XXXIII. THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

 

This investigation developed the following evidence regarding the sighting of Jap submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (Exhibits 18, 76, 76):

At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a submarine periscope of the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in a defensive

 

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sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance buoys. It was about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.

The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD between 0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued on its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:

 

"Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course speed 9 knots"

 

After receiving this visual, signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the CONDOR, asking:

 

"What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you sighted?"

 

At 0520 the CONDOR replied:

 

"The course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance"

 

In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536, the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the submarine it was at about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the captain of the WARD realized that his search had been in the wrong direction. He then continued searching, but again without result.

The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. The captain considered that the identification at that time was not positive enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat. The Senior Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who commanded the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of the WARD thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that he had seen a submarine (p. 87‑92, 428‑429).

The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a radio station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, 14th N. D. (Ex. 18.) Since the conversation was solely between the ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made that it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which was maintained in the Communications Office, 14th N. D., did not overhear or intercept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.

At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate vessel charged with opening and closing the net at the entrance. The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be kept closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders from him, from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer, who could be reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the gate vessel indicates that the net was opened and closed a number of times during the night of December 6‑7. At 0458 on the 7th the gate was opened and the CROSSBILL and the CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed. The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR, now Lieutenant Commander M. H. Hubbell, testified that at 0532, when the CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were "approaching daylight conditions" (Exhibits 44, 45).

The log of the signal bower for December 6‑7, 1941, records the closing of the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an entry at 0600 that the ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Ex. 4B).

The USS ANTARES, with a 500‑ton steel barge in tow, arrived of Pearl Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls with the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which appeared do be a small submarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard quarter. The ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two smoke pots near the object (Exhibit 73).

The WARD complied and at 0610 sighted an unidentified submarine one point off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES into Pearl Harbor. General quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, increasing the WARD's speed from five to twenty‑five knots. At 0645 she opened

 

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fire with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed directly over the conning tower; the second, from No 3 gun, at fifty yards or less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. At about this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also noted that the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the submarine. The submarine keeled over to starboard and started to sink. The WARD ceased firing and then dropped depth charges A large amount of oil appeared on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water (Exhibit 74).

At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18):

 

"We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area."

 

The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following supplementary message:

 

"We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area (Exhibit 18)."

 

This message was received by the Bishop's Point Radio Station, relayed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the Duty Officer of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.

The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the WARD and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could take care of the situation, while the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which might be desired (pages 414‑116, 452‑469).

 

A. JAPANESE SUBMARINES

 

Captain Smedberg said that the sum of the information on the midget subs used by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor was that they were carried and launched from mother submarines, were about 41 feet in length, and had a maximum cruising range of 175‑180 miles at the most economical cruising speed of 4‑6 knots. They were probably not equipped with radio (p. 8‑9) Complete information on Jap midget subs is available in Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 20 October 1944, Volume 1, number 15 (Exhibit 5), and Office of Naval Intelligence Publication "ONI 220‑J, Japanese Submarines" (Exhibit 6).

NOTE: The latest Office of Naval Intelligence publication referring to Jap midget submarines ("ONI 222‑J, The Japanese Navy") establishes that the Japanese midget submarines used at Pearl Harbor were actually about 80 feet long, rather than 41 feet long as stated by Captain Smedberg. They carried two 18‑inch torpedoes, had a top speed of 12 knots, and could dive to a depth of 100 feet.

 

Captain Ramsey said that at 0730 on December 7, 1941, he received a call from the Staff Duty Officer to the effect that they had sunk a submarine one mile off the Pearl Harbor entrance (page 586).

 

Captain Earle said that at about 0710 on December 7, he learned of the submarine attack off Pearl Harbor; that this did not indicate to him that an air attack might be imminent; that his reaction was that the enemy had decided to be a little more active with his submarine campaign of war; that the WARD was making another mistake. He pointed out that they had had on the average of ten or fifteen reports of submarine sighted in that area in  the several months preceding the attack. When he received word of this attack, he told the Watch Officer to be sure and get the dispatch verified, to notify the Commander in Chief's Watch Officer immediately, to advise ComFOURTEEN's Operations Officer, and then he called Admiral Bloch and discussed the matter with him. As the matter had been referred to the Commander in Chief, they decided that they would wait for further develop-

 

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ments. They did not discuss the fact that the presence of the submarine might indicate an air attack. (p. 376)

Admiral Bellinger read an excerpt from a report prepared by him as follows:

"0700 Patrol Plane 14P(1) sighted and attacked enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. 0715 Message coded and transmitted to Base. 0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty Officer. 0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer. 0740 Message relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander‑in‑Chief: 0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer. 0757 First bomb dropped near VP‑22 hangar. 0758 Message broadcast to all ships present 'AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.' 0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone and received by some of the planes in the air at 0805." (p. 129)

Admiral Bellinger knew of no attempt at his command headquarters to relay the information of the attack on the submarine to Army headquarters.

 

He requested authentication; reported it to the Staff Duty Officer of CincPac, and drew up a search dispatch (page 586).

 

Concerning the submarine attack on the morning of December 7th, Admiral Smith said that he had received no report of that attack, the report was received by the Staff Duty Officer, who was Commander V. R. Murphy, who delivered the message to Admiral Bellinger, and he believed to Admiral Kimmel. He said:

"My recollection is that Admiral Bloch informed the Secretary of the Navy a few days after Pearl Harbor that he had received this message at 7:15. Talking to Captain Maddox, who was on board the ANTARES, the ANTARES had been about to enter Pearl Harbor, and as she turned, the conning tower of the midget submarine broke the surface. He called this to the attention of the destroyer WARD who sank the submarine, and the WARD informed the signal tower, unfortunately by signal, that he had attacked a submarine at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. As Captain Maddox said at the time, he regretted that he had not put the thing out by radio in plain language telling everybody that it actually was a submarine and it actually had been sunk. You see, we had received so many false submarine reports before that time. I do not remember the exact wording of the signal sent through the signal tower, but I gathered from what Admiral Bloch told us later that he did not consider it as serious as it actually was. I'm quoting from a conversation between Admiral Bloch and the Secretary of the Navy, a few days after Pearl Harbor, in the presence of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Pye and General Short and myself. But the first message I got was that Pearl Harbor was under attack. I received no message before that about the submarine. You must also realize the communications between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu were very poor. Efforts had been made for months to get more trunk lines through but it was sometimes very difficult to communicate between the two places. It was particularly difficult to communicate with the Army. It had to go through several stations."

Captain Murphy said that no specific information was furnished to him concerning the international situation when he went on watch as Staff Duty Officer; he had a memorandum from Captain McMorris giving him the dispositions of the ships and forces of the Fleet and instructions as to action to be taken in the event of war. (p. 196)

Captain Murphy said that he was not familiar with the Army's condition of readiness on December 7th. (p. 198) He did not know whether or not the Army radar system was operating that day.

Captain Murphy said that as Staff Duty Officer if anything unusual occurred during his tour of duty, he would have advised ComFOURTEEN, who in turn would have advised the Army since ComFOURTEEN was charged with dealings with the Army. (p. 201)

Captain Murphy said that about 7:20 or 7:25 in the morning of December 7th, he received a report to the effect that a submarine had been sunk by the WARD. He described his actions as follows:

"At that time, I was in the process of getting dressed in my quarters. Lieutenant Commander Black gave me the report. He was Assistant Duty Officer. And I said, 'Did he say what he was doing about it? Did he say whether Admiral Bloch knew about it, or not?' And he said, 'No.' I said, 'While I'm finishing dressing, call him and see what he's doing about it and whether or not he's called Admiral Bloch.' I finished dressing, Black

 

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came back and said he had dialed and dialed and the line was busy. I then dialed the operator—it was a local dial system—and told him to tell the Duty Officer to call me immediately and to break in on any conversation he might be holding unless it was of supreme importance. I went to the office and as I walked in the office, the phone was ringing. I answered the phone and it was Ramsey—now Captain, L. C. Ramsey, from PatWingTwo. He said he had a report from a patrol plane to the effect that a submarine had been sunk in the Defensive Sea Area. I said, 'I have just had a report that I have not been able to get any more details on,' and told him what the report was. At that time, the phone rang from the Fourteenth Naval District and the Duty Officer was on the phone. He said that Admiral Bloch had been informed, that he had ordered the ready‑duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and to investigate, and had ordered the stand‑by destroyer to get up steam. I said, Had you any previous details or any more details of this attack?' He said, 'The message came out of a clear sky. There was no word of preliminary search or chase of any kind.' I then called Admiral Kimmel and gave him both messages and told him that Admiral Bloch knew it and of the ready‑destroyer being ordered out and of the stand‑by destroyer getting up steam. He said, 'I will be right down.' About that time, and I'm not sure of the sequence, Ramsey called again and said that he had nothing further and did I have anything further. I said, 'No,' but I thought it might be wise for him to make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted them. About that time, the phone rang again; it was the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that he had another message from the WARD saying that she was towing a sampan into Honolulu Harbor and requesting a Coast Guard tug be sent to his assistance. I called Admiral Kimmel and gave him that message. Before I finished that message, the yeoman came in, said, 'There's a message from the signal tower saying the Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor and this is no drill.' I gave that message to Admiral Kimmel, either directly on that one call or a call immediately thereafter. I do not recall exactly whether it was the same call or thereafter. I then told the Communications Officer to send a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations, Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with priority of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, over the Chief of Naval Operations, and to our forces at sea: 'JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.' I then called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you got available'—no, I'll correct that: I told the yeoman to call the signal tower and ask if the Pearl Harbor Defense Plan had been executed, and he said it had been by Admiral Bloch. I called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you got available?' He said, 'I don't think I have any, but I'm scraping together what I can for search.' I then called all the Staff of the Commander-in‑Chief; some I called myself and some the yeoman called, using every phone we had in the office. I distinctly remember talking to Captain Smith myself. By that time, Captain McMorris came in, either just preceded or followed by the Admiral, I don't recall, and we drafted a more formal dispatch to the forces at sea, giving them instructions and information. From then on, the duties were largely taken over by the regular Staff and the War Plans Division helped in advising the other people who had the immediate direction of events."

Captain Murphy said that that contact was about the third or fourth of a series of such contacts; that all previous ones had, insofar as actual proof was concerned, turned out to be negative. This one, he thought, might be the real thing but he wanted some further information as to why the WARD thought that it sunk a submarine so that he could formulate an opinion whether or not there was a submarine sunk. In the previous contacts, they had never been able to establish definitely that there had been a submarine involved. He had less doubt about the authenticity of this than he had had about some of the others. He did not interpret this submarine as possibly being accompanied by an air attack (p. 202)

 

Admiral Bloch stated that at 0715 on December 7, 1941, he received a telephone message from the Chief of Staff that the WARD had attacked a submarine off  Pearl Harbor and was escorting a sampan in.

 

Commander Granville C. Briant was Aviation Aide to ComFourteen in 1941. (p. 229). During November and December, 1941, Commander Briant was one of the District Watch Officers. There were about eight to ten of such officers. Commander Briant discussed the instructions given to

 

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Watch Officers and qualifications of those on the Watch Officers list. (p. 230). He also discussed the functions of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 232). Commander Briant said that to his mind the Watch Officers had not been advised of the seriousness of the situation and specifically they were not advised of the war warning. (p. 233)

Admiral Bloch said that, "on the morning of December 7, the only contact that was made prior to the air raid was with an enemy submarine. This submarine was sighted by USS WARD, which was inshore patrol, and the USS ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the ANTARES. I did receive at 7:12 a.m. a telephone message from the Chief of Staff telling me that he had received a dispatch from the WARD that was somewhat difficult to understand, that he had been attacked and was counter‑attacking a submarine at the entrance to the channel at Pearl Harbor. He further stated that he was then engaged in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu. The Chief of Staff gave me this message. I asked him what it was; is it a real submarine or is it a report? We had had a number of false reports in the past and he said he didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the nature of the dispatch whether it was bona fide or sound contact or sight contact, whether he had been fired upon or had fired, and I asked him to get it cleared up immediately. Captain Momsen was sent immediately to headquarters; dispatched another destroyer and tried to get information from the WARD. Before we got the information straightened out, the air attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed—at least his operations Watch Officer was informed about the entire matter just at the same time we were." (pp. 21 and 22)

Admiral Bloch did not think that the Army had been advised on the morning of December 7 of the dispatch from the WARD concerning the submarine attack. (p.22)

 

The Staff Duty Officer at CincPac was given the same information. They were not sure whether this was a true report. The ready duty destroyer was ordered out. Before the report was clarified, the air attack had started. The first submarine contacted was one mile outside the entrance buoy (page 401). He learned after December 7th that a patrol plane had also seen this submarine or another, attacked it with depth bombs and sunk it. This was a midget (page 403 .

A midget submarine was later sunk inside the harbor. When it was later recovered, it was found that both its torpedoes were missing (page 403). It had fired at the CURTISS and missed.

No anti‑submarine nets had been installed, but anti‑torpedo nets had been installed to keep a submarine outside from firing torpedoes into the harbor. If the anti‑torpedo net had been closed, a midget submarine would probably have become fouled in the net. Practice required the net gates to be open all day and closed all night except when ships were passing them. At 0445, December 7, 1941, some minesweepers came in and the gate was not closed until after 0800 when it was ordered closed by Headquarters (page 404). The deepest part of the channel was 72 feet; the depth of the net was 45 feet (page 405). From keel to conning tower the submarine was about 20 feet.

Also, a midget submarine ran aground on a reef off Bellows Field and was recovered by the Army (page 406).

Admiral Kimmel testified that on December 7th his headquarters were at the submarine base at Pearl Harbor, his Flagship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was nearby and he could move to it on short notice. By moving his headquarters to shore, be did not intend to supplant Admiral Bloch (page 278) There was nothing irregular in his establishing his headquarters ashore since this in no way changed his responsibilities (pages 363‑4).

Between 0730 and 0740, Admiral Kimmel had a report of a submarine attack off Pearl Harbor and he was waiting for an amplification of this report. Between November 27th and that time, he had had about a half‑dozen such reports. While waiting for amplification, the air attack started (page 332). He said that the officer reporting the sinking of the submarine should, under 2CL-41, have broadcast in plain language, but sent it in code which resulted in delay.

Admiral Kimmel said that the one submarine which did attempt to attack in Pearl Harbor was stopped before accomplishing anything (page 373).

He also said that be had reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the time of the attack (page 1124).

Admiral Calhoun said that on December 7, 1941 he bad no warning that a submarine was in Pearl Harbor until the MEDUSA and CURTISS informed

 

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him that they had sunk a midget submarine on the other side of Ford Island (page 945).

 

Captain Layton testified that a submarine entered Pearl Harbor and fired both of its torpedoes, one passing between the RALEIGH and CURTISS, the other burying itself in the mud near the berth of the UTAH. This submarine was sunk and was so thoroughly destroyed that no intelligence material was obtained from it. (Page 285‑286)

Another Japanese midget submarine which was beached of Bellows Field, Oahu, was captured on December 8th along with its commanding officer. This submarine contained various documents which were captured, including a chart of Pearl Harbor on which was laid a course into the harbor, around Ford Island, and out of the harbor, as well as indications of positions of various ships in the harbor. (Exhibit 82A, 33A)

Captain Layton also testified that the midget submarine beached of Bellows Field bore the designation I‑18 which was the apparent designation of its "mother submarine." He pointed out that the chart of Pearl Harbor which was recovered from the "I‑18" contained notations in pencil along both sides of the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor, reading "1‑16", "I‑20", "1‑22", "1‑18", and "I‑24". He testified that from intelligence subsequently received it was known that such were the designations of the Japanese mother submarines that carried the five midget submarines believed to have been present outside Pearl Harbor on 7 December. (Page 284).

Captain Layton further tested that the times shown on the track map of Pearl Harbor that was recovered from the Japanese submarine off Bellows Field was, in accordance with Japanese naval custom, Tokyo time, minus nine, and that all dates indicated were east longitude or Tokyo dates, regardless of the fact that the 180th meridian may have been crossed. Therefore, he said, that the "times in these logs and memoranda and notebooks will always remain as minus nine, four and a half hours earlier than Pearl Harbor." (Page 279).

Captain Layton examined the original Japanese map which contained the track around Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 32A), and stated it to be his professional opinion as a seaman that the track shown on the map was a projected track and not an actual logged track by bearings and distances indicated thereon. He stated that "it is too exact to be an exact track and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to have been performed by the captain of this midget submarine, who had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the machinist's mate, who closed and opened switches, cut in and out the CO2 absorbent material, and in general performed the duties of chief engineer and auxiliary gang." (Page 281‑28.2).

Captain Layton also testified that the notations on the chart under the time 0450 did not indicate that the captain of the midget submarine recorded that he, himself, had sunk an enemy ship. Captain Layton pointed out that the submarine still had both of its torpedoes aboard, which was its full complement. He pointed out also that the track in question was carefully laid out both by course and distance, with the course in degrees and distance in meters, and the time in minutes and seconds; and that the latter indicated that the speed of the submarine was to be varied from point to point so as to make its arrival at the several points at a predetermined time. He pointed out that the time indicated, 0450, which was Tokyo time, would be 0920 Pearl Harbor time; and that at 0920 Honolulu time, the attack was still taking place and there was a tremendous amount of activity in the area indicated on the map. Accordingly, Captain Layton gave it as his opinion that he doubted if the captain of the midget submarine would have been able to so meticulously follow his course all around the harbor and at the same time make notations from point to point. (Page 283).

The notations on the Japanese chart indicated also that the submarine commander had received intelligence reports as late as December 5th. (Exhibit 32-32A).

The Japanese submarine commander who was captured, upon being interrogated, admitted that he had failed in his mission. (Page 16).

With reference to the language appearing on the Japanese map, which is variously interpreted as "sink enemy ship," and "enemy ship sunk," Captain McCollum testified that it was not possible to infer whether the past tense or the future tense was in the mind of the person who made the notations, because there were no kana symbols attached showing the tense of the verb. (Page. 25‑26)

NOTE: It is to be noted that the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board that Japanese midget submarines must have been in the harbor

 

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a few days before the attack and evidently moved in and out of the harbor at will ('RAPHB', page 155) is based wholly on the captured Japanese maps and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge at Honolulu, 7 December 1941, which in turn is based solely on those maps. In this connection, it is pointed out that Admiral Hewitt made a thorough study of the question (Hewitt Report, Page 146‑148) which caused him to conclude that there was no evidence warranting the belief that any Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. (Hewitt Report, Page 157).

 

B. DETECTION OF PLANES BY THE ARMY RADAR SYSTEM

 

J. L. Lockard, First Lieutenant, U. S. Army, and Sergeant George E. Elliott, U. S. Army, who were privates on December 7, 1941, testified that they were on duty that morning from 0400 to 0700 on a mobile radar unit on the northern part of Oahu at a site called Opana (page 628).

There were supposed to be three men on the shift, but the men arranged, and Sergeant Murphy approved, only two, it being a Sunday morning (pages 637‑8). The station had been set up in November, about Thanksgiving (page 639).

Lockard stated (page 641) that his station worked 0400 to 0700 on Sundays and holidays and 0700 to 1700 on weekdays. The Robert's Report states that on November 27, 1941 the Army ordered the radar system operated each day from 0400 to 0700, but Lockard had no knowledge of such order (page 643), and his station operated those hours on Sunday.

Elliott understood that the station had been operated from 0400 to 0700 before December 7th according to schedules (page 652).

The radar set which they were operating could cover 180° from northeast to west. They were instructed to track for flights, intercept them and report them to the Information Center (page 629). Lockard was in charge of the station. They had telephonic communication with the Information Center.

Lockard had been operating these radar sets since August, when they were put in operation (page 630). The set was of rather crude construction at that time. It would pick up one plane at 100 miles and sometimes not pick up three or four (page 631).

They had no information prior to 0800 of the movement of friendly aircraft. Radar could not distinguish friend from foe.

On the morning of December 7th, they continued to operate after 0700 as the truck had not come for them, in order to give Elliott training in radar operation (page 631). He was not regarded by Lockard as a qualified operator (page 633).

At about 0702 they discovered an unusually large response in a northerly direction at 136 miles, Lockard checked the equipment to make sure, and when the planes came in to 132 miles they decided to call the Information Center (page 633). Elliott first talked to the switchboard operator at the Information Center (page 633).

Elliott testified that he had wanted to send the information in right away, but that Lockard had laughed at him and finally told him to send it in if he liked. After a short time, they did (page 648).

Lockard their got the switchboard operator to call the Army officer on duty and then he reported the information to him. The officer thanked him. They continued to track the planes in to 20 miles, when they lost them because of distortion.

They left the unit and became aware of the attack at 0830 and went back on duty at their unit at 0910. Their equipment meanwhile was being operated by others who had relieved them (page 636).

Elliott had no information concerning an expected flight of B‑17's (page 646).

This, incidentally, was the first time Elliott had this 0400 to 0700 duty; previously he had worked in the late mornings or afternoons (page 646). He thought that other units had also picked up the flight and reported it, but had no knowledge to that effect (page 657).

Lt. Col. K. A. Tyler, U. S. Army, who was then a first lieutenant, was at the Army Information Center on the morning of December 7, 1941. He was there for training as an assistant controller. He was the only officer present and had been on duty there only once before (pages 446‑7). Five or six plotters were on duty, who plotted radar reports (page 448). In all, five radar stations were in operation.

He received no information or instructions before going on watch, nor did he relieve any one. Watch was 0400 to 0800 (page 449). He understood the mechanics of radar, but he had never seen one in operation.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, at 0715, he received a call from the radar station at Opana, stating that the operator had a report of a large number of

 

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planes at 130 miles. Private Lockard was the operator he talked to (page 457) He thought about the report for a minute, thanked the operator, and did nothing about it.

He was looking for a flight of B‑17's, but had no official notice that they were coming in. A bomber pilot friend had told him that when there was a flight of B‑17's en route, the radio stations played Hawaiian music all night. That night and morning they did. He thought B‑17's were coming in because Hawaiian music was playing on the radio, which was an arrangement made for homing planes (page 458). He did not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to contact his superiors (page 459).

There was no means of distinguishing friend from foe. He thought the planes were either B‑17's, due from San Francisco on a northeast course, or some Navy carrier planes. He thinks now that the large plot report at 0715 were the Japanese planes (page 460).

The only information he had of Japanese‑United States relations was what he had read in newspapers.

He learned of the attack by phone call at 0800. He called all forces back. Major Berquist and Major Tindall came and took over (page 452). A naval officer reported to the Information Center shortly after the attack began (page 453).

Commander Taylor said that on the morning of December 7th, he got to the Information Center between 0830 and 0900 (page 612). Upon his arrival, the Information Center was in great confusion. Plots were made of everything reported, but there was no way of determining what planes were Japanese or American (page 613).

Captain Ramsay said that during the day, they called Army radar and requested that they track the Japanese planes in retiring and advise; but got no information (page 601).

It is not clear whether the Navy had been advised of the expected arrival of the Army planes on December 7th. Admiral McMorris stated that several senior members of CincPac's staff certainly were aware that some large bombers were flying from California to Oahu at that time, December 6th (page 900).

Admiral Smith thought that they did not know of the prospective arrival of Army planes on December 7th (page 563). He said, incidentally, that the Army B‑17's arrived that morning without ammunition (pages 569‑72). Captain. Ramsey stated that prior to 0755 on December 7th, he had no information as to the scheduled arrival of Army planes (page 587).

 

C. THE AIR ATTACK

 

Captain Smedberg said that a Chief Yeoman in the Japanese Navy who had formerly been attached to the staff of Admiral Yamamoto, Commander‑in‑Chief of the Jap Combined Fleet, and who had been captured during the Marianas campaign, had furnished what is believed to be an accurate account of the composition and movements of the enemy forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This information is presented in summarized form in Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 8 December 1944, vol. 2, number 22 (Exhibit 3; p. 4‑5).

The high points of the prisoner's account were as follows: The secret operation order upon which the Pearl Harbor attack was based was dated 1 November 1941 and specified that: (1) "War will be declared on X‑Day," and (2) "This order will become effective on Y‑Day." A second operation order, dated 5 November, fixed Y‑Day as 23 November 1941 (22 November, Pearl Harbor time), and a third operation order, dated 10 November, set X‑Day as 8 December 1941 (7 December, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 5‑6).

The Japanese plan called for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by a carrier "Striking Force," with a "Surprise Attack Force" of submarines delivering a coordinated blow. The submarine force was to carry out reconnaissance in advance of the attack by the Jap carrier planes and was to attack U. S. warships which escaped from Pearl Harbor. If the opportunity became available, it was also to launch attacks with midget subs after the plane attacks (p. 6‑7).

The striking force, commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo, consisted of three of Japans five carrier divisions: The KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1); HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and sometimes as CarDiv 5); the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUMA, and destroyers, including elements of DesRon 1 (Exhibit 3; p. 8).

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                                563

 

The "Surprise Attack Force" included about twenty fleet‑type submarines, some of which carried midget subs. This constituted a large part of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet.

The Japanese operation order specified that the carrier force was to leave Japan about X minus 16 Day (21 November 1941, Pearl Harbor time) and proceed by way of Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles, for Pearl Harbor. Most of the submarines of the "Surprise Attack Force" were to leave the Inland Sea on X minus 20 Day (17 November 1941, Pearl Harbor time) (p 6‑7).

The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the Bongo Channel some time between November 19 and November 21, 1941, Pearl Harbor Time and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island where at assembled and fueled. Departure was taken on or about 27 November 1941, under cover of a heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly direction., heading on course about 085° to a point in longitude about 170° W; then, turned southeast on course about 135° and proceeded to a point due north of, and approximately 200 miles from, the island of Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor Time. From that position the Pearl Harbor attack was launched. Following the attack, the striking force retired initially to the northwest on a heading of about 300° to a point about longitude 170° E, thence to the southwest, irregularly on varying headings to a point near 140° E, and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3, page 16).

 

General Short testified that he heard the first bomb of the attack; the Chief of Staff told him it was the "real thing." He immediately ordered an all‑out alert (No. 3). His narrative of the attack appears at pages 254‑255 of the Record. He had no notice of a submarine having been sunk near Pearl Harbor prior to the attack.

Admiral Kimmel testified that he became aware of the attack by a telephone message from the Staff Duty Officer (pages 332-333). He reached his headquarters at 0805

Admiral Bloch said that he knew of the attack at 0755; he heard bombs and saw a Japanese plane;. he went to headquarters, sent dispatches to Washington, Philippines Guam and to ships at sea advising that Oahu had been attacked; called all Navy Yard workers and Naval personnel to duty, flooded dry docks and took other local measures (page 400). He said that ample personnel reported (page 401). When the Japanese attacked, a visual signal was given and the air raid alarm was given. Insofar as other measures planned, including air search for the enemy, were possible after the attack, they were carried out.

Admiral Pye testified that on the morning of December 7th, he was in the Halikulani Hotel (page 418). He learned of the attack at 0755 and proceeded to Pearl Harbor in an automobile with Admiral Leary (page 423). His Chief of Staff took action to carry out 2CL‑41 as he was not aboard at the time of the attack (page 421).

 

Concerning the sortie of ships on December 7, Admiral Pye said:

"I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff informed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had first been made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first shots, some of the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside would be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the Commander‑in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's with regard to the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There were no carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition after the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul." (p. 166)

 

564                                           CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Admiral Bellinger said that, on December 7, 1941, the Naval Base Defense Force immediately assumed a functioning status without orders from higher authority (page 664).

Captain Ramsey saw the bombing on Ford Island; had a radio message broadcast of the raid; ordered planes in the air to search 315° to 360° from Pearl Harbor to the maximum distance, and assigned searches of other sectors (page 587).

After the attack he ordered the planes in the air to search 315° to 360° because they always thought that the likely direction of approach (page 597). To the best of his belief, the Japanese attack came from the northwest and subsequent information indicated that the lanes had been launched from carriers about 325 miles from Oahu bearing 325° (page 598).

 

Shortly after December 7, Admiral Davis saw a chart recovered from a Japanese plane which indicated that the planes had been launched from a point about 250 miles north of Oahu. (p. 103‑104)

 

Captain Ramsey reviewed what he did on the morning of December 7th (page 605). After he issued search orders and Admiral Bellinger approve, there were a stream of requests for information; the first order he received was from CincPac to "locate and destroy enemy," but all possible action was already taken; communications were disrupted by the raid and smoke; all planes available were told to take off immediately; various orders were received during the day, including some from CincPac to search specific sectors (page 606).

Captain Ramsey said that they received some information during the morning concerning a chart from a shot‑down plane in which the purported rendezvous was to the southwest of Hawaii (page 602).

Various Army planes did go northward that day—they went out to 150 miles but had to return because B‑17's could go no further without protection of A‑20's, which had no longer range (page 602).

Admiral Smith stated that he did not get information as to the probable location from which the Japanese carriers launched the attack for some two days. There was a great deal of confusion; false reports from civilians of troop and parachute landings; a false report from one of our planes of an enemy carrier to the south; a squadron of our seaplanes returning from Midway to Pearl Harbor on that afternoon dropped two bombs on what the pilot said was a camouflaged Japanese carrier south of Pearl Harbor, but seems to have been the PORTLAND. A chart showing the position of Japanese carriers was taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on December 7th, but was not shown to the Navy until the afternoon (page 564). Planes left to the north, but this was not known by the Navy until two days after the attack. Visibility was good at Oahu on December 7th, but fog could usually be found to the north.

Admiral Kitts said that about 175 to 250 Japanese planes came in from carriers to attack from west‑northwest, a distance of some 200 miles (page 524).

 

Admiral Kitts said that no orders in regard to fire control were issued on December 7 other than by the ships' commanding officers and one by the Commander in Chief were issued to stop firing on friendly planes. (p. 191) Admiral Kitts said that, as he recalled it, 28 planes were shot down by the Fleet. (p.193)

 

He testified that on December 8th, after the attack, he was in conference with General Davidson and was shown a radar plot showing planes coming in from about 150 miles and going out again. The plot coming in might have been interpreted as friendly planes, but after a two‑hour attack on Pearl harbor, the outgoing plot must have been the enemy. This plot was not reported to the Navy until he saw it on December 8th (page b20).

Colonel Phillips said that on December 7, 1941 be received a telephone message of the attack and ordered the all‑out alert. Some Army pursuit planes took off but he did not know when or how many (page 389). He did not know whether any bombers took off. He said that there was on December 7th, a radar track of planes which turned out to be Japanese, but he cannot remember whether it was incoming or outgoing or either (page 488). He saw this track after December 7, 1941, but did not remember where or what it showed (page 489).

Admiral Smith was not familiar with the Army radar system (page 558). He stated that after the attack, Colonel Davidson told him the radar track had been reconstructed from the bearings, but on Sunday that they were not convinced that that was the direction from which the attack came (page 558). This is "obviously correct, because we searched to the south rather than to the north" (page 588).

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                                            565

 

Commander Taylor described the confusion which existed on December 7 at the Information Center. He said, among other things, that there were a number of plots prepared of the course of aircraft that morning which were studied in an attempt to determine exactly where the raids had come from and what direction they had returned; that about 48 hours after the raids they completed the construction of an estimated plot, and that it was his understanding that during the subsequent visit of the Secretary of the Navy, this plot was shown to him as evidence that all information received by the Information Center had been received in an orderly manner. (p. 351)

At the time of the attack, Commander Wright was having breakfast with Commander Williams, who, he said, had been handling the traffic analyses end of the job. He directed Williams to go over to the Communication Intelligence Unit, find out as much as he could about the composition and location of the attacking forces and telephone the information. He said that, in general, the information coming over indicated that there were at least four carriers, including the two by identified radio calls. The bearings obtained on this force seemed to indicate that they were nearly due South at an estimated distance of 250 to 300 miles. Conflicting reports were coming in from other sources. One bearing which was obtained from Lualualei, was in direct conflict with the other bearings, and indicated that the attacking force was almost exactly due North. (p. 380‑1). Commander Wright said that he believed that an early arbitrary assumption that the surface forces were actually to the Southward affected all of the subsequent reports. He said that the report from Lualualei was transmitted by him to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, then Lt. Comdr. Layton, and he assumed that he passed it on to higher authority. (p. 381)

 

Captain Rochefort said that when the attack commenced, the communications unit at Pearl Harbor lost all contact with the direction finder stations, one of which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea and that consequently no bearings on the attacking Jap force were received by his unit. He added that the failure of communications was not due to sabotage but was an accident caused by Army personnel setting up certain new circuits. He said that the Lualualei direction fender, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally broadcast by radio a bearing obtained on one of the attacking units. He had heard that this bearing was received by CinCPac as an alternate bearing, either 357 true or 178 true, but was subsequently informed by the direction finder station that it had actually transmitted the bearing as 357. He said that the Lualualei direction finder was capable of obtaining a unilateral bearing. (p. 63‑64)

 

D. THE ARRIVAL OF THE ARMY'S MESSAGE

 

It will be recalled that on the morning of December 7th, General Marshall sent a message which indicated that the Japanese were presenting a note at 1 p.m., Washington time, which corresponds to dawn at Hawaii.

General Short testified that the December 7th dispatch from the Chief of Staff (Exhibit 48) was received by the Signal Officer at 1145, and decoded by 1428 well after the Japanese attack (page 251).

That dispatch, as set forth in Exhibit 48, was as follows:

"Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)

"Subject: Far East Situation.

"The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East: Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

Admiral Kimmel testified that a copy of the December 7th disptach of the Chief of Staff to Short was received by him on the afternoon of December 7th, too late. He considered this information as news of a Japanese ultimatum and, as it stated that a note was to be delivered at 1 p.m. Washington time which was sunrise in Hawaii and midnight in Manila, he felt that it would have indicated a Japanese attack at Oahu (page 328).

 

566                                           CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

E. THE FAILURE TO TELEPHONE ON DECEMBER 7TH

 

Colonel Phillips said that at about 0822 Hawaiian time on December 7th, he telephoned General Marshall, that it took about five minutes to get the call through, and the connection was excellent. General Marshall asked if he had got the message. He replied, "What message?" General Marshall said, "The message I sent yesterday" or "last night."  He replied "No."  (page 490).  He go the dispatch from General Marshall at 1530, December 7, 1941.  He did not know the time at which it had been sent or when it got to RCA in Honolulu.

Admiral Smith said that communications on December 7, 1941 could be established with Washington in thirty minutes by radio; they had no telephone (page 549).

Admiral Bloch stated that the only telephone connection he had with Washington was the regular commercial, not scrambler, phone (page 410).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the Navy Department had no scrambler telephone connection to Pearl Harbor; the Army had one; that the scrambler telephone is not secure against an expert and that the Navy Department did not use the scrambler phone until 1942 (page 843).

It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he may have been derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply; that he regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel about this, and also regretted not having paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (pages 113, 793, 797).

 

F. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE IF THERE HAD BEEN ADVANCE NOTICE

 

General Short testified that if he had had two hours notice on December 7th, he could have been completely ready for an air attack. He thought that he would have alerted against an air attack if he had the information contained in the Chief of Staff's December 7th dispatch two hours before the attack (page 256). He stated, however, that he could not have prevented a torpedo attack on the battleships even with two hours warning since any aircraft attack once launched can be driven in (pages 265‑6).

Admiral Kimmel testified that if he had received Exhibit 48 prior to the attack he would have assumed the highest condition of readiness (page 329). He also testified that in the event of an attack together with submarines; and he had reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the time of the attack, it is well within the realm of possibility that had he taken the Fleet to sea, the losses would have been greater (page 1124). However, that presupposes that they would have found the Fleet and would have been able to deliver an attack. Had the Fleet gone to sea, the Japanese might not have attacked at that time at all. However, he thought that he would have taken the Fleet to sea.

 

In his closing testimony Admiral Brown made a statement to the effect that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl Harbor on December 7 might have been, we were bound to suffer great damage even though a more effective alert would have destroyed more Japanese planes. Even if we had known the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor, we could not have kept our ships at sea indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall. Japanese agents in Honolulu were almost free to pick the date and hour of attack. On December 7, the Japanese risked an attack only because they had complete information about our dispositions; their agents ashore were able to observe and report the state of our defenses and their so‑called diplomatic agents were able to direct the moment of attack. Admiral Brown then said: "I wish to go on record as being of the opinion that the major lesson for the nation to learn from the attack on Pearl Harbor is that we should never again allow enemy aliens within sighting distance of a major operating base from which considerable portions of our naval and air forces can be observed."

Admiral Bloch said that had the Fleet left Pearl Harbor on December 7, there was a serious question in his mind as to whether or not the entire Fleet would have been destroyed in view of the powerful forces that the Japanese had in the area. Also, he said, had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities instead of the airfields and the ships of the Fleet, the United States would have been hurt more so far as the prosecution of the war was concerned even though we did have a terrific loss of life. He pointed out that the oil storage was in tanks above the ground or visible from the air. (p. 94)

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                                567

 

Admiral Kimmel said that if he had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles, and had it met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering an attack except by means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said that as they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126). Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have been very useful—one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor; and had he known the location of the enemy, they probably could have delivered a very effective attack.

 

Admiral Halsey said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, they were 150 to 175 miles from the entrance to Pearl Harbor. He had flown off some of his planes and some of them on arrival at Pearl Harbor shot down Japanese planes and some were shot down. A number of his planes were shot down by anti‑aircraft fire. (p 305)

On the morning of December 7, Admiral Newton was about 300 odd miles from Midway when he learned of the attack. He thought that he would receive orders to intercept the enemy which he felt must be to the Northward of Oahu and signaled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was cancelled because presumably Midway had also been attacked. He reported his position to the Commander in Chief and told him that he had cancelled the Midway flight. Sometime during that morning, he received a dispatch from the Commander in Chief to report to Admiral Halsey but he did not know where Admiral Halsey's task force was or where it had been. He sent a dispatch advising Admiral Halsey of his position and Admiral Halsey directed him to join him in the vicinity of Oahu. He set a course for Oahu and about ten or eleven that morning received a message from Admiral Halsey that he was to assume enemy carriers about 200 miles south of Oahu and was to intercept and destroy those carriers. He changed course and sent search planes. The search for the enemy was called off in that vicinity as the authorities at Pearl had received information indicating that the attack had been from carriers located to the north, not to the south. They returned to Pearl Harbor around the 13th or 14th, meanwhile continuing air patrol. The PORTLAND was bombed by one of our own planes. (p. 319

Admiral Newton said that he had assumed that the Japanese carriers attacked from the north because they had a better chance for coming in from that direction without being observed and because of the fact all shipping had been diverted to the southward and the training grounds of the Fleet were also to the southward. He felt sure that the Japanese were cognizant of this and consequently was greatly surprised when he was told that the Japanese carriers were to be assumed to be south of Oahu.

 

The court stated, and Admiral Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid one must know in advance that the carrier is on its way (page 1126), and within narrow limits of its time of arrival and sector. If he had detected an attack by the Japanese naval force 700 miles from Oahu, he would have violated his orders just as he did when he gave the orders to bomb the submarines; he does not know what he would have done, but thinks he would have found some way to handle the situation (page 1127).

Admiral McMorris said that if he had known a few days before that an attacking force was coming, he would have had the Fleet out, regardless of defense, so they could attack the enemy forces (page 897). His action (getting the Fleet out if he knew that a hostile force was approaching) would have been the same if a state of war had or had not existed (page 898). He would have informed the Navy Department if we had not been at war. To have deferred action would certainly have been unwise, even under our Constitution (page 898). Even if long range reconnaissance to 700 miles had been in effect, the attack could not have been prevented. He might have sent ships out to intercept the enemy and diverted carriers for this purpose. However, he thought the losses might have been greater if this had been done (page 898). However, the Army planes would have been alerted too said undoubtedly would have done some damage, principally to enemy planes. He doubted that the enemy carriers would have suffered very seriously (page 899).

 

Admiral McMorris said that had they foreseen the Japanese carrier raid, they would not have had the American battleships in port. He said, however, that actually the most profitable target for the Japanese would have been the oil tankers at Pearl Harbor. If they had destroyed them and the shops and dry docks, our capabilities would have been nullified for a very long time. (p. 248)

 

568                                           CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Admiral Bellinger agreed with the Court's view that it is a historical fact that carrier borne planes must be caught before they are launched in order to successfully repel a carrier attack. He stated that he doubted very seriously that even with advance warning of this attack, he could have taken steps to save a great many planes which might have been destroyed otherwise, because of the difficulty of dispersion of patrol planes (page 686).

Admiral Turner thought that the Fleet could have been kept at sea after the orders for defensive deployment (page 1021). Admiral Stark knew that CincPac had his fleet divided in three parts and that an operating schedule provided for the time each part was to be in Pearl Harbor (page 1022). This seemed satisfactory.

He did not think that the Japanese attack could have been averted. Its destructive effect could have been lessened and more Japanese planes destroyed. If some ships had been deployed to northward, there would have been a better chance of detecting the enemy and bringing out shore based planes and carriers to attack them (page 1024). It was well recognized by people who concerned themselves with the defense of Oahu that the northern flank is a very weak place (page 1024).

Admiral Smith said that if Exhibit 48 (the Army dispatch of 1 p.m. meeting, had reached them between 0500 and 0600 Hawaiian time, effective measures could have been taken against the Japanese (pages 549‑50), and perhaps we would not have been damaged so much and the Japanese more. The destroyers could have gotten out and probably the cruisers; Army and Navy aircraft alerted, and oil tankers sent out to the carriers; but, the battleships probably could not have gotten out, and, if they did, would have been sunk outside (page 550). The Robert's Report, he said, is incorrect in saying that prompt receipt of that message would still have been too late to be of any substantial use (pages 549‑50).

Admiral Smith later said that if they had known, they would have given Condition I, sent the Fleet to sea, alerted all aircraft and sent carriers to the north to try to locate the enemy (page 569). It was true, he said, that if the Fleet had sortied from Pearl Harbor shortly before the attack and were within enemy range, they would have been sunk, but had they been two or three hundred miles to the west, it is very unlikely that the heavy ships would have been attacked. The battleships, therefore, could have been used as a support force since their a speed was about 15 knots (page 568). Getting the Army planes aloft before sunrise would not, in Admiral Smith's opinion, have diverted the attack but would have decreased our damage and increased the damage to the Japanese. "There is no question but that the Fleet in Pearl Harbor would have been damaged even if we had been alert" (page 568). He agreed with the court that the only method by which the attack could have been completely diverted would have been to locate the carriers before they got within launching range.

 

G. THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE

 

The personnel casualties were summarized by Lt. Comdr. Robert D. Powers, Jr., USNR, as follows:

"These reports, examined by me in the office of the Bureau of Personnel, give in detail the names of ships and stations of the killed and wounded as a result of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports are very voluminous. From this examination, I obtained a calculation of the total of the killed and wounded. This calculation shows that the total killed, including those who died of wounds and those missing and declared dead, was 3067, and those wounded, 896."

The damage to ships, as described by CincPac on February 16, 1942 (Exhibit 61), was as follows:

"(a) Battleships:

"ARIZONA sank at her berth as a result of one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bomb hits. One of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the forward magazines. The ship is considered to be a total wreck except for material which can be salvaged and reassigned. A considerable amount of ordnance material has already been removed, and work is underway in removing the 14‑inch guns from turrets three and four.

"CALIFORNIA sank at her berth as a result of hits by two aircraft torpedoes and one or more near bomb misses. Also received one large bomb hit on starboard upper deck abreast of foremast, which caused a serious 5‑inch powder fire. It sank gradually for about three or for days and is now resting rather solidly on a mud bottom. The quarterdeck is under about twelve feet of water, and the port side of forecastle is under about three feet of water.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                                569

 

"NEVADA struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and by at least five bombs and two near misses. Each of the near misses caused rupturing of the hull on the port and starboard bows, respectively. One bomb hit in way of foremast caused explosion and fire damage which wrecked the vertical area extending from the second deck to the bridge. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle from side to side forward of No. 1 turret, and this damage extended down to the second deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships caused considerable local damage to the mainmast, stack, and other structure, and caused many casualties to 5‑inch gun crews.

"OKLAHOMA capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The hull is 20° to 30° to being up‑side down, with a considerable portion of the bottom and starboard side above water.

"PENNSYLVANIA one bomb hit in way of after 5‑inch gun starboard side. The vessel was in drydock No. 1. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable but not of a vital nature, although there were a large number of casualties and one gun was put out of commission. The damage did not extend below the second deck.

"MARYLAND two bomb hits on forecastle. One small bomb (probably 100 pounds) through the forecastle deck forward of the chain pipes and exploded on the maindeck causing only a small amount of damage. The second bomb (probably 500 pounds) passed through the side of the ship about twelve feet under water and exploded in the C&R storeroom.  This explosion wrecked flats and bulkheads in that area, and fragments caused numerous leaks through the sides and bottom. These leaks were temporarily patched without going into drydock.

"TENNESSEE two bomb hits (probably 15‑inch shell type). One of the bombs struck the center gun of No. 2 turret causing a large crack which necessitated replacement of the gun. This bomb exploded and did considerable local fragment damage. Another similar bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret. and penetrated same in way of a riveted joint. This bomb was a dud and did no serious damage except for putting one rammer out of commission. The TENNESSEE suffered serious damage aft in officers' quarters due to fire resulting from the great heat caused by the oil fire starting from the ARIZONA. The shell plates around the stern were somewhat buckled and joints broken.

"WEST VIRGINIA sank at her berth as a result of four or five aircraft torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits. The vessel rests on a hard bottom with all spaces flooded up to two or three feet below the main deck. Most of the damage from torpedoes is in the midship area, which is badly wrecked both below water and above water. A large bomb passed through the foretop and the boat deck and apparently exploded near the port side of the main or second deck. This explosion caused considerable wreckage and a terrific powder and oil fire, which burned out the whole area and extended to the foremast structure up to and including the bridge. A. second bomb hit hit the top of turret III and passed through the 6‑inch top. The nature of the penetration indicated defective material. This bomb did not explode but caused damage to the slide of the left gun. Recently another torpedo hole, and parts of the torpedo, have been located aft under the counter. The steering engine room appears to be wrecked and the rudder is lying on the bottom.

"(b) Cruisers:

"HELENA hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft torpedo causing the flooding of No. 1 and 2 firerooms and the forward engineroom. The starboard engine was found to be seriously damaged. Temporary repairs to hull were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H., and the vessel has proceeded to Mare Island under two shafts to await permanent repairs.

"HONOLULU damaged by near miss of large bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through dock and exploded fifteen or twenty feet from the port side at frame 40. This explosion caused considerable damage to the hull and resulted in the flooding of storerooms and magazines in that area, and also drowned out, the electric power cables of turret II. Most of the flooding resulted from rupture of a magazine flood seachest; the hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked some due to pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were completed at Pearl Harbor T. H.

"RALEIGH hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side which flooded out the forward half of the machinery plant: The ship was also hit by one bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's side, and finally exploded about fifty feet away. The damage from the explosion was not extensive, but together with the hole made in the side, caused serious

 

570                               CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

flooding on the port side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the extent of damage and resulted from inability to close armored hatches tightly against the water head. The bomb struck only a few feet abaft the gasoline stowage. Permanent repairs to the hull are being completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H. The vessel will return to Mare Island about the middle of February for permanent repairs to machinery and power leads, this being necessitated primarily by replacement of one boiler and the cast iron turbine casings of engine No. 4.

"(c) Destroyers:

"SHAW hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock; also hit by many fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock. The serious fire follow­ing bomb hits resulted in blowing up of forward magazine and heat damage to shell plating in the forward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously damaged. The SHAW was re‑docked on the same drydock on January 26, 1942, for installation of a false bow at about frame 50. The vessel will be ready to proceed to Mare Island under her own power between 10 and 15 February.

"CASSIN and DOWNES: CASSIN was struck by one bomb and DOWNES by two (probably 500 pounds). These vessels were in drydock No. 1 ahead of the PENNSYLVANIA. One bomb explosion aft between the two vessels apparently knocked the CASSIN partly off the drydock blocking and caused her to fall over on the DOWNES when the dock was being flooded during the raid. This caused a serious structural failure amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the DOWNES were set‑off and blew out the maindeck and starboard side of the vessel in that area. This caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious oil fire followed the explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both vessels. Fragments and explosions have caused over 200 holes in the hull of the CASSIN and probably well over 400 in the hull of the DOWNES.

"Moat of the machinery of both ships has been removed for examination and re‑conditioning, and it now appears that the machinery of the CASSIN is 98% good and the DOWNES about 95% good. Permanent and temporary repairs have been made on the hull of the CASSIN to permit her re‑floating about Feb­ruary 5, and similar work is proceeding on the DOWNES.

"At present it appears inadvisable to count on the recommissioning of these two vessels as first‑line destroyers, but it is likely that repairs can be effected within two to four months which will make the vessels entirely suitable for escort vessels, thus releasing two first‑line destroyers for this duty. The Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., is working up sketch plans covering suitable arrangements for deck houses, bridge, armament, etc., adequate for an escort vessel. It is generally believed that although the hull of the vessels have been considerably weakened, they will be entirely adequate to carry the considerable reduced load in armament and other topside weights required for an escort vessel.

"(d)  Auxiliary vessels:

"OGLALA sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the starboard side and exploded against the starboard aide of the HELENA. Vessel sank slowly at ten‑ten dock, capsized against the dock about 1 1/2 hours after being struck. This vessel is probably not worth salvaging but plans are being made to remove her from the berth that she now occupies.

"CURTISS struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire. Machinery of the crane was seriously damaged and the radio antennae were put out of commis­sion. One bomb (probably 500 pounds) struck the forward end of the hangar on the port side off the center line, exploding on the second deck. The explosion and resulting fire caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of material. Tem­porary repairs have been completed and permanent repairs await availability of the ship at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

"VESTAL struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit for­ward and exploded in the steel shape storage, which stopped a large part of the fragments and minimized damage considerably. The other bomb struck aft and exploded in the hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the shell. Flooding aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge almost to the main deck. The vessel was alongside the ARIZONA when the raid commenced and was beached at Aeia to prevent further sinkage. Temporary repairs have been completed during a short stay in drydock, and permanent work will be completed when a dock is available.

"UTAH struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes capsized at berth. Ship is within a few degrees of being exactly upside down."

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                                            571

 

The damage to airplanes; as reported on February 15, 1942 (Exhibit 61) was:

 

"Extracts from Columns ...............................

2

5

6

Type

Number present Dec. 7

Number on hand after raid

Number usable after raid

Patrol planes ...............................................

69

45

11

Inshore patrol planes ...................................

0

0

0

Fighters .......................................................

24

15

0

Scout bombers .............................................

60

29

14

Torpedo bombers ........................................

2

2

0

Battleship and cruiser planes .........................

92

82

11

Utility and transport planes (non‑combatant) .

54

48

16

Total ......................................................

301

221

52"