[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
July 30, 1941
Purple
#609.
Re my #608[a].
Today
I knew from the hard looks on their faces that they meant business and I could
see that if we do not answer to suit them that they are going to take some
drastic steps.
During
my first conversation with Roosevelt after I took office the President,
referring to the Panay incident, said that at the time he cooperated with the
Secretary of State and succeeded in restraining popular opinion but that in
case such a thing happened a second time, it would probably be quite impossible
to again calm the storm. The latest incident brought all this back to me and I
can see just how gravely they are regarding it. Think of it! Popular demand for
the freezing of Japanese funds was subsiding and now this had to happen. I must
tell you it certainly occurred at an inopportune moment.
Things
being as they are, need I point out to you gentlemen that in my opinion it is
necessary to take without one moment's hesitation some appeasement measures.
Please wire me back at the earliest possible moment.
[a] See S.I.S. #20331 (J. D.-1: 4149): Welles summons Nomura and demands
explanation of Tutuila bombing immediately.
Army 20423 Trans. 8/2/41 (2)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)