XXXII.
CONDITIONS AT PEARL HARBOR PRIOR TO ATTACK
A.
THE SHIPS IN PORT
Admiral Hewitt's
investigation developed that at the time of the attack, the forces of the
Pacific Fleet were, according to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly
in port and partly at sea as follows:
(1) In Pearl Harbor:
(a) Task Force One,
Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one light cruiser and one
destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers, seventeen
destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.
(b) Task Force Two
(under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was at sea with units thereof
constituting a separate task force—Task Force Eight) comprising three
battleships, eight destroyers; one light cruiser, and four mine layers.
(c) Task Force Three
(less detached units under command of Vice Admiral Brown at sea, and less a
separate task force—Task Force Twelve—which was at sea under Rear Admiral
Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers, and four mine layers which
were under overhaul.
(d) Five submarines
and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Seven.
(e) The TANGIER,
HULBERT, CURTISS, and THORNTON, and Patrol Squadrons (VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23,
and 24‑a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force Nine.
(f ) Marine Air
Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty planes) at Ewa, Oahu.
(g) Two destroyer
tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and
repair, vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadrons VJ‑1, VJ‑,2,
and VJ‑3, as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, ,2 PBY‑1, 1 J2V.
(2) At sea:
(a) Task Force Eight
(Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one aircraft carrier
(ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, located 200 miles west
of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to Pearl Harbor after
landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.
(b) Task Force Three
(Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in port, consisting of one heavy
cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of its divisions, was exercising
with landing boats at Johnston Island.
(c) Task Force Twelve
(Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinarily a component of Task Force Three,
consisting of one aircraft carrier (LEXINGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five
destroyers, located about 425 miles Southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a
westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island.
(d) One heavy cruiser
and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task Force Three, were
engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu.
(e) Four submarines of
Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to Pearl Harbor.
(3) At other places:
(a) At Midway Island,
two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol Squadron VP‑21 (consisting
of twelve, planes) of Task Force Twelve.
(b) At Wake Island,
two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air Squadron.
(e) At Johnston Island
(in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise), two Base Force PBY‑1
planes.
(d) At Mare Island,
five submarines of Task Force Seven.
(e) At San Diego, four
submarines of Task Force Seven.
To sum up: At Pearl
Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers,
two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroyers, five
submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender,
four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of
various types, of which nine were under overhaul: At sea, there were two
aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines,
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 537
and one mine layer squadron less one
division. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy patrol
planes and one Marine Air Squadron.
Except as to Task
Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reenforce Wake and
Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in
accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment schedule (Ex., 73;
Hew. page 605).
Admiral
DeLany stated that the ships were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, in
accordance with the operating schedule of the Fleet; the principal mission in
late 1941 was training, and they had no orders from Washington to discontinue
(page 507).
Admiral Smith said that after the reorganization of the
Pacific Fleet to three task forces, one task force was always at sea and very
often two, and they held exercises against one another; sometimes all three
task forces would be at sea at the same time. (p. 35)
As Operations Officer, one of Admiral DeLany's duties was
the preparation of "Schedules of Employment." These were originally
prepared on a quarterly basis about six weeks before the end of the quarter,
and a considerable number of these were printed and widely distributed. (p.
83) The schedules provided for patrol of the operating areas and for air patrol
coverage, entrances and sorties, primarily because they felt that the
possibility of a submarine attack in the operating areas was something that
they had to guard against and also to prevent any blocking of the channel in
and out of Pearl Harbor (p. 84).
On December 7, Commander Paul C. Crosley was Flag Secretary
on the Staff of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet. He produced
a copy of the Pacific Fleet employment schedule, dated August 13, 1941, which
was incomplete since Enclosure A was missing. Enclosure A was a photostatic
copy of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter. (p. 179)
Commander Crosley also produced a proposed employment schedule dated November
10, 1941. (p. 180). Commander Crosley produced copies of the employment
schedules for Task Forces 1, 2 and 3 for the second quarter of the fiscal year
1942, and discussed the method of printing and distributing same. (p. 181).
Admiral Brainard did not recall any changes which had been
made in the employment schedules for the last quarter of 1941 which had been
submitted by the Pacific Fleet. He said that a rather general freedom of action
was given to the Fleet Commanders as to changes in the operating schedules. He
recalled that about the middle of 1941, the schedules were changed from type
schedules to task force schedules after the Commander‑in‑Chief had
established a task force organization. (p. 401)
Admiral
Pye stated that the task forces rotated days at sea and in port; the days and
dates varied. A task force could be figured to stay in port for nine to
fourteen days (page 430). His task force, Task Force One, was in Pearl Harbor
from November 27th until December 7th (page 418).
Admiral Pye said that it did not occur to him at any time
between November 27 and December 7 to take the ships to sea because of the
Army's inadequacy since it was his confirmed opinion that the greatest danger
was from submarines. (p.169)
On
December 7, 1941, Task Force One was in port, except for the SARATOGA, which
was on the West Coast. Task Force Two was at sea; the ENTERPRISE was delivering
planes to Wake; Bat. Div. One of Admiral Halsey's Task Force Two was in port.
Task Force Three was conducting operations at sea; and Task Force Three's
carrier, the LEXINGTON had gone to Midway to deliver planes (page 539). The
COLORADO was on the West Coast, and the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock at Pearl
Harbor (page 540
Admiral
McMorris said that one of the considerations that prompted leaving the
battleships of Task Force Two when the ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake with Marine
planes, was the possibility of a clash with some Japanese ships and they did
not want to handicap the carrier and its light forces with the slower
battleships (pages 891‑2). The Fleet, he said, was operating under a
schedule, but no directive had been received to keep the Fleet in Pearl Harbor
at that particular time (page 893).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that about two‑thirds of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, because Task Force One and Task Force Two
overlapped in schedule for a few days (page 369).
538 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The
location of the various ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th was set forth on
a map, which is Exhibit 60. From the summary annexed to that map, it appears
that there were in port 8 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 29
destroyers, 8 destroyer minelayers, 4 destroyer minesweepers, 5 submarines, 1
floating drydock, 1 hospital ship, and 21 auxiliaries. It also appears that the
MARYLAND and OKLAHOMA were double berthed near Ford Island, as were the
TENNESSEE and WEST VIRGINIA, and the ARIZONA and VESTAL.
Admiral
Bloch said that the berthing of ships so as to develop maximum antiaircraft
fire was the responsibility of the senior officer embarked; the double
battleships were unavoidable (page 400).
(3) Admiral
Bloch said that on December 7 all of the available battleships were in Pearl
Harbor—8 battleships—and that those most severely damaged were the double‑berthed
battleships in the outer positions at the moorings; however, he did not think
that the double berthing could have been avoided since there were no other
berths available. (p. 28)
Admiral Anderson said that air torpedo attack was the most
damaging to his battleships. The planes, he said, came from an easterly
direction. As the ships were berthed, there was a considerable number of the ship's
guns so placed that they could have borne upon the attacking torpedo planes.
Admiral Anderson said that assuming that at least one‑fourth of the antiaircraft
guns had been ready for opening fire and free to fire at will upon the
approaching planes, his estimate would be that those guns could not have
defeated nor seriously diminished the attack. (p. 397) Admiral Anderson said
that there wasn't any choice as to what the Commander Battleships could do in
assigning specific ships to specific berths. There were just about as many
berths designated available to him as there were ships. (p. 398)
Admiral
Smith said that the ships were anchored in four sections because the Army did
not have enough anti‑aircraft guns and it was necessary to locate the
ships so that the fire from the ships' guns would be effective. "We"
knew that the only guns that cold be fired in defense of Pearl Harbor probably
were the Navy guns (page 552).
Admiral Smith said that they had thought at the time that
the Army and Navy operating through the local defense forces were capable of
furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack but
that he now realized that they were not. (p. 42)
Admiral Brown said that knowing that the Army defenses were
wholly inadequate, he thought that the whole Fleet felt that the ships would
have to depend upon their own anti‑aircraft for their own defense both at
Pearl Harbor and at sea. (p. 144)
B.
THE ANTI‑AIRCRAFT GUNS
Admiral Turner discussed the knowledge in the Navy
Department of the Army's condition of readiness as to anti‑aircraft
equipment, radar and the like at page 260.
Admiral
Kimmel testified that there were no naval guns ashore except a Marine battery
(page 283). Admiral Kitts said that the statement in the Roberts' Report about
Navy shore batteries, at page 20, is inaccurate although there may have been a
Marine battery (pages 518, 521).
Admiral Bloch said that at the time of the attack on Pearl
Harbor, there was one Marine battalion which had some anti‑aircraft weapons.
(p 88)
Admiral Halsey said that during the months preceding
December 7, he had been of the view that the Army did not have enough equipment
or the proper equipment to defend Pearl Harbor, particularly as to anti‑aircraft
guns and fighting planes. (p. 303)
Admiral
Kitts stated that the Army had charge of the shore‑based anti‑aircraft
batteries. In the area immediately around Pearl Harbor, the only anti‑aircraft
fire on December 7th was from the ships and the fleet marine school at Palua.
The greatest strength of Army anti‑aircraft guns was in mobile batteries
of 3" caliber, which had not been emplaced on December 7th and did not get
in position until after noon on December 7th. He estimated that the Army had 32
to 48 3" guns and one battery of 90 mm. guns (page 516).
He
said that the Army anti‑aircraft guns at Kamehameha were in action in
about 25 minutes after the attack. These were fixed position guns (page 522).
The main Army anti‑aircraft guns were mobile batteries which were not in
place
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 539
except one battery. He
was informed that the Army's mobile anti‑aircraft was first in place at
noon (page 522). The fixed guns may have been in operation earlier.
Admiral Kitts discussed the readiness of personnel and
ammunition on shipboard and anti‑aircraft batteries. (p. 191) Admiral
Kitts said that the Fleet had its full allowance of ammunition and in general
its mobilization allowance aboard at the time of the attack. (p. 192) Admiral
Kitts discussed the gunnery training which had been given prior to Pearl
Harbor. (p. 193) Admiral Kitts discussed the anti‑aircraft guns at Pearl
Harbor, (p. 189) and the anti‑aircraft armament on ships in the Harbor.
(p. 190)
The
number and location of the Army's guns were, according to Admiral Bloch (page
413) as follows:
"To
my best belief and knowledge, the Army had about 80 3‑inch anti‑aircraft
guns, about 20 37‑millimeter guns, and about 100 50‑calibre machine
guns‑all of these for anti‑aircraft use. Of the 3‑inch guns,
it is my recollection that about 30 were in fixed emplacements, always mounted,
and about one‑half or two‑thirds of this 30 were located at forts
in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the other 3‑inch guns, I believe,
were mobile 3‑inch guns; all of the 37‑millimeter guns and 50‑calibre
guns were mobile. I cannot state with any great degree of accuracy that none of
the mobile guns were in place, but I think it is a fair statement to make that
most of them were not in place, in their designated locations. In addition to the
Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in conjunction
with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the neighborhood of 12 in
Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not mounted and not on their sites,
because they had not received their orders from the Army."
Admiral
Bloch stated that the Army planned the mounting of the anti‑aircraft
guns; he did not consider mounting anti‑aircraft or machine guns on
buildings in Pearl Harbor, nor did he ask the Army to install guns in such places
(page 416). The Army, he said, had insufficient guns to carry out its assigned
tasks under JCD‑42 (page 387).
According to Admiral DeLany, Admiral Kimmel was familiar
with the terribly weak defenses of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main
defense of the place from an air attack lay in the anti‑aircraft guns of
the Fleet. (p. 78)
Admiral McMorris said that although he personally felt the
Army's preparations for the defense of Oahu were adequate that he thought
Admiral Kimmel had been concerned over the anti‑aircraft defenses and had
talked with the Commanding General on the subject.
Colonel
Phillips testified that he did not consider the material condition of readiness
of the Army adequate to defend Pearl Harbor (page 494). There was, he said, a
shortage of anti‑aircraft guns (page 479).
General
Marshall said that for Hawaii—110 30‑mm., 144 37‑mm., and 516 50 calibre
AA guns had been ordered; on December 7, 1941, four‑fifths of the 30‑mm
were complete, and one‑fifth of the lesser calibres (page 855).
Admiral
Pye testified that there was no system of coordinating the fire between ship
and shore batteries; Sector Commanders took command of fire control and so
notified ships in their sectors (page 418).
Colonel
Phillips could not recall whether there had been any plan for coordinating the
Army gunfire with the Navy gunfire (page 481). The Local Joint Army-Navy
Committee made various plans, but he did not recall when they had met last
prior to December 7th (page 481).
General
Short testified that no plans had been made for coordinating the gunfire from
the ships in the harbor with the Army's fire (page 228).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that ComFOURTEEN had had many drills for coordinating the
fire of the ships in harbor with the shore fire (page 365).
C.
ARMY AND NAVY CONDITIONS OF READINESS
General
Short testified that the Army had three alerts‑the first against sabotage;
the second the additional threat of submarine, surface or aircraft attack; and
the third an "all‑out" alert. The alert in effect on December
7, 1941 was Army Alert No. 1—the anti‑sabotage alert (page 228).
Admiral Bloch said that with the exception of one or two
isolated cases, there was never any sabotage at Pearl Harbor. Those cases
involved disgruntled sailors. There was no sabotage on the 7th of December.
(p. 88)
540 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral
Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of an Army alert was in effect
although he did know that they had some kind of an alert effective (page 326).
He did not make specific inquiries of General Short as to the nature of the
alert which the Army was maintaining (page 343).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that the Navy condition of readiness in effect was condition
No. 3 as set forth in 2CL‑41 and an order requiring two 5‑inch guns
and two 50‑caliber guns on each battleship, which amounted to one‑fourth
of their anti‑aircraft to be mapped at all times (page 278). He said that
he considered condition 3 and the measures which he had in force sufficient
under the circumstances (page 279).
Admiral
Kimmel stated that on December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral Pye was the Senior Officer
embarked in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel's headquarters were at the submarine
base, and the PENNSYLVANIA was his Flagship to which he could move on short
notice (page 278). He testified that ComFOURTEEN was to advise the Senior
Officer Present Afloat of the condition of readiness to maintain and that the
Senior Officer Present Afloat was charged with the duty of setting the
condition of readiness for ships (page 365). He did not know whether Admiral
Bloch advised Admiral Pye of the condition of readiness to maintain (page 279).
The
condition of readiness of the Fleet, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not changed
after November 27th because full security measures for ships at sea were
already in effect (page 303).
The
court wanted to know whether if Admiral Kimmel had increased the alert would it
have done any more than man a few anti‑aircraft guns (page 1124). He
said, at best, it might have done so and it might, have enabled the
intercepting fighters to come into action a little better.
Admiral
Bloch stated that Condition 3 was, and for several months had been, in effect
for the Fleet; the condition of readiness for Navy shore establishments and aircraft
was determined by each commanding officer, but there was none in effect on
December 7th, except normal day to day routine for training (page 390).
Admiral
Pye stated that there was no condition of readiness set for ships in port. His
testimony before Admiral Hart that condition 3 was in effect and that he so
informed Admiral Kimmel was erroneous (page 419).
Admiral Pye said that the defenses of the Fleet were largely
in the hands of the Army and the condition of readiness was not set by the
Fleet itself, but was set by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
(p. 158)
Admiral Pye said that Condition 3 was in effect for the
ships in the Harbor on December 7, and had been prescribed previous to the last
entry on the understanding that that condition would be in effect unless other
notice was given. He did not receive any advice from the Commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District as to the necessity for a higher condition of
readiness. (p.164‑5).
However, each
battleship had two 5" anti‑aircraft guns ready and two machine guns
manned in addition to the anti‑aircraft control (page 419). This
condition was in excess of that required by condition 3. Gun crews for manned
guns were required to be on deck near their guns with communications, including
antiaircraft control, manned (page 422). The anti‑aircraft control
(director room) was the only battle lookout. The officers and men required to
remain aboard were sufficient to man all anti‑aircraft guns.
Admiral Anderson said that none of the three specific
conditions of readiness set forth in sub‑heading G of 2CL‑41 were
maintained by the Fleet while it was in Pearl Harbor during November and
December. He said that he was very clear that none of these conditions was in
effect at the time of the attack because be gave close personal attention to
matters of gun and ammunition readiness and on his own initiative he had
increased the degree of gun and ammunition readiness in the battleships. He had
established 24‑hour watches on two of the eight .50 calibre guns on each
battleship, and two of the 5" anti‑aircraft guns on each ship were
to be told off each day as ready guns. (p. 396) Admiral Anderson said that the
anti‑aircraft batteries aboard the battleships were, generally speaking,
eight 5 anti‑aircraft guns .25 calibre, and eight .50 calibre machine
guns. Also most of the ships had either four guns of three inch .50 calibre or
four quads of 1" 1. (p. 397)
Admiral Bunkley said that in October, 1941, while his ship
was in port, they were not under any condition of readiness, i.e., under
conditions one, two or three. They had two machine guns manned at all times and
am-
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 541
munition
ready for two 5" guns with the crews of those guns standing by. They were
operating under the Fleet security letter issued prior to October and a
security order for the CALIFORNIA which was designated to prevent sabotage by
requiring a security patrol. There were no changes ordered prior to December 7
that he could remember. (p 413‑4)
While at sea, Admiral Bunkley said the battleships did
maintain conditions of readiness and it was his opinion that these precautions
were carried out both for training and because of the danger of a submarine
attack. (p. 415)
Admiral
Pye said that: He was at sea on November 24th and received a dispatch from
Admiral Kimmel and from then on until the task force entered Pearl Harbor, all
possible measures against submarine and aircraft attack were taken (page 433).
He said that Admiral Bloch only had the duty to inform him as Senior Officer
embarked in Pearl Harbor of the necessity for a condition of readiness (page
420). He did not do so (page 420).
Admiral
Kitts testified that Condition 3 was in effect at sea and its equivalent in
effect in port (page 513). He said that the condition of readiness at Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941 was equal to or better than that laid down in 2CL‑4
1, dealing with Port Security (page 523).
Admiral
Smith said that despite the Robert's Report, the state of readiness was
adequate to meet the emergency (page 548).
Admiral
Delaney said that the condition of readiness was as set forth in 2CL‑41
(page 498). He felt that this was satisfactory.
D.
NUMBER AND CONDITION OF THE MEN
Admiral
Bloch stated that the Army had insufficient and "green" personnel
(page 387). According to General Short, on December 7, 1941, he had 57,000
troops. He had asked for 71,500 (page 257).
As
to Navy personnel, Admiral Smith said that in his opinion (which the Court did
not seem to share), the withdrawal of men from the Fleet for the purpose of
filling complements and new construction had not materially decreased the
efficiency of the Fleet (page 560) The ship did have the crews that they had
normally held, "say a year before Pearl Harbor" (page 560) on the 85
per, cent basis. He commented that several days after Pearl Harbor they
received a letter written shortly before Pearl Harbor from the Bureau of
Personnel, refusing to give them further men, and stating that the war was in
the Atlantic.
Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel had constantly asked
for additional equipment of men for the Pacific Fleet, but he adverted to a
letter received shortly after Pearl Harbor from the Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation, dated November 25, 1941, File No. FF12/MM‑(55), (Secret‑Confidential
File Room Bureau of Personnel) advising that the war was in the Atlantic.
(p.38)
Admiral Smith said that the personnel and materiel shortages
did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet; he had always felt that the
complements were unnecessarily large; the Fleet was adequately manned; he
considered the ships very efficient; the efficiency of the Fleet was not harmed
by the shortages; but the Commander‑in‑Chief was looking into the
future when he would have to send these men home for new construction. (p. 38)
Admiral Smith said that the materiel conditions of the Fleet
was all right and was satisfactory to the Commander‑in‑Chief. (p.
39)
Admiral Smith said that the program of alterations, as laid
down by the Materiel Bureaus of the Navy Department, did not interfere with the
operations and training of the Fleet. (p. 39)
Admiral Smith said that the morale and health of the Fleet
was excellent. (p. 39)
Admiral Smith said that, in his opinion, the efficiency of
the Fleet did not suffer from too frequent changes of personnel. (p. 63)
Admiral Halsey said that one of his most vivid recollections
of the period prior to the attack was the constant effort on the part of
Admiral Kimmel and his subordinate commanders to get additional personnel and
materiel. (p. 307)
Admiral
Kimmel testified that regular liberty was granted the night of December 6th‑7th,
i.e., three‑fourths of the officers and one‑half of the men had
liberty. The ones who remained were required to be trained and capable of
manning antiaircraft guns. At the time of the attack there were 90 per cent of
the men and 70 per cent of the officers aboard. There was no evidence of
consequential indulgence in liquor (page 330).
542 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General
Short testified that he knew of no unusual intoxication on the night of
December 6th, and that no effects of overindulgence were apparent on the
morning of the 7th (page 269).
Admiral
Delaney testified that morale in the fleet was high. The fleet had been intensively
trained under warlike conditions. Joint training with Army had been conducted
(page 496).
Admiral
Kitts, who was in charge of training, stated that in his opinion the efficiency
of the ships and gunnery on December 7, 1941, was in the highest state ever
reached in time of peace (page 512). He stated that a shortage of 50-calibre
ammunition had affected the target practice of the ships. (In this connection,
the Court took judicial notice of the Robert's Report.) (page 518). He said,
however, that the Fleet's training and efficiency were of the highest; subject
to manpower and some ammunition shortages (page 525).
Admiral
Kitts said that he was ashore on the night of December 6th‑7th, and saw
nothing out of line as to behavior or sobriety. The officers and men of the
ships were fit for duty on December 7, 1941. The high state of readiness of
personnel for combat was the result of intensive training during 1941 (page
526).
Admiral
Pye testified that from the viewpoint of sobriety the conduct of the men and
officers on the 6th and 7th of December, was satisfactory (page 443). Their
behavior during the attack was superb (page 445). He considered that the state
of training was the highest he ever saw in the Fleet, despite shortages of
material (page 444).
Admiral Pye said that in his opinion on December 7, the
Fleet was in the highest state of efficiency that it had ever attained. (p.
149)
Admiral Calhoun said that there was no unusual or excessive
drinking on the night of December 6th, and no evidence of drunkenness on the
morning of December 7th. (p. 226) Admiral Calhoun discussed the liberty
provisions over the week‑end. (p. 226)
No
instances of men being unfit for duty came to the attention of Admiral Bloch
(page 411). Admiral DeLany stated that in his opinion the men were fit for duty
and they performed their duty well (page 508). According to Captain Ramsey, all
men were fit for duty and were efficient (page 607). Commander Rochefort
testified that the deportment of the officers and men was excellent (page 476).
Colonel Phillips stated that the condition of officers and men as to sobriety
was normal on December 6th‑7th. All the men he came in contact with on
December 7th were fit for duty and on the job (pages 494‑5).
E.
THE AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE
General
Short testified that the aircraft warning service was in the course of
preparation and was being operated for training which had started in October,
1941. The system was not completely installed and the personnel were not
expert: In October, 1941, he had sent fifteen men to sea with the Navy for
training and the system could be counted on to do a fairly satisfactory job
(pages 223‑225). In addition to the radar system, they maintained 100
coast artillery stations as lookout stations. These were not continuously
manned, and were not manned on December 7th because of the alert then in effect
(page 225). No civilian lookouts were maintained because the distances at Oahu
were so small as to make them valueless (page 227).
General
Short said that the radar stations were supposed to be effective at ranges of
from 75 to 100 miles, and that they might have been more effective if higher
station locations had been completed (page 227). On December 7th, the aircraft
warning service was being operated from 0400 to 0700 daily (page 228). The
system was operated after 0700 for training, if the personnel wished to do so
(page 263). The radar system was operated from 0400 to 0700 because he
estimated that that was the best time for the enemy to attack, if the enemy were
going to attack (page 265). The Interceptor Command was functioning after
November 27th on a 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. in. basis daily, although the
Interceptor Command was not established by written order until December 17th.
General
Short testified that a request had been made for a Navy liaison officer in the
Information Center of the Aircraft warning system in August, and on November
24th the Navy took steps to set up liaison officers. He does not recall whether
they were actually there on December 7th (page 226). He said that Admiral
Kimmel assigned Commander CURTISS as Liaison Officer the day after the request
was made, but General Short felt that Admiral Kimmel did not understand that he
wanted a liaison officer actually working in the Information Center. and not a
general liaison officer. Lt. Comdr. Taylor was sent to help with the aircraft
warning system (pages 261‑2).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 543
Colonel
Phillips said that the Interceptor Command was barely in the first stage of
organization on December 7th; there were no permanent stations, but a mobile
station was operating (page 487) Ultimately this command included an
information center, but he isn't sure whether it was set up on December 7th.
The Aircraft Warning System was operating for training from November 27th until
December 7th. He did not remember the hours they were working (page 487), but
it was in the morning.
General
Marshall said that in connection with the installation of the aircraft warning
service, the plans were for six fixed and six mobile stations (page 857).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that he did everything he could to assist the Army on the
radar set‑up. He sent officers to work with the Army. Army personnel had
been taken to sea for radar training. He knew that the Army radar system was in
operation and that it was far from perfect (pages 289‑290). He said that
he did not know that the radar system was not to be operated after 0700 (page
290). He did not know the details of the progress of construction on the radar
system but knew that the Navy had continued pressure on the Army to get
something done on this line (page 294). The Army's radar crews, he said, were
green and untrained; the equipment was not adequate; and the warning net needed
polishing in order to make it effective (page 304).
Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel knew that the Army
radar station had not been functioning; it had just been completed; it had been
operating on the morning of December 7, but Admiral Kimmel hadn't known it.
(p.41)
Admiral Smith said that he knew the Army radar could not be
depended upon to give warning of a Japanese carrier raid. (p. 44)
Admiral
Kimmel testified that he was quite certain that in many conversations which he
had with General Short, he stressed the necessity for an aircraft warning
system as well as for other elements of defense (page 1128); General Short
never requested him to supply any naval operators to be used in the operation
of Army radar on Oahu, and so far as Kimmel is concerned, he made no request of
the Commandant (page 1129). General Short did ask for a liaison officer in
July, who was furnished. Admiral Kimmel was informed that General Short did not
in fact request the Commandant for "watch officers;" they would have
been supplied, had he asked (page 1129). Admiral Kimmel did send Commander
Taylor to assist the Army (page 1130). Admiral Bloch was the proper person to
handle radar matters with the Army.
Admiral
Bloch stated that the Navy liaison officer who was supposed to be supplied to
the Army Interceptor Command was only one of a number to be supplied as well by
the Army (page 1146). A Navy liaison officer was not there on December 7th
because the Army had not even sent watch officers, nor had they asked the Navy
to send a watch officer. The Army Warning Service was not actually established
until December 7th (page 1147). A Navy liaison officer for the Army Interceptor
Command, for the evaluation and relay of information, was not sent until after
December 7th, as the system was not set up before then, although the agreement
had required this.
Admiral Bloch said that when General Short arrived in
February, he and Admiral Bloch talked about the Army's radar system and as the
net progressed to completion General Short, about September or October, told Admiral
Bloch that he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train operators and
he wanted to know if there was anything Admiral Bloch could do to help him.
Admiral Bloch requested the Commander‑in‑Chief to permit General
Short to send a number of his men to sea for training which was done. As of
December, Admiral Bloch thought that the net was still in the condition where
all the kinks were not yet all out of it and they were still training operators
and could not be depended upon, but Admiral Bloch had no knowledge as to
whether they were standing any regular watches and early in December there was
no means developed for controlling aircraft so as to differentiate by means of
radar between friendly and other planes. (p. 11‑12)
As to communications, Admiral Bloch said the communication
plan gotten out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from
the Base Defense Commander to all ships and points. All ships and stations were
required to listen at all times on that frequency. There were teletypes between
the Army Headquarters and Admiral Bloch's Headquarters with a branch in Admiral
Kimmel's office. There was telephonic communication
544 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
between
Admiral Bloch's Headquarters and General Short's "Message Center".
Admiral Bloch also had such communication from the Harbor Control and Command
Posts, both at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor to the gates. There was also
telephonic communication between the Harbor Control and the Artillery Headquarters.
There were, Admiral Bloch said, means for rapid communication including
communication from the "Interceptor Command" to Admiral Bloch's
Headquarters. (p. 19)
Admiral Bloch said that there was no naval officer
specifically detailed at the Army Interceptor Command. After December 7, that
Command was staffed by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and
training them at that time, the Army asked for watch officers to communicate
with the Navy, although Admiral Bloch said it had been his plan that the communications
would be sent by Army people to the Navy. Nevertheless, Navy people were sent
there on December 7. (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch said he did not recall that the Army radar net
had ever been used in any tactical operation. (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch said that the Army was having a great deal of
trouble getting the radar system to work; there was trouble with the
electronics and the Army came to Admiral Bloch for assistance; the Army was
referred to the Commander in Chief and an officer by the name of Taylor was
sent to help the Army in an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's
net going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison and Admiral Bloch
thought that he was there only in the capacity as an expert to assist the Army
with their electrical and mechanical difficulties. (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch had no confidence in the Army radar system
because he knew that it was not completely set up; the operators were not
completely trained; and there was no way so that friendly or hostile planes
could be identified there being no IFF equipment. Admiral Bloch said that there
was a standard procedure for aircraft approach to and departure from Oahu for
Army and Navy planes and that in addition to Army and Navy planes, there were
various commercial companies operating aircraft there. (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch said that the Army had a number of observation
posts on Oahu and adjacent islands, but that these were not manned unless there
was a full alert and that not all of such posts had means of rapid communications
with headquarters. (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch said that the only arrangement the Navy had
for obtaining information with respect to approaching aircraft or ships by
visual observation was the signal tower. (p. 21)
Captain
Ramsey stated that about a week or ten days before December 7th, General
Davidson asked Admiral Bellinger whether the Navy could furnish officer
personnel to help man the radar system for 24‑hour operation and said
that if the Navy did not supply the men, he could operate only in the critical
hours of the morning and evening. The final decision was that the Navy could
not supply the officers required at that time on a permanent basis. He did not
know they reason (page 601).
Admiral
Bellinger stated that he was only slightly informed as to the Army radar system
(page 686).
Admiral Bellinger said that the Army Interceptor Command was
not ready to perform its part in the protection of Pearl Harbor from the
viewpoint of the radar installations and of their ability to control their
fighter groups, the number of planes they had, and the general quality of their
pilots. (p. 131)
Commander
W. G. Taylor testified that between October 1st and December 7th, he was
assigned to temporary duty Commander Airforce, Pacific Fleet (page 609). He was
loaned to the Army Interceptor Command in an advisory capacity to aid in
setting up the air warning system. (3)
Admiral
Halsey said that he had sent his communication officer to work with the Army on
the Army's radar system and that that officer had reported to him that the
radar system was very backward as to its state of readiness. (p. 302)
He
had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar with
radar development at the time. In working with the Army, he worked mainly on
liaison between the air warning systems and the commands; he worked in an
advisory capacity (page 611). He had been detailed to the job at the direction
of. Admiral Kimmel around the middle of November, at the request of the Army
(page 622).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 545
He
first reported to the Army as an advisor about the second week in November and
called a conference at which he submitted a memorandum which was prepared
because of the difficulty in getting the Information Center set up. (4)
Commander William E. G. Taylor completed a naval flight
course and was commissioned an Ensign in 1926; after a year's service, he
resigned his commission and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine
Corps Reserve. He served as an instructor specializing in fighter aircraft, and
was placed on inactive duty as a Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1934.
He then had various jobs as a pilot, and was commissioned a Sub‑Lieutenant
in the British Naval Reserve Force in September, 1939, and thereafter engaged
in various combat operations with the British. (p. 338‑340) He said that
the British fighter operations were very effectively directed while the planes
were in the air. The general assumption was that the direction was employing a
system of advanced electronics for interception of enemy aircraft. (p.341)
Commander Taylor, while serving with the British, made
reports to United States Naval representatives and endeavored to get as much
information as he could on the methods of fire control used by the British. (p.
342) Commander Taylor returned to the United States in an effort to get from
the British faster fighter craft which could be used by the Fleet and the Fleet
air arm. (p. 342) Commander Taylor was next transferred to the British Royal
Air Force on October 2, 1940, and was assigned to an R. A. F. squadron known as
242 in order to get operational experience before taking over his own squadron.
He said that it was generally accepted that the major reason for the success of
the R. A. F. fighter during the so-called Battle of Britain was the magnificent
fighter direction control which the British had. (p. 343)
During this period of service with the Royal Air Force,
Commander Taylor became more interested in the patrol system used by the
British and continued to make reports to the American Naval Attaché. Commander
Taylor said that both the American Army and the American Navy had a large
number of observers who were studying the Royal Air Force system, and that his
impression that all of the information was made available to them, but that it
did not appear that these observers brought back the full importance of the
method used by the British. (p. 343‑4) Commander Taylor said that he had
made a full report to various officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics and
particularly sought out the officer who was at that time in charge of radar
development. Commander Taylor could arouse no interest in the use of this radar
for fighter direction. (p. 344)
In July, 1941, after having had his own squadron for six
months, Commander Taylor was advised by the British that because of his age
they were going to make him a Wing Commander in charge of a fighter operational
unit. He asked to be allowed to go back either to the British Navy or to be
returned to the American Navy. He was commissioned in the American Navy in
July, 1941, given a special assignment to visit several radar stations, and
reported to the Bureau of Aeronautics in August of 1941. (p. 345)
Commander Taylor was given various lecturing assignments to
ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and he arrived at Pearl Harbor in
October, 1941, where he spoke to Admirals Halsey and Kimmel, among others. He
lectured to the Army fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field and lectured to the
pilots of the SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE. He found that the ENTERPRISE fighter
direction was considerably behind the British methods but had progressed much
further than any other ship. He found that the ENTERPRISE had had their radar
equipment for some time, the SARATOGA had no radar, and the LEXINGTON had recently
acquired radar. In all ships equipped with radar, all hands were going through
a training period. Commander Taylor was recalled by a dispatch from Admiral
Kimmel which stated that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, desired
Commander Taylor's assistance for technical purposes. (p. 347)
The conditions found by Commander Taylor about November 1,
1941, as to the Army warning system, which he reported to both the Army and the
Navy prior to November 15, 1941, were as follows:
"During the first week in November, we inspected all of
the installations and plans for the air warning system and I found these facts
to be true; (1) Construction and maintenance of the air warning system was a
Signal Corps function directly under the cognizance of the Chief Signal
Officer, Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This Command
546 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
appeared
to have little conception of the vast function of the air warning system and
exhibited very little interest in expediting its installation. At no time
before December 7, 1941, did this Command furnish either the authority or
impetus badly needed to get the work or organization properly started. (2) The
actual operation of the air warning system—that is, the evaluation and
dissemination of radar information and the control of fighter defense—was under
the Interceptor Command. The Interceptor Command fully realized the importance
of the air warning system. Although the officers concerned were not fully informed
of its complicated functions, they were willing and eager to take advice and
lend all assistance in their power to help complete its installations. They
seemed relatively impotent, however, in getting assistance needed from the
Commanding General's Staff. (3) One Captain of the Air Corps and one Captain of
the Signal Corps had been through the Air Warning School at Mitchell Field, New
York. It was with these two officers that I worked. Both were capable and
energetic. They worked twelve to fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, in an
attempt to speed up completion of the air warning system. (4) The air warning
equipment and communications system were largely field or mobile equipment and
the entire system was temporary. However, with the exception of the ground‑to‑air
and air‑to‑ground radio equipment, the system was adequate to serve
its purpose as was later proved. ( 5) There were only five Army mobile radar
equipments in the Hawaiian area. These equipments had been in Oahu about three
months. The five sets were installed and, in my opinion, as well sited as
terrain would permit and were the absolute minimum needed to cover the entire
seaward search for the Island. The radar equipment itself was inferior to any I
had seen before. The deficiency in the equipment, however, was due to crude
mechanical construction rather than to any electronic fault. This made the
operation of the equipment difficult and slow, with the result that the
reported azimuth readings were frequently very inaccurate and the reports were
slow in coming in. The equipment had a reliable range of eighty to one hundred
miles. A "dead" area existed through a fifteen miles radius from the
equipment. It was, therefore, impossible to pick up aircraft plots within the
first fifteen miles off shore. At each radar station, there was at least one
officer or sergeant well trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In
addition, there were seven or eight other enlisted operators under instruction
at each station. All stations were under‑manned for twenty‑four
operation. At the time of my inspection either commercial or Signal Corps field
telephone lines had been installed between the radar stations and the
Information Center. (6) The Information Center itself had been planned on an
Area Command scale similar to the Boston or New York Information Centers and
was too large in scope to effectively handle raids on the small Island of Oahu.
The building was a temporary, wooden building and had been just been completed
at the time of my inspection. The communications equipment was mostly field
telephone equipment of the type developed during the last war. Positions had
been provided for controllers and liaison officers, but liaison command lines
had not been installed. These were not installed, primarily, because the
activities at which the liaison command lines were to terminate were uninformed
as to the purpose concerning the air warning system and because the Commanding
General had not taken the steps to coordinate these activities with the air
warning system. The Signal Corps had furnished sufficient plotters to man two
watches only. These were just starting their training at the time of my
inspection. There were no controllers or liaison officers available at this
time and no provisions had been made to provide them. (7) The anti‑aircraft
batteries had installed a command post but no liaison had been established
between the anti‑aircraft command and the Information Center. (8) No
attempt had been made to secure control of the anti‑aircraft guns of
ships in harbor. (9) No liaison had been established between the searchlights
and the Information Center. (10) No attempt had been made to disperse the
fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field. (11) No automatic aircraft recognition
system was installed which would identify all types of aircraft. (12) No
aircraft approach lane system had been planned. (13) No system for identifying
aircraft approaching Oahu by reports from parent aviation activities had been
organized. (14) No visual observers reporting system had been organized. . .
"
"By December 7, 1941, all telephone communication lines
had been installed with the exception of the Civilian Air Raid Precaution
Command lines, and
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 547
the
command lines from the Information Center to five fighter squadron dispersal
points at Wheeler Field: Direct command lines were installed from Liaison
positions in the Information Center to the various Army and Navy commands and
activities. The civilian line had not been completed due to the fact no air
raid center had been set up in Honolulu. The command lines to the fighter
dispersal points were not completed, due to switchboard complications at
Wheeler Field. Two fighter squadrons were dispersed, one at Bellows Field and
one at Haliena Field. The dispersal of the remaining fighter squadrons was
awaiting installation of command lines. An excellent liaison had been
established between the Army anti‑aircraft batteries (three and five
inch) and searchlights. About 15 November, I was instructed by CinCPac's Staff
to request control of anti‑aircraft guns of ships in harbor from Com 14.
This request was refused by Com 14 on the grounds that 'No Army organization
would control guns on any naval vessel. If anything comes over, we will shoot
it down.' However, this control was voluntarily turned over to the Information
Center on December 9, after ships' guns had shot down USS ENTERPRISE aircraft.
At the same time, I was also instructed by CinCPac to request naval liaison
officers for the Information Center from Com 14. His Chief of Staff informed me
that these liaison officers should come from the Fleet. I was referred to
Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I was told by Commander, Patrol Wing Two, that no
liaison officers were available in that Command. I returned to CinCPac and
reported my failure to obtain naval liaison officers. CinCPac's Operations
Officer informed me that he would take steps to find some. These officers did
not report to the Information Center until December 8. I was further instructed
by CinCPac to confer with Commander, Patrol Wing Two, in order to establish an
aircraft identification system and aircraft approach lanes to Oahu. A
conference was held at the Information Center, between November 15 and 20, at
which officers from all flying activities were present to discuss these
matters. It was decided by the aviation activities concerned that these systems
would not be put into effect until war was declared, because it was felt that
activating these systems prior to that time would complicate crowded flying
conditions and hinder flying training. The Army stated that movements of
aircraft from the United States to the Southwest Pacific were secret, and it
was, therefore, not desirable to report those movements at that time. It should
be noted that without an aircraft movement reporting system to the Information
Center, it was impossible for the Information Center to determine whether radar
reports were of friendly or of hostile aircraft. CinCPac's Operations Officer
stated, however, that their Operations Office was prepared to report the
movements of aircraft under their cognizance at any time this information was
requested. Some doubt existed as to whether the Signal Corps (Hawaiian
Department) or Interceptor Command should furnish controllers. As no
controllers seemed to be forthcoming from the Hawaiian Department, Interceptor
Command decided to use Squadron Commanders as controllers at the Information
Center. These officers were heavily occupied with training their squadrons and
were seldom available for controller training. However, no other source of
controllers seemed to exist. Bomber Command, G. H. Q., and G‑2 liaison
officers were not made available until several days after December 7, when
their importance at the Information Center was finally realized. Interceptor
Command had taken the initiative in the training of Information Center
plotters. This training was progressing satisfactorily when, during the last
week in November, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that the
radar stations would operate only between 0400 and 0700. I was informed that
the decision to limit the operating hours was made to prevent breakdown of the
radar equipment from prolonged operation. Training which had been conducted
from 0800 to 1700 daily only, due to the shortage of radar operators and
plotters, was necessarily limited to the hours of 0400‑0700 by the order.
The Information Center, therefore, virtually ceased to function except during
those hours. I informed CinCPac's Operations Officer of the situation as it
existed on about 1 December and was told that in view of the failure of the
responsible commanders to take action to provide necessary personnel and to
activate the Information Center on a twenty‑four basis, he would initiate
a letter requesting the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to take action
immediately. I do not know whether this letter was ever written, or not.
However, no action was taken up to December 7." (P. 350‑351)
548 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Taylor said that there was a 15‑mile dead
area around Oahu in which the Army radar would not function. Prior to December
7 there was no visual system to supplement that weakness. (p. 351)
Commander Taylor said that the Army's radar operators and
maintenance men at radar stations were insufficient in number and were not
fully trained even up to December 7. (p. 352)
Commander Taylor said that he had asked the Navy for six
liaison officers for the Information Center, and on December 8 he received ten
who were survivors from the CALIFORNIA. He had also asked ComFOURTEEN to whom
he was directed by the Commander in Chief's Staff, that control of the anti‑aircraft
guns on naval vessels in the harbor should be held by the Information Center;
also that some action be taken to identify aircraft approaching Oahu; and that
a letter be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to expedite
putting the Information Center on a 24-hour basis. (p. 352)
Commander Taylor said he made full reports to the Staff of
the Commander in Chief as to the inadequacy of the Army Air warning system. (p.
352) He was quite sure that the Commander in Chief's Staff fully realized the
situation.
His
recommendation in regard to the Army air warning system was made on November
24, 1941. The memorandum containing his recommendation was introduced in
evidence, marked Exhibit 62, and read to the Court. This covered a meeting held
for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made
fully operative on a wartime basis; attended by Army and Navy officers who
agreed as to the importance of the Center and as to the necessity for liaison
watch officers from each activity to transmit information; information was to
be drawn from various sources including naval aircraft; the system was being
operated 0700 to 1130 but should be on a full‑time basis; ComFOURTEEN
should be approached with a view of obtaining naval liaison officers; confusion
during exercises due to the number of planes could be controlled (1) by having
all flights reported by parent units; (2) by enforcing aircraft approach
procedure; (3) by requiring approaching planes to report at least 60 miles
before coming in (CincUS had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint
exercises, this was to be discussed for a decision as to its value); IFF was
not available; the question of gun control of ships in port was to be discussed
with CincUS also it was decided to investigate the possibility of using naval
radar to supplement land radar in an emergency.
Very
little was done as a result of this memorandum, he said, because they were
unable to get more personnel. It was the Army's duty to supply personnel, with
the exception of the Navy liaison officers (page 619). He personally requested
CincPac's, ComFOURTEEN's Chief of Staff and Admiral Bellinger to supply liaison
officers and was told that they were not available, but would be ordered to
report to the Information Center as soon as possible. Liaison officers were
essential to the proper dissemination of information (page 620). Their absence
here, however, actually made little difference so far as the Navy liaison was
concerned.
Commander
Taylor said that the air warning system could have been made operative sooner
if there had been some impetus behind it with enough power to get the things
needed (page 621). This impetus should have come from the Hawaiian Department,
U. S. Army. He remained with the Army for one month after December 7th, and at
the end of seven days the Information Center was running smoothly. The war made
it easier to get liaison officers (page 621).
Even
if information from the radar were properly plotted, it would have been
impossible to tell if planes were Japanese or whether they were United States
planes; without some method of identification, radar cannot tell friend from
foe. The Information Center is for the purpose of determining what friendly
planes are in the air so that if a radar track is picked up that does not
correspond to the course of the friendly planes it is presumed that it is the
track of enemy planes.
The
radar equipment of the Army, he said, was adequate to do a fair job in the
morning. Communication between the air warning system and the other
organizations was in, except for some of fighter dispersal areas and the lines
to the civilian air warning. Communications between fighter director officers
and fighter aircraft were inadequate to control fighters more than five miles
off shore. The Army radar operators were well trained. For some time prior to
December 7th the radar had been operated from 0800 to 1630 in the afternoon,
but shortly before December 7th, General Short gave orders to close down the
radar stations
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 549
except between the
hours of 4:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. (page 611). He understood the change was made
to save the equipment.
On
December 7th, there were no permanent radar installations: on Oahu there were
five mobile sets (page 624). The permanent equipment was there, but it would
take some time to put it in (page 624).
He
stated that the Information Center of the air warning system was not adequately
set up prior to December 7th, and they were in the process of teaching
controllers (page 612).
At
no time were there sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel to operate the
radar station even partially (page 625). The Robert's Report is incorrect in
stating that there were sufficient partially trained personnel on November 27th
to operate the system twenty‑four hours a day (page 626). There were
insufficient well‑trained personnel to operate even partially at any
time. They could get fairly good 360° coverage, and he believed that in no case
could a large raid come in undetected (page 626).
The
Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army; was in charge of the radar, and the Navy assisted
in setting up an air warning system, except that they had not furnished liaison
officers (page 615). The radar was entirely under the control of the Army; his
duties were advisory (page 616). At the time he came in contact with the Army,
the Information Center was being organized by two junior Army officers who
worked hard to get the system into operation but did not have enough force to
get what they needed from various commands to get the station operating (Page
627).
There
was not sufficient personnel to operate the radars twenty‑four hours a
day, although he felt that the station should be operated twenty‑four
hours a day, fully manned. There were just enough sets to cover the area of
Oahu. If any one set had gone out, it would have meant the loss of that
coverage. (page 617)
Concerning the Army radar system, Admiral DeLany said that
they did not rely upon it for any information because the radar itself had just
been installed and was being used for training operators. (p. 80)
Captain Curts discussed his connection with the development
of radar from 1936 to 1938 and the disclosure of the Navy's developments to the
Army in about 1937. (p. 110) Captain Curts discussed the status of the Army
radar in November 1941 at Pearl Harbor. He did not know what delayed the Army
generally in securing radar. The Army's problem in connection with radar was
much simpler than the Navy's; he informed Admiral Kimmel that the Army radar
was not in an operational but was merely in an instruction status prior to
December 7. (p 111)
Admiral Anderson said that it was the Army's mission
primarily to defend Pearl Harbor and that he had no exact knowledge as to the
readiness to repel air attack; he was not familiar with the state of readiness
of the air warning net.
F.
SHIPS' RADAR
Admiral
Kimmel testified that some of the ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th were
equipped with radar, but it was not manned because it was ineffective due to
the surrounding hills ( age 331).
Admiral
Pye said that the PENNSYLVANIA and CALIFORNIA were equipped with radar (page
422). The efficiency of this radar was good. The ships' radar could not be used
in port because of the surrounding hills and buildings.
Admiral Pye said that after the beginning of the war, the
PENNSYLVANIA while at sea had picked up planes with radar and tracked them for
a distance of 85 miles. (p. 168)
Admiral
Smith said that the ships' radar was of no use in port (page 559). He stated
that two carriers which were outside had radar, but picked up nothing, and that
Admiral Halsey on his trip to Midway and return had an air search to a radius
of 300 miles and picked up nothing (page 559). To have stationed a ship clear
of Pearl Harbor with radar would have been ineffective due to the 65‑mile
range of the radar, and to station a cordon for that purpose would have been
ineffective and very dangerous because of the risk of attack on the ships (page
559). However, he did not recall consideration of this at the time.
Captain
Ramsey stated that the CURTISS, from her berth in Pearl Harbor, could cover the
150°‑160° arc to southward with her radar for a distance depending on the
altitude of the target (page 603).
Commander
Taylor said that the radar equipment in the Navy was excellent prior to
December 7, 1941, but the operators of radar were, in general, inex-
550 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
perienced (page 610).
In a land‑locked harbor with mountains around it, performance of radar
equipment aboard ship was not good (page 614). In Pearl Harbor the ships' radar
might work, and again—it might not. It would be affected by mountains to the
north as to performance to the south (page 614).
G.
STEPS TAKEN BY COMMANDER LOCAL NAVAL DEFENSE FORCE
Admiral
Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch's performance of duty as Naval Base Defense
Officer was satisfactory (page 285). He was to advise of the condition of
readiness, but this did not relieve the Senior Officer Present Afloat from
fixing the condition of readiness (page 286).
Admiral
Bloch, he said, was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer and was to command
the Naval forces in the event of an attack, and also for necessary drills (page
289). Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch had nothing suitable for
reconnaissance (page 356), and that planes were available to Admiral Bloch only
for drill or in an emergency (page 354), but that he should have asked for
planes if he considered them necessary for long range reconnaissance, and could
have asked for submarines or surface ships for such use (pages 354‑5). He
said that Admiral Bloch had available four old destroyers, four small
minesweepers, three coast guard cutters, and the SACRAMENTO (page 361).
Admiral
Bloch testified that the forces assigned to him as a local defense force were
four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three Coast Guard cutters, the
SACRAMENTO, one net vessel, one gate vessel, two self‑propelled oil
lighters, and a few small tugs and small craft. This force was not adequate to
perform the Navy's task under JCD‑42 (page 386). He had no surface or
aircraft far offshore patrol and had no attack force.
Admiral
Bloch said that CincPac was his immediate superior in command (page 388). He
stated his responsibility under 2CL‑41 and what steps had been taken so
as to discharge this responsibility. These were an agreement which had been
made with the Army regarding the use of planes, and drills held pursuant
thereto, marine anti‑aircraft had been made available to the Army,
arrangements had been made at Navy installations to emplace Army guns (which
were not emplaced prior to the attack) and to take care of those gun crews;
about twenty‑six 3" anti‑aircraft guns had been emplaced by
the Army near Pearl Harbor; air control had been arranged for through Commander
Patrol Wing Two; in drills the Senior Officer Present Afloat had been advised
of what condition of readiness to maintain and this was Admiral Bloch's
responsibility; bi‑weekly drills had been held with the Army during the
Autumn and up to December 7th; a Communications plan, including air raid alarm
signal, had been planned and executed in drills (page 390).
On the 7th of December, 1941, certain features of the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan for the Hawaiian Department plan were in effect,
Admiral Bloch said:
"Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features of
that plan were in effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy in paragraph 18
(a) was required to furnish inshore patrol. We had an inshore patrol working on
7 December. By (b), we were required to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol
of an intermittent character, forces being furnished by the Commander‑in‑Chief
of the U. S. Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of sortie.
(c) and (d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this
joint air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting planes
on shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to the Army. (e),
which is the harbor control post, was effective and in active operation. (f),
which was installation and operation of an underwater defense, was effective.
We had some buoys, sono‑buoys. I'm not sure whether the magnetic loops
had been laid, or not. I think they had been and were in operation. Nets,
torpedo nets, at the entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in operation.
(h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every day. (i) distant
reconnaissance: the district had no forces capable of performing that task, as
the Commander‑in‑Chief and the Navy Department knew. We had been
informed that 108 patrol planes would be furnished us at the earliest possible
date but none had come to Pearl Harbor, and I believe, on that particular
point, that I had asked Admiral Kimmel about the distant reconnaissance and
asked him if he would furnish me patrol planes, and he told me he would do what
he could, but he couldn't make any promises of furnishing a force because there
was a possibility of the Fleet leaving and
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY
551
taking
its forces with it. (k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that was
effective. (1) : with regard to supplying local communication service for
prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked on
and largely effective. (m): all preparations had been made to assume censorship
of the part that the Navy was to assume censorship of and was put into effect
immediately after the attack. (o) : supply and hospitalization provisions had
been made for that."
Captain Curts said in substance that the communications
between Headquarters and the ships were the same as they would have been if
Headquarters had been maintained aboard the PENNSYLVANIA. Captain Curts
discussed communications arrangements with the Army and with aircraft and with
the air station at Kaneohe Bay. (pp. 105‑107)
General
Short testified that he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and
was sending out task forces on offshore patrol during' the period from October
16th to December 7th, and that Harbor patrol posts were established and the
channel was being swept (page 234). (2)
Admiral Bloch said that he gave General Short no reason for
believing that the Navy forces at sea would give adequate warning against a
hostile attack. (p. 21)
Admiral
Bloch stated that there was no inner air patrol on the morning of December 7,
1941. He had asked the Navy Department for four observation sea planes for this
purpose (page 407). He had no planes under his direct command.
H.
ARMY AIRCRAFT
General
Short testified that his aircraft defenses were very inadequate and that he had
on December 7th, twelve B‑17's, only six of which were in commission. In
addition to the six available B‑17's, he had ten A‑20's, and 50 B‑18's,
which he characterized as death traps against a modern plane, only twenty‑four
of which were in commission. He had asked the War Department for more planes
(pages 223, 224, 231).
On
December 7th, General Short testified, the Army pursuit planes were in a state
of routine training except for the alert against sabotage (page 228). Not being
alerted for combat, it required 55 minutes for the Army aircraft to get into
action on December 7th (page 229). General Short testified that on December
7th, the Army maintained no inshore patrol except as incidental to training.
One squadron of planes, he said, did have ammunition right next to the planes
(page 229). The long range bombers which he had were available for cooperation
with the Navy. The B‑17's were good for a 1200 mile radius if they
carried bomb loads.
Colonel
Phillips testified that on December 7th, the Army had about twelve planes
sendable for distant reconnaissance (page 484), and a squadron of small
reconnaissance planes (page 485). He said that there was a shortage of Army
planes (page 479).
General
Marshall said that for the Hawaiian project 148 pursuit planes were scheduled:
there were 99 P‑40's and 46 P‑36's there on December 7th, The
commander had asked for 180 long range bombers but shortages prevented reaching
this figure. There were 12 B‑17's thereon December 7th (page 855).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that during his tour of duty, the effective Army pursuit
planes had been increased from none to 100 and that only six Army B‑17's
were available on December 7th (page 289). He said that in November, 1941, the
War Department had ordered the transfer of certain B‑17's from Oahu to
the Philippines, which left only twelve at Oahu, six of which were available
for use (page 290).
Admiral
Kimmel stated that the best defense the Army had against an attack such as the
attack which in fact was made, was pursuit planes, and that the Army did not
have sufficient planes or crews (page 331). He estimated that on December 7th
the Army needed three times the number of pursuit planes they had at Oahu (page
371).
Admiral Bloch‑said that in his opinion the Army did
not have an adequate number of fields to disperse their fighters on; their main
fighter field was Wheeler Field; they had another at Bellows Field and an
improvised field in the neighborhood of Haleiwa; and Admiral Bloch had
recommended that the Navy release a field at Kahuku Point. (p. 21)
Admiral Bloch believed that on December 7 the LEXINGTON, the
ENTERPRISE, the SARATOGA and the YORKTOWN were away from Pearl
552 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Harbor
and had their planes with them so that there were only about 70 Marine fighting
planes at Pearl Harbor at the time. How many were available that morning, he
did not know. (p. 25)
Admiral Bloch said that the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Air Force, General Martin, had told him that he only had three planes
available for inshore air patrol; he could not use the Army bombers because
they could not see, and he could not use the fighters because they couldn't
carry bombs and could not see very well either; Admiral Bloch believed that one
of the three planes cracked up before December 7. (p. 25)
Admiral Bloch's recollection of the number Army bombers available on December is set
forth on page 25.
Admiral Smith said that they did not have a very high regard
for the ability of the Army fighter and bomber pilots; that they considered,
apart from anti-aircraft gunfire, that the most efficacious defense against air
attack would be from the Navy's own carrier planes; since the carriers were
away with their planes, he said, he would have sensed, if he had realized the
danger of an air raid, that there was no security for Pearl Harbor aside from
the antiaircraft gunfire. (p. 44)
The Army aircraft, Admiral McCormick said, were insufficient
in number and limited in usefulness because they lacked some navigational equipment
and had some weakness in radio. The comparative efficiency of personnel, was
not in his mind at the time. (p. 72)
During his discussion of the Army aircraft, Admiral Davis
said that provisions for command in the air were still only of a general nature
and there had been no real development along that line by drills, although
drills had been held. There were two reasons for this: first, that the air
warning net and radar system had not been actually placed in operation and
secondly, that the Hawaiian area had not been placed on the basis of unity of
command so that, human nature being what it is, progress along the lines of
mutual drills was slower that it might have been. (p. 100)
Admiral Pye said that it was definitely known that the air
forces available to the Army and the aircraft installations were below those
which were considered necessary for proper defense. (p. 163)
Commander Taylor said that, in his opinion, there were
sufficient numbers of fighter aircraft at Oahu to repel a number of aircraft
that actually attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, and that the quality of the
fighter aircraft was such as not to outperform the Japanese fighters, but the
performance was sufficient, he believed, to have been able to break up, to a
large extent, a raid of the sort which came in. Commander Taylor said that
about 50 percent of the fighter pilots of the Interceptor Command were well
trained: the other percent were green. (p. 353)
I.
THE SUBMARINES
Rear
Admiral Withers, Commander Submarines, stated that the submarines were engaged
in training for war. They were assigned to task forces for training and trained
with other ships.
He
considered his force mobilized on December 7th, and the condition of the
personnel was excellent (page 1087). The submarines were ready for war but
there was no particular condition of readiness in effect.
He
generally kept about one‑third of. the submarines at Pearl Harbor (page
1085). The total number of submarines which he had was 32, 18 of which were
based at Hawaii. Some of these were on the West Coast for overhaul (page 108).
Twelve submarines had gone to Manila early in November, 1941 for observation,
and to be in position should war come (page 1084). On December 7th two
submarines were off Midway and two off Wake. There was no line of submarines
out to cover the area surrounding Hawaii (page 1084). Only five submarines were
at Pearl Harbor (pages 1088‑9). Five submarines were inadequate to throw
a scouting force around Hawaii (page 1089).
J.
RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANES AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE
The
responsibility for long range reconnaissance, the readiness of aircraft and
drills, the extent of the actual reconnaissance and the extent of
reconnaissance which could have been undertaken during the period November 27th
to December 7th have been discussed at pages 77‑85, supra.
The
court inquired whether Admiral Kimmel's reason for not using planes for distant
reconnaissance was not that the presence of foreign carriers was neither
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 553
known nor suspected.
He agreed (page 380). There were no inner air patrol flown on December 7, 1941,
stated Admiral Kimmel (page 375). As to distant reconnaissance, he said that
the planes available to the Army and Navy had been lumped for defense but there
were not enough to perform distant reconnaissance effectively. A total of 81
patrol planes and twelve B‑17's were in the area. Of this number, 61
patrol planes and six B‑17's were available on Oahu immediately prior to
the attack. There were twelve patrol planes operating from Midway. The number
was not sufficient "on a requirement of 84 planes" for 360° patrol
based on 15 mile visibility. The inadequacy had been reported and more planes
asked for; they did the beat they could. He thought that there were a number of
planes searching on December 7th in the operating areas and some engaged in
maneuvers with our own submarines—he was told that there were about a dozen in
the air (page 374). Midway was running a reconnaissance, as much as they could
with 12 planes. He estimated that not more than 50 patrol planes on Oahu were
in flying condition on December 7th.
Admiral
Bellinger said that on December 7, 1941, the actual situation of the planes was
as follows: There were 7 planes in the air conducting search between 120°‑170°
to a distance of 450 miles from Midway; there were four planes on the surface
of Midway armed with two 500‑pound bombs, and on ten‑minute notice;
at Oahu, there were 12 planes of VP‑11 ready for flight on four hours
notice; VP‑12 had six planes ready for flight in 30 minutes notice, and 5
ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP‑14 had 3 in the air on security
patrol, 3 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice, and 4 ready on 4 hours notice;
VP‑22 had 12 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP‑23 had 11 ready
for flight on 4 hours notice; VP‑24 had 4 planes in the air conducting
tactics with submarines, and 1 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice (page
684).
Admiral Bellinger described his duties on December 7. Planes
normally under his command consisted of a total of 81 planes on December 7. (p.
115). On December 7, he said, there were 36 planes at Kaneohe Air Station, 33
planes at Pearl and 12 at Midway. Twelve of the planes at Pearl had returned on
December 5 from an extensive tour of duty at Midway and Wake. They had been
sent there about October 17. He did not believe that any of the patrol planes
were dispatched to the outlying islands after November 27 except in connection
with sending Marine planes by carrier to Wake where one squadron was sent. (p.
116).
Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 58 of the 81 planes were in commission, nine
were under repair and fourteen were in the air. (p. 117).
Admiral Bellinger discussed the conditions of readiness of
the airplanes and the report of availability of Army and Navy planes on
December 5 and 6. (pp. 125 and 126).
Admiral Bellinger said that after the attack, the Army
communicated with the Army planes and the Navy communicated with the Navy
planes. He also discussed the communication difficulties between Pearl Harbor
and the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe. (p. 123).
There
was no inner patrol around the entrances of Pearl Harbor on the morning of
December 7th (page 685), and there were no planes available to him, either Army
or Navy for that purpose (page 685).
Captain
Ramsey said that units of the Army bombardment division and of Marine
bombardment aviation reported daily planes available to Naval Base Defense Air
Force, when functioning. The Base Defense Air Force only came into existence in
an emergency or for drill purposes. ComFOURTEEN or CincPac could vitalize this
Base Defense Air Force (pages 574‑6). Some order by officer senior to
Admiral Bellinger was necessary (page 576). PatWings One, and Two were under
Admiral Bellinger's command, of course.
Exhibit
53 was the basic operations plan of Naval Base Defense Force and was in effect
on December 7th (page 576) Annex B to Operations Plan No. 1‑41 was issued
pursuant to this plan, and Addendum 1 to Operating Plan No. 1A‑41 was an
estimate of the situation prepared by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin,
covering the situation at the end of March, 1941 (page 577). (Paragraph 3(b) of
this addendum stated that an air attack was the most likely and dangerous form
of attack on Oahu, etc.). He considered this estimate sound, and that if any
attack came on Oahu, it would come by air, which would be the only effective
way to attack (pages 578‑9).
The
general condition of readiness of aircraft was "Baker 5," 50%
available on four hours notice, between November 27th and December 7th, but
many units were in a higher condition and some airplanes were actually in the
air (page 579) .
554 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He
had no records from which he could refresh his memory as to the condition of
readiness but gave isolated examples (page 580); PatWing Fourteen was in the
air, conducting search of the operating area on December 7th, he did not
remember whether there were three or four; there were about six planes of
PatWing Two in the air conducting tactics with the submarines in the
"sanctuary over that island." (page 585). There was a ready squadron,
planes lined up and presumably ready to take the air in 30 minutes, which was
to be relieved at 8 o'clock by another from Kaneohe (page 580).
The
readiness question was one in fact decided by higher authority (page 581). He
could not say whether directly by CincPac or Commander Naval Base Defense
Force. In ordinary drill practice the drill message placing the organization on
an activated status came from the latter; then they would send a dispatch to
all units making aircraft available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, and start
issuing drill orders. Planes in the air were to be sent immediately to search
sectors. At the end they would send a message, "Resume normal condition of
readiness." At least once in a while he was on that job (it appears he was
there at least as early as November 1, 1941, but may have been there earlier,
see page 575) the condition of readiness was changed to a higher degree. He
could not recall who sent the message, but it was some higher authority and the
change was from "Cast" to "Baker" (page 581).
Under
normal operating conditions the planes available for the Naval Base Defense Air
Forces were under different commanders.
The
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force never had planes assembled under his
command except for drill or emergency and, therefore, except in these cases, he
had no opportunity to set the condition of readiness (page 582).
He
also said that aside from the ready squadron at Ford Island, the other patrol
craft there were in various position: some were ready for launching, some being
repaired, some in hangers for long repair or modification (page 585).
On
the morning of December 7th, six planes at Midway were scouting to cover task
forces there and six on the water fully manned and loaded with live bombs (page
585).
He
stated that dispersal of patrol planes was impracticable on land or in harbor
(page 585).
According
to Captain Ramsey, on the morning of the 7th, patrol planes covering operating
areas were under orders to depth bomb submerged submarines outside the
sanctuary without a close escort. He said that for several months prior to
December 7th, the planes of PatWing Two flew armed. All planes on search of
operating areas, by order of CincPac, carried live depth charges (page 604).
The Army planes were usually armed (page 604).
He
said that before December 7th, he had only one officer assistant; after, he had
42 officer assistants (page 608). They were available later because their ships
had been sunk.
General
Short testified that one of the most important things the Navy was supposed to
do was long range reconnaissance (page 228). He said that from October 16th to
December 7th, he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and was
sending out task forces on offshore patrol, harbor patrol, posts were
established and channels were being swept. There was a plan for Navy long
distance reconnaissance and drills were held once a week (page 234). He said
the joint air plan was effective March 1941 (page 234).
General
Short testified that he did not know what Admiral Bloch did with respect to
distant reconnaissance. Under the agreement, if the Navy planes were
insufficient for such reconnaissance, the Navy could have asked the Army for
planes (page 237). The Navy made no request of General Short for planes for
distant reconnaissance, although General Short conferred with the Navy on
December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251).
General
Marshall said that heavy Army bombers had been delayed because of delay at the
manufacturing plants and, after delivery, unexpectedly strong winds, adverse to
Hawaii, kept the planes at the West Coast for three weeks. The initial squadron
arrived in the middle of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (pages 681‑2).