The Coming Winter in Europe


By ROY F. HENDRICKSON, Deputy Director General, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

Delivered at Food Forum meeting, Chicago, Illinois, June 26, 1945

Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XI, pp. 612-616.

THE coming winter in Europe will witness the most difficult food shortages of modern times. There will be few islands of relative plenty; for most areas it will be a period of serious scarcity. Extensive restoration of inland transportation, badly shattered by the effects of war, would be a major ameliorating factor. The second mitigating factor will be the extent to which the rest of the world is willing and able to provide food which can be shipped into Europe.

Tonight I propose to discuss the situation as it appears to exist now, the progress being made, the dilemmas presented by decisions which must be made if real assistance is to be provided, and the consequences of half-hearted steps to meet the situation.

A glance at the war maps of last September and the positions of the armies through the months of winter and spring climaxed by Hitler's collapse in May, shows that a vast area of Europe was over-run by active warfare during that period. Among the significant by-products of this activity was serious interference with harvests last fall, with autumn plantings of cereals, and with tillage and spring plantings in many areas. It follows—taking into account also the absence of fertilizers on most soils for several years, and the loss of draft animals—that this year's harvest in Europe will be far below normal despite heroic efforts on the part of its people.

Centuries of cultivation in Europe have depleted soil fertility which in most areas required frequent replenishment, especially with chemical fertilizer. This has been impossible for several years to any considerable extent, except for potash in some central European areas. Shipments of phosphates, mostly from North Africa, have been negligible because of war conditions and shipping shortages. Many countries went without nitrates except for the use of minor reserves for three to five years.

As a consequence, productivity is down even in such areas as were able to maintain a substantial production of animal draft power—and there are few if any areas which escaped military demands either on the part of their own armies or those of the enemy. The loss of tractors was very heavy, with relatively small replacements made during the war and with other machines immobilized by lack of fuel or repair parts.

Crop estimates are relatively unreliable at this time, but in the case of cereals it is unlikely that Europe will achieve much better than a half crop this year. Dairy production, while it may recover greatly in 18 months, cannot recover rapidly enough to affect the picture next winter very substantially, because the oilseeds that furnish protein supplements in dairy rations and other fodder are not available to the extent necessary to meet more than a small percentage of the need. Meat production will be low with emphasis laid as far as possible on restoring breeding herds and flocks. Sugar production too will be far below normal. Vegetable and potato production has the best prospect of making a contribution to the over-winter food supply. But even the production of these will be affected by the fertilizer and transport shortage.

While the production picture may mean that certain limited areas, rich in soil and other resources, may have fair yields and a good outlook, the overall situation, the total output, will be far below need—and Europe has normally for many years been a big importer of food.

The second overall factor affecting the available food supply will be distribution. The physical aspects of distribution present a dark picture. First of all, the damage to railroads, the heavy losses of rolling stock, mean that a heavier-than-normal load is thrown on other forms of transportation—which means on trucks, primarily. And the shortage of trucks, of tires, of repair parts, and of fuel—unless a trend of greater success in making up the deficit in coming months develops than has been possible since liberation thus far—will mean that what amounts to an exportable surplus in one area cannot be moved into deficit areas.

Not only were physical communications, including telephones and telegraphs often reduced to little or no effectiveness, but the administrative organizations of the governments have been greatly harmed. To no single group did the Germans devote more of their attention than to the civil servants, that is the government officials, and to the police of the countries they occupied. Without an adequate number of such experienced officers, any government does its work slowly, or in some cases not at all. The tools of effective work are lacking. When you find a cabinet of 27 members having only nine jeeps among them, you have not only a reduction in efficiency of these important officials, but you have the makings of a cabinet crisis.

Deficit areas do not mean cities alone. There are vast areas which have long had a population load far greater than their land resources, even in times when per-acre productivity was high. The transport shortage will also affect the ability to move inland and distribute properly the goods from abroad. But inland transport shortages should not deter a substantial effort to bring goods in from the outside.

There are other aspects of distribution which cannot be remedied rapidly. Under German occupation black markets flourished. Those who patriotically resisted the Germans tried hard to avoid, despite extreme military regimentation, yielding up their produce when levies were made on them. They felt it was loyal, and certainly profitable—though often risky—to contribute to the operations of the black market rather than to donate to the enemy.

New or liberated governments cannot quickly set up the necessary machinery, staffed from a population deeply cut in numbers and more deeply cut in skill by war. To meetthe objective of equitable distribution becomes very nearly impossible when it involves meeting the demand with a supply half as large as the demand. It is not necessary to meet needs 100 percent, or to the point of saturation; no one really expects that. But even the best regulatory machinery with the best disciplined population behind it is not likely to achieve great success in distributing evenly a supply smaller by 25 to 50 percent than the demand, especially in the case of most foods. In the case of one product—meat—you need not go far from where we are sitting to find support for that statement.

When the occupation was at its peak, the Germans were able to supplement their food supplies in many ways. In the first place, many of the millions of people they had brought as slaves into Germany proper were used to keep the German farm plant at top production. Germany was able to call upon Bulgaria and Rumania for upwards of a million tons of food annually, and to obtain vast quantities from France, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and for a time from the Ukraine of the Soviet Union. The occupied areas were severely rationed, with few exceptions. As little as possible was thrown to food deficit areas—especially Belgium, Greece and Norway.

As much emphasis as possible must be laid not only on meeting the crisis which is faced next winter but on taking all possible steps to insure that 1946 shall bring forth as bountiful a harvest as Europe can provide for itself. The first program then must envisage supplying fertilizers which need to be applied this fall and winter, providing farm tools, including tractors and draft animals where they can be used effectively, and having seed on hand in ample time to allow for some slowness in distribution. Meantime the need for doing everything possible to restore inland transportation, especially through the provision of trucks and repairs for those now incapacitated, should be made not only to assist in insuring next year's harvest but to distribute effectively the limited harvest of this year.

What has been done to date? Some of the nations of Europe are financing their own imported relief supplies, either through the use of foreign exchange they possessed from before the occupation or with credit plus some assistance from friendly neighbors. Norway is an instance of this. Two nations require only limited assistance from abroad, Denmark and Rumania. The Danes do require fertilizer, some machinery, and are anxious to import oilseeds and fodder once again so as to restore their livestock production, especially dairy output. The Netherlands, Belgium and France require very substantial quantities of food, which to a large extent they are financing from their own resources. The Soviet Union is reported to be making every effort to restore her production. Italy is being assisted by the Allied Commission, with hopes that the relatively productive Po Valley will aid materially in overcoming in part the deficit position of Italy from Rome south, which has normally required substantial imports from outside. Germany is being dealt with by the military forces with responsibility for zones divided between the Soviet Union, the British, the French and the United States. Bulgaria is reported to be having a drought, but no clear picture is available as to whether it will need outside assistance. In Austria it is likely that considerable outside assistance will be required, with the military again having responsibility.

To meet the needs of those countries with insufficient means to finance imports of supplies needed from abroad, the United Nations created UNRRA and subscribed contributions to carry out a program of assistance. In Europe thus far on their application, Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania,

Czechoslovakia and Poland have been found to be entitled to assistance. All of them suffered greatly under the occupation of the Germans and their needs are substantial.

In the case of Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, upon their liberation from the Germans, the Combined Military of the U. S., the U. K., and Canada provided relief assistance while the area was still considered to be important from the standpoint of military operations.

UNRRA began providing relief goods to Greece starting April 1, 1945, taking over responsibility for imported supplies from the military at that time. In the case of Yugoslavia, UNRRA began its responsibility April 15. In both cases it agreed to purchase goods then in the military pipeline supplementing as soon as ships and supplies made it possible. As of July, only goods which UNRRA has procured will be available. In Albania, the period of military responsibility will end shortly with UNRRA assuming a supply responsibility within the next month.

In the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, there was no similar period of military responsibility. UNRRA began supplying foodstuffs and other relief and rehabilitation goods as soon as possible, but it had to be and continues to be on a far smaller schedule than need for the following reasons: The course of the war did not provide easy access to either of these countries. Thus far the only means of sending supplies has been through a single port, Constanta in Rumania. This port suffered war damage and it is limited in its capacity to handle cargo. We loaded two boat loads in March, four more in April, four in May and during the month of June we are loading nine. In July, to this same port we hope to send eleven boat loads. Only a small portion of June and July shipments will be foodstuffs because of the high priority at this time which must be given to fertilizers, trucks, raw cotton and wool, and farm implements. It is hoped that the ports of Danzig and Gydnia, though mined and seriously damaged, will be in working condition soon. It is hoped also that the port of Trieste may soon be available to receive goods not only for Yugoslavia but for Czechoslovakia, The port of Hamburg in Germany through which large quantities of goods moved to Czechoslovakia in pre-war days is not yet available.

The capacity to receive goods in substantial volume in 80 far as port handling facilities are concerned rose most rapidly in the countries being assisted by UNRRA in the case of Greece. On my recent visit there I saw the damage done to the great Greek port of Piraeus, where virtually all cargo handling facilities had been destroyed. The Germans had systematically dynamited the great power cranes, and in the case of elevators and mills their demolition experts had, with some economy, put the dynamite charges in just the right places in the foundations to make the structures worthless for a long period ahead. But large boats can now move into the ports with ample working space and the Greeks have supplied ample manpower to do an expeditious job of unloading.

In the case of Yugoslavia, the early assistance provided by the military was severely limited because only two ports were first available, Split and Dubrovnik; and both had limited usage because dredging could not be continued during the war. As a result the Liberty freighters, which carry most UNRRA cargo, have to be partly off-loaded in Italy and then sent on, traveling light with about half cargoes into those ports. From a very small port receiving capacity in March, Yugoslavia's ports have moved steadily ahead in their capacity to receive cargo, and this can be expanded when Trieste is available. It is hoped that other ports will shortly be swept of mines and made available too.

The Danube River, a highly important artery feedingEastern Europe including Yugoslavia, should gradually provide assistance too, but there is a shortage of barges and tugs. When I was in Yugoslavia, I found a group of officials who were bringing together information on points where barges had been sunk and a program for reclaiming them. But that is not fast work when a country is short of almost everything, including tools. In Yugoslavia I was told that out of some 2300 locomotives which had been operating there before the war, only nine were in operating condition when the Germans left. In late March, some 270 others had been restored to working condition. But there are few cars for them to pull and not many stretches of more than 100 miles of rail that could be utilized until temporary bridges could be restored. Railroad transportation all the way between Trieste and Belgrade is now reported to be available.

In Albania I visited the small, but principal port, Durazzo. It lies at the foot of a high hill on which stood one of King Zog's several palaces, a palace which incidentally is now a convalescent home for wounded or sick soldiers.

Again the Germans systematically destroyed the port which had been built up over many years of painstaking effort. The Germans in charge of the demolition went over, with local authorities, the installations to be destroyed making a careful record of them and saying that settlement would be made later. At least this will be one claim before the reparations authorities which should be fully documented. Eveary wharf and every crane, the concrete abutments and breakwaters, were put out of condition. Only one dock—an old wooden one with rotten piling—capable of handling about 30 tons a day, was intact. From Durazzo to the capital, Tirana, some 18 bridges had been put out of commission, but the Albanians had succeeded in building temporary bridges across all the streams and chasms.

For the next few months, until the end of November, the indigenous supply of food raised by the Europeans through their own efforts should be most in evidence. It is from December until the first results from the 1946 harvest are available that the most severe pinch will come. Nations being assisted by UNRRA and all others will therefore be more dependent on imported foods to be shipped during the fall for storing and in later months for immediate consumption than they are even at the present time.

Great emphasis is now being laid on inland transport supplies, on agricultural rehabilitation materials, on raw cotton and raw wool to restore the productivity of textile mills and provide cloth for winter wear, and on tools and similar equipment. But despite this, food is already the biggest single item in the UNRRA shipping program and proportionate to the shipping made available must increase as a percentage of the total loadings for marry months to come.

For the second half of 1945 in metric tons, the minimum import requirements of food for nations to be assisted by UNRRA (including a small child-feeding program that averages 16,000 tons a month for Italy under a special provision authorized by the UNRRA Council) will be 2,423,000 tons. Of this supply, more than one-half or 1,259,000 tons will be grain and gram products. Even if we assume that less than 2,423,000 tons of food will be shipped the last six months of the year, food will still constitute more than one-half of 3,895,000 tons of supplies which we should send to countries requiring UNRRA's assistance during that period. In terms of dollars, the cost of the overall program would be about $750,000,000, which when shipping charges are added increases to a total cost of about $913,000,000.

The food needs for the period July through December include these: dairy products, 132,000 tons; meat, 168,000 tons, nearly half of which is fatbacks; fish, 87,000 tons; edible fats and oils, 154,000 tons; oilseeds, 122,000 tons; dried beans and dried peas, 102,000 tons; sugar, 69,000 tons; inedible fats and oils, 4,000 tons; soap, 40,000 tons, oil equivalent; animal feeds, 211,000 tons.

While the United States must be called upon for the largest share, very substantial quantities are being requested and obtained in Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba and other Latin-American countries, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, South Africa and others. We depend for our allocations upon the Combined Food authorities of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada to assign UNRRA its sources of supply. UNRRA depends upon the United Maritime authority which includes in addition to the United States and the United Kingdom, Norway, France, the Netherlands and other nations, for shipping. European countries financing imported food and other supplies and shipping with their own resources go to the same allocating authorities.

It has long been axiomatic to those who have studied the effects of war upon supplies that the end of a war increases rather than decreases the demand. UNRRA is hopeful that the period during which it must provide assistance—serving as an arranger between the nations of good will and the nations in need—will be short. But it is foolish to be so optimistic as to believe that these nations can recover quickly from the effects of long years of occupation and plundering. It is not possible for these countries, practically without foreign exchange, to restore quickly their former export position so that they can in effect trade surplus goods for foods and other items they must import although every effort must be made in that direction.

How well prepared are the nations of good will to meet the deficit during the coming year?

It has been a long and difficult war in which marked expansion in food production has taken place in the U.K., the U. S., Canada and many other areas. The demands of the military forces are not dropping away fast. In addition to troops, there still are large numbers of prisoners of war, and in zones of military occupation the military has a responsibility for civilian supply. The brightest spot is in cereals, but cereals cannot do the whole job of meeting the food deficit.

It is evidence that the deficits, as at the outset of the war, are in the fields of proteins and fat. Meat is short, and dairy products in terms of quantities apparently available to liberated areas, appear to be equally short; fish is also short.

I said "available to liberated areas." This availability has to be determined by the people and the governments of the supplying areas—it cannot be determined by the liberated areas. To make foods available to liberated areas will require sacrifices as well as a generous spirit motivated by humanitarianism. But it will also require an appreciation on the part of governments and people that starvation or near starvation in European countries will mean disease, unrest and a threat to securing the foundations of a durable peace.

The American people are not without an appreciation of the facts, and their attitude, judging by Mr. Gallup's most recent poll, shows on the part of the great majority of people a true realization of the situation.

To the question: "Do you think many people in Europe will starve this year unless we send them food 70 per cent replied in the affirmative, 23 percent in the negative. It is hard to find where the last group found ground for this optimism. To the question: "Do you think there is enough food in this country to keep Europeans from starving and still not reduce the amount people eat here?", 56 percent replied "no," while 35 per cent replied "yes."

Eighty-five percent replied "yes" to the question: "Wouldyou be willing to continue to put up with present shortages of butter, sugar, meat, and other rationed food products in order to give food to people who need it in Europe?"

Mr. Gallup's fourth question was: "If necessary, would you and your family be willing to eat about one-fifth less than you and your family are now eating in order to send more food to Europe?" Seventy percent replied in the affirmative, only 23 percent replied in the negative, and 7 per cent had no opinion.

All of this indicates a realistic appreciation of the situation, a most generous spirit of helpfulness and sacrifice, and a determination to support the official position of the United States Government.

The share that the supplying nations can provide will of course depend not only on the attitude of the people and their governments but upon the fortunes of the crops this year, and it is always dangerous to divide up a crop which isn't made.

Now what is the attitude of the peoples of the countries in need? There is no categorical answer to this but there are some factors which we should not quickly overlook. These people met the forces of the German attack first, and without any really significant exceptions they fought bravely. Even after they were defeated and their lands occupied, their resistance continued. They heard over their radios from their allies that the most patriotic measures they could take would be to resist the enemy fiercely, to harass him, to be uncooperative, to sacrifice their resources and their lives if necessary. In turn they were told obliquely and directly that their sacrifices would not be in vain, that when liberation came there would be stocks of supplies in the hands of supplying nations ready to be moved in to assist them. There must have been some scepticism, but the evidence of their bravery and their sacrifices indicates that scepticism was scant indeed.

As allies, they do not have the role of beggars. Their nationalism, driven underground for some years, has emerged and it is an asset to build upon and not a liability, just as the desire and the determination of those nations with foreign exchange resources to do everything possible for themselves is an asset of character and independence which is one of the truly impressive assets of the post war period.

The supplies to be brought in from the outside will with the sole exception of Greece represent only a relatively small fraction of the total food they will have. Their indigenous supplies, while inadequate, will be the base of their programs. The outside help that will be so hard to obtain will be supplemental to indigenous supplies which in the face of great difficulties they will attempt to utilize effectively and equitably.

They are not going to quote chapter and verse of the promises made to them by official spokesman during the war period, but they are likely to ask some questions which in the interest of amity among allies will require straight answers. They are going to be concerned first of all with the distribution of supplies among the allies as compared with those who have been recent enemies of the allies.

They are going to ask if enemy prisoners of war and recent enemy civilians deserve a better fate in terms of food during the winter of 1945-46 than those who fought the good fight against an enemy whose ruthlessness is matched only by that of the Japanese.

They are going to ask if their own governments are making fully clear and understandable their plight and if they don't get an answer that suits them, they may want to change their governments; and that can lead to further chaos, too. They are going to ask whether the principle of sharing alike, which they were told was a principle to be followed in fighting the Germans, is not also a proper principle during the emergency immediately following liberation.

And there are other questions which they will ask, which will have a bearing upon postwar trade, postwar good will, and the duration of the peace*

How long must assistance be provided to Europe? It is too early to supply a reasonably accurate forecast. This does not depend alone upon the rate of the restoration of European food production and upon its effective distribution by means of the restoration of inland transport. It also depends upon these factors;

1. The rate at which effective, efficient government can be restored.

2. The rate at which transport and industrial production in Europe can be restored, which in turn depends upon the output of coal, steel plants, the forests, and industry generally.

3. It depends too upon the rate at which effective instrumentalities are established in the outside world for providing credit and for supporting and stabilizing currency.

When I was in Greece, although it had then been liberated only a matter of six months it was using its second currency established during that time. Inflation was proceeding rapidly and one of the principal answers to that problem centered about providing enough supplies, particularly food, transport, and raw materials for industry. During June we are shipping from the United States enough raw cotton to feed the small cotton textile industry of Greece for approximately six months. The output will stay in Greece, which is about as short of clothing and shoes as it is of food—and the shortage of food can be demonstrated most quickly by the fact that the diet during March did not average 1600 calories per person in Greece. That is about 50 percent of the calory intake of the average American in 1944.

As rapidly as normal trade—trade other than relief goods—is restored, UNRRA assistance can be reduced; but normal trade does not restore itself without appropriate credit or other foreign exchange arrangements. These simply are not in sight for some months to come in the case of any of the countries now being assisted by UNRRA which are the countries poorest by far in foreign exchange resources.

At a later stage comes assistance for China, which has fought a ruthless aggressor for a very long time and which has suffered painfully. She will need help promptly and on a substantial basis as her vast territory is liberated, district by district. In dealing with her problem one advantage appears which does not seem to exist in connection with Europe in relief.

Military food surpluses so far as Europe is concerned are a myth. The needs of the military during deployment, the needs of their prisoners of war and of areas under military occupation, will continue to make the military requirements large in Europe for some time to come. Instead of yielding up food supplies which can be used in a substantial degree to alleviate European distress, military stockpiles will go for military needs. There will be some equipment—we hope there will be a goodly number of trucks—but actual progress to date in the release of surpluses has been inconsiderable even in these categories. The needs for vast armies to carry on the struggle in the Southern Pacific and the Far East are such that military demands show no sign of any rapid cut-back, despite the many optimistic forecasts that seemed to radiate in the late summer and early fall of 1944. Pipe-dreams they proved to be in the case of food—pipe-dreams which lured many to the belief that V-E Day, whichthey then saw just ahead, would magically change the needs for food even though history provided no evidence for such a dangerous conclusion. In the case of China, however, with Japan crushed, substantial demobilization of armies should become possible and some surpluses become available. Even so, however, such army surpluses of food are not likely to be great. Far more important from a food standpoint for China is the prospect that liberation will open the way towards the utilization of productive areas of the Far East, itself—particularly in rice, oilseeds and, we hope, sugar, where the Japanese-occupied areas of the world normally account for well over 90 percent of the world rice supply. Gradually these rice producing areas will be liberated and some stocks for the succor of China, as well as for other Far Eastern areas so greatly dependent upon this food, should become available, with equitable distribution of this supply a pressing need for at least two years after Chinese liberation.

In the case of both Europe and China, UNRRA will emphasize plain, staple foods. These, not highly processed foods, will dominate the picture. But children especially, and adults too, cannot live on bread alone. I met a man in Greece who claimed that he and his family lived on raisins for two years, with the exception of some vegetables during the summertime. It was, as one can well imagine, not a very happy experience.

I also met many people there who had been forced to live on bread alone for many months at a time. Many Europeans, Eastern Europeans particularly, have always consumed very large quantities of bread, but it produces a problem of malnutrition if this diet cannot be supplemented by other more concentrated foods which yield a better balance to the diet as a whole.

The solo bread diet is a challenge to man's powers of indigestion—you can't take in enough in three meals a day to meet bodily needs, even when one is relatively inactive physically. I found it a common sight in Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Italy for working people—truck drivers, streetcar operators, chambermaids—as well as adults and children in the stores, to reach into their pockets and pull out a chunk of bread. They would take a large bite and go on chewing. These in-between meals are necessary because the solo bread eaters require many extra eating periods to get necessary nourishment even when physical activity is moderate. Meat, milk products, and fats were very scarce. Any casual examination of a normal diet in this country will show how importantly they figure in the calory makeup of our diets.

The principal supplying countries are finding it difficult to provide either the supplies or the shipping necessary to carry out the program which appears essential to provide a decent level of assistance to the liberated countries. In the face of evidence that the people of supplying countries have a realistic appreciation of the facts and a desire to help generously, their governments appear to doubt whether further sacrifices will be accepted. We have found increasing doubt and hesitation on the part of the officials responsible for allocating and procuring for UNRRA the foods the peoples of the liberated areas definitely need.

For example, UNRRA could not obtain from the United States any cheese, dried eggs or margarine, and obtained only small quantities against its request for sugar, canned fish, dry skim and condensed milk for the second quarter of 1945, UNRRA's request for about 4,000 tons of canned pork from the United States for the second quarter of 1945 is expected to result in procurement of only 175 tons for this period, The request for over 31,000 tons of lard from the United States to fill UNRRA's requirements for the first half of 1945 resulted in procurement of only 6,000 tons in this period.

Where we asked for 12,500 tons of evaporated milk for the third quarter of 1945 for the small children of areas being assisted by UNRRA, indications are that we will be allocated not more than 5,670 tons; out of 14,000 tons of condensed milk which we requested for the same period, the allocation appears to be 1,134 tons. Out of 45,000 tons of refined sugar requested from the world supply, as in the case of evaporated and condensed milk, indications are that for the third quarter of 1945 we will get only the 20,000 tons we have bought in Cuba. And it has been indicated to us that we will get even less in the fourth quarter.

Perhaps it will require a considerable time for the very complex machinery of allocation and procurement to adjust to the demands resulting from liberation—but time runs out rapidly when the problem is as urgent and dangerous as the problem of shortages this coming winter.

I have drawn a picture of what the situation will be this coming winter unless we get some of the protective foods, such as some milk for the small children, nursing mothers and invalids, substantial quantities of fats and some small quantities of meats and other animal proteins. But these will not do the job alone because inland transport is needed first to utilize the production in Europe, and secondly, to move the imported foods inland. Some additional trucks will be required to make up for destruction to the railroads. There are hundreds of thousands of trucks in the European area now. A small fraction of that number released by the military forces can practically solve that problem for the winter.

Unless the inland transport and food problems are attacked resolutely, suffering will be intense; and the effects on the people physically and psychologically, will be severe, with results that will take much from the contribution to the peace which the great military victory promised to make possible.

The most difficult problem appears to be to convert the good will, desire and realistic appreciation of millions of people, anxious to help the peoples of liberated areas, into effective expression—the kind of expression that delivers the goods.