JULY 30, 1941. 
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: German-Japanese Relations.

I. Discussion.

1. The American Ambassador to Japan in a telegram to the Secretary of Stare dated July 23, 1941, points to a trend in Japanese public and private opinion indicating that Japan is no longer a happy partner in the Tripartite Agreement. He states that there has been a gradual weakening over a considerable period of time of the ties binding Japan to the Axis Powers. He further states a feeling he has had for some time that if the Germans ran true to form they would sooner or later overshoot their mark in Japan, and that the proud and sensitive Japanese people would eventually realize the fundamental contempt and scarcely concealed arrogance of the Germans for the Yellow Race.

2. According to the Ambassador there is a growing feeling among many Japanese that Japan is being treated as a satellite, if not as a dependent, a feeling

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which has been developing as the result of the increasing influx of Nazi officials (including members of the Gestapo) into Tokyo, the efforts of these officials to exercise a controlling influence in matters of domestic concern and in many aspects of Japanese life, and the constant interference by the German Ambassador in trying to regiment Japanese newspapers along Axis lines.

3. The Ambassador remarks that as usual, the Germans have overshot their mark.

4. The Ambassador reported in a telegram to the State Department dated July 27, 1941, that Former Foreign Minister Matsuoka informed the Turkish Ambassador that he had cabled Ribbentrop 48 hours in advance of the Nazi attack on the Soviet asking if there were any truth in reports of such an attack and Ribbentrop replied with a categorical denial.

5. Our Minister to Thailand in a telegram to the Secretary of State dated July 26, 1941, reported that the Prime Minister had informed him that Lt. Col. Scholl, German Military Attache, had called and warned him (the Prime Minister) against "going too far" with Japan, "because", said the German Attache "you cannot trust Japan". The German Attache stated further that "Germany will settle with Japan after she has won the war in Europe."

6. In view of the conditions depicted above, the time appears ripe for the judicious use of information which will have as its aim the dissolution of the Tripartite Agreement. Any action on our part which will make Japan an even more reluctant Axis partner weakens our potential enemies, enhances our own prestige and authority and materially and favorably affects our national defense.

II. Recommendation.

That the Secretary of War confer with the Secretary of State with a view to placing the information contained in paragraph 5 above in the hands of the Japanese Ambassador.

                                                SHERMAN MILES
                                         Brigadier General U. S. Army
                                   Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
   Secretary of War
   Chief of Staff
   War Plans Division 
   General Embick 
   Asst. Sec. of War