PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 361
HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT NO. 2
NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF
RECORD OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY
With Cross‑References
to Admiral Hart's Investigation Together With Addendum Thereto (Admiral
Hewitt's Findings and Conclusions)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword................................................................................. 383
Chapter:
I. A. Commander—in—Chief,
U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet............................. 385
B. Basing of Fleet at Hawaii
..................................................... 385
C. Air Patrol from Hawaii in 1940
................................................ 387
D. The International Situation: Likelihood of
Attack and the Status of Defenses
Prior
to Admiral Kimmel's Command ............................................. 368
E. Joint Estimate of Richardson and Kimmel as to
Situation and Defenses .......... 389
F. The Grew Report of Rumored Japanese Attack and
ONI Evaluation ................. 370
II. Assumption of Command by Admiral Kimmel—His
Reorganization of the Pacific Fleet and
His
Staff:
A. Assumption of
Command.......................................................... 370
B. Reorganization of the Pacific
Fleet............................................ 371
C. Admiral Kimmel's Staff
........................................................ 371
D. General Orders Nos. 142 and 143
............................................... 374
III. The Chief of Naval Operations—His Staff and
Duties:
A. The Chief of Naval
Operations.................................................. 374
B. Admiral Stark's Staff
......................................................... 374
C. The Duties of the Chief of Naval Operations
................................... 377
362 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page
Chapter:
IV. The Commanding General Hawaiian Department‑His
Major Mission:
A. The Commanding
General......................................................... 375
B. General Short's Major Mission ................................................. 379
V. Relations in General Between Navy and Army
Commanders:
A. In Washington
................................................................. 379
B. In Hawaii
..................................................................... 379
VI. The War Plans Relating to Hawaii and the
Adequacy of the Pacific Fleet:
A. The Plans for Defense of Hawaii
............................................... 381
B. Testimony Concerning the War Plans in General
................................. 395
C. Adequacy of Fleet Generally to Carry Out its
Tasks ............................ 400
VII. The Possibility of Aerial Torpedo Attack at
Pearl Harbor:
A. Knowledge and Evaluation of Secretary's Letter
................................ 402
B.
Correspondence on Anti‑torpedo Baffles in Pearl Harbor
........................ 403
VIII. The
Situation Prior to the Freezing of Japanese Assets:
A. The Inadequacy of Local Defense Forces and
Necessity for Reliance on the Fleet 405
B. Admiral Kimmel's View Concerning the
Possibility of a Surprise Attack ......... 405
C. Admiral Kimmel's Desire for Information as to
Developments .................... 406
D. Information Sent to Admiral Kimmel Concerning
the International Situation ..... 406
IX. Admiral Kimmel's Visit in June and Annual
Report:
A. Admiral Kimmel's
Visit......................................................... 407
B. Kimmel's Annual Report‑Year Ending June
30, 1941............................... 407
X. Reconnaissance Toward Jaluit
..................................................... 407
XI. The
Freezing of Japanese Assets—Deterioration of Situation and Fleet Security
Order:
A.
The Freezing Order ............................................................ 408
B.
Further Deterioration of Situation ............................................ 409
C.
Inadequacy of Equipment and Efforts to Rectify ................................ 411
D.
Admiral Kimmel's Letter on Security of the Fleet............................... 411
XII. Intelligence in Washington—The Interception
and Decoding of Secret Japanese
Communications:
A.
ONI Distribution and Acquisition of Intelligence in General.................... 413
B.
The Interception and Decoding of Secret Japanese Communications ............... 416
C.
Failure to Send this Secret Information to Admiral Kimmel ..................... 418
XIII. Resignation
of Japanese Cabinet—Arrival of Kurusu—The Possibility of a Surprise
Aggressive
Movement:
A.
The Dispatch of October 16, 1941 .............................................. 418
B.
Admiral Stark's Letter of October 17, 1941 .................................... 420
C.
Japanese Messages Concerning German Attitude; Nomura's Desire to Resign ....... 420
D.
Admiral Bloch's Letter on Inadequacy of Local Defense ......................... 421
E.
Admiral Kimmel's Estimate and Action .......................................... 421
F.
The First Japanese "Deadline" Message
......................................... 422
G.
Admiral Stark's Letter of November 7, 1941 .................................... 422
H.
Japanese Interest in Ships at the Philippines and Seattle ..................... 423
I.
Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall Recommendation as to Ultimatum .......... 423
J.
Further and Final Japanese "Deadline" Messages
................................ 424
K.
The Possibility of a Surprise Aggressive Movement.............................. 425
XIV. Dispatches Concerning Reinforcement of Wake
and Midway ........................... 426
XV. Intercepted Japanese Communications of
November 26th and 27th .................... 427
XVI. The State Department Note of November 28th
....................................... 427
XVII. The War
Warning of November 27th:
A.
The Warning.................................................................... 430
B.
Preparation of the Warning..................................................... 431
C.
The Failure to Mention Hawaii.................................................. 432
D.
The Direction to "Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment" ................ 433
XVIII. Repetition of Army Dispatch on November 28th:
A.
General Marshall............................................................... 435
IX. Reinforcement of Midway and Wake
................................................. 435
XX. Pearl Harbor—Estimates of the Situation:
A.
Admiral Kimmel................................................................. 437
B.
Admiral Bloch ................................................................. 438
C.
Admiral Pye.................................................................... 438
D.
Admiral Smith.................................................................. 441
E.
Admiral McMorris .............................................................. 443
F.
Admiral Delaney ............................................................... 446
G.
Admiral Calhoun ............................................................... 447
H.
Captain Layton ................................................................ 447
I. Admiral Bellinger
............................................................. 447
J. Admiral
Kitts.................................................................. 448
K. Admiral
Withers................................................................ 448
L.
Colonel Phillips............................................................... 448
M.
General Short.................................................................. 448
XXI. Conferences Between Admiral Kimmel and General
Short after November 27th ......... 449
XXII. Action
Taken by Admiral Kimmel‑Extent of Reconnaissance:
A.
In General .................................................................... 450
B.
Responsibility for Long Range Reconnaissance .................................. 453
C.
Readiness of Aircraft and Drills .............................................. 457
D.
Extent of Reconnaissance....................................................... 457
E.
Extent of Reconnaissance Which Could Have Been Taken .......................... 457
XXIII. Action
Taken by General Short .................................................... 462
XXIV. Japanese
Espionage and United States Intelligence at Pearl Harbor—Japanese Military
and
Fleet Movements:
A.
Japanese Espionage ............................................................ 463
B.
United States Intelligence at Pearl Harbor..................................... 466
C.
Japanese Military and Fleet Movements.......................................... 478
XXV. Intercepted Japanese Communications After the
"War Warning" and up to December 6,
1941:
A.
Failure to Transmit to Admiral Kimmel ......................................... 490
B.
Concerning the Diplomatic Negotiations and Situation .......................... 491
C.
Concerning United States Ships and Planes...................................... 496
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 363
Chapter: Page
XXVI. The
"Winds" Code and Messages:
A. The Winds Code
................................................................ 501
B. Monitoring the Code Words
..................................................... 502
C.
Admiral Kimmel's Knowledge of Winds Code....................................... 502
D.
"Winds" Messages Using the Code Words for
Russia............................... 502
E.
Was There a "Winds Code" Message Relating to the United States?
............... 503
XXVII. Information
Sent to Admiral Kimmel After the "War Warning."
...................... 510
XXVIII. The
"Mori" Conversation: Japanese Burning Papers .............................. 523
XXIX. The
Likelihood of a Japanese Attack at Hawaii as Estimated in Washington, December
6,
1941:
A. Navy
Estimates................................................................. 525
B. Army
Estimates................................................................. 527
C. State
Department Estimates .................................................... 527
XXX. Japanese Message Advising of Fourteen Part
Reply and First Thirteen Parts:
A.
Message advising of Fourteen Part Reply........................................ 527
B. The
First Thirteen Parts of the Reply.......................................... 527
C.
Delivery of the Translations of the Above Messages............................. 528
XXXI. December
7, 1941 in Washington:
A.
Intercepted Communications Other Than Part Fourteen and the "1 p.m.
Message"... 529
B. Part
Fourteen and the "1 p.m.
Message"......................................... 530
C.
Delivery of Part Fourteen and the "1 p.m. Message" and Action Taken............ 531
XXXII. Conditions
at Pearl Harbor Prior to Attack:
A.
The Ships in Port.............................................................. 536
B.
The Anti‑aircraft
Guns......................................................... 538
C.
Army and Navy Conditions of Readiness.......................................... 539
D.
Number and Condition of the Men................................................ 541
E.
The Aircraft Warning Service................................................... 542
F.
Ships' Radar................................................................... 549
G.
Steps Taken by Commander Local Naval Defense Force............................. 550
H.
Army Aircraft.................................................................. 551
I.
The Submarines................................................................. 552
J.
Reconnaissance Airplanes and Air Reconnaissance................................ 552
XXXIII. The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor:
A.
Japanese Submarines............................................................ 556
B.
Detection of Planes by the Army Radar System................................... 561
C.
The Air Attack................................................................. 562
D.
The Arrival of the Army's Message.............................................. 565
E.
The Failure to Telephone on December 7th....................................... 566
F.
What Could Have Been Done if There Had Been Advance Notice..................... 566
G.
The Casualties and Damage...................................................... 568
Appendix: List of witness before Court of Inquiry
....................................... 571
List of
witnesses before Admiral Hart............................................. 573
Addendum One‑Findings
And Conclusions ................................................... 575
FOREWORD
Public Law No. 339, 78th
Congress, approved June 13, 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation
into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such
proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.
A Court
of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. N. (Retired), Admiral
Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. N. (Retired) and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S.
N., (Retired), with Commander (Retired) and Biesemeier, U. S. N., as Judge
Advocate, was appointed on July 13, 1944. The Court was directed to convene on
July 17, 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of
inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941; to inquire
thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of
the facts it might deem to be
established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to
whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of
any person or persons in the Naval Service, and, in case its opinion was that
offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend
specifically what further proceedings should be had.
The Court of Inquiry
commenced its proceedings on July 31, 1944, and submitted the record of its
proceedings on October 20, 1944. During its investigation, the Court took the
testimony of thirty‑nine witnesses, and received seventy-seven exhibits.
Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the
findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET,"
and the balance "SECRET."
By letter dated October 21,
1944, the Secretary of the Navy requested the commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations to advise as to how much of the records of the
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bear such a relation to present military
operations as to require high security classification.
The Commander in Chief, U.
S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations advised, in a letter dated November 3,
1944, that a substantial part of the records of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry
bears such a relation to the national security and to current military operations
as to make it essential that that information not be revealed publicly.
364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
After thorough review of the
record of proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, the Secretary
concurred with the views of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of
Naval Operations, as expressed in his letter of November 3, 1944, and
accordingly has directed that in the best interests of the present and future
military operations of the United States, the existing TOP SECRET" and
"SECRET" classifications of the record must be continued. The Navy
Department has stated that the record of the Court will not be made public
while the war is in progress.
The net result of the
findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as
reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U.
S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by the Secretary of the Navy is
that the evidence now available does not warrant and will not support the trial
by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.
The Secretary in his
findings upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other
proceedings in the matter to date, has found that there were errors of judgment
on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and
at Washington.
The Secretary is not
satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all
possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his own investigation
should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession
of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. Some of
the testimony will be much delayed because certain witnesses who are actively
engaged in combat against the enemy are not available and will not be available
within the predictable future. The present decision of the Secretary will be
reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed in the light of the
evidence then at hand.
The Secretary made this
personal statement to the press on December 1, 1944: "In reaching the
above conclusions and decisions I am fully mindful of the wide and legitimate
public interest in the Pearl Harbor attack. However, there is one consideration
which is paramount to all others, and that is: What will best serve the
continued successful prosecution of the war? The actions I have taken in my
judgment, are taken in the light of that consideration, and I accept full and
complete responsibility for them."
In connection with the
Secretary's further investigation, the following statement has been prepared,
narrating the evidence obtained by the Court of Inquiry. It is believed that
all significant evidence so obtained has been included. Because reference is made
to "TOP SECRET" material, this statement has been classified
"TOP SECRET."
On June 15, 1944, two days
after the enactment of Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress, Admiral Thomas
C. Hart, USN (Retired), completed an examination of witnesses and the taking of
testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which had been
directed by the Secretary of the Navy in a precept to Admiral Hart, dated
February 12, 1944. In the course of his examination, Admiral Hart took the
testimony of forty witnesses, some of whom also testified later before the
Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, and received forty‑two exhibits.
Various of the witnesses before Admiral Hart furnished information which does
not appear in the Record of Proceedings of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of
Inquiry. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hart has been digested. The following
narrative statement of the evidence obtained by the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of
Inquiry has been cross‑referenced to the evidence obtained by Admiral
Hart. The left‑hand "pink" pages refer to the record of the
examination of witnesses conducted by Admiral Hart. It should be noted that the
record of proceedings before Admiral Hart has been reclassified as "TOP
SECRET."
JOHN F. SONNETT.
ADDENDUM TO FOREWORD
After reviewing the evidence
obtained in the prior investigations and examining the Report of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, the Secretary of the Navy having determined in his Third
Endorsement dated 1 December 1944, that it was necessary, by precept, dated 2 May
1945, appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, as investigating officer,
with John F. Sonnett as counsel, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR, as
assistant counsel, to examine such witnesses and to obtain such other evidence
as might be necessary in order to fully develop the facts in connection with
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation by Admiral
Hewitt was completed on 12 July 1945.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 365
A digest of the evidence
obtained in the further investigation by Admiral Hewitt has been prepared, and
keyed into the following Narrative Statement in the manner in which the
evidence adduced before Admiral Hart was treated. The left‑hand yellow
page, under the left‑hand pink pages, contain the evidence adduced before
Admiral Hewitt, keyed on the white pages at the points indicated by the yellow
crayon.
The findings and conclusions
of Admiral Hewitt are attached to the following Narrative Statement as Addendum
I.
JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lieutenant, USNR.