XXXIII.
THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
This investigation developed the following evidence regarding
the sighting of Jap submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941
(Exhibits 18, 76, 76):
At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper,
sighted a submarine periscope of the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was
in a defensive
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sea
area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged.
When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance buoys. It was
about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned
sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.
The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD
between 0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then
engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then
continued on its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:
"Sighted
submerged submarine on westerly course speed 9 knots"
After
receiving this visual, signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about an hour
and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the CONDOR,
asking:
"What
was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you
sighted?"
At 0520 the CONDOR replied:
"The
course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000
yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance"
In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between
0521 and 0536, the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the
submarine it was at about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the
entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020
magnetic, the captain of the WARD realized that his search had been in the
wrong direction. He then continued searching, but again without result.
The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the
WARD. The captain considered that the identification at that time was not
positive enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat.
The Senior Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who
commanded the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of the WARD
thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that he had seen
a submarine (p. 87‑92, 428‑429).
The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was
overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu,
a radio station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol,
14th N. D. (Ex. 18.) Since the conversation was solely between the
ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made that it
be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to
higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which was
maintained in the Communications Office, 14th N. D., did not overhear or
intercept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.
At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate
vessel charged with opening and closing the net at the entrance. The instructions
of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be kept closed from sunset
to sunrise and opened only on orders from him, from the Assistant Captain of
the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer, who could be reached via the signal
tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the gate vessel indicates that the net was
opened and closed a number of times during the night of December 6‑7. At
0458 on the 7th the gate was opened and the CROSSBILL and the CONDOR stood in.
It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed. The Commanding Officer of the
CONDOR, now Lieutenant Commander M. H. Hubbell, testified that at 0532, when
the CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were
"approaching daylight conditions" (Exhibits 44, 45).
The log of the signal bower for December 6‑7, 1941,
records the closing of the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an
entry at 0600 that the ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Ex. 4B).
The USS ANTARES, with a 500‑ton steel barge in tow,
arrived of Pearl Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it
exchanged calls with the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object,
which appeared do be a small submarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard
quarter. The ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several
minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two
smoke pots near the object (Exhibit 73).
The WARD complied and at 0610 sighted an unidentified
submarine one point off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES
into Pearl Harbor. General quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full
ahead, increasing the WARD's speed from five to twenty‑five knots. At
0645 she opened
556 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fire
with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one or
two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed
directly over the conning tower; the second, from No 3 gun, at fifty yards or
less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning
tower. At about this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also
noted that the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the
submarine. The submarine keeled over to starboard and started to sink. The WARD
ceased firing and then dropped depth charges A large amount of oil appeared on
the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water (Exhibit 74).
At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant,
FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18):
"We
have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area."
The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message
might not be interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent
the following supplementary message:
"We
have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in
defensive sea area (Exhibit 18)."
This message was received by the Bishop's Point Radio
Station, relayed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore
Patrol, and delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval
District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the
ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the Duty
Officer of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.
The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch.
Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was
that the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake,
the WARD and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched,
could take care of the situation, while the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,
to whom they had referred the information, had the power to take any other
action which might be desired (pages 414‑116, 452‑469).
A.
JAPANESE SUBMARINES
Captain Smedberg said that the sum of the information on the
midget subs used by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor was that they were carried and
launched from mother submarines, were about 41 feet in length, and had a
maximum cruising range of 175‑180 miles at the most economical cruising
speed of 4‑6 knots. They were probably not equipped with radio (p. 8‑9)
Complete information on Jap midget subs is available in Commander‑in‑Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 20 October 1944,
Volume 1, number 15 (Exhibit 5), and Office of Naval Intelligence Publication
"ONI 220‑J, Japanese Submarines" (Exhibit 6).
NOTE: The latest Office of Naval Intelligence publication
referring to Jap midget submarines ("ONI 222‑J, The Japanese
Navy") establishes that the Japanese midget submarines used at Pearl
Harbor were actually about 80 feet long, rather than 41 feet long as stated by
Captain Smedberg. They carried two 18‑inch torpedoes, had a top speed of 12
knots, and could dive to a depth of 100 feet.
Captain
Ramsey said that at 0730 on December 7, 1941, he received a call from the Staff
Duty Officer to the effect that they had sunk a submarine one mile off the
Pearl Harbor entrance (page 586).
Captain Earle said that at about 0710 on December 7, he
learned of the submarine attack off Pearl Harbor; that this did not indicate to
him that an air attack might be imminent; that his reaction was that the enemy
had decided to be a little more active with his submarine campaign of war; that
the WARD was making another mistake. He pointed out that they had had on the
average of ten or fifteen reports of submarine sighted in that area in the several months preceding the attack.
When he received word of this attack, he told the Watch Officer to be sure and
get the dispatch verified, to notify the Commander in Chief's Watch Officer
immediately, to advise ComFOURTEEN's Operations Officer, and then he called
Admiral Bloch and discussed the matter with him. As the matter had been
referred to the Commander in Chief, they decided that they would wait for
further develop-
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ments.
They did not discuss the fact that the presence of the submarine might indicate
an air attack. (p. 376)
Admiral Bellinger read an excerpt from a report prepared by
him as follows:
"0700 Patrol Plane 14P(1) sighted and attacked enemy
submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. 0715 Message coded and
transmitted to Base. 0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff
Duty Officer. 0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer. 0740 Message relayed
by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander‑in‑Chief: 0750
Search plan drafted by Operations Officer. 0757 First bomb dropped near VP‑22
hangar. 0758 Message broadcast to all ships present 'AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR.
THIS IS NO DRILL.' 0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone and
received by some of the planes in the air at 0805." (p. 129)
Admiral Bellinger knew of no attempt at his command
headquarters to relay the information of the attack on the submarine to Army
headquarters.
He requested
authentication; reported it to the Staff Duty Officer of CincPac, and drew up a
search dispatch (page 586).
Concerning the submarine attack on the morning of December
7th, Admiral Smith said that he had received no report of that attack, the
report was received by the Staff Duty Officer, who was Commander V. R. Murphy,
who delivered the message to Admiral Bellinger, and he believed to Admiral
Kimmel. He said:
"My recollection is that Admiral Bloch informed the
Secretary of the Navy a few days after Pearl Harbor that he had received this
message at 7:15. Talking to Captain Maddox, who was on board the ANTARES, the
ANTARES had been about to enter Pearl Harbor, and as she turned, the conning
tower of the midget submarine broke the surface. He called this to the
attention of the destroyer WARD who sank the submarine, and the WARD informed
the signal tower, unfortunately by signal, that he had attacked a submarine at the
entrance to Pearl Harbor. As Captain Maddox said at the time, he regretted that
he had not put the thing out by radio in plain language telling everybody that
it actually was a submarine and it actually had been sunk. You see, we had
received so many false submarine reports before that time. I do not remember
the exact wording of the signal sent through the signal tower, but I gathered
from what Admiral Bloch told us later that he did not consider it as serious as
it actually was. I'm quoting from a conversation between Admiral Bloch and the
Secretary of the Navy, a few days after Pearl Harbor, in the presence of
Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Pye and General Short and myself. But the first
message I got was that Pearl Harbor was under attack. I received no message
before that about the submarine. You must also realize the communications
between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu were very poor. Efforts had been made for
months to get more trunk lines through but it was sometimes very difficult to
communicate between the two places. It was particularly difficult to
communicate with the Army. It had to go through several stations."
Captain Murphy said that no specific information was
furnished to him concerning the international situation when he went on watch
as Staff Duty Officer; he had a memorandum from Captain McMorris giving him the
dispositions of the ships and forces of the Fleet and instructions as to action
to be taken in the event of war. (p. 196)
Captain Murphy said that he was not familiar with the Army's
condition of readiness on December 7th. (p. 198) He did not know whether or not
the Army radar system was operating that day.
Captain Murphy said that as Staff Duty Officer if anything
unusual occurred during his tour of duty, he would have advised ComFOURTEEN,
who in turn would have advised the Army since ComFOURTEEN was charged with
dealings with the Army. (p. 201)
Captain Murphy said that about 7:20 or 7:25 in the morning
of December 7th, he received a report to the effect that a submarine had been
sunk by the WARD. He described his actions as follows:
"At that time, I was in the process of getting dressed
in my quarters. Lieutenant Commander Black gave me the report. He was Assistant
Duty Officer. And I said, 'Did he say what he was doing about it? Did he say
whether Admiral Bloch knew about it, or not?' And he said, 'No.' I said, 'While
I'm finishing dressing, call him and see what he's doing about it and whether
or not he's called Admiral Bloch.' I finished dressing, Black
558 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
came
back and said he had dialed and dialed and the line was busy. I then dialed the
operator—it was a local dial system—and told him to tell the Duty Officer to
call me immediately and to break in on any conversation he might be holding
unless it was of supreme importance. I went to the office and as I walked in
the office, the phone was ringing. I answered the phone and it was Ramsey—now
Captain, L. C. Ramsey, from PatWingTwo. He said he had a report from a patrol
plane to the effect that a submarine had been sunk in the Defensive Sea Area. I
said, 'I have just had a report that I have not been able to get any more
details on,' and told him what the report was. At that time, the phone rang
from the Fourteenth Naval District and the Duty Officer was on the phone. He
said that Admiral Bloch had been informed, that he had ordered the ready‑duty
destroyer out to assist the WARD and to investigate, and had ordered the stand‑by
destroyer to get up steam. I said, Had you any previous details or any more
details of this attack?' He said, 'The message came out of a clear sky. There
was no word of preliminary search or chase of any kind.' I then called Admiral
Kimmel and gave him both messages and told him that Admiral Bloch knew it and
of the ready‑destroyer being ordered out and of the stand‑by
destroyer getting up steam. He said, 'I will be right down.' About that time,
and I'm not sure of the sequence, Ramsey called again and said that he had
nothing further and did I have anything further. I said, 'No,' but I thought it
might be wise for him to make his search planes available in case the Admiral
wanted them. About that time, the phone rang again; it was the Duty Officer of
the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that he had another message from the
WARD saying that she was towing a sampan into Honolulu Harbor and requesting a
Coast Guard tug be sent to his assistance. I called Admiral Kimmel and gave him
that message. Before I finished that message, the yeoman came in, said,
'There's a message from the signal tower saying the Japanese are attacking
Pearl Harbor and this is no drill.' I gave that message to Admiral Kimmel,
either directly on that one call or a call immediately thereafter. I do not
recall exactly whether it was the same call or thereafter. I then told the
Communications Officer to send a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations,
Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with priority of the Commander‑in‑Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, over the Chief of Naval Operations, and to our forces at sea:
'JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.' I then called Ramsey and
said, 'How many planes have you got available'—no, I'll correct that: I told
the yeoman to call the signal tower and ask if the Pearl Harbor Defense Plan
had been executed, and he said it had been by Admiral Bloch. I called Ramsey
and said, 'How many planes have you got available?' He said, 'I don't think I
have any, but I'm scraping together what I can for search.' I then called all
the Staff of the Commander-in‑Chief; some I called myself and some the
yeoman called, using every phone we had in the office. I distinctly remember
talking to Captain Smith myself. By that time, Captain McMorris came in, either
just preceded or followed by the Admiral, I don't recall, and we drafted a more
formal dispatch to the forces at sea, giving them instructions and information.
From then on, the duties were largely taken over by the regular Staff and the
War Plans Division helped in advising the other people who had the immediate
direction of events."
Captain Murphy said that that contact was about the third or
fourth of a series of such contacts; that all previous ones had, insofar as
actual proof was concerned, turned out to be negative. This one, he thought,
might be the real thing but he wanted some further information as to why the
WARD thought that it sunk a submarine so that he could formulate an opinion
whether or not there was a submarine sunk. In the previous contacts, they had
never been able to establish definitely that there had been a submarine
involved. He had less doubt about the authenticity of this than he had had
about some of the others. He did not interpret this submarine as possibly being
accompanied by an air attack (p. 202)
Admiral
Bloch stated that at 0715 on December 7, 1941, he received a telephone message
from the Chief of Staff that the WARD had attacked a submarine off Pearl Harbor and was escorting a sampan in.
Commander Granville C. Briant was Aviation Aide to ComFourteen
in 1941. (p. 229). During November and December, 1941, Commander Briant was one
of the District Watch Officers. There were about eight to ten of such officers.
Commander Briant discussed the instructions given to
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559
Watch
Officers and qualifications of those on the Watch Officers list. (p. 230). He
also discussed the functions of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 232). Commander
Briant said that to his mind the Watch Officers had not been advised of the
seriousness of the situation and specifically they were not advised of the war
warning. (p. 233)
Admiral Bloch said that, "on the morning of December 7,
the only contact that was made prior to the air raid was with an enemy
submarine. This submarine was sighted by USS WARD, which was inshore patrol,
and the USS ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the ANTARES. I did
receive at 7:12 a.m. a telephone message from the Chief of Staff telling me
that he had received a dispatch from the WARD that was somewhat difficult to
understand, that he had been attacked and was counter‑attacking a
submarine at the entrance to the channel at Pearl Harbor. He further stated
that he was then engaged in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu. The Chief of
Staff gave me this message. I asked him what it was; is it a real submarine or
is it a report? We had had a number of false reports in the past and he said he
didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the nature of the dispatch whether
it was bona fide or sound contact or sight contact, whether he had been fired
upon or had fired, and I asked him to get it cleared up immediately. Captain
Momsen was sent immediately to headquarters; dispatched another destroyer and
tried to get information from the WARD. Before we got the information
straightened out, the air attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed—at least
his operations Watch Officer was informed about the entire matter just at the
same time we were." (pp. 21 and 22)
Admiral Bloch did not think that the Army had been advised on
the morning of December 7 of the dispatch from the WARD concerning the
submarine attack. (p.22)
The Staff Duty Officer
at CincPac was given the same information. They were not sure whether this was
a true report. The ready duty destroyer was ordered out. Before the report was
clarified, the air attack had started. The first submarine contacted was one
mile outside the entrance buoy (page 401). He learned after December 7th that a
patrol plane had also seen this submarine or another, attacked it with depth
bombs and sunk it. This was a midget (page 403 .
A
midget submarine was later sunk inside the harbor. When it was later recovered,
it was found that both its torpedoes were missing (page 403). It had fired at
the CURTISS and missed.
No
anti‑submarine nets had been installed, but anti‑torpedo nets had
been installed to keep a submarine outside from firing torpedoes into the
harbor. If the anti‑torpedo net had been closed, a midget submarine would
probably have become fouled in the net. Practice required the net gates to be
open all day and closed all night except when ships were passing them. At 0445,
December 7, 1941, some minesweepers came in and the gate was not closed until
after 0800 when it was ordered closed by Headquarters (page 404). The deepest part
of the channel was 72 feet; the depth of the net was 45 feet (page 405). From
keel to conning tower the submarine was about 20 feet.
Also,
a midget submarine ran aground on a reef off Bellows Field and was recovered by
the Army (page 406).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that on December 7th his headquarters were at the submarine
base at Pearl Harbor, his Flagship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was nearby and he could
move to it on short notice. By moving his headquarters to shore, be did not
intend to supplant Admiral Bloch (page 278) There was nothing irregular in his
establishing his headquarters ashore since this in no way changed his
responsibilities (pages 363‑4).
Between
0730 and 0740, Admiral Kimmel had a report of a submarine attack off Pearl
Harbor and he was waiting for an amplification of this report. Between November
27th and that time, he had had about a half‑dozen such reports. While
waiting for amplification, the air attack started (page 332). He said that the
officer reporting the sinking of the submarine should, under 2CL-41, have
broadcast in plain language, but sent it in code which resulted in delay.
Admiral
Kimmel said that the one submarine which did attempt to attack in Pearl Harbor
was stopped before accomplishing anything (page 373).
He
also said that be had reason to believe that there were a great many submarines
in the area at the time of the attack (page 1124).
Admiral
Calhoun said that on December 7, 1941 he bad no warning that a submarine was in
Pearl Harbor until the MEDUSA and CURTISS informed
560 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
him that they had sunk
a midget submarine on the other side of Ford Island (page 945).
Captain Layton testified that a submarine entered Pearl
Harbor and fired both of its torpedoes, one passing between the RALEIGH and
CURTISS, the other burying itself in the mud near the berth of the UTAH. This
submarine was sunk and was so thoroughly destroyed that no intelligence
material was obtained from it. (Page 285‑286)
Another Japanese midget submarine which was beached of
Bellows Field, Oahu, was captured on December 8th along with its commanding
officer. This submarine contained various documents which were captured,
including a chart of Pearl Harbor on which was laid a course into the harbor,
around Ford Island, and out of the harbor, as well as indications of positions
of various ships in the harbor. (Exhibit 82A, 33A)
Captain Layton also testified that the midget submarine
beached of Bellows Field bore the designation I‑18 which was the apparent
designation of its "mother submarine." He pointed out that the chart
of Pearl Harbor which was recovered from the "I‑18" contained
notations in pencil along both sides of the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor,
reading "1‑16", "I‑20", "1‑22",
"1‑18", and "I‑24". He testified that from
intelligence subsequently received it was known that such were the designations
of the Japanese mother submarines that carried the five midget submarines
believed to have been present outside Pearl Harbor on 7 December. (Page 284).
Captain Layton further tested that the times shown on the
track map of Pearl Harbor that was recovered from the Japanese submarine off
Bellows Field was, in accordance with Japanese naval custom, Tokyo time, minus
nine, and that all dates indicated were east longitude or Tokyo dates,
regardless of the fact that the 180th meridian may have been crossed.
Therefore, he said, that the "times in these logs and memoranda and
notebooks will always remain as minus nine, four and a half hours earlier than
Pearl Harbor." (Page 279).
Captain Layton examined the original Japanese map which
contained the track around Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 32A), and stated it to be his
professional opinion as a seaman that the track shown on the map was a
projected track and not an actual logged track by bearings and distances
indicated thereon. He stated that "it is too exact to be an exact track
and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to have
been performed by the captain of this midget submarine, who had to control
trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine without assistance. The
second member of the submarine was the machinist's mate, who closed and opened
switches, cut in and out the CO2 absorbent material, and in general performed
the duties of chief engineer and auxiliary gang." (Page 281‑28.2).
Captain Layton also testified that the notations on the
chart under the time 0450 did not indicate that the captain of the midget
submarine recorded that he, himself, had sunk an enemy ship. Captain Layton
pointed out that the submarine still had both of its torpedoes aboard, which
was its full complement. He pointed out also that the track in question was
carefully laid out both by course and distance, with the course in degrees and
distance in meters, and the time in minutes and seconds; and that the latter
indicated that the speed of the submarine was to be varied from point to point
so as to make its arrival at the several points at a predetermined time. He
pointed out that the time indicated, 0450, which was Tokyo time, would be 0920
Pearl Harbor time; and that at 0920 Honolulu time, the attack was still taking
place and there was a tremendous amount of activity in the area indicated on
the map. Accordingly, Captain Layton gave it as his opinion that he doubted if
the captain of the midget submarine would have been able to so meticulously
follow his course all around the harbor and at the same time make notations
from point to point. (Page 283).
The notations on the Japanese chart indicated also that the
submarine commander had received intelligence reports as late as December 5th.
(Exhibit 32-32A).
The Japanese submarine commander who was captured, upon
being interrogated, admitted that he had failed in his mission. (Page 16).
With reference to the language appearing on the Japanese
map, which is variously interpreted as "sink enemy ship," and
"enemy ship sunk," Captain McCollum testified that it was not
possible to infer whether the past tense or the future tense was in the mind of
the person who made the notations, because there were no kana symbols attached
showing the tense of the verb. (Page. 25‑26)
NOTE: It is to be noted that the conclusion reached by the
Army Pearl Harbor Board that Japanese midget submarines must have been in the
harbor
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY
561
a
few days before the attack and evidently moved in and out of the harbor at will
('RAPHB', page 155) is based wholly on the captured Japanese maps and on the
testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge at Honolulu, 7 December
1941, which in turn is based solely on those maps. In this connection, it is
pointed out that Admiral Hewitt made a thorough study of the question (Hewitt
Report, Page 146‑148) which caused him to conclude that there was no
evidence warranting the belief that any Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor
prior to December 7th. (Hewitt Report, Page 157).
B.
DETECTION OF PLANES BY THE ARMY RADAR SYSTEM
J.
L. Lockard, First Lieutenant, U. S. Army, and Sergeant George E. Elliott, U. S.
Army, who were privates on December 7, 1941, testified that they were on duty
that morning from 0400 to 0700 on a mobile radar unit on the northern part of
Oahu at a site called Opana (page 628).
There
were supposed to be three men on the shift, but the men arranged, and Sergeant
Murphy approved, only two, it being a Sunday morning (pages 637‑8). The
station had been set up in November, about Thanksgiving (page 639).
Lockard
stated (page 641) that his station worked 0400 to 0700 on Sundays and holidays
and 0700 to 1700 on weekdays. The Robert's Report states that on November 27,
1941 the Army ordered the radar system operated each day from 0400 to 0700, but
Lockard had no knowledge of such order (page 643), and his station operated
those hours on Sunday.
Elliott
understood that the station had been operated from 0400 to 0700 before December
7th according to schedules (page 652).
The
radar set which they were operating could cover 180° from northeast to west.
They were instructed to track for flights, intercept them and report them to
the Information Center (page 629). Lockard was in charge of the station. They
had telephonic communication with the Information Center.
Lockard
had been operating these radar sets since August, when they were put in
operation (page 630). The set was of rather crude construction at that time. It
would pick up one plane at 100 miles and sometimes not pick up three or four
(page 631).
They
had no information prior to 0800 of the movement of friendly aircraft. Radar
could not distinguish friend from foe.
On
the morning of December 7th, they continued to operate after 0700 as the truck
had not come for them, in order to give Elliott training in radar operation
(page 631). He was not regarded by Lockard as a qualified operator (page 633).
At
about 0702 they discovered an unusually large response in a northerly direction
at 136 miles, Lockard checked the equipment to make sure, and when the planes
came in to 132 miles they decided to call the Information Center (page 633).
Elliott first talked to the switchboard operator at the Information Center
(page 633).
Elliott
testified that he had wanted to send the information in right away, but that
Lockard had laughed at him and finally told him to send it in if he liked. After
a short time, they did (page 648).
Lockard
their got the switchboard operator to call the Army officer on duty and then he
reported the information to him. The officer thanked him. They continued to
track the planes in to 20 miles, when they lost them because of distortion.
They
left the unit and became aware of the attack at 0830 and went back on duty at
their unit at 0910. Their equipment meanwhile was being operated by others who
had relieved them (page 636).
Elliott
had no information concerning an expected flight of B‑17's (page 646).
This,
incidentally, was the first time Elliott had this 0400 to 0700 duty; previously
he had worked in the late mornings or afternoons (page 646). He thought that
other units had also picked up the flight and reported it, but had no knowledge
to that effect (page 657).
Lt.
Col. K. A. Tyler, U. S. Army, who was then a first lieutenant, was at the Army
Information Center on the morning of December 7, 1941. He was there for
training as an assistant controller. He was the only officer present and had
been on duty there only once before (pages 446‑7). Five or six plotters
were on duty, who plotted radar reports (page 448). In all, five radar stations
were in operation.
He
received no information or instructions before going on watch, nor did he
relieve any one. Watch was 0400 to 0800 (page 449). He understood the mechanics
of radar, but he had never seen one in operation.
On
the morning of December 7, 1941, at 0715, he received a call from the radar
station at Opana, stating that the operator had a report of a large number of
562 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
planes at 130 miles.
Private Lockard was the operator he talked to (page 457) He thought about the
report for a minute, thanked the operator, and did nothing about it.
He
was looking for a flight of B‑17's, but had no official notice that they
were coming in. A bomber pilot friend had told him that when there was a flight
of B‑17's en route, the radio stations played Hawaiian music all night.
That night and morning they did. He thought B‑17's were coming in because
Hawaiian music was playing on the radio, which was an arrangement made for
homing planes (page 458). He did not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to
contact his superiors (page 459).
There
was no means of distinguishing friend from foe. He thought the planes were
either B‑17's, due from San Francisco on a northeast course, or some Navy
carrier planes. He thinks now that the large plot report at 0715 were the
Japanese planes (page 460).
The
only information he had of Japanese‑United States relations was what he
had read in newspapers.
He
learned of the attack by phone call at 0800. He called all forces back. Major
Berquist and Major Tindall came and took over (page 452). A naval officer
reported to the Information Center shortly after the attack began (page 453).
Commander
Taylor said that on the morning of December 7th, he got to the Information
Center between 0830 and 0900 (page 612). Upon his arrival, the Information
Center was in great confusion. Plots were made of everything reported, but
there was no way of determining what planes were Japanese or American (page
613).
Captain
Ramsay said that during the day, they called Army radar and requested that they
track the Japanese planes in retiring and advise; but got no information (page
601).
It
is not clear whether the Navy had been advised of the expected arrival of the
Army planes on December 7th. Admiral McMorris stated that several senior
members of CincPac's staff certainly were aware that some large bombers were
flying from California to Oahu at that time, December 6th (page 900).
Admiral
Smith thought that they did not know of the prospective arrival of Army planes
on December 7th (page 563). He said, incidentally, that the Army B‑17's
arrived that morning without ammunition (pages 569‑72). Captain. Ramsey
stated that prior to 0755 on December 7th, he had no information as to the
scheduled arrival of Army planes (page 587).
C.
THE AIR ATTACK
Captain Smedberg said that a Chief Yeoman in the Japanese
Navy who had formerly been attached to the staff of Admiral Yamamoto, Commander‑in‑Chief
of the Jap Combined Fleet, and who had been captured during the Marianas
campaign, had furnished what is believed to be an accurate account of the composition
and movements of the enemy forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941. This information is presented in summarized form in Commander‑in‑Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 8 December 1944, vol.
2, number 22 (Exhibit 3; p. 4‑5).
The high points of the prisoner's account were as follows:
The secret operation order upon which the Pearl Harbor attack was based was
dated 1 November 1941 and specified that: (1) "War will be declared on X‑Day,"
and (2) "This order will become effective on Y‑Day." A second
operation order, dated 5 November, fixed Y‑Day as 23 November 1941 (22
November, Pearl Harbor time), and a third operation order, dated 10 November,
set X‑Day as 8 December 1941 (7 December, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 5‑6).
The Japanese plan called for a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor by a carrier "Striking Force," with a "Surprise Attack
Force" of submarines delivering a coordinated blow. The submarine force
was to carry out reconnaissance in advance of the attack by the Jap carrier
planes and was to attack U. S. warships which escaped from Pearl Harbor. If the
opportunity became available, it was also to launch attacks with midget subs
after the plane attacks (p. 6‑7).
The striking force, commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo,
consisted of three of Japans five carrier divisions: The KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv
1); HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred to as
CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and sometimes as CarDiv 5); the HIYEI and
KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv
8), plus ABUKUMA, and destroyers, including elements of DesRon 1 (Exhibit 3; p.
8).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY
563
The "Surprise Attack Force" included about twenty
fleet‑type submarines, some of which carried midget subs. This
constituted a large part of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet.
The Japanese operation order specified that the carrier
force was to leave Japan about X minus 16 Day (21 November 1941, Pearl Harbor
time) and proceed by way of Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles, for
Pearl Harbor. Most of the submarines of the "Surprise Attack Force"
were to leave the Inland Sea on X minus 20 Day (17 November 1941, Pearl Harbor
time) (p 6‑7).
The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage
near the Bongo Channel some time between November 19 and November 21, 1941,
Pearl Harbor Time and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island where at
assembled and fueled. Departure was taken on or about 27 November 1941, under
cover of a heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly direction., heading
on course about 085° to a point in longitude about 170° W; then, turned
southeast on course about 135° and proceeded to a point due north of, and
approximately 200 miles from, the island of Oahu, where it arrived early in the
morning of 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor Time. From that position the Pearl
Harbor attack was launched. Following the attack, the striking force retired
initially to the northwest on a heading of about 300° to a point about
longitude 170° E, thence to the southwest, irregularly on varying headings to a
point near 140° E, and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3, page 16).
General
Short testified that he heard the first bomb of the attack; the Chief of Staff
told him it was the "real thing." He immediately ordered an all‑out
alert (No. 3). His narrative of the attack appears at pages 254‑255 of
the Record. He had no notice of a submarine having been sunk near Pearl Harbor
prior to the attack.
Admiral
Kimmel testified that he became aware of the attack by a telephone message from
the Staff Duty Officer (pages 332-333). He reached his headquarters at 0805
Admiral
Bloch said that he knew of the attack at 0755; he heard bombs and saw a
Japanese plane;. he went to headquarters, sent dispatches to Washington,
Philippines Guam and to ships at sea advising that Oahu had been attacked;
called all Navy Yard workers and Naval personnel to duty, flooded dry docks and
took other local measures (page 400). He said that ample personnel reported
(page 401). When the Japanese attacked, a visual signal was given and the air
raid alarm was given. Insofar as other measures planned, including air search
for the enemy, were possible after the attack, they were carried out.
Admiral
Pye testified that on the morning of December 7th, he was in the Halikulani
Hotel (page 418). He learned of the attack at 0755 and proceeded to Pearl
Harbor in an automobile with Admiral Leary (page 423). His Chief of Staff took
action to carry out 2CL‑41 as he was not aboard at the time of the attack
(page 421).
Concerning the sortie of ships on December 7, Admiral Pye
said:
"I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and
returned to the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty
minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff
informed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for
emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had first been
made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first shots, some of
the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or
immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to
sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance with the
order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing this maneuver, we came
to the conclusion that one ship outside would be no better off than inside and
would probably be in more danger of submarines, and as she passed us, we
directed her to anchor. She had not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond
that when she was bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was
actually beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the
Commander‑in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was
passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because
all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's with regard to
the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the
cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There
were no carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition
after the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers
were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul." (p. 166)
564 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral
Bellinger said that, on December 7, 1941, the Naval Base Defense Force immediately
assumed a functioning status without orders from higher authority (page 664).
Captain
Ramsey saw the bombing on Ford Island; had a radio message broadcast of the
raid; ordered planes in the air to search 315° to 360° from Pearl Harbor to the
maximum distance, and assigned searches of other sectors (page 587).
After
the attack he ordered the planes in the air to search 315° to 360° because they
always thought that the likely direction of approach (page 597). To the best of
his belief, the Japanese attack came from the northwest and subsequent
information indicated that the lanes had been launched from carriers about 325
miles from Oahu bearing 325° (page 598).
Shortly after December 7, Admiral Davis saw a chart
recovered from a Japanese plane which indicated that the planes had been
launched from a point about 250 miles north of Oahu. (p. 103‑104)
Captain
Ramsey reviewed what he did on the morning of December 7th (page 605). After he
issued search orders and Admiral Bellinger approve, there were a stream of
requests for information; the first order he received was from CincPac to
"locate and destroy enemy," but all possible action was already
taken; communications were disrupted by the raid and smoke; all planes
available were told to take off immediately; various orders were received
during the day, including some from CincPac to search specific sectors (page
606).
Captain
Ramsey said that they received some information during the morning concerning a
chart from a shot‑down plane in which the purported rendezvous was to the
southwest of Hawaii (page 602).
Various
Army planes did go northward that day—they went out to 150 miles but had to
return because B‑17's could go no further without protection of A‑20's,
which had no longer range (page 602).
Admiral
Smith stated that he did not get information as to the probable location from
which the Japanese carriers launched the attack for some two days. There was a
great deal of confusion; false reports from civilians of troop and parachute
landings; a false report from one of our planes of an enemy carrier to the
south; a squadron of our seaplanes returning from Midway to Pearl Harbor on
that afternoon dropped two bombs on what the pilot said was a camouflaged
Japanese carrier south of Pearl Harbor, but seems to have been the PORTLAND. A
chart showing the position of Japanese carriers was taken from a Japanese plane
by the Army on December 7th, but was not shown to the Navy until the afternoon
(page 564). Planes left to the north, but this was not known by the Navy until
two days after the attack. Visibility was good at Oahu on December 7th, but fog
could usually be found to the north.
Admiral
Kitts said that about 175 to 250 Japanese planes came in from carriers to
attack from west‑northwest, a distance of some 200 miles (page 524).
Admiral Kitts said that no orders in regard to fire control
were issued on December 7 other than by the ships' commanding officers and one
by the Commander in Chief were issued to stop firing on friendly planes. (p.
191) Admiral Kitts said that, as he recalled it, 28 planes were shot down by
the Fleet. (p.193)
He
testified that on December 8th, after the attack, he was in conference with
General Davidson and was shown a radar plot showing planes coming in from about
150 miles and going out again. The plot coming in might have been interpreted
as friendly planes, but after a two‑hour attack on Pearl harbor, the
outgoing plot must have been the enemy. This plot was not reported to the Navy
until he saw it on December 8th (page b20).
Colonel
Phillips said that on December 7, 1941 be received a telephone message of the
attack and ordered the all‑out alert. Some Army pursuit planes took off
but he did not know when or how many (page 389). He did not know whether any
bombers took off. He said that there was on December 7th, a radar track of
planes which turned out to be Japanese, but he cannot remember whether it was
incoming or outgoing or either (page 488). He saw this track after December 7,
1941, but did not remember where or what it showed (page 489).
Admiral
Smith was not familiar with the Army radar system (page 558). He stated that
after the attack, Colonel Davidson told him the radar track had been
reconstructed from the bearings, but on Sunday that they were not convinced
that that was the direction from which the attack came (page 558). This is
"obviously correct, because we searched to the south rather than to the
north" (page 588).
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY
565
Commander Taylor described the confusion which existed on December
7 at the Information Center. He said, among other things, that there were a
number of plots prepared of the course of aircraft that morning which were
studied in an attempt to determine exactly where the raids had come from and
what direction they had returned; that about 48 hours after the raids they
completed the construction of an estimated plot, and that it was his
understanding that during the subsequent visit of the Secretary of the Navy,
this plot was shown to him as evidence that all information received by the
Information Center had been received in an orderly manner. (p. 351)
At the time of the attack, Commander Wright was having
breakfast with Commander Williams, who, he said, had been handling the traffic
analyses end of the job. He directed Williams to go over to the Communication
Intelligence Unit, find out as much as he could about the composition and
location of the attacking forces and telephone the information. He said that,
in general, the information coming over indicated that there were at least four
carriers, including the two by identified radio calls. The bearings obtained on
this force seemed to indicate that they were nearly due South at an estimated
distance of 250 to 300 miles. Conflicting reports were coming in from other sources.
One bearing which was obtained from Lualualei, was in direct conflict with the
other bearings, and indicated that the attacking force was almost exactly due
North. (p. 380‑1). Commander Wright said that he believed that an early
arbitrary assumption that the surface forces were actually to the Southward
affected all of the subsequent reports. He said that the report from Lualualei
was transmitted by him to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, then Lt. Comdr.
Layton, and he assumed that he passed it on to higher authority. (p. 381)
Captain Rochefort said that when the attack commenced, the
communications unit at Pearl Harbor lost all contact with the direction finder
stations, one of which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea and that
consequently no bearings on the attacking Jap force were received by his unit.
He added that the failure of communications was not due to sabotage but was an
accident caused by Army personnel setting up certain new circuits. He said that
the Lualualei direction fender, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally
broadcast by radio a bearing obtained on one of the attacking units. He had
heard that this bearing was received by CinCPac as an alternate bearing, either
357 true or 178 true, but was subsequently informed by the direction finder
station that it had actually transmitted the bearing as 357. He said that the
Lualualei direction finder was capable of obtaining a unilateral bearing. (p.
63‑64)
D.
THE ARRIVAL OF THE ARMY'S MESSAGE
It
will be recalled that on the morning of December 7th, General Marshall sent a
message which indicated that the Japanese were presenting a note at 1 p.m.,
Washington time, which corresponds to dawn at Hawaii.
General
Short testified that the December 7th dispatch from the Chief of Staff (Exhibit
48) was received by the Signal Officer at 1145, and decoded by 1428 well after
the Japanese attack (page 251).
That
dispatch, as set forth in Exhibit 48, was as follows:
"Memorandum
for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)
"Subject: Far East Situation.
"The
Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be
sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East: Commanding
General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department;
Commanding General, Fourth Army:
"Japanese
are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an
ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop
Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert
accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."
Admiral
Kimmel testified that a copy of the December 7th disptach of the Chief of Staff
to Short was received by him on the afternoon of December 7th, too late. He
considered this information as news of a Japanese ultimatum and, as it stated
that a note was to be delivered at 1 p.m. Washington time which was sunrise in
Hawaii and midnight in Manila, he felt that it would have indicated a Japanese
attack at Oahu (page 328).
566 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
E.
THE FAILURE TO TELEPHONE ON DECEMBER 7TH
Colonel
Phillips said that at about 0822 Hawaiian time on December 7th, he telephoned
General Marshall, that it took about five minutes to get the call through, and
the connection was excellent. General Marshall asked if he had got the message.
He replied, "What message?" General Marshall said, "The message
I sent yesterday" or "last night." He replied "No."
(page 490). He go the dispatch
from General Marshall at 1530, December 7, 1941. He did not know the time at which it had been sent or when it got
to RCA in Honolulu.
Admiral
Smith said that communications on December 7, 1941 could be established with
Washington in thirty minutes by radio; they had no telephone (page 549).
Admiral
Bloch stated that the only telephone connection he had with Washington was the
regular commercial, not scrambler, phone (page 410).
Admiral
Ingersoll said that the Navy Department had no scrambler telephone connection
to Pearl Harbor; the Army had one; that the scrambler telephone is not secure
against an expert and that the Navy Department did not use the scrambler phone
until 1942 (page 843).
It
will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he may have been derelict in
not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply;
that he regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel about this, and also
regretted not having paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (pages 113,
793, 797).
F.
WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE IF THERE HAD BEEN ADVANCE NOTICE
General
Short testified that if he had had two hours notice on December 7th, he could
have been completely ready for an air attack. He thought that he would have
alerted against an air attack if he had the information contained in the Chief
of Staff's December 7th dispatch two hours before the attack (page 256). He
stated, however, that he could not have prevented a torpedo attack on the battleships
even with two hours warning since any aircraft attack once launched can be
driven in (pages 265‑6).
Admiral
Kimmel testified that if he had received Exhibit 48 prior to the attack he
would have assumed the highest condition of readiness (page 329). He also
testified that in the event of an attack together with submarines; and he had
reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the
time of the attack, it is well within the realm of possibility that had he
taken the Fleet to sea, the losses would have been greater (page 1124).
However, that presupposes that they would have found the Fleet and would have
been able to deliver an attack. Had the Fleet gone to sea, the Japanese might
not have attacked at that time at all. However, he thought that he would have
taken the Fleet to sea.
In his closing testimony Admiral Brown made a statement to
the effect that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl Harbor
on December 7 might have been, we were bound to suffer great damage even though
a more effective alert would have destroyed more Japanese planes. Even if we
had known the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor, we could not have kept
our ships at sea indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall. Japanese agents in
Honolulu were almost free to pick the date and hour of attack. On December 7,
the Japanese risked an attack only because they had complete information about
our dispositions; their agents ashore were able to observe and report the state
of our defenses and their so‑called diplomatic agents were able to direct
the moment of attack. Admiral Brown then said: "I wish to go on record as
being of the opinion that the major lesson for the nation to learn from the
attack on Pearl Harbor is that we should never again allow enemy aliens within
sighting distance of a major operating base from which considerable portions of
our naval and air forces can be observed."
Admiral Bloch said that had the Fleet left Pearl Harbor on
December 7, there was a serious question in his mind as to whether or not the
entire Fleet would have been destroyed in view of the powerful forces that the
Japanese had in the area. Also, he said, had the Japanese attacked the oil
supply at Oahu, the drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities
instead of the airfields and the ships of the Fleet, the United States would
have been hurt more so far as the prosecution of the war was concerned even
though we did have a terrific loss of life. He pointed out that the oil storage
was in tanks above the ground or visible from the air. (p. 94)
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY
567
Admiral
Kimmel said that if he had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles, and had it
met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering an
attack except by means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said that as
they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which
could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126).
Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have
been very useful—one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles
west of Pearl Harbor; and had he known the location of the enemy, they probably
could have delivered a very effective attack.
Admiral Halsey said that at the time of the attack on Pearl
Harbor, they were 150 to 175 miles from the entrance to Pearl Harbor. He had
flown off some of his planes and some of them on arrival at Pearl Harbor shot
down Japanese planes and some were shot down. A number of his planes were shot
down by anti‑aircraft fire. (p 305)
On the morning of December 7, Admiral Newton was about 300
odd miles from Midway when he learned of the attack. He thought that he would receive
orders to intercept the enemy which he felt must be to the Northward of Oahu
and signaled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was cancelled because
presumably Midway had also been attacked. He reported his position to the
Commander in Chief and told him that he had cancelled the Midway flight.
Sometime during that morning, he received a dispatch from the Commander in
Chief to report to Admiral Halsey but he did not know where Admiral Halsey's
task force was or where it had been. He sent a dispatch advising Admiral Halsey
of his position and Admiral Halsey directed him to join him in the vicinity of
Oahu. He set a course for Oahu and about ten or eleven that morning received a
message from Admiral Halsey that he was to assume enemy carriers about 200
miles south of Oahu and was to intercept and destroy those carriers. He changed
course and sent search planes. The search for the enemy was called off in that
vicinity as the authorities at Pearl had received information indicating that
the attack had been from carriers located to the north, not to the south. They
returned to Pearl Harbor around the 13th or 14th, meanwhile continuing air
patrol. The PORTLAND was bombed by one of our own planes. (p. 319
Admiral Newton said that he had assumed that the Japanese
carriers attacked from the north because they had a better chance for coming in
from that direction without being observed and because of the fact all shipping
had been diverted to the southward and the training grounds of the Fleet were
also to the southward. He felt sure that the Japanese were cognizant of this
and consequently was greatly surprised when he was told that the Japanese
carriers were to be assumed to be south of Oahu.
The
court stated, and Admiral Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that in
order to detect a carrier raid one must know in advance that the carrier is on
its way (page 1126), and within narrow limits of its time of arrival and
sector. If he had detected an attack by the Japanese naval force 700 miles from
Oahu, he would have violated his orders just as he did when he gave the orders
to bomb the submarines; he does not know what he would have done, but thinks he
would have found some way to handle the situation (page 1127).
Admiral
McMorris said that if he had known a few days before that an attacking force
was coming, he would have had the Fleet out, regardless of defense, so they
could attack the enemy forces (page 897). His action (getting the Fleet out if
he knew that a hostile force was approaching) would have been the same if a
state of war had or had not existed (page 898). He would have informed the Navy
Department if we had not been at war. To have deferred action would certainly
have been unwise, even under our Constitution (page 898). Even if long range reconnaissance
to 700 miles had been in effect, the attack could not have been prevented. He
might have sent ships out to intercept the enemy and diverted carriers for this
purpose. However, he thought the losses might have been greater if this had
been done (page 898). However, the Army planes would have been alerted too said
undoubtedly would have done some damage, principally to enemy planes. He
doubted that the enemy carriers would have suffered very seriously (page 899).
Admiral McMorris said that had they foreseen the Japanese
carrier raid, they would not have had the American battleships in port. He
said, however, that actually the most profitable target for the Japanese would
have been the oil tankers at Pearl Harbor. If they had destroyed them and the shops
and dry docks, our capabilities would have been nullified for a very long time.
(p. 248)
568 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral
Bellinger agreed with the Court's view that it is a historical fact that
carrier borne planes must be caught before they are launched in order to
successfully repel a carrier attack. He stated that he doubted very seriously
that even with advance warning of this attack, he could have taken steps to
save a great many planes which might have been destroyed otherwise, because of
the difficulty of dispersion of patrol planes (page 686).
Admiral
Turner thought that the Fleet could have been kept at sea after the orders for
defensive deployment (page 1021). Admiral Stark knew that CincPac had his fleet
divided in three parts and that an operating schedule provided for the time
each part was to be in Pearl Harbor (page 1022). This seemed satisfactory.
He
did not think that the Japanese attack could have been averted. Its destructive
effect could have been lessened and more Japanese planes destroyed. If some
ships had been deployed to northward, there would have been a better chance of
detecting the enemy and bringing out shore based planes and carriers to attack
them (page 1024). It was well recognized by people who concerned themselves
with the defense of Oahu that the northern flank is a very weak place (page
1024).
Admiral
Smith said that if Exhibit 48 (the Army dispatch of 1 p.m. meeting, had reached
them between 0500 and 0600 Hawaiian time, effective measures could have been
taken against the Japanese (pages 549‑50), and perhaps we would not have
been damaged so much and the Japanese more. The destroyers could have gotten
out and probably the cruisers; Army and Navy aircraft alerted, and oil tankers
sent out to the carriers; but, the battleships probably could not have gotten
out, and, if they did, would have been sunk outside (page 550). The Robert's
Report, he said, is incorrect in saying that prompt receipt of that message
would still have been too late to be of any substantial use (pages 549‑50).
Admiral
Smith later said that if they had known, they would have given Condition I,
sent the Fleet to sea, alerted all aircraft and sent carriers to the north to
try to locate the enemy (page 569). It was true, he said, that if the Fleet had
sortied from Pearl Harbor shortly before the attack and were within enemy
range, they would have been sunk, but had they been two or three hundred miles
to the west, it is very unlikely that the heavy ships would have been attacked.
The battleships, therefore, could have been used as a support force since their
a speed was about 15 knots (page 568). Getting the Army planes aloft before
sunrise would not, in Admiral Smith's opinion, have diverted the attack but
would have decreased our damage and increased the damage to the Japanese.
"There is no question but that the Fleet in Pearl Harbor would have been
damaged even if we had been alert" (page 568). He agreed with the court
that the only method by which the attack could have been completely diverted
would have been to locate the carriers before they got within launching range.
G.
THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE
The
personnel casualties were summarized by Lt. Comdr. Robert D. Powers, Jr., USNR,
as follows:
"These
reports, examined by me in the office of the Bureau of Personnel, give in
detail the names of ships and stations of the killed and wounded as a result of
the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports are very voluminous. From this
examination, I obtained a calculation of the total of the killed and wounded.
This calculation shows that the total killed, including those who died of
wounds and those missing and declared dead, was 3067, and those wounded,
896."
The
damage to ships, as described by CincPac on February 16, 1942 (Exhibit 61), was
as follows:
"(a)
Battleships:
"ARIZONA
sank at her berth as a result of one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight
heavy bomb hits. One of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the
forward magazines. The ship is considered to be a total wreck except for
material which can be salvaged and reassigned. A considerable amount of
ordnance material has already been removed, and work is underway in removing
the 14‑inch guns from turrets three and four.
"CALIFORNIA
sank at her berth as a result of hits by two aircraft torpedoes and one or more
near bomb misses. Also received one large bomb hit on starboard upper deck
abreast of foremast, which caused a serious 5‑inch powder fire. It sank
gradually for about three or for days and is now resting rather solidly on a
mud bottom. The quarterdeck is under about twelve feet of water, and the port
side of forecastle is under about three feet of water.
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 569
"NEVADA
struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and by at least five bombs and two
near misses. Each of the near misses caused rupturing of the hull on the port
and starboard bows, respectively. One bomb hit in way of foremast caused
explosion and fire damage which wrecked the vertical area extending from the
second deck to the bridge. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle from side
to side forward of No. 1 turret, and this damage extended down to the second
deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships caused considerable local damage to
the mainmast, stack, and other structure, and caused many casualties to 5‑inch
gun crews.
"OKLAHOMA
capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after receiving three or
more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The hull is 20° to 30° to being up‑side
down, with a considerable portion of the bottom and starboard side above water.
"PENNSYLVANIA
one bomb hit in way of after 5‑inch gun starboard side. The vessel was in
drydock No. 1. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable but not of a
vital nature, although there were a large number of casualties and one gun was
put out of commission. The damage did not extend below the second deck.
"MARYLAND
two bomb hits on forecastle. One small bomb (probably 100 pounds) through the
forecastle deck forward of the chain pipes and exploded on the maindeck causing
only a small amount of damage. The second bomb (probably 500 pounds) passed
through the side of the ship about twelve feet under water and exploded in the
C&R storeroom. This explosion
wrecked flats and bulkheads in that area, and fragments caused numerous leaks
through the sides and bottom. These leaks were temporarily patched without
going into drydock.
"TENNESSEE
two bomb hits (probably 15‑inch shell type). One of the bombs struck the
center gun of No. 2 turret causing a large crack which necessitated replacement
of the gun. This bomb exploded and did considerable local fragment damage.
Another similar bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret. and penetrated same in way
of a riveted joint. This bomb was a dud and did no serious damage except for
putting one rammer out of commission. The TENNESSEE suffered serious damage aft
in officers' quarters due to fire resulting from the great heat caused by the
oil fire starting from the ARIZONA. The shell plates around the stern were
somewhat buckled and joints broken.
"WEST
VIRGINIA sank at her berth as a result of four or five aircraft torpedo hits
and at least two bomb hits. The vessel rests on a hard bottom with all spaces
flooded up to two or three feet below the main deck. Most of the damage from
torpedoes is in the midship area, which is badly wrecked both below water and
above water. A large bomb passed through the foretop and the boat deck and
apparently exploded near the port side of the main or second deck. This
explosion caused considerable wreckage and a terrific powder and oil fire,
which burned out the whole area and extended to the foremast structure up to
and including the bridge. A. second bomb hit hit the top of turret III and
passed through the 6‑inch top. The nature of the penetration indicated
defective material. This bomb did not explode but caused damage to the slide of
the left gun. Recently another torpedo hole, and parts of the torpedo, have
been located aft under the counter. The steering engine room appears to be
wrecked and the rudder is lying on the bottom.
"(b)
Cruisers:
"HELENA
hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft torpedo causing the flooding of No.
1 and 2 firerooms and the forward engineroom. The starboard engine was found to
be seriously damaged. Temporary repairs to hull were completed at Pearl Harbor,
T. H., and the vessel has proceeded to Mare Island under two shafts to await
permanent repairs.
"HONOLULU
damaged by near miss of large bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through
dock and exploded fifteen or twenty feet from the port side at frame 40. This
explosion caused considerable damage to the hull and resulted in the flooding
of storerooms and magazines in that area, and also drowned out, the electric power
cables of turret II. Most of the flooding resulted from rupture of a magazine
flood seachest; the hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked some due to
pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were completed at Pearl Harbor T.
H.
"RALEIGH
hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side which flooded out the
forward half of the machinery plant: The ship was also hit by one bomb
(probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's side,
and finally exploded about fifty feet away. The damage from the explosion was
not extensive, but together with the hole made in the side, caused serious
570 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
flooding on the port
side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the extent of damage and
resulted from inability to close armored hatches tightly against the water
head. The bomb struck only a few feet abaft the gasoline stowage. Permanent
repairs to the hull are being completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H. The vessel will
return to Mare Island about the middle of February for permanent repairs to
machinery and power leads, this being necessitated primarily by replacement of
one boiler and the cast iron turbine casings of engine No. 4.
"(c)
Destroyers:
"SHAW
hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock; also hit by many fragments
from another bomb which struck the drydock. The serious fire following bomb
hits resulted in blowing up of forward magazine and heat damage to shell
plating in the forward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously
damaged. The SHAW was re‑docked on the same drydock on January 26, 1942,
for installation of a false bow at about frame 50. The vessel will be ready to
proceed to Mare Island under her own power between 10 and 15 February.
"CASSIN
and DOWNES: CASSIN was struck by one bomb and DOWNES by two (probably 500
pounds). These vessels were in drydock No. 1 ahead of the PENNSYLVANIA. One
bomb explosion aft between the two vessels apparently knocked the CASSIN partly
off the drydock blocking and caused her to fall over on the DOWNES when the
dock was being flooded during the raid. This caused a serious structural
failure amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The
torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the DOWNES were set‑off and
blew out the maindeck and starboard side of the vessel in that area. This
caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious oil fire followed the
explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both vessels. Fragments
and explosions have caused over 200 holes in the hull of the CASSIN and
probably well over 400 in the hull of the DOWNES.
"Moat
of the machinery of both ships has been removed for examination and re‑conditioning,
and it now appears that the machinery of the CASSIN is 98% good and the DOWNES
about 95% good. Permanent and temporary repairs have been made on the hull of
the CASSIN to permit her re‑floating about February 5, and similar work
is proceeding on the DOWNES.
"At
present it appears inadvisable to count on the recommissioning of these two
vessels as first‑line destroyers, but it is likely that repairs can be
effected within two to four months which will make the vessels entirely
suitable for escort vessels, thus releasing two first‑line destroyers for
this duty. The Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., is working up sketch plans
covering suitable arrangements for deck houses, bridge, armament, etc.,
adequate for an escort vessel. It is generally believed that although the hull
of the vessels have been considerably weakened, they will be entirely adequate
to carry the considerable reduced load in armament and other topside weights
required for an escort vessel.
"(d) Auxiliary vessels:
"OGLALA
sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the starboard
side and exploded against the starboard aide of the HELENA. Vessel sank slowly
at ten‑ten dock, capsized against the dock about 1 1/2 hours after being
struck. This vessel is probably not worth salvaging but plans are being made to
remove her from the berth that she now occupies.
"CURTISS
struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This
resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire. Machinery of the crane was
seriously damaged and the radio antennae were put out of commission. One bomb
(probably 500 pounds) struck the forward end of the hangar on the port side off
the center line, exploding on the second deck. The explosion and resulting fire
caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of material. Temporary repairs have
been completed and permanent repairs await availability of the ship at the Navy
Yard, Pearl Harbor.
"VESTAL
struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit forward and exploded
in the steel shape storage, which stopped a large part of the fragments and
minimized damage considerably. The other bomb struck aft and exploded in the
hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the shell. Flooding aft
caused the after part of the vessel to submerge almost to the main deck. The
vessel was alongside the ARIZONA when the raid commenced and was beached at
Aeia to prevent further sinkage. Temporary repairs have been completed during a
short stay in drydock, and permanent work will be completed when a dock is
available.
"UTAH
struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes capsized at berth. Ship is
within a few degrees of being exactly upside down."
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 571
The damage to airplanes; as reported on February 15,
1942 (Exhibit 61) was:
|
"Extracts from Columns ............................... |
2 |
5 |
6 |
|
Type |
Number
present Dec. 7 |
Number
on hand after raid |
Number
usable after raid |
|
Patrol planes ............................................... |
69 |
45 |
11 |
|
Inshore patrol planes ................................... |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Fighters
....................................................... |
24 |
15 |
0 |
|
Scout bombers
............................................. |
60 |
29 |
14 |
|
Torpedo bombers ........................................ |
2 |
2 |
0 |
|
Battleship and cruiser planes
......................... |
92 |
82 |
11 |
|
Utility and
transport planes (non‑combatant) . |
54 |
48 |
16 |
|
Total ...................................................... |
301 |
221 |
52" |