AUGUST 20, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Chinese Resistance.
1. General Chu, Chinese Military Attaché, called on me today at his request to discuss the general situation. He was evidently worried because China was not specifically mentioned in all the discussion with regard to the conference between The President and the British Prime Minister. He seemed to feel that China is being forgotten for the moment. I told him of course that China is and will remain a pivotal point in the war, and that although not specifically mentioned in regard to the conference, the situation in the Far East, including China, was undoubtedly carefully considered.
2. General Chu then pointed out that much has recently been said about halting Japanese aggression both to the south and to the north, but nothing specific on stopping Japanese aggression in China proper. He went on to point out the possibility of Japan concentrating all of her efforts on crushing Chinese resistance
if she considers herself stopped by the Anglo-American front from further aggression to the south and to the north. He said, rather pointedly, "You know we cannot hold out indefinitely." I pointed out to him that the present emphasis on aid to Russia was probably due to Anglo-American belief that the Russian crisis was an immediate one, a question of holding her in the war for the next six weeks until winter comes to her relief. Chinese resistance on the other hand would not appear to present so pressing a time factor, considering the long period of four years in which they have successfully withstood Japanese pressure. General Chu admitted this, and in answer to my questions as to the duration of Chinese resistance he said that undoubtedly the situation would hold throughout this calendar year. I pointed out to him that Japanese's present extension of her forces both in the north and in the south precluded the possibility of her concentrating her efforts against the Chinese at this time. He admitted this, but stated that he believed Japan must continue her aggressive policy, and that it was possible for her to regroup her forces against China if she were barred from the north and the south. He said that he feared that the Anglo-American policy of holding Japan in the north and the south might force her into a last desperate effort to overcome Chinese resistance. In his opinion Japan cannot stop, and in all questions of major policy the Japanese Government must bow to the decision of its military forces. He cited the Chinese proverb, "He who rides on the tiger must go where the tiger goes."
3. General Chu professed to have little information on the Russian situation, but said that what he had was encouraging. He thought the outstanding thing was that Russia had successfully taken the first shock of war. He remarked that the first few months of the Sino-Japanese war were by far the hardest, and after that the Chinese had settled down to a long resistance.
4. General Chu's visit undoubtedly indicates what we have had from other sources-that the Chinese here, and presumably also in Chungking, fear that they are being left out of the big picture, that we may not be firm in our present stand vis-a-vis Japan, and that aid to China may become more difficult in the future.
5. This Division believes that considerable morale aid might be given to China in the form of public statements emanating from high officials of the Government on our deep interest in Chinese resistance and our policy of aiding it. An official announcement of the forthcoming dispatch of a military mission to China is suggested. It is realized however that such morale aid would have to be considered in the light of its effect on the critical relations now existing between Japan and the United States.
/s/ Sherman Miles
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Secretary of War ONI
Assistant Secretary of War Mr. Currie
Chief of Staff General Magruder
War Plans Division
(EXHIBITS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, PHA, PT. 14, EXHIBIT NO. 33 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT)