[Secret]
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 August 1941.
(Purple) (CA)
#447 (In 2 parts, complete).
1.
The Imperial Government is trying to give its attention to the all important
matter of Japanese-U. S. relations. This is not an easy task, for there are numerous
obstacles involving domestic politics.
According
to the various reports you have submitted on the subject the President and the
Secretary of State are displaying considerable understanding in their attitudes
towards Japan. You imply that they view the situation cool headedly, regardless
of the trend of general public opinion.
On
our side, however, there are quite a few persons who vigorously insist that the
U. S. economic pressure on Japan is being daily in creased in intensity. For
example, the newspaper Yomiuri carried dispatch from ------ on the 2nd, in
which it was reported that the President of the United States had either
ordered the complete suspension of, or curtail to the extreme, all exports of
petroleum products. As a result of this order, the dispatch continued, even
those exports for which permits had already been issued, had to be cancelled.
Regardless
of whether there was any truth in the report or not and regardless of the extent
of the alleged curtailment, such reports give the antagonists a strong talking
point. This is a situation which causes us no end of anxiety
2.
If it is believed by any that our people and country can be threatened into
submission by the so-called strengthened encirclement policy or by the
application of economic pressure, it is a mistaken notion. As a matter of fact
it is erroneous to the extreme as should be obvious to any who understands our
national characteristics.
If
such a policy as the above is adopted, we cannot guarantee that the trend will
not be in directly the opposite direction from our goal of an improved U.
S.-Japanese relationship. One should be able to see this clearly from the
example set forth above.
3.
We are convinced that we have reached the most important, and at the same time
the most critical, moment of Japanese-U. S. relations. It was at a time like
this that the Imperial Government voluntarily agreed to temporarily cease the
bombing of Chungking and its suburban area. This should clearly indicate
Japan's sincerity, considerateness, and restraint toward the United States.
If
an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan, as two
equal powers on the Pacific, is sincerely desired, the points which will most
effectively bring about such improvements must be given unbiased and cool
consideration.
For
the purpose of preventing the possibility of letting anyone, either within or
out of the country, be under the impression that the negotiations were
conducted under the threat of economic pressure, all measures which may be
construed as being economic pressure should be abandoned at once. That we shall
reciprocate in kind was made clear in the recent statement issued by the
Minister of Finance.
4.
Based on the general plan outlined by the last Cabinet, the Imperial Government
proposes a plan, set forth in my separate message #448*, to improve Japanese-U.
S. relations. This last plan was drawn up as a reply to the plan suggested by
the President on the 24th, and is being submitted only after the respective
positions of the United States and Japan as they affect the other, were given
thorough consideration.
Will
Your Excellency make an effort to clearly impress this point on the President
and the Secretary of State and at the same time draw their attention to the
graveness of this matter.
5.
In form, the proposal which is being forwarded herewith, is a reply to the
President's plan of the 24th. Our real motive, however, is to incorporate its
provisions into the final agreement. With this instrument, we hope to resume
the Japanese-U. S. negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in
the delivery of our revised proposals of 14 July and because of our occupation
of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime. Since that is our
intention, please relay the matter contained in my separate message #448*
without delay.
*JD-1: 4326.
20615
JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-6-41 (S-TT)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)