September 30, 1941
#614 (Part 1 of 3.)
Re your #865 [a].
1. As you say, so long as they do not send us any reply we should presenting them with various written suggestions. I am entirely in agreement with you.
2. I, too, in the beginning was in a hurry to draw up a plan and hurry along the negotiations, that is why on the 14th of July I sent you some instructions, but since you never presented the American officials with them, and in the light of subsequent events, in order to finally evolve a comprehensive settlement, on September 4 I brought forth a proposal. I incorporated this proposal in my #595 [b] and did my best to harmonize it with the American proposal. There are no changes to be made in the substance of it and if the Americans so desire I think we might negotiate on the basis thereof.
3. My views on certain points which you mention in your message as follows. In case they question you please answer accordingly:
1. The reason why I left out the expression, "As there is no real objection we will make no northward invasion", in part 2 of your message is that if we were to insert this into the body of the text it might only give them the suspicion that we have direct designs against the Soviet. This whole matter, after all, concerns the China incident and the South Seas question. There is no particular problem in the north. In the preface to the clause concerning the stability of the Pacific area this matter is fully included so I am willing to leave it up to the leaders on both sides and if necessary to clarify this in the minutes. In my proposal of the 4th I made it plain that there was no objection to this statement.
Army 22870 Trans. 9/30/41 (S)
[a] Not available.
[b] See S. I. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a
proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.
September 30, 1941
#614 (Part 2 of 3)
2. The first clause relating to the attitude of both Governments toward the European war is all right as it stands so far as I am concerned. Since we say "when the proper time comes" I am sure that this will cover their misgivings.
3. Concerning the second clause of the same article, as you say, they may have something more to say. We will merely wait for them to broach the subject and if necessary not be loathe to consider it again.
4. The part concerning the adjustment of the China incident.
a. We do not mean by the first clause that this is the joint responsibility of the Japanese and the American Governments. All along the United States has insisted that a settlement of the China trouble has a great bearing on the stability of the Pacific. That is why we went so far as to say that both Governments "will endeavor to bring about etc." We do not mean to discuss this in detail but if they oppose it as it stands we are ready to change it or leave it out.
b. We have been looking forward with expectancy from the beginning to American mediation and so we are not making any new requests such as you mentioned.
c. The insertion of the phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" is merely in accordance with the three principles laid down by KONOYE and there is no special meaning to it. Please explain this to them.
d. There is no objection to requesting that President ROOSEVELT mediate.
Army 22871 Trans. 9/30/41 (S)
September 30, 1941
#614 (Part 3 of 3.)
e. When we come to the question of non-discrimination in economic activities in China, I want you to make it clear to them so that they will not entertain any misgivings that this principle should not apply merely between Japan and China but also to third countries. Advise them, furthermore, that the principle that neighbors naturally have intimate relations is practiced throughout the whole world and is by no means a new theory.
5. The clause concerning commerce between the two countries in my #595 [a] coincides in meaning with the American proposal. Only in the meantime the freezing order has taken place and subsequent developments have modified the situation. We only hope that conditions will soon be ameliorated. Once they eliminate this order we will have no objection to their proposal on this subject.
6. a. Concerning the stipulations about the political stability of the Pacific, the stipulations in the American proposal are pet principles of Secretary HULL and the United States sets great store by them. They are merely general stipulations, therefore, we will not be loathe to reconsider them.
b. I transferred the matters concerning the military evacuation of French Indo-China and the settlement of the Chinese incident to the clause concerning the establishment of peace in the Pacific. This will make the clause more harmonious and expand its significance. That is all I meant by this action. If they don't like it, however, we will put it back like it was.
If the Americans present you with an aide memoiré today, without any delay, wire it on to me. I am ready and eager to make a translation of it. If possible, before you send it, send me a brief summary.
Army 22872 Trans. 9/30/41 (S)
[a] See S.I.S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)