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ADDENDUM ONE‑FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.
2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.
4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese as to the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the preparations being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor contributed to the success of their attack.
5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.
6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged.. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.
7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States.
8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.
9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p.m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.
10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
11. The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.
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12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable message; were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.
13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work.
14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.
15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by tote Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes; and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft.
16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications.
17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for the following reasons:
(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and destruction of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.
(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction, anywhere in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were not available, and could not have been expected to be available.
(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the probability of its successful interception and destruction prior to the following dawn would have been small.
18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, for the following reasons:
(a) Ships' anti‑aircraft batteries would have been fully manned and ready. It is to be noted that the anti‑aircraft fire was more effective against the subsequent attacks than the initial air attack.
(b). Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been immediately appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.
(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been set, thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.
(d) Many planes could have been in the air, in readiness.
(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.
19. The only adequate means of assuring detection of an approaching carrier attack was by 360 degree distant air search from Oahu. Sufficient planes were not available to carry out an all‑round distant air reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
20. A thorough appreciation of the danger the capabilities of the available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes to the Pacific Fleet. Although the additional planes, if assigned, would not have been sufficient for a 360 degree daily search, they would have increased the area which could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an inducement to such employment. Admittedly, in making over‑all plane assignments, it was necessary for the Chief of Naval Operation to weigh the prospective needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostilities with Axis submarines were already in progress.
21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees; could have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of time with the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel and could have been designed to cover the most probable approach bearings from which an attack might have been expected. Such reconnaissance would have had a reasonable chance of success.
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22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor the key members of the latter's staff, seem to have given serious consideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.
23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:
(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti‑aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of anti‑torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.
(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti‑aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations.
24. Admiral Kimmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack in the Hawaiian area was justified.
25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action which he could have taken, it should be noted that:
(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have meant the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the naval expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on planes and crews which would have reduced their later effectiveness.
(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest and relaxation desirable in port for the maintenance of personnel efficiency.
(c) Failure to install anti‑torpedo nets was influenced (i) by information from CNO which made it appear that effective drops of aircraft torpedoes with the depths of water and length of run available in Pearl Harbor were not probable; (ii) the interference such nets would have caused in harbor operations due to crowded conditions.
(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on necessary ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some reconnaissance.
(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of anti‑aircraft batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port or at sea.
26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.
27. More effective action would have been taken both before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the Hawaiian area a suitable, operating agency for the adequate exercise of joint command functions. This omission was the fault of no one person, but of the existing system.
28. War experience has shown that:
(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."
578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders of the different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal members of their staffs, must be in close physical touch, and not entirely dependent on telephonic, radio, or similar communications. In no other way can a full exchange of information and ideas be assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.
(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in an emergency must be in active operation prior to such emergency.
29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such as Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle of "Unity of Command." The commander exercising such joint command should be assisted by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the functions of both services concerned.
1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.
2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Mars halls and raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.
3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by Japan.
4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W‑day, which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened with Japan. W‑day was not fixed prior to the attack.
6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.
7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.
8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.
9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.
10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.
11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.
12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning, service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable.
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13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to Warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.
14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.
15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it, was probable that there might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.
16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.
17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.
18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures; including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore‑based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.
20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily, search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of threatening naval forces"; that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and that submarines in the Hawaiian area * * *." (Italics supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.
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23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a serious probability.
24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating setup which could insure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.
25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands were reenforced with Marine planes.
26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.
27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.
29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, DC., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese Government's actual views concerning they diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.
30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.
31. The Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CinCPac of the important facts learned.
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33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.
34. The warnings sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.
36. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the November 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.
37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p.m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p.m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.
38. This so‑called "1 p.m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.
39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.
40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.
41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p, m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.
42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that a "surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."
43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and
582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.
45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.
46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op‑20‑G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a winds message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op‑20‑G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.
47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering other messages, including the "1 p.m. delivery message," he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.
48. Except for the omission of the United .States, the "hidden word" code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.
49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Office feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.
51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a transcript of a trans‑Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be studied further by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying the
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presence or absence of ship's, and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.
52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular significance.
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.
54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA‑K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op‑20‑G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.
55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti‑torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.
56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA‑K2" code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet Air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
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58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.
59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was distributed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the composition of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.
60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.
61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.
62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one‑third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Paleo and the Marshalls.
63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet units in a loose‑knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included "CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo‑Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.
64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.
65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.
66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day, he received
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the November 28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.
67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, states that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941, This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka‑Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."
68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate planed in the Bako‑Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.
69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.
70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Career Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect. " * * *
"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location." * * *
"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."
73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources the only practicable way by which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have
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obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.
74: Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Navy had the obligation, through ComFOURTEEN, to conduct distant reconnaissance and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army‑Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.
75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after, 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.
77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was used as a basis for the joint Army‑Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter‑measure included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and materiel available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.
80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.
81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.
82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.
83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.
84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected
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within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.
85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL‑46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."
86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL‑46."
87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reenforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.
89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu dining the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.
90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.
92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.
93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.
94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.
95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward. obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.
96. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.
97. The battleships each had two 5" anti‑aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forth‑four on four hours notice.
98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.
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99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.
100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.
101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.