[These exhibits contain the answers to a "General survey concerning the attack on Hawaii" from Japanese sources after the war. Included are statements on the planning of the attack and force structure. LWJ]

From: Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Pt. 13, Exhibit No. 8, pp. 391-429.

Page 391

EXHIBIT NO. 8
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Exhibit No 8:                                                      Page
 (1) Messages from MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo, dated 14 and
     15 October 1945 to War Department ............................ 392
 (2) Report dated 26 October 1945 from General MacArthur to War
     Department with five inclosures .............................. 392
 (3) Report dated 1 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War
     Department with one inclosure ................................ 399
 (4) Report dated 8 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War
     Department with one inclosure ................................ 412
 (5) Source Documents used by Navy in compiling the "Navy Summary 
     of the Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor" ......... 431
Exhibit No. 8-A Report dated 12 November 1945 from General Mac-
  Arthur to War Department with one inclosure ..................... 413
Exhibit No. 8-B Report dated 29 November 1945 from General Mac-
  Arthur to War Department with one inclosure ..................... 415
Exhibit No. 8-C Report dated 4 December 1945 from General MacArthur
  to War Department with one inclosure ............................ 424
Exhibit No. 8-D Report dated 13 December 1945 from General Mac-
  Arthur to War Department with three inclosures .................. 425

Page 392

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE DATED 14 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

Japanese say many records were burned. However, complete report, with chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. Preliminary information received from the Japanese Navy is as follows: On 5 November 1941, plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 Cabinet Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile action should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters on 2 December. Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters and Combined Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack.

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North-170° East by afternoon 3 December for complete refueling. Attack force was organized as follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Alagi [Akagi]), 2nd Air Squadron (Hiryu and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron (Hiei and Kongo), 8th Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions making one squadron, 8 transports and 2 submarines.

Japanese lost 27 aircraft, estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships (Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk, 4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot down.

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November.


PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGES DATED 15 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

1. We are continuing local investigation.

2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have already been sent to Washington.


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (2G Oct 45) GB                              26 OCTOBER 1945.
Subject: Additional Data with Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl
         Harbor
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. 
    (Attn: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. In compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and WX 755G1, 14 October 1845, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in amplification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945.

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which has been furnished and Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage pos-

Page 393

sible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

                                             /s/ H. W. ALLEN,
                                                 Colonel, A. G. D.,
                                                 Ass't Adjutant General.

5 Incls:
     Incl 1-Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45.
     Incl 2-Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45.
     Incl 3-Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45.
     Incl 4-Questionnaire to Liaison Committee.
     Incl 5-Map, Routes of Jap Fleet.

(Incl. #1)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

                                                       8 OCTOBER 1945.
N. D. No. 108.
To: Colonel F. P. Munson, USA

G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Commander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.

                                            K. NAKAMURA
                                     Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
                            Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

General Survey of the Attack on Hawaii Prepared in Accordance with Oral Instruction by Col. Munson to Commander Yamaguchi of the Liaison Committee for the Imperial Army and Navy.

1. Operational Orders
  (A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters
    (1) Imperial Naval Order
      (a) (Issued 1 December)
          Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and
          self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the
          United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands.
          Time to start an action will be given later.
    (2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General Staff under
        the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order.
        (Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction).
      (a) (Issued 1 December)
          The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the
          start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the
          Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the First Air
          Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.
    (3) Imperial Naval Order
      (a) (Issued 2 December)
          The hostile actions against the United States of America, the
          British Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on
          December 8.
    (4) Naval General Staff Instruction
      (a) (Issued 2 December)
          Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-
          American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior
          to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the
          Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to
          their bases.
  (B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined
      Fleet and other Headquarters.
        The subject matters are being investigated through members
        connected with the said forces of that period.

Page 304

II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources
    (1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announcements by
        American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)
    (2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-
        November.
    (3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters
        immediately preceding the outbreak of war.
    (4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii.

III. Organization of Attacking Force
    First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga)
    Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu)
    Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku)
    Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei)
    Eighth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma)
    First Destroyer Squadron {Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division, 17th
      Destroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer
      Division)
    Supply Force (8 Transports)
    Submarine Force (2 Submarines)

IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map)

V.  Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy
      Sunk-2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma)
           1 Destroyer
           1 Transport
      Seriously Damaged-4 Battleships
                        4 Heavy Cruisers
      Aircraft shot down or burned-over 350

VI. Losses of Japanese Navy
    Failed to Return-27 aircrafts

N. B.-As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be made.


(Incl #2)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY
                                                       10 October 1945.

N. D. No. 123
To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supreme
    Commander for the Allied Powers.
Re: N. D. No. 108, 8 October 1943.
Subject: Additions to the Answers already given to the questions
         regarding the Attack on Hawaii.

1. Additional operational orders:

(a) Units of the attacking force assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofujima), by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.-About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet issued the above order because he recognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situation, as well as to keep its location and movements secret.

(b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General Headquarters.

N. B.-Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be approaching to a stage where commencement of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following order (Imperial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such situation promptly."

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American

Page 395

negotiations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United States proving successful.

[2]

2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of the Japanese Navy.

Even within the, Navy, the only those who knew of the above fact were in addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and a certain restricted number of officers intimately concerned with the fleet operation.

3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.

                                            K. NAKAMURA
                                     Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
                            Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.


(Incl #3)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY
                                                     11 OCTOBER 1945.
N. D. No. 130
To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of
    The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our report as follows:

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 7 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling".

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order).

"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan".

(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble".

3. Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission:

[2]

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete re-fueling".

4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon.

(a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval operations against the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (including the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November.

(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 1 December.

(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that hostile action was to be opened on 8 December.

5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were concerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor:

The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet.

Page 396

N. B.-Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made as a result of further investigation.

                                            K. NAKAMURA
                                     Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
                            Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.


(Incl #4)

[1]

QUESTIONNAIRE

                                                        17 OCTOBER 45.

To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans orders, maps, photos, reports, and other official documents available. In case question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official position.

1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

(Give names or agencies, e.g. Admiral, General Staff, Naval General Staff, War Ministry, etc.)

2. When?

(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e.g. August 1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922-any time such a proposal first was considered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion)

3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese plans for possible use in event of war with U. S.?

4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans.

(State objectives forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected to accomplish, etc.)

5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor.

(Gives dates as accurately as possible, e.g. 1 September 1941, Spring of 1941)

6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry or some combination of persons or agencies.)

7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.

8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision? (e.g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P. I.?; Destroy U. S main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect mandated islands, or what?)

[2]

Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed, (e.g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) NOTE: When I say Plan, I differentiate between plans or staff studies and the actual orders issued to put the plan in effect.

10. When did this work begin?

11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it?

12. When was the plan finally approved?

13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan? (e.g. the Emperor, the War Ministry, the General Staff, the Naval Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at Honolulu, Military Attaches to ----- ----- ----- The Ambassador at Washington, Kurusu, etc) NOTE: Names of individuals and agencies are both desired-for example, the Cabinet as a whole might not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also: state persons who had partial knowledge; e. g. the Emperor might have known you planned to attack but not without declaring war, etc.

14. What sources furnished information on which the plan was based? Give names, rank and positions. (e.g. Military attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu, Broadcasts, New articles).

15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-listed sources?

16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps carried by your aviators obtained? (e.g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on which to approach, etc.).

17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route?

18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?

[3]

19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units in the harbor:

20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken).

Page 397

21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed. Discuss:

a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.

b. Partial decisions made and by whom.

c. How were the commanders and particular units to participate (Both fleet units and air units) selected?

d. Why was the route you selected chosen?

e. What provision was made against discovery en route?

f. What action was to be taken if discovered?

g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were employed?

h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed?

22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons?

23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?

24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).

25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time during the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets?

26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack. Include:

Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?

Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?

Time each group was to strike its target.

Route(s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected?

27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.

(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any back, and other details, conclusions, as to usefulness of this weapon.)

[4]

28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give details: (e.g. If the U. S. had made some concession was it to be abandoned or changed? If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have been made?)

29. Furnish a copy of each of the following:

a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation.

b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.

e. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect. NOTE: If any document is not available give all details of it you can from memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.)

30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?

31. Where did it assemble?

32. When did it move out on its mission?

33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.

34. Did everything go as planned?

35. If not, what change or mishaps occurred and why?

36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?

37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?

38. If so, what was done about them?

39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a landing?

40. List your losses.

41. List estimated U. S. losses.

42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses?

[5]

43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the attack. (e. g. night after attack, following day, etc.)

44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case. (e.g. "All copies of order burned on surrender," "Adm. who is only person who knew this was killed on (date).").

45. Did you have any submarine operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation instructions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were there any casualties among these submarines?

47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in the Hawaiian area?

48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Page 398

[Map: "Routes followed by Japanese Fleet to and from Pearl Harbor." Map was not reproduced due to poor condition. The map listed as Item 15 in Part 21 is the best available in the PHA. See also The Rising Sun in the Pacific, Samuel Eliot Morison, p. 91, LWJ]

Page 399

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.06 (1 Nov. 45)GB                                1 NOVEMBER 1945.
Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl
         Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1841, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No 4 to our communication of 26 October (refered to above) and includes detailed information in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 30-47 inclusive, thereof.

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interrogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Establishments of the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text.

4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and question 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of surrender, however, efforts to reconstruct it at least partially, from memory and from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

                                             /s/ H. W. ALLEN,
                                                 Colonel, A. G. D.,
                                                 Ass't Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

(Incl 1)
1032             ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Doc. #1032                                                  DRM/FMO/HDP

Pp. 1

I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the information therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded later.

II. The reply to Paragraph 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people concerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in preparation.

Pp. 2

(Note: The following Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on the recollections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi. member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WANATABE, Yasuji.)

1. Who conceived and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise attack?

Adm. YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet.

2. When was this done?

The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMAMOTO ordered Rear Adm. ONISHI, Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.)

Page 400

3. Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a war against the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S prewar plan?

No.

4. If this is so, write the facts shown in the pre-war plans.

(No statement.)

Pp. 3

(Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the recollections of Adm. NAGANO, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General Staff.)

5. When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR?

3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, when CinC, Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO.

6. Who made the foregoing decision?

Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO.

7. If the decision was made in conference, give time of said conference and names of all persons present.

It was not made in conference.

Pp. 4

(Note: The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10,11 and 12 are based upon the recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; and Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff.)

8. What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?

The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Is lands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.

9. Who were the persons who worked out the details of the actual plan?

Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff.

10. When was the above undertaking started?

In the first part of September 1941.

11. Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed?

CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

Pp. 5.

12. When was the final confirmation of this plan made?

1 Dec. 41.

13. Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan?

(Note: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm. NAGANO, Osami; Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; and Comdr. MIYO Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.)

Those connected with the Navy are as follows:

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance:

Chief of the Naval General Staff

Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff

Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff

Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff

The commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff members of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance:

Pp. 6

Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff

Navy Minister

Navy Vice-Minister

Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry

Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some of their personnel

Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their chiefs of staff and some of the staff members.

Page 401

(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance:

Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government had been delivered.)

(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown. However, it is certain that none of the Japanese officials who were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONOLULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.)

Pp. 7

(Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WATANABE, Yasuji; and the commanding officer, officer of the Air Unit, Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)

21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved.

a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome.

(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the destroyers had a cruising radius extending to approximately E Long 160°. In the event the destroyers were unable to refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return. In actual fact, however, the sea was comparatively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible.

(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was the most effective method of putting the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

(a) The fleet that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow.

(b) The fleet that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with torpedo nets.

(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.

(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom?

There were none.

c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to participate selected (surface forces and air forces)?

Pp. 9

Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight personnel of Car Div 4 (RYUJO and RYUHO) to Car Div 1 (AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time the most highly trained units in the Combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency.

Surface forces: As far a possible, vessels with a long cruising range were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers.

d. What were the reasons for the actual course selected?

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the [Pp. 10] central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although

Page 402

it maybe assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHNSTON Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack could be made.

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected.

e. What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery enroute?

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes.

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection

Pp. 11

(3) Complete radio silence was carried out.

f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been taken? The day of the attack was designated as X-day.

If discovered prior to X-2 day, we would have returned without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions.

g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the UNITED STATES elsewhere?

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU Area.

h. If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been taken?

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in the INLAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.

Pp. 12

22. State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of 7 December.

(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet.

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon.

However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days.

Pp. 13

23. How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons?

In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). Sun rise that day was at 0230 hours.)

Page 403

Pp. 14

24. Explain in detail the organization of the Task Force (Ships and air strength).

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was the commander of the AKAGI Air Unit.)

(1) Ships

 TASK FORCE

CinC, 1 Air Fleet, Vice Adm. NAGUMO, Chuichi

UNIT                  COMMAND                STRENGTH            DUTY

Air Attack Force    Under Direct        Six Aircraft Carriers     Air
                    Command              AKAGI    ZUIKAKU       Attack
                                         KAGA     HIRYU
                                         SORYU    SHOKAKU

Screening Unit      Com Des Ron 1       One light cruiser       Screen;
                    Rear Adm OMORI,       NAGARA                 cover
                    Sentaro             Nine destroyers
                                          URAKAZE      KASUMI
                                          ISOKAZE      ARARE
                                          TANIKAZE     KAGERO
                                          HAMAKAZE     SHIRANUHI
                                                 AKIGUMO

Support             Com Bat Div 3       Two battleships          Screen;
Force               Rear Adm MIKAWA,      HIEI    KIRISHIMA      support
                    Gunichi             Two heavy cruisers
                                          TONE    CHIKUMA

Patrol              Com Sub Div 2       Three Submarines         Patrol
Unit                Capt. IMAIZUMI        I-19                   ship
                    Kijiro                I-21                   lanes
                                          I-23

Midway              Com Des Div 7       Two destroyers           Attack
Neutralization      Capt. KONISHI,        AKEBONO                air
                                          USHIO                  base on
                                                                 Midway

Supply Force

1 Supply Unit       Captain of          KYOKUTO                  Special
                    KYOKUTO MARU        MARU                     Duty
                                                                 Ship
                                        Five tankers
                                          KENYO MARU
                                          KYOKUTO MARU
                                          KOKUTO MARU
                                          SHINKOKU MARU
                                          AKEBONO MARU

2 Supply Unit       Captain of          Three tankers            Supply
                    TOHO MARU             TOHO MARU
                                          TOEI MARU
                                          NIPPON MARU

Page 404

Pp. 15

(2) Air Strength

(a) Reconnaissance Unit.

 Type                Type         No.       Ships             Duty
                     of          of       on which
                  airplane    airplanes     based

Airplanes for    Type Zero        2        Tone (1)     Reconnaissance
reconnaissance Reconnaissance             Chikuma (1)   of PEARL HARBOR
just before      Seaplanes                              and LAHAINA
the attack                                              Anchorage just
                                                        before the
                                                        attack.

Search            Type 95         4        Hiei (1)     Patrolling
patrol         Reconnaissance             Kirishima (1) waters
planes                                    Tone (1)      around
                                          Chikuma (1)   OAHU

Page 405

Pp. 16

(b) Attack Units

[See page 423, LWJ]

Pp. 17

[See page 423, LWJ]

Page 406

"Sketch of MOVEMENTS OF AIR UNITS AFTER THEY CAME IN SIGHT OF OAHU"

[Not reproduced at this time, LWJ]

Page 407

Pp. 18

25. During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces diverted to attack secondary targets?

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEMBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.

(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two air craft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation.

Pp. 19

26. (NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target.

(1) First Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships.

Reasoning:

(1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more.

Pp. 20

(2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of bombers.

(3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many of them as possible. However, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons:

(a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be unsuccessful.

(b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in PEARL HARBOR requires a special technique.

(c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs abreast each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method against the inside ships.

(b) Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships and aircraft carriers.

Reasoning:

Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concentrated on the battleships.)

(c) Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Air bases.

15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)-Hangars and grounded air planes at FORD Island.

16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)-Hangars and grounded air planes at WHEELER.

Reasoning:

Pp. 22

(1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet temporarily out of action, the attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our

Page 408

main attack units-the horizontal bombing and torpedo bombing units.

(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island.

(d) Fighter Striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit-FORD Island and HICKMAN.

4 Fighter Striking Unit-WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.

6 Fighter Striking Unit-KANEOHE.

Reasoning:

(1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter planes which got into the air.

Pp. 23

(2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.

(2) Second Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Air bases.

6 Attack Unit-Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.

5 Attack Unit-Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEOHE,

FORD Island and BARBERS POINT.

Reasoning:

By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.

(b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers.

Reasoning:

(1) Although the 250-kg bombs which the airplanes were able to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleship, it was estimated that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers of that time.

(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)

(c) Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit-FORD Island and HICKHAM.

Pp. 25

4 Fighter Striking Unit-WHEELER and KANEOHE.

Reasoning:

Same as stated previously.

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets.

Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the carriers to OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.)

The positions of the carrier groups were as follows:

(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

Pp. 28

The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is in the appended sketch.

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.

First Attack Unit.

Dive Bombing Unit

WHEELER Field-0325 hours.

Torpedo Attack Unit

Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage-0327 hours.

Page 409

Horizontal Bombing Unit

Same as above-0235 hours.

Fighter Striking Unit

Began ground strafing-0330 hours.

Second Attack Unit.

All three units-Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter Striking Unit-attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945.

(NOTE: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour).

Pp. 27

d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the carriers? Why were these courses chosen?

A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to the carriers.

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to with drawing on courses designed to deceive possible opposition.

Pp. 29

27. How were midget submarines used.

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)

a. Reasons for use:

To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in the assault by the air forces.

b. How many were used?

Five.

c. Were they expected to return?

While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)

d. Did any return?

None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted.

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon.

Pp. 30

The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to PEARL HARBOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time).

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the day light attack on 8 December; but it was verified that the night attack on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to one or more large war vessels.

Pp. 31

28. Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed for the emergency?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been discarded or modified?

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been modified?

(Replies by FUCHIDA:)

(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have counterattacked.

(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.

Page 410

Pp. 32

(Note: The following replies, Paragraphs 30-38, are based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

30. When did the Task Force begin to form?

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.

31. Where was the rendezvous?

TANKAPPU-WAN.

32. When did the Task Force get underway on its mission?

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November.

33. Was there any provision to receive word of a settlement while this Task Force was underway? What steps would have been taken if a compromise had been reached?

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TANKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.

34. Did everything proceed according to plan?

Yes.

Pp. 33

35. If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen and why?

(No statement.)

36. Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway?

No.

37. Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway?

None.

38. If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been taken?

(No statement.)

Pp. 34

39. Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not followed up by surface units or by a landing?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American task forces were unknown and since the chances of scouting them were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken.

(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without detection.

Pp. 35

(Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

40. What damage did the Japanese receive?

In the First Attack:
   Fighter planes....................................  3
   Dive bombers......................................  1
   Torpedo bombers...................................  5
                                           Total ....  9
In the Second Attack:
   Fighter planes....................................  6
   Dive bombers...................................... 14
                                           Total .... 20

Grand total ......................................... 29

Page 411

41. What was the estimated damage to American forces?

     (1) Naval vessels:
         Sunk: 4 battleships
               1 cruiser
               2 tankers

Pp. 36

        Heavily damaged: 4 battleships
        Lightly damaged: 1 battleship

    (2) Airplanes
        Shot down: Approximately 10 Airplanes.
        Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 200
                                           airplanes
        Total: Approximately 260 airplanes.

It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a considerable number were destroyed in the hangars.

42. How was the damage inflicted on the Americans determined?

(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return.

(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.

(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.)

Pp. 37

48. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the main attack?

(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.)

A part from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance.

Pp. 38

(Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of the attack.)

45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack on PEARL HARBOR?

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.

46a. If there were, where were these submarines based?

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJALEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII.

b. What were their operation orders?

Pp. 39

The orders given to the submarines were as follows: Part were to proceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters by the evening of 7 December, while the midget submarines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR.

At the same time, they were given strict orders not to attack until the Task Force strike had been verified.

c. Were reports made during and after the attack?

When the Task Force and the midget submarine strikes were completed, the midget submarines reported as follows:

(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the of 8 December.

(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack succeeds".

(3) A report on the departure of midget submarines and that it was impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery measures had been tried.

d. What damage was sustained by the submarines?

Pp. 40

One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near the entrance to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the antisubmarine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely.

Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR; the time and place of its sinking are unknown.

Page 412

47. How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian waters?

The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from 8 December, the day of the attack, until early January of the following year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the submarines returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time.

End


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45)GB                               8 NOVEMBER 1945.
Subject. Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl
         Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
    (Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945) GB, and AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75501, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander:

                                             /s/ H. W. ALLEN,
                                                 Colonel, A. G. D.,
                                                 Ass't Adjutant General.
1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.
(Incl. #1)
Doc No. 1668
ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
NOTE: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
PEARL HARBOR QUESTIONNAIRE
26 OCTOBER 1945 The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON'S questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack are contained herein. NOTE. Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira (28 December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were staff officers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and because of the pertinent records have been burned, these answers are based upon the recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty in the Intelligence Department at that time.

14. Sources of intelligence?

Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area, the condition of military installations, the days upon which the fleet moved out of and into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters in which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc., were used as basic intelligence material. This material was collated by the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff and used as the basis for the operation plan.

The primary sources were:
1. Naval attache to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

Page 413


2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.
3. American radio broadcasts (public).
4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU.
5. General information.

15. Characteristics of intelligence?

Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of years.

16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of the air units obtained?

A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.

B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled from the sources listed in "14".

C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force and the air units were determined from information provided by the previously named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to be those upon which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc.

17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was underway?

As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in "14" it was forwarded to the Attack Force.

18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII? None.

19-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same.

Applicable facts not available.

48. What pertinent information was received from merchant ships prior to the attack?

Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on moorages in PEARL HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in the HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation of information mentioned in "14".

EXHIBIT NO. 8-A

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (12 Nov 45) GB                               12 NOVEMBER 1945.
Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl
         Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
    (Attention: A. C. of S., G-2).

1. Reference previous correspondence above file and subject, and in compliance with your radios WX 73711 War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 1941, an additional document is forwarded herewith.

2. This document provides further amplification previously furnished by the Japanese in answer to question 27 and questions 45-47 inclusive of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945 with respect to submarine operations in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack, and which was forwarded on 1 November 1945.

For the Supreme Commander:

                                             /s/ H. W. Allen,
                                                 H. W. ALLEN,
                                                 Colonel, A. G. D.,
                                                 Ass't Adjutant General.
Page 414 1 Incl: Notes of Correspondent. [A newspaper Article Published in the Yomiuri-Hochi, 30 October 1945] [1]
THE EVE OF "PEARL HARBOR"
An early chapter in the History of War Crimes.

December 8, 1941. This is the fatal date when the American People as one resolved themselves to "Remember Pearl Harbor!" But long before this date Japan's submarine offensive on Pearl Harbor were going on and several eery periscopes were feeling out movements of American fleets from the rough sea. The former War Correspondent Hanakata has only now made public his notes taken at that time from direct narrations of the late Captain (then Lt Commander) Katsuji Watanabe of "I No. 69" and the late Rear Admiral (then Captain) Shinki Nakaoka of the 11th Detachment of the 3rd Submarine Fleet.

"The Japanese submarine detachment belonged to the Sixth Fleet, whose flagship was the light cruiser Katori. In early November orders for war preparation were given to this detachment, and on 11 November over ten submarines of the First and 3rd Detachments, including "I" Nos. 69, 74, 75 and others left Yokosuka Naval Base, with knowledge of the growing war fever in Washington and Tokyo.

"The submarine fleet followed a course due east in line ahead, stretching over 20 miles. They navigated at surface speeds of from 12 or 13 to 20 knots. But when they got near the Hawaiian waters they extended and followed their respective courses. The duties of the submarine fleet were known as (a) to feel the movements of American fleets around Pearl Harbor; (b) to dispatch "special submarines" from their decks and to observe their war results; (c) to attack escaping American war vessels, if any; (d) to rescue operators of "special submarines", down fliers and others wherever possible.

"In Hawaiian waters the submarines floated on the sea in the night, and in the day time they submerged to periscope depth. The schedule of Pearl Harbor attack at 0300 on December 8th was transmitted to the submarine fleet two or three days beforehand. On 7th "I No. 74" sighted the carrier Lexington but no trouble ensued.

"The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was carried on as had been scheduled. Before this, five large sized "I" type submarines belonging to the First Submarine Detachment had launched "special submarines" from their decks. That was the departure of the now well known Commander Iwasa and other members of "special attack parties".

"The submarines followed the upheaval in the harbor only through occasional land explosions coming through the deep water, and they confirmed the Harbor Battle at night when they emerged from the bottom of the sea. At 1631 (2101 Hawaiian time) Rear Commander Watanabe of "I No. 69" detected from the periscope a huge fiery column which marked the end of the USS Arizona.

[2]

"Lt. Commander Watanabe's radio intercepted dispatches in relation to this were by the enemy and his "I No. 69" was pursued by enemy destroyers which dropped depth charges madly. Under this circumstance "I No. 69" dived 60 to 70 meters beneath the surface, though her ordinary diving capacity had been set at 30 meters. The submarine sustained damage here and there and finally was caught by submarine wires. She struggled hard and just managed to get away from the wires. Altogether this old submarine remained submerged about 39 hours. All hopes of rescuing fellow-fighters who had been shot down had been abandoned."

The notes from direct narration by Captain Watanabe and Rear Admiral Nakaoka end here. But Mr. Hanakata observes that most of the officers and crews of Japanese submarines, including those participating in the siege of Pearl Harbor, perished at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, the prey of American radio locators. For example, the said Captain Watanabe perished with his submarine in 1943 around the Gilbert Islands. Rear Admiral Nakaoka was promoted to be captain of the crack cruiser Atago but he also was killed in action by enemy bombs on the bridge of that vessel. The Yomiuri-Hochi 30 October 1945.

I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing notes represent a true report of the information given me by the late Captain Watanabe and the late Rear Admiral Nakaoka at the time of interview.

                                                      /s/ M. HANAKATA.

Page 415

EXHIBIT NO. 8-B

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (19 Nov 45) GB                               29 NOVEMBER 1945.
Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl
         Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
    (Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2).

1. Reference our communications of 26 October 1945, 1 November 1945, and 8 November 1945, same file number and subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945 requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains a reconstruction from memory of certain Japanese documents relative to the attack, all originals of which are reported to have been burned at the time of surrender. The reconstructions have been obtained by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy in compliance with question 29 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander:

                                             /s/ H. W. Allen,
                                                 H. W. ALLEN,
                                                 Colonel, A. G. D.,
                                                 Ass't Adjutant General.
1 Incl. Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire. [1] Dec 1976 [sic, LWJ]
ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
NOTE: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-2.
REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
                                                       22 OCTOBER 1945.

Navy Ministry

The answers to Question 29 of Col. MUNSON's questionnaire on the PEARL HARBOR attack, dated 17 October, are contained herein.

29. Copies of the following will be submitted:

1. Operation plan for the PEARL HARBOR attack.

Operational research and other documents related to the attack.

3. Orders relative to carrying out the plan (together with all revisions).

All copies of the above items were burned at the time of the surrender, and as a result no documents are available. The essential points in the orders relative to carrying out the operation are hereby submitted. The information is based on the recollections and inquiries of the following three men:

 Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff.
  Section Orders and Directives
    Rear Admiral TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (then a captain and chief of
      Operation's Section, Naval General Staff).
  Combined Fleet Orders
    Rear Admiral KUROSHIMA, Kameto (then a captain and member of
      Combined Fleet Senior Staff (SHUSEKI SAMBO).)
  Task Force Orders
    Capt FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (then a commander and in command of AKAGI Air
      Unit).

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 1 (essentials).
                                                             5 Nov 41.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. Because it is feared that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary operational preparations.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Page 416

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 (essentials).

                                                               9 Nov 41.
From Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. The Combined Fleet will prepare itself for the possibility that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS may become inevitable in the first part of December. The necessary forces will be sent to the prepared points at a suitable time prior to the beginning of operations.

B. A strict watch against possible surprise attacks will be maintained during these movements.

[3]

C. The operation policy in the event hostilities break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is set forth in the Separate Volume.

NOTE: The part of the operation policy relating to the HAWAII area is recalled as follows:

"At the very beginning of hostilities the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area will be attacked by a force having 1 Air Fleet as its nucleus. An attempt will be made to destroy the American fleet"


Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order (essentials).

                                                            21 Nov. 41.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

A. At the appropriate time the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will order the forces necessary for carrying out the operation to proceed to rendezvous areas.

B. If friendly forces are challenged by American, English or Dutch forces during the operational preparations, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet is authorized to use force in order to protect the friendly forces.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.


Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 5 (essentials).

                                                            21 Nov. 41.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

A. In the event that an agreement is reached in the negotiations between the UNITED STATES and JAPAN the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will immediately order the forces for the operation to return.

B. The use of force mentioned in Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 5 is limited to the following cases:

1. If American, English or Dutch surface forces should proceed into Japanese territorial waters for reconnaissance purposes.

[4]

2. If American, English or Dutch surface forces approach Japanese territorial waters and it is recognized that they are jeopardizing our forces.

3. If aggressive action imperiling our forces is taken by American, English or Dutch surface forces outside territorial waters.


Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9 (essentials).

                                                            1 Dec. 41.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

A. It has been decided that JAPAN will commence hostilities with the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND and the NETHERLANDS in the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will destroy enemy surface and air forces in the ORIENT, and, in the event enemy fleets attack, will intercept and destroy them.

C. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, in co-operation with the Commander in Chief Southern Army, will rapidly attack important American,

Page 417

English and the Dutch bases in the ORIENT, and will occupy and protect them.

D. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will co-operate in the operations of the CHINA area fleet when necessary.

E. The times for starting the movement of forces for the above will be given in a later order.

F. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.


Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 9 (essentials).

                                                            1 Dec. 41.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

The Combined Fleet operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be based upon the Separate Volume- "Imperial Navy's Operation Policy against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS".

[5]

NOTE: As far as can be remembered, the Operation Policy in the Separate Volume was entirely the same as the Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive of 5 November.


Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 12 (essentials).

                                                            2 Dec. 41.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

A. Beginning 8 December, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will start using military power in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9.

B. The use of military force against the NETHERLANDS will be started after moves have been made against the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.


Chief of Naval General Staff Verbal Directive.

                                                            2 Dec. 41.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO (given to him while he was in TOKYO).

It is to be understood beforehand that if an agreement is reached in the negotiations between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES before the use of military power has started, the Combined Fleet forces will be directed by special order to return.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order-(essentials).
                                           Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
                                           7 Nov. 41
                                                     YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
                                                     CinC Combined Fleet
[6]

Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will gather in HITOKAPPU-WAN and remain there to take on supplies until 22 November. Every precaution will be taken to insure secrecy in movements.

NOTE: About the time the above order was issued, a Combined Fleet order (giving directions for carrying out the Operation Policy) based on Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 was also issued. Detailed information as to its contents is not available. (It is thought that it was about the same as Paragraph 1 of Task Force Operation Order 1, which was issued later).

Page 418

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order-(essentials).
                                           Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
                                           22 Nov. 41
                                                     YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
                                                     CinC Combined Fleet

Combined Fleet Order

A. The Task Force will move out from HITOKAPPU-WAN and proceed to the HAWAII area, maintaining the greatest secrecy as to its movements and a close watch against submarine or air attacks. At the opening of hostilities the Task Force will attack the main strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area and inflict crippling damage on it.

The first attack will be at dawn on X-Day (to be given in a later order).

At the conclusion of the air attacks the force will regroup and withdrawn immediately to JAPAN, being prepared at all times to meet enemy counterattacks

B. In the event an agreement is reached in the negotiations with the UNITED STATES, the Task Force will immediately return to JAPAN.

NOTE: In ND No 130 of 11 Oct 45 it was stated that this order was issued 25 November. However, that was an error, and the date of the order has now been corrected to 22 November.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order-(essentials).
                                           Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
                                           25 Nov. 41
                                                     YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
                                                     CinC Combined Fleet
[7]

Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will move out of HITOKAPPU-WAN on 26 November and proceed without being detected to the evening rendezvous point (Lat 40° N, Long 170° W), set for 3 December, where refueling and supply will be carried out as quickly as possibly.

NOTE: In accordance with this order the Task Force moved out of HITOKAPPU WAN at 0600 hours on 26 November.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operation Order-(essentials).

Time of origin: Approximately 1730 hours, 2 Dec 41.

Text: X-Day will be 8 December.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 1 (essentials).
                                           Flagship AKAGI HITOKAPPU-WAN
                                           23 Nov. 41
                                                    NAGUMO, Chuichi
                                                    Task Force Commander

Task Force Order

A. The Task Force will proceed to the HAWAII area, taking every precaution to insure the secrecy of its movements. The force will attack the enemy fleet in the HAWAII area and attempt to cripple it.

The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-Day.

When the attacks have been completed the force will quickly withdraw. Upon returning to JAPAN the force will be re-equipped and supplied and there assigned a task in the Second Phase Operations.

If, while underway, the Force is intercepted by the enemy fleet, encounters a powerful enemy force, or it appears that the enemy is going to attack in order to gain the advantage, the Task Force will attack immediately.

B. Chart (See next page.)

Page 419

"B. The allocation of strength will be shown in the table below."

[This information is provided on page 403 and will not be reproduced here, LWJ]

Page 420

[8]

C. Movements of each force

1. General:

The entire force (except the MIDWAY Neutralization Unit) will leave HITOKAPPU-WAN by special order. The force will proceed to the rendezvous point (Lat 42° N, Long 170° W) in convoy at a speed of from 12 to 14 knots, making every effort to conceal its movements and maintaining a strict watch against submarine and air attacks. Refueling will be carried out at every opportunity en route. When X-Day (the day upon which hostilities will be started) is designated, the force will proceed from the rendezvous point to the point where contact will be made with the enemy (Lat 32° N, Long 157° W).

Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day, the force will proceed due south at high speed (approximately 24 knots), arriving at the point from which the airplanes will be launched (200 nautical miles north of the enemy anchorage) at 0100 hours on X-Day. Air attacks will then be made against the enemy fleet and important air bases on OAHU.

Upon completion of the air attacks, the airplanes will be taken aboard and the force will withdraw. It will proceed west, staying at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY, to the regrouping point (Lat 30° N, Long 165° and from there the western part of the INLAND SEA. It will arrive there about X-15 Day and begin preparations for the Second Phase Operations.

If the air attacks have been a complete success and there is little chance of an enemy counterattack, or if the problems of supply necessitate it, a return course which passes near MIDWAY may be taken. In this event, Car Div 5 and the two ships of Bat Div 3 will be dispatched from the Task Force on the night of X-Day to early in the morning of X-1 Day, and will make an air attack against MIDWAY.

If by some chance a powerful enemy force has cut off the return route, the Task Force will proceed south through the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the MARSHALLS.

If it is anticipated that this fuel supply is insufficient for proceeding to the return route rendezvous point, the Screening Unit will be detached and sent back.

2. Patrol Unit:

The Patrol Unit will accompany the main unit.

If the Screening Unit is detached, the Patrol Unit will be the advance screen for the main unit, and it will be responsible for screening the airplanes, during landings and takeoffs.

After the air attacks the Patrol Unit will screen on the side nearest the enemy; if the enemy attacks, the unit will engage and pursue him utilizing all available strength.

3. MIDWAY Neutralization Unit:

The unit will leave TOKYO Bay about X-6 Day, and after refueling, will proceed to MIDWAY taking every precaution to conceal its movements. It will arrive at MIDWAY on the night of X-Day, attack the air base, and withdraw. After refueling, it will return to the western part of the INLAND SEA.

[9]

The SHIRIYA will accompany the unit and act as the supply ship.

The Supply Force will accompany the main unit to the point there the enemy will be contacted. After refueling the ships there, it will proceed immediately to the regrouping point and wait for the rendezvous to be made arriving there by 0800 hours on X-6 Day. While proceeding to the regrouping point the unit will stay at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY.

D. In the event that the operation is cancelled while the Task Force is under way, the force will return immediately to HITOKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO or MUTSU-KAIWAN.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 3 (essentials).
                                           Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN
                                                               23 Nov 41
                                                         Nagumo, CHUICHI
                                                     Task Force Commander

Task Force Order

The plan for the air attack against HAWAII is as follows:

A. Movements of Air Attack Force.

At 0600 hours on X-1 Day the force will be 700 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z (western tip of LANAI Island). Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day the force will increase its speed to 24 knots, following a 180° course.

Page 421

At 0130 hours on X-Day the First Attack will take off from a point 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z. At 0245 hours the Second Attack Unit will take off from a point 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z.

When all the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit have taken off, the force will withdraw on a northerly course at approximately 24 knots.

It is estimated that the airplanes of the First Attack Unit will return between 0530 hours and 0600 hours and the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit between 0645 hours and 0715 hours.

When the units return preparations will be made immediately for the next attack. Carrier attack planes will be armed with torpedoes.

If the land based air power has been completely knocked out, repeated attacks will be made immediately in order to achieve maximum results. However, if a powerful enemy force is in route to attack subsequent attacks will be directed against it.

B. Organization of air attack units

As shown in Separate Tables.

C. Targets.

1. [a? LWJ]. First attack unit.

[10]

   2 [A? LWJ]. 1 Group (SHUDAN)
     (1) Not more than four battleships and four carriers.
     (2) Order of selection.
         First battleships, then carriers.

  B. 2 Group will attack enemy land based air power as indicated
     below.
    (1) 15 Attack Unit
        FORD Island—hangars and grounded airplanes.
    (2) 16 Attack Unit
        WHEELER Field—hangars and grounded airplanes.
    (3) Fighter Striking Unit
        Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.

 2. Second Attack Unit 2. Group will bomb enemy air bases as
    indicated below.
   (1) 5 Attack Unit
       KANEOHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT—hangars and
       Grounded planes.
   (2) 6 Attack Unit
       HICKHAM Field—hangars and grounded airplanes.

b. 2 Group will have four or five aircraft carriers as its target. If
there are an insufficient number of carriers present, cruisers and
battleships will be attacked in that order.

c. Fighter Striking Unit
   Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes. 

D. Outline of attack procedure.

   1. First Attack Unit.
   2. Surprise will be the basis of the attack. 1 Group Torpedo Bombing
      Unit will attack first; 1 Group Horizontal Bombing Unit next, and 2
      Group last.

b. The Fighter Striking Unit will, as a single formation at the beginning
come in over the target area at about the same time as 1 Group. Its main
function will be to eliminate opposition from enemy fighters.

If no opposition is encountered in the air, the unit will switch to the
following strafing assignments against grounded airplanes.

(1). 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units
     Ford and HICKHAM
(2). 3 and 4 Fighter Striking Units
     WHEELER and BARBERS POINT
(3). 5 and 6 Fighter Striking Units
     KANEOHE  

C. In the event that the enemy has maintained strict lookouts and opposition is strong, the units will attack in the following order, with only a slight time interval between attacks.

(1) Fighter Striking Unit

(2) Ship Bombing Unit

(3) Horizontal Bombing Unit

(4) Torpedo Bombing Unit

2. Second Attack Unit.

The entire unit will attack at about the same time.

The Fighter Striking Unit will follow the outline of movements given for the Fighter Striking Unit of the First Attack Unit. However, if no opposition is

Page 422

encountered in the air, strafing will be carried out as follows: 2. 1 and 2 Fighter striking Units.

FORD AND HICKAM

b. 2 and 4 Fighter Striking Units.

WHEELER and KANEOHE

[11]

3. Outline for attack in CASE most of the carriers and battleships are anchored outside of PEARL HARBOR.

2. The organization, targets, etc will be the same as that set forth in the previous section. However, 1 Group of the First attack Unit will increase its use of torpedo planes.

b. Each air attack unit will first hit the fleet and then OAHU, maintaining its formation as a single group and striking under air cover of the Fighter Striking units.

However, if the attacks against the fleet anchorage proceed smoothly, the forces which didn't participate in those attacks will move on immediately to OAHU, while the units which participated will return to their ships.

4. Regrouping and returning:

a. The regrouping point following the attack will be 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from the western tip (KAENA POINT) of OAHU. The airplanes will rendezvous at an altitude of 1,000 m (if clouds are present at about that altitude the rendezvous will be made below them).

b. The attack units will wait at the regrouping points for about 30 minutes. After making the rendezvous with the fighter striking units they will return to their ships.

e. The fighter striking units will cover the return of the main attack units and intercept any enemy pursuit.

E. Reconnaissance:

1. Reconnaissance before the attack.

No special reconnaissance will be made.

2. Reconnaissance just before the attack.

The two reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will be launched at 0030 hours on X-day. Without being detected they will reconnoiter the PEARL HARBOR and LAHAINA anchorages, and report whether or not the enemy fleet (particularly carriers and battleships) is at these anchorages.

3. Scouting and search.

The reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will be launched about 0300. They will search over as wide an area as possible between the Task Force and the enemy and along the channels on the east and west sides of OAHU. They will report the presence of enemy surface force moving out to attack and its movements, the presence of counter-attacking enemy airplanes and their movements, etc.

4 Following the attack, if conditions permit, one element of the fighter planes (will be designated by the commanding officer of the fighter units) will conduct a high-speed, low altitude reconnaissance of the damage done to ships and airplanes.

F. Air Patrol:

From 1 hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset on the day of attack, Air Patrol Readiness Disposition 1, Plan B will be used.

Page 423

"Separate Table"

[This is a conflation of the data from Pp. 16-17 and the information given at this point, LWJ]

FIRST ATTACK UNIT
  Comdr. FUCHIDA
    189 Aircraft

1 Group (SHUDAN)
  Comdr. FUCHIDA
    Type 97 Carrier Bombers (90 total)
      Horizontal bombing attack
        One No. 80, Mark 5 Bomb
          (800 kg. armor-piercing.)
          Target: battleships

  1 Attack Unit                     2 Attack Unit
    Comdr. FUCHIDA                    Lt. Comdr HASHIGUCHI
      15 Aircraft                         15 Aircraft

  3 Attack Unit                     4 Attack Unit
    Lt. ABE                           Lt. Comdr KUSUMI
      10 Aircraft                         10 Aircraft

          Special Attack Unit
           Lt. Comdr. MURATA
             12 Aircraft
               Torpedo bombing attack
                 One Type-91 Aerial Torpedo.
                (800 kg.)
                  Target: battleships, aircraft carriers

  1 Special Attack Unit             2 Special Attack Unit
    Lt. Comdr. MURATA                 Lt. KITAJIMA
      12 Aircraft                         12 Aircraft

  3 Special Attack Unit             4 Special Attack Unit
    Lt. NAGAI                         Lt. MATSUMURA
       8 Aircraft                          8 Aircraft

2 Group
  Lt. Comdr. TAKAHASHI
    Type 99 Carrier Bombers (54 total)
      Dive bombing attack
        One No. 25 Land Bomb (250 kg.)
          Target: Air Bases: FORD Island, WHEELER

  15 Special Attack Unit             16 Special Attack Unit
    Lt. Comdr. TAKAHASHI               Lt. SAKAMOTO
      27 Aircraft                          27 Aircraft

3 Group
  Lt. Comdr. ITAYA
    Type ZERO Carrier Fighters (45 total)
      Air Control and Strafing Attack
        Two 20-mm. Mgs.
        Two 7.7-mm. Mgs.
          Target: 1. Airborne airplanes
                  2. Strafing of grounded airplanes:
                     FORD Island
                     HICKHAM
                     WHEELER
                     BARBERS POINT
                     KANEOHE

  1 Fighter Striking Unit            2 Fighter Striking Unit
    Lt. Comdr. ITAYA                   Lt. SHIGA
        9 Aircraft                         9 Aircraft

  3 Fighter Striking Unit            4 Fighter Striking Unit
    Lt. SUGANAMI                       Lt. OKAJIMA
        9 Aircraft                         6 Aircraft

  5 Fighter Striking Unit            6 Fighter Striking Unit
    Lt. SATO                           Lt. KANEKO
        6 Aircraft                         6 Aircraft

SECOND ATTACK UNIT
  Lt. Comdr. SHIMAZAKI
    171 Aircraft

1 Group
  Lt. Comdr. SHIMAZAKI
    Type 97 Carrier Bombers (90 total)
      Horizontal bombing attack
        One No. 25, Land Bomb (250 kg.)
        Six No. 6, Ordinary Bombs (60 kg.)
          Target: Air Bases:
                  HICKHAM
                  KANEOHE
                  FORD Island
                  BARBERS POINT

  6 Attack Unit                     5 Attack Unit
      Comdr. SHIMAZAKI                  Lt. Comdr ICHIHARA
        27 Aircraft                       27 Aircraft

2 Group
  Lt. Comdr. EGUSA
    Type 99 Carrier Bombers (81 total)
      Dive bombing attack
        One No. 25 Land Bomb (250 kg.)
          Target: Aircraft carriers, cruisers

  13 Special Attack Unit             14 Special Attack Unit
    Lt. Comdr. EGUSA                   Lt. KOBAYASHI
      18 Aircraft                        18 Aircraft

  11 Special Attack Unit             12 Special Attack Unit
     Lt. Comdr. CHIHAYA                Lt. MAKINO
       18 Aircraft                       27 Aircraft

3 Group
  Lt. SHINDO
    Type ZERO Carrier Fighters (36 total)
      Air Control and Strafing Attack
        Two 20-mm. Mgs.
        Two 7.7-mm. Mgs.
          Target: 1. Airborne airplanes
                  2. Strafing of grounded airplanes:
                     HICKHAM
                     FORD Island
                     WHEELER
                     KANEOHE

  1 Fighter Striking Unit            2 Fighter Striking Unit
    Lt. SHINDO                         Lt. NIKAIDO
        9 Aircraft                         9 Aircraft

  3 Fighter Striking Unit            4 Fighter Striking Unit
    Lt. IIDA                           Lt. NONO
        9 Aircraft                         6 Aircraft

[Pp. 17 added here.]

(c) Combat Air Patrol

Patrols    Type of      Number of        Ship on         Type of
           Airplane     Airplanes        Which Based     Patrol

Patrol 1                   18            AKAGI  -9       Direct air
           Type Zero                     KAGA   -9       escort

Patrol 2    Carrier        18            SORYU  -9       Airplanes ready
                                         HIRYU  -9       on flight deck
            Fighter
Patrol 3                   18            ZUIKAKU-9       Airplanes ready
                                         SHOKAKU-9       on hangar deck
                                                      (fueled and armed)
                   Total   54

Notes:

1. Direct air escort was carried out from an hour before sunrise until
45 minutes after sunset.

2. The patrols alternated every two hours.

Page 424

EXHIBIT NO. 8-C

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
AG 350.05 (4 Dec 46)GB                               4 DECEMBER 1945.
Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl
         Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
    (Attention Assistants Chief of Staff, G-2)

1. Reference previous correspondence same file number and subject and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains data in amplification of the original Japanese answer to question 14 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945. A copy of this questionnaire was forwarded as Inclosure No. 4 to our communication of 26 October 1945, and the original Japanese answer to question 14 thereof was included in inclosure to our communication of 8 November 1945.

3. This report completes the series of partial reports obtained through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, which series collectively provide all data available from known Japanese sources on subjects listed in your radio WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1940. However, should additional data come to light incident to future investigations of Japanese conduct of the war, same will be promptly forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander:

                                                /S/ E. D. Law, Jr.
                                                    E. D. LAW, Jr.
                                                       Major, AGD,
                                                         Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[1]

3643 B

N. D. 406

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by Colonel MUNSON, G-2.

17 NOVEMBER 1945.

To: Colonel F. P. MUNSON

From: Rear Admiral NAKAMURA

Answers with reference to a letter to Rear Admiral Nakamura from Colonel Munson dated 10 November 1945

1. In the report sent by the HONOLULU consul-general to the Foreign Ministry, anything concerning the Navy was reported to the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff by that Ministry. These reports, it is recollected, were gradually increased in number as the relations between AMERICA and JAPAN became more tense.

The above reports by the consul-general were chiefly items concerning the general political and economic situation in HAWAII and the UNITED STATES as seen from HAWAII, items concerning the Japanese living in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, and partly items concerning military matters. Thus, although there were things going on in HAWAII, as was reported at that time such as concentration of American fleet units in the PEARL HARBOR area and the considerable hastening of expansion of military installations in the HAWAIIAN area, to which great attention was attracted as compared with reports by diplomatic establishments located in other areas, it is recalled that there was nothing which required special surveillance as far as the data for an attack on the UNITED STATES fleet in HAWAII were concerned.

(Since the staff officer connected with the documents reporting the above facts has died and the various records have been burned, the foregoing is the conjecture of commander TACHIBANA, Tomo who worked in the same department at that time.)

The Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff was having a most [2] difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the Ameri-

Page 425

can fleet in the HAWAIIAN area. Owing to this, the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff had been for years compiling material by carefully collecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from Naval officers at WASHINGTON, newspapers and magazines published in AMERICA, American radio broadcasts, signal intelligence, passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, other foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms, and the like.

The foregoing statistical method of estimation had been in use for a considerable length of time. Publications with information on important moorings within PEARL HARBOR had already been compiled.

Furthermore, if we were to go into the facts mentioned above more minutely and if two or three examples which made a relatively strong impression were given, they would appear as follows:

A. American radio broadcasts 5 December 194i (or 6 December 1941) (American time).

The UNITED STATES broadcast of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in PEARL HARBOR was overheard.

B. Signal intelligence.

According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the UNITED STATES fleet anchored in PEARL HARBOR or out on training was deduced. Again by combining the flying time (judged according to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on training missions, and the location of UNITED STATES fleet units as seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, the training areas of the UNITED STATES fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of airplane patrols at HAWAII were deduced in the same way

C. Newspapers and magazines published in the UNITED STATES

Material was obtained for deduction of AMERICA'S war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of warships and airplanes, army strength at HAWAII, PANAMA, PHILIPPINES and other places, etc.

D. Observation submarines

With an observation submarine operating at a lessening distance outside the Islands, the sphere of observation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS was gradually made smaller (It reached outside Of PEARL HARBOR on 6 December—American time). Thus, the ships out at sea, ships at LAHAINA, the airplane patrols, etc., were ascertained.

The above submarine, while out at sea, did not discover an American fleet at sea or at LAHAINA, but met aircraft carriers and patrol planes.

II. The gist of ". . . and other general intelligence" contained in the last items of the answer with reference to question No. 14, dated 17 October, was the reports for foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms in [3] foreign countries, etc., to the Foreign Ministry, the main store of the commercial firm, etc., chiefly on the general political and economic situation (some military matters included) of the country where the establishment or firm was located. These reports were not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to have a special write-up, and were considered on their own merits.

EXHIBIT NO. 8-D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
AG 350.05 (13 Dec 46)GB                               13 DECEMBER 1945.
Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl
         Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
    (Attention Assistants Chief of Staff, G-2)

1. Reference Par 3 of our communication, same file number and subject dated 4 December 1945, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl

Page 426

Harbor on 7 December 1941, copies of three (3) interrogations of Japanese Navy and Civil Officers are forwarded herewith.

2. These interrogations, obtained by Naval sources, are believed to provide further amplification of data previously forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander:

                                                /S/ E. D. Law, Jr.
                                                    E. D. LAW, Jr.
                                                       Major, AGD,
                                                         Asst. Adj. Gen.

3 Incls:

Incl 1—Interrogation Capt. Genda.

Incl 2—Interrogation Mr. Kase.

Incl 3—Interrogation Mr. Tanomogi.

[1]

[Copy]

NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION
Date: 28 Nov. 1945.                                   Place: FLTLOSCAP
Interrogation No. 10

Subject: Pearl Harbor Attack.

Personnel Interrogated: Captain Minoru Genda, Air Operations officer on staff of Admiral Nagumo during attack on Pearl Harbor. He was with Admiral Nagumo aboard his Flagship Akagi. Captain Genda was given the responsibility of planning the attack.

Interrogators: Captain Robinson and Captain Payton Harrison, USNR.

Interpreter: Douglas Wada.

Summary:

The idea of the surprise attack originated with Admiral Yamamoto during a conversation with Admiral Omishi of the 11th Carrier Division about February 1, 1941. Captain Genda was present at this meeting and remembers Yamamoto saying, "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed." After some further discussion Yamamoto directed Onishi to draw up a plan for a surprise attack. Captain Genda was later called in by Onishi to draw up broad outlines for such a plan and determine its feasibility and possibility of success.

About September 1st map games were begun at the War College in Tokyo, to test the plan on the game board and work out all details connected therewith. The following Naval officers were the only ones who had knowledge of the plan and who worked on it at the War College at this time; Admirals Yamamoto, Ugiki, Naguno, Yamagushi, Okusaka; Captains Onishi, Genda, Kuroshima; Commanders Sasaki, Ono, following members of the Navy General staff: Admiral Fukudome, Captains Sanagi and Tonioka, Commander Miyo.

On about November 15th Admiral Yamamoto finally approved the plan and gave it to Admiral Naguno with orders covering the manner of its final execution. On November 22nd the striking force rendezvoused at Etorofu and departed on its mission at 0600 hours Nov 26th. A speed of from 12 to 14 knots was maintained and the Task Force fueled at sea whenever the weather permitted, in order to keep full tanks. The weather was stormy and refueling difficult. It was, however, because of the weather conditions prevailing in this part of the Pacific at this time of year that the northern route was chosen. They didn't expect to meet any shipping, and fog and stormy weather would impair visibility conditions anyway. Twice after departure information was received from Naval General Headquarters in Tokyo giving the dispositions of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. The second despatch on this subject was received three days before the attack, or December 5th.

[2]

The green light to execute the attack was sent by Admiral Yamamoto from his Flagship the Yamato on December 2nd. The message was "NIITA KAYAMA NOBORE" and means climb mount NIITAKA. This was the code phrase meaning "proceed with attack". There was an additional part to the message specifying X-Day as December 8th at the time this message was received, the striking force was near the 180th meridian at latitude 42.

Page 427

In the early morning of December 7th the Force was 700 miles north of Lanai at which time it turned south and commenced the dash in at a speed of 26 knots.

The following was the composition of the striking force:

6 Carriers with Akagi Flagship of Admiral Naguno.
2 Battleships; Hiei and Kiroshima.
2 Heavy Cruisers, Tone and Chikuma.
9 Destroyers with light cruiser Abukuma as flagship.
3 Submarines; I-19, I-21, and I-23.

Following is the number and type of planes used in the attack:

Fighters ..........................  81
Dive bombers ...................... 145
Horizontal bombers ................ 104
Torpedo planes ....................  40
Total ............................. 370

Of the fighters, 39 were kept around the Carriers as intercepters, in case the U. S. planes got in the air and made an attack. They went out in two waves about one half hour apart. At time of launching position of striking force was about 200 miles north of western tip of Lanai.

Several planes were sent early which got over Pearl about daylight and reported that the Fleet was in.

Surprise was expected, but if the U. S. Forces were on the alert and the attacked discovered, all attacking planes were to drive home the attack regardless.

A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, Staff Communication officer. Admiral Naguno and his staff felt that they could sense from these broadcasts whether or not the Forces on Oahu had an inkling of the impending attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by these broadcasts. Since KGU and KGMB were going along in their normal manner, Nagumo felt that our forces were still oblivious to developments.

For several days prior to the attack the Jap Force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They had not broken the code, but they had been able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the number of our patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the south western sector from Oahu.

[3]

The three submarines were placed in a line 100 miles ahead of the carriers for the final dash southward. Surface speed of these submarines was 23 knots. If they sighted any planes or shipping they were to submerge, get clear and radio the striking force as soon as it was safe to surface.

Everything went off according to plan. Total Japanese losses were 29 planes.

[1]

(Incl 2)

NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION

Interrogation No. 9.

Subject: Information received by Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Japanese Consul General in Honolulu.

Personnel Interrogated: Mr. Toshikazu Kase, in charge of North American Section of Foreign Office at time of attack on Pearl Harbor. Undergrad work Amherst; graduate study at Harvard in international law, and relations 1928. Member of Foreign Office since late 1940. Became Chief of Section 1 (dealing with North America, i. e. U. S. and Canada) in October 1941. Held this post for about a year.

Where Interrogated: Office of the Fleet Liaison Officer with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Interrogator: Captain Peyton HARRISON, USNR.

Interpretor: Lt. (jg) S. E. SPRAGUE.

Summary:

Mr. Kase Stated that he was personally acquainted with Mr. Kita, former Consul-General in Hawaii. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor Mr. Kita sent

Page 428

messages to the foreign office every few days informing it of the presence of units of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Although the Foreign Office received these wires, they paid little attention to them. Instead, they passed them right along to the Navy Ministry. Mr. Kase believes that all these despatches have been destroyed. At the time of receipt these despatches were not considered of any significance by the foreign office, but were considered just a matter of routine. However, "in the light of after events", Mr. Kase "can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance". The foreign office was very busy with its negotiations with accredited representatives in Washington, and matters concerning the whereabouts and activities of the U. S. Fleet were not a matter of interest. Mr. Kase was busy sending despatches to Nomura and Kurusu and trying to improve the tense situation. The Navy department was not cognizant of these messages being sent to the foreign office representatives in Washington. The foreign ministry deliberately kept things from the Navy Department and vice versa. "Every Ministry had its own secrets". Mr. Kase had no recollection of the presence of a certain Mr. Morimura who arrived at the Consul-General Office Honolulu, in the spring of 1941. Mr. Kase "could not speak with authority" on the question as to whether or not Mr. Morimura could have been sent by the war or Navy Departments with special and secret instructions to Consul-General Kita.

[2]

Q. What instructions were given Mr. Kita, Japanese consul at Honolulu, regarding transmission of information about U. S. fleet or military installations in Hawaii?

A. I don't recall any specific instructions he had. He may have had general instructions to be followed in case of disturbances because of the presence in Hawaii of many "hyphenated" citizens. After I became Chief of Section in October 1941 I don't recall any specific instructions being given him.

Q. We know that Kita sent messages to Japan before the outbreak of war concerning the U. S. Fleet. To whom were messages sent? Did you see them?

A. They came through the Foreign Office and I saw them, perhaps without knowing their significance. As far as I am aware, the Foreign Office gave him no specific instructions about sending such information. He made reports as a routine matter. Messages were addressed to the Foreign Minister.

Q. Those messages sent about the whereabouts of the U. S. Fleet, are any copies of these messages now in the Foreign Office?

A. No, I don't think so. When I left my section, I take it for granted my section had these telegrams. There were two successors to me since I left my office. Department buildings were destroyed in May. I doubt if copies of messages are there.

Q. Did Kita state every two or three days what ships were in Pearl Harbor?

A. I remember there were a few telegrams of that sort. I would put them aside. We were more interested in the course of negotiations. At that time we were intensely absorbed in negotiations proper between Tokyo and Washington. Such affairs as Kita's telegrams did not get much of our attention.

Q. Who was most interested in these telegrams?

A I suppose the Navy Minister.

Q. Who would know whether such telegrams are available?

A. The chances are they have all been destroyed, don't you think so? Very short telegrams usually, not even occupying a full page. These telegrams, were not considered important at all from our point of view. Very likely they have been burned. The Foreign Office served as a channel—we just had a look at them. We thought they were just matters of routine. In the light of afterevents, I can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance. But we did not know at the time.

Q. Do you recall any trouble Kudo got into involving shipment of scrap iron?

A. No. I don't recall him.

Q. Interrogator recounted l'affaire Kudo and its expose in newspapers.

A. Rather crude practice, wasn't it? I don't like to impugn his honor, but I don't think Mr. Kudo is one of our career men. I don't think that was done with knowledge of the Foreign Office.

Q. Boxes were addressed to Foreign Office in Tokyo.

A. Oh?

Q. Can you find out where Mr. Kudo is?

A. We can find out for you. I shall have his whereabouts found out.

Page 429

[3]

Q. You say you were absorbed in negotiations at the time. You were sending despatches to Nomura?

A. Yes, we were primarily interested in that. I was engaged in clerical work Of the negotiations.

Q. Did Navy Ministry have knowledge of these despatches?

A. No, I don't think so. Some were kept secret from Navy Department. Every ministry has its own official secrets. The majority of telegrams were not given to the fighting services. They were not in a position to request that just as we were not in a position to request their despatches. The gist of negotiations and their progress were sometimes discussed at Joint conferences.

Q. We know Kita was sending telegrams. Who would have given him such instruction?

A. I don't know who would have given him such instructions.

Q. Couldn't someone in Navy Department have given him instructions without your knowing it? Wouldn't that have been possible?

A. (Hesitation.) It might have been possible. But not through Foreign Office by telegram. Every telegram to Kita had to pass through Foreign Office and be approved. I don't recall any specific instructions transmitted to Kita through Foreign Office.

Q. In the spring of 1941, Mr. Morimura arrived in Honolulu to assist Mr. Kita. Do you know Mr. Morimura?

A. I was not aware of his existence. I became Chief of Section in October 1941 and was deeply absorbed in the Tokyo-Washington negotiations. I really did not have time to learn about minor officials in all the consulates.

Q. Well, who would know of his existence and his work? Whose place did you take?

A. Mr. Yuki, who accompanied Mr. Kurusu to Washington. I don't know exactly how long he was there before me. He is now councilor of embassy at Bangkok.

(At some point about here interrogator described Morimura's activities.)

Q. Would it have been possible for the Navy Department to send Mr. Morimura to Honolulu?

A. I don't know. I can't speak with any authority. That was before my time.

Q. Who was Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister?

A. Togo was Foreign Minister and Nishi was Vice Minister. They assumed office in October 1941.

Q. Would it have been possible for Morimura to have had instructions from Navy Department to give to Kita?

A. I'm not qualified to answer that question. I don't know anything about this affair. I can't even say whether it was possible.

         Minister—Togo
Vice Foreign Minister—Nishi
_____________|_______________________________
                                            |
                                            |
                               Director American Affairs
                                       (Yamamoto)
                           _________________|_____________
                           |                |            |
                        Section 1       Section 2     Section 3
                    (North America ) (So. America) (Passports, etc.)


This HTML document was created by GT_HTML 6.0d 01/11/97 4:48 PM.