pearl Harbor, after the attack, and statements made by him there (page 556‑57).
He said that at lunch he joined Secretary Knox, Kimmel, Pye, Bloch, Short,
Beatty (Aide to Secretary), and that the Secretary said: "Did you not get
a warning on the 6th of December?" They said, "No," and the
Secretary then continued: "We learned surreptitiously on the 6th of
December that Nomura and Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with
Secretary Hull at 1 p.m. on Sunday, the 7th. I know that information was sent
to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of course, it was sent to you." They never
got that information (page
536 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
566). The Secretary also said, "Frankly, I
know of no one in the War Department or in the Navy Department, not even Kelly Turner,
who expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor" (page 567). Admiral Smith said
that it is easy to deduce from the 1 o'clock delivery dispatch, which they
received after the attack, that Pearl Harbor was a logical place of attack as
the time indicated was sunrise there.