XXXII. CONDITIONS AT PEARL HARBOR PRIOR TO ATTACK

 

A. THE SHIPS IN PORT

 

Admiral Hewitt's investigation developed that at the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, according to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port and partly at sea as follows:

(1) In Pearl Harbor:

(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.

(b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force—Task Force Eight) comprising three battleships, eight destroyers; one light cruiser, and four mine layers.

(c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Admiral Brown at sea, and less a separate task force—Task Force Twelve—which was at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers, and four mine layers which were under overhaul.

(d) Five submarines and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Seven.

(e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTISS, and THORNTON, and Patrol Squadrons (VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24‑a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force Nine.

(f ) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty planes) at Ewa, Oahu.

(g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair, vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadrons VJ‑1, VJ‑,2, and VJ‑3, as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, ,2 PBY‑1, 1 J2V.

(2) At sea:

(a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.

(b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of its divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.

(c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinarily a component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier (LEXING­TON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about 425 miles South­east of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island.

(d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu.

(e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to Pearl Harbor.

(3) At other places:

(a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol Squadron VP‑21 (consisting of twelve, planes) of Task Force Twelve.

(b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air Squadron.

(e) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise), two Base Force PBY‑1 planes.

(d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.

(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.

To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroy­ers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 air­craft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul: At sea, there were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines,

 

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and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron.

Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reenforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment schedule (Ex., 73; Hew. page 605).

 

Admiral DeLany stated that the ships were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, in accordance with the operating schedule of the Fleet; the principal mission in late 1941 was training, and they had no orders from Washington to discon­tinue (page 507).

 

Admiral Smith said that after the reorganization of the Pacific Fleet to three task forces, one task force was always at sea and very often two, and they held exercises against one another; sometimes all three task forces would be at sea at the same time. (p. 35)

As Operations Officer, one of Admiral DeLany's duties was the prepara­tion of "Schedules of Employment." These were originally prepared on a quarterly basis about six weeks before the end of the quarter, and a con­siderable number of these were printed and widely distributed. (p. 83) The schedules provided for patrol of the operating areas and for air patrol cov­erage, entrances and sorties, primarily because they felt that the possibility of a submarine attack in the operating areas was something that they had to guard against and also to prevent any blocking of the channel in and out of Pearl Harbor (p. 84).

On December 7, Commander Paul C. Crosley was Flag Secretary on the Staff of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet. He produced a copy of the Pacific Fleet employment schedule, dated August 13, 1941, which was incom­plete since Enclosure A was missing. Enclosure A was a photostatic copy of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter. (p. 179) Commander Crosley also produced a proposed employment schedule dated November 10, 1941. (p. 180). Commander Crosley produced copies of the employment schedules for Task Forces 1, 2 and 3 for the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942, and discussed the method of printing and distributing same. (p. 181).

Admiral Brainard did not recall any changes which had been made in the employment schedules for the last quarter of 1941 which had been submitted by the Pacific Fleet. He said that a rather general freedom of action was given to the Fleet Commanders as to changes in the operating schedules. He recalled that about the middle of 1941, the schedules were changed from type schedules to task force schedules after the Commander‑in‑Chief had established a task force organization. (p. 401)

 

Admiral Pye stated that the task forces rotated days at sea and in port; the days and dates varied. A task force could be figured to stay in port for nine to fourteen days (page 430). His task force, Task Force One, was in Pearl Harbor from November 27th until December 7th (page 418).

 

Admiral Pye said that it did not occur to him at any time between November 27 and December 7 to take the ships to sea because of the Army's inadequacy since it was his confirmed opinion that the greatest danger was from sub­marines. (p.169)

 

On December 7, 1941, Task Force One was in port, except for the SARATOGA, which was on the West Coast. Task Force Two was at sea; the ENTERPRISE was delivering planes to Wake; Bat. Div. One of Admiral Halsey's Task Force Two was in port. Task Force Three was conducting operations at sea; and Task Force Three's carrier, the LEXINGTON had gone to Midway to deliver planes (page 539). The COLORADO was on the West Coast, and the PENN­SYLVANIA was in drydock at Pearl Harbor (page 540

Admiral McMorris said that one of the considerations that prompted leaving the battleships of Task Force Two when the ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake with Marine planes, was the possibility of a clash with some Japanese ships and they did not want to handicap the carrier and its light forces with the slower battleships (pages 891‑2). The Fleet, he said, was operating under a schedule, but no directive had been received to keep the Fleet in Pearl Harbor at that particular time (page 893).

Admiral Kimmel testified that about two‑thirds of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, because Task Force One and Task Force Two overlapped in schedule for a few days (page 369).

 

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The location of the various ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th was set forth on a map, which is Exhibit 60. From the summary annexed to that map, it appears that there were in port 8 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 29 destroyers, 8 destroyer minelayers, 4 destroyer minesweepers, 5 submarines, 1 floating drydock, 1 hospital ship, and 21 auxiliaries. It also appears that the MARYLAND and OKLAHOMA were double berthed near Ford Island, as were the TENNESSEE and WEST VIRGINIA, and the ARIZONA and VESTAL.

Admiral Bloch said that the berthing of ships so as to develop maximum anti­aircraft fire was the responsibility of the senior officer embarked; the double battleships were unavoidable (page 400).

 

(3)        Admiral Bloch said that on December 7 all of the available battleships were in Pearl Harbor—8 battleships—and that those most severely damaged were the double‑berthed battleships in the outer positions at the moorings; however, he did not think that the double berthing could have been avoided since there were no other berths available. (p. 28)

Admiral Anderson said that air torpedo attack was the most damaging to his battleships. The planes, he said, came from an easterly direction. As the ships were berthed, there was a considerable number of the ship's guns so placed that they could have borne upon the attacking torpedo planes. Admiral Anderson said that assuming that at least one‑fourth of the anti­aircraft guns had been ready for opening fire and free to fire at will upon the approaching planes, his estimate would be that those guns could not have defeated nor seriously diminished the attack. (p. 397) Admiral Anderson said that there wasn't any choice as to what the Commander Battleships could do in assigning specific ships to specific berths. There were just about as many berths designated available to him as there were ships. (p. 398)

 

Admiral Smith said that the ships were anchored in four sections because the Army did not have enough anti‑aircraft guns and it was necessary to locate the ships so that the fire from the ships' guns would be effective. "We" knew that the only guns that cold be fired in defense of Pearl Harbor probably were the Navy guns (page 552).

 

Admiral Smith said that they had thought at the time that the Army and Navy operating through the local defense forces were capable of furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack but that he now realized that they were not. (p. 42)

Admiral Brown said that knowing that the Army defenses were wholly inadequate, he thought that the whole Fleet felt that the ships would have to depend upon their own anti‑aircraft for their own defense both at Pearl Harbor and at sea. (p. 144)

 

B. THE ANTI‑AIRCRAFT GUNS

 

Admiral Turner discussed the knowledge in the Navy Department of the Army's condition of readiness as to anti‑aircraft equipment, radar and the like at page 260.

 

Admiral Kimmel testified that there were no naval guns ashore except a Marine battery (page 283). Admiral Kitts said that the statement in the Roberts' Report about Navy shore batteries, at page 20, is inaccurate although there may have been a Marine battery (pages 518, 521).

 

Admiral Bloch said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was one Marine battalion which had some anti‑aircraft weapons. (p 88)

Admiral Halsey said that during the months preceding December 7, he had been of the view that the Army did not have enough equipment or the proper equipment to defend Pearl Harbor, particularly as to anti‑aircraft guns and fighting planes. (p. 303)

 

Admiral Kitts stated that the Army had charge of the shore‑based anti‑aircraft batteries. In the area immediately around Pearl Harbor, the only anti‑aircraft fire on December 7th was from the ships and the fleet marine school at Palua. The greatest strength of Army anti‑aircraft guns was in mobile batteries of 3" caliber, which had not been emplaced on December 7th and did not get in position until after noon on December 7th. He estimated that the Army had 32 to 48 3" guns and one battery of 90 mm. guns (page 516).

He said that the Army anti‑aircraft guns at Kamehameha were in action in about 25 minutes after the attack. These were fixed position guns (page 522). The main Army anti‑aircraft guns were mobile batteries which were not in place

 

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except one battery. He was informed that the Army's mobile anti‑aircraft was first in place at noon (page 522). The fixed guns may have been in operation earlier.

 

Admiral Kitts discussed the readiness of personnel and ammunition on shipboard and anti‑aircraft batteries. (p. 191) Admiral Kitts said that the Fleet had its full allowance of ammunition and in general its mobilization allowance aboard at the time of the attack. (p. 192) Admiral Kitts dis­cussed the gunnery training which had been given prior to Pearl Harbor. (p. 193) Admiral Kitts discussed the anti‑aircraft guns at Pearl Harbor, (p. 189) and the anti‑aircraft armament on ships in the Harbor. (p. 190)

 

The number and location of the Army's guns were, according to Admiral Bloch (page 413) as follows:

"To my best belief and knowledge, the Army had about 80 3‑inch anti‑aircraft guns, about 20 37‑millimeter guns, and about 100 50‑calibre machine guns‑all of these for anti‑aircraft use. Of the 3‑inch guns, it is my recollection that about 30 were in fixed emplacements, always mounted, and about one‑half or two‑thirds of this 30 were located at forts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the other 3‑inch guns, I believe, were mobile 3‑inch guns; all of the 37‑millimeter guns and 50‑calibre guns were mobile. I cannot state with any great degree of accuracy that none of the mobile guns were in place, but I think it is a fair statement to make that most of them were not in place, in their designated locations. In addition to the Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in conjunction with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the neighborhood of 12 in Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not mounted and not on their sites, because they had not received their orders from the Army."

Admiral Bloch stated that the Army planned the mounting of the anti‑aircraft guns; he did not consider mounting anti‑aircraft or machine guns on buildings in Pearl Harbor, nor did he ask the Army to install guns in such places (page 416). The Army, he said, had insufficient guns to carry out its assigned tasks under JCD‑42 (page 387).

 

According to Admiral DeLany, Admiral Kimmel was familiar with the terribly weak defenses of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense of the place from an air attack lay in the anti‑aircraft guns of the Fleet. (p. 78)

Admiral McMorris said that although he personally felt the Army's prepara­tions for the defense of Oahu were adequate that he thought Admiral Kimmel had been concerned over the anti‑aircraft defenses and had talked with the Commanding General on the subject.

 

Colonel Phillips testified that he did not consider the material condition of readiness of the Army adequate to defend Pearl Harbor (page 494). There was, he said, a shortage of anti‑aircraft guns (page 479).

General Marshall said that for Hawaii—110 30‑mm., 144 37‑mm., and 516 50 ­calibre AA guns had been ordered; on December 7, 1941, four‑fifths of the 30‑mm were complete, and one‑fifth of the lesser calibres (page 855).

Admiral Pye testified that there was no system of coordinating the fire between ship and shore batteries; Sector Commanders took command of fire control and so notified ships in their sectors (page 418).

Colonel Phillips could not recall whether there had been any plan for coordinating the Army gunfire with the Navy gunfire (page 481). The Local Joint Army-­Navy Committee made various plans, but he did not recall when they had met last prior to December 7th (page 481).

General Short testified that no plans had been made for coordinating the gunfire from the ships in the harbor with the Army's fire (page 228).

Admiral Kimmel testified that ComFOURTEEN had had many drills for co­ordinating the fire of the ships in harbor with the shore fire (page 365).

 

C. ARMY AND NAVY CONDITIONS OF READINESS

 

General Short testified that the Army had three alerts‑the first against sabo­tage; the second the additional threat of submarine, surface or aircraft attack; and the third an "all‑out" alert. The alert in effect on December 7, 1941 was Army Alert No. 1—the anti‑sabotage alert (page 228).

 

Admiral Bloch said that with the exception of one or two isolated cases, there was never any sabotage at Pearl Harbor. Those cases involved dis­gruntled sailors. There was no sabotage on the 7th of December. (p. 88)

 

540                                           CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of an Army alert was in effect although he did know that they had some kind of an alert effective (page 326). He did not make specific inquiries of General Short as to the nature of the alert which the Army was maintaining (page 343).

Admiral Kimmel testified that the Navy condition of readiness in effect was condition No. 3 as set forth in 2CL‑41 and an order requiring two 5‑inch guns and two 50‑caliber guns on each battleship, which amounted to one‑fourth of their anti‑aircraft to be mapped at all times (page 278). He said that he considered condition 3 and the measures which he had in force sufficient under the circumstances (page 279).

Admiral Kimmel stated that on December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral Pye was the Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel's headquarters were at the submarine base, and the PENNSYLVANIA was his Flagship to which he could move on short notice (page 278). He testified that ComFOURTEEN was to advise the Senior Officer Present Afloat of the condition of readiness to maintain and that the Senior Officer Present Afloat was charged with the duty of setting the condition of readiness for ships (page 365). He did not know whether Admiral Bloch advised Admiral Pye of the condition of readiness to maintain (page 279).

The condition of readiness of the Fleet, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not changed after November 27th because full security measures for ships at sea were already in effect (page 303).

The court wanted to know whether if Admiral Kimmel had increased the alert would it have done any more than man a few anti‑aircraft guns (page 1124). He said, at best, it might have done so and it might, have enabled the intercepting fighters to come into action a little better.

Admiral Bloch stated that Condition 3 was, and for several months had been, in effect for the Fleet; the condition of readiness for Navy shore establishments and aircraft was determined by each commanding officer, but there was none in effect on December 7th, except normal day to day routine for training (page 390).

Admiral Pye stated that there was no condition of readiness set for ships in port. His testimony before Admiral Hart that condition 3 was in effect and that he so informed Admiral Kimmel was erroneous (page 419).

 

Admiral Pye said that the defenses of the Fleet were largely in the hands of the Army and the condition of readiness was not set by the Fleet itself, but was set by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 158)

Admiral Pye said that Condition 3 was in effect for the ships in the Harbor on December 7, and had been prescribed previous to the last entry on the understanding that that condition would be in effect unless other notice was given. He did not receive any advice from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District as to the necessity for a higher condition of readiness. (p.164‑5).

 

However, each battleship had two 5" anti‑aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned in addition to the anti‑aircraft control (page 419). This condition was in excess of that required by condition 3. Gun crews for manned guns were required to be on deck near their guns with communications, including antiaircraft control, manned (page 422). The anti‑aircraft control (director room) was the only battle lookout. The officers and men required to remain aboard were sufficient to man all anti‑aircraft guns.

 

Admiral Anderson said that none of the three specific conditions of readiness set forth in sub‑heading G of 2CL‑41 were maintained by the Fleet while it was in Pearl Harbor during November and December. He said that he was very clear that none of these conditions was in effect at the time of the attack because be gave close personal attention to matters of gun and ammunition readiness and on his own initiative he had increased the degree of gun and ammunition readiness in the battleships. He had established 24‑hour watches on two of the eight .50 calibre guns on each battleship, and two of the 5" anti‑aircraft guns on each ship were to be told off each day as ready guns. (p. 396) Admiral Anderson said that the anti‑aircraft batteries aboard the battleships were, generally speaking, eight 5 anti‑aircraft guns .25 calibre, and eight .50 calibre machine guns. Also most of the ships had either four guns of three inch .50 calibre or four quads of 1" 1. (p. 397)

Admiral Bunkley said that in October, 1941, while his ship was in port, they were not under any condition of readiness, i.e., under conditions one, two or three. They had two machine guns manned at all times and am-

 

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munition ready for two 5" guns with the crews of those guns standing by. They were operating under the Fleet security letter issued prior to October and a security order for the CALIFORNIA which was designated to prevent sabotage by requiring a security patrol. There were no changes ordered prior to December 7 that he could remember. (p 413‑4)

While at sea, Admiral Bunkley said the battleships did maintain conditions of readiness and it was his opinion that these precautions were carried out both for training and because of the danger of a submarine attack. (p. 415)

 

Admiral Pye said that: He was at sea on November 24th and received a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel and from then on until the task force entered Pearl Harbor, all possible measures against submarine and aircraft attack were taken (page 433). He said that Admiral Bloch only had the duty to inform him as Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor of the necessity for a condition of readiness (page 420). He did not do so (page 420).

Admiral Kitts testified that Condition 3 was in effect at sea and its equivalent in effect in port (page 513). He said that the condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was equal to or better than that laid down in 2CL‑4 1, dealing with Port Security (page 523).

Admiral Smith said that despite the Robert's Report, the state of readiness was adequate to meet the emergency (page 548).

Admiral Delaney said that the condition of readiness was as set forth in 2CL‑41 (page 498). He felt that this was satisfactory.

 

D. NUMBER AND CONDITION OF THE MEN

 

Admiral Bloch stated that the Army had insufficient and "green" personnel (page 387). According to General Short, on December 7, 1941, he had 57,000 troops. He had asked for 71,500 (page 257).

As to Navy personnel, Admiral Smith said that in his opinion (which the Court did not seem to share), the withdrawal of men from the Fleet for the purpose of filling complements and new construction had not materially decreased the efficiency of the Fleet (page 560) The ship did have the crews that they had normally held, "say a year before Pearl Harbor" (page 560) on the 85 per, cent basis. He commented that several days after Pearl Harbor they received a letter written shortly before Pearl Harbor from the Bureau of Personnel, refusing to give them further men, and stating that the war was in the Atlantic.

 

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel had constantly asked for additional equipment of men for the Pacific Fleet, but he adverted to a letter received shortly after Pearl Harbor from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, dated November 25, 1941, File No. FF12/MM‑(55), (Secret‑Confidential File Room Bureau of Personnel) advising that the war was in the Atlantic. (p.38)

Admiral Smith said that the personnel and materiel shortages did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet; he had always felt that the complements were unnecessarily large; the Fleet was adequately manned; he considered the ships very efficient; the efficiency of the Fleet was not harmed by the shortages; but the Commander‑in‑Chief was looking into the future when he would have to send these men home for new construction. (p. 38)

Admiral Smith said that the materiel conditions of the Fleet was all right and was satisfactory to the Commander‑in‑Chief. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that the program of alterations, as laid down by the Materiel Bureaus of the Navy Department, did not interfere with the operations and training of the Fleet. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that the morale and health of the Fleet was excellent. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that, in his opinion, the efficiency of the Fleet did not suffer from too frequent changes of personnel. (p. 63)

Admiral Halsey said that one of his most vivid recollections of the period prior to the attack was the constant effort on the part of Admiral Kimmel and his subordinate commanders to get additional personnel and materiel. (p. 307)

 

Admiral Kimmel testified that regular liberty was granted the night of December 6th‑7th, i.e., three‑fourths of the officers and one‑half of the men had liberty. The ones who remained were required to be trained and capable of manning antiaircraft guns. At the time of the attack there were 90 per cent of the men and 70 per cent of the officers aboard. There was no evidence of consequential indulgence in liquor (page 330).

 

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General Short testified that he knew of no unusual intoxication on the night of December 6th, and that no effects of overindulgence were apparent on the morning of the 7th (page 269).

Admiral Delaney testified that morale in the fleet was high. The fleet had been intensively trained under warlike conditions. Joint training with Army had been conducted (page 496).

Admiral Kitts, who was in charge of training, stated that in his opinion the efficiency of the ships and gunnery on December 7, 1941, was in the highest state ever reached in time of peace (page 512). He stated that a shortage of 50-calibre ammunition had affected the target practice of the ships. (In this connection, the Court took judicial notice of the Robert's Report.) (page 518). He said, however, that the Fleet's training and efficiency were of the highest; subject to manpower and some ammunition shortages (page 525).

Admiral Kitts said that he was ashore on the night of December 6th‑7th, and saw nothing out of line as to behavior or sobriety. The officers and men of the ships were fit for duty on December 7, 1941. The high state of readiness of personnel for combat was the result of intensive training during 1941 (page 526).

Admiral Pye testified that from the viewpoint of sobriety the conduct of the men and officers on the 6th and 7th of December, was satisfactory (page 443). Their behavior during the attack was superb (page 445). He considered that the state of training was the highest he ever saw in the Fleet, despite shortages of material (page 444).

 

Admiral Pye said that in his opinion on December 7, the Fleet was in the highest state of efficiency that it had ever attained. (p. 149)

Admiral Calhoun said that there was no unusual or excessive drinking on the night of December 6th, and no evidence of drunkenness on the morning of December 7th. (p. 226) Admiral Calhoun discussed the liberty provisions over the week‑end. (p. 226)

 

No instances of men being unfit for duty came to the attention of Admiral Bloch (page 411). Admiral DeLany stated that in his opinion the men were fit for duty and they performed their duty well (page 508). According to Captain Ramsey, all men were fit for duty and were efficient (page 607). Commander Rochefort testified that the deportment of the officers and men was excellent (page 476). Colonel Phillips stated that the condition of officers and men as to sobriety was normal on December 6th‑7th. All the men he came in contact with on December 7th were fit for duty and on the job (pages 494‑5).

 

E. THE AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

 

General Short testified that the aircraft warning service was in the course of preparation and was being operated for training which had started in October, 1941. The system was not completely installed and the personnel were not expert: In October, 1941, he had sent fifteen men to sea with the Navy for training and the system could be counted on to do a fairly satisfactory job (pages 223‑225). In addition to the radar system, they maintained 100 coast artillery stations as lookout stations. These were not continuously manned, and were not manned on December 7th because of the alert then in effect (page 225). No civilian lookouts were maintained because the distances at Oahu were so small as to make them valueless (page 227).

General Short said that the radar stations were supposed to be effective at ranges of from 75 to 100 miles, and that they might have been more effective if higher station locations had been completed (page 227). On December 7th, the aircraft warning service was being operated from 0400 to 0700 daily (page 228). The system was operated after 0700 for training, if the personnel wished to do so (page 263). The radar system was operated from 0400 to 0700 because he estimated that that was the best time for the enemy to attack, if the enemy were going to attack (page 265). The Interceptor Command was functioning after November 27th on a 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. in. basis daily, although the Interceptor Command was not established by written order until December 17th.

General Short testified that a request had been made for a Navy liaison officer in the Information Center of the Aircraft warning system in August, and on November 24th the Navy took steps to set up liaison officers. He does not recall whether they were actually there on December 7th (page 226). He said that Admiral Kimmel assigned Commander CURTISS as Liaison Officer the day after the request was made, but General Short felt that Admiral Kimmel did not understand that he wanted a liaison officer actually working in the Information Center. and not a general liaison officer. Lt. Comdr. Taylor was sent to help with the aircraft warning system (pages 261‑2).

 

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Colonel Phillips said that the Interceptor Command was barely in the first stage of organization on December 7th; there were no permanent stations, but a mobile station was operating (page 487) Ultimately this command included an information center, but he isn't sure whether it was set up on December 7th. The Aircraft Warning System was operating for training from November 27th until December 7th. He did not remember the hours they were working (page 487), but it was in the morning.

General Marshall said that in connection with the installation of the aircraft warning service, the plans were for six fixed and six mobile stations (page 857).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did everything he could to assist the Army on the radar set‑up. He sent officers to work with the Army. Army personnel had been taken to sea for radar training. He knew that the Army radar system was in operation and that it was far from perfect (pages 289‑290). He said that he did not know that the radar system was not to be operated after 0700 (page 290). He did not know the details of the progress of construction on the radar system but knew that the Navy had continued pressure on the Army to get something done on this line (page 294). The Army's radar crews, he said, were green and untrained; the equipment was not adequate; and the warning net needed polishing in order to make it effective (page 304).

 

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel knew that the Army radar station had not been functioning; it had just been completed; it had been operating on the morning of December 7, but Admiral Kimmel hadn't known it. (p.41)

Admiral Smith said that he knew the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning of a Japanese carrier raid. (p. 44)

 

Admiral Kimmel testified that he was quite certain that in many conversations which he had with General Short, he stressed the necessity for an aircraft warning system as well as for other elements of defense (page 1128); General Short never requested him to supply any naval operators to be used in the operation of Army radar on Oahu, and so far as Kimmel is concerned, he made no request of the Commandant (page 1129). General Short did ask for a liaison officer in July, who was furnished. Admiral Kimmel was informed that General Short did not in fact request the Commandant for "watch officers;" they would have been supplied, had he asked (page 1129). Admiral Kimmel did send Commander Taylor to assist the Army (page 1130). Admiral Bloch was the proper person to handle radar matters with the Army.

Admiral Bloch stated that the Navy liaison officer who was supposed to be supplied to the Army Interceptor Command was only one of a number to be supplied as well by the Army (page 1146). A Navy liaison officer was not there on December 7th because the Army had not even sent watch officers, nor had they asked the Navy to send a watch officer. The Army Warning Service was not actually established until December 7th (page 1147). A Navy liaison officer for the Army Interceptor Command, for the evaluation and relay of information, was not sent until after December 7th, as the system was not set up before then, although the agreement had required this.

 

Admiral Bloch said that when General Short arrived in February, he and Admiral Bloch talked about the Army's radar system and as the net progressed to completion General Short, about September or October, told Admiral Bloch that he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train operators and he wanted to know if there was anything Admiral Bloch could do to help him. Admiral Bloch requested the Commander‑in‑Chief to permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea for training which was done. As of December, Admiral Bloch thought that the net was still in the condition where all the kinks were not yet all out of it and they were still training operators and could not be depended upon, but Admiral Bloch had no knowledge as to whether they were standing any regular watches and early in December there was no means developed for controlling aircraft so as to differentiate by means of radar between friendly and other planes. (p. 11‑12)

As to communications, Admiral Bloch said the communication plan gotten out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from the Base Defense Commander to all ships and points. All ships and stations were required to listen at all times on that frequency. There were teletypes between the Army Headquarters and Admiral Bloch's Headquarters with a branch in Admiral Kimmel's office. There was telephonic communication

 

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between Admiral Bloch's Headquarters and General Short's "Message Center". Admiral Bloch also had such communication from the Harbor Control and Command Posts, both at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor to the gates. There was also telephonic communication between the Harbor Control and the Artillery Headquarters. There were, Admiral Bloch said, means for rapid communication including communication from the "Interceptor Command" to Admiral Bloch's Headquarters. (p. 19)

Admiral Bloch said that there was no naval officer specifically detailed at the Army Interceptor Command. After December 7, that Command was staffed by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and training them at that time, the Army asked for watch officers to communicate with the Navy, although Admiral Bloch said it had been his plan that the communications would be sent by Army people to the Navy. Nevertheless, Navy people were sent there on December 7. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said he did not recall that the Army radar net had ever been used in any tactical operation. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the Army was having a great deal of trouble getting the radar system to work; there was trouble with the electronics and the Army came to Admiral Bloch for assistance; the Army was referred to the Commander in Chief and an officer by the name of Taylor was sent to help the Army in an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's net going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison and Admiral Bloch thought that he was there only in the capacity as an expert to assist the Army with their electrical and mechanical difficulties. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch had no confidence in the Army radar system because he knew that it was not completely set up; the operators were not completely trained; and there was no way so that friendly or hostile planes could be identified there being no IFF equipment. Admiral Bloch said that there was a standard procedure for aircraft approach to and departure from Oahu for Army and Navy planes and that in addition to Army and Navy planes, there were various commercial companies operating aircraft there. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the Army had a number of observation posts on Oahu and adjacent islands, but that these were not manned unless there was a full alert and that not all of such posts had means of rapid communications with headquarters. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the only arrangement the Navy had for obtaining information with respect to approaching aircraft or ships by visual observation was the signal tower. (p. 21)

 

Captain Ramsey stated that about a week or ten days before December 7th, General Davidson asked Admiral Bellinger whether the Navy could furnish officer personnel to help man the radar system for 24‑hour operation and said that if the Navy did not supply the men, he could operate only in the critical hours of the morning and evening. The final decision was that the Navy could not supply the officers required at that time on a permanent basis. He did not know they reason (page 601).

Admiral Bellinger stated that he was only slightly informed as to the Army radar system (page 686).

 

Admiral Bellinger said that the Army Interceptor Command was not ready to perform its part in the protection of Pearl Harbor from the viewpoint of the radar installations and of their ability to control their fighter groups, the number of planes they had, and the general quality of their pilots. (p. 131)

 

Commander W. G. Taylor testified that between October 1st and December 7th, he was assigned to temporary duty Commander Airforce, Pacific Fleet (page 609). He was loaned to the Army Interceptor Command in an advisory capacity to aid in setting up the air warning system. (3)

Admiral Halsey said that he had sent his communication officer to work with the Army on the Army's radar system and that that officer had reported to him that the radar system was very backward as to its state of readiness. (p. 302)

He had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar with radar development at the time. In working with the Army, he worked mainly on liaison between the air warning systems and the commands; he worked in an advisory capacity (page 611). He had been detailed to the job at the direction of. Admiral Kimmel around the middle of November, at the request of the Army (page 622).

 

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He first reported to the Army as an advisor about the second week in November and called a conference at which he submitted a memorandum which was prepared because of the difficulty in getting the Information Center set up. (4)

 

Commander William E. G. Taylor completed a naval flight course and was commissioned an Ensign in 1926; after a year's service, he resigned his commission and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. He served as an instructor specializing in fighter aircraft, and was placed on inactive duty as a Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1934. He then had various jobs as a pilot, and was commissioned a Sub‑Lieutenant in the British Naval Reserve Force in September, 1939, and thereafter engaged in various combat operations with the British. (p. 338‑340) He said that the British fighter operations were very effectively directed while the planes were in the air. The general assumption was that the direction was employing a system of advanced electronics for interception of enemy aircraft. (p.341)

Commander Taylor, while serving with the British, made reports to United States Naval representatives and endeavored to get as much information as he could on the methods of fire control used by the British. (p. 342) Commander Taylor returned to the United States in an effort to get from the British faster fighter craft which could be used by the Fleet and the Fleet air arm. (p. 342) Commander Taylor was next transferred to the British Royal Air Force on October 2, 1940, and was assigned to an R. A. F. squadron known as 242 in order to get operational experience before taking over his own squadron. He said that it was generally accepted that the major reason for the success of the R. A. F. fighter during the so-called Battle of Britain was the magnificent fighter direction control which the British had. (p. 343)

During this period of service with the Royal Air Force, Commander Taylor became more interested in the patrol system used by the British and continued to make reports to the American Naval Attaché. Commander Taylor said that both the American Army and the American Navy had a large number of observers who were studying the Royal Air Force system, and that his impression that all of the information was made available to them, but that it did not appear that these observers brought back the full importance of the method used by the British. (p. 343‑4) Commander Taylor said that he had made a full report to various officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics and particularly sought out the officer who was at that time in charge of radar development. Commander Taylor could arouse no interest in the use of this radar for fighter direction. (p. 344)

In July, 1941, after having had his own squadron for six months, Commander Taylor was advised by the British that because of his age they were going to make him a Wing Commander in charge of a fighter operational unit. He asked to be allowed to go back either to the British Navy or to be returned to the American Navy. He was commissioned in the American Navy in July, 1941, given a special assignment to visit several radar stations, and reported to the Bureau of Aeronautics in August of 1941. (p. 345)

Commander Taylor was given various lecturing assignments to ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and he arrived at Pearl Harbor in October, 1941, where he spoke to Admirals Halsey and Kimmel, among others. He lectured to the Army fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field and lectured to the pilots of the SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE. He found that the ENTERPRISE fighter direction was considerably behind the British methods but had progressed much further than any other ship. He found that the ENTERPRISE had had their radar equipment for some time, the SARATOGA had no radar, and the LEXINGTON had recently acquired radar. In all ships equipped with radar, all hands were going through a training period. Commander Taylor was recalled by a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel which stated that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, desired Commander Taylor's assistance for technical purposes. (p. 347)

The conditions found by Commander Taylor about November 1, 1941, as to the Army warning system, which he reported to both the Army and the Navy prior to November 15, 1941, were as follows:

"During the first week in November, we inspected all of the installations and plans for the air warning system and I found these facts to be true; (1) Construction and maintenance of the air warning system was a Signal Corps function directly under the cognizance of the Chief Signal Officer, Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This Command

 

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appeared to have little conception of the vast function of the air warning system and exhibited very little interest in expediting its installation. At no time before December 7, 1941, did this Command furnish either the authority or impetus badly needed to get the work or organization properly started. (2) The actual operation of the air warning system—that is, the evaluation and dissemination of radar information and the control of fighter defense—was under the Interceptor Command. The Interceptor Command fully realized the importance of the air warning system. Although the officers concerned were not fully informed of its complicated functions, they were willing and eager to take advice and lend all assistance in their power to help complete its installations. They seemed relatively impotent, however, in getting assistance needed from the Commanding General's Staff. (3) One Captain of the Air Corps and one Captain of the Signal Corps had been through the Air Warning School at Mitchell Field, New York. It was with these two officers that I worked. Both were capable and energetic. They worked twelve to fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, in an attempt to speed up completion of the air warning system. (4) The air warning equipment and communications system were largely field or mobile equipment and the entire system was temporary. However, with the exception of the ground‑to‑air and air‑to‑ground radio equipment, the system was adequate to serve its purpose as was later proved. ( 5) There were only five Army mobile radar equipments in the Hawaiian area. These equipments had been in Oahu about three months. The five sets were installed and, in my opinion, as well sited as terrain would permit and were the absolute minimum needed to cover the entire seaward search for the Island. The radar equipment itself was inferior to any I had seen before. The deficiency in the equipment, however, was due to crude mechanical construction rather than to any electronic fault. This made the operation of the equipment difficult and slow, with the result that the reported azimuth readings were frequently very inaccurate and the reports were slow in coming in. The equipment had a reliable range of eighty to one hundred miles. A "dead" area existed through a fifteen miles radius from the equipment. It was, therefore, impossible to pick up aircraft plots within the first fifteen miles off shore. At each radar station, there was at least one officer or sergeant well trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In addition, there were seven or eight other enlisted operators under instruction at each station. All stations were under‑manned for twenty‑four operation. At the time of my inspection either commercial or Signal Corps field telephone lines had been installed between the radar stations and the Information Center. (6) The Information Center itself had been planned on an Area Command scale similar to the Boston or New York Information Centers and was too large in scope to effectively handle raids on the small Island of Oahu. The building was a temporary, wooden building and had been just been completed at the time of my inspection. The communications equipment was mostly field telephone equipment of the type developed during the last war. Positions had been provided for controllers and liaison officers, but liaison command lines had not been installed. These were not installed, primarily, because the activities at which the liaison command lines were to terminate were uninformed as to the purpose concerning the air warning system and because the Commanding General had not taken the steps to coordinate these activities with the air warning system. The Signal Corps had furnished sufficient plotters to man two watches only. These were just starting their training at the time of my inspection. There were no controllers or liaison officers available at this time and no provisions had been made to provide them. (7) The anti‑aircraft batteries had installed a command post but no liaison had been established between the anti‑aircraft command and the Information Center. (8) No attempt had been made to secure control of the anti‑aircraft guns of ships in harbor. (9) No liaison had been established between the searchlights and the Information Center. (10) No attempt had been made to disperse the fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field. (11) No automatic aircraft recognition system was installed which would identify all types of aircraft. (12) No aircraft approach lane system had been planned. (13) No system for identifying aircraft approaching Oahu by reports from parent aviation activities had been organized. (14) No visual observers reporting system had been organized. . . "

"By December 7, 1941, all telephone communication lines had been installed with the exception of the Civilian Air Raid Precaution Command lines, and

 

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the command lines from the Information Center to five fighter squadron dispersal points at Wheeler Field: Direct command lines were installed from Liaison positions in the Information Center to the various Army and Navy commands and activities. The civilian line had not been completed due to the fact no air raid center had been set up in Honolulu. The command lines to the fighter dispersal points were not completed, due to switchboard complications at Wheeler Field. Two fighter squadrons were dispersed, one at Bellows Field and one at Haliena Field. The dispersal of the remaining fighter squadrons was awaiting installation of command lines. An excellent liaison had been established between the Army anti‑aircraft batteries (three and five inch) and searchlights. About 15 November, I was instructed by CinCPac's Staff to request control of anti‑aircraft guns of ships in harbor from Com 14. This request was refused by Com 14 on the grounds that 'No Army organization would control guns on any naval vessel. If anything comes over, we will shoot it down.' However, this control was voluntarily turned over to the Information Center on December 9, after ships' guns had shot down USS ENTERPRISE aircraft. At the same time, I was also instructed by CinCPac to request naval liaison officers for the Information Center from Com 14. His Chief of Staff informed me that these liaison officers should come from the Fleet. I was referred to Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I was told by Commander, Patrol Wing Two, that no liaison officers were available in that Command. I returned to CinCPac and reported my failure to obtain naval liaison officers. CinCPac's Operations Officer informed me that he would take steps to find some. These officers did not report to the Information Center until December 8. I was further instructed by CinCPac to confer with Commander, Patrol Wing Two, in order to establish an aircraft identification system and aircraft approach lanes to Oahu. A conference was held at the Information Center, between November 15 and 20, at which officers from all flying activities were present to discuss these matters. It was decided by the aviation activities concerned that these systems would not be put into effect until war was declared, because it was felt that activating these systems prior to that time would complicate crowded flying conditions and hinder flying training. The Army stated that movements of aircraft from the United States to the Southwest Pacific were secret, and it was, therefore, not desirable to report those movements at that time. It should be noted that without an aircraft movement reporting system to the Information Center, it was impossible for the Information Center to determine whether radar reports were of friendly or of hostile aircraft. CinCPac's Operations Officer stated, however, that their Operations Office was prepared to report the movements of aircraft under their cognizance at any time this information was requested. Some doubt existed as to whether the Signal Corps (Hawaiian Department) or Interceptor Command should furnish controllers. As no controllers seemed to be forthcoming from the Hawaiian Department, Interceptor Command decided to use Squadron Commanders as controllers at the Information Center. These officers were heavily occupied with training their squadrons and were seldom available for controller training. However, no other source of controllers seemed to exist. Bomber Command, G. H. Q., and G‑2 liaison officers were not made available until several days after December 7, when their importance at the Information Center was finally realized. Interceptor Command had taken the initiative in the training of Information Center plotters. This training was progressing satisfactorily when, during the last week in November, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that the radar stations would operate only between 0400 and 0700. I was informed that the decision to limit the operating hours was made to prevent breakdown of the radar equipment from prolonged operation. Training which had been conducted from 0800 to 1700 daily only, due to the shortage of radar operators and plotters, was necessarily limited to the hours of 0400‑0700 by the order. The Information Center, therefore, virtually ceased to function except during those hours. I informed CinCPac's Operations Officer of the situation as it existed on about 1 December and was told that in view of the failure of the responsible commanders to take action to provide necessary personnel and to activate the Information Center on a twenty‑four basis, he would initiate a letter requesting the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to take action immediately. I do not know whether this letter was ever written, or not. However, no action was taken up to December 7." (P. 350‑351)

 

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Commander Taylor said that there was a 15‑mile dead area around Oahu in which the Army radar would not function. Prior to December 7 there was no visual system to supplement that weakness. (p. 351)

Commander Taylor said that the Army's radar operators and maintenance men at radar stations were insufficient in number and were not fully trained even up to December 7. (p. 352)

Commander Taylor said that he had asked the Navy for six liaison officers for the Information Center, and on December 8 he received ten who were survivors from the CALIFORNIA. He had also asked ComFOURTEEN to whom he was directed by the Commander in Chief's Staff, that control of the anti‑aircraft guns on naval vessels in the harbor should be held by the Information Center; also that some action be taken to identify aircraft approaching Oahu; and that a letter be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to expedite putting the Information Center on a 24-hour basis. (p. 352)

Commander Taylor said he made full reports to the Staff of the Commander in Chief as to the inadequacy of the Army Air warning system. (p. 352) He was quite sure that the Commander in Chief's Staff fully realized the situation.

 

His recommendation in regard to the Army air warning system was made on November 24, 1941. The memorandum containing his recommendation was introduced in evidence, marked Exhibit 62, and read to the Court. This covered a meeting held for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a wartime basis; attended by Army and Navy officers who agreed as to the importance of the Center and as to the necessity for liaison watch officers from each activity to transmit information; information was to be drawn from various sources including naval aircraft; the system was being operated 0700 to 1130 but should be on a full‑time basis; ComFOURTEEN should be approached with a view of obtaining naval liaison officers; confusion during exercises due to the number of planes could be controlled (1) by having all flights reported by parent units; (2) by enforcing aircraft approach procedure; (3) by requiring approaching planes to report at least 60 miles before coming in (CincUS had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises, this was to be discussed for a decision as to its value); IFF was not available; the question of gun control of ships in port was to be discussed with CincUS also it was decided to investigate the possibility of using naval radar to supplement land radar in an emergency.

Very little was done as a result of this memorandum, he said, because they were unable to get more personnel. It was the Army's duty to supply personnel, with the exception of the Navy liaison officers (page 619). He personally requested CincPac's, ComFOURTEEN's Chief of Staff and Admiral Bellinger to supply liaison officers and was told that they were not available, but would be ordered to report to the Information Center as soon as possible. Liaison officers were essential to the proper dissemination of information (page 620). Their absence here, however, actually made little difference so far as the Navy liaison was concerned.

Commander Taylor said that the air warning system could have been made operative sooner if there had been some impetus behind it with enough power to get the things needed (page 621). This impetus should have come from the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army. He remained with the Army for one month after December 7th, and at the end of seven days the Information Center was running smoothly. The war made it easier to get liaison officers (page 621).

Even if information from the radar were properly plotted, it would have been impossible to tell if planes were Japanese or whether they were United States planes; without some method of identification, radar cannot tell friend from foe. The Information Center is for the purpose of determining what friendly planes are in the air so that if a radar track is picked up that does not correspond to the course of the friendly planes it is presumed that it is the track of enemy planes.

The radar equipment of the Army, he said, was adequate to do a fair job in the morning. Communication between the air warning system and the other organizations was in, except for some of fighter dispersal areas and the lines to the civilian air warning. Communications between fighter director officers and fighter aircraft were inadequate to control fighters more than five miles off shore. The Army radar operators were well trained. For some time prior to December 7th the radar had been operated from 0800 to 1630 in the afternoon, but shortly before December 7th, General Short gave orders to close down the radar stations

 

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except between the hours of 4:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. (page 611). He understood the change was made to save the equipment.

On December 7th, there were no permanent radar installations: on Oahu there were five mobile sets (page 624). The permanent equipment was there, but it would take some time to put it in (page 624).

He stated that the Information Center of the air warning system was not adequately set up prior to December 7th, and they were in the process of teaching controllers (page 612).

At no time were there sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel to operate the radar station even partially (page 625). The Robert's Report is incorrect in stating that there were sufficient partially trained personnel on November 27th to operate the system twenty‑four hours a day (page 626). There were insufficient well‑trained personnel to operate even partially at any time. They could get fairly good 360° coverage, and he believed that in no case could a large raid come in undetected (page 626).

The Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army; was in charge of the radar, and the Navy assisted in setting up an air warning system, except that they had not furnished liaison officers (page 615). The radar was entirely under the control of the Army; his duties were advisory (page 616). At the time he came in contact with the Army, the Information Center was being organized by two junior Army officers who worked hard to get the system into operation but did not have enough force to get what they needed from various commands to get the station operating (Page 627).

There was not sufficient personnel to operate the radars twenty‑four hours a day, although he felt that the station should be operated twenty‑four hours a day, fully manned. There were just enough sets to cover the area of Oahu. If any one set had gone out, it would have meant the loss of that coverage. (page 617)

 

Concerning the Army radar system, Admiral DeLany said that they did not rely upon it for any information because the radar itself had just been installed and was being used for training operators. (p. 80)

Captain Curts discussed his connection with the development of radar from 1936 to 1938 and the disclosure of the Navy's developments to the Army in about 1937. (p. 110) Captain Curts discussed the status of the Army radar in November 1941 at Pearl Harbor. He did not know what delayed the Army generally in securing radar. The Army's problem in connection with radar was much simpler than the Navy's; he informed Admiral Kimmel that the Army radar was not in an operational but was merely in an instruction status prior to December 7. (p 111)

Admiral Anderson said that it was the Army's mission primarily to defend Pearl Harbor and that he had no exact knowledge as to the readiness to repel air attack; he was not familiar with the state of readiness of the air warning net.

 

F. SHIPS' RADAR

 

Admiral Kimmel testified that some of the ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th were equipped with radar, but it was not manned because it was ineffective due to the surrounding hills ( age 331).

Admiral Pye said that the PENNSYLVANIA and CALIFORNIA were equipped with radar (page 422). The efficiency of this radar was good. The ships' radar could not be used in port because of the surrounding hills and buildings.

 

Admiral Pye said that after the beginning of the war, the PENNSYLVANIA while at sea had picked up planes with radar and tracked them for a distance of 85 miles. (p. 168)

 

Admiral Smith said that the ships' radar was of no use in port (page 559). He stated that two carriers which were outside had radar, but picked up nothing, and that Admiral Halsey on his trip to Midway and return had an air search to a radius of 300 miles and picked up nothing (page 559). To have stationed a ship clear of Pearl Harbor with radar would have been ineffective due to the 65‑mile range of the radar, and to station a cordon for that purpose would have been ineffective and very dangerous because of the risk of attack on the ships (page 559). However, he did not recall consideration of this at the time.

Captain Ramsey stated that the CURTISS, from her berth in Pearl Harbor, could cover the 150°‑160° arc to southward with her radar for a distance depending on the altitude of the target (page 603).

Commander Taylor said that the radar equipment in the Navy was excellent prior to December 7, 1941, but the operators of radar were, in general, inex-

 

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perienced (page 610). In a land‑locked harbor with mountains around it, performance of radar equipment aboard ship was not good (page 614). In Pearl Harbor the ships' radar might work, and again—it might not. It would be affected by mountains to the north as to performance to the south (page 614).

 

G. STEPS TAKEN BY COMMANDER LOCAL NAVAL DEFENSE FORCE

 

Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch's performance of duty as Naval Base Defense Officer was satisfactory (page 285). He was to advise of the condition of readiness, but this did not relieve the Senior Officer Present Afloat from fixing the condition of readiness (page 286).

Admiral Bloch, he said, was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer and was to command the Naval forces in the event of an attack, and also for necessary drills (page 289). Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch had nothing suitable for reconnaissance (page 356), and that planes were available to Admiral Bloch only for drill or in an emergency (page 354), but that he should have asked for planes if he considered them necessary for long range reconnaissance, and could have asked for submarines or surface ships for such use (pages 354‑5). He said that Admiral Bloch had available four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three coast guard cutters, and the SACRAMENTO (page 361).

Admiral Bloch testified that the forces assigned to him as a local defense force were four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three Coast Guard cutters, the SACRAMENTO, one net vessel, one gate vessel, two self‑propelled oil lighters, and a few small tugs and small craft. This force was not adequate to perform the Navy's task under JCD‑42 (page 386). He had no surface or aircraft far offshore patrol and had no attack force.

Admiral Bloch said that CincPac was his immediate superior in command (page 388). He stated his responsibility under 2CL‑41 and what steps had been taken so as to discharge this responsibility. These were an agreement which had been made with the Army regarding the use of planes, and drills held pursuant thereto, marine anti‑aircraft had been made available to the Army, arrangements had been made at Navy installations to emplace Army guns (which were not emplaced prior to the attack) and to take care of those gun crews; about twenty‑six 3" anti‑aircraft guns had been emplaced by the Army near Pearl Harbor; air control had been arranged for through Commander Patrol Wing Two; in drills the Senior Officer Present Afloat had been advised of what condition of readiness to maintain and this was Admiral Bloch's responsibility; bi‑weekly drills had been held with the Army during the Autumn and up to December 7th; a Communications plan, including air raid alarm signal, had been planned and executed in drills (page 390).

 

On the 7th of December, 1941, certain features of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan for the Hawaiian Department plan were in effect, Admiral Bloch said:

"Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features of that plan were in effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy in paragraph 18 (a) was required to furnish inshore patrol. We had an inshore patrol working on 7 December. By (b), we were required to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol of an intermittent character, forces being furnished by the Commander‑in‑Chief of the U. S. Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of sortie. (c) and (d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this joint air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting planes on shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to the Army. (e), which is the harbor control post, was effective and in active operation. (f), which was installation and operation of an underwater defense, was effective. We had some buoys, sono‑buoys. I'm not sure whether the magnetic loops had been laid, or not. I think they had been and were in operation. Nets, torpedo nets, at the entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in operation. (h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every day. (i) distant reconnaissance: the district had no forces capable of performing that task, as the Commander‑in‑Chief and the Navy Department knew. We had been informed that 108 patrol planes would be furnished us at the earliest possible date but none had come to Pearl Harbor, and I believe, on that particular point, that I had asked Admiral Kimmel about the distant reconnaissance and asked him if he would furnish me patrol planes, and he told me he would do what he could, but he couldn't make any promises of furnishing a force because there was a possibility of the Fleet leaving and

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                                551

 

taking its forces with it. (k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that was effective. (1) : with regard to supplying local communication service for prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked on and largely effective. (m): all preparations had been made to assume censorship of the part that the Navy was to assume censorship of and was put into effect immediately after the attack. (o) : supply and hospitalization provisions had been made for that."

Captain Curts said in substance that the communications between Headquarters and the ships were the same as they would have been if Headquarters had been maintained aboard the PENNSYLVANIA. Captain Curts discussed communications arrangements with the Army and with aircraft and with the air station at Kaneohe Bay. (pp. 105‑107)

 

General Short testified that he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol during' the period from October 16th to December 7th, and that Harbor patrol posts were established and the channel was being swept (page 234). (2)

 

Admiral Bloch said that he gave General Short no reason for believing that the Navy forces at sea would give adequate warning against a hostile attack. (p. 21)

 

Admiral Bloch stated that there was no inner air patrol on the morning of December 7, 1941. He had asked the Navy Department for four observation sea planes for this purpose (page 407). He had no planes under his direct command.

 

H. ARMY AIRCRAFT

 

General Short testified that his aircraft defenses were very inadequate and that he had on December 7th, twelve B‑17's, only six of which were in commission. In addition to the six available B‑17's, he had ten A‑20's, and 50 B‑18's, which he characterized as death traps against a modern plane, only twenty‑four of which were in commission. He had asked the War Department for more planes (pages 223, 224, 231).

On December 7th, General Short testified, the Army pursuit planes were in a state of routine training except for the alert against sabotage (page 228). Not being alerted for combat, it required 55 minutes for the Army aircraft to get into action on December 7th (page 229). General Short testified that on December 7th, the Army maintained no inshore patrol except as incidental to training. One squadron of planes, he said, did have ammunition right next to the planes (page 229). The long range bombers which he had were available for cooperation with the Navy. The B‑17's were good for a 1200 mile radius if they carried bomb loads.

Colonel Phillips testified that on December 7th, the Army had about twelve planes sendable for distant reconnaissance (page 484), and a squadron of small reconnaissance planes (page 485). He said that there was a shortage of Army planes (page 479).

General Marshall said that for the Hawaiian project 148 pursuit planes were scheduled: there were 99 P‑40's and 46 P‑36's there on December 7th, The commander had asked for 180 long range bombers but shortages prevented reaching this figure. There were 12 B‑17's thereon December 7th (page 855).

Admiral Kimmel testified that during his tour of duty, the effective Army pursuit planes had been increased from none to 100 and that only six Army B‑17's were available on December 7th (page 289). He said that in November, 1941, the War Department had ordered the transfer of certain B‑17's from Oahu to the Philippines, which left only twelve at Oahu, six of which were available for use (page 290).

Admiral Kimmel stated that the best defense the Army had against an attack such as the attack which in fact was made, was pursuit planes, and that the Army did not have sufficient planes or crews (page 331). He estimated that on December 7th the Army needed three times the number of pursuit planes they had at Oahu (page 371).

 

Admiral Bloch‑said that in his opinion the Army did not have an adequate number of fields to disperse their fighters on; their main fighter field was Wheeler Field; they had another at Bellows Field and an improvised field in the neighborhood of Haleiwa; and Admiral Bloch had recommended that the Navy release a field at Kahuku Point. (p. 21)

Admiral Bloch believed that on December 7 the LEXINGTON, the ENTERPRISE, the SARATOGA and the YORKTOWN were away from Pearl

 

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Harbor and had their planes with them so that there were only about 70 Marine fighting planes at Pearl Harbor at the time. How many were available that morning, he did not know. (p. 25)

Admiral Bloch said that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Martin, had told him that he only had three planes available for inshore air patrol; he could not use the Army bombers because they could not see, and he could not use the fighters because they couldn't carry bombs and could not see very well either; Admiral Bloch believed that one of the three planes cracked up before December 7. (p. 25)

Admiral Bloch's recollection of the number  Army bombers available on December is set forth on page 25.

Admiral Smith said that they did not have a very high regard for the ability of the Army fighter and bomber pilots; that they considered, apart from anti-aircraft gunfire, that the most efficacious defense against air attack would be from the Navy's own carrier planes; since the carriers were away with their planes, he said, he would have sensed, if he had realized the danger of an air raid, that there was no security for Pearl Harbor aside from the antiaircraft gunfire. (p. 44)

The Army aircraft, Admiral McCormick said, were insufficient in number and limited in usefulness because they lacked some navigational equipment and had some weakness in radio. The comparative efficiency of personnel, was not in his mind at the time. (p. 72)

During his discussion of the Army aircraft, Admiral Davis said that provisions for command in the air were still only of a general nature and there had been no real development along that line by drills, although drills had been held. There were two reasons for this: first, that the air warning net and radar system had not been actually placed in operation and secondly, that the Hawaiian area had not been placed on the basis of unity of command so that, human nature being what it is, progress along the lines of mutual drills was slower that it might have been. (p. 100)

Admiral Pye said that it was definitely known that the air forces available to the Army and the aircraft installations were below those which were considered necessary for proper defense. (p. 163)

Commander Taylor said that, in his opinion, there were sufficient numbers of fighter aircraft at Oahu to repel a number of aircraft that actually attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, and that the quality of the fighter aircraft was such as not to outperform the Japanese fighters, but the performance was sufficient, he believed, to have been able to break up, to a large extent, a raid of the sort which came in. Commander Taylor said that about 50 percent of the fighter pilots of the Interceptor Command were well trained: the other percent were green. (p. 353)

 

I. THE SUBMARINES

 

Rear Admiral Withers, Commander Submarines, stated that the submarines were engaged in training for war. They were assigned to task forces for training and trained with other ships.

He considered his force mobilized on December 7th, and the condition of the personnel was excellent (page 1087). The submarines were ready for war but there was no particular condition of readiness in effect.

He generally kept about one‑third of. the submarines at Pearl Harbor (page 1085). The total number of submarines which he had was 32, 18 of which were based at Hawaii. Some of these were on the West Coast for overhaul (page 108). Twelve submarines had gone to Manila early in November, 1941 for observation, and to be in position should war come (page 1084). On December 7th two submarines were off Midway and two off Wake. There was no line of submarines out to cover the area surrounding Hawaii (page 1084). Only five submarines were at Pearl Harbor (pages 1088‑9). Five submarines were inadequate to throw a scouting force around Hawaii (page 1089).

 

J. RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANES AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE

 

The responsibility for long range reconnaissance, the readiness of aircraft and drills, the extent of the actual reconnaissance and the extent of reconnaissance which could have been undertaken during the period November 27th to December 7th have been discussed at pages 77‑85, supra.

The court inquired whether Admiral Kimmel's reason for not using planes for distant reconnaissance was not that the presence of foreign carriers was neither

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                                553

 

known nor suspected. He agreed (page 380). There were no inner air patrol flown on December 7, 1941, stated Admiral Kimmel (page 375). As to distant reconnaissance, he said that the planes available to the Army and Navy had been lumped for defense but there were not enough to perform distant reconnaissance effectively. A total of 81 patrol planes and twelve B‑17's were in the area. Of this number, 61 patrol planes and six B‑17's were available on Oahu immediately prior to the attack. There were twelve patrol planes operating from Midway. The number was not sufficient "on a requirement of 84 planes" for 360° patrol based on 15 mile visibility. The inadequacy had been reported and more planes asked for; they did the beat they could. He thought that there were a number of planes searching on December 7th in the operating areas and some engaged in maneuvers with our own submarines—he was told that there were about a dozen in the air (page 374). Midway was running a reconnaissance, as much as they could with 12 planes. He estimated that not more than 50 patrol planes on Oahu were in flying condition on December 7th.

Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 1941, the actual situation of the planes was as follows: There were 7 planes in the air conducting search between 120°‑170° to a distance of 450 miles from Midway; there were four planes on the surface of Midway armed with two 500‑pound bombs, and on ten‑minute notice; at Oahu, there were 12 planes of VP‑11 ready for flight on four hours notice; VP‑12 had six planes ready for flight in 30 minutes notice, and 5 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP‑14 had 3 in the air on security patrol, 3 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice, and 4 ready on 4 hours notice; VP‑22 had 12 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP‑23 had 11 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP‑24 had 4 planes in the air conducting tactics with submarines, and 1 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice (page 684).

 

Admiral Bellinger described his duties on December 7. Planes normally under his command consisted of a total of 81 planes on December 7. (p. 115). On December 7, he said, there were 36 planes at Kaneohe Air Station, 33 planes at Pearl and 12 at Midway. Twelve of the planes at Pearl had returned on December 5 from an extensive tour of duty at Midway and Wake. They had been sent there about October 17. He did not believe that any of the patrol planes were dispatched to the outlying islands after November 27 except in connection with sending Marine planes by carrier to Wake where one squadron was sent. (p. 116).

Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7,  58 of the 81 planes were in commission, nine were under repair and fourteen were in the air. (p. 117).

Admiral Bellinger discussed the conditions of readiness of the airplanes and the report of availability of Army and Navy planes on December 5 and 6. (pp. 125 and 126).

Admiral Bellinger said that after the attack, the Army communicated with the Army planes and the Navy communicated with the Navy planes. He also discussed the communication difficulties between Pearl Harbor and the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe. (p. 123).

 

There was no inner patrol around the entrances of Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th (page 685), and there were no planes available to him, either Army or Navy for that purpose (page 685).

Captain Ramsey said that units of the Army bombardment division and of Marine bombardment aviation reported daily planes available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, when functioning. The Base Defense Air Force only came into existence in an emergency or for drill purposes. ComFOURTEEN or CincPac could vitalize this Base Defense Air Force (pages 574‑6). Some order by officer senior to Admiral Bellinger was necessary (page 576). PatWings One, and Two were under Admiral Bellinger's command, of course.

Exhibit 53 was the basic operations plan of Naval Base Defense Force and was in effect on December 7th (page 576) Annex B to Operations Plan No. 1‑41 was issued pursuant to this plan, and Addendum 1 to Operating Plan No. 1A‑41 was an estimate of the situation prepared by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin, covering the situation at the end of March, 1941 (page 577). (Paragraph 3(b) of this addendum stated that an air attack was the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu, etc.). He considered this estimate sound, and that if any attack came on Oahu, it would come by air, which would be the only effective way to attack (pages 578‑9).

The general condition of readiness of aircraft was "Baker 5," 50% available on four hours notice, between November 27th and December 7th, but many units were in a higher condition and some airplanes were actually in the air (page 579) .

 

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He had no records from which he could refresh his memory as to the condition of readiness but gave isolated examples (page 580); PatWing Fourteen was in the air, conducting search of the operating area on December 7th, he did not remember whether there were three or four; there were about six planes of PatWing Two in the air conducting tactics with the submarines in the "sanctuary over that island." (page 585). There was a ready squadron, planes lined up and presumably ready to take the air in 30 minutes, which was to be relieved at 8 o'clock by another from Kaneohe (page 580).

The readiness question was one in fact decided by higher authority (page 581). He could not say whether directly by CincPac or Commander Naval Base Defense Force. In ordinary drill practice the drill message placing the organization on an activated status came from the latter; then they would send a dispatch to all units making aircraft available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, and start issuing drill orders. Planes in the air were to be sent immediately to search sectors. At the end they would send a message, "Resume normal condition of readiness." At least once in a while he was on that job (it appears he was there at least as early as November 1, 1941, but may have been there earlier, see page 575) the condition of readiness was changed to a higher degree. He could not recall who sent the message, but it was some higher authority and the change was from "Cast" to "Baker" (page 581).

Under normal operating conditions the planes available for the Naval Base Defense Air Forces were under different commanders.

The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force never had planes assembled under his command except for drill or emergency and, therefore, except in these cases, he had no opportunity to set the condition of readiness (page 582).

He also said that aside from the ready squadron at Ford Island, the other patrol craft there were in various position: some were ready for launching, some being repaired, some in hangers for long repair or modification (page 585).

On the morning of December 7th, six planes at Midway were scouting to cover task forces there and six on the water fully manned and loaded with live bombs (page 585).

He stated that dispersal of patrol planes was impracticable on land or in harbor (page 585).

According to Captain Ramsey, on the morning of the 7th, patrol planes covering operating areas were under orders to depth bomb submerged submarines outside the sanctuary without a close escort. He said that for several months prior to December 7th, the planes of PatWing Two flew armed. All planes on search of operating areas, by order of CincPac, carried live depth charges (page 604). The Army planes were usually armed (page 604).

He said that before December 7th, he had only one officer assistant; after, he had 42 officer assistants (page 608). They were available later because their ships had been sunk.

General Short testified that one of the most important things the Navy was supposed to do was long range reconnaissance (page 228). He said that from October 16th to December 7th, he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol, harbor patrol, posts were established and channels were being swept. There was a plan for Navy long distance reconnaissance and drills were held once a week (page 234). He said the joint air plan was effective March 1941 (page 234).

General Short testified that he did not know what Admiral Bloch did with respect to distant reconnaissance. Under the agreement, if the Navy planes were insufficient for such reconnaissance, the Navy could have asked the Army for planes (page 237). The Navy made no request of General Short for planes for distant reconnaissance, although General Short conferred with the Navy on December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251).

General Marshall said that heavy Army bombers had been delayed because of delay at the manufacturing plants and, after delivery, unexpectedly strong winds, adverse to Hawaii, kept the planes at the West Coast for three weeks. The initial squadron arrived in the middle of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (pages 681‑2).